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AGAM-P (M) (16 Jul 69) FOR OT-UT-692248

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group, ending 30 Apr 69 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to ensure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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  12th Combat Aviation Group
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO San Francisco 96266

AVBACA-SC 14 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group, for Period Ending 30 April 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (U)

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1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities:

   a. (U) Mission: No change.

   b. (U) Organization:

      (1) The Command Airplane Company (PROV) was transferred from the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion to the 165th Aviation Group, per GO 1668, HQ 1st Aviation Brigade, dated 14 April 1969.

      (2) The 120th Assault Helicopter Company was transferred from the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion to the 165th Aviation Group, per GO 1667, HQ 1st Aviation Brigade, dated 14 April 1969.

      (3) Attachments and detachments: The 129th Medical Detachment was released from attachment to the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion and attached to the 222nd Combat Aviation Battalion, per GO 9, HQ 12th Combat Aviation Group, dated 16 April 1969.

      (4) Stationing List and Organizational Chart: See Inclosure 1.

   c. (U) Personnel:

      (1) LTC John H. Phillips, 099709, AR, assumed duties as Group Executive Officer on 18 March 1969 vice LTC Ernest F. Barrett, 065114, FA.

      (2) Major Roy H. Herron, 083921, FA, assumed duties as Group S-2 on 23 March 1969 vice CPT Kenneth G. May, 05406302, MI.

   FOR OT UT

692248 Inclosure

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group,
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, (HCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (U)

(3) Major John J. Top, O88920, FA, assumed duties as Group S-3 on
19 March vice LTC John H. Phillips, M99709, AR.

(4) Captain Gary W. Vance, OF106857, INF, assumed duties as Safety
Officer on 24 April 1969 vice Major Ronald J. Holasek, O1061084, AR.

(5) Captain Ollen W. Wade, O5419517, FA, assumed duties as Commander,
HHC, on 20 February 1969 vice Captain Richard C. Keehn, O2337930, AR.

(6) The personal posture has remained fairly stable, averaging gen-
erally 95 percent fill, with the exception of seven (7) critical MOS's. The shortage of these key personnel has had unfavorable impact on the maintenance and operational ability of the Group.

Critical MOS's:

a. 11D40   c. 67J20   e. 71F20   g. 67I30, 67U30
b. 45J20   d. 68L20   f. 7G420

Of the critical MOS's, Technical Inspectors have been the most critical. The average TI strength has been between 50 and 55 percent which is not an acceptable fill.

To compound the critical shortages, experience continues to stay low. This is visible in that many of the crew chiefs are awarded MOS's after OJT from 67A10 and 67A1F MOS's.

As an immediate step to rectify the shortages, incountry schools have been recommended; however, particularly in Technical Inspectors, action is still pending.

(7) Throughout the quarter we have seen a steady increase of company
grade officer and warrant officer strength with a like decline of field
grade officers. The first two months of the next quarter promise to reach
an all time low in this respect. It is felt that the lack of this ex-
perience has been contributory to higher accident rates, and has placed a
greater reliance for leadership on the company and battalion commanders.

(8) (U) Unit Strength: Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group as of
30 April 1969:

1. Military

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Off</td>
<td>WO</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
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<td>95</td>
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(2) Civilian

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>6</td>
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Total
Auth  O/H
8     10

* AVCO - attached
** LYCOMING - attached

e. (U) Aircraft Status as of 30 April 1969:

<table>
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<th>UH-1D</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>U-6A</th>
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<tr>
<td>Auth</td>
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f. (C) Operations:

(1) The tempo of operations has shown steady increase with assets of the Group focusing on enemy activity. Enemy units have become increasingly difficult to locate which has resulted in increased use of "Eagle Flight" tactics. This tactic is a very economical method of covering a large area of operation on a daily basis. It does however, lend itself best to the open paddy lands of the Delta. Areas where large enemy troop concentrations can mass under cover must continue to be attacked with mass.

(2) The increased tempo plus elimination of one standown day per month from 2 to 1 has caused the 2800 hour program, implemented during November 1968, to be exceeded in many Assault Helicopter Companies. Comprehensive data was collected during this period which resulted in confirmation of the 2800 hour program as an easily supportable average. During the quarter, the standard Assault Helicopter Company package was changed to nine (9) lift ships, four (4) guns, one (1) C & C, and one (1) general support aircraft. By committing one aircraft per company in GS, an additional assault company was made available on a daily basis.

