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31 May 1981, DoDD 5200.10; OAG D/A ltr 29 Apr 1982

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA (N) (14 Aug 69) FOR OT UT 692337 27 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States of the U.S. and its contents in any form is prohibited by law.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

as

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   1st Infantry Division Artillery
S0BJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery for period, 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969, AGS 05 for-65 (U)

Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDLTT (MD)
APO US Forces 96345

1. Operations Significant Activities:

a. The 1st Infantry Division Artillery continued to support combined offensive operations Toan Thang (Complete Victory) Phase II and Phase III. Toan Thang II terminated on 17 Feb 69; Toan Thang III commenced on 18 February and continues as this reporting period ends. The operations continued to be characterized by changes to the organization for combat (Inclosure E1) and frequent tactical moves of artillery units (Inclosure 42). In addition, the 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery established a forward TOC at Quan Loi to support operations of the 1st Brigade in the Quan Loi and Song Be areas. Division Artillery units participated in Operation Atlas Wedge, 18-25 March 1969; Atlas Power, 10-15 April 1969; Plainsfield Warrior, 18-23 April 1969; provided artillery follow-ups for B-52 strikes of Red Lightning I (10-11 March 1969) and Red Lightning II (22-23 March 1969); and fired countermortar/rocket plenls in the defense of Saigon, Bien Hoa, Lai Khe, Quan Loi, and Song Be.

b. 1st Infantry Division Artillery operations were conducted in accordance with the Field SOP. Significant activities and procedures are noted below:

(1) One hundred twelve firing unit moves were conducted during this period, ninety-one were overland, seventeen were rotary wing, there were combination rotary and overland, and one was a combination fixed wing and overland move.

(2) Organization for combat was dictated by the operational areas of the maneuver elements. Normally, each maneuver battalion was supported by at least one 105mm howitzer battery. The locations of the organic medium artillery changed frequently during the reporting period. General Support Reinforcing missions were assigned individual medium and heavy batteries to assist the Direct Support Battalions in providing fires for airmobile assault preparations, ground operations and countermortar/rocket suppression fires for the three base camps within the Division tactical areas, the Capital Military Assistance Command, and the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command. The medium batteries are presently being employed with the batteries split into separate firing units, located separately and assuming separate missions. This allows the Division Artillery to provide more medium coverage throughout the tactical area of operations.

(3) A calibration program has been in effect for the past six months, utilizing the chronograph. The Division Artillery chronograph team calibrates all the Divisional batteries quarterly and more frequently if requested.

c. Intelligence:

(1) The Target Information Center has developed an average of 140 targets each day during the reporting period. A total of 12,593 targets were identified; 9,182 were fired (73%). A total of 35,559 rounds from all calibers were expended on these targets. Thirty percent of these targets were of an immediate engagement nature, while the remainder were engaged on a prearranged schedule of fires.
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12 May 1969

2a. Radar:

(a) There were a total of 404 radar sightings, during the reporting period. The majority of sightings were made by the AN/TPS-25 radar. Of these radar sightings, 197 were fired. A total of 5,731 rounds were fired on these sightings from all calibers.

(b) There are three AN/MPQ-4’s, one AN/TPS-25, and eleven AN/TPS-5’s operating in the Division TOR. The AN/MPQ-4 radar that was OPCON to the Royal Thai forces, Vietnam was released and moved to Song Be to provide coverage for Division units in that area. There were three AN/TPS-25 moves during the three month period, to provide coverage for the 2d Brigade area of operations in the Thu Duc District. On 20 April 1969, Division Artillery assumed responsibility for the Ground Surveillance Sections of the Infantry Battalions in the Division. These radars (AN/TPS-5) are to be employed on a radar bolt across the division area of operations. Dead space is to be filled by placing sensor devices. The remaining radars are to be employed in other selected areas within the division.

d. Metro: The Division Artillery Meteorological Section continued to develop and compute the 1010 and computer meteorological messages four times daily. Meteorological messages are currently being broadcast directly to the firing units in the field on the Division Artillery Admin/Log net.

e. Survey: During the quarter, ground survey was completed to four Fire Support Patrol Bases in the division sector. Directional control was established at eight additional fire support patrol bases where ground control could not be completed due to a lack of security for overland routes.

f. Logistics:

(1) During the past quarter Division Artillery units operated a Forward Supply Point at Dong Xoai from 4 through 8 February and from 17 April through the end of the quarter. C-130’s carried 480 round of 105mm and 184 rounds of 155mm ammunition into Dong Xoai every third or fourth day. Resupplying Class V by air to Dong Xoai reduced the turn around mileage for resupply by about 60 kilometers, resulting in a great saving of wear and tear on vehicles caused by the poor roads.

