<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td><strong>LIMITATION CHANGES</strong></td>
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<td><strong>TO:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROM:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 01 MAY 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTHORITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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AGAM-P (M) (1 Aug 69) FOR OT UT 692119 5 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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The Adjutant General

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  1st Battalion, 83d Artillery
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 83D ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96308

1 May 1969


THRU: Commanding General
XXIV Corps Artillery
ATTN: AVII-MIC
APO 96308

Commanding General
XXIV Corps
ATTN: AVII-GCT
APO 96308

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVNCO-EST
APO 96508

Commander-In-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: OCPF-PT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310


1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Personnel and Administration:

(1) During the entire reporting period this Headquarters remained assigned to XXIV Corps. The battalion was attached to XXIV Corps Artillery as of 282000H, Feb 69 by XXIV Corps OPORD 11-69 (Spring Offensive) and further attached on 16 April by XXIV Corps General Order 373 dated 23 April 1969.
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1 May 1969


(2) Base Camp Locations:

(a) Headquarters Battery:

During the entire reporting period, Headquarters Battery was located at Gia Le Combat Base (YD 835151; Ref Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50000).

(b) Service Battery:

During the entire reporting period, Service Battery was located at Gia Le Combat Base (YD 835151; Ref Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50000).

(c) Battery A:

1. 1 Feb 69 to 8 Feb 69 - FSB Bastogne (YD 620095; Ref Map Sheet 6441I, 1:50000).
2. 6 Feb 69 to 11 Mar 69 - Gia Le Combat Base (YD 835151; Ref Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50000).
3. 11 Mar 69 to 15 Apr 69 - FSB Bastogne (YD 620095; Ref Map Sheet 6441I, 1:50000).
4. 15 Apr 69 to 29 Apr 69 - FSB Blaze (YD 529021; Ref Map Sheet 6441I, 1:50000).
5. 29 Apr 69 to 30 Apr 69 - FSB Arrow (YD 4775029; Ref Map Sheet 6441I, 1:50000).

(d) Battery B:

1. 1 Feb 69 to 5 Feb 69 - FSB Anzio (YD 934072; Ref Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50000).
2. 5 Feb 69 to 12 Apr 69 - FSB Roy (YD 058029; Ref Map Sheet 6541I, 1:50000).
3. 12 Apr 69 to 25 Apr 69 - FSB Quick II (YD 894994; Ref Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50000).
4. 25 Apr 69 to 27 Apr 69 - FSB Quick II (YD 894994; Ref Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50000).
5. 27 Apr 69 to 30 Apr 69 - FSB Roy (YD 058029; Ref Map Sheet 6541I, 1:50000).

(e) Battery C:

1. 1 Feb 69 to 19 Mar 69 - FSB Jack (YD 495287; Ref Map Sheet 6442II, 1:50000).

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2 9 Mar 69 to 24 Mar 69 - FSB Boyd (YD 741132; Ref Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50000).
3 24 Mar 69 to 30 Apr 69 - FSB Bastogne (YD 621096; Ref Map Sheet 6441II, 1:50000).

(3) Command Changes:

Headquarters Battery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPT John R. Mania</td>
<td>CPT William D. Burnett</td>
<td>8 Apr 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Personnel Strength as of 30 April 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>535</td>
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<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>509</td>
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</table>

(5) Critical MOS Shortages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Auth</th>
<th>Aeg</th>
<th>30 Day Loss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13E40</td>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E40</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E20</td>
<td>SP5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13L10</td>
<td>FFC</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13L1N</td>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36E20</td>
<td>FFC</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63C20</td>
<td>SP5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71H20</td>
<td>SP5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71D20</td>
<td>SP6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76S20</td>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82E20</td>
<td>SP5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94A10</td>
<td>FFC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94B20</td>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94E20</td>
<td>SP6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94F40</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(6) Personnel Changes During Quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Gains</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>E4</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Battle Wounds</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Battle Deaths</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) Medical Service Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Patients Visited (Unit Personnel)</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted to Hospital</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHKL</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuated Out of Country (Non-Hostile)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuated Out of Country (EHKL)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaria Cases</td>
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(9) Awards and Decorations:

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<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Presented</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCM</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(10) Judicial and Non-Judicial Actions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Courts-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Courts-Martial</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Courts-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 15</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(11) Reportable Accidents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(12) R&R: During this reporting period, this Headquarters has received a sufficient quantity of R&R allocations. Additional allocations to Australia and Hawaii could be utilized by this command.