(3) The performance and resilience of the Assault Helicopter Companies while operating under more demanding conditions gives indication that the 2800 hour program can be extended. Resultant from this observation, a study was directed with a view toward extending the flying hour limits in order to maximize all assets. The point at which optimum results are achieved is a very delicate balance of flying hours versus availability. It is the point where flying hours and availability both begin to decrease. To achieve this result requires very close management because once exceeded, a disproportionate recovery time is required before the unit is back on its feet. Experience shows that low availability has a variety of causes, but high flying hours, NOS rate, combat damage, personnel or a combination are the dominating factors. If a unit experiences low

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availability, relief can be found by reducing the commitment, stand-down, by making more parts available, by providing additional aircraft or a combination.

(4) The Air Cavalry Squadron flying hour program, 1600 hrs per month, has also been challenged and extended to 1900 hours mission time. This figure should prove supportable. A test period of forty-five days has been established. Concurrently, the employment of two (2) LOR's and one (1) AH-1G "Cobra" per "Hunter Killer" Team is being experimented with tactically. Initial observations conclude that although two (2) LOR's does give more thorough coverage, the amount is not proportional to assets committed. The final results will appear next quarter as a lesson learned.

(5) The Assault Support Helicopter assets were taxed somewhat heavily during March and early April when a twenty (20) percent increase in flying hours was necessary for support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. This increase required seven (7) aircraft daily per company, opposed to the standard package of six (6). This increased the monthly hours flown to 1400 hours. This level is marginally sustainable under the present logistical and personnel posture. The 1400 hour program for CH-47's continues to be desirable on a monthly basis.

(6) Considerable mention has been made to date of various flying hour programs. This tends to indicate that the total hours flown is a measure of effectiveness of a particular type unit. This is valid as a gross measuring stick, however it appears that a more valid measure of effectiveness is the relation of total hours, total insertions, contacts, body count, extraction, tons moved, etc. This means of evaluation will be implemented for quarter beginning 1 May 1969 and should reflect more favorably as a measure of effectiveness.

(7) The transfer of the 120th Assault Helicopter Company and the CIC (PRAV) to the 165th Aviation Group relieved the Group of its only mission not in support of CG, II FORCIN. These two units provide exclusive support for H3, MACV and H2, USAV. The Group is now purely combat support organization.

(8) A general summary of the Group's operational involvement during the quarter has been the intensification of management. Through this approach, more effective utilization and operational results are expected. Immediate results indicate that as aviation support is optimized, ground units are not necessarily able to utilize the additional hours. Continued emphasis by all commanders can resolve this problem area.

g. (U) Operational Results as of 30 April 1969: Reported by assigned Battalion/Squadron.
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h. (U) Training:

(1) In order to better orient the new commanders of ground units to which the 12th Combat Aviation Group renders support, a commanders orientation program has been implemented at Aviation Battalion level. All new commanders (ground) and their staffs receive briefings on capabilities of the aviation assets available to them. Briefings include safety factors, load factors, capabilities and limitations of Army aviation assets. To cover the vast personnel turbulence associated with command and staff changes at all levels, classes (briefings) are conducted at least on a quarterly basis.

(2) The Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARS) courses continue to prove invaluable in maintaining a high degree of maintenance proficiency within units of the 12th Combat Aviation Group. The requirements for attendance at this course, however, are forcing the loss of quotas due to lack of qualified personnel. In most instances it has been necessary to request waivers for one requirement or another. The AARS supply course continues to be most in demand.

(3) The VNAF UH-1 transition training program being conducted by units of the 12th Combat Aviation Group is progressing extremely well and has succeeded in graduating highly qualified VNAF UH-1D and UH-1H pilots.

(4) The OJT training of personnel from the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) in AH-1G maintenance is progressing extremely well. The first class is scheduled to graduate in the next reporting period. Conduct of this training is proving very beneficial to both this command and the 101st Airborne Division.

