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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA (M). (8 Aug 69) FOR OT UT 392284 20 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

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15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned
(1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969)

TO: Deputy Commanding General
USARV
ATTN: AVHC-DH
APO 96375

The inclosed Operational Report Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with AR 525-15, USARPAC Regulation 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. R. STAMP
1LT AGC
Asst AG

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

I. Significant Organizational or Unit Activities

1. Introduction:

The Operational Report Lessons Learned covers the period 1 February 1969 through 31 March 1969. During this period, the 173d Airborne Brigade has continued to conduct combat operations aimed at locating and destroying North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces and installations in the Republic of Vietnam. The Brigade also conducted pacification operations designed to safeguard the village areas and gradually turn over full responsibility to the Vietnamese themselves. As United States Army Vietnam's reserve, the Brigade has remained alert to quickly and forcefully respond to any enemy threat and meet any assigned mission. The 173d Airborne Brigade's civic action program continued to play a primary role in the Brigade's efforts to help the people of Vietnam help themselves.

Fighting the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Regulars requires a highly mobile combat force, able to adapt to an elusive enemy on its own ground and conduct successful operations in low plains, rice paddies, dense jungles and mountainous terrain. The 173d Airborne Brigade has proved to be just such a unit.

Since arriving in Vietnam in May 1965, as the American Army's first ground combat unit, the 173d, better known as the Sky Soldiers, have provided quick reaction to problem areas from the mountains of I Corps to the rice barns of the IV Corps Tactical Zone.

To best accomplish its mission, the 173d Airborne Brigade conducts a total of 10 combat operations throughout its area of responsibility. Operations took place in the following three AO's, AO Dan Cuong/Lee (Bong Son-Uplift), AO Sue Phan/Marshall (An Khe), and AO Dan Phu/Willowright (Tuy Hoa). In mid March the Brigade terminated its major combat operations and began conducting pacification operations in Binh Dinh Province. For a short time the Brigade also conducted operations around the port of Qui Nhon in southern Binh Dinh province. Among the responsibilities of the Brigade are: Reconnaissance-in-force operations throughout its geographical area; security of Highway 19 from An Khe to Mang'ang Pass (the main logistical link between the coastal port of Qui Nhon and the Central Highlands); security of Highway 1 from Qui Nhon to I Corps (South Vietnam's only north-south highway), and protection of the villages and rice harvests in the heavily populated agricultural regions along the coast.

The 173d Airborne Brigade continued to be under the leadership of Brigadier General John W. Barnes, who assumed command on 15 December 1968. BG Barnes joins the 173d Airborne Brigade with an impressive background of leadership. A native of El Paso, Texas, BG Barnes is a 1942 United States Military Academy graduate...

(1)
Central Academy graduate. Commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers, his entire World War II service was with the 51st Engineers, where he served in succession as company commander, adjutant, assistant division engineer and operations officer.

BG Barnes earned his Masters Degree in Aeronautical Engineering from the California Institute of Technology in 1946, and after various peacetime assignments came Korea where he commanded the 1542d Engineer Combat Battalion until his branch transfer to Infantry in February 1954. Various other assignments and schooling followed until August 1966 when he returned to the Pentagon as Assistant Director for Operational Test and Evaluation.

BG Barnes' assignment prior to assuming command of the 173d Airborne Brigade was as Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps Tactical Zone. His decorations include the Legion of Merit, Soldier's Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal and Army Commendation Medal. He also wears the Presidential Unit Citation (Korea), the Vietnamese Distinguished Service Order, 1st Class, the Vietnamese Gallantry Cross with Gold Star, and Vietnamese Psychological Operations Medal, 1st Class.
Subject: Operational Report Lessons Learned

2. Organization:

General William C. Westmoreland, in late 1967, saluted the 173d Airborne Brigade as "one of the finest units in the history of the American Fighting Man".

Indeed, the first Army combat unit in Vietnam, the first to make a helicopter assault, the first to engage the enemy and the only unit to make a combat jump, the 173d has attained a stunning battle record from cracking the infamous Iron Triangle to reaching the summit of Hill 875 at Dak To.

Organized on 25 June 1963, from the 2nd Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry, the 173d Airborne Brigade inherited the proud tradition of the 503d Parachute Regiment that jumped into combat on Corregidor in 1944. The Brigade was originally designed as a "quick reaction" strike force for troubled areas in the Far East. And, for two years before coming to Vietnam, the Brigade trained extensively in airborne, guerrilla and jungle warfare. Countless training jumps on Taiwan earned the paratroopers the name of Sky Soldiers.

Presently under the control of the 1st Field Force Vietnam, the Brigade is conducting operations east of the central highlands, north to I Corps, south to Tuy Hoa and west to An Khe. The Brigade is also used as a strike force to other hot spots in the Corps area.

Diversity in structure provides the Brigade with the capability of conducting numerous types of operations at the same time. The fighting force of the Brigade is comprised of four airborne infantry battalions of the 503d Infantry, the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, E Troop, 17th Cavalry, the 1st Battalion (Mech) 50th Infantry, D Company, 16th Armor, and 173d Engineer Company.

In the past quarters there were four significant changes in the structure of the Brigade. Effective 4 February 1969, Company D, 16th Armor was detached from the 4th Battalion, (Airborne) 503d Infantry. By authority of VCOG it was returned to Brigade control for administration and logistical actions. The unit was placed under the operational control of the Brigade Liaison Team OIC for Tuy Hoa.

Effective 10 March 1969, Company E (Provisional) was inactivated, and personnel declared essential to operational and support functions were assigned to the 173d Support Battalion. Remaining personnel were placed into the Brigade replacement stream and assigned according to current requirements. Material was retained where an authorized requirement existed, and material classified as excess to authorized organizational needs was disposed of according to established procedures.

Also effective on 10 March 1969, the 2d Provisional Rifle Company (Installation Security) was inactivated, and all personnel were placed into the Brigade replacement stream and assigned according to current requirements. Material was
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disposed of according to established procedures. One airborne infantry company in its entirety from the 4th Battalion (Airborne) 503rd Infantry was provided on a rotational basis for Greenline perimeter security at Camp Radcliff. Each company so designated is OPCON to the 1st Battalion (Mech) 50th Infantry for the duration of its perimeter security mission. The duration of perimeter security cycle for each company was at the discretion of the Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion (Airborne) 503rd Infantry.

The fourth change became effective 13 April 1969 when C/1-69th Armor was released from its status as OPCON to the 173rd Airborne Brigade and returned to the control of the 4th Infantry Division. At 130800H C/1-69th (-) commenced a road move from LZ Uplift to Camp Radcliff where 1 Platoon C/1-69th Armor joined it for operations under the direction of the 4th Inf Div.

A minor change not affecting the structure or organization of the Brigade occurred on 14 April 1969 when the name of D Company 16th Armor in AO Dan Phu/ Wainwright was redesignated the Tuy Hoa Provisional Tank Co. The unit remained under the operational control of the Bde LNO team at Tuy Hoa.
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3. Intelligenc:
   a. General:

   During the past three months the 173d Airborne Brigade conducted numerous activities throughout its area of responsibility. This area includes a large part of II Corps as assigned by higher headquarters. Intelligence matters can best be reported according to the Brigade's three AU's. They are: AO Dan Cuong/Lee (formerly Cochise), AO Dan Phu/Wainwright (formerly Bolling), and AO Quoc Manh/Marshall (formerly Walker). Matters not directly affecting one of these AOs will be treated separately.

   b. Enemy Order of Battle:

   The enemy order of battle is given below:

   **AO Dan Cuong/Lee**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>EST STRENGTH</th>
<th>PROBABLE LOCATION</th>
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<tr>
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<td>BS 3265</td>
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<td>2d VC Regt/NT 3</td>
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<td>93d Bn/2d VC Regt</td>
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<td>97th Bn/2d VC Regt</td>
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<td>E210 LF Bn</td>
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*AO Dan Phu/Mainwright*

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*AO Suc Manh/Marshall*

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<td>BQ 2143</td>
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<tr>
<td>5210 LF Bn</td>
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c. **Nature of the Terrain:**

(1) **AO Dan Quang/Le:**

This AO is located in the northern portion of Binh Dinh Province, centered around the city of Bong Son (BR 8796). In the flat, seasonally inundated coastal plains, there are three low mountain spurs with numerous adjacent hills. The lowland plains grade westward into rolling plains, foothills, and then into steep, heavily dissected mountains. The terrain becomes increasingly rugged from east to west. The predominant vegetation is rice cultivation in the lowlands and light to dense undergrowth in the hills and mountains. There are numerous valleys which facilitate movement, however, all expedient movement is restricted to existing trails, roads and waterways. The coastal lowlands consist of poorly drained, flat to undulating plains. Most of the lowlands have an average elevation of 10 meters. There are some extensive lowland areas which have an elevation of 20 meters or greater, such as My Hoi (BR 2465). The lowlands are 10 kilometers wide in the north and gradually broaden to 29 kilometers in the south.

(2) **AO Dan Phu/Mainwright:**

This AO is located north and west of the city of Tuy Hoa (CQ 1547) in Phu Yen Province. The area of interest is bounded by coordinates BQ7000, CQ1060 and CQ3000. The eastern boundary is the South China Sea. Three-fourths of the area is mountainous and forested. Most of the remainder of the area is...
flat land used either for cultivation of rice or other lowland crops. Along the coast there are rolling hills and sand dunes, except where the mountain outcroppings meet the sea. Since most of the area consists of mountains and hills, there is no drainage problem. The major drainage system is formed by the DA RANG or SONG BA Rivers and its tributaries. This river traverses the center of the AO from west to east (BQ7039-CQ6346). The tributaries flow generally north-south depending upon their location relative to the SONG BA River. The river empties into the South China Sea. Vegetation in the plains area is predominantly rice fields. Further inland, dense broadleaf evergreen forest covers the mountain ridge with canopy rising in excess of 50 feet. Interprovincial Route 7E and Route 1 are the main lines of communication in the area.

AO Suc Manh/Marshall

This AO is located in west-central Binh Dinh Province and is centered around the city of An Khe (BR 4549). Generally, the AO is two high river valleys defined by the IAKRDM and DAK AYUNH Rivers and by three mountain ridges: KONG GRANG on the west, CAU TOMACH in the central portion of the AO and the high mountains along the PLEIKU-BINH DINH Province border. Average elevation of the river valleys is between 500-700 meters. The high hills have an average elevation of 1200 meters. The vegetation of the river valleys is primarily composed of two multi canopied, light undergrowth forests. The light undergrowth forest is predominant throughout the river valleys. Highway 19 is the principle road in the area. It is an all weather loose surface road, one to two lanes wide. Highway 19 runs east-west through the center of the AO. The other roads in the area are unimproved dirt roads, usable only during fair weather.

d. Nature of the Weather:

(1) February:

February is a dry season month throughout most of the Republic of Vietnam. The mean daily temperature increased slightly and remained in the high 70s and low 80s. The majority of precipitation was associated with afternoon convective showers or isolated thundershowers. Visibility was generally good during the month. Low level clouds, due to the monsoonal flow, often occurred in the early mornings with ceilings below 1,000 feet common in exposed valleys. Morning fog also formed over most river valleys and was most prevalent and persistent in the deep, steep-walled valleys. This fog generally formed around 0400H and dissipated by 0900H. Visibility was usually reduced to less than 3 miles during these hours of early morning fog.
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(2) March:

In the central highlands along the eastern coast of the Republic of Vietnam, there is an overall increase in temperature, visibility and humidity and subsequently a decrease in precipitation, wind speed and thunderstorm activity. This is due to the lessening of the northeast monsoonal influences.

The majority of precipitation during the first half of the month was associated with afternoon convective showers but continued to decrease in frequency during the latter part of the month. The precipitation for March was between 2 and 3 inches which was obtained mostly during 3 days.

Cloudiness decreased in amount and persistency toward an April minimum. Mean cloudiness in the coastal central highlands was about 30 to 40% and the ceilings were around 3000 feet with ceilings of around 1500 feet on several mornings in this area.

Visibility was generally 5 to 8 miles during March with occasional morning cloudiness limiting it to 2 to 3 miles but lifting prior to 0900 hours. Unlike other portions of Vietnam the Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces received very few thunderstorms with none occurring during March of this year.

Mean temperatures raised about ten degrees from that of February. The range was from 67 degrees (during the early part of the month) to a high of 99 degrees during the extreme latter part of the month, with a mean temperature of 80 degrees. Relative humidity showed an increased high of 83% which is also somewhat higher than the previous month.

Winds during March generally came from the NNE or NE with wind speeds varying from nearly nonexistent to 24 knots. The higher winds were during the earlier part of the month due to the greater influences of the northeastern monsoonal conditions. This trend should continue through the next month.

(3) April:

The majority of precipitation during the first half of the month was associated with afternoon convective showers but continued to decrease in frequency during the latter part of the month. The precipitation for April was between 2 and 3 inches. Cloudiness decreased in amount and persistency toward a May minimum. Mean cloudiness in the coastal central highlands was about 30 to 40% and the ceilings of around 1500 feet on several mornings in this area. Visibility was generally 5 to 8 miles during April with occasional morning cloudiness limiting it to 2 to 3 miles but lifting prior to 0900 hours.
Mean temperatures remained about the same as that of March. The range was from 61 degrees (during the early part of the month) to a high of 98 degrees during the extreme latter part of the month, with a mean temperature of 80.2 degrees. Relative humidity showed an increased high of 84% which is also somewhat higher than the previous month. Winds during April generally came from the N or NE with wind speeds varying from nearly nonexistent to 20 knots.

a. Enemy Strengths and Weaknesses:

(1) AO Dan Cuong/Lee

(a) Strengths:

1. The enemy continues to carry out small-scale attacks, gaining for him a certain degree of success, allowing him to cause friendly casualties at a minimum risk to his forces. He is capable of continuing such operations, targeted against friendly convoys, bridges, and RF/FF outposts.

2. The enemy is still able to conduct extensive sapper attacks and their rate has continually increased since the first of the year. Sappers enjoy an elite status among VC/NVA units, specializing in spearheading infantry operations, in explosives and demolitions, land and water mine warfare, assassination, terrorism, kidnapping, sabotage and bridge destruction. Their primary mission is to precede enemy infantry in attack, breaching barbed wire and other obstacles impeding the infantry's advance.

3. Elements of the 500th Transportation Battalion continue to operate in the An Lao Valley (BS7408) and An Do Valley area (BS8515), providing a resupply capability for the 3rd NVA Division, which is operating in Quang Ngai Province. During the last three weeks of February, 6 reports per week were received concerning a battalion sized force west of Tam Quan; LRP observations have, however, failed to confirm these reports.

4. The enemy remains capable of employing mortars and recoilless rifles against airfields and landing zones, as this type of attack involves little risk to his forces, and, if successful, can cause considerable damage and cause both aircraft and equipment to be inoperable for varying periods.

(b) Weaknesses:

1. Successful combat operations conducted during the months of February, March and April, based on combat intelligence, rendered hardships on existing VC/NVA units and caused enemy elements to continue to avoid major contact with allied units.
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2. The enemy continues to be prone to hunger and personnel illness through sustained living in the jungle environment. The enemy is generally short of medicine and proper medical treatment facilities. A NVA PW captured in November stated that 200 men of his 600 man infiltration group were too sick to participate in combat operations upon their arrival in Binh Dinh Province.

3. Psychological warfare will no doubt continue to have effect on enemy morale and effectiveness, especially due to successful Allied operations during the past quarter, the growing effectiveness of combined US-ARVN operations and the continued use of National Police. Recruited and impressed VC personnel are relatively untrained and inexperienced NVA units are short of experienced leaders. The NVA replacements have received minimal training. This lack of training lowers morale and makes the enemy extremely vulnerable to allied psychological operations.

(2) AO Dan Phu/Wainwright:

(a) Strengths:

1. The enemy is capable of continued harassment, terrorism and base camp infiltration, making full use of sapper-type units. The enemy is also capable of attacking population centers and allied installations in multi-battalion strength, utilizing the 4th, 5th and 6th Bn, 95th NVA Regiment and the 85th LF Bn. Principal targets are TUY HOA City District Headquarters and allied airfields.

2. Enemy forces in AO Wainwright are capable of being reinforced by the currently unlocated 95th NVA Regiment. The resultant increase in manpower and equipment of such an enemy option would pose a distinct threat to US/GVN/FWMAF installations and activities.

3. The enemy retains his ability to continue interdiction of communication lines, mining of primary and secondary routes of travel, sabotage operations and small-scale operations against such targets as the bridge at Q 201351, as this is the primary crossing across the SONG BA River at TUY HOA City. The enemy can also attempt company-sized attacks, reinforced by local forces, on weakly-defended district headquarters and outposts, as a victory for propaganda means and to harass the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam pacification efforts.

4. A Hoa Chanh who turned himself over to the 130th RF Company has stated the former SSR of MR 5 has dissolved, and the 6th Bn, 95th NVA

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Regt, former SSR and elements of Infiltration Group 7010 are forming a new regiment, the OT10. If true, this expansion would pose a definite threat to US/GVN/FWMAF installations and activities within the AO.

(b) Weaknesses:

1. The success of US, ARVN and ROK operations from January through October makes the VC/NVA vulnerable to psychological warfare, especially as the enemy continues to be prone to hunger and personnel illness through both sustained living in the jungle environment and a marginal logistics system.

2. The enemy supply system flows from west to east and can be interdicted on the western edge of PHU YEN Province. The enemy's logistics systems is currently operating at a marginal level, thus, the indications are a move by the 95th NVA Regiment to the west. The major weakness of the enemy has been his inability to sustain contact due to their marginal logistics system.

3. The enemy continues to be vulnerable to air and artillery retaliation, aerial observation and photography, intermittent artillery firing, APD and Red Haze reading. The use of ready reaction forces has severely limited the enemy's mobility and activities.

4. Recruited and impressed VC personnel are relatively untrained, unexperienced and lacking motivation. NVA units are short experienced leaders and NVA replacements have received minimal training. This lack of training lowers morale and makes the enemy extremely vulnerable to allied psychological operations.

5. The enemy is generally short of medicine and proper medical treatment facilities. This lack of medicine, particularly for treatment of malaria cases, deeply erodes the combat effectiveness of the enemy.

(3) AO Suc Mem/Marshall:

(a) Strengths:

1. The enemy is able to continue to employ, to a limited extent, mortars and recoilless rifles against Camp Radcliff. If successful, such an attack can cause personnel injury, damage to fixed-wing and rotary aircraft and damage to logistical storage areas and logistical items.

2. The enemy is able to conduct company and perhaps larger sized attacks in both isolated villages and hamlets and outposts and check-
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points maintained by US forces along Highway 19. He is also capable of conducting ambushes and isolated mineings of primary and secondary routes of travel, interdiction of lines of communication, sabotage operations against pipelines, and terrorist activities, including sporadic but effective sniper firings, against the outposts and checkpoints maintained within the AO along Highway 19.

2. The E210 LF Battalion remains on the perimeter of the eastern portion of the TAOR, and is capable of reinforcing enemy elements. A PW captured by 1/50th Inf on 20 March 1969 vic BR5045 has stated his unit is the 7th Bn, 18th NVA Regiment, indicating the possible presence of the battalion within the AO.

4. The enemy remains capable of making use of extensive sapper activities, most particularly in the destruction by explosives and demolitions of vital bridges along Highway 19 and aircraft, logistical points and primary buildings within Camp Radcliff.

