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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, A(AG)
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96308

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15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of XXIV Corps Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS - CSFOR - 65 (U)

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1. (C) Section 1 Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. Organization.

   (1) Effective 16 Feb 69 with publication of XXIV Corps GO 373, 23 Apr 69, 1st Bn, 83d Artillery (8"/175) and 2d Bn, 138th Artillery (155SP), previously assigned to XXIV Corps, were attached to XXIV Corps Artillery.

   (2) On 7 Mar 69, Battery B, 8th Bn, 4th Artillery, previously under OPCON of HQ, III Marine Amphibious Force in Southern I Corps Tactical Zone, was returned to XXIV Corps control. Official change of status occurred at 071600H Mar 69. The battery was initially positioned at Dong Ha.

   (3) On 20 Apr 69, 5th 155 Gun Btry (FMF), under OPCON of 108th Artillery Group, was officially redesignated 5th 175 Gun Btry (FMF). No change in status was made. Cross training of USMC personnel in matters of maintenance, prescribed load list, fire direction, and firing battery operations was accomplished prior to January 1969 by 108th Artillery Group using Army 175mm guns. All six USMC 175mm guns were operational on 20 April. No change was made in the two 8" self-propelled howitzers sections included in the battery or in the organizational structure of the unit.

   (4) On 13 April, Btry B, 2d Bn, 94th Artillery changed tubes from 175mm to 8" completing a transition of the battalion to all 8" howitzers. The battery was moved south to the 101st Airborne Division area of operations.

   b. Significant Activities.

   1. Unit Actions. The 101st Airborne Division, 3d Marine Division (Reinforced), and 1st ARVN Division continued search and destroy, cordon and search, reconnaissance in force (RIF), rice denial and pacification support operations during the reporting period. The enemy's post Tet offensive...
began 23 February with increased activity, attacks on military and population centers, and more aggressive actions in the Area of Operations. In general, enemy activities caused no significant changes in US or ARVN plans and operations. XXIV Corps Artillery participated in combat operations 89 days during the reporting period.

(a) 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile). Operations in progress at the beginning of the reporting period included: OHIO RAPIDS, a joint probe and reconnaissance in force south and west of Base Area 101 by 3d Bde, terminated 28 February; PLATTE CANYON, an air/overland assault and fire base construction operation into the Ruong Ruong Valley (area of operations extension into Quang Nam Province) by 1st Bde, in progress on 1 February and terminated 5 February 69; SHERMAN PEAK, a probe and RIF south of Bastogne (YD6109) and Veghel (YD5503) by 2d Bde, terminated 9 February 69.

Other operations during the reporting period included: SPOKANE RAPIDS, a RIF operation in Base Area 114 by 1st Bde, 20 February to 3 March; MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER, an air assault, RIF, search and destroy operation in the southern A Shau Valley and adjoining terrain to the south and east, by 2d Bde, started 1 March and is still in progress; BRISTOL BOOTS, a land assault by 1st Bde into the Ruong Ruong Valley (Area of Operations extension into Quang Nam province) started 25 April and is still in progress. All major operations were conducted jointly with ARVN units. BRISTOL BOOTS was preceded by a series of cover and deception artillery raids using divisional units plus Bty B, 2d Bn, 138th Artillery, Btry C, 2d Bn, 138th Artillery, Btry B, 1st Bn, 83d Artillery and Btry C, 1st Bn, 83d Artillery. The raids consisted of moves into forward positions in the vicinity of Quick II (YC8999) by self-propelled units with concurrent hasty air lift occupation of forward bases by division 105mm units. Firing was done on a scheduled basis following which the units were extracted. The pattern was repeated to accustom the enemy to expect the raids without follow-up maneuver force assaults. The division began a program of constructing an extensive series of mutually supporting fire bases throughout the area of operation. Ten and two thousand pound "daisy cutter" bombs were frequently used. The purpose of the program is to permit rapid deployment of artillery and maneuver forces anywhere in the area of operation without the time consuming effort required to construct cleared bases.