(2) A 105mm battery located at Song Be was resupplied by fixed wing aircraft from 13 March through the end of the quarter.

(3) On a typical day during the quarter, three 105mm batteries and a 155mm battery were resupplied by rotary wing aircraft.

(4) The remainder of Division Artillery units were resupplied on the road.

(5) Toward the end of the quarter, a severely reduced ASR on 4.2 Inch HE ammunition threatened the effectiveness of Division Artillery mortars. Supplemental allocations from Division and Division Artillery tactical savings resources alleviated the situation.

2. (c) Lessons Learned:

a. Personnel:

(1) Observation: Batteries are frequently required to assume split missions for extended periods of time. Experience has shown that 100% TOE strength of company grade officers and personnel in 13E20 and 13E40 are insufficient when employing split batteries.

(2) Evaluation: Strength varied from slightly over 100% fill to to slightly less. A strength level of at least 110% would provide sufficient personnel, both officer and enlisted, for a battery to operate in a split role.

(3) Recommendation: That company grade officers and personnel in 13E20 and 13E40 strength be maintained at not less than 110% of authorized strength in those batteries habitually operating in a split role.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery for period, 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969, RCS GS for-65 (U)

b. Operations:

   (1) Observation: When a AN/TPS-4, AN/TPS-5, AN/TPS-25, or AN/TPS-33 radar has been located at one site for an extended period of time and the targets engaged, the number of targets detected decreases.

   (a) Evaluation: Engaging targets located by radar with artillery fire reduces enemy activity in the area. By moving the radar to a new site periodically, it is possible to cover a larger operational area and to detect greater numbers of targets over a given period of time. When a radar is returned to a former site after it has been away for several days, an increased level of enemy activity can usually be detected.

   (b) Recommendation: That ground surveillance radars be relocated periodically.

   (2) Observation: That the enemy has the capability to continually harass base camps with mortar and rocket attacks.

   (a) Evaluation: It is recognized that an effective countermortar/rocket program must be capable of immediately engaging targets with accurate and responsive fires. The enemy tactic normally used is to fire a few rounds rather than a sustained volley. Therefore, such targets are classified as "fleeting" targets and by their very nature are difficult to bring under fire. Despite an aggressive and effective countermortar program, which incorporates, and is modified by radar sightings of launch sites, suspected and confirmed cache sights, and accurate shell reports, the enemy retains the capability to harass base camps with mortar and rocket fires. The most successful countermortar program is one which includes infantry units on the ground.

   (b) Recommendation: That Infantry RIF operations be conducted in the suspected rocket belt area on a recurring basis. The artillery battalion should recommend the specific areas and patrol routes for the infantry units based on data obtained from radar sightings of launch sites, suspected and confirmed cache sites, recent trail activity, shell reports, and OZEI pertaining to the enemy mortar and rocket activity. With infantry units on the ground, the enemy is denied access to the "rocket belt." The artillery in support of the infantry units virtually seals the area off from the enemy.

   (3) Observation: To defeat rocket and mortar attacks, a special S2/60 section is required to evaluate all data pertaining to attacks.

   (a) Evaluation: To properly evaluate all intelligence pertaining to rocket attacks on a base camp, a Rocket Information Center was established which collects only data pertaining to the rocket attacks. All trail activity, OP sightings, shell reports, enemy contacts, and other intelligence were assembled and compiled. Based on data analysis, it is possible to make recommendations to infantry elements to search and destroy launch sites and rocket serving areas being used to make the attacks.

   (b) Recommendations: That base camps which are subject to rocket and mortar attacks maintain a Rocket Information Center to compile data and direct artillery fires against enemy rocket and mortar sites.

   a. Training: Observation. Maintaining proficiency in technical fire direction for 1E220 and 1E40 assigned tactical fire direction duties at battalion requires close monitoring.

   (1) Evaluation: It has been found that an intensive training program in technical fire direction, that insures a minimum of ten hours training per week must be in effect to maintain proficiency in technical fire direction. Personnel should be assigned to eight hour shifts in the Battalion Tactical Operations Center and the training scheduled after the shift duties. The Shift Officer and NCO for each shift should conduct the training. Training should consist of as much practical team drill as possible to include actually firing the batteries.

   (2) Recommendation: That a technical FDC training program be in effect for all FDC personnel performing duties in Battalion Tactical Operations Centers.
d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics: Observation. It is not possible to land ammunition for batteries next to gun positions (parapets) because of the rotor wash of the helicopter which blows down antennas and tents and causes hazards to the aircraft due to great clouds of dust. Ammunition is landed on a resupply pad which is usually 100-500 meters from the gun positions. Unloading the A-22 bags and unloading the ammunition into a truck consumes too much time.