(b) Weaknesses:

1. The enemy is vulnerable to aerial observation and air and artillery retaliation in most areas of the TAOR. He is also vulnerable to intermittent artillery firings, APD sensings and Red Haze readings and ready-reaction force units.

2. Due to the widespread support of allied operations in this AO and continued successful rapport with the Vietnamese civilians, through such means as the hiring of Vietnamese workers on Camp Radcliff, the success of revolutionary-development programs, and the protection offered the Vietnamese farmers through the continued presence of US troops, the enemy is not able to coerce the populace through terrorist or sabotage activities as evident in other areas of South Vietnam. By virtue of the Allied-Vietnamese relationship, the operations successes of US troops, and our continued presence, the enemy, most especially the VC, is particularly vulnerable to the Chieu Hoa and and other psychological operation programs.

3. The enemy is generally short of medicine and proper medical treatment facilities. This lack of medicine, particularly for treatment of malaria cases, deeply erodes the combat effectiveness of the enemy.

4. Many enemy units are experiencing morale problems brought on by a shortage of medical support, sickness, lack of food, allied firepower, lack of significant victories and the unexpected length of the war. Continued allied operations against base areas and enemy LOC continue to disrupt enemy planning and resupply, and deteriorate combat effectiveness.
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f. Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses (Omitted, Hq, DA)

g. Estimate of Future Enemy Actions:

(1) AO Dan Cuong/Lee:

It is expected that VC/NVA forces in AO lee will conduct interdiction missions against CL-1 and TL-3A, utilizing mines, snipers and platoon size ambushes. The enemy can also be expected to conduct offensive operations in the form of ground probes, stand-off attacks by fire and sapper attacks against US/GVN installations as well as ground attacks in up to company size strength in support of the "Summer Offensive" which may be initiated or culminated on Ho Chi Minh's Birthday on 19 May 1969. Ground attacks will be targeted primarily against RF/PF and ARVN outposts and US elements engaged in pacification activities. District Headquarters may also be attacked primarily because of the psychological advantage which could be gained from such an attack. The 18th NVA Regiment supported by local guerrillas constitute a particular threat to the Phu My Plains area.

(2) AO Dan Phu/Wainwright:

Continued interdiction of LOC and harass-ment of the GVN pacification effort is expected. The 85th LF Battalion is believed to be located in Base Area 236 and the 6th Bn, 95th NVA Regiment is believed to be located in the mountainous area northwest of Tuy Hoa. These two units have been avoiding contact during the month of April and it is believed they have been re-supplying and regrouping in preparation for the Summer Offensive which is scheduled to begin in May 69. The previously unreported 12th NVA Regiment is believed to be located in Phu Yen Province and, as such indicates a significant increase in the enemy's capability in AO Wainwright. The 12th NVA Regt may figure strongly in the Summer Offensive, although it must be pointed out that sufficient information is not presently available to accurately assess the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Regt. The 30th MF Battalion is located southwest of Tuy Hoa and will probably be targeted against the Vung Ro Bay Transportation complex during the Summer Offensive. The 6th Battalion 95th NVA Regt, the 85th LF Bn along with other Local Force elements will probably be targeted against Tuy Hoa City and the pacification hamlets in the AO Wainwright area.
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(3) AO Suc Manh/ Marshall:

The 4th and 5th Battalions, 95B NVA Regt will continue efforts to interdict QL-19 from LZ Schueler west. The enemy will employ mines, snipers, small anti-tank teams, mortar attacks and up to multi-company strength ambushes in his efforts. His pipeline interdiction efforts will also continue. The enemy is capable of conducting attacks by fire and limited ground attacks supported by snipers against friendly installations and outposts. The movement of the 3rd Battalion, 18th NVA Regt into the AO in February, confirmed by both PW statements and captured documents, significantly increases the enemy threat to QL-19. The enemy will attempt to increase his interdiction efforts along QL-19, as this economy of force measure is especially suitable for his forces.
4. Combat Operations:
   a. Introduction:

   During the months of February, March, and April, the 173d Airborne Brigade conducted combat operations in the areas of responsibility assigned the Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade, encompassing Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Phu Bon Provinces and coinciding with the area of operations assigned to the 22d Infantry Division (AIVN). The Brigade Forward Command Post continued to be located at LZ English, north of Bong Son, and the Brigade Rear continued to be located at Camp Radcliff (AN KHE). As of 31 January 1969 all existing operations had ceased and three new operations began concurrent with new reporting period. In AO Dan Cong/Lee the 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry conducted operations Darby Crest I (1 Feb 69 - 3 Mar 69), Darby Crest II (3 Mar 69 - 25 Mar 69) and Darby Crest III (25 Mar 69 - 15 Apr 69). They were conducted in areas generally to the north of LZ Uplift for the primary purpose of conducting Hunter-Killer/Search operations. The 1/503d received support from C (-) 1-69 Armor and 3/E-17 Cavalry as security forces along QL-1. Also in AO Dan Cong/Lee the 2nd Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry conducted Operations Darby Trail I (1 Feb 69 - 8 Feb 69) and Darby Trail II (8 Feb 69 - 15 Apr 69). They were conducted in areas surrounding LZ English for the primary purpose of Hunter-Killer/Reconnaissance in Force operations. The 2/503d received support from C (-) 1-69 Armor at North English; 1/E-17 Cavalry provided security at the Bong Son Bridge.

   In AO Dan Phu/Wainright the 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry conducted Operations Darby March I (1 Feb 69 - 8 Feb 69) and Darby March II (8 Feb 69 - 6 Mar 69). They were conducted in areas around Tuy Hoa as Hunter-Killer/Reconnaissance in Force operations. Also during this time 2-16 Armor (Tuy Hoa Provisional Tank Co) continued operations near Tuy Hoa North Airfield and surrounding areas in support of the Phu Yen Province Pacification Program. They are continuing these operations at the present time. On 6 March 1969, however, the 4/503 moved to AO Suc Manh/Marshall where they conducted Operations Stinger (6 Mar 69 - 10 March 69) and Darby Punch III (10 Mar 69 - 24 Mar 69). Operation Darby Punch III was conducted in areas around An The as Hunter-Killer/Reconnaissance in Force operations. Also active in AO Suc Manh/Marshall during the present quarter was the 1st Battalion (Mech 50th Infantry) which provided security and minesweeps on QL 19 and perimeter defense of Camp Radcliff until 15 April 1969 when they were relieved by elements of the 4th Infantry Division.

   On 21 March 1969 the 4/503 departed An the for Qui Nhon where they commenced Search and Clear/Security operations. This was not given a formal operation name, but continued until 8 April when the 4/503 (-) moved to North English. From 8 April 1969 to 15 April 1969 the 4/503d was involved in Darby Trail II in conjunction with the 2-17th. The 173d Airborne Brigade terminated Operation Darby Crest III and Darby Trail II on 15 April 1969 and at the same time, commenced...
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Operation Washington Green which is continuing at the present time. The 1st Battalion (Mech) 50th Infantry returned to AO Dan Cuong/Lee, and the Brigade terminated operations in AO Suc Manh/Marshall on 17 April 1969 when the 4th Infantry Division assumed control. Throughout this quarter the 3/319th Artillery continued in direct support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The 3rd Battalion (Abn) 503rd Infantry continued to remain OPCOM to Task Force South, conducting combat operations in southern II Corps. The activities of the 3/503d are reported by Task Force South.

b. AO Dan Cuong/Lee:

(1) General:

AO Dan Cuong/Lee is the Brigade's most densely populated area of operation, containing nearly 350,000 people. Of this number, an estimated 215,000 are considered as being under Viet Cong influence or as living in contested areas. Most of the population lives along the coast of the South China Sea in the rich, rice-producing lowlands and are engaged in either rice production (three to four crops each year) or commercial fishing, or the most part on an individual basis. The entire Binh Dinh area has long been identified as a Viet Cong stronghold, dating back to the days of French occupation.

One can easily realize that the enemy has long been aware of the Province's political and economic importance. The enemy's main force units, both Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, by and large remain in the jungle areas to the west of the rich, populated plains. Here they train and resupply, periodically making sorties into the lowlands in attempts to attack both American and Vietnamese military installations or local governmental headquarters. The main force units are also continually sending agents into the plains with many missions. By one, two's and in small groups, they come to purchase rice, fish, corn, coconuts, vegetables and medical supplies. They also acquire intelligence information and act as couriers.

It is also significant that Binh Dinh's coastal lowlands are some of the richest agricultural areas in Vietnam, its main crop being rice and vegetables. Three or four rice crops can be grown and gathered each year. The farmers of the Province also have and raise cattle for market. The coastal waters support a bustling fishing industry, the greater part of it being carried on by individuals in their own small boats. Fishing is aggressively pursued, perhaps 25% of the population being engaged in fishing itself or its offshoots, and contributes a great deal to the area's prosperity. It is significant that both farming and fishing produce excesses, to be sold in markets along the coast and in the Highlands. Thus, Binh Dinh Province is an economic "breadbasket".

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In addition, Route 1 L, Vietnam's coastal highway and the country's primary land communication route for all business and commerce (it is the only highway that runs the length of the country), runs through Binh Dinh's center. Because of its importance, Route 1 L has now been almost completely surfaced with asphalt in Binh Dinh Province. The Vietnam National Railroad, which runs parallel to Route 1 L, is heavily damaged, and has not been in use in AO Dan Quong/Lee since late 1964. However, the Vietnam National Railroad now operates between Quy Nhon and Phu Giat Air Force Base, hauling heavy equipment and building materials.

The close of the last reporting period (31 Jan 69) saw the 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry conducting operations in the Vinh Thanh and Suoi Ca and along the Crescent and Crows Foot areas. However, the 18th NVA Regt continued to avoid contact with these allied forces. The 2nd En (Abn) 503d Infantry conducted operations targeting the 570th Transportation Battalion along the Quang Ngai-Binh Dinh Province border and the An Lao Valley. Since 5 January 1969, four (4) reports of regimental-sized units and thirteen (13) reports of battalion or multi-battalion sized forces being present west of Tan Quan (BS 8015) have been received. However, FWA1 reconnaissance in force operations and LPP teams have failed to produce evidence of a regimental-sized unit operating in the area. Hand-held photography and visual reconnaissance have, nonetheless, shown a marked increase in fortification construction.

(2) Operation Darby Crest I:

On 010001H February 1969 the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry commenced Operation Darby Crest I with the 40th ARVW Regiment in the Crescent Plains area via BR 8194. This was based on intelligence gathered from LRP sightings, captured documents, airborne personnel detector (APD) readings, and agent reports. The operation was targeted against the D22 Hoai An District Co., local force guerrillas, and elements of the 18th NVA Regiment conducting food collection efforts in the Crescent area.

During Operation Darby Crest I the following significant contacts were made: (Omitted, Hq, DA)
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Operation Darby Crest I terminated effective 030730H March 1969, and 1/503d prepared for future operations. Cumulative results for the operation are as follows:

**US Losses:** 1 KIA, 6 WIA

**CIDG Losses:** None

**ARVN Losses:** 1 KIA, 1 WIA

**US Inflicted Enemy Losses:** 48 KIA, 1 CIA, 18 SA, 6 HG's, 1 GS, 267 det, misc documents, 5 RS, 60,000 piasters, 1 Civ radio and misc equip.

(3) **Operation Darby Crest II:**

On 040800H March 1969 the 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry commenced Operation Darby Crest II. For the most part, strategy consisted of Huk/RIF and cordon-search of selected villages along QL 1 in support of Rural Development Teams and overall pacification projects. To a large extent this was a continuation of Operation Darby Crest I.

During Operation Darby Crest II the following significant contacts were made:

(Omitted, Hq, DA)
(4) Operation Darby Crest III:

On 250800 H March 1969 the lst Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry commenced Operation Darby Crest III. This was largely a continuation of the two previous operations which utilized Hawk/RF operations and from time to time utilized the strategy of air assaulting a rifle company to surround a village early in the morning or cordoning a village at last light of the day prior to the search. Utilizing the National Police, a complete investigation would then be made of all inhabitants. Personnel without identification cards and other suspects would be detained for further investigation. Villages were searched, personnel were screened, caches were uncovered, Viet Cong and Viet Cong sympathizers were identified and successful contact was made with many three to five man Viet Cong carrying parties, liaison teams and reconnaissance units.

During Operation Darby Crest III, the following significant contacts were made: (Omitted Hq, DA)
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Operation Darby Crag III terminated effective 151200H April 1969, and the 1/503 immediately began new operations. Cumulative results for the operation are as follows:

US Losses: 3 WIA
CIDO: None
ARVN: None

US Inflicted Enemy Losses: 5 VC/NVA KIA, 1 SA, 1 HG, 145 det, 1.5 tons rice, misc equip and documents.

5) Operation Darby Trail I:

On 010001H February 1969 the 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry commenced Operation Darby Trail I with elements of the 40th ARVN Regiment and 2/14th APC Troop in the Bong Son Plains area vic BS 8407. This was based upon CIW statements, aerial reconnaissance, agent reports, Infra-red (IR) readouts, airborne personnel detector (APD) readings, and captured documents. The operation was targeted against the supply and transportation elements of the 3a NVA Division, Base Area 225 and the possible location of the 2d NVA Regiment.

During Operation Darby Trail I the following significant contacts were made:

1. 031240 BS712262 2/503 Hawk 21 eng 4 VC/NVA resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BG) and 1 rucksack CIA.

2. 050605 BS905974 2/503 Hawk 24 eng 1 VC who attempted to flee during a cordon and search operation. Documents on body confirmed he was a VC.

Operation Darby Trail I terminated effective 072400H February 1969 and the 2/503 immediately began new operations. Cumulative results for the operation are as follows:

US Losses: 1 WIA
CIDO Losses: None
ARVN: None

US Inflicted Enemy Losses: 4 KIA, 15 RS, misc med supplies, 8 mags, 10 ammo pouches, 2 canteens, 1 qt opium, 5 entrenching tools.

6) Operation Darby Trail II:

On 080001H February 1969 the 2nd Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry commenced Operation Darby Trail II as a continuation of Operation Darby Trail I, with elements of 2/40th ARVN Regt and 2/14th APC Trp active in surrounding areas. Maximum utilization of all intelligence sources was employed to locate enemy forces,
extensive use was made of Hawk/RIF tactics. On 081600H April 1969 the 4/503 (-) departed Qui Nhon for LZ North English and commenced operations as part of Darby Trail II. Their emphasis was also on Hawk/RIF tactics against local VC/NVA.

During Operation Darby Trail II the following significant contacts were made: (Omitted Hq, DA)
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AO Dan Phu/Wainwright:

(1) General:

AO Dan Phu/Wainwright is located in Phu Yen Province, to the west
and the north of Tuy Hoa city. Its population is estimated at 150,000 people,
most of whom live in the coastal, rice-producing lowlands or along the Song Ba
River. Of these 150,000 people, less than 5,000 are considered as being under
Viet Cong control and approximately 13,000 are inhabitants of contested areas.
The inhabitants principle occupations are fishing on an individual, small boat
basis, and farming, with rice being the main crop.

This AO is the normal area of operation for the 4th Battalion (Abn)
503d Infantry and D Company 16th Armor, (Tuy Hoa Provisional Tank Co) but after
6 March 1969 when 4/503 departed the AO the bulk of tactical responsibility was
assumed by D/16th Armor which remained. The continuing mission was locating and
destroying enemy forces in the area of operations, providing security for the
successful harvest of the population's rice crop (in conjunction with the 28th
ROK Regiment and the 47th Infantry Regiment, 22d Infantry Division (ARVN), to
provide security for elements of the 577th Engineer Battalion as they conducted
Rome Plow clearing operations along QL 7B (from Tuy Hoa to Cheo Reo), to support
the PHY YEN Province chiefs accelerated Pacification Program objectives and to
provide Phu Yen Province with a combat element to be utilized as a rapid reaction
force.

The close of the last reporting period (31 January 1969) saw D/16th
Armor conducting combined operations with Regional Force and Popular Force ele-
ments in support of the Phu Yen Province Accelerated Pacification Program, design-
ed to upgrade Government of the Republic of Vietnam control of AN NGHIEP Village
(6Q0741). The 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry returned to the AO on 22 Jan-
uary from other operations and immediately began conductin, reconnaissance in
force and HAWK Team operations to the west of DONG TRE, with these operations
continuing as the operation period ended.

(2) Operation Darby March I:

On 010001 H February 1969 the 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry
commenced Operation Darby March I in conjunction with the 26th Republic of Korea
Regiment. This operation was based upon maximum utilization of intelligence
sources and was in support of the Phu Yen Province Pacification Program. D/16th
Armor continued security operations at AN NGHIEP Hamlet and provided security for
the 577th Engineer Battalion conducting land clearing operations along QL 7B.
They also provided security at the Tuy Hoa North Airfield (CQ1548) and acted as
a Rapid Reaction Force.

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During Operation Darby March I the following significant contacts were made:

1. 020945 BQ992516 4/503 Hawk 422 eng 2 VC/NVA at 50 meters resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 2 AK-47s and 2 rucksacks CIA.

2. 020945 BQ997511 4/503 Hawk 423 fd 1 VC/NVA body fm B/4/503 contact at 0000510 on 310842 Jan.

3. 030745 BQ992514 D/4/503 eng 1 VC/NVA who returned fire. Results were 1 US WIA and 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1 AK-47 and 1 rucksack CIA.

4. 031005 BQ992516 B/4/503 eng 5 VC/NVA resulting in 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1x AK-47, 1x M-79, 1x SKS, 1x B-40 RL and 1 RPD LMG and misc military items CIA.

5. 040730 BQ996514 B/4/503 eng an estimated VC/NVA plt resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

6. 071325 BQ944579 D/4/503 rec'd SA fire fm 1 VC/NVA resulting in 1 US KIA. Arty was fired with und results.

Operation Darby March I terminated effective 080100 H February 1969 and 4/503 immediately began new operations, while D/16th Armor continued normal operations with no change. Cumulative results for the operation are as follows:

US Losses: 4 WIA
CIDG Losses: 1 KIA, 3 WIA
ARVN Losses: None
ROK Losses: None

US Inflicted Enemy Losses: 8 KIA, 8 SA, 21 HGs, 3 RS, 3 mag, 1 CS, 398 SA rds, 17 M-79 rds, 1 B-40 rkt rd, 4 satchel charges.

(3) Operation Darby March II:

On 080100 H February 1969 the 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry commenced Operation Darby March II. This was largely a continuation of Darby March I against the local VC/NVA forces but did not include combined operations with ROKs. There were, however, joint operations with elements of the 47th ARVN Regiment vic CQ5206 based upon visual reconnaissance and agent reports. These operations were in conjunction with pacification programs in Phu Yen Province.

During Operation Darby March II the following significant contacts were made:

1. 081240 BQ946577 D/4/503 eng 1 VC/NVA resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 M-1 carbine CIA. At 081430 again eng 1 VC/NVA resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 carbine CIA.
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2. 111804 BQ986584 4/503 Hawk 445 eng 1 VC/NVA sqd resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and a rucksack CIA.

3. 130946 BQ989583 4/503 Hawk 447 eng 2 VC/NVA resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1x M-1 carbine, 1x US pistol and 1 homemade rucksack CIA.

4. 161635 CQ072517 D Co loc 8 km W of Tuy Hoa was eng by an unk size enemy force. SA fire was exchanged, and arty and gunships supported the frdlly ele. Contact broke at 1815 hrs with the enemy fleeing NW. 1x ARVN soldier with the frdlly ele was KIA. Enemy results are unk.