Corps artillery units supported division operations from Hill 88 (AUB000), Tomahawk (ZD1101), Roy (ZDO503), Anzie (YD9307), Quick I (YD9003), Quick II (Y08999), Jeannie (YD5539), Gia Le (YD8315), Phu Bai (YD8813), Bastogne (YD6109), Panther II, (YD7911), Boyd (YD7413), Birmingham (YD7010), Blaze (YD5302), Thor (Y06683), Evans (YD5332), Nancy (YD4339), Sally (YD6427), Hank (Y09188), Fist (YC8884), T-Bone (YD6320), Jack (YD4928), Beach (AT8798), and Cannon (YD4703). In general, artillery operations in the division area of operations became increasingly dispersed during the reporting period. This was due to the completion of the roads into the Ruong Ruong Valley and from Bastogne to Blaze. Continued expansion is

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Forecast as the road into the A Shau Valley is completed, Btry L, 1st BN, 83d Artillery was able to move 6 km beyond Blaze toward the A Shau Valley into new FSB Cannon at the end of the reporting period.

(b) 3d Marine Division (Reinforced). Operations in progress at the beginning of the reporting period included: DIJAY CANYON by Task Force Hotel in the northern A Shau-southern Da Krong Valley area, terminated 18 March 69, supported by Btry C, 1st BN, 83d Artillery from Jack (YD1028) with a liaison team from the battery at FSB Cunningham (YD1813); LITTLE MOUNTAIN by 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in the coastal plain from Cua Viet south to the province boundary and inland to include Base Area 101, terminated 20 February 69; DIJAY RIVER by 9th Marines in the area south of Highway 9, terminated 28 February 69; SCOTTSDALE II by 1st BN in the area north of Highway 9, terminated 28 February 69; KENTUCKY by 3d Artillery and 2d LAVN BN in the northeast corner of the area of operations, terminated in mid-February. Also in mid-February the 2d BN, 3d Marines, 3d BN, 3d Marines, four batteries of 2d BN, 12th Marines and 2d Provisional Battery returned from operation TAYLOR CANYON in 1st Marine Division area of operations. The 3d Marines then started DIJAY RIVER WEST, in the west central part of the 3d Marine Division area of operations, ending the operation in late February. In late February, the three Marine 155mm Provisional Batteries were all reorganized as howitzer batteries and one battery each was placed under OPCON of the direct support battalions. Other operations during the reporting period included: JUMBLE MARTIN by 1st Marines (-) in the NW corner of the area of operations, started 23 February and still in progress at the end of the reporting period; ELLIS RAVINE by elements of 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and 2d LAVN Regiment, traversing the Da Krong Valley from Go Lu east, 6-15 April 69; KENTUCKY by 3d Artillery and 2d LAVN Regiment in the eastern DI area, 23 March - 3 April 69; HOWIN CRASH by two battalions of 3d Marines under Task Force Hotel, in the upper Da Krong Valley area, started 15 March and still in progress at the end of the period. On 10 March, Btry C, 1st BN, 10th Artillery was committed in support of Task Force Ramagen, under Task Force Hotel, for a fast moving RIF operation in the area from Kho Sonh west to the Leotian border, and south to the limits of the Vietnamese armistice. Maneuver elements were from 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The operation was unusual in that the battery moved with the armored infantry forces throughout the operation, establishing temporary firing positions wherever required. Details of the artillery part of the operation are covered in the operational report of 1st BN, 10th Artillery. The unit took moderately heavy casualties in several attacks by NVN units.

Corps Artillery units supported 3d Marine Division (Reinforced) operations from 42 (YD2174), 14 (YD170), C1 (YD2167), C2 (YD1364), Elliot Combat Base (YD2804), Dong Ha (YD2259), Nancy (YD1339), Vandegrift Combat Base (X2013), Cates (YD9213), Jack (YD2180), Snapper (X2034), Seagon (X2027), and many temporary positions occupied during operations with Task Force Ramagen. Btry C, 1st BN, 10th Artillery provided supporting fires to the Nui Loc
Special Forces Team from 12-16 March. The USMC 105mm L/56 Battery, 1st Armored Amphibious Bn, in support of Task Force Clearwater, permanently departed the division area of operations on 28 April. Btry C, 1st Bn, 40th Artillery returned to Dong Ha on 29 April, when Task Force Harmon was disbanded, in preparation for assuming the role of providing fire support for Task Force Clearwater (Cua Viet), on 1 May.