(a) Out of Country R&R:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) In-Country R&R:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China Beach, Da Nang</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(13) Safety: During this reporting period the battalion conducted a class on General Safety.

b. Operations:

(1) Deployment of the battalion and missions executed during this reporting period:

(a) Headquarters and Service Batteries:

1. During the entire reporting period, this headquarters was assigned to XXIV Corps Artillery with a tactical mission of GSR 101st Airborne Division (M) Artillery.

2. Headquarters and Service Batteries continued to provide the administrative and logistical support for this headquarters from their location at Van Le Combat Base.

(b) Battery A (8 inch Howitzer)

1. During this reporting period, Battery A made five (5) separate road marches to several different fire support bases located within the 101st Airborne Division (M) Area of Operations. The battery remained under the fire and administrative control of this headquarters.

2. On 15 March 1969, Battery A departed FSB Bastogne en-route to the floor of the A Shau Valley. Through a series of moves, the battery has moved to within 10 kilometers of the A Shau Valley. These moves mark the most forward locations that heavy artillery has occupied toward the A Shau Valley.

(c) Battery B (8 inch Howitzer)

1. During this period, Battery B made six (6) road marches to fire support bases within the 101st Airborne Division (M) Area of Operations.
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SOUTH

SUBJ: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery
for Period Ending 30 April 1969; RCS CSPOR 65 (HI) (U).

1 May 1969

2. Several of these moves were in support of short duration operations. The battery remained under the fire and administrative control of this headquarters.

(d) Battery C (175mm Gun)

1. From 1 February 1969 until 19 March 1969 the battery continued to support the 3rd Marine Division in Operation Dewey Canyon from FSB Jock.

2. On 24 March 1969, the battery moved to FSB Bastogne to support operations deep in the southern portion of the Shau Valley. The mission remained unchanged; GSR 101st Airborne Division (AM) Artillery.

(2) Battalion Activities:

(a) Normal operations consistent with the battalion mission were conducted during the reporting period.

(b) The battalion has not had an artillery accident or incident in over seventeen months.

(c) The Battalion Metro Station deployed to FSB Roy (2D 05031; Ref Map Sheet 6541I; 1:50000) early in the reporting period. On 30 April 1969, the Battalion Metro Station dispatched a four (4) man visual Mountain Metro Team to support operations of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) in the Phong Phong Valley area via YC 6784 (Ref Map Sheet 6541I; 1:50000).

(d) Operation Nevada Eagle:

1. Operation Nevada Eagle terminated on 28 February 1969. All batteries under the control of the battalion fired in support of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) operations.

2. Summary of missions fired and rounds expended during this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>6 inch</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds</td>
<td>2783</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Operation Dewey Canyon

7

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OPERATIONAL REPORT OF HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 83RD ARTILLERY FOR PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1969; RCS CSFOR 65 (KJ) (U).

1. Operation Dowoy Canyon terminated on 19 March 1969. Battery C, 175mm Guns, supported the operation with 645 missions and 3007 rounds.

2. The 3rd Marine Division operation was in effect from 25 January 1969 to 19 March 1969.

(f) Shoman Peak:

1. Operation Shoman Peak terminated on 8 February 1969. Battery A, 8-inch Howitzer, supported the operation.

2. A total of 160 missions and 492 eight inch rounds were expended.

(g) Kentucky Jumper:

1. Kentucky Jumper commenced on 1 March 1969 throughout the Area of Operations of the 101st Airborne Division (M). All batteries under the control of the battalion fired in support of the operations.

2. Recapitulation of missions fired and rounds expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>8 inch</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>3892</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds</td>
<td>8251</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(h) Massachusetts Striker:

1. This operation commenced on 1 March 1969. Batteries A and C are the participants from this battalion.

2. A summary of missions and rounds expended during this period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>8 inch</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds</td>
<td>3723</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(i) Caisson XIV:

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Operation Casus XIV was a who day raid involving Battery B; 8 inch howitzer.