5. 201740 CQ040498 1/B Co loc 12 km W of Tuy Hoa was eng by an unk size enemy force. Arty and gunships supported the contact. Results were 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). There were no frdlly cas.

6. 211700 CQ084505 Hawk 441 rec’d SA and AW fire fm 10-12 VC/NVA. Fire was returned with SA and AW. Gunships and arty supported the Hawk ele. D Co was committed as a reaction force. Contact broke at 1740 hrs and resulted in 1 US WIA, 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC), and 2 AK-47s, 4 chicom HGs, 1 pistol belt, 126 rds of AK-47 rds and 1 pr of binoculars CIA.

7. 212300 CQ058500 2/B Co eng an unk size enemy force with claymores and HGs approx 10 km W of Tuy Hoa. There were no frdlly cas. Enemy losses were 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 AK-47 CIA.

8. 241235 BQ986530 A Co loc 18 km WNW of Tuy Hoa eng an unk size enemy force moving S on a trail. The incident resulted in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC). A 9mm pistol with 2 clips of ammo, 3x M-26 HGs, assorted NVA web-gear, medicine and several docs were CIA.

9. 251430 BQ996519 A Co loc 17 km WNW of Tuy Hoa was eng by an unk size enemy force using SA and AW. The enemy loc in well fortified psns 20m fm the frdlly ele when contact was initiated. SA and AW fire was exchanged and at 1700 hrs, A Co withdrew fm the area in order to direct arty onto the enemy psn. B Co moved in to the contact area to act as a blocking force for A Co. Gunships also provided supporting fires. Enemy cas are unk and A Co sustained 7 men KIA and 10 men WIA in the contact.

10. 251500 CQ055511 B Co, enroute to A Co's contact area eng 3 VC/NVA in a small enemy base camp 16 km WNW of Tuy Hoa. The contact resulted in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). 1x SKS and 3 rucksacks were CIA. There were no frdlly cas.

11. 252230 CQ001516 B Co loc 16 km WNW of Tuy Hoa eng 5 VC/NVA who were coming fr. the vic of A Co's contact area. B Co used claymore mines on the enemy resulting in 5 VC/NVA KIA (BC). Items captured were 2 AK-47s, 1 AK-50, 2x SKS's, 19 chicom HGs, 1 M-26 HG, 5 AK/-/- mag with ammo, 537 AK-47 rds, 1x RPD drum, 5 rucksacks, 5 hamrocks, 100 1l of rice, and und ant of docs. There were no
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frdly cas. These KIAs and vps captured have been added to the totals for the operation.

12. 261000 CQ001516 B Co eng 1 VC/NVA resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). 2 chicom HGs and 19 AK-47 rds were CIA. There were no frdly cas.

MARCH:

13. 011100 BQ987563 4/503 A Co detonated unk type booby trap slightly wounding 5 US. At the same time 2-3 VC/NVA eng them and fled with unk cas when arty and gunships came to support.

14. 011718 CQ004573 4/503 A Co rec'd AW fire fm 3 VC/NVA after contact ele followed blood trail finding 1 9mm pistol, 1 poncho, 1 US litter, 1 US lensatic compass, 9 M-26 HGs and 50 lbs of potatoes CIA.

15. 021150 CQ010387 D/16 Armor ele escorting work party on hwy 7B rec'd SA and AW fire fm 7-8 VC/NVA resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA fm 577 Engrs.

Operation Darby March II terminated effective 060001 H March 1969 and 4/503 initiated withdrawal from AO Dan Phu/Wainwright to AO Suc Manh/Marshall. D/16 Armor continued normal Hawk/RIF operations while also providing security and RRF. Cumulative results for the operation are as follows:

US Losses: 7 KIA, 27 WIA
CIDG Losses: None
ARVN Losses: None
ROK Losses: None

US Inflicted Enemy Losses: 25 KIA, 14 SA, 12 RS, 1.5 tons rice, 1 pr binoculars, 13 HGs, 1 lensatic compass, misc docs and equip.

After the termination of Operation Darby March II D/16th Armor continued normal operations in the AO. On 14 April 1969 D/16th Armor became the Tuy Hoa Provisional Tank Company. In keeping with Brigade pacification efforts which began on 15 April 1968 the unit continued operations with the 47th ARVN Regiment in execution of the Tuy Hoa District pacification plan. The CP was collocated with the 4/47th ARVN at An Nghiep. Pacification activities centered around Mui Nieu (CQ 0745) and Phu Sen (BQ9636).
The following significant contacts were made after the termination of Operation Darby March II:

1. 211000 CQ001391 D/16 Armor 5 ton vehicle detonated 10-15 lb mine causing moderate damage. At 1430 hrs another 5 ton truck received moderate damage from a similar mine.

2. 250010 CQ059395 D/16 Armor rec'd 10-15 rds 82mm mtr. Countermortar was fired with unk results.

3. 261850 CQ059402 D/16 Armor APC hit an unk type mine. 3 US KIA, 2 US WIA and heavy damage to APC resulted. ARVN soldiers riding APC jumped off and detonated mine causing 9 WIA, another APC hit another mine while helping first APC. 5 additional ARVN's WIA.

4. 291700 CQ060402 D/16 Armor 1st Plt of Co D detained 3 VCOs. They were classified as 1 VC PW and 2 Civil Defendants.

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5. 031805 CQ044458 D/16 Armor loc 10 km W of Tuy Hoa sighted an unk size enemy force approx 1800 meters to their SW. They eng the area with .50 cal MG fire, 81mm mtr fire and art; also eng the area with unk results.

The Tuy Hoa Provisional Tank Company was still continuing operations in support of the pacification effort at the close of the present reporting period (30 April 1969). The cumulative results for their operation are as follows:

US Losses: 3 KIA, 2 WIA

CIDG Losses: None

ARVN Losses: 14 WIA

US Inflicted Enemy Losses: 1 VC PW and 2 Civil Defendants detained.
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d. AO Suc Manh/Marshall:

(1) General:

AO Suc Manh/Marshall is located in Binh Dinh Province in the areas surrounding An Khe. Notable in AO Suc Manh/Marshall is the good rapport that has continued with the Vietnamese citizens and the successful efforts of the government's Revolutionary Development program. This is the least populated of the Brigade's AOs. The 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry has been active in the AO in the present reporting period, but the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry did not conduct operations in the AO prior to 7 March 1969 when they arrived from Tuy Hoa (AO Dan Phu/Wainwright). Also, except for one company OPCON to 1/50th, the 4/503 did not conduct operations in the AO after 24 March 1969 when they departed for Qui Nhon.

The mission of Brigade units in the AO are to secure and maintain the vehicular traffic on QL 19, secure the Camp Radcliff/An Khe complex, locate and destroy enemy personnel and base camps and continue to support revolutionary development and civic action projects in the area of operation. The 2d Provisional Rifle Company, 173d Support Battalion (Airborne) continued to furnish perimeter guards and emergency support for Camp Radcliff, until 10 March 1969 when the 2d Provisional Rifle Company was deactivated and perimeter security was assumed by 1/50th with the OPCON company from 4/503.

The 1/50th continued its mission of securing strong points and bridge points along QL 19 which is the primary communications and logistics route from Qui Nhon to Pleiku. They also employed search and destroy and RIF operations, plus joint US-RF/FF operations (there are no ARVN units in the AO) and held one company as a RHF.

The close of the last reporting period (31 January 1969) saw a marked increase in enemy attacks against convoys and security forces along QL 19. Additionally, almost without exception the Camp Radcliff defensive perimeter had nightly activity in the forms of ground surveillance radar sightings, activated 'trip' flares, frontal movement and harassing fires. However, the 407th Bn withdrew from the AO and was located by a PW as having deployed to Pleiku Province. As stated earlier, the 1/50th continued uninterrupted operations in AO Suc Manh/Marshall prior to the arrival of the 4/503.

(2) Operation Stingray:

On 061146 H March 1969 the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry commenced Operation Stingray. The concept of the operation and its results presently have a higher classification than this report and reference is made to GARR Stingray I Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade, dated 23 March 1969 for further information.
Copies of this CAAR have been submitted through proper channels. Operation Stingray terminated effective 100800 H March 1969 at which time the 4/503 commenced new operations while retaining Stingray posture at Camo Radcliff.

(3) Operation Darby Punch III

On 100800 H March 1969 the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry commenced operation Darby Punch III. The operation made maximum use of intelligence sources and was designed primarily as Hunter-Killer (Hawk) and Reconnaissance-in-Force (RIF) tactics to combat local VC/NVA forces and support the local pacification programs. At 111035 H March 1969 the 4/503 commenced a second Stingray operation while continuing Operation Darby Punch III, and this is covered in CAAR Stingray II, Headquarters 173d Airborne Brigade, dated 23 March 1969, copies of which have been submitted through proper channels.

Prior to the beginning of Operation Darby Punch III the following significant contacts were made in AO Suc Nenh/Marshall by the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry: (Omitted Hq, DA)
CO. F1 DENTIAL

AVDR.SC/MHD
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 May 1969

(4) Search and Clear/Security:

Units of the 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry commenced an air move to Qui Nhon by C-130 from Camp Radcliff at 21422 H March 1969 with the last elements closing at Qui Nhon at 241940 H. D-4/503 remained at Camp Radcliff OPCON to 1/50th for camp security/RIF. Upon their arrival, the 4/503 commenced Hawk/RIF operations via GRO725 with 1 ROK Bn and 1 ARVN Bn. They also provided security for the large supply areas around the port of Qui Nhon.

During this operation there were no significant contacts reported. The 4/503 terminated S&G/Security operations effective 081600 H April 1969 and moved to LZ North English where they commenced operations in Derby Trail IX effective 081600 H April 1969. D-4/503 became OPCON to the 240th Quartermaster Battalion for security of tank farms 1 and 3 remaining in Qui Nhon, and C-4/503 continued as the company OPCON to 1/50th at Camp Radcliff. Cumulative results of the S&G/Security operation are as follows:

US Losses: None

US Infiltrated Enemy Losses: 45 det, 1 M72 LAW, 1 rucksack, misc docs.

b. Pacification Operations:

The 173d Airborne Brigade terminated Operations Derby Crest III and Derby Trail IX effective 151200 H April 1969 and effective at the same time commenced Operation Washington Green. Successful tactical operations by the Brigade had eliminated sufficient enemy forces and curtailed enemy activity to such a degree that the Brigade could concentrate on working with the local GVN forces in village security. A key move toward this goal was the co-location of US and ARVN battalion tactical CP's for better co-ordination between the two forces.

The pacification approach involves providing security to designated hamlets on a 24 hr basis. VC within the hamlets are rooted out and destroyed in coordinated actions with district forces, RD cadre, and district officials. Once the VC/NVA are denied access in and out of the hamlet's the RD cadre and district officials are able to control and work in the hamlets. Next, pacification means improving the military efficiency of ARVN as well as RF and FF forces. This entails joint operations and coordination training, and some limited material support. Finally, pacification involves assisting the GVN agencies within the
districts whenever possible. These efforts are all designed to bring peaceful stabilization within Binh Dinh Province and gradually transfer all responsibility to the Vietnamese themselves.

The 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry (-), (with E/17th Cavalry (-) and 1 platoon of A Company 1st Battalion (Mech), 50th Infantry OPCON) conducted HAWK/Security operations in support of the Hoai An pacification program. The battalion tactical CP was co-located with the Hoai An District HQ at LZ Orange. Pacification activities centered around An Duc Village (BR7982) and An Tin Village (BR7992) targeted against the D-22 Local Force Company.

The 2nd Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry (with the 2d Platoon of C Company 1st Battalion (Mech) 50th Infantry OPCON) conducted HAWK/Security operations in support of the Hoai An District pacification efforts. The battalion tactical CP was co-located with the Hoai An District HQ. Pacification activities centered around An Duc Village (BR7982) and An Tin Village (BR7992) targeted against the D-22 Local Force Company.

The 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry (with C Co (-) 1st Battalion 50th Infantry OPCON) conducted HAWK/Security operations in support of the Tam Quan District pacification efforts. The battalion tactical CP was co-located with the Tam Quan District HQ at LZ Tom. Pacification activities centered around Hoai Chau Village (BR8811) targeted against the D-35 Sapper Company.

The 1st Battalion (Mech) 50th Infantry (-) (with B Company 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry OPCON) conducted HAWK/Security operations in support of the Phu My District pacification program. The battalion tactical CP was co-located at Phu My District HQ. Pacification activities centered around Chanh Khoan Hamlet (BR9383) targeted against the D-23 Local Force Company.

During Operation Washington Green the following significant contacts were made as of 31 April 1969: (Omitted Hq, Da)
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

Operation Washington Green was still being conducted at the close of this reporting period (30 April 1969). Cumulative results for the operation to that time are broken down according to battalion/district and are as follows:

1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry:

US Losses: 54 US WIA, 1 2½ ton truck (slight damage); 1 Sct Dog killed

Friendly Losses: None

CIDG Losses: None

ARVN Losses: None

US Inflicted Enemy Losses: 4 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 2 SA, 18 det, 1.5 tons rice, and misc equipment CIA.

2nd Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry:

US Losses: 1 US KIA, 6 US WIA

Friendly Losses: 1 RVN Civ KIA

CIDG Losses: None

ARVN Losses: None

US Inflicted Enemy Losses: 5 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 27 det, 2 Chieu Hoi's.

4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry:

US Losses: 7 US KIA, 9 US WIA, 1 M16 and 1 M79

Friendly Losses: 3 National Police KIA

CIDG Losses: None

ARVN Losses: 1 interpreter WIA

US Inflicted Enemy Losses: 8 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 42 det
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1st Battalion (Mech) 50th Infantry:

US Losses: 9 US WIA, 1 TRV (trk rcvy veh) damaged
CIDG Losses: None
Friendly Losses: 2 RVN Civilians WIA
ARVN Losses: None
US Inflicted Enemy Losses: 1 VC/NVA KIA (EC); 18 Detainees

f. HAWK Team Operations:

During the past quarter, the 173d Airborne Brigade continued to utilize Hunter-Killer (HAWK) teams in their efforts to locate and destroy enemy forces. HAWK teams could safely be utilized due to the absence of large VC/NVA main force elements in the Brigade's three areas of operation. Their purpose has been to place small (fire team and larger) size ambushes along the jungle and lowland trails used by small enemy squads, couriers, liaison teams, and logistical carrying parties. By placing ambushes along these routes of enemy activity, the HAWK teams have provided a constant source of harassment to enemy units and have been able to cover an especially large land area. The utilization of HAWK teams by the 173d Airborne Brigade has proven to be particularly effective realizing an exceptionally high kill ratio. For a resume of team tactics and operations refer to GAAR: HAWK Team Operations, 173d Airborne Brigade, dated 13 January 1969.

g. Long Range Patrol (LRP) Activities:

(1) General:

During the past quarter, extensive use was made of Company N (Ranger) 75th Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade. A resume of their activities and significant contacts given below.

(2) February:

Company N (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted a total of 46 LRP missions during the month of February 1969. The LRP teams were generally assigned surveillance missions, however, they were also assigned hunter-killer (HAWK) and prisoner of war capture missions. These patrols accounted for 19 VC/NVA KIA (20), 16 VC/NVA KIA (poss), 2 WGS det and 7 enemy wpsns captured. The patrols o-a approx 380 VC/NVA personnel on 94 occasions. In conjunction with these missions, the LRP teams on 15 occasions adjusted artillery fire onto observed enemy personnel.
Based upon observations made by LRP teams, the 1/53 Inf conducted operations in central AO Dan Sinh Lee. Numerous company size operations were conducted in the AO, and on 2 occasions reaction forces were committed to exploit LRP observations.

During February the following significant contact were made: (Omitted Hq, DA)
Subject: Operational Report Lessons Learned

5. Artillery, Air, and Naval Support:

a. Artillery Support:

The 173d Airborne Brigade continued to be supported by its own direct support artillery, the 3d Bn 319th Artillery and elements of the 41st Artillery Group, I Field Force Vietnam, during the reporting period. For the entire period 3rd Bn 319th Artillery headquarters remained at LZ English, C Battery, 3d Bn 319th Artillery continued to remain as direct support artillery for the 3d Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, Task Force South. A synopsis of artillery support is reported by month for the reporting period.

(1) February:

The 3d Battalion 319th Artillery Headquarters remained at LZ English throughout the month. Btry A was also located at LZ English as the month commenced supporting a MSF company operating to the North of LZ English. Btry B continued to provide direct support to the 2/503d Inf from FSB Shenandoah. Btry C continued its operation with the 3/503d Inf in AO McClain as part of Task Force South. Btry D located at FSB Barbara, provided direct support to the 4/503d Inf throughout the reporting period.

On 4 Feb Btry D was probed by an undetermined size enemy force. Inspection of the perimeter the next day disclosed 1 VC/NVA body and 4 satchel charges. Activity of this type was to continue throughout the month for Btry D.

One 9 Feb Btry A moved from LZ English to FSB Lowboy to provide direct support to the 2/40th ARVN Regt operating along the Americal Division cordon. On the same day Btry D closed out the FSB Shenandoah and moved into LZ English in direct support of the 2/503d Inf. This move was accomplished with fifteen (15) CH 47 hook-loads in a total elapsed time of 100 minutes.

During the period 12-16 Feb and intensive H&I program was instituted by the CO 3/319th to thwart any VC/NVA offensive during the Tet holiday period. The entire Bong Son Plains area was included and it is interesting to note that the area was remarkably quiet. The heavy interdiction program was thought to have played a significant role.

Between 4 Feb and 20 Feb there were nine (9) reported incidents of aircraft receiving anti-aircraft fire in the LZ English - Bong Son area. There were a variety of airbursts observed but no firm AA positions could be located. On 21 Feb the 3/319th Arty placed 3 "Red Raider" teams on observation posts in an attempt to flash enemy weapons location. Again on 28 Feb a "Red Raider" team was placed for 3 days on an OP. Although no positive readings could be obtained from these teams, they did provide additional locations from which to adjust artillery on the enemy, and consequently will continue to occupy various OP's.
AVI 03/10

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

On 25 Feb LZ English received 20-30 82mm rounds. The 3/319th Artillery radar located at LZ North English identified the launch grid and the counter-mortar program was initiated in less than 90 seconds.

(2) March:

The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery Headquarters, remained at LZ English throughout the month and continued its mission of direct support for the 173d Airborne Brigade. Battery A, 3/319th FA, began the month by moving from FSB Louboy, where it had been supporting 40th ARVN Rept operations, to FSB Two Bits to support the 1/503d Inf Bn. Battery B, 3/319th FA, provided fire support from LZ English for the Bong Son - North English area and for the 2/503d Inf Bn. Btry C, 3/319th FA, continued its operation with the 3/503d Inf Bn in AO McClain as part of Task Force South. Btry D, 3/319th Artillery, began the month at FSB Barbara providing direct support to the 4/503d Inf Bn.

On 4 March Cpt Ngo, Battery Commander of C/63d ARVN Arty, led a combat patrol, consisting of a survey element and a security element from 3/319th FA, to the position from where LZ English was mortared on 28 Feb 1969. The surveyed location was incorporated into the U.S. and ARVN countermortar programs for LZ English.

Also, on 4 March, Btry D, 3/319th FA, moved by CH-47 from FSB Barbara to Tuy Hoa in preparation for a C-130 move on 7 March to An Khe in order to support future operations of the 4/503d Inf Bn.