(5) During the quarter, two symposiums were conducted. One on armed helicopter tactics and the other on Air Mission Commandership. These symposiums were attended by personnel from each battalion and company. Cross fertilization of ideas and standardization of techniques were the primary goals. These conferences were well received and prove to be a very useful educational tool. They are scheduled in the future on a quarterly basis.

i. (U) Intelligence:

(1) Security:

(a) The S-2 Section continued in its capacity as the focal point for
advice to the commander for matters pertaining to personnel security and the safeguarding of classified material.

(b) Strong emphasis was made on the handling of all classified material. In addition, strong emphasis was made on the destruction of official correspondence, orders, organization charts, installation maps or sketches, bulletins, telephone directories, and personal mail.

(c) The Group Headquarters continued to maintain a very strong security posture. The S-2 section conducted periodic unannounced security inspections on all staff sections and Headquarters Company. Security posters were displayed in all staff sections, and Headquarters Company; security reminders were posted on all telephones throughout the group headquarters. All incoming personnel received briefings on DABA, pens, and unsolicited correspondence, in addition to a security briefing.

(d) The quarterly inspection for clandestine surveillance and listening devices was conducted on all units down to the company level.

(e) The quarterly unannounced counterintelligence inspection was conducted by the 219th Military Intelligence Detachment on 15 March 1969. The S-2 section was given a thorough inspection to include the inspection of SecFed documents, receipt files, destruction certificates, all procedures in the handling and marking of classified material, and procedures for briefing incoming personnel. No deficiencies were noted. Minor deficiencies in the S-3 office pertaining to regrading instructions were noted and corrected, and an indorsement reflecting the corrections was submitted to the G-2, II Field Force IV.
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(f) The semi-annual review of all classified documents was conducted on 25 March 1969. After each section was notified to review for destruction, a 100% review was conducted for downgrading and/or destruction. As a result, 61 CONFIDENTIAL documents and 57 SECRET documents were destroyed. At present, 128 SECRET documents remain in the S-2 Classified Repository. All De Form 1203s were renewed in accordance with Change 1, USARV Regulation 380-5.

(g) All subordinate units were given a CI Inspection and two (2) pre-IG Inspections were conducted by the Group S-2 Office, one at the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion and the other at the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

(2) Intelligence Statistics:

(a) The classified repository and distribution facility operated by the S-2 Section processed approximately 17,855 incoming and outgoing pieces of CONFIDENTIAL material and 117 incoming and outgoing SECRET documents.

(b) Also during the period, a total of 174 security clearances and Personnel Security Investigations were processed.

(c) Map processing continued to be a S-2 function. A total of 20 map requests were processed, resulting in an issuance of approximately 2,170 map sheets.

(3) (C) Enemy Activities:

(a) Enemy Divisional units have generally pulled back into their base area. Sub-Region Main Force Units have pulled away from the Capital Military District, however, since 20 April agent reports and FCS have indicated that local force units have been broken down into company size units and are infiltrating towards the Capital Military District.

(b) The divisions have maintained their presence in forward base areas with at least one (1) regiment.

(4) (U) Escape and Evasion:

(a) For the reporting period, the E & E Officer conducted staff visits to subordinate battalions. These visits provided the units with guidance and assistance pertaining to survival, escape, and evasion.

(b) Five-hundred (500) E & E Plastic maps were issued to subordinate units during the reporting period, and thirty-five (35) "Blood Chits" were issued.

(c) Lessons Learned, not previously reported: NONE.
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(d) E & E Schools: All units down to company level were screened pertaining to school trained E & E Officers; list of those E & E Officers not school trained has been submitted to S-3. While the S-2 continued to be the E & E Officer, School quotas continued to be handled by the S-3.

j. (U) Safety:

(1) During this reporting period, the 12th Combat Aviation Group accident rate increased in February, decreased in March, and increased again in April. The Group experienced 16 accidents in February, 13 accidents in March, and 22 in April. The rates during these months were 26.8, 19.2, and 35.8 respectively. There has been an increase in the number of fatalities and strike aircraft. The emphasis on aviation safety has increased, with various unit programs, awards and safety news letters. Serious pilot error accidents require the Battalion Commander, Company Commander and the negligent aircraft commander to report the Group Commander to explain the cause of the accident and corrective action.

