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### AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 500th Transportation Group, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, ADC
Acting The Adjutant General

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    500th Transportation Group
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 500TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (HT)
APO 96312

AVC: CR-52-TC-3C

12 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 500th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

TO:
Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Section I. Operations: Significant Activities

The 500th Transportation Group was organized as a separate headquarters on 1 January 1969 when the colors were transferred from the 124th Transportation Command (Provisional).

The Group was constituted of three Battalions, the 191st Ordnance Battalion, the 262nd Quartermaster Battalion, and the 36th Transportation Battalion.

This organization was developed to provide more direct command and control of these important combat service support elements of the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay.

Under the previous organization, the 191st Ordnance Battalion and the 262nd Quartermaster Battalion reported directly to US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, without an intermediate control headquarters. The 36th Transportation Battalion, with a long haul mission, was previously part of the Transportation Terminal Command.

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The S-1, S-3, S-4 staff sections of this headquarters were organized starting on 1 January and were fully operational 13 January. The authorized strength of the 500th Transportation Group (MT) with the three battalions is 3035 personnel.

In order to build good unit esprit de corps and elevate morale in the new Group, a competition was initiated among the units in each battalion for the title of Battalion Honor Company, followed by competition between the three top units for the title of Group Honor Company. Battalion competition closed on 31 March 1969 and the units selected are now competing for the Group award to be given in early July. The battalion winners received trophies and the Group winner will receive a banquet and electronic equipment for the dayroom, or an equivalent in money.

2. Section II. Lessons Learned. Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. Personnel:

(1) Observation: A critical shortage of qualified driver personnel exists.

(2) Evaluation: Drivers being lost through normal rotation were replaced by soldiers with a combat arms MOS, primarily 11B. These replacements received extensive on the job training to become qualified drivers for convoy operations. A shortage of 11E MOS personnel in this combat zone resulted in levies of these personnel just at the time they were becoming productive as drivers. A shortage of drivers exists as a result of the levies.

(3) Recommendation: That driver requirements be met with personnel who have been trained as drivers in CONUS, and who are awarded driver MOS's prior to arrival in Vietnam.

b. Operations:

(1) 5th Wheel Pin Disengagement

(a) Observation: Serious incidents have occurred while attempting to unhook the 5th wheel pin. Drivers have removed the tractor from under their loads too soon, causing personnel to be caught between the duals.

(b) Evaluation: The placement of the pin on 5 ton tractors is such that a person has to stand between the duals to unhook the load, which is normally a safe practice. In combat zones, drivers frequently disengage quickly because of ammunition trailers catching fire or damage to equipment due to enemy action.
Over anxious drivers tend to pull away before the individual removing the pin has cleared the wheels of the vehicle, thereby causing serious injuries or death to the person removing the pin.

(c) Recommendation: That a safety pull string system be employed as shown in Incl 2 so a man won't be required to stand between the duals to disengage the pin.

(2) Long Haul Communications

(a) Observation: Communications with long haul convoys are required in order to effect a greater command and control of convoys while away from commanders.

(b) Evaluation: Long haul convoys require a higher quality communication than normal because they are frequently a great distance from their home station for a period of days. During this time, it is essential that radio contact be maintained to ensure proper coordination of all facets of the operation. Problems can be rapidly identified and assistance rendered by the appropriate commander or staff at the home base. During the past 3 months the 500th Group has had a working radio system within convoys. It employs 2 AN/GRC 106 single side bands, 1 AN/VAC-46 & 1 AN/GRC-125. The base station maintains 2 AN/FRC-93's with phone patch capability. The above combination of radios has enhanced the overall operation of the convoy, making it a much more efficient operation.

(c) Recommendation: That all long haul convoys be equipped with a similar radio capability to ensure more efficient operation of convoys.

(3) V-100 Commando Vehicles

(a) Observation: The M-151, ½ ton vehicle is marginally satisfactory as a command and control vehicle, or as a security vehicle when compared to the V-100 commando vehicle.

(b) Evaluation: The ½ ton use as a "gun jeep" and as a control vehicle is common on convoy operations. Armored hardening kits are available in a limited quantity. A test was conducted within this command to determine the suitability of the V-100 for convoy security and control. The conclusions reached include the following advantages. The mere presence of the V-100 increases the morale of all convoy personnel by its armored appearance, and the quality of its weapon system. The armor protection and increased firepower of the twin thirty (30) caliber machineguns make this vehicle far superior to an M-151 for fire power, and it is a much more stable gun platform.
The V-100 is no more trouble to operate, can attain the same speeds, provides adequate maneuverability, and can cross more difficult terrain than the M-151. No crewman are directly exposed to hostile fire and there is no chance of the crew falling from the vehicle as exists, and has happened on many convoys with the armor plated M-151. Crew fatigue is much less in the V-100.

(c) Recommendation: That the V-100 commando vehicle be favorably considered for use in the 500th Trans Gp and all convoys in the Republic of Vietnam because of the superior performance and protection it provides.

c. Training: None

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics:

1) Food Service

(a) Observation: There are eleven mess halls assigned to this command. Mess personnel are experiencing extreme difficulties in keeping sump pits clean and in a sanitary condition.