CO, 3/319th FA, was the Fire Support Coordinator for Operation Stingray II on 6 March 1969. The target area was approximately 15 kilometers SW of An Khe. Delivery of the massive fire support into the target area was carried out smoothly and efficiently.

Stingray II was planned for 10 March 1969. In order to provide additional fire support, Battery D, 3/319th FA, road marched from An Khe to LZ Action on 9 March 1969. A special shipment of Tactical CS ammunition was flown in for use by the 105mm howitzers. After a delay of one day Stingray II was put into effect on 11 March. CO, 3/319th FA, was the Fire Support Coordinator for the operation. At the termination of Stingray II Battery D displaced by road back to An Khe.

On 1 March Battery D moved by CH-47 to FSB Ellen to support operations of the 4/503d Inf Bn southwest of An Khe.

Operation Red Thrust I, an artillery raid by one platoon of B/3/319th FA, took place on 19 March. The platoon was in position overlooking the upper An Lao Valley for approximately 5 hours and fired a total of 662 rounds. Spotters aircraft were airborne during the raid, and the platoon fired 4 missions and 151 rounds on targets acquired by them. Hooch complexes and possible base camp areas were fired on, and one secondary explosion was reported as a result of the obser-
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

The confirmed and acquired targets engaged on Red Thrust I were out of range of all other artillery as deployed at that time. The raid attacked an area that had been untouched by artillery in approximately 24 months, and the upper An Lao Valley would have continued to be a secure sanctuary if the raid had not been conducted.

On 21 March LZ English received 9-12 incoming 82mm mortar rounds. The counter-mortar radar in North English spotted the mortar rounds on the ascending portion of their trajectory and alerted the Bn FDC before the first round impacted. The countermortar radar also identified a B-40 rkt attack on LZ Tom and a mortar attack on Tam Quan District Headquarters.

Red Thrust II commenced on 23 March with the insertion of a platoon of B/3/319th into FSB Lisa. Again spotter aircraft were airborne during the operation and in 23 missions the platoon fired 482 rounds on the targets acquired by the aircraft. There were 4 ranger teams inserted into the area. Heavy contact compromised the positions of 2 ranger teams. Artillery support allowed contact to be broken and extraction made without further incident. Acquired intelligence targets were also engaged by the raiding platoon. Expenditures for all missions totaled 1113 rounds. Heavy sightings and contacts indicate that the area is a lucrative target for further artillery raids, and future raiding operations will concentrate in the upper An Lao Valley region.

Battery D moved by CH-47 from FSB Ellen to An Khe on 24 March. The following day they road marched to Qui Nhon to support the 4/503d Inf Bn operating in the area.

With the move of the 1/503d Inf Bn back to LZ Uplift, Battery A road marched from FSB Two Bits to FSB Crystal on 26 March to support operations of the 1/503d Inf Bn in the Phu My Plains.

April:

The 3d Battalion, 319th FA Hqs remained at LZ English throughout the month and continued its mission of direct support to the 173d Airborne Brigade. Battery A began the month at Lz Crystal providing direct support to the 1/503d Inf. Battery B provided fire support from LZ English for the Bong Son-North English area and 2/503d Inf. Battery C continued its operation with the 3/503d Inf in AO McLain as part of TF South. Battery D began the month at FSB Ramirez on a mountain top overlooking Qui Nhon supporting the 4/503d Inf.

Operation Red Thrust III, a combined artillery-ranger raid by a platoon of Battery B and 6 teams from Co N (Ranger) 75th Inf, began on 1 Apr and lasted till 7 April. Security at the raid position (FSB Projo, B5681188) was supplied by the 3d Platoon of C/2/503d Inf. During the operation the raiding elements sighted approximately 75 VC/NVA, mostly in new uniforms and carrying weapons. A total of 1460 rounds was expended by the platoon of Btry B. Three confirmed kills.
were credited to the artillery, with 15 more probable that could not be verified by body count. Numerous Ranger contacts and incidents of incoming small arms at the firing position confirmed the increased number of enemy troops in the area.

In conjunction with Red Thrust III a Red Raider team was fielded by HSB. The officer and 5 enlisted men operated with a ranger team and manned a radio relay site, and ground observation post during the first 5 days of the month.

On 5 April Btry D was extracted from FSB Ramirez by CH-47 and moved by road the following day to FSB Louhoy. The road march was completed in 4 hours with no difficulties encountered.

A/6/84 moved from LZ Tom to LZ North English 13 April and continued its mission of GS to US, GVN, FW11AF, reinforcing the fires of the 3/319th.

Operation Red Thrust IV commenced on 14 April with a platoon of Btry A combat assaulting FSB Robertson (BR667676). HSS, B, and D Batteries furnished security elements for the perimeter defense of the firing position. Three 81mm mortars from C/1/503d Inf Bn provided defensive fires inside the minimum range of the howitzers, and a Quad .50 cal from E/41st M3 provided automatic weapons support. A total of 17 teams from Co G (Ranger) 75th Inf operated under the fan of fire support provided by the raiding howitzers. The raid terminated on 18 April after expending a total of 1427 rds.

The 173d Airborne Brigade began Operation Washington Green on 15 April. The operation committed 1 US maneuver battalion and elements of the 40th and 41st ARVIII Regt to pacification of each of the districts in Binh Dinh Province.

During the opening phases of Washington Green the VC were not dormant. LZ English was hit by 14 rounds of the enemy’s 82mm mortar fire on 17 April. The 3/319th Artillery Counter-mortar radar at LZ English spotted the mortar rounds on the ascending portion of their trajectory and notified the BN FDC before the rounds had impacted. No friendly casualties were reported.

On 22 April elements of Btry A combat assaulted FSB Frost (BR754940). The Btry road marched from LZ Crystal to LZ English and then rigged for CH-47 move to FSB Frost, occupying the position on 25 April.

In order to provide mutually supporting fires between DS batteries Btry B road marched from LZ English to LZ Two Bits. Mutually supporting fires were essential because in their new positions both Btry A and Btry B secured themselves without the assistance of any infantry perimeter guard.

Red Raider 6 was inserted at FSB Frost on 27 April and established an observation post and ambush sites outside the perimeter.
On 29 April Operation Red Thrust V commenced. This combined Arty-Ranger raid was based at FSB Projo and targeted against what intelligence agencies identified as an increased troops concentration in the upper An Loa Valley. Security was provided by a reinforced platoon from the 2d Co, 2d Bn, 40th ARVN Regiment. FSB Projo, vacated on 7 April by Red Thrust III was found to be covered by punji stakes when the combined US/ARVN element made the combat assault. Three slight WIA's were sustained from the punji stakes, but no booby traps were encountered. The operation continued as the reporting period came to a close.

Toward the end of the month Btry C was placed under the operational control of a Provisional Artillery Group in III CTZ. Orders issued by the Group, Btry C dispatched from Bao Loc and on 30 April was positioned at YU375437 (vic Bu Gia Map) to support NSF operations.

In conjunction with Operation Washington Green personnel from the operations section, 3/319th FA, visited the District Chiefs, Senior Advisors, and the infantry battalions involved in the accelerated pacification program. A fire support plan was drawn up for Tam Quan and Hoai Phan Districts. These plans were approved by the Districts Chiefs, Senior Advisors, and Battalion Commanders concerned, and have been distributed to the infantry and artillery units in Tam Quan and Hoai Phan Districts.

b. Air Support:

(1) The 173d Aviation Platoon (Casper), continued to support all combat operations during the months of February, March, and April. The statistical report of the Aviation Platoon's activities for these three months is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UH-1H Missions</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command/Control</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Assault</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(2) The USAF continued to provide tactical air support for the 173d Airborne Brigade during the past reporting period. Their Liaison HQ remained at LZ English but operations were conducted in all three Brigade AOs.

(a) AO Dan Cuong/Lee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF MISSION</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preplanned FAC Airstrike</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate FAC Airstrike</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spooky or Shadow</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESULTS OBTAINED</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Fires</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Destroyed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foxholes and Caves Destroyed</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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The FAC flew a total of 627.5 hours in support of Brigade operations during the reporting period. The hours were utilized as follows: (Omitted Hq, DA)
The FAC flew a total of 329.0 hours in support of Brigade operations during the reporting period until 15 April 1969 when the Brigade terminated operations in AO Suc Manh/marshal. The hours were utilized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF MISSION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops in Contact</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired Enemy Locations</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected Enemy Locations</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed Enemy Locations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Target Destruction</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Zone Construction</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Assault Preparation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. NAVAL SUPPORT:

Naval Gunship Support: Additional artillery support was provided from United States Navy destroyers on station with either two or three twin-mounted 5" guns. The destroyers and their on-station sequence for the period February 1969 - April 1969 are reported as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>VESSEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 - 7 February</td>
<td>USS Knox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 21 February</td>
<td>USS Wedderbarn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 February - 7 March</td>
<td>USS Lynne McCormack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - 11 March</td>
<td>USS Anderson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 25 March</td>
<td>USS Goldsborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 12 April</td>
<td>USS Wedderbarn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 - 20 April</td>
<td>USS Wedderbarn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Naval gunfire liaison was provided by Sub Unit One, First AMELICO composed of Navy and Marine personnel.
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6. Combined US-ARVN Operations and Training:

   a. The 173d Airborne Brigade has continued to increase its use of combined US-ARVN co-bat operation as a basic means of accomplishing its tactical mission. The purpose is to better defeat the VC/NVA forces and to assist Republic of Vietnam forces in attaining a higher level of combat efficiency. These operations also contribute to the revolutionary development program and make more available to Republic of Vietnam forces the United States logistical support, particularly in the areas of aviation and heavy equipment assets. The following is reported:

   (1) Operations of Battalions in "Pairing Concept":

      (a) 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry:

         During the past quarter the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade participated in operations Darby Crest I, II, and III in the Dinh Trao Plains area (BR9282) with elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions, 40th ARVN Regiment, 22d ARVN Division. The operations were targeted against the D-22 District Force Company, elements of the 18th NVA Regiment conducting food collections in the Crescent Area, and village and hamlet VCI in conjunction with the insertion of Phu My District RD cadre teams. Liaison visits were conducted before and during the operations. Constant radio communications between headquarters were maintained during the operation, and daily SITREP's were exchanged. NPF (National Police Field Force) operated with US forces during the operations.

      (b) 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry:

         The 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade participated in two combined operations with the 2d Battalion, 40th ARVN Regiment and the 2/14th APC Troop during the past quarter. Operation Darby Trail I, targeted against the XRC Local Force Battalion and supply and transportation elements of the 3d NVA Regiment, was a search and destroy operation using US and ARVN units in adjoining AO's. The operation was conducted on the Binh Dinh/Quang Ngai Province border. Liaison visits were exchanged between the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry and the 40th ARVN Regiment prior to the operation, and liaison visits continued throughout the operation. Schemes of maneuver, fire support, aviation support information, and intelligence were exchanged, as well as daily SITREP's. Operation Darby Trail II consisted of the same elements as Darby Trail I, with maximum employment of HAWK teams throughout the AO. Liaison visits and staff coordination continued and daily SITREP's and intelligence continued to be exchanged. In addition, during the period 22-24 March, a platoon of C/2-503d was

   

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placed OPCON to the 40th ARVN Regiment and an ARVN Platoon was placed OPCON to C/2-503d. Although a language problem existed with the exchange elements, they rotated quite effectively within the other unit's framework. The exchange led to a greater mutual understanding and respect and more exchanges of this nature are anticipated.

(c) 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry:

The 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry participated in Operation Darby March II, a combined encirclement operation, with three battalions of the 47th ARVN Regiment in MACV designated Base Area 236. The ARVN Recon Company was placed OPCON to the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry from 15-20 February. The two platoons were combined with two US companies, forming combined reinforced companies. SITREP's, INTSUM's, and LOG STAT's were exchanged in addition to liaison visits between headquarters. On 21 February, a co-located CP was established. All combat elements of the 47th ARVN Regiment and the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry deployed on a combat sweep through the area. Artillery support and fire coordination were effected from the co-located CP. Daily exchange of SITREP'S, intelligence, contact reports, etc, was greatly facilitated in the co-located CP. The ARVN knowledge of both the enemy and terrain was invaluable in planning operational phases. The 4th Battalion C&C aircraft was made available to the CO and staff officers of the 47th ARVN Regiment on four occasions.

b. The 173d Airborne Brigade has also continued to conduct combined operations and assistance programs with RF/PF units. The significant achievements are given below:

(1) February:

(a) 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry:

The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry conducted liaison and coordination visits with District and Subsector Chiefs within their AO at least three times a week. In periods where operation Darby Crest was conducted in their area, the District/Subsector Chief was visited daily. Weekly liaison and social visits were made to RF/PF units. The 1st Battalion continues its sponsorship of a RF platoon in the village of Van Troang. As a result of this sponsorship, US - GVN relations in the area are excellent. A school repair project and a dispensary repair project were participated in during the month. Three MEDCAPS
were performed at RF/PF locations with over 200 patients treated.

(b) 2nd Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry:

The 2nd Battalion, 503d Infantry conducted two operations with RF/PF units during February.

1. A cordon and search operation of Dinh Cong Hamlet on 5 February 1969 employed D Company, 2d Battalion and 72 RF/PF from LZ Two Bits. After D Company has cordoned of the village during darkness, the RF/PF were lifted in at first light to conduct the search. US artillery support and airlift capabilities were made available during the operation. Results were 2 VC/NVA KIA and 21 detainees.

2. A cordon and search operation of Lo Dien Hamlet on 12 February 1969 employed B Company, 2d Battalion and 69 RF/PF personnel from LZ Two Bits. Again, US troops cordoned of the hamlet during darkness and the RF/PF unit was helilifted in at first light to conduct the search. The results of this operation were 12 detainees.

(c) 1st Battalion (Mech) 50th Infantry:

During February the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry participated in three combined operations with RF/PF units.

1. On 10 February 1969, a cordon and search operation was conducted at An Luy Hamlet employing two platoons of PF (An Tuc). US forces established the cordon before first light, then the PF platoons were lifted in and conducted the search. The operation initiated as a result of the murder of an intelligence source, resulted in four detainees, all of whom were later classified as draft dodgers.

2. On 11 February, VC/NVA forces ambushed a convoy on CL 19, approximately 3 kilometers east of An Khe. Immediate telephonic liaison was affected with PF forces. Two platoons of PF (An Tuc) and a US platoon closed the contact area from the west while another US platoon closed from the east and a PF platoon outpost (An Ny) provided blocking fires with their 82mm mortars. Gunships expended on the enemy location. The speed and effectiveness of the reaction forces was attested to by the operation results - 5 individual weapons CIA, and 4 crew served weapons CIA.

3. On 22 February, VC/NVA forces ambushed a US convoy east of Bridge 19 on QL 19. Again, immediate telephonic liaison was affected and US and PF forces swept the contact area. Gunships expended on the area. The results of the operation were 8 VC/NVA KIA, 4 individual weapons and 3 crew served weapons CIA.
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(d) 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery:

The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery continued to provide close artillery support to Hoai An, Hoai Nhơn, and Tam Quan Districts upon requests through 40th ARVN Regimental channels. In addition, it provided direct support to the District Advisors in Contact Missions. Continuous liaison is maintained to include forwarding all movements of artillery units and changes in fire direction frequencies to the districts and receiving daily reports from them on the evening locations of all RF/PF elements.

(2) March:

(a) 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry:

The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry conducted daily liaison and coordination visits with District and Subsector Chiefs in periods when Operation Derby Crest was in progress in their areas. Direct telephone systems have been installed wherever possible to complement existing radio facilities. Civic action projects, including two MEDCAP's, two leaflet drops, a dispensary repair project and repair of a village headquarters were conducted. In addition, four MEDCAP's were conducted at RF/PF unit locations with approximately 350 patients treated. The 1st Battalion continued its sponsorship of an RF platoon in Van Truong Village.

(b) 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry:

The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry conducted two combined operations with RF/PF units and provided combined training to four platoons of PSDF during March.

1. On 12 March D Company, 2d Battalion and an intelligence platoon from Hoai Nhơn Subsector conducted a cordon and search operation on the village outside of LZ English at BS 865017. US forces established the cordon at night and the intelligence platoon entered through the cordon at first light to search for suspected VC spies in the village. Although no spies were located some documents and other evidence of their presence were found. The operation had been proposed by the Hoai Nhơn District Chief and District provided the plan.

2. On 21 March 1969, A Company, 2d Battalion and an RF Platoon from Hoai Nhơn Subsector conducted a search and clear operation in the vicinity of Denh Cong (1) Hamlet, BR908977. US forces established blocking positions and RF troops moved into the area overland and by helicopter and began the sweep. Two helicopter lifts of three aircraft each were provided for the RF troops from US resources. The operation produced negative results but improved mutual cooperation and working relationships.
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(c) 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry:

The 4th Battalion conducted a combined cordon and search operation of Phu Tai (1) Hamlet with the 108, 117, 181, and 939 RF Companies on 31 March 1969. The operation achieved complete surprise and resulted in 68 detainees (41 by US forces and 17 by RF units in the cordon).

(d) 1st Battalion (Mech) 50th Infantry:

The 1st Battalion (Mech) 50th Infantry conducted a combined cordon and search of Cuu Dao Hamlet with two PF platoons and one intelligence squad on 29 March 1969. Although negative results were found, a good rapport was established between all participating units. The 1st Battalion (Mech) 50th Infantry continues sponsorship of the Dan My, Dan K Dan, and Dan Cho outposts, with current emphasis being placed on the renovation of the Dan Kim Dan outpost and defensive positions. Six rolls of barbed wire, 100 engineer stakes, 2400 plastic water bottles, 9 cases of .556mm ammunition, 20 rounds of 60mm mortar HE and 18 rounds of 60mm illumination were provided to outposts during March. Two MEDCAPs were conducted with approximately 155 persons treated.

(e) 3d Battalion 319th Artillery:

The 3d Battalion 319th Artillery continued to support to Hoai An, Hoai Nhon, and Tam Quan Districts. Six MEDCAPs to RF/PF units were conducted with 174 personnel treated. The following materials were furnished to RF/PF outposts: 60 4 x 8 x 12' beams, 800 sandbags, 30 sheets of FSP, and 270 rounds of 81mm illumination.

(f) 173d Engineer Company:

The 173d Engineer Company constructed a timber trestle bridge at BR819900 on 31 March 1969 while an RF/PF platoon secured the bridge site. Coordination and cooperation was excellent and RF/PF personnel were taught the basic rudiments of military bridging during construction.

(3) April:

(a) Two combined reaction forces were deployed in response to enemy initiated incidents during the month.

1. On 2 April, the 1st platoon of B Company, 2-503d, joined RF/PF forces via My Duc (1) Hamlet (BR803968) in response to an enemy initiated ambush on a MACV vehicle on Highway 514 and a simultaneous attack on nearby RF/PF forces. The reaction force was requested by the Hoai Nhon District Chief. The attack on the RF/PF broke when US troops were helilifted in; a joint US-ARVN sweep yielded negative results.
I.

At 172330 April, PF forces in Lai Duc Village (BR876895) came under attack by an unknown size enemy force. The District Chief led a combined reaction force of D/2-503d, attached APCs from C/1-50th, and PF units in relief. The APCs moved to within 100 meters of the village, where the troops dismounted and entered the village. Again, the enemy broke contact and no further contact was established.