(2) The 12th Combat Aviation Group has had 3 mid-air collisions during this reporting period. These 3 mid-air accidents caused 18 fatalities. During this reporting period there were 16 accidents as a result of material failure and 31 as a result of pilot error. These accidents occurred during months when weather conditions were good for flying. Emphasis is now being placed on flying during the rainy season which is approaching.

k. (U) Logistics:

(1) Supply:

(a) MTOE's were implemented for subordinate units. Units have requisitioned MTCE shortages and excesses have been reported for disposition.

(b) Approximately 2000 pair of nomex flight gloves were received during the period, however due to initial shortage and the comparatively short life of the nomex gloves they still are in short supply. Sunglasses were issued in very limited quantities and are still critically short. These items were included on the Commander's Critical Items List (CCIL). 1st Aviation Brigade has been most helpful in obtaining releases for items reported.

(c) Supply and automotive maintenance visits to companies and detachments of the Group continue to prove to be beneficial in preparation for AGI/CM inspection. Sixty-seven (67) such visits were made during this period.

(d) Ammunition storage, accounting and handling procedures have greatly improved. Units are now preparing for the U.S.I.A. Ammo Surveillance Inspection to be conducted during May 1969. Each unit of 12th Combat Aviation

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Group will be inspected.

(e) Shortages of 3/4 and 1/4 ton trucks are critical. 1st Aviation Brigade G-4 has been successful in obtaining release of a limited number 1/4 tons; however, 3/4 ton vehicles are in extremely short supply with no foreseeable relief. 1st Aviation Brigade is aware of these problems and is continuing to assist in eliminating them.

1. (U) Medical:

(1) During the past quarter this office voluntarily gained three units for medical support in addition to HQ, 12th Group. They are: Headquarters and Headquarters Company 79th Engineer Company, the 66th Engineer Company (Topo), and the 547th Engineer Detachment. This brings the total number of personnel supported by this office to approximately 500. It has been found that the resulting daily sick-call of approximately 25 patients can be handled by the authorized personnel of this section if adherence to the procedures set by this office (observation of sick-call hours for routine items, use of DD Form 689) is enforced by the orderly rooms involved.

(2) Classes were initiated during the month of April for battalion clerks. These classes will be repeated at approximately quarterly intervals. Instruction covering all phases of the medical reports required of the battalions was given as well as practical exercises on the more difficult sections of the reports. It is hoped that the time required to complete reports at both battalion and group level will be reduced by these classes and that all suspense dates may be more easily met.

(3) Conferences for the group flight surgeons continue to be held at six to eight weeks intervals. The goal of these meetings is similar to that of the other classes in that more efficient liaison between battalion and group medical officers is sought. At these conferences the battalion surgeons are presented pertinent material by the group surgeon and by other medical officers such as the Commanding Officer of the 32nd Medical Depot or a specialist from one of the hospitals in country.

m. (U) Religious Activities:

(1) Troop visitations and contact by the Chaplains continued to be emphasized this quarter. All replacement and rotating personnel were interviewed with emphasis on needs of men while here in Vietnam. Office hours for counseling continue on a scheduled basis with appointments as required.

(2) The group continued to get good response to letters written to home churches. This program reflects favorably on replacement personnel.

(3) The Chaplain's services continue to be provided for large area overseas. Services were conducted in conference rooms, libraries, day rooms, mess halls, as well as in chapels. Increased opportunities in
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religious education have been provided by additional study groups and the showing of religious films. During April, the G.o.m. Chaplain assumed coverage of the HHC, 79th Engineer Group during the absence of an assigned Chaplain.

(4) The Group Chaplain visited Battalion Chaplains and all Company areas to provide supervision, coordination, and support for Chaplain activities. Continuous improvements have been made in all battalion facilities.

(5) Character Guidance Briefing and Training Conference in which all Chaplains participated was held by the Group Chaplain each month. This conference also serves as liaison and aids considerably in administering a standardized and meaningful Chaplain’s program.

(6) Chaplain Activities provided in Group this quarter were:

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<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
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<td>Religious Education</td>
<td>133</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pastoral Visits</td>
<td>6000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Character Guidance</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>+60%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civic Action</td>
<td>172</td>
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n. Sigurals:

(1) Communications: During the month of February the Group’s Teletype Communications Center was moved into the Command bunker, thereby completing the project started the previous quarter of placing all communications in a hardened site. This action paid dividends during the post TET offensive when the bunker and its communications facilities became the center of activities. Throughout the offensive, the communications systems were used constantly with no difficulties.

