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IN REPLY REFER TO AGDA (M) (15 Aug 69) FOR OT UT 692262

9 September 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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[Signature]

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Acting The Adjutant General

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  17th Combat Aviation Group
AVBACB-SC

8 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969, ACS CSFOH-65 (R1) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION


   a. (U) General. This report covers the period 1 February 1969 through 30 April 1969, and is submitted in accordance with AR 525-15 and USAV Regulation 525-15. The report includes Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 17th Combat Aviation Group; 201st Aviation Company (Corps); 25th Medical Detachment (CA); and the 58th Aviation Detachment (Support).

   b. (C) Personnel.

      (1) Infusion: The Group has continued an infusion program directed towards the reduction of rotational humps between like units within a battalion/squadron and between battalions. Personnel of the 238th Aviation Company (Escort), which arrived in March, were infused to the maximum extent within the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion during April. Additional infusion within the 17th Combat Aviation Group is planned for May.

      (2) Replacements:

         (a) In general, replacements during the last quarter have increased and have been arriving steadily before the rotation of the individual they were to replace. This has allowed a proper overlap period. A total of 430 replacements were received during the month of February. The Group received 638 during March and 928 during April. This has built the strength of the Group upward to 1513 assigned aviation personnel as of 30 April 1969, whereas 5153 Aviation personnel of an authorized (TOL) 1582 and an established manning level of 1425. Enlisted strengths were raised to an assigned strength of 6303 of an authorized 6372. The Group is 98% filled.

(b) A large number of UH-1 qualified warrant officer aviators arrived during the month of April. This has brought the warrant officer manning level to over fifty in each assault helicopter company and caused each battalion to be overstrength in aviator warrant officers.

(3) Changes of Command: The following changes of command were made during this reporting period:


(b) On 6 March 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cooper, 076966, assumed command of the 223rd Combat Support Aviation Battalion, vice Lieutenant Colonel William H. Bayer, OF 105611.

(c) On 15 March 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Garry H. Farmer, 087738, assumed command of the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion, vice Lieutenant Colonel Orlando Z. Gonzales, 079304.

(d) On 15 March 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Calvin H. Bean, 084900, assumed command of the 7 Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, vice Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Keuter, OF 107225.

(e) On 26 April 1969, Major Ronald E. Holasek, 04061084, assumed command of the 201st Aviation Company (Corps), vice Major Ray A. Young, 02779124.

(4) The following changes were made within the Group Staff:

(a) On 19 February 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Ullrich Hermann, 069679, became the Group Executive Officer, vice Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Stanley, 02010706.

(b) On 20 February 1969, Captain Marc L. Tumas, OF 108014, became the Group Adjutant, vice LT Joseph C. LoFloro, 05346276.

(c) On 21 February 1969, Captain Robert M. Zimmerman, 05331964, became an assistant S3.

(d) On 28 February 1969, LT Roy C. Kohr, 05334011, became an assistant S3.

(e) On 9 March 1969, C.3 Walter V. Collins, U 3 150 899, became the Group Personnel Officer, vice LT Douglas G. Grapes, 05260177.
CONFIDENTIAL

A/B.CB-SC 8 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969, NCS CLP-65 (III) (U)

(f) On 12 March 1969, Major Leigh H. Ogden, 075737, became the Group S1, vice Major Robert H. Furney, 028690.

(g) On 15 March 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Neuter, 070225, became the Deputy Aviation Officer, IPFV, vice Lieutenant Colonel Stephen F. Cameron, 062328.

(h) On 19 March 1969, Captain Leroy H. Bond, 05321628, became the assistant S2.

(i) On 23 March 1969, Captain Philip A. Desimone, 05271622, became commanding officer of the 25th Medical Detachment, vice Captain Fred G. Vargolin, 05542726.

(j) On 8 April 1969, Captain Joseph H. Frajer, 05425494, became Assistant Safety Officer, vice Captain Frank H. Anderson, III, 05324332.