2. The battery fired a total of 34 missions and 96 eight inch rounds.

(j) Operation Bristol Boots:

1. Bristol Boots commenced on 25 April 1969. The participants were Batteries B and C. Battery B returned to its base camp location on 27 March 1969, but the operation continues.

2. A summary of missions and rounds expended during this period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 inch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1557</td>
<td>5866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Ammunition Expenditures and Missions Fired:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8 inch</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>Rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A</td>
<td>1537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B</td>
<td>4298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) During the reporting period this unit participated in combat operations for 89 days.

a. Training:

(1) On the job training continued in all units of the battalion during this reporting period.

(2) All newly arrived replacement personnel received fourteen hours of instruction as outlined in the Battalion SOP. Replacement training is accomplished within seven (7) days after arrival in country.

(3) This headquarters filled six (6) allocations to the XXIV Corps Arty Fire Direction Officer School.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, HCS CSPOR 65 (R1) (U).

(4) An examination program for all firing battery officers and key
non commissioned officers has been developed. This program consists of a
series of maintenance examinations on the guns/howitzers and firing battery
techniques.

(5) A Battalion Firing Battery Inspection Team was formed to provide
detailed assistance in the areas of firing battery and fire direction proced-
ures.

(6) All battalion officers and senior non commissioned officers at-
tended a class on marksmanship given by the XXIV Corps Judge Advocate General
Section.

(7) The Battalion Surgeon conducted classes on Heat Injuries and
MEDVAC procedures.

(8) Battery Motor Officers, PLL clerks and key maintenance supervi-
sors received classes on the maintenance of prescribed load lists.

(9) Continued emphasis is being placed on the driver training pro-
gram. Defensive driving and driver's maintenance procedures are the primary
topics.

d. Intelligence:

(1) Daily intelligence reports are received from the 101st Airborne
Division (AIR) and XXIV Corps Artillery.

(2) PERINTREP 7-69 and 8-69 currently provide enemy order of battle
information applicable to the battalion.

(3) The battalion frequently performs Visual Reconnaissances over
areas previously fired upon to obtain an assessment of battle damage.

e. Logistics:

(1) Monthly deadline percentage: 25% vehicles per day.

(2) Miles traveled by ammunition trains: 66,652 miles.

(3) Number of air sorties flown: 5 - CH-47 sorties.

(4) Resupply

(a) Class I 223 tons

10
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGZ-C


1 May 1969

(a) Class II 42 tons
(b) Class III 3770 gallons
(c) Class V 1545 tons by road
(d) Class V 10 tons by air

f. Communications:

(1) Shortages of repair parts for the AN/GRC-46 radios have caused excessive deadline time.

(2) Since many of the firing elements are located in remote areas, a need for continuous communications is essential. Directional parabolic antennas have given this headquarters the continuous communication that is required.

g. Civic Actions: During the period of 1 Feb 69 through 31 Apr 69 the battalion conducted a civic action project in the village of Loo Son, Phu Long District, Thu Thin Province. The project consisted of rebuilding Xuan Loc Buddhist School and was coordinated with the G-5, 101st Airborne Division (M). The battalion constructed desks, benches, installed windows, doors, and performed an overall renovation of this school. All material used in this project came from packing crates and other expendable material. Cement, tablets, pencils, soap and candy were furnished from excess material/supplies within the battalion. This civic action project has improved the relationship between the Vietnamese and all US Forces within this area. Within the next reporting period this project should be completed and another project undertaken by the battalion.

2. (C) Section 2: Lessons Learned; Commanders Observations; Evaluations; and Recommendations.

a. Personnel and Administration: None.

b. Operations:

(1) Item: Lessons Learned #1: Use of azimuth Indios for Heavy Artillery.

(a) Observation: An additional method for setting up firing charts of heavy artillery units is required.

(b) Evaluation: In this battalion, the maximum traverse limits established prohibit traversing 533 miles left and right from the center of

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the gun/howitzer. As a result, large changes in the azimuth of fire requires the weapon to be reoriented on a different azimuth. Since the M107/M110 does not have a 6,400 ft traverse capability, deflection indices are unsuitable on the firing chart. A solution used by this battalion is to lay out the firing range chart with eight azimuth indices spaced 500 miles apart, starting with the 0/6,400 mile index. The azimuth to the target or azimuth of lay is recorded by placing the left edge of the Range Deflection Protractor on the nearest index to the target. Placing a pin at the base deflection, move the RDP to the nearest 100 mile increment on the arc of the RDP to the target. The azimuth of lay will be determined by adding or subtracting the number of 100 mile increments moved to the initial azimuth. Without moving the RDP, a pin is placed at the base deflection. This pin is now the deflection index. Deflection for all targets within the established traverse limits of the firing weapon may be taken from the temporary deflection index. For targets outside the on-carriage traverse limits (200 miles left and right of the center of traverse for the 175mm gun and 300 miles left and right of the center of traverse for the eight inch howitzer), observe the above procedure on a new temporary deflection index constructed.