(b) The following combined forces are providing security screens for specific target hamlets in Hoc Hoa District:

1. The 163 RF Co, 2/FF Plt, and C/2-503d in Dinh Cong (BR787952) and Dinh Tri (TRG02965) hamlets.

2. The 971 RF Co (-), 227 PF Plt, and C/2-503d in My Duc Hamlet (BR787952).

(c) From 19-22 April, 2-503d provided formal training to PF units in Dinh Chong Hamlet (TR55942). RF/FF training has been a continuing effort under Operation Khe Sanh Team, with informal classes being given to a RF/FF force located with US units in the field. RF/FF squads have been integrated with US units in both small unit patrolling and ambushes.

2. Other Combined Operations and Assistance for ARVN, MSF/CSF, Units and the IFF:

(a) Three MSF companies deployed with the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry during Operation Darby Trail I and II. MSF271 conducted RIF operations within the 2d Battalion's AO during Darby Trail I. During Darby Trail II, MSF 261 and MSF 262 also conducted RIF operations with the 2d Battalion during the period 3-13 February and 10-24 February respectively. A forward observer was assigned to each company and the operations from the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery. Coordination and cooperation was excellent during these operations.

(b) One CSF company (Det A 221) provided security for FSB Barbara, where the co-located CP of the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry and the 27th ARVN Regiment was maintained during Operation Darby March II. On 4 February at approximately 2030 hours, the company repelled a probe by an unknown size enemy force on the FSB. The security provided was excellent.

(c) During February, the 2d Battalion (Pleiku) conducted two combined operations with the 1st Battalion (Mech) 5th Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade.

2. From 9-19 February, the 2d MSF Battalion conducted RIF operations in conjunction with Operation Darby Punch in the An Khe area, east
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of MACV designated enemy base area 202. Fire support was provided by C Battery, 6/29th Artillery until 15 February and through the 1st Battalion (Mech), TOO thereafter. US aviation assets were provided and moved 234 troops and 94 tons of cargo in support of the NSF Battalion.

2. During Operation Darby Punch II (20-28 February) the 2d NSF Battalion again conducted RIF operations in the An Khe area, first to the east of An Khe and later to the southwest. Fire support was provided through the 1st Battalion (Mech) TOO. US aviation assets moved 230 troops and 12 tons of cargo in support of the operation.

(d) The NPFF participated in three cordon and search operations with the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry during February. They included the hamlets of Lo Dian (12 February), Tan Thanh (14 February), and Cuu Loi (25 February). NPFF were helilifted into the area with US units and after the cordon had been established, assisted in the search of the hamlet. These three operations resulted in 30 VC/NVA KIA, 4 VC/NVA CIA, and 58 detainees.

(2) March:

(a) During March, the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry combined with the 2d NSF Reconnaissance Company in Operation Darby Punch III. This operation was a combined HAWK operation south of An Khe and east of MACV designated Base Area 202.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry participated in three combined operations with NPFF during March.

1. On 12 March the 1st Platoon of C Company, 1-503d Infantry, a platoon of C Company, 1-69th Armor and NPFF elements conducted a combined combat sweep to the west of Highway QL 1 in the crescent area to prevent VC and VCI from reentering the area after the termination of Darby Crest. Rations were provided to NPFF units and tanks provided transportation. Coordination and cooperation were excellent.

2. From 25-31 March, A/1-503d Infantry and NPFF elements conducted a combined search and clear operation and cordon and search operation south of the Nui Mieu and Tiger Mountains to destroy the VC infrastructure in these areas. The operation resulted in 2 VC/NVA KIA and 31 detainees.

3. From 26-31 March, B/1-503d Infantry and NPFF elements conducted combined search and clear and cordon and search operations in the area southeast of LZ Crystal. This operation resulted in 1 VC/NVA KIA and 19 detainees.
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(c) The 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry conducted a combined cordon and search operation at Phu Tai (I) Hamlet with four RF companies and one NP company.

(d) On 30 March TF E/17th Cavalry and a team of the Phu My NPFF conducted a combined cordon and search operation of Van An Hamlet (BR928841). Approximately 15 people were screened with negative results.

3) April:

Three combined cordon and search operations were conducted during April, one by the 2d Battalion in Operation Darby Trail II an, two by TF 4-503d in Operation Washington Green. All three were targeted against the local VCI.

(a) On 3 April, B/2-503d and NPFF elements conducted a cordon and search of Cau Loi Hamlet (BS924220). US forces established the cordon and 1 platoon of Company B accompanied NPFF elements during their search. The operation was based on intelligence gathered from a FW and captured documents and yielded 40 detainees, 16 of whom were later classified civil defendants.

(b) On 12 April, Company B, 4-503d, and NPFF elements conducted a cordon and search of Hoi Phuhamlet (BS88305'). US forces established a cordon and one platoon accompanied the NPFF elements during the search. Two detainees were extracted.

(c) On 25 April, Company A, 4-503d, 217 RF Company (-), and NPFF elements conducted a cordon and search of An Qui Hamlet (BS886116). After US troops established the cordon prior to first light the RF and NPFF elements conducted the search. Seven detainees were extracted.
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7. **Chemical Operations:** The 51st Chemical Detachment of the 173d Airborne Brigade provided chemical support on a standby basis whenever requested by elements of the Brigade. The following missions were accomplished:

a. **Herbicide Missions:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>METHOD</th>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>SORTIES/AMOUNT</th>
<th>HECTARES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 Feb</td>
<td>UH1D with 110 gal SASS</td>
<td>BS93085 Grass/Shrubs</td>
<td>1/110G Diesel</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Feb</td>
<td>UH1D with 110 gal SASS</td>
<td>CR03153 Grass/Shrubs</td>
<td>1375G Blue</td>
<td>140</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CR033140 Trees on perimeter</td>
<td>1650 Orange</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Mar</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 gal tank</td>
<td>BR97455 Elephant Grass, 600 gal tank</td>
<td>BR97445 Trees and Shrubs</td>
<td>6/2000 gal Blue</td>
<td>598.6</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>BR620475</td>
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<td>BR430465</td>
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<td>BR478465</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Mar</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 gal tank</td>
<td>BR913745 Grass &amp; Shrubs</td>
<td>1/275 gal Orange</td>
<td>123</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BR906748</td>
<td>110 gal White</td>
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<td>BR935740</td>
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<td>BR925752</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Apr</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 gal tank</td>
<td>BR45477 Single &amp; double-canopy trees &amp; shrubs</td>
<td>2/970 gal Orange</td>
<td>170</td>
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<td>BR57477</td>
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<td>BR456463</td>
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<td>BR45465</td>
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<td>BR445470</td>
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<td>BR447473</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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12 Apr

CH-47 with 30 mtr width Grass/Shrubs 1/550 gal Blue
600 gal tank strip along perimeter fr:
BR450285  
BR475490  
BR488451

26 Apr

CH-47 with 600 gal tank
BR929747 Elephant grass 1/350 gal Blue
BR930745 trees and shrubs
BR931743 70/30%
BR932740
BR930738
BR925740
BR924742
BR925745

b. Riot Control Agent CS:

(1) Hawk Team 14 Co D 1/503 Inf used two E-8's on 4 Feb in attempt to force 2 VC/NVA from tunnel cave complex in vic of BR918808, with negative results. The 51st Chemical Det utilized a Mity Mite and 80 lbs of micropulverized CS on the same complex with negative results.

(2) On 5 Feb 27 E-8 CS Launchers (See 1 above) were incorporated into the perimeter defense of LZ English.

(3) Result of tunnel operation (See 1 above) was 2 VC/NVA KIA. The tunnel complex was seeded with an additional 80 lbs of CS-I and on 7 Feb was destroyed.

(4) E-158's were dropped in support of Snoopy Reating in AO Lee. Two were dropped on 6 Feb at BR799923, two were dropped 10 Feb at BR821589 and BR325582, two were dropped on 14 Feb at BR798932; Both failed to ignite, the cause was attributed to loose set screw on the fuse assembly, 3 more were dropped on 19 Feb at BR318991 and functioned normally. All drop were followed by gunships and artillery fire with no visible results.

(5) On 6 March the 51st Cml Det supported 4/503 in Operation STINGRAY I. Three CH-47 aircraft were used to drop E-158 CS Canister Clusters. A total of 77 E-158s were loaded in 2 aircraft and 78 in the other. A total of 182 E-158s were used to blanket the area. One EM was wounded while dropping E-158s. One E-158 malfunctioned at the tail of the aircraft and had to be kicked out. Some CS did get into the aircraft.

(6) On 12 March the 51st Cml Det supported 4/503 on Operation STINGRAY II. Again 3 CH-47 aircraft were used. A total of 30 E-158s were rigged in each of
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The aircraft. A total of 90 E-158s were employed.

(7) On 13 March 56 E-158s were tested to find out why some munitions malfunctioned. Two munitions failed to function and two functioned prematurely.

(8) On 29 April, the Brigade Chemical Officer and NCO, and the CO, 51st Chemical Detachment, engaged a suspected enemy position by dropping 8 E-158 CS cannisters in an area bounded by the following coordinates: BS745020, BS740020, BS747029, BS749029. The CS was followed by gunship fire and 20 minutes of artillery Firecracker and HE fire. A BDA following the strike observed no visible results.

c. Per Analysis Detector Program:

(1) MPD Operator from the 51st Cal Det supported 4/503 in AO Wainuright during February. There were two missions flown for 5 hours and 30 minutes.

(2) 1 MPD Operator from the 51st Cal Det supported the 1/50 Inf Mechanized Infantry in AO Marshall during Feb flying 4 missions and 5 hrs 15 min.

(3) 1 APD/MPD Operator from the 51st Cal Det supported the 173d Abn Bde in AO Lee during Feb flying 16 missions and 21 hrs and 25 minutes.

(4) On 11 Feb 69 at 1700 hrs the one 01 Fixed Wing Aircraft carrying a Snoopy Operator and one MPD was fired upon and crashed in the vic of BR340735. The pilot was killed and the MPD Operator received fractures of left femur, right ankle and left wrist. The operator was extracted and evacuated to the 67th Evac Hospital.

(5) 1 MPD Operator from the 51st Cal Det supported the 4/503 in AO Marshall during March. There were five missions flown for 7 hrs & 45 min.

(6) 1 APD/MPD Operator from 51st Cal Det supported the TF 173d Abn Bde in AO Lee during March flying 7 missions for 9 hrs and 30 minutes.

(7) On 6 March 1969 2 MPD were used in conjunction with Operation Stingray 1. The MPD was used to pinpoint enemy location before initiation of the operation was ordered.

(8) 1 APD/MPD operator from the 51st Cal Det supported TF 173d Abn Bde in AO Lee during March flying 11 missions for 16 hours and 20 minutes. The missions provided training for new individuals of the Command who will be flying these missions periodically in the future.
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d. Miscellaneous Activities:

(1) The 173d Abn Bde Chemical Section assisted the Brigade PSYOPS Section by dropping Chieu Hoi and VIP leaflets over hot snoopy reading at the following location:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>NO. OF LEAFLETS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 Feb</td>
<td>BR7384-7385</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Feb</td>
<td>BR9697-9699</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Feb</td>
<td>BR8198-8199</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Feb</td>
<td>BR3187-8237</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) On 1 April, members of the Bde Cpl Section and 51st Chemical Det sprayed 100 gal of 4% Malathion in vic of BR934894. This mission was flown to destroy swarms of flying insects around Relay Station 60 (Hawk's Nest).

(3) Alternate Trail Dust Mission was flown on 2 April in vic of BR3512 to BR4497.

(4) Two PFT missions were conducted during the month of April; both missions were in support of clearing selected areas of the perimeter at LZ English. On 10 April one operator was severely burned when the valve section of the PFT he was using malfunctioned and would not stop the flow of fuel. He was using unthickened fuel. 40 gallons of thickened fuel were expended on 29 April in the perimeter clearing operation.
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8. Engineer Support:

a. During the reporting period the 173d Engineer Company completed several construction tasks while continuing to support the organic and attached maneuver battalions. A breakdown by month projects worked on by the 173d Engineer Company follows:

(1) Projects that the 173d Engineer Company worked on during the month of February were; Rebuilding of bunkers 12, 16, 16A, 27, 37 and 38, erecting a tangle foot fence between bunkers 25 and 36, erecting a double concertina fence from bunker 31 to 36, building a signal relay station on top of hill 641 (though this was completed in March), a demolition team closed down FSB Shenandoah, a demolition team destroyed a tunnel and cave complex on an island in the Song Son River, blowing weapons emplacements at LZ Two Bits, building of bunkers on the east side of the air-field. In Bao Loc the 3d Platoon constructed an underground TOC, and fourteen WABTOCs.

(2) Projects that the 173d Engineer Company worked on during the month of March were; Signal relay station on hill 641, blew weapons emplacements at LZ Two Bits, constructed 61st Avn TOC, put roofs on 8 buildings in Hqs area, repaired bridge going into Bon Son, rebuilt bunkers 17, 18 and 36, constructed chaplain's quarters, constructed a wire fence around east side of the air field and around the class I yard, constructed a new company CP, Pemaprime machine continued to work on Bde roads, put in a bridge at the National Police HQs in Bong Son, constructed a bridge at Hoi Duc, constructed a tower for a siren at Provost Marshall HQs, furnished transportation for the IPW compound, furnished dump trucks to haul gravel for 19th Engr Bn, D7 dozer worked at LZ Two Bits and for the RF/PP, west of the Song Kim Son River, started work on buildings for the 404th RRU.

(3) Projects that the 173d Engineer Company worked on during the month of April were; a new area for the 9th Scout Dog plt, a new area for the 404th RRU, revetments for the Provost Marshall, a shed for a 150 KW Generator, a stenographers hooch, a building for the Air Force, BOQ in the Bde Hqs area, revetments for the dustoff aircraft, erected lights outside the Casper berm, conducted an explosives test, supported the 3/319th Artillery in building FSB Frost, constructed a new waterpoint at LZ Ollie, conducted civic actions near LZ Orange, repaired a bridge in the Commanding General's area, a grader and a penaprime machine worked on the Bde roads during the month, dump trucks hauled gravel for S5.

b. Significant activities for the reporting period were:

(1) The 173d Engineer Company had the responsibility of performing minesweeps on a daily basis from LZ English, along QL-1 and 3 Alpha to LZ Pony, from LZ w-31ft north along QL-1 ending at 3 Alpha, and from LZ Schmaller to LZ Action.
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(2) For the entire reporting period a squad from the fourth platoon was attached to the Fourth Battalion, 503d Infantry performing many engineer tasks.

(3) The third platoon was located at Bao Loc, where it was supporting the Third Battalion, 503d Infantry.

c. Problems Confronting the Commander:

(1) Continued shortages of major items (a scoop loader, 3 ton crane and dump trucks) and dispersion of operational equipment throughout Brigade AO's, severely hampered operations in the LZ English area.

(2) Repair parts shortages for one dozer has prevented it's use throughout the period. A dozer of the airmobile type was dropped by a CH 54 while being transported to FSB Frost, thus depriving the company of it's use for the latter period of April.

(3) Dispersion of fork lifts when convoys arrive has created a problem for this unit. Due to the short turn about time convoys have, the unit sometimes finds it necessary to utilize a wrecker or manpower to off load lumber and cement, periodically causing damage to the material.
9. Training:

a. During the reporting period the 173d Airborne Brigade continued to conduct jungle warfare training of newly arrived replacements. A breakdown of personnel trained by month follows:

1. February:
   (a) Personnel assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 29 Officers and 475 Enlisted Men.
   (b) Personnel not assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 2 Officers and 17 Enlisted Men.

2. March:
   (a) Personnel assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 18 Officers and 571 Enlisted Men.
   (b) Personnel not assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 4 Officers and 40 Enlisted Men.

3. April:
   (a) Personnel assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 37 Officers and 474 Enlisted Men.
   (b) Personnel not assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 3 Officers and 122 Enlisted Men.

b. The 173d Airborne Brigade also continued its sponsorship of the RF/PF Leadership School at Camp Radcliff. A breakdown of Vietnamese personnel trained by month follows:

   1. February:
      (a) Sixty (60) non-commissioned officers graduated from the school on the first day of the month. Class 2-69 started on 20 January 1969 and graduated on 1 February 1969. The Honor Graduate for Class 2-69 was Trung Si I To van Khe from Phu Yen Province. The Honor Graduate received a plaque and a certificate of achievement for his efforts. The RF/PF Leadership School suspended classes during the Vietnamese Tet holidays with Class 3-69 starting on 3 March 1969.
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(b) The 173d Support Battalion initiated a four-day course for training of Vietnamese Revolutionary Development Team personnel. The course consisted of instruction on the assembly, disassembly, and maintenance of the carbines and BAR; ambush and counter-ambush techniques; night ambush and defense of hamlets; familiarization and characteristics of hand grenades and claymore mines. An overnight field exercise is planned for integration in future classes for practical exercise and instructional purposes. Thirty-three (33) students graduated from the school during the month. Class 1-69 started on 3 February and graduated on 9 February 1969 with twenty-one (21) students. Class 2-69 started on 6 February 1969 and graduated on 9 February 1969 with twelve (12) students. All students received a certificate at a graduation exercise at the conclusion of each class. It is anticipated that these RD classes will continue to be scheduled between RF/FF classes.

2. March:

(a) The 173d Support Battalion continued to conduct the Brigade Regional Forces/Popular Forces Leadership School during March. Class 3-69 started on 3 March 1969 and forty-six (46) non-commissioned officers graduated from the school on 15 March 1969. The Honor Graduate for Class 3-69 was Nguyen Ngoc Truong of Binh Dinh Province. The Honor Graduate received a plaque and a Certificate of Achievement for his efforts. Class 4-69 began on 24 March 1969 with fifty-three (53) non-commissioned officers attending.

(b) The RF/FF Leadership School continued its four-day training course for Vietnamese Revolutionary Development Team personnel. RD class 3-69 began on 17 March 1969, and thirty-one (31) students graduated from the course on 20 March 1969. All graduates received a Certificate of Training at a graduation exercise at the conclusion of the class.

3. April:

(a) The 173d Support Battalion continued to conduct the Brigade Regional Forces/Popular Forces Leadership School during April. RF/FF Class 4-69 began on 25 March 1969 with fifty-three (53) NCO's, and graduated on 8 April 1969. Trung Si Doan van Xiu of Binh Dinh Province was the Honor Graduate of Class 4-69. RF/FF Class 5-69 began on 14 April 1969 with 24 officers, and graduated on 26 April 1969. 2/Lt Nguyen Van Cua of Phu Yen Province was the Honor Graduate of RF/FF Class 5-69. Each graduate of the RF/FF Leadership School receives a certificate of completion, a "Sky Warrior" shoulder tab and a class picture. The Honor Graduate of the RF/FF also receives a Honor Graduate Certificate of Completion.

(b) The RF/FF Leadership School continued its training course for Revolutionary Development Team personnel. RD Class 4-69 began on 8 April 1969 with 30 students and was graduated on 10 April 1969. All graduates received a Certificate of Training at a graduation exercise at the completion of the class.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

10. Psychological Operations and Civic Action:

a. February:

(1) Community Relations and Civil Affairs Projects:

(a) The S-5 Section, 173d Airborne Brigade continued to actively support ARVN dependent housing during February. Block making continues at all three ARVN Regimen
tal Areas. Actual construction has begun at TUY HOA (47th Regiment) and LZ Dog (40th Regiment). The Brigade S-5 also
continued to supply building and barrier materials to MACV and Civil Affairs Teams in support of the accelerated pacification program. Increased emphasis
was placed on getting ARVN's to perform civic actions. At the end of Feb-
uary several projects, including the repair of two schools, the improve-
ment of a rural road, MEDCAP operations, and the repair of a dispensary have
been undertaken by the 22d ARVN Division, supplemented by the 503d Infan
ty Division.