(k) On 18 April 1969, Captain Richard A. Masinelli, 05331970, became Assistant S3, vice Captain Clifford H. George, 05411100.

(5) A statement of authorized and assigned strength as of the last day of the quarter is attached as Inclosure 1.

c. (c) Intelligence.

(1) General. During the first week of February 1969, enemy initiated activity continued at a low ebb throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone. The average number of daily corps-wide incidents was 12 with most of these attributed to isolated cases of sniper fire, mining incidents and booby traps. The tempo picked-up during the second week of February, with the average number of incidents increasing to 21. The 17th Aviation Group and subordinate units had been actively engaged in preparing for the predicted T.T offensive since early December 68. Practice alerts were conducted, perimeter barriers strengthened, after action reports of T.T 68 were reviewed and more stringent controls were imposed on indigenous personnel. During the third week of February, which was the week of T.T, very little change was noted in enemy activity and tactics from the preceding week. During the early morning hours of 23 February an apparent coordinated wave of rocket and mortar attacks was launched throughout the corps area. The 17th Aviation Group sustained light to moderate aircraft damage and very light casualties at the following installations: Dong Ba Thin, Fliciku, Kontum, and Qui Nhon. These attacks ushered in the post T.T offensive of 69. Throughout the remainder of February and during the first three weeks
in March. The standoff attacks continued, though slowly diminishing in number as time progressed. Very few follow-up ground attacks were associated with the shelling. None were reported by subordinate unit installations. From late March until 30 April the enemy activity slowly declined to a level that existed just prior to TET 69.

(2) Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance. With the decrease in enemy activity during early February, more reliance was placed on the reconnaissance and surveillance program to determine enemy locations and their possible courses of action. Intelligence extracted from captured documents on 19 April indicated that an NVA force estimated at three regiments were infiltrating into the II Corps area from Cambodia on three separate axis with Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa Provinces as objectives. Since that time the maximum number of reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft have been tasked to concentrate on these three corridors. As of 30 April, no significant sightings had been noted.

(3) Air Activity. While flying in support of II Corps during the last quarter the 17th Aviation Group reported 243 aircraft hit by hostile fire (February 89, March 100 and April 54). This averages 81 aircraft per month as compared with 65 per month for the previous quarter. This increase is attributed to the post TET offensive beginning in late February and continuing through late March.

(4) Physical Security. Twenty three standoff rocket and mortar attacks were launched at the 17th Aviation Group installations this quarter; Ban Me Thuot 6, Pleiku 5, Kontum 4, Nha Trang 2, LZ English 2, Honsol 1, Qui Nhon 1, Phan Thiet 1, and Dong Ba Thin 1. This compares with 24 attacks for the previous quarter. One sapper was attempted on 23 Feb at the Qui Nhon airfield. No damage was incurred. Damage and casualties for the entire quarter were considered to be relatively light.

(5) Security Clearances. Forty six security clearances were processed through the S2 office during this quarter.

d. (U) Operations.

(1) The 238th Aviation Company (Escort) arrived in-country on 20 March 1969 and was positioned at An Khê Army Airfield as part of the 268th CAB. They became fully operationally ready on 20 April 1969.

(2) C Troop 7/17th Cavalry Squadron was relocated from Honsol Army Airfield to An Son on 23 April 1969. C Troop was released

from operational control of the 4th Infantry Division and placed under operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade on 15 April 1969. It will provide aviation support for operation Washington Green, the pacification program in Binh Dinh Province.

3. There has been no change in the mission of the 17th CAG.

4. Operational results are attached as Inclosure 2.

i. (U) Training.

1. ROKF-V Aviator Transition Training. Transition training for ROKAviators was initiated by this headquarters on 7 April 1969. Phase I and II of the program consists of 14 hours of formal ground instruction and a minimum of 25 hours of transition flight instruction. The first 30 day period is devoted to transition training by the 17th CAG Standardization section. A subsequent 60 day period Phase III, will be devoted to operational flying with an assault helicopter company. The first class of 4 aviators successfully completed the transition training, Phase I and II, on 30 April 1969. The flight time average was 32 hours per aviator. A total of 24 ROKF-V aviators will receive transition and operational training during the next six months. There have been no significant difficulties encountered during this training program.