(c) 1st AOT Division. All major US operations in the 101st Airborne Division area of operations and many US operations in the 3d Marine Division area of operations were joint operations with 1st AOT Division forces. With one minor exception, throughout the entire reporting period, 1st AOT Division artillery units were deployed as full batteries in roles consistent with US artillery principles. 2d AOT Regiment maintained an area of operations generally bordered by the IS 15 grid line-highway 9-South China Sea-HZ. AOT artillery units in this area supported the 2d AOT Regiment, with Corps Artillery units providing reinforcing fire support. 5th LAVI Regiment maintained its area of operations in the Vinh Loo and Phu Yen coastal plain districts, conducting operations in support of the pacification and rice denial programs. 3d AOT Regiment sustained its mission of security for Hue and KIF operations in its area of operations east of Hue. 1st AOT Division Artillery units were deployed on many fire bases in the area of operations, including Sabre (YD6918), Pistol (YD6090), Sun (YD5401), Barbara (YD3323), Geronimo (YD6920), Whip (YD5988), Mener (YD6339), Hdi Lai (YD1617), 12 (YD2174), 01 (YD2167), 02 (YD1616), Phu Loc (YD6090), Phong Dien (YD6324), Quang Binh (YD6733), Sword (YD1231), Lighting (YD2177), Torrance (YD6329), Torch (YD9237), Saigon (YD2777), Dong Ha (YD2660), and several bases in Base Area 114.

(2) Forward Observers and Liaison Officers. At the end of the reporting period, Corps Artillery units were providing Forward Observer/Liaison Officer support as follows: 101st Airborne Division 6, 3d Marine Division 6, 1st AOT Division 12, AOT convoy support 1 (on call), Phu Bai Base Defense 2, Phu Bai Base Defense 3 (on call), Hai Loc Special Forces Team 1; Total 31.

(3) Battle Damage Assessment. BDA for Corps Artillery units during the reporting period is listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TACTICAL DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>110</td>
<td>383</td>
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<td>Structures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Automatic Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of XXIV Corps Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS - CSFOR - 65 (U)

Lunar casualties

PROBABLY

Enemy Personnel KIA

Secondary Explosions

Secondary Fires

Trunck Line Destroyed

Mortars Silenced

Automatic Weapons Silenced

(4) Firing Battery Inspection Team (FBIT). At the end of the reporting period, the FBIT completed its first six months of operation. At the beginning of the period and at the request of the Commanding Officer, 101st Airborne Division Artillery, the FBIT began inspections of Division Artillery units. In April, the inspections were further expanded to include 12th Marines, Fleet Marine Force, and 1st ARVN Division batteries. Modified inspections of battalion Fire Direction Centers were also started, using only one inspector. The purposes of battalion Fire Direction Center inspections are essentially the same as those applicable to battery inspections: to provide an outside-agency evaluation of the Fire Direction Center, to identify areas of strength and weakness, to upgrade gunnery procedures, and to reduce friendly fire incidents by emphasizing the double check system. Additionally, 12th Marine units use the battalion Fire Direction Center as primary, while the batteries act as secondary check Fire Direction Centers. About 3-4 FBIT inspections are conducted each week. The FBIT continues to be a valuable tool for maintaining high standards and proficiency, and for collecting and disseminating good ideas for improvement in firing battery, fire direction, and local security matters.

(5) Forward Observer/Fire Direction Officer School. During the reporting period, the XXIV Corps Artillery Forward Observer/Fire Direction Officer School continued conducting courses on the basis of one Forward Observer and one Fire Direction Officer school per month.