(2) Avionics:

(a) During this period the units of the Group received the remainder of the Y-28’s which they are authorized on the BOI. In most cases this BOI calls for a number in excess of the actual needs of the units.

(b) The six (6) ASC-15 Command Consoles authorized by USAFR SOI were received during the first part of this quarter. These six were issued to
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the 25th Aviation Company (Corps) to be used in their dedicated command and control aircraft.

(c) Receipt of the A-122 Command Consoles has not progressed as well as expected. 12th Combat Aviation Group was supposed to receive twelve (12) A-122's from other units as these units received ASC-15's. The A-122's were to be used in support of ARVN Divisions and their advisors. To date only two have been installed. Others are on hand but are missing parts required for installation.
2. (U) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, Recommendations, and Command Action Taken:

a. (U) Personnel:

(1) OBSERVATION: The critical shortage of Technical Inspectors has long existed and AG action has failed to provide enough replacements to fill TOE vacancies.

(2) EVALUATION: Units of the Group were surveyed to determine the short term effects of continued replacement input at the rate experienced over the past six (6) months. The results indicate a further decline in assigned TIs.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That a school for Technical Inspectors be established in-country at which better qualified mechanics could be trained, thus relieving the shortage.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: A Command Letter was forwarded to Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade requesting the school recommended.

b. (U) Intelligence: None.

c. (U) Operations:

(1) OBSERVATION: Assault Helicopter Companies and Air Cavalry Troops appear capable of flying more flight hours per month on a sustained basis than they presently fly.

(2) EVALUATION: The current policy supporting 2800 hours per month per AHC and 1600 hours per month per ACT does not maximize the capability of the respective units. Considerable emphasis has been given to the optimum total hours each unit can fly. Experience shows that the ACT should be capable of 1900 hours mission time per month. The evaluation of the AHC is still in progress with internal findings supporting 3000 hours as a sustainable figure.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That all commands review the capabilities of their aviation units and increase flying hours as possible to optimize all assets.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: The Air Cavalry Troops' monthly flying hour program was increased to 1900 on a forty-five day test basis. The Assault Helicopter Companies' capability was placed under study.

d. (U) Training: None.

e. (U) Logistics:
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14 May 1969

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(1) OBSERVATION: There is often a wide variation in zero balance rates, satisfaction rates and old requisitions (O2 over 30 days old; 12-17 over 90 days old) between units using the same type, model, series, and density of aircraft.

(2) EVALUATION: A study was made of UH-1 AH-1's using the Availability Rates (O/R), Net Operational Ready Supply (NORS), Zero Balance, IFD O2 over 30 days old and IFD's 12-17 over 90 days old. This study was over a 90-day period. It was found that units with less than 900 line items or over 1100 line items experienced a lower O/R and higher NORS rate. Units below 900 line items did not have enough on hand assets while units over 1100 line items could not control their assets.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That all UH-1 AH-1's or similar units review their PLL/ASL's to determine if they fall within the 900 - 1100 line item range. Adjustments to upgrade or lower the line items carried may be necessary.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: All UH-1 AH-1's have been advised of our findings and given examples to demonstrate them. Each unit above or below the criteria is evaluating its Technical Supply. Fringe files are being carefully reviewed. Future inspections and assistance visits will take note of the number of line items carried.

f. (U) Medical: None.

g. (U) Safety:

(1) OBSERVATION: On 21 March 1969, two (2) UH-1 aircraft from the 335th Assault Helicopter Company went inadvertent IFR and crashed into a hillside killing eight (8) crew members.

(2) EVALUATION: Supervisory error and crew error were the cause of these accidents. A contributing cause factor was hours which caused fatigue among the crews that was beyond the limit of safe physical and mental endurance. The lead ship did not notify his flight of the IFR danger after he encountered this condition, the second ship in this flight also failed to radio the last two ships in this flight of four after he encountered these IFR conditions.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: That careful consideration be given to factors affecting both aircraft and crew such as weather, pilot fatigue, and necessary maintenance, unless otherwise dictated by the tactical situation.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: Unit Commanders were urged to stress the fact that tactical instrument training is insufficient to permit an aviator to enter and successfully negotiate IFR conditions for any long period of time. Unit Commanders were also encouraged to implement an IFR training program to include hood time and course of action to be taken in the event of inadvertent IFR conditions.
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h. (U) Escape and Evasion: None.

i. (U) Signal:

(1) OBSERVATION: A magnetized component on the tail rotor of a UH-1 will cause the secure FM to receive garble when the rotor is turning.