2. Replacement Training. A comprehensive replacement training program went into full swing the past quarter. A total of 418 individuals received training to enable them to smoothly transition into their new environment and to enhance combat efficiency prior to participation in combat support operations.

3. Headquarters company engaged in twelve (12) days training. Subjects covered: Command information, psychological warfare, civil affairs, weapons firing, character guidance, military justice, intelligence training, communications security, code of conduct, survival, escape and evasion, safeguarding defense information, CBR, riot control, sentry duty and physical security.

4. The 201st Aviation Company transitioned a total of three (3) U-21A pilots during the reporting period.

f. (U) Logistics.

1. Equipment Status Reports: The Equipment Status Reports, AR 711-5 submitted in March were found to contain many errors. Efforts to correct them have revealed many units are without experienced and knowledgeable supply personnel. AR 711-5 Equipment
Status Report Assistance Team has been formed to train these personnel.

(2) Engineer Support: Engineer projects have not progressed as expected in this quarter. Changing priorities have resulted in the deferral of many needed projects. Efforts are continuing to achieve a higher priority on critical projects.

(3) Mess Hall Refrigeration: Shortage of mess hall refrigeration equipment has continued to reduce the efficient operation of unit messes in some units. The low priority of Combat Support Units has prevented an improvement in this area. Efforts are being made to correct this problem.

(4) New Turbine Engine Oil, MIL-L-23699: During this quarter a new turbine engine oil, MIL-L-23699, was authorized to replace the standard MIL-L-7808 on certain aircraft. The change caused incidents of lower power to occur in the older engines. This problem has been cured by an aggressive cleaning program and conversion to the new oil is now being made only as new engines are installed.

(5) Aircraft status appears as Inclosure 3.

2. (U) Organization: Organizational Chart appears as Inclosure 4. Station listing appears as Inclosure 5.

h. (U) Chaplain.

(1) The 17th CAG Protestant Chaplain Fund designated 3 offerings during this quarter for the Vietnamese Evangelical Bible Institute in Nha Trang. A total of $99.55 was contributed.

(2) The Group Chaplain delivered 11 boxes of medicine during this quarter to the Evangelical Clinic in Nha Trang. This medicine is sent from the St. John's Lutheran Church in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

(3) The nightly devotional classes continues with a total of 89 sessions and total attendance of 356 men.

(4) The Group Chaplain went on 29 roundtrip flights on his visits to Battalions and Companies located at Minh Hoa, Qui Nhon, Phu Hiep, An Son, Dong Ba Thin, Camp Holloway, Camp Enari and Kontum during this period.

(5) The Group Chaplains Conferences continue. A total of 3 conferences were held with all 6 chaplains attending each conference.
(6) On the 8th of February, the Army Chief of Chaplains visited Nha Trang and all 6 chaplains of this Group attended the briefing and reception.

(7) The Group Headquarters Chapel has been improved during this quarter. A new ceiling was put in and all the walls painted. The offices also had new ceilings put in and all the walls repainted.

(8) The Group Chaplain continues the Sunday evening General Protestant Services. During this period, 13 evening services were held with a total attendance of 355 men.

i. (U) Aviation Safety.

(1) The accident rate for the 17th CAG has continued to rise during this quarter. This is partially due to the influx of inexperienced personnel arriving in SVN during the months of October and November 1968. The cumulative accident rate per 100,000 flying hours has increased from 16.2 to 21.0.

(2) The accident experience for this quarter is as follows:

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<td>c. 10th CAB</td>
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2. Section 2, Lesson Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   a. (U) Personnel. None

   b. (U) Operations.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(1) Allocation of aviation support direct to ARVN Divisions.