(6) Artillery Air Warning System. On 19 December 1968, XXIV Corps Regulation 355-1, Safeguarding Aircraft From Hazards Due to the Delivery of Supporting Fires, was published. This regulation, written by Corps Artillery, established Air Warning Control Centers (AWCC) operating in local (usually Brigade) areas on HF nets for advising helicopters of artillery hazards. The Air Warning Control Centers report all fires to an Air Warning Control Center Central which passes information to air traffic agencies and contacts fixed wing or fast moving aircraft on a UHF net. The system is established within a division area. XXIV Corps Artillery operated the 101st Airborne Division Air Warning Control Center Central until 19 March because of the existence of a residual communications net previously established for the USEC DASC under Task Force X-RAY before that element departed the XXIV Corps in the summer of 1968. On 19 March, the 101st Airborne Division established its own Air Warning Control Center Central at Camp Eagle, and the XXIV Corps Artillery Central was permanently disbanded.
15 May 1969

S U J E C T: Operational Report of XXIV Corps Artillery for Period

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(7) Automatic Weapons Employment. During the reporting period, requests for automatic weapons support from the divisions increased, primarily because of Task Force Remagen and more ground operations in 3d Marine Division Area of Operations and the extension of roads into the Ruong River Valley and towards the A Shau Valley in 101st Airborne Division Area of Operation. To assure an equitable distribution of automatic weapons assets to the divisions, Corps Artillery made a study of the use, employment and needs for H-2 Twin 40mm "dusters" and H-55 Quad 50mm weapons. The current disposition of units has one H-2 battery at Phu Bai (TD6114), and three H-2 batteries in the Dong Ha area; the H-55 battery, G/65th Artillery, is also in Dong Ha. The study resulted in the following conclusions or decisions:

(a) Priority of daylight employment of H-2s was and would remain as follows:
1. Mine sweep
2. Combat support/reconnaissance in force operations
3. Position defense
4. Convoy escort

(b) Priority of daylight employment of H-55's was and would remain as follows:
1. Convoy escort
2. Combat support/reconnaissance in force operations
3. Position defense
4. Mine sweep

(c) The normal means of night employment for both H-2/H-55 weapons is for a fixed location defense, either near but not on a perimeter or as part of a mobile reaction force.

(d) The current disposition of automatic weapons assets is 6-H-2 and 2-H-55 for Phu Bai Base Defense, 2-H-2 and 2-H-55 committed outside the Corps Area of Operations, and the remaining assets distributed a little better than 7 to 1 in favor of 3d Marine Division over 101st Airborne Division. This distribution is consistent with the terrain and road network in each Area of Operations and will remain generally the same, at least until the 101st Airborne Division has installations in the A Shau Valley.

(e) For special or limited operations, automatic weapons assets for the 101st Airborne Division will be provided by dispatch of task forces from the Dong Ha area. 1st Bn. 11th Artillery will coordinate and handle dispatch of task forces and distribution of Automatic Weapons assets.

(f) The weapons committed to Phu Bai base defense will remain at that location except for an emergency need elsewhere.
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(a) No attempt to position automatic weapons to meet an enemy high performance aircraft threat is reasonable or feasible.

(b) Heavy Artillery Dispositions and Tube Configurations. With return of Btry B, 6th Bn, 4th Artillery (175mm) and the acquisition of 6 - 175mm guns in 5th 175 Gun Btry, the balance of heavy artillery was overthrown in favor of 175mm guns versus 8" howitzers. Accordingly, Btry B, 2d Bn, 9th Artillery was repositioned to 8" and moved south to the 101st Airborne Division area of operation, where maneuver force operations were expanding over a considerably greater area.

(9) Heavy Artillery Gun Pad Construction. In Dec 68, a program of construction of permanent gun pads at fire support bases where present and future operational needs for heavy artillery could be anticipated was initiated. The program was continued throughout this reporting period. Permanent pads are now available at the following locations in the numbers indicated:

(10) FADAC. An intensified program to increase the number of FADACs operational in Corps Artillery has been initiated. Prior to the program, an average of about 5 FADACs were inoperative each day. On 13 April, for the first time since formation of XXIV Corps (formerly Provisional Corps Vietnam), all 25 FADACs in XXIV Corps Artillery were operational. Since that time, the average number of inoperative FADACs has been approximately 2 each day.