(b) Combined or unilateral assistance in commodity dis-
tribution for the month was as follows:

1. Food

    a. The Brigade S-5 donated 600 pounds of food to various orphanages, schools, churches and villages throughout the Brigade
       AO.

    b. The 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry donated 50 pounds of food to the village of AN HOAN.

    c. The 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry donated 220 pounds of assorted foods and fruits to the Ngoc Son School in Bong Son.

    d. The 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry donated 138 gallons of milk, 170 pounds of assorted vegetables and 1500 pounds of rice
to the province of PHU YEN.

    e. The 173d Support Battalion donated 450 pounds
       of food to the An Khe orphanage, 385 pounds of food to An Thack Village and
       2700 pounds of edible garbage to villagers in the An Khe area for feeding
       their pigs.

    f. The 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry donated 500 pounds of rice to a Montagnard village in their AO.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. The 3d Bn 319th Artillery donated 700 pounds of food to the Bong Son refugee camp.

2. Clothing:
   a. The 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry donated 30 pounds of clothing to the village of My Loc.
   b. The 2nd Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry delivered 25 items of assorted clothing to the Ngoc Son School.
   c. The 173d Support Battalion delivered 70 meters of cloth to the An Khe orphanage.

3. Building Materials:
   a. The Brigade S-5 delivered the following items to the designated projects sites in the Brigade AO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>SITE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75 Sheets of tin</td>
<td>HOAI AN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 tons of sand</td>
<td>Bong Son Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165 gallons of diesel fuel</td>
<td>Bong Son Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>677 kilos of lime</td>
<td>Bong Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 board feet of lumber</td>
<td>Phu My District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 GP Medium tents</td>
<td>De Duc Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 eight foot pickets</td>
<td>Tam Quan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. The 2nd Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry donated 40 bags of cement, two 2\text{\frac{1}{2}} ton truckloads of sand, and 1000 pounds of steel for the construction of the An Duong Pagoda.

   c. The 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry donated 400 board feet of lumber, 20 gallons of paint and 100 pounds of cement to the village of An Tuc.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

4. Hygienic Items:
   a. The 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry donated 150 bars of soap, 40 tooth brushes and 40 tubes of tooth paste to the village of My Loc.
   b. The 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry donated 200 bars of soap to the villages of An Than and Lo Dien, 60 bars of soap and 30 tubes of tooth paste to the Ngoc Son School.
   c. The 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry donated 100 bars of soap with various toilet article to wounded RF/PF soldiers in Phu Yen Province.
   d. The 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry donated 150 bars of soap to a Montagnard village.
   e. The 3d Bn 319th Artillery donated 100 bars of soap to the Bong Son refugee camp.

5. School Supplies and Educational Assistance:
   a. The 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry donated 5 pounds of paper, 50 pencils, 20 desks and 4 benches to the My Loc village school.
   b. The 2nd Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry donated various school supplies to the Ngoc Son School.
   c. The Vietnamese medical personnel working at the aid station in the village of Dong Tie received OJT from the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry medical personnel.
   d. The 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry provided four U.S. Sky Soldiers to teach at the An Khe High School in their off duty time.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

6. MEDCAPS:

68 MEDCAPS were conducted during the month of February and 2810 patients were treated.

(2) Rural Development:

(a) The 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry assisted in construction of a dispensary at the village of My Loc.

(b) The 2nd Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry assisted in the construction of two houses.

(3) Psychological Operations:

(a) Town Meetings - The 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry conducted one town meeting in Chan Than Hamlet.

(b) Loudspeaker and Leaflet Missions:

1. Speaker time - 89 hours

2. Total leaflets dropped - 3,414,000

3. Basic Themes - VIP, Chieu Hoi, National Safe Conduct Pass, GVN Image and TET.

b. March:

(1) Community Relations and Civil Affairs Projects:

(a) The S-5 Section, 173d Airborne Brigade continued to actively support ARVN Dependent Housing. Block making continued at all three ARVN Regimenal Areas. Actual construction has begun at all three areas. 40th ARVN Regiment (LZ English) has 2 units 45% and 5% complete, respectively. 41st ARVN Regiment (Phu My) has 1 unit 10% complete, and 47th ARVN Regiment (Tuy Hoa) has 2 units 60% and 10% complete respectively. Brigade S-5 also continued to supply building and barrier material to MACV and Civil Affairs Teams in support of the accelerated Pacification Campaign. Increased emphasis was placed on getting ARVN and local GVN Agencies to conduct Civic Action and PSYOPS programs in their areas of responsibility. In addition to projects such as MEDCAP, improvement of rural roads and repair of a dispensary, it is noteworthy that 22d ARVN Division, supplemented by this command, spon-
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

sored until completion, rebuilding Cu'Qui Thuan (BS 895138) and the rebuilding of Duong Lieu School (BR 93:211). These projects were accomplished by the 40th ARVN Regt in concert with 2/503d Inf, 173d Abn Bde. The ARVN soldiers supplied materials (provided by Bde S-5) and provided personnel to work along with the people. The project was handled in such a manner as to reflect ARVN (GVN) support and assistance to the people in their self help program. Additionally, 22d ARVN Division has increased its use of psyops facilities available through this command. A good example of this took place, when on 22 March 1969, VC burned a hamlet (Tai Luong, BS 887025) displacing 456 families. The S-5 Officer of the 40th ARVN Regiment, prepared a Psyops Leaflet which was turned over to us for reproduction. After being checked and reproduced, 1500 copies were released to 40th ARVN Regiment S-5 who in concert with the local district and hamlet officials conducted a Psyops program and provided RF/PF labor to move foodstuff and housing materials (reclaimed lumber, tin, ammo boxes, etc) to the burned out area. Materials furnished by this command were: 4 ea 2½ ton truck loads of reclaimed lumber, 1 ea truck load of reclaimed tin, 30 ammo boxes, 13 bags of bulgar wheat, and 7 GP medium tents and assorted food stuffs. However, the entire project was handled by local officials in the name of GVN, and all materials provided by us, were turned over to local Vietnamese Officials for actual distribution to the people. The Volunteer Information Program this year, has been very successful. As of 25 March 1969, the program has netted this command, 2 Machine Guns, 3 Small Arms Rounds, 40 Hand Grenades, 23 Mines and Booby Traps, plus many other assorted explosives and documents.

(b) The LZ English Health School and Dispensary continue to be effective. The fifth class graduates 7 April 1969. Recently, plague was discovered in the local village of Bong Son. The Health Worker School personnel including recent graduates, assisted in the dusting of Bong Son and the immunization of 2,260 persons to date. Immunization procedures continue. The rapid and professional manner in which this problem was handled is a tribute not only to the expertise of medical (U.S. and Local GVN) personnel but also to the time and efforts of the LZ English Health School Personnel.

(c) The 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade, continues unilateral sponsorship of the Ngoc Son Addict Orphanage in Bong Son. The 3d Bn 319th Artillery, 173d Airborne Brigade, continues unilateral sponsorship of the Catholic Refugee Camp in Bong Son.

(d) Combined or Unilateral Assistance in Commodity Distribution for the month was as follows:

1. Food:
AVEE-30/48D

15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

a. The Brigade S-5 donated 720 pounds of food to the various orphanages, churches and villages throughout the Brigade AO.

b. The 1/503d donated 180 pounds of assorted food and candy throughout the AO.

c. The 2/503d donated 100 pounds of food and candy to the Ngoc Son School in Bong Son.

d. The 4/503d donated 941 pounds of assorted foods and fruit, and 48 gallons of milk to the An Túc District Headquarters for distribution throughout the district.

e. The support Battalion, donated 1,420 pounds of assorted food and fruit to the various churches and schools in An Khe, and delivered 6,440 pounds of edible garbage to the An Khe Pig Farm.

f. The 1/50th donated 100 pounds of assorted food, fruit and candy to children in various hospitals and orphanages in An Khe. In addition soap and shower shoes were given to wounded RF/FF soldiers and their families. Also 150 pounds of edible garbage was donated to the An Khe Pig Farm.

g. The 3/319th donated 300 pounds of food to the Bong Son Refugee Camp (Catholic). All food is turned over to the parish priest for redistribution to the people.

2. Clothing:

1/503d donated 20 pounds of clothing during MEDCAP Operations.

3. Building Materials:

a. The Brigade S-5 delivered the following items to various projects in the Bde AO. (It should be noted that the greater portion of items such as lumber, cement, lime and nails are delivered to ARVN Dependent Housing Projects).

ITEMS

3,023 Bags of Cement
16,831 Board Feet of Lumber
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1,060 Sheets of Tin
531 Bags of Lime
690 Rolls Barbed Wire
19,700 Sand Bags
15 Tents GP Medium (Salvage)
2,360 Pickets (Engineer 6' - 8')
1,150 Gallons Gas
175 Pounds of Nails (Assorted Sizes)

b. 1/503d donated 300 board feet lumber and 200 roof tiles in support of My Loi Village HQ repair.

g. 2/503d delivered 2 2½ ton truck loads of lumber, 6 2½ ton truck loads of sand, 9,000 gallons of water, 1,000 pounds of steel and 80 bags of cement to the Hoi Duc/Hoi An Pagoda to assist in building of same.

d. The 4/503d delivered 3,000 board feet of lumber, 281 bags of cement and 300 gallons of water to various projects in their AO.

e. 1/50th donated 50 pounds of nails to the New Zealand Red Cross for construction of homes for Montagnards.

f. 3/319th donated 2,600 bags of cement and 10,000 board feet of lumber to the Bong Son Catholic Refugee Camp.

4. Agricultural Supplies:

4/503d donated 25 assorted farming tools to Montagnard resettlement Camp KU DINH DUP.

5. Hygiene Items:

a. 1/503d donated 200 bars soap, 7 toothbrushes and 8 tubes tooth paste during MEDCAPS.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

b. 2/503d donated 30 tubes of tooth paste and 300 bars of soap to the Ngoc Son School in Bong Son. 300 bars of soap donate during MEDCAPS.

g. 3/319th distributed 400 kits of personal hygiene items to the Bong Son Catholic Refugee Camp.

6. School Supplies:

a. Brigade S-5 purchased 35,000 $VN worth of school supplies which were distributed to various schools throughout the Bde AO. Supplies consisted of pens, ink, ink wells, blotters, rulers, notebooks and pencils. All supplies were turned over to ARVN S-5 Officer, by Battalion S-5 Officers of this command, to be redistributed as though it came from the ARVN Regiments.

b. 1/503d donated 80 pounds of paper to the Diem Tieu Refugee Village.

g. 4/503d donated 100 school kits to the St John the Baptist Catholic Church/School in An Khe.

7. Visits to Local Institutions and GVN Districts:

The Brigade Commander, his staff, Battalion Commanders and Staff, try to make daily visits to liaison and coordinate with their counterparts as well as local GVN Officials throughout the Brigade AO. These visits are single or multi-purpose, military or civil in nature, or just friendly visits, which is determined by the daily situation.

8. Educational Assistance:

a. 4/503d provides medical instruction for Vietnamese personnel (OJT) working at the aid station of Dong Tie Village.

b. 1/50th provides 4 Sky Soldiers who teach at the An Khe High School on their off duty time.

9. MEDCAPS:

60 MEDCAPS were conducted during March and 4584 patients were treated.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(2) Rural Development:
   (a) 2/503d gave construction assistance in the form of 20 man hours, 1 2½ ton trucks of lumber, 9000 gallons of water and 80 bags of cement, toward the construction of 2 schools and a pagoda.
   (b) 3/319th has donated 34 man days of labor and the equivalent of 33,000 $V property in support of the Bong Son Hospital.

(3) Psychological Operations:
   (a) 1/503d conducted 2 town meetings at Vinh Ly (BR949612) and Chanh Ho (2) (BR 971630) in Phu My (D).
   (b) Armed Propaganda Teams: Negative
   (c) Loudspeaker and Leaflet Missions
      1. Speaker Time: 64½ Hours
      2. Total Leaflets dropped: 2,815,000

   c. April:
      (1) Community Relations and Civil Affairs Projects:
         (a) The S-5 Section 173d Airborne Brigade continues to actively support ARVN Dependent Housing. Vertical construction is well underway at all three areas. 40th ARVN Regiment which is located at LZ English, is constructing units at LZ Dog. One unit is completed with exception of closing the septic tank located at the rear of the building. Families to move into the new quarters have been picked based on number of children and financial needs. They are expected to move into the new quarters within ten days. The 41st Regiment at LZ Crystal has one unit 80% complete. The 47th Regiment at Tuy Hoa has one set of quarters 95% complete and two sets of quarters 25% complete. This project has picked up ARVN Command emphasis and enthusiasm since vertical construction has begun. The ARVN Commanders are placing greater emphasis and the soldiers are displaying greater enthusiasm.
SUNJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(b) The LZ English Health School and Dispensary continue to be very effective. During the past month, the Dispensary treated 1,000 people from the local villages. Plague which was mentioned in our last report was brought under control through the efforts of many agencies. However, it is noteworthy to mention that health worker graduates contributed immeasurably in the dusting of thousands of homes and the immunization of over 12,000 persons.

(c) The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade, continues unilateral sponsorship of the "goc Son Buddhist Orphanage in Bong Son. The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, 173d Airborne Brigade, continues unilateral sponsorship of the Catholic Refugee Camp in Long Son.

(d) Significant Pacification Items: RD Cadre has opened schools, several of which are now operating in tents, in 7 target hamlets during the past two weeks. A total of 70 persons have moved back to My Duc Hamlet (Hoai Nhon) to begin rebuilding and cleaning up the hamlet. Once this is accomplished, it is planned that 600 persons will return. Only persons capable of working to repair homes have moved to the hamlet at this time. The 3d Battalion, 40th ARVN Regiment repaired a 6 classroom school in Qui Thuan (Tam Quan) which is a target hamlet. The 4th Battalion, 40th ARVN Regiment is presently making extensive repairs to the My An (Hoai Nhon) Market Place. This is a target hamlet in the 40th Regiment AO. The parish priest at Qui Thuan (Tam Quan) asked the District Chief for assistance in repairing the Catholic Church in the hamlet. He has moved approximately 20 persons into the hamlet to begin repairs. Upon accomplishment of the project (2-3 months) the priest will assist the District Chief in appealing to the former residents of the hamlet to return. They are estimated at several thousand and are presently residing in refugee camps at Tam Quan, Bong Son and Qui Nhon. Hamlet chiefs in several target hamlets have now returned and are living in the hamlets (day and night). Among these are:

- Qui Thuan (Tam Quan)
- Truong Xuan (Tam Quan)
- My Duc (Hoai Nhon)
- Binh Tri (Hoai Nhon)
- Binh Cong (Hoai Nhon)
- An Thuong (Hoai An)

(e) Combined or Unilateral Assistance in Commodity Distribution

1. Food:

a. The Brigade S-5 donated 520 pounds of assorted foods and candies to the various orphanages, schools, churches, refugee camps, and villages throughout the Brigade AO.

b. The 1/503d distributed 130 pounds of captured rice and candies throughout Phu My and Hoai An District.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. The 2/503d distributed over 1,200 pounds of rice, fruits, candies, and 40 gallons of milk throughout their AO.

2. The 4/503d delivered over 800 pounds of rice, fruits, candies, and milk to the An Khe Refugee Center and the Catholic Orphanage.

3. Support Battalion distributed 610 pounds of assorted foods, and fruits to the Catholic and Protestant Churches in An Khe.

4. 1/50th Mechanized distributed 200 pounds of assorted foods and candy to the An Khe Elementary School.

2. Clothing:

a. Brigade S-5 donated 50 pounds of clothing to children dependents in the 40th ARVN Regiment.

b. 1/50th Mechanized donated clothing to 35 children of the Xuyen Elementary School.

3. Building Materials:

a. The Bde S-5 delivered the following items to ARVN Dependent Housing Sites:

(1) 7,313 Bags Cement
(2) 24,866 Boardfeet Lumber (Random Lengths)
(3) 2,888 Sheets Tin
(4) 472 Pounds Nails (assorted sizes)
(5) 4 Panama Block Making Machines
(6) 290 Door and Window Hinges

b. The 1/503d delivered 615 boardfeet of lumber to various projects in their AO.

c. The 2/503d delivered 2,000 sand bags, 8,000 gallons of water, 14 cubic yards of crushed rock, 6 gallons paint, 43 bags of cement, 12 sheets of plywood (salvage) and 10 tons of sand to various project sites.

d. The 4/503d distributed 1,800 boardfeet of lumber, 16 gallons of paint, 1,200 sand bags and 4,400 pounds of cement to various project sites.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

A. Agricultural Supplies: The 4/503d delivered 3,600 pounds of edible garbage to the An Tuc Pig Farm.

B. Hygienic Items:
   a. 1/503d distributed 80 lbs of soap and 12 toothbrushes.
   b. 2/503d distributed 650 bars of soap and 25 tubes of toothpaste.
   c. 4/503d distributed 65 cases of soap.
   d. 3/319th distributed 425 rounds of assorted hygienic items to include, soap, toothpaste and toothbrushes.

C. School Supplies:
   a. 2/503d distributed one hundred dollars worth of school supplies to the Ngoc Son School.
   b. 4/503d delivered 100 school kits to the Cui Chuan School. Kits consisted of pencils, erasers, rulers, pens, ink, ink pots, blotters, and notebooks.
   c. 1/50th provided school supplies for 72 children of the Xuyen Elementary School.
   d. 3/319th Artillery distributed 550 pounds of school supplies (pens, pencils, notebooks, erasers, ink and blotters) in the AO.

E. Visits to Local Institutions and GVN Districts:

The Brigade Commander, his staff, Battalion Commanders and Staff, try to make daily visits for liaison and to coordinate with their counterparts as well as local GVN Officials throughout the Brigade AO. These visits are single or multi-purpose, military or civil in nature, or just friendly visits, which is determined by the daily situation. It should be noted that Battalion CP's are co-located with each district headquarters, (i.e., 1/50th - Phu My, 1/503d - Hoai An, 2/503d - Hoai Nhon and 4/503d - Tam Quan). In this manner coordination is merely a matter of turning to your counterpart. This has proven to be very effective, has increased understanding and rapport between US, ARVN and GVN Officials, has increased operational efficiency and greatly enhanced the Pacification Program.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

8. Educational Assistance:

a. The 2/503d provides a teacher, one hour daily to the Ngoc Son School to teach fundamentals of English.

b. 4/503d provides medical instruction (OJT) for Vietnamese Personnel at the Dong Te Village Aid Station.

9. MEDCAPS:

97 MEDCAPS were conducted during April and 13,277 patients were treated.

(2) Rural Development:

(a) Road Improvement: The 1/50th spent 200 man hours rebuilding a bridge at Tru Thong (BR 937834), and provided 1,000 boardfeet lumber and 20 pounds of nails for this project.

(b) School Improvement: 1/50th spent 150 man hours repairing the Xuyen Elementary School at An Khe.