(a) Observation: In the past the ARVN Forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone have not been provided sufficient aviation assets to participate regularly in airmobile combat operations and therefore have not been able to accumulate experience necessary to conduct successful operations.

(b) Evaluation: After careful consideration it was determined by higher headquarters that allocation of aircraft direct to the ARVN Forces would provide necessary experience and that training by 17th CAG personnel would enable them to plan and conduct more extensive airmobile operations. The experience gained by commanders and staff as a result of this direct allocation will promote efficient utilization of aviation resources. This procedural change will encourage greater participation by the ARVN in airmobile operations.

(c) Recommendations: That aviation resources continue to be allocated directly to ARVN divisions so that their participation and combat effectiveness in airmobile operations increases.

(2) Indocrtination of Commanders in Aircraft Operations Procedures.

(a) Observation: In the past there has been evidence of lack of understanding by tactical commanders during airmobile operations as pertains to responsibility and authority for aircraft operations.

(b) Evaluation: USARV recently published a regulation on Indocrtination of Commanders and Army Aviators in Aircraft Operating Procedures. The provisions of this regulation were implemented and amplified to reduce conflicting areas of responsibility which were peculiar to the operational requirements of this headquarters. Mobile training teams were organized at Battalion level for the purpose of conducting orientations. Aviation Liaison officers have been placed with the ARVN Divisions and the Special Tactical Zone to insure proper coordination is effected and to initiate a comprehensive indoctrination program for commanders and staff personnel.

(c) Recommendations: That the Mobile Training Teams continue to conduct orientation until such time as a complete evaluation of this program can be completed. Liaison officers should remain with all major units to promote proper utilization of aviation resources.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969, HCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(3) Unsatisfactory Mission Reports.

(a) Observation: Studies by this headquarters indicated a need for increased emphasis on the submission of Unsatisfactory Mission Reports.

(b) Evaluation: Unsatisfactory Mission reports need to be submitted on those missions which are of questionable validity or are poorly planned and organized by the ground commander. The elimination of coordination problems and poor aircraft utilization depends upon the timely submission of these reports. Command relationships improve significantly when misunderstandings can be eliminated rather than being allowed to accumulate and breed ill feelings.

(c) Recommendations: That continued emphasis be placed on the submission of Unsatisfactory Mission Reports. This headquarters has been able to garner a significant amount of information from Unsatisfactory Mission Reports and has been able to make recommendations to improve the quality of support to ground elements.

(4) Aviation Support for Tactical and Resupply Emergencies.

(a) Observation: Commitment of helicopters in support of TAC-E and ER missions occasionally created a situation whereby aviation units were unable to adequately support their daily commitments.

(b) Evaluation: TAC-E/ER support during the hours of darkness often involves the stand-down of crew and aircraft for rest and maintenance. This stand-down in turn often creates an over-commitment of aviation elements or a draw-down of aviation support from other supported elements. After extensive research, it was deemed necessary to establish some type of control to prohibit the misallocation and misuse of aviation resources.

(c) Recommendation: That a program be established to monitor the validity and effectiveness of TAC-E/ER missions. In view of this recommendation a comprehensive reporting system was developed to enable this headquarters to evaluate TAC-E/ER missions and to take appropriate command action where necessary to insure proper utilization of aviation resources. A sample report format is attached as Inclosure 6.

(5) (U) Phu Hiep Study
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U)

(a) Observation: (C) An extensive study was conducted to determine the feasibility of closing Phu Hiep Army Airfield with the simultaneous move of elements of the 17th CAG to other locations in II Corps.

(b) Evaluation: (C) If the anticipated move is effected, it would require the relocation of five aviation units and a battalion headquarters. The 17th CAG will lose flexibility in conducting airmobile operations in the Phu Hiep-Tuy Hoa area. Aircraft availability will decrease significantly during relocation. Tac-E/ER support will not be adequately responsive during or subsequent to a move. The logistical savings realized by closing Phu Hiep are not sufficient to justify or offset the loss of operational flexibility, the cost of facilities elsewhere, and the disruption of aviation support.