(11) CMMI Team. The XXIV Corps Artillery CMMI Team, established in Dec 68, continued its inspections of Corps Artillery units at the rate of about five inspections per week.

2. (C) Section 2, Part I, Lessons Learned, Commander's Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.


(1) Observation: The grass burst point of impact for complete base ejection smoke rounds is not the same as the high explosive point of impact, even though the firing tables are theoretically the same for both rounds; the terrain in the Corps Area of Operations causes smoke canisters to come to rest well short of the grass burst point for a complete smoke round.

(2) Evaluation: It is quite common for the initial round in observed fire missions to be base ejection smoke. Once the smoke round is observed at an apparently safe location, the observer changes to shelling high explosive and continues his adjustment. Several recent friendly fire incidents have indicated a serious problem in changing shells. The same firing tables are used for both base ejection smoke and high explosive projectiles, though the data applies to a grass burst (fuse action) for the smoke round. It is
generally recognized that the second cut back on the time setting for a graze burst will cause the canisters to eject about 200 meters in the air. The canisters can be expected to fall short of the point where a graze burst would occur. In open, flat, hard terrain, the canisters will bounce almost to the graze burst point. The terrain and vegetation here, however, habitually cause the canisters to come to rest well short of this.

Very limited test firing indicates that the canisters stop short of the graze burst point by more than 100 meters for 155mm charge 7 and by about 200 meters for 105mm charge 7. This, in itself, has required special attention and training.

The fact that the canisters fall short of the graze point is not the only problem. Although the base ejection smoke and high explosive rounds are theoretically equivalent, the high explosive round apparently achieves a greater range than the complete smoke round when fired at the same quadrant elevation. Limited test figures for charge 7 show that the high explosive travels between 100 and 200 meters beyond the HC round for both calibers.

In March, this headquarters sent a letter on this subject to the Artillery Board at Fort Sill. A reply indicated that Firing Table Branch, Ballistics Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground has been studying the problem for about one year. Unofficial preliminary data has been published for all artillery units in Change 1 to the XXIV Corps SOP.

Recommendation: That the general nature of this problem be brought to the attention of all howitzer units, along with any available official preliminary data on the magnitude of the range differences achieved by the two projectiles.

c. Training. None.

d. Intelligence. Item: Meteo Section Augmentation.

Observation: Meteo sections in the XXIV Corps Area of Operations are frequently called upon to furnish visual teams to extend meteo coverage to mountainous regions where electronic sections either cannot be employed or are unavailable for employment. When the teams are thus deployed the electronic section is immediately placed under-strength in personnel. The visual team also requires a second barometer which is not usually part of the section's authorized equipment. Once in operation, the visual team frequently finds itself blocked from making measurements of the winds aloft by intervening cloud decks. After obtaining their data, the team must communicate with the electronic section which is located some distance away and must use radio to send its data. The meteo section does not have a second radio which is necessary for this communication.
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(2) Evaluation: With the addition of 4 metro computers, a barometer, and radio, the metro section would be able to deploy a visual team at any time it is required to do so. The visual team could also obtain all-weather capability for wind measurement if it was equipped with a miniaturized radio direction finder or radar capable of tracking a small balloon. Since this visual team will be faced with resupply limitations, the weight of their equipment and expendables must be kept at a minimum. To save weight in balloon gas supply, a small balloon could be used—one that is no larger than the standard 100 gram pilot balloon. This will require a small balloon borne transmitter (if the radio direction finding method is elected). Such a transmitter should not be difficult to produce since temperature and densities could be obtained by taking a surface virtual temperature measurement and trending it to meet the electronic station's virtual temperature curve at an altitude of 2000 meters using the mountain met technique.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) That the Tables of Organization and Equipment of all metro sections which may operate in mountainous areas in Vietnam be:

1. Increased by four metro computers.
2. Issued an additional barometer and radio.

(b) That a miniaturized radio direction finder or radar be developed for use with a small transmitter capable of being borne aloft by a small balloon. The system should be capable of providing angular data and/or slant range for upper wind directions and speeds and should have this capability for up to 12 kilometers of height.