(1) Evaluation: A sled was made from Perforated Steel Planking (PSP) and salvage bumpers from a 3/4 ton truck. Ammunition in A-22 bags can easily be tipped onto the sled and the sled pulled to the gun positions by a 3/4 ton truck. This greatly reduces the time required for setting up the battery in a new position for normal handling of resupply ammunition.

(2) Recommendation: That sleds be made for each battery for use with rotary wing moves and aerial resupply of ammunition.

f. Organization: None

g. Other:

(1) Observation: When a conex is air moved, it is not stable and has a tendency to spin or wrap the air lift straps.

(a) Evaluation: The wrapping or twisting of the air lift straps will cause undue wear, and increase the possibility of dropping the load.

(b) Recommendation: That a spooky parachute be affixed to one end of the container, which will impose enough drag to stabilize the conex.

(2) Observation: For full effectiveness, the collimator must be elevated to the level of the sights on the M109 howitzer. The lighting device for the collimator is inferior and, as a rule, inoperative.

(a) Evaluation: The legs of the collimator can be modified and extended to elevate the collimator to the level of the sights. A flashlight may be attached to the end of the collimator to enhance night lighting.

(b) Recommendation:

(1) That three seven foot lengths of pipe measuring 3/4 to 1 1/4 inches in diameter be attached to the legs of the collimator tripod, extending the legs to a length of 8 feet.

(2) That the adapter for the night light be modified to accommodate a flashlight.
AVDB-E (MHD) (12 May 69) 1st Inf
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 1st Infantry
Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSPOR-65)
(R1)

Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, APO San Francisco 96345 15 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, II Field Forces Vietnam, ATTN: 7th MHD, APO 96265

1 (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2 (U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached Operational Report
Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery and con-
curs with it.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Wm. J. BRIDGES
CO, 1st Inf Div Arty

CF:
1LT AGC
Ass't AG
This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report—Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery for the period ending 30 April 1969 as indorsed, with the following comment.

Reference paragraph 2a(l)(b). Concur with the recommendation that company grade officers and personnel in MOS 13E20 and 13E40 strengths be maintained at not less than 110 percent of authorized strength in those batteries habitually operating in a split role. Division artillery, even if held at 100 percent officer strength, can generally control this situation by offering some of their assets to those batteries. For example, officer spaces can be diverted from Division Artillery headquarters to provide additional battery assistant executive officers or fire direction officers at firing battery level. A likely source would be aerial observer spaces, since sufficient numbers of qualified aerial observers are seldom available to fill these authorized spaces. MOS 13E20 and 13E40 are generally always in short supply. The obvious solution is to train 13A's who possess sufficient aptitude to learn fire direction techniques. Here again, division artillery can keep an eye on battery requirements and help out by shifting assets or assisting in training. Units should seek ways to solve such problems rather than ask for overstrengths when overstrengths are not likely to be forthcoming.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B. G. Macdonald

ILT, AGC

Assist AG
This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Batteries are frequently required to assume split missions for extended periods of time," section II, page 2, paragraph 2a(1); nonconcur. If temporary operational commitments require the employment of split batteries, the responsible commander should consider redistribution of internal assets. Officer and enlisted personnel are assigned to major subordinate commands by this headquarters based upon TOE/ATOC authorizations. If the battery is to be split on a permanent basis, TSOC action would appear appropriate. Unit will be advised of above comment.

b. Reference item concerning "It is not possible to land ammunition for batteries next to gun positions (parapets) because of the rotor wash of the helicopter which blows down antennas and tents and causes hazards to the aircraft due to great clouds of dust," section II, page 4, paragraph 2e(1); nonconcur. Tipping A-22 bags full of ammunition can be hazardous depending on the height from which the ammunition is tipped. In addition, the A1 planking (PST) is a controlled item. Units are not authorized to alter A1 planking. Unit will be advised of above comment. No further action required.

c. Reference item concerning "When a conex is air moved, it is not stable and has a tendency to spin or wrap the air lift straps," section II, page 4, paragraph 2g(1); concurs. Additional instructions for rigging conex containers for sling loading are contained in TM 55-450-11.

d. Reference item concerning "For full effectiveness, the collimator must be elevated to the level of the sight on the M109 howitzer," section II, page 4, paragraph 2g(2); concurs. The unit will be advised to submit an EIR (equipment improvement report) on the lighting device for the collimator.

For the Commanding:

[Signature]

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (12 May 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Infantry Division
Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 23 JUL 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Thoiti
CPT, AGC
Adj AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 1st Infantry Division Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CO, 1st Infantry Division Artillery

12 May 1969

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A