(c) Recommendation: (C) That Phu Hiep Army Airfield remain open and that aviation elements presently situated at Phu Hiep remain there to provide the best possible aviation support to Phu Yen and Phu Bon Provinces. The comprehensive study conducted by this headquarters, in coordination with the aviation officer, IFFV, provided conclusive evidence that the closing of Phu Hiep would cause deterioration of aviation support in east central II Corps and would significantly hinder support of the counterinsurgency effort in that area.

c. (U) Training. None
d. (U) Intelligence. None
e. (U) Logistics.

(1) Engineer Support:

(a) Observation: Engineer construction on MACV approved projects has been unpredictable. Changes in priority and starting dates and changes of projects among engineer units by local engineers have made completion dates uncertain. These uncertain completion dates interrupt other needed improvements while units do without required maintenance and security facilities awaiting project completion.

(b) Evaluation: Even after MACV approves, funds, and sends a construction directive to the engineers for construction of a project, completion of the project is unnecessarily slow and uncertain. The projects are subject to local priorities and unit moves that can and are changed frequently. This system has left
many projects either unstarted or partially completed. Units, through desperation, have often been forced to jury rig the projects on a self-help basis because of safety regulations or lack of equipment. In these cases the units must wait on the engineer priority system. One example of this system is the hangar for a CH-47 Company (Plciku) for which the Engineer Construction Directive is dated 21 Jan 66. The footings have been completed for one year, but no other construction has begun. This unit has performed field type maintenance for over three years without shelter and will soon suffer another monsoon season. In a second example, unit BOQ's on the same work directive as the CH-47 Hangar have been started. Now, a work delay on this project is caused by a lack of material. This project could have been completed had the engineers ordered all required lumber when the project was approved instead of waiting until the priority had been established. A third example is the security lighting system at Kontum, an approved project since 26 May 1968. The power generators were not ordered until the project was started in March 1969. This equipment now is on Red Ball requisition from CONUS with an anticipated waiting period of 3 extra months.

(c) Recommendations: That expected completion dates be given to requesting units by the supporting engineer units on projects which have been approved and funded by MACV. This could possibly be done by establishing priorities at MACV for all projects as they are approved, or by projects being contracted to civilian contractors giving fixed completion goals, or lastly, when necessity dictates, by self-help programs assisted with engineer advice and equipment.

(2) Inaccurate AR 711-5 Reports.

(a) Observation: Units maintaining property books in accordance with AR 735-35 frequently submit inaccurate AR 711-5 reports due to a shortage of knowledgeable Supply Officers and NCO's.

(b) Evaluation: Errors most frequently encountered on AR 711-5 reports are caused by lack of experienced personnel. Some units reported equipment on temporary loan. Other units reported unauthorized substitute items and failed to report authorized reportable or substitute items. Many errors were found in the listing of total assemblies, kits and major components identified in DA Circular 725-11. In an attempt to overcome this problem the 17th Combat Aviation Group established an Equipment Status Report Assistant Team. This team has visited each battalion.
within the Group providing instructions and assistance in the
correct procedures necessary for this report. Although much was
accomplished, it was found that the shortage of experienced supply
personnel and the continued replacement of the personnel that
have been trained will cause these problems to continue.

(c) Recommendations: That each Group Headquarters
consider initiating an Equipment Status Assistance Team to provide
ready guidance to units as long as the present shortage of know-
ledgeable supply personnel exists.

(3) New Turbine Engine Oil MIL-L-23699.

(a) Observations: Oil leaks result when turbine engine
oil MIL-L-23699 is used to replace turbine engine oil MIL-L-7808
in aircraft engines and gear boxes.