(a) Recommendations: That Section II of Chapter 16, FM 6-40, be expanded to include a solution similar to the one utilized in this battalion.

(b) Observations: A change is required in the frequency of transmitting meteorological messages and the effective ranges of the meteorological messages in Vietnam's I Corps Tactical Zone.

(b) Evaluation: In I CTZ the recognized time frame that a meteorological message is considered valid is six (6) hours. Applying the MET to firing data from a MET that was six (6) hours old caused rounds to land an average of 500 meters over the target. In a similar manner, five hour old METs were used at two different stations to fire on targets. In both cases the first rounds impacted 400 meters over the desired target. The inaccuracy produced were a direct result of the invalid METs. According to FM 6-15, Artillery Meteorology, when the weather pattern is variable, the valid time should not exceed a two (2) hour period. When the weather pattern is stable, the valid time may be extended to four (4) hours during the middle of the day or night. Many of the firing elements located in northern I CTZ are placed on or near large mountain ranges. The vast majority of the firing elements in this area fire predominately into very mountainous regions. As a result, wind plays an important role in all firing, causing large variations over short distances. In mountainous terrain, the distance that the MET is valid should be reduced by approximately 50 percent. Basically, this means that a MET station collocated with an eight inch howitzer battery would not be able to provide MET data at the battery's maximum range. This maximum valid distance of approximately 16 km cannot be overlooked because of the effect the
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AVGAZ-C

1 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, 103 GSPOR 65 (HI) (U).

wind, in the mountainous areas, has on the accuracy of artillery fire. There
are many tendencies to overlook space validity, as a requirement, for a valid
meteorological message.

(a) Recommendations: That the meteorological stations within
I CTZ initiate an electronic meteorological flight to be broadcast every four
hours. Also, that meteorological sites be located in areas, so as to insure,
that the recommended valid distances in mountainous areas are observed.

c. (U) Training and Organizational: None.
d. (U) Intelligence: None.
e. (U) Logistics:
   (1) Item: Lesson Learned #3: Artillery Mechanics.

   (a) Observations: There are several periodic adjustments and
checks required on M107/M110 in order to prevent failures. Presently, all
organizational adjustments and/or checks must be made at the battery level.

   (b) Evaluation: Since many adjustments and checks are required
on the weapons, the battery is often unable to perform all of the required
maintenance. The problem is compounded even further by climatic conditions
and heavy firing. In many cases, weekly visits by the DS unit are not suffi-
cient to accomplish these checks. As of yet, the personnel from the DS unit
have not been able to make the rounds of all batteries to be of any real as-
sistance. Many long hours spent waiting for answers to work orders and parts
could be eliminated if trained personnel were located at the battalion main-
tenance.

   (c) Recommendation: That three (3) Turret Artillery Mechanics
be authorized at the battalion maintenance of each heavy artillery battalion.

f. (U) Organization: None.
g. (U) Civil Affairs: None.
h. (U) Survival; Escape and Evasion: None.

CERIL L. SYKES
LTG, PA
Commanding

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1. (c) The GRL of the 1st Battalion, 63d Artillery has been reviewed by this headquarters and is forwarded in accordance with USAV Reg 525-15.