(b) Evaluation: Adequate equipment to clean sump pits is not available to the units. Equipment that is available is not capable of performing the job because of its magnitude. Mess stewards are being required to spend excessive time and effort on this problem. This time could be more effectively utilized in supervising and improving food services.

(c) Recommendation: That command emphasis be placed on eliminating this problem, and a determination be made as to the adequacy of existing contracts to provide required services.

2) Maintenance Facilities

(a) Observation: There are twelve motor pools within this command. Of the twelve, 80% are equipped with maintenance tents located in sandy areas. These facilities are often made almost untenable due to weather conditions (ie, rain, wind, storms and blowing sand and dust).

(b) Evaluation: Present facilities in the motor pools are inadequate. Shop floors made of wood have become saturated with grease and oil which creates a fire and safety hazard.
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AVCA CEB-TO-5C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 500th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for Period ending 30 April 1969, AGS CSFR-65 (AI)

Shop floors covered with landing mats become slippery from spilled oil and grease, and create a safety hazard. Shops with dirt or sand floors hamper mechanics by sand sticking to their tools, sand getting on parts, in fuel and grease. This increases the wear and tear on vehicles and increases the maintenance workload. An approved project for MCA construction covers this problem area; however, the date construction will begin has not been determined.

(c) Recommendation: That sufficient command emphasis be placed on the MCA project to assure accomplishment of construction of adequate maintenance facilities in the near future.

f. Organization: None

g. Other: None

3. Section III, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information: Not required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JAMES F. HUNT
Asst Adjutant

2 Inclosures
1 - Group Organization Chart
2 - Diagram of 5th Wheel Pin

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AVCA CRB-GO-0 (12 May 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 500th Transportation Group for the
Period Ending 30 April RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, APO 96312

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-0,
APO 96384

This headquarters concurs with the Operational Report of the 500th Trans-
portation Group with the following exceptions.

1. Reference Section II, paragraph 9 (1) a. Concur: At present Support
Command has only 71% of authorized drivers. This shortage has been
brought to the attention of 1st Logistical Command.
   b. Nonconcur on recommendation that drivers be trained in CONUS. On
the job training of drivers should be sufficient.

2. Reference Section II, paragraph b (3) Concur: Further recommend
that this vehicle be considered for addition to all TOE’s for line haul
units within the US Army.

3. Reference Section II, paragraph e (1) Concur: This presents a
potential health problem and should be given immediate attention. Either
self-help or a responsive contract should be employed to rectify this
condition.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LEE W. SHEARER, JR
LT, AGC
ASST AG

CF: 500th Transportation Group
SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned of the 500th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for Period Ending 30 April 1969 HCS CSFOU-65.

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375.

The Operational Report — Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 500th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning Qualified Drivers, page 2, paragraph 2 a (1). Concur with the basic recommendation. Nonconcur with paragraph 1 b of 1st Indorsement. This command is presently at 88% authorized strength in MOS 64A10 and 64B20. The assignment of unqualified personnel seriously impairs the operational capability of units assigned to HVN. The introduction of sufficient qualified individuals to the replacement stream from AIT centers would greatly enhance the operational capabilities of units assigned to HVN by minimizing the transition period required to train individuals for a job.

   b. Reference item concerning 5th Wheel Pin Disengagement, page 2, paragraph 2 b (1). Concur. Action is necessary to improve the method of pin disengagement. Recommend that this problem be reviewed by USATACOM and appropriate action be taken to modify the equipment.

   c. Reference item concerning V-100 Commando Vehicles, page 3, paragraph 2 b (3). Concur. This headquarters strongly feels there is a requirement in Vietnam for organic armor in Commando vehicles; however, the ENS-A-R request submitted by this headquarters was not favorably considered.

   d. Reference item concerning Food Service, page 4, paragraph 2 e (1). Concur. This headquarters is aware of the problem and is taking action to insure that the contractor will provide service to keep the sump pits clean as required.

   e. Reference item concerning Maintenance Facilities, page 4, paragraph e (2). Nonconcur. This headquarters recognizes the need for additional maintenance shop space at Cam Kanh Bay and has given expeditious processing to the construction request. This project has been approved and directed by MACV (Project No. S-019-11), but has been given a low priority (No. 80 for vertical construction) on the MACV Central Area Integrated Priority List of Contract Construction.
AVCA 00-MH (12 May 69) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 500th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous endorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

C. D. STAFFORD
Lt., AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM, CRB
500th TC Group
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HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, APO 96558

1. (C) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 500th Transportation Group (KT).

2. (C) Reference item concerning "V-100 Commando Vehicles," section II, page 3, paragraph 2c(3), 1st indorsement, paragraph 2 and 2d indorsement, paragraph 2e; nonconcur. Present assets of V-100 armored cars are being issued to US Army military police units and will be employed primarily for convoy and line of communication security. When considering the increased convoy security that will be provided by the military police units equipped with V-100 armored cars, it does not appear feasible to issue V-100 armored cars to transportation units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
500th Trans Gp
1st Log Cmd

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GPOP-DT (12 May 69) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 500th Trans Gp (Motor Transport) for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 23 JUL 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:
Engagement & Disengagement of 5 Ton Fifth Wheel

bunk adapter  
brazing rod
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 500th Transportation Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

**CO, 500th Transportation Group**

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**ABSTRACT**

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