(b) Evaluation: Turbine engine oil MIL-L-23699 has been
approved for use in UH-1 aircraft engines and gear boxes as a
replacement oil for MIL-L-7808. However, conversion to MIL-L-23699
oil causes leaking seals and high oil consumption often resulting
in low power output in the older components. These problems do
not exist when MIL-L-23699 is used from the outset in new or newly
overhauled components. One assault helicopter company completed
the conversion from MIL-L-7808 to MIL-L-23699 and almost immediately
began to experience oil leaks from transmission input quill seals.
Seventy-four (74) input quills and/or seals were replaced in a
one month period. At approximately thirty-five (35) flying hours
after conversion, the engines developed excessive low power pro-
blems caused by dirty engine compressor blades. Cleaning the
engines with walnut shells only caused an additional loss of
power. The upper half of an engine compressor section case was
removed and an enamel like substance made up of MIL-L-23699 and
walnut shell deposits was found throughout the compressor section.
The excessive build-up of these deposits was the result of a
lack of cleaning during the period the input quills were leaking
oil into the engine. The walnut shell cleaner has only glazed
the deposits. The compressor section was cleaned by soaking in
solvent for a four hour period and then scrubbing with a brush.
This removed the deposits and solved the low power problem.

(c) Recommendations: Conversion from MIL-L-23699 should
be accomplished only in new or newly overhauled aircraft components
to help prevent leaking seals, high oil consumption, and related
problems caused by the oil leaks in components previously using
MIL-L-7808. In addition, an aggressive engine cleaning program is
mandatory whenever leaking transmission input quills are experienced.
(4) Food Service.

(a) Observation: Unit mess halls within the 17th Combat Aviation Group are experiencing difficulties in storing subsistence items that require refrigeration.

(b) Evaluation: Two units have experienced undue spoilage of subsistence supplies due to lack of proper refrigeration equipment. The problem has been traced to low priorities afforded units of the 17th Combat Aviation Group for initial issue of refrigeration units and inadequate procedures for replacement of inoperable refrigerators. One unit that has been in-country over one year is still number 46 on the priority list for initial issue. Another unit at LZ English was told the parts were not on hand for repairs. Then, the replacement, which the unit requisitioned on 9017, was cancelled 80 days after being accepted because it was command controlled.

(c) Recommendations: (1) That units within the 17th Combat Aviation Group be given a higher priority for initial issue of refrigeration units.

(2) That definite published procedures be established for obtaining refrigeration equipment.

f. (U) Organization: None

g. (U) Surgeon:

(1) Flight Surgeons and Aircraft Accident Investigation.

(a) Observation: Flight surgeons were not entering accident investigations early enough.

(b) Evaluation: Many aircraft accidents are investigated by a single investigating officer and the flight surgeon. It was noted that only the investigating officer was placed on orders for the investigation. In many cases, the flight surgeon was asked for his input days and, in a few cases, one to two weeks later. Crewmen, witnesses, equipment and the aircraft were often not available to the surgeon after such delays. This resulted in poor inputs into the accident reports from the flight surgeons. The 17th CAG has directed that convening authorities place the flight surgeon and the investigating officer on the same accident investigation order.
(c) Recommendations: That all groups establish the requirement that a flight surgeon be placed on accident investigation orders for accidents investigated by a single investigating officer.

h. (U) Aviation Safety.

(1) Accident Rate:

(a) Observation: The accident rate has continued to rise during this quarter.

(b) Evaluation: This is partially due to the influx of inexperienced personnel arriving in RVN during the months of October and November 1968. These replacements are the bulk of the unit operational personnel at the present time and the average experience level is approximately 500 hours. At this limited experience level, the aviator becomes over-confident, complacent, and contemptuous of the aircraft. This is evidenced in that approximately seventy percent of the accidents are a direct result of pilot error, and pilot error is usually a contributing factor in the other thirty percent.

(c) Recommendations: That a comprehensive and continuing education program be conducted at unit level for the applicable aircraft and the environmental factors of the particular area of assignment.

(2) Hover check, UH-1B/C and AH-1G.

(a) Observation: The criteria used for hover check for the UH-1B/C and AH-1G helicopters has proven unacceptable.