(3) Psychological Operations:

(a) Town Meetings: Negative

(b) Armed Propaganda Teams: Negative

(c) Loudspeaker and Leaflet Missions

1. Speaker Time: 46½ hours

2. Total Leaflets Dropped: 3,853,000

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

11. Personnel and Administration:

a. General:

(1) The Brigade personnel posture was good during the reporting period. Overall the Brigade was over-strength 223 personnel. There were, however, certain MOS skills that were short. The shortages at the end of the reporting period were as follows:

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<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71P</td>
<td>Flight Op Coord</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71T</td>
<td>Maint Data Sp</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76A</td>
<td>Supplyman</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76J</td>
<td>Med Sup &amp; Parts, Sp</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76S</td>
<td>Autm Rpr Parts Sp</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76U</td>
<td>Comm-Electron Repair Parts Sp</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76V</td>
<td>Equip Stor Sp</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76W</td>
<td>Petroleum Stor Sp</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBE-SC/HD

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76X</td>
<td>Shorage Sp</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81A</td>
<td>General Draftsman</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84G</td>
<td>Photo Lab Sp</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91C</td>
<td>Clinical Sp</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94A</td>
<td>Food Service Appr</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Personnel:

(1) The strength of the Brigade as of the last day of each month was as follows: (Omitted Hq, DA)
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

C. Discipline, Law and Order:

1. The 173d Military Police Platoon is based on a six Squad structure. Platoon Headquarters and three Squads (+) are supporting the Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade and his staff at LZ English. One squad (-) is in support of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Rear) at An Khe. One Squad (-) is in support of Task Force South at Bao Loc.

2. Base Camp Operation:

(a) The daily commitments at the end of this reporting period for a 24 hour period were: 3 Desk Sergeants, 2 Desk Clerks, 1 Patrol Supervisor, 14 Patrolman, 2 to set up at the Bong Son Bridge, National Police Station for fire support, 3 TOC Guards, 4 IPW Cage Guards, 3 Gate Guards, and a special 2 man unit that sets up a checkpoint at LZ Uplift twice weekly to check 173d Airborne Brigade vehicles for proper authorization to leave AO Lee.

(b) A total of 1 indigenous personnel (interpreter) was processed by the Brigade Provost Marshall Office for the issuance of Brigade Identification Cards during the reporting period.

(c) The total number of detainees processed by the 173d Military Police Platoon during the reporting period is as follows:

1. Prisoners of War - 63
2. Civil Defendants - 304
3. Innocent Civilians - 911
4. Returnees - 0
5. Total - 1278

(d) During the reporting period the 173d Military Police Platoon escorted a total of 17 convoys.

(e) There is no registration of privately owned weapons done at the Brigade level. All registration is done at the USARV Provost Marshall Office and the Brigade Provost Marshall Office will assist Brigade personnel with the necessary forms and information. With the exception, in emergency situations when an export license has not been received prior to departure of weapons owner, the Brigade Provost Marshall can prepare a certificate for the Vietnamese Customs Export to serve as a temporary export license.
(f) The following is a breakdown of all violations recorded at the Brigade Provost Marshall Office during the reporting period:

1. Non-traffic Violations - 129
2. CID Reports of Investigation - 95
3. CID Cases - 64
4. Traffic Violations - 29
5. Motor Vehicle Accidents at Fault - 17
6. Motor Vehicle Accidents not at Fault - 19
7. Motor Vehicle Fatalities - 2

(3) Tactical Support:

(a) During the reporting period the 173d Military Police Platoon was in operational support of AO Marshall (An Khe), AO Lee (LZ English) and 3/503d Infantry, Task Force South (Bao Loc).

(b) The total number of detainees processed by each area of operations is as follows:

1. AO Marshall - 64
2. AO Lee - 730

(4) Staff Judge Advocate:

(a) The discipline of the Brigade has been good during this reporting period. In addition to the activities listed below, the SJA Section gave 38 commander briefings, legal instruction to over 2100 replacement personnel, reviewed 15 reports or survey and board proceedings.

(b) Legal assistance was rendered to 1285 personnel. This includes Brigade and non-Brigade personnel.

(c) Article 15 and non-judicial punishment involved 716 cases. Following is a breakdown of personnel punished by month:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. E-4 and below
   - February: 223
   - March: 196
   - April: 212

2. E-5 and above
   - February: 37
   - March: 39
   - April: 7

3. Officers
   - February: 0
   - March: 2
   - April: 0

(d) The following is a breakdown by month of the type of court-martial cases for the Brigade during this reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) There were 32 Personnel Property Claims processed during the reporting period.

(d) Development and Maintenance of Morale:

1. Morale within the Brigade remained excellent due to increased and improved services and facilities.

2. Finance: The Brigade Finance Section (Company "A", Admin) continued to provide financial support throughout the reporting period. Newly arrived replacements were made aware of the Soldiers Savings Program and the various allotments available to them through orientations and various newsletters. The total payments processed were as follows:

   - Regular monthly payments - 23,023
   - Partial payments made - 5,577
   - Total payments processed and made - 28,600

3. Chaplain:

   - General: During this reporting period religious activities were widespread. There was good coverage of all units in the Brigade. The statistics on the specific activities speak for themselves. The location in which these activities occurred were base camps, areas of operation, check points, strong points, observation points and hospitals. They occurred both on group and individual levels.

   - Hospital visits continued to be made as often as was possible. BG Barnes also, upon his assumption of command began the policy of visiting each hospital in the Brigade area of operation at least once weekly. These visits
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

are much appreciated by wounded and sick personnel.

(c) Character guidance briefing continued to be made available to commanders during the reporting period.

(d) Total services conducted and attendance during the quarter were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Protestant</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>6,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Catholic</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>11,607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Administrative Services:

(1) Postal Services:

(a) General: Postal services were good with incoming mail being received on 89 out of 89 days. The average time in transmission of mail from San Francisco to actual recipient at field locations was 7 days. Out-going mail was dispatched on 89 out of 89 days. The average time of transmission of the mail from the sender to the APO in San Francisco was 5 days.

(b) Mail Processed (pounds).

1. February:
   a. Received - 68,485 lbs
   b. Dispatched - 27,362 lbs

2. March:
   a. Received - 93,343 lbs
   b. Dispatched - 17,447 lbs

2. April:
   a. Received - 68,000 lbs
   b. Dispatched - 37,023 lbs
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(c) Total amount of money orders sold:

1. February - $357,743.42 (average purchase $40.00)
2. March - $376,388.64 (average purchase $55.00)
3. April - $395,867.83 (average purchase $60.00)

(d) The total amount of postage and parcel post fees was as follows:

1. February - $3,626.00
2. March - $3,634.00
3. April - $5,375.00

(2) Special Services Activities:

(a) February:

1. General: The Special Services Program continued during February with R&R being the main attraction. The entertainment center in An Khe is almost finished and is scheduled for completion soon.
2. There were 3 USO shows and attendance was 1,300 during the month of February.
3. Number of R&R's:
   a. In-country: Allocated, 90 - Used, 137
   b. Out-of-country: Allocated, 509 - Used 603
4. There were a total of 1,192 films shown during February.
5. The Brigade Band played 15 shows during February. The attendance was 3,000.
6. The photo lab was used by 207 personnel during February.

(b) March:

1. General: Special Services activities continued with R&R continuing to be the main attraction. The opening of the Brigade swimming pool in An Khe has been delayed due to a difficulty in procuring materials and equipment needed to complete the project.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

2. There were 2 USO shows in March with an estimated attendance of 900 personnel.

3. Number of R&R's:
   a. In-country: Allocated, 90, Used, 135
   b. Out-of-country: Allocated, 500, Used 616

4. There were a total of 1212 films shown during March.

5. The Brigade Band played 20 shows and the estimated attendance was 3500.

6. A beach was opened at Williams Bridge on 29 March 1969. The hours of operation are 0900 - 1900 daily.

7. The photo lab was used by 243 personnel during March.

(c) April:

1. General: R&R remains the main Special Services attraction. The opening of the Brigade swimming pool is still delayed because of a lack of materials and equipment.

2. There were 4 USO shows during the month of April. The attendance was 900 personnel.

3. Number of R&R's:
   a. In-country: Allocated, 63 - Used, 63
   b. Out-of-country: Allocated, 509 - Used 613

4. There were 1,212 films shown in the month of April.

5. 236 personnel used the gymnasium in April.

6. 202 personnel utilized the photo lab in April.

7. 2,800 personnel used the beach in April.

8. The Brigade Band played 22 shows in April. The estimated attendance was 3,500 personnel.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(3) Public Information Office Activities:

(a) General: The mission of the Brigade Information Office is two-fold. First is the coordination and conduct of a command information program that serves the needs of the Commanding General. Second, is the preparation and conduct of a public information program that provides a record of newsworthy events and combat action by the Brigade. Numerous public information releases, cleared through the USARV Information Office, supported the second part of the mission. It is often impossible to separate the command information function from the public information function; i.e., besides serving the command information function, the Brigade's yearbook, magazine and newspaper will also serve as public records of the Brigade's activities.

(b) Significant Coverage: The Brigade Information Office made maximum utilization of personnel to insure adequate coverage in the Brigade's three areas of operation. Significant coverage for the reporting period was given to civic action programs throughout the Brigade's area of operation. Coverage of enemy activities involving the elements of this brigade was given maximum support by the staff of the information office.

(c) Information Activities:

| News Releases:               | 71 |
| Formal Interviews and Briefings | 123 |
| Hometown News Releases:      | 2,039 |
| Hometown Pictorial Releases: | 77  |

(d) Major projects produced during the period:

- Newspaper "Fire Base 173"
- Quarterly magazine, Sky Soldier
- Brigade Yearbook
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

2. Logistics:

a. General:

(1) Supply requirements in the An Khe area decreased during the past quarter largely because the movement of 4th Bn 503d Infantry to LZ North English and the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry to LZ Uplift. Consequently the emphasis on support to LZ English has increased. Requirements to support troops of 1/50th in Class I at LZ Uplift has required the location of an officer in that area to supervise forward supply activities. Projected movement of the 173d Support Battalion to various areas around Qui "Thon has brought increased demands for building materials to construct facilities necessary for operations. Requirements for building materials for new mess facilities for 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry at LZ Uplift after that mess facility burned down were expedited and supplies delivered.

(2) There were no critical shortages in Class I, II & IV, III, V, VII or VIII encountered during this period. The addition of one sortie daily by C-130 aircraft from An Khe to LZ English has not substantially increased supply effectiveness. Major quantities of supplies are still moved by the "Airborne Express" by ground transportation due to the priority for air movement of troops and mail, and the adequate availability of organic ground transportation.

(3) A moratorium established by 1st Log Command on AFls (follow-ups of requisitions) to depots in now in effect and unit's AFls will not be processed at depot until approximately 1 June 1969. This moratorium was instituted because the APD equipment at depots could not handle the volume of AFls, AFls, and ACIs without seriously affecting the supply service to requisitioning units.

(4) The Brigade Supply Office is currently conducting Special Projects to include: Project Strip, Project Clean, Project Count, Project Edit/Challenge, and Project Rags. These internal purification programs placing special emphasis on requirements outlined in AR 725-50 are proceeding within the established time frames. It is anticipated that these projects will be temporarily discontinued during the relocation of Brigade Supply Operations.

b. Supply:

(1) Class I (est)

(a) Total number of "A" Rations: 117,661
(b) Total number of "B" Rations: N/A
(c) Total number of "C" Rations: 183,437
(d) Ration Supplemental Packs, in a state which could not be used in the prescribed manner because of age limitations are being used in Civil Affairs Pacification Programs and during 173d Spt Bn MEDCAPS and CA activities.

(e) Items Issued (Significant): 80
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

Compressor, Reciprocating 11 EA
Frequency Meter AN/VFM-159 1 EA
10 KW 400 Cycle Generator 1 EA
Generator, Signal AN/VRM 103 1 EA
Howitzer, Light, Towed, M102 3 EA
Machineguns, 7.62 mm 27 EA
Mortar, 81 mm 7 EA
Mortar, 4.2 In 3 EA
Radio Set, PRC-77 4 EA
Receiver, Radio R 442/VRC 1 EA
Trailer, Cargo, 3/4 ton M101 1 EA
Tank, Trailer, M149 2 EA
Truck, Cargo, 2 1/2 ton, M35A2 4 EA
Truck, Tractor, 5 ton 2 EA
Truck, Utility, 4 1/2 ton, M51A1 7 EA
Truck, Van Shop, 2 1/2 ton, M109A3 48 EA
Truck, Wrecker, 5 ton, M543A1 1 EA
Typewriter, Non-Portable, 20" 5 EA
N79 GL 108 EA
Generator, 3 KVA 400 CY 3 EA
M1 Cal 50 1 EA
Rifle M16A1, 5.56 mm 132 EA
Napalm, Unsp 1 EA
Scoop Loader 1 EA
Radar Set PPS-5 1 EA
Rifle M16 w/scope 6 EA
Telephone TA-312 6 EA
Trailer 1 1/2 ton 4 EA

(f) Continuous liaison is made with the ICCY, USARV G-4, and the supporting 1st Log Depots. The Periodic Logistics Report was discontinued during this period. Current status on outstanding dues in for critical shortages is obtained by continuous follow up action.

(g) Support has been rendered to numerous US units (not organic or attached to the 173d Abn Bde) located at An Khe and surrounding areas. This support has been mainly of barrier material and construction supplies.

(2) Class III (EST)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>REPORTING PERIOD TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>311,343</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mogas</td>
<td>280,256</td>
</tr>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(3) Class VIII:

(a) The month of February saw little change in the total number of lines stocked at BM55. The demand supported items accounted for 30 percent of the total lines, but almost 75 percent of the total volume. The breakdown for items stocked by federal stock class was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Stock Class</th>
<th>Demand</th>
<th>Fringe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3000-6500 Selected Items</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6505 Drugs</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6510 Dressings</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6515 Instruments</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6520 Dental Equipment</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6525 X-Ray Supplies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6530 Hospital Furniture</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6532 Hosp &amp; Surg textiles</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6545 Sets, Kits &amp; Outfits</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6600-9700 Lab Equipment</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>420</strong></td>
<td><strong>950</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) During the month of March certain changes were instituted. Beginning on March 23d, in an effort to get medical supplies to the units at LZ English, LZ Unlift, and Bao Loc, BM55 began to ship almost all supplies to these units by air. This was accomplished on a daily basis. From 22 March to 31 March 6575 lbs of supplies were shipped by air. The breakdown was 6020 lbs to LZ English and 555 lbs to Bao Loc. Supplies for LZ English that still must be sent by Airborne Express are over size items such as litters, and all flammable items such as alcohol and ether.

(c) During the month of April a 100% location survey and a 100% wall to wall inventory was conducted by BM55. As a result of these two activities, the number of due-outs were greatly reduced. In April, 526 requisitions were received and 735 requisitions were shipped to using units. The majority of shipments were by aircraft with 14,025 lbs being sent to LZ English, and 1575 lbs to Bao Loc. The beginning of the period the number of requisitions from customers over 15 days old was 479. At the end of the period the number over 15 days old had dropped to 274. In April, the Brigade Surgeon was completing the list of drugs authorized for use in the Brigade. As a result of this list, 96 demand supported drugs have been dropped from stockage at BM55. The final list of drugs will be completed in early May. Upon completion of the drug list, the Brigade Surgeon will complete a list of all other medical items used in the Brigade. The net result of these lists will be a large reduction in the number of lines stocked by BM55.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

II. Lessons Learned - Commander's Observations

During the reporting period, various lessons were learned. These lessons learned were drawn from the operations which occurred during the period extending from 1 February 1969 through 30 April 1969.

1. Personnel:

   a. OBSERVATION: Administration of the Malaria Urine Testing Program

      EVALUATION: As Ranger units conduct long range reconnaissance operations that are, for the most part, divorced from normal logistical and command and control monitoring, the 75th Infantry (Ranger) has reported a high degree of negative malaria pill consumption. By conducting malaria urine tests on Tuesday and Friday of each week rather than on Tuesday alone, and by assigning each member of the unit a testing number which is attached to the urine specimen bottle, this unit has had positive results.

      RECOMMENDATION: That other units experiencing problems in malaria control consider conducting malaria urine tests twice weekly and institute a pinpoint identification system so that negative users can be identified by appointed numbers and thus by name.

   b. OBSERVATION: Misuse of Personnel

      EVALUATION: It has been noted that some personnel are not being properly utilized once they are assigned to specific sections within the Brigade. For example, individuals assigned to a staff section or company for duty in MOS 71520 (clerk-typist) are being utilized as RTO's.

      RECOMMENDATION: Recommend personnel be assigned duties compatible with MOS and grade. If they prove ineffective, then they should be reclassified into an MOS for which they are physically and mentally qualified.

   c. OBSERVATION: Practical Minimum Assignment

      EVALUATION: It has been noted that staff sections and company orderly rooms are retaining too many personnel to perform and maintain the normal routine flow of correspondence and mission accomplishments.

      RECOMMENDATION: Recommend supervisors analyze the work flow process, analyze job performance and have each individual prepare an individual job description of what he does in order to see if some persons within a given office are performing duties that could be accomplished as an additional duty by authorized personnel.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

2. Operations:

a. OBSERVATION: Artillery Preparations of Landing Zones

EVALUATION: Artillery preparations fired on proposed Landing Zones have caused fires. These fires have been caused not only by white phosphorus rounds indicating the last round, but also by point detonating HE rounds during the prep.

RECOMMENDATION: During the dry season when fire hazards exist, point detonating HE rounds should be fired to neutralize known/suspected enemy positions in the vicinity of an LZ and VT fused HE rounds should be fired on the LZ. By utilizing artillery fusing in this manner the possibility of conducting a combat assault into a burning/smoking LZ will be greatly diminished.

b. OBSERVATION: Tracker Dog Team

EVALUATION: Tracker dog teams have been utilized several times without success.

RECOMMENDATION: It appears that the two man security element which was posted to the dog’s front puts out a stronger, fresher scent which overpowers the older VC/NVA trail. Trackers must be employed on fresh trails and the two man security element must act as flank security and not as frontal security and trail breaker.

c. OBSERVATION: Tracker Dog Teams Employed in Search and Rescue Missions of a Downed Aircraft

EVALUATION: In a recent operation a tracker team and a tracking dog were employed to search for a downed aircraft. The team went to the site of the crash and noticed that the heavy smell of JP4 in the area caused the dog to lose its ability to smell or effectively track in the area.

RECOMMENDATION: If a CCT is to be used in the future for similar search and rescue missions, the dog should be kept out of the crash area itself in order to preserve the dog’s sense of smell and his ability to track.

d. OBSERVATION: Maintaining Fire Superiority

EVALUATION: Continuous artillery must be delivered on the enemy to maintain fire superiority and to prevent his breaking the contact by fleeing. In an artillery mission there is a time lapse when the shell being fired is changed from High Explosive to Improved Conventional Munitions. This time lag results from the height of wind and burst corrections that must be computed in order to insure
proper ground effect. The break in fire support affords the enemy valuable time and freedom of movement. This time lapse must be avoided at all cost.