(2) EVALUATION: A problem was encountered in which an aircraft would receive only garble if someone was transmitting on FM secure when the rotor was turning. The secure FM received properly when the rotor was stopped and also when the FM antenna was removed, connected to a longer lead-in cable and placed about twenty (20) feet from the tail rotor. The FM also worked properly in plain mode. It was noticed that as the rotor slowed down to just a few RPF's, the reception on the secure mode would be alternately okay and garbled. The garble occurred at the same frequency as the speed of the tail rotor. After three (3) days of changing radios, KY-28's, antennas, and checking wiring, a piece of safety wire was suspended from a string and moved in a close proximity to the tail rotor. This safety wire was attracted to one of the bolts on the tail rotor hub assembly. After striking the bolt four sharp blows with a wrench to realign the molecules and demagnetize the bolt, the FM radio worked properly in the secure mode. The magnetized bolt set up a magnetic field which, when the rotor was turning, produced a small signal in the FM antenna. This signal did not affect the plain mode of operation; it appeared as a bit of noise. In the secure mode the signal was carried to the KY-28 along with the signal from the distant station. The KY-28 in deciphering the sum of both signals was producing garble. This particular aircraft had just come out of FE in which the tail rotor hub assembly was magnifluxed. Some magnetism must have remained on that particular bolt.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That unit maintenance personnel insure each component undergoing magniflux is completely demagnetized prior to installation on the aircraft.

(4) COMMAND: Information was disseminated through maintenance channels and will be published in the 34th General Support Maintenance News Letter.

HERB D. PANTHER

Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

1 Incl
11 Stationing list/Organizational Chart

Incl wd Hq, DA

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3-GG, USMV, ATT: NHGC-DST, APO 96375
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CONFIDENTIAL

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 30 MAY '69

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group for the period ending 30 April 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B. G. MACDONALD
1LT, AGC
Asst AG
Subject: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation
Group for Period Ending 30 April 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65) (NI) (u)

Dita, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade,APO 96584 8 Jun 1969

To: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVAG-DST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: TPCP-CT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be
adequate and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 1n(2)c, page 11. The ROI as established by USAV
in message 66623, DTG 310320Z Dec 68, for all command consoles does
not include any AGC-122 Command Consoles for the 12th Group. Upon
investigation it was determined that this was a special requirement
by II Field Forces coordinated with USAV. This project already has
command attention from II Field Forces.

b. Paragraph 2a, page 12. Concur with observation. As a result
of action taken by this headquarters, USAV is instituting a Technical
Inspector course at the ARTT School. It is anticipated that the course
will commence on 1 July 1969.

For the Commander:

[Signature]

David R. Anderson
C/P, AGC
Asst. AG
AVHGC-DST (14 May 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group, for Period Ending 30 April 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. Wilson
C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
12th Cbt Avn Gp
1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 12th Cbt Avn Gp for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSF6-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96553 7 JUL 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]  
C. L. SHORT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG.
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 12th Combat Aviation Group**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

**CO, 12th Combat Aviation Group**

**Report Date:** 14 May 1969

**Contract or Grant No.:** 692248

**Project No.:** N/A

**Distribution Statement:**

**Supplementary Notes:** N/A

**Sponsoring Military Activity:** OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract:**

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**Document Control Data - R & D**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Originating Activity (Corporate Author)</th>
<th>Confidential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2a. Report Security Classification:**

**2b. Group:**

**3. Report Title:**

**4. Descriptive Notes (Type of report and inclusive dates):**

**5. Author(s) (First name, middle initial, last name):**

**6. Report Date:**

**7a. Total No. of Pages:**

**7b. No. of Refs:**

**8a. Originator's Report Number(s):**

**9a. Project No.:**

**9b. Other Report No(s) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report):**

**10. Distribution Statement:**

**11. Supplementary Notes:**

**12. Sponsoring Military Activity:**

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**UNCLASSIFIED**

Security Classification

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**DD FORM 1473**