(b) Evaluation: In many instances the bleed-off technique used for hover check is not sufficient for take-off power or to maintain forward flight in the UH-1B/C and AH-1G helicopters. Also, it encourages the aviator to attempt take-off if the helicopter will hover under any condition. If take-off is accomplished using this bleed-off technique for hover check, sufficient lift is not produced by the rotor system during autorotation to compensate for the additional weight.

(c) Recommendation: That the hover criteria for the UH-1B/C and AH-1G helicopters be amended to allow no KPM bleed-off for the hover check. This headquarters has established the following criteria for normal take-off.

1 Hover at one foot above the ground.

2 Stabilize engine RPM at 6600.

3 Return to ground for take-off.

NOTE: If take-off cannot be accomplished using this criteria, the helicopter will be off loaded to include the gunner and/or fuel and ammunition until the helicopter will hover with a stabilized engine RPM of 6600.

3. Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.

Army Combat Readiness Training (CRT) Proficiency Flying Program Study (RCS ATOPS-(OT)-107). The cited study was staffed by this headquarters and forwarded through channels on 30 March 1969. The purpose of the study was to determine the best course of action to fulfill current and projected requirements for aviation proficiency flying in the Army. The following were the primary points of discussion:

(1) Alternatives for accomplishment of proficiency flying were:

Alt 1: A program similar to the current proficiency flying program as outlined in AR 95-32.

Alt 2: A program of flying escusal when in an assignment outside of aviation operational units, with refresher flight training as necessary prior to returning to operational flying.

Alt 3: A proficiency flying program which would be a combination of 1 and 2 above. Periodic, but less frequent, flying throughout a non-aviation assignment, and refresher flying training as necessary prior to returning to operational flying.

(2) This headquarters comments favored alternative 3. Minimums established by AR 95-32, in terms of hours required, are adequate to maintain the basic aeronautical skills provided the aviator conscientiously applies the time to the fundamentals of basic tactical flight. Ideally an aviator removed from the aviation environment for any length of time should be retrained and updated in the latest aviation techniques and procedures. Duration of such training is dependent on time spent outside an aviation assignment and the experience of the aviator involved.

(3) Questionnaires pertaining to this study were circulated throughout this headquarters and subordinate elements. The results were not compiled or analyzed at this level.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969, NCS CSFOR-65 (K1) (U)

(4) Essential Elements of Analysis were presented and appropriate comments were solicited from subordinate elements. Comments were prepared by this headquarters on all EEA and forwarded for evaluation.

NELSON A. MAHONE JR.
COL, FA
Commanding

Incl 5 and 6 wd, Hq, DA

DISTRIBUTION:
2 CINCUSARFAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
3 CG, USAV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
2 CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBn-MH, APO 96384
4 CG, 1 FFORGEV, ATTN: AVOA-GC-OT, APO 96350

CF:
CO, 10th Cab
CO, 52d Cab
CO, 223rd CSab
CO, 268th Cab
CO, 7/17th ACS
CO, 201st Avn Co
AVFA-60-HIST (8 May 69) 1st Inf
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, HGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DI, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 8 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
FREDERICK E. HOLLAND
LT AGC
ASST AG

Copy for:
2-CSFOR, DA
1-HQs, 17th CAG
AVG-SC-0 (8 May 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 17 JUN 69

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it adequate and concurs with the contents, except as noted below.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 2e(1)(c), page 10. Non-concur. The referenced work order is for base construction which has a low priority. The priorities established by COMUSMACV are for combat support, MACV detachment upgrade, LOC construction and base construction. Priorities for construction in II Corps for both MCA construction and operational support is determined by the Commanding General, IFFV. It is doubtful that RMK will be used in this area within the foreseeable future; therefore, the bulk of construction in the central highlands must be accomplished by one engineer group.