RECOMMENDATION: When the mission enters fire for effect one platoon of the battery will continue to fire HE at the fire for effect grid while the other two platoons prepare the ICM rounds. Only when the ICM rounds are on the target will the platoon firing HE change their shell to Firecracker. In this way there will be no lapse in the firepower being brought to bear on the enemy.

e. OBSERVATION: Landing Zone Sites for Ranger Insertion

EVALUATION: In conducting Ranger insertions, it is both vital and necessary that the insertion be made in such a manner that the Ranger team location is not compromised, thus jeopardizing the mission. The 75th Inf (Ranger) has conducted over 350 Ranger team insertions into areas were no allied units were currently operating without loss of either personnel or equipment. This has been achieved by the utilization of two methods. First, in conducting an aerial reconnaissance of the area of operations, an altitude of not less than 1500 feet is maintained at all times and a straight-line azimuth heading is employed, so that to the enemy that might be observing from the ground the aerial reconnaissance looks like a normal passenger or logistical mission and offers no hint of forthcoming insertion. Secondly, the Landing Zone chosen for insertion ideally is to be on the reverse slope of the ridgeline, and divorced from nearby streams or trails. It should also be, if possible, a one ship Landing Zone and be as concealed from ground observation as is possible. By utilizing these two methods of choosing Landing Zones, the stated successes have been achieved by this unit.

RECOMMENDATION: That other Ranger and medium range patrol units consider this method of choosing insertion Landing Zones.

f. OBSERVATION: Cordon and Search/Sky Sweep Operations

EVALUATION: When an element is to be inserted in more than one lift, the usual procedure is for the first lift to establish a blocking position and then use subsequent lifts as the sweep/search force. This allows VC the opportunity to either escape or hide themselves or equipment.

RECOMMENDATION: The first element or the ground should make a rapid sweep of the area and try to develop a c...tact. Subsequent lifts can be landed on the initial LZ to establish a blocking force or inserted to exploit the developed situation. After the later lifts have established a blocking position the initial element can sweep back to the LZ making a detailed search.

g. OBSERVATION: Combined Artillery – Ranger Operations

EVALUATION: When supporting a Ranger operation consisting of widely
OPERATIONAL REPORT

LESSONS LEARNED

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 May 1969

The following report is intended to provide a summary of lessons learned during recent operations in the Republic of Vietnam. These lessons are intended to improve future operations and support the units involved.

a. OBSERVATION: Distributed teams are very difficult to obtain current and accurate locations if the Ranger TAC is not collocated with the artillery unit.

RECOMMENDATION: In order to provide close support to ground elements it is essential that the artillery commander have a Ranger counterpart that he can directly coordinate fire support with. When combined raids are executed the Rangers should establish a TAC CP with the artillery elements so that fire support coordination can be effected enabling accurate and responsive fires to be delivered.

b. OBSERVATION: Fire Support as Observation Posts

EVALUATION: On platoon sized artillery raids, the howitzers are usually emplaced on a prominent hilltop to facilitate defense of the position. This type of position also makes an excellent observation post.

RECOMMENDATION: Proper utilization of the fire base's terrain can greatly increase the amount of information supplied to intelligence agencies and provide additional targets. Binoculars, BC Scopes, and Starlight Scopes should be brought with the raiding unit and manned by as many personnel as practical. Possible enemy trails and supply routes that can be observed from the firing position should be seeded with trip flares and other warning devices. When the devices are activated at night pre-computed data can be quickly fired and the individuals who tripped the flares can be taken under fire accurately.

c. OBSERVATION: Red Raider Operations

EVALUATION: Artillery units in the Republic of Vietnam frequently do not fully utilize their capability to provide effective observation posts. If the artillery does not employ observation posts it is not fully exploiting its capability to bring firepower on the enemy.

RECOMMENDATION: The artillery should operate observation posts on the LRRP concept utilizing "Red Raider" teams. During the month of March there were 4 "Red Raider" teams fielded by the 3d Bn, 319th Field Artillery. These teams acted as observation posts and radio relays for artillery raids conducted by the battalion. None of these required additional infantry security for defense of their position.

d. OBSERVATION: PRC 77

EVALUATION: Generally in even slightly damp weather the PRC 77's range and effectiveness are reduced. One corrective action was to wrap the unit in a plastic bag or poncho, but this was found to collect moisture in the form of condensation.

END

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

RECOMMENDATION: The best solution was found to be draping an oily towel, also used to clean weapons, over the radio. This not only waterproofs the unit, but also absorbs the moisture and the PRC 77 is able to operate at 100% efficiency.

k. OBSERVATION: Starlight Scopes

EVALUATION: It has been found common practice to remove the rubber eye piece of the scope for storage in its case. In use however much dirt and sand scratch the unprotected rear lens. The effectiveness of the scope is thereby greatly reduced or negated.

RECOMMENDATION: By leaving the rear eye piece in place when storing the scope this damage is avoided. The time involved is not longer and no damage occurs when this procedure is followed.

1. OBSERVATION: VC/NI Identification

EVALUATION: The examination of every dead for possible VC/NI identification causes serious problems to the leaders in the field. Often this requirement is given only lip service by US forces and GVN agencies. In order for the identification to work properly, police special branch and/or VN counter intelligence forces equipped with a list of names and a "rogues gallery" of known VC/NI members must be available on call to go to the scene of the kill and make an on the spot identification attempt. An alternate solution where LZ's are available is to extract the bodies to the local DIOCC.

RECOMMENDATION: This unit has employed three methods of attempting to identify the VC/NI dead: National Police accompanying a unit, extracting bodies to the Phu My DIOCC, and delivering police special branch members to the site of the kill. A fourth alternative is to issue cameras to the units and deliver exposed film to Brigade S-2 for processing and dissemination to PIOCC/DIOCC for comparison with "rogues gallery" photos and/or identification by Ho Chi Minh and PW's.

m. OBSERVATION: Tunnel and Cave Clearing Operations (1)

EVALUATION: The use of E8, 16 tube tactical CS launcher has proved very effective in operations involving tunnels and caves. By firing the E8 launcher directly into the cave or tunnel entrance, a dense cloud of CS is forced far down inside the tunnels and caves.

RECOMMENDATION: This method is far more rapid than depending on natural draft to circulate CS from grenades throughout the tunnel, and is quicker and less troublesome than bringing in the "Mity-Mite" blower and powdered CS. For long term contamination of tunnels and other man made caves, the powdered CS remains the best solution.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

n. OBSERVATION: Tunnel and Cave Clearing Operations (2)

EVALUATION: On recent combat operations, a unit from this Brigade discovered 1 armed NVA soldier in a tunnel. The unit commander immediately set up security to block escape routes and to search the area for other exits. Several methods were used to try to get the enemy out of the cave, including: CS grenades, frag grenades, and smoke grenades. After these attempts failed, the unit commander called for a "Mity-Mite" blower with powdered CS. While waiting for the "Mity-Mite", the NVA soldier threw a grenade out of the tunnel entrance wounding four US troops.

RECOMMENDATION: When an armed enemy is inside a tunnel or a cave and security must be placed in close proximity, it is recommended that all exits be blocked in a manner that will prevent grenades from being tossed from within. The use of a barrier material inside the tunnel or cave would prevent injury to security personnel. A few items that will satisfy this requirement are: poncho, poncho liner, blanket, or several small trees forced into the caves entrance.

o. OBSERVATION: Impact Grids for Illumination Rounds

EVALUATION: It has been noted that when elements securing bridges along QL 1 detect movement or experience sniper fire, there is an undue delay when calling for artillery illumination. Reasons cited for this is that there are many small hamlets along the highway, thus preventing illumination because the impact would endanger the hamlets.

RECOMMENDATION: Although illumination grids must constantly be cleared, preplanned grids have been coordinated with the District Forces in relationship to hamlet locations. Consequently when illumination is desired, a preplanned target is available and the only careful clearance procedures necessary is the location of friendly troops.

p. OBSERVATION: False Insertion of Recon Teams

EVALUATION: During the insertion of a Recon Team, a false insertion was made. Gunships prepped the false LZ and the insertion ship touched down momentarily before inserting the team on the actual LZ approximately 1 Km away. The team moved a short distance and established an OP. Remaining in the same general area for three days, they had no sightings. They then moved approximately 2 Km. Subsequent to relocating they had three enemy observations and captured one NVA soldier. Upon interrogation the NVA stated that his unit had observed the false insertion and his unit had cleared the surrounding area for approximately 2 Km. When he was captured he had an idea that Americans were in the area.

RECOMMENDATION: False insertions are an effective deceptive measure for insertion of small units; however it must be recognized that enemy units will give a wide berth to any area they believe to have been an insertion site. Recon Teams must move a considerable distance from any real or false insertion area in order to obtain maximum results.
AVBRE-SG/VHD

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

q. OBSERVATION: Accidental Discharge of the M-60 Machine Gun

EVALUATION: When the M-60 machine gun is carried with ammunition loaded, it is not uncommon for the safety lever to be on the fire position either through neglect or contact with dense jungle. Accidental discharges have been known to occur when the trigger is struck by brush or the gunner's equipment. If the gun is unloaded, the amount of time necessary for even an expert team to put the gun into action causes the gun to be ineffective for the fleeting targets common to guerrilla warfare.

RECOMMENDATION: The gun can be carried in the "half-cock" position. The bolt is pulled to the rear and the chamber inspected to ensure that the weapon is clear. The feed tray cover is then closed. The bolt is eased forward so that the bolt is no longer in the firing position. The ammunition is then fed into the weapon until it clicks into place. The weapon cannot be fired accidentally, but can be put into action simply by pulling the bolt to the rear and placing the selector on the fire position.

r. OBSERVATION: Hawk Team Concept

EVALUATION: The possibility of friendly elements meeting unexpectedly and initiating contact is vastly increased while operating as small unit Hunter-Killer (HAWK) teams.

RECOMMENDATION: Hawk teams must keep the CP informed of their location and direction of movement. Team leaders must be aware of other teams' locations and direction of movement. A moving team should communicate with any adjacent team. A Hawk team operating without any communications must remain within clearly defined boundaries, and all other teams should stay clear of that area.

s. OBSERVATION: Halts on Trails

EVALUATION: Recently a platoon sized element stopped for a rest on a trail. The forward security element sighted one VC approaching on the trail at the same time that they were sighted by the VC. The VC was fired upon by small arms but escaped.

RECOMMENDATION: During halts while operating on trail networks, move all the troops off the trail when terrain permits. The forward and rear security should establish hasty ambush positions beside the trail.

t. OBSERVATION: Injury Prevention

EVALUATION: As a result of inadequate shielding beneath the driver's seat of the M113A1 (APC), drivers have received injuries when their APC's ran over mines.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

RECOMMENDATION: Injuries of this nature can be prevented by placing two layers of sandbags underneath the drivers seat.

OBSERVATION: Decontamination of Powdered CS on Highways

EVALUATION: Recently the NVA spread powdered CS on a stretch of 200 meters of QL19. The powdered CS was effective enough to require gas masks. Traffic could not pass because the powdered CS would cling to the underside of a vehicle, making it difficult to drive without a gas mask.

RECOMMENDATION: Initial attempts to sweep the CS off the highway were ineffective. A water trailer was used in an attempt to wash the highway, but this was too time consuming. A post fire truck was dispatched from Camp Radcliff and using the high pressure hoses, the highway was quickly washed down. This decontamination procedure was effective and the residual CS fumes were at a low enough level to allow the passage of vehicles with unmasked drivers.

3. Training and Organization

a. OBSERVATION: Junior Enlisted Leadership Training

EVALUATION: Many of our present squad leaders and team leaders are relatively inexperienced individuals who through demonstrated leadership have been given these positions. Realizing this, the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) has initiated a ten day leadership course at the Division Training Center, Camp Radcliff. The instruction given is basic military leadership and is aimed at filling the knowledge gap that the junior enlisted leaders have by virtue of their inexperience.

RECOMMENDATION: Due to good working relations between 1st En, 150th Infantry and the 1st Cavalry Division Training Center we have been able to send twelve individuals to the leadership course during February. This has enabled the 1-150th to increase the leadership quality in their companies.

4. Intelligence

a. OBSERVATION: Liaison in Local Hamlets

EVALUATION: Beginning on 18 April the 3d En (Abn) 503d Infantry placed squads in six hamlets in order to work with FF platoons and RD cadre located there. Almost immediately, the members of both FF and RD teams began reporting valuable information to the squads in the hamlets. The reports and the activity observed by the troops were passed immediately to the battalion, which in turn was
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

able to react before the enemy could accomplish its mission. Experience indicates that the same reports forwarded through normal channels would have taken longer to reach the battalion and would very likely have arrived too late for effective reaction.

RECOMMENDATION: In pacification operations enemy information can be obtained readily when US/ARVN soldiers are stationed in or near population centers.

b. OBSERVATION: Map Basic Load

EVALUATION: With increased use of squad and fire team size Hawk teams, small unit leaders do not have enough maps.

RECOMMENDATION: Increase the basic load of maps to include Plt Ldr, Plt Sgt, Sqd Ldr and FT LDR.

c. OBSERVATION: VIP (Voluntary Informant Program)

EVALUATION: The VIP was highly successful during January 1969, however, during February the program slipped noticeably. This was due to increased enemy activity during which S-2 personnel were extremely busy and the program was not given the priority it enjoyed in January.

RECOMMENDATION: VIP to be successful must be run on a daily basis. Long periods of time will pass with insignificant results, however, when the local populace realizes the sincerity of the program, results will be realized as in January 1969.

d. OBSERVATION: Enemy Detection of US Operations

EVALUATION: It has been observed that when planning for combat operations air reconnaissance is flown over the target area. This not only warns the VC/NVA that something is about to take place, it also gives him an opportunity to prepare likely IZ's with booby traps and punji stakes.

RECOMMENDATION: Once an area has been programmed for combat operations, all aircraft operating should avoid circling, flying over, or flying too near the target area. If a VR is absolutely necessary, a covert method of accomplishing this should be worked out. An example would be to fly at two or three thousand feet, staying at least 1 Km away from the area and fly in a straight line avoiding any circling.

9/

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

a. OBSERVATION: Proper Utilization of NPFF

EVALUATION: During cordon and search operations, the US units cordoned while the RF units went into the hamlets for the initial search. Once the RF unit moved into the hamlet, the National Police were inserted by aircraft. Results of the operation were marginal due to the fact that the RF units moved into the hamlet and gathered the detainees for the National Police to question, often missing or overlooking certain key personnel who should have been detained.

RECOMMENDATION: In order to preclude any confusion during the initial search and gathering of personnel, the NPFF should enter the hamlet at the same time that the RF unit does, enabling proper "on the spot" interrogating and classifying of detainees.

5. Logistics

a. OBSERVATION: Support Maintenance for Battalion Communication

EVALUATION: It is essential that support maintenance units have the capability to support subordinate units. Presently however, the maintenance unit supporting the 1st Bn (M), 50th Infantry does not possess the capability, either in personnel or resources, to adequately support a mechanized infantry battalion.

RECOMMENDATION: A more realistic appraisal of the unit's needs could have possibly prevented the serious deadline rate of communication equipment that is presently developing.

b. OBSERVATION: Utilization of Emergency Resupply Packet

EVALUATION: After initiating contact it is often decided that a Ranger team should relocate either by foot or by helicopter rather than be extracted from their AO. In relocating, a resupply of ammunition must be made ready for the Ranger team that had been in contact. So that this resupply can be made with a minimum of delay, this unit has developed a pre-packed resupply pack. The Emergency Resupply Packet consists of twenty (20) M-26 grenades, six (6) M-17 claymore mines, and ten thousand (10,000) rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition.

RECOMMENDATION: That other units utilizing Ranger teams or medium range patrol elements consider the utilization of the Emergency Supply Packet.
6. Other
   a. OBSERVATION: Civil Affairs Projects

   EVALUATION: Recently a rifle company whose mission it was to secure a hamlet which was undergoing pacification, initiated the project of rebuilding a bridge near the hamlet. They performed all the work themselves with the materials being furnished by their battalion S-5.

   RECOMMENDATION: In all projects of this type, the US military personnel should act only as advisors and to help supply the needed materials. The actual work should be done by the Vietnamese people, i.e. RF/PF and ARVN personnel. By following this procedure, the image of the GVN forces will be improved.
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AVFA-GC-HIST (15 May 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned (1 Feb - 30 Apr 69) of 173d Airborne Brigade (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 15 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

(C) This headquarters concurs with the subject report, with the following comments:

a. Reference Section 2, para 2a: The recommendation is valid where fire hazard exists; however, last round indication must be closely coordinated to ensure safety yet preclude delays in landing.

b. Reference Section 2, para 2d: The use of FADAC should minimize delays in the preparation of FIRECRACKER data.

c. Reference Section 2, para 2h: Artillery observation posts are established in most areas whenever possible.

d. Reference Section 2, para 2i: Use of additional artillerymen in an infantry security role is not consistent with their training, and should not be considered normal.

e. Reference Section 2, para 2o: The recommendation is an inherent part of the Artillery Assistance Program (I FORCEV Reg 350-1).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FREDERICK E. HOLLAND
1LT AGG
ASST AG

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2 - ACSFOR, DA
1 - 173d Abn Bde

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
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AVHGC-DST (15 May 1969) 2d Ind

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 173D Airborne Brigade.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Artillery, Air, and Naval Support, section I, page 73, paragraph 5a. The intensive interdiction program fired by 3/319th Artillery from 12-16 February 1969 is not in keeping with MACV and USARV policy on interdiction fires. Interdiction fires are de-emphasized to eliminate unnecessary expenditures against unrewarding targets or targets which are not based on timely intelligence. The unit will be advised to review its command management of artillery ammunition.

b. Reference item concerning Administration of the Malaria Urine Testing Program, section II, page 126, paragraph 1(a); nonconcur. The malaria-urine test (Wilson-Edeson Field Test for Chloroquine in Urine) should only be performed upon the recommendation of the unit surgeon and in those units with a definite malaria problem. The Wilson-Edeson Test when performed once a week is sufficient to identify those individuals who fail to take the chloroquine-primoquine tablet. Unit will be advised. No further action is required.

c. Reference item concerning the Radio Set, AN/PRC-77, section II, page 129, paragraph 2(j); nonconcur. This appears to be an unfounded comment. Command-wide experience with the AN/PRC-77 reveals no such deficiency nor has any such deficiency been detected in the AN/PRC-25 which is housed in the identical case. The Signal Officer, 173d Airborne Brigade has no knowledge of any such deficiency with the AN/PRC-77. Unit should refrain from the practice of using an oil soaked rag as it has no beneficial effect on the performance of the radio and could result in damaged rubber components. Unit will be advised of above comment. No further action is required.

d. Reference item concerning Starlight Scopes, section II, page 130, paragraph 2(k); concur. When storing the starlight scope, the rubber eyepiece should remain in place for added protection to the eyepiece assembly.

e. Reference item concerning Support Maintenance for Battalion Communication, section II, page 135, paragraph 5(a); concur. The required
support maintenance in tactical units is formulated by TOE's directly from the Department of Army. When a unit desires an increase of personnel and equipment, NTOE actions are initiated to include justifications for these increases.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
LT, ACC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
173d Abn Bde.
I FFV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ 173d Airborne Brigade for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Short
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
ORGANIZATION: 173d Airborne Brigade

ASSIGNED
ATTACHED
MI: Military Intelligence Detachment
ITD: Infantry Teacher Detachment
KG: Kidney History Detachment
APU: Army Postal Unit
USAF: U.S. Air Force Control Party
PI: Public Information Detachment
CTT: Combat Tracker Team
CSAR: Crewed Surveillance Radar
LRRP: Long Range Recon Patrol
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 173d Airborne Brigade

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CG, 173d Airborne Brigade

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