Logistics. None.

Organisation. None.


(1) Observation: There is a shortage of power supplies for radio sets AH/VRC-46 and AH/VRC-47 when mounted in a fixed installation such as a bunker or command post. Normally, power supply PP-2953 is used to power these radios when in fixed configuration, but the PP-2953 is in short supply in Vietnam.

(2) Discussion:

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(a) A field expedient power supply can be constructed using Radio Receiver AN/GRR-5, which is available in most artillery units. This power supply requires no changes to the Receiver AN/GRR-5, is simple to construct, and can be made from parts readily available in Vietnam.

(b) Required parts include: Radio Receiver AN/GRR-5, four diodes, two vehicle batteries, and some single conductor copper wire.

(c) The AN/GRR-5 is used because its T-1 transformer will step down 115 volts (input in a fixed installation) to 28 Volts. This is the only part of the AN/GRR-5 that is used and any transformer that will step 115 Volts down to 28 Volts will work just as well.

(d) Once the voltage has been reduced, it must be converted from alternating current to direct current. This is accomplished by a bridge rectifier constructed from the four diodes (See inclosure 2).

(e) The result is a slightly pulsating direct current which is then fed into the batteries which have been connected in series. The batteries act as a filter for the fluctuations in current from the bridge rectifier. (Actually the batteries power the radio; the AN/GRR-5 and bridge rectifier only maintain the charge in the batteries).

(f) The radio mount (MT-1029) is powered directly off the batteries.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) That all units which have shortages of power supplies for tactical radio sets in fixed configurations consider the use of this field expedient power supply. One has been in constant use in HHP, XXIV Corps Artillery for a period of almost two months with no trouble.

(b) That any unit which wishes to use this field expedient attempt to obtain a transformer to step 115 Volts down to 28 Volts before using the transformer in AN/GRR-5. Use of the AN/GRR-5 will cause no damage to the radio set but it is more desirable not to change the intended configuration of the radio unless it is absolutely necessary.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report: XXIV Corps Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1969

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1 - 2d Bn, 138th Artillery
10 - XXIV Corps Artillery File

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11
TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. The ORLL of XXIV Corps Artillery has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. Concur with commander's observations, evaluations and recommendations with the added comment. Section 2, para 2g(3), page 9. The AN/GRR-5 as a "field expedient" power supply should only be used when a proper power supply is on requisition or is in repair.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
H.R. TAYLOR
CPT, AGC
ASST AG
AVHGC-DST (15 May 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of XXIV Corps Artillery for Period Ending
30 April 1969 RCS - CSFOR - 65 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 JUL 69

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, XXIV Corps Artillery.

2. Reference item concerning "Metro Section Augmentation", section II, page 8, paragraph d(l); nonconcurs. DA standardization policy would require change to the TOE for all metro sections if this recommendation were approved. A request for temporary loan of equipment should be submitted by metro units in mountain regions required to furnish visual teams to extend metro coverage. A miniaturized radio direction finder or radar could be developed under the ENSURE program. USARV Regulation 70-1, dated 17 April 1969, establishes procedures for initiation and submission of requirements for developmental and nonstandard items of new materiel under the provisions of AR 71-1. Unit will be advised of above comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C.D. Wilson

Cy from:

XXIV Corps Arty

XXIV Corps
GPOP-DT (15 May 69) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, XXIV Corps Arty for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 6 AUG 69
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph 2g. This type field expediency must be considered in light of its implications. Even minor modifications to TOE items, in this case the AN/GRR-5, either delete, or at best reduce, its capability to perform its primary function in the organization. The recommended use of the AN/GRR-5 as a field expedient fixed station battery charger for the AN/VRC-46 and 47 (as an alternate for the PP-2953) is most applicable in Vietnam. However, the modification, or expediency, must be a command decision versus an accepted and standard alternate solution.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGG
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, XXIV Corps Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CG, XXIV Corps Artillery

15 May 1969

CGS, XXIV Corps Artillery

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N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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