   b. Paragraph 2e(3), page 12. A USAFV letter, Subject: Use of MIL-L-23699 and MIL-L-7808 Oils in Army Turbine Powered Aircraft, dated 3 May 1969 outlines the proper use of oil and changeover procedures. The complaint of leakage problems upon changeover to MIL-L-23699 in components which have been using MIL-L-7808 for some time is a general reported fault and appears to be valid. When problems are encountered the letter specifies requirements for submitting EIR's with certain information contained therein. Bringing attention to these problems through the use of EIR action is the most expeditious way of effecting a change in procedure. This headquarters is in agreement with a recommendation to change over oils as new components are placed into use and to eliminate the requirement to changeover old components at the next Periodic Inspection. This would eliminate all problem areas and is a more logical procedure for executing the changeover.

   c. Paragraph 2e(4), page 13. Non-concur. The allocation of equipment for the up-grade of cantonment mess halls has been completed by G-4 USARV. All units having refrigeration equipment requirements have had the equipment allocated to them. Priority of issue was established by the Installation Coordinator on an area of urgency need with hospitals having first priority. Supply directives are presently being published.
AVBA1C-0 (8 May 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969, ICUS CFPFA-65 (AI) (c)

by USAICOV and staffed through area depots for release of available equipment. Units in built-up areas are being issued 65 cu ft refrigerators; all others will be issued 70 cu ft refrigerators after 1 June 69. Further, refrigeration will be submitted in accordance with USAV Unclassified message 62891, Subject: Garrisonless Equipment, dated 201A17 May 1969 which establishes standard procedures for requisition and issue of refrigeration equipment within USAV.

d. Paragraph 2B(2), page 14. Concur with recommendation for hover criteria for the OH-1H/C and AH-1G helicopters. A new hover criteria has been published in 1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 365-10, dated 1 May 1969, which states as follows:

"(1) Normal Takeoff

a. Hover at 1-foot

b. Check R.P. - 6600, no bleed-off

c. Return to ground - Takeoff

(When required by tactical necessity unit commander can authorize a stabilized 6300 R.P. hover check at 1-foot. This is authorized only from established roaming/refueling areas with clear takeoff space of sufficient length and suitable surface). This change to the regulation will be sent to subordinate units approximately 30 June 1969. From an operations standpoint the new hover criteria may result in either a smaller fuel load or a decreased amount of ordnance on board. This may, in turn, reduce the on-station time or number of firing passes presently expected of our gunships.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DAVID D. ANDERSON
CG, AGC

19
AVHGC-DST (8 May 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 4 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group.

2. Reference item concerning New Turbine Engine Oil MIL-L-23699, Section II, page 12, paragraph 2e(3); nonconcur. Leaking transmission input quills existed prior to the change to MIL-L-23699 oil as a lubricant. It is expected that some leakage will exist due to MIL-L-23699 being a more detergent lubricant. If any problem occurs which is attributed to the oil change-over, an EIR exhibit consisting of the discrepant component and about one pint of oil will be held for analysis. EIR should be submitted IAW USARV letter dated 3 May 1969, subject: Use of MIL-L-7808 and MIL-L-23699 oils in Army Turbine Powered Aircraft.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON

Cy furn:
17th Cbt Avn Gp
1st Avn Bde
GPOP-DT (8 May 69) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ 17th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 JUL 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph 2b, 2d Indorsement. Message has been dispatched to all other sub-commands requesting information on similar difficulties with use of subject oil. Information pertaining to difficulties resulting from use of subject oil will be evaluated and, if of value, will be furnished US Army, Aviation Command. Any change to present instructions and procedures will be forwarded to sub-commands for implementation.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC

Ass't AG

Cy furn:

CG USARV
UNIT STRENGTHS AS OF 30 APRIL 1969

1. Military

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OPERATIONAL RESULTS

1. (C) Results.

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<th>Enemy KSA</th>
<th>Dam Dest.</th>
<th>Sandpans Da. Dest.</th>
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* (58th Avn Det)

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17th CAG

2

*Operational results are reported as combined totals by the 101st Avn Co and the 58th Avn Det.*
## AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF 30 APRIL 1969

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 17th Combat Aviation Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CO, 17th Combat Aviation Group

8 May 1969

692262

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310