2. (u) Reference item concerning use of azimuth indices for heavy artillery, page 11, paragraph 2b(1). This headquarters concurs that Section II of Chapter 16, M 5-40, should be expanded to include a system of indexing firing charts for weapons which must relay when firing outside of traverse limits. This headquarters does not concur with the method used, as it is unnecessarily complicated. Other heavy units use a system which gives a graphic readout from the RDF. The chart is indexed for polar plotting of azimuth by placing indices every 1000 mils. Deflection indices are not placed on the chart. The RDF is prepared with two sets of markers, one set for azimuth and one set for deflection. The target is plotted and the battery is laid on an azimuth to the nearest 100 mils. The Executive Officer has a card prepared which shows the values to be placed on the upper scale of the aiming circle for each 100 mils direction. Azimuth is included in the initial fire commands and howitzers reorient using as a guide the azimuth markers placed around the position every 400 mils. Without moving the RDF from the azimuth of lay, another pin is placed at the base deflection and serves as a temporary deflection index. The left edge of the RDF is placed against the target pin and deflection is read from the temporary deflection index pin.

3. (c) Reference item concerning validity of ballistic meteorological messages, page 12, paragraph 2b(2). This headquarters concurs that metro messages should be provided more frequently and that stations located so that valid distances are observed. However, within current assets, the size and topography of the Corps' area of operation, it is impractical. At present, there are seven electronic metro stations in the Corps AO. There are 12 firing batteries located in mountainous terrain which are an excessive distance from the nearest metro station. Four additional metro stations would be required to service these batteries. Visual met teams are used to produce "mountain mets." Personnel to operate these stations come from the aforementioned seven metro sections. As sections are already understrength, loss of personnel to provide visual teams at another location seriously affects the efficiency of already understrength sections. In addition, a four hour flight schedule would not provide enough time for
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AVII-ATC (1 May 69) 1st Ind (con't) 17 May 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period
        Ending 30 April 1969, RCS GSHIO - 65 (RI)(U)

Metro equipment maintenance. XXIV Corps Artillery Metro Quality Control
is currently studying the deterioration of met data throughout a 24-hour
period. It is felt that this study will suggest a flight schedule that
will minimize effects of the met deterioration. From experience, the
Corps Artillery Metro Officer stated that Vietnam has more stable weather
conditions than any area in the world where U.S. artillery is currently
operated. Met data begins deterioration as soon as it is determined.
Techniques presently used are the best available for the state of the art.
Results of the deterioration study will be sent to the Target Acquisition
Department at Fort Sill.

4. (C) Reference item concerning artillery mechanic, page 13, paragraph
2c(l). This headquarters nonconcurs with unit recommendation that three
Turret Artillery Mechanics be authorized at the battalion maintenance section
of each heavy artillery battalion. The basic problem is that the DSU
is understrength. Even if the unit had artillery mechanics, they would
not be permitted to perform direct support level maintenance.

5. (U) Reference para la (2)(c)5. FSB Arrow should read FSB CANNON.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
HERBERT SIEGEL
Major, ADA
Adjutant
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AVII-QCT (1 May 69) 2d Ind.

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for period ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (RC) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO 96308 6 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam APO 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery, has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Reference: Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities, Para 1, f (2), page 11. Further coordination with 1/83d Arty has determined that para 1, f (2) of the attached ORLL was erroneously reported. The directional antennas discussed are in fact log periodic antennas, AS-2236/GRC, and were obtained on loan from local USMC units. This antenna is presently not available in Army supply channels, however, it has proven invaluable in special situations requiring long-range FM communications. Unit has been instructed to review their requirements and submit METB changes.

3. (U) Comments on Section 2: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Concur with ORLL as indorsed by HQ, XXIV Corps Artillery.

b. Reference paragraph 2e (1) (C), page 13. Unit has been instructed to coordinate with supporting DSU to have frequent contact team visits or have contact teams co-located where required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

H. R. TAYLOR

CPT, AG

Asst AG

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD Dir 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST (1 May 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 25 JUN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 1st
Battalion, 83d Artillery.

2. Reference item concerning Use of Azimuth Indices for Heavy Artillery,
section II, page 11, paragraph 2b(1), and 1st Indorsement paragraph 2.
Concur that section II of Chapter 16, FM 6-40, be expanded to include a
system of indexing the 6400 mil firing charts for weapons which must relay
for a direction that allows for safe firing within traverse limits. The
system described in the ORLL and 1st Indorsement is considered to be valid.
The unit will be requested to submit DA Form 2038 to US Army Field Artillery
School, ATTN: AKPSIAS-PL-FM, Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73502, recommending a
change to FM 6-40 to establish a system of indexing firing charts for
heavy artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96550

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF: D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

D. Tucker
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CO, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

N/A

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT