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IN REPLY REFER TO

ACAM-P (M) (6 Jun 69) FOR OT UT

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport), Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

7 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the period ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R-1)

THRU: Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
ATTN: AVCA QN-00-H
APO 96238

TO: Assistant C of S for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D. C. 2310

SECTION I
Operations: Significant Activities

A. COMMAND: (U)

1. The 8th Transportation Group (US) engaged in operations during the 92 days of this reporting period.

2. LTC William R. SABER, Jr. assumed command of the 51st Transportation Battalion on 8 January 1969.

3. The principal staff members assisting Colonel Garland A. Ludy, Group Commander were: LTC Raymond L. Farmer, Deputy Commander; Major Dyman D. Cuda, S-3; Major Glenn W. Long, Signal Officer; Lt. Col. C. A. Dishby, Jr., S-2; Capt. Theus S. Milhous, S-2; and Capt. Robert P. Coleman, S-4.

4. The following visitors were recorded on the Group visitors' register on the dates indicated:

- 7 Nov 68 - COL John M. Bennett, Trans Div, MACV J-45
- 21 Nov 68 - Mr. Binder, Editor, Army Magazine
- 21 Nov 68 - COL Marshall M. Motes, CO, USAD
- 25 Nov 68 - COL John A. Armey, DOT, Com Rhmk Div
- 1 Dec 68 - BO Charles W. Ryder, Jr., QL, USARFAC

FOR Comp UT
69/324 INCL
D. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALS AND DISCIPLINE: (U)

1. During the reporting period, the 8th Transportation Group (MT) was understrength an average of 222 personnel.

2. In December and January, an intensive program was undertaken to rewrite all 8th Group standard operating procedures, policy letters and other directives as regulations. This program has been successfully completed.

3. The number of court martial increased significantly in this reporting period: November (1), December (6), and January (12). Over half the cases contain charges of sleeping on guard or other similar offenses.

4. 8th Transportation Group resumed special court martial jurisdiction of the 124th Transportation Battalion on 5 December 1968. Previously, the Ploieşti Sub Area Command, now the 5th GS Gp, had jurisdiction.

C. OPERATIONS: (C)

1. During this reporting period, task vehicles of this command traveled 4,375,581 miles hauling 260,555 tons of cargo, 6,831,562 gallons of POL and 7,635 passengers. The 8th Group amassed a total of 16,761,974 ton miles.

2. The number of hostile incidents in which 8th Group convoys were involved were as follows:

   - Ambushes - 6
   - Sniping - 15
   - Mining - 3

The results of those encounters were:

   - Friendly KIA - 5
   - WHA - 17
   - Enemy (known) - KIA - 2
   - Vehicles Destroyed - 39
   - RIM's - 353
   - Tonnage not moved due to enemy activity - 3,176 8/T's

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the period ending 31 January 1969, ROCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

3. The volume of enemy hostility required the continued presence of gun trucks in order to lay down a suppressive base of fire in the critical first 10-15 minutes of an ambush prior to the arrival of the tactical reaction force. This interdiction firepower coupled with the command policy to keep moving if caught in the kill zone, coupled with an enforced 100 meter interval between vehicles, contributed significantly to keeping down the number of friendly casualties in ambushes around by company sized NVA/VC forces.

4. The 50th Transportation Company of the 27th Transportation Battalion was brought to service balance in equipment and personnel on 2 November 1968.

5. The 529th Transportation Company (Light Truck-2½ Ton) in Phu Hiep, RVN, and the 545th Transportation Company (Light Truck-5 Ton) Vung Ro Brry, RVN were assigned to the 8th Transportation Group and attached to the 5th Transportation Battalion on 1 December 1968.

6. The Goor Company (Provisional) in Pleiku was dispatched TDY to Chu Lai on I CTZ on 8 December 1968.

7. On 2 December 1968, the 529th Transportation Company became inoperable due to a virtual sapping out of its personnel and equipment in order to bring other units within the command up to strength.

8. The 359th Transportation Company (Medium Truck-Tractor) in Pleiku was attached to the 8th Transportation Group on 1 January 1969. The 6th Group attached this unit to the 124th Transportation Battalion.

9. On 10 January 1969, the 545th Transportation Company received orders for a permanent change of station from Vung Ro Brry to the better physical facilities of Phu Hiep which had been vacated by the 529th Transportation Company. This also enabled the 545th to achieve a better defense posture due to terrain advantages.

10. On 28 January 1969, a Trailer Transfer Point was established at the 8th Division CEN Entri to expedite trailer turn-round time.

D. TRAINING: (U)

1. Training was conducted in accordance with the master training schedule and replicable training directives to the maximum extent possible. Due to the rotation of the 8th Transportation Group units nearly all training was conducted in the evenings. There were exceptions for driver training and for the initial in-country orientation. There were 92 days of training in this reporting period.

2. Driver training was conducted on a continuing basis by each battalion. It consisted of classroom orientation and on-the-job training which included driving in convoys while under the supervision of a trained driver. Due to the absence of school trained 5 1/2 Ton Tractor drivers in the replacement stream, much valuable time was spent on training such drivers, whereas if training had been received in CONUS it would have substantially shortened such training and consequently would have resulted in an increased operational output.

INCL:

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1. Based on the wide-spread road network traveled by units of the 6th Group to reach many varied destinations such as dry, convoy commanders and other personnel afforded the opportunity to gather important intelligence information. Information concerning road and bridge conditions, suspected enemy locations and anticipated enemy activity was gathered and disseminated to all convoy commanders and to other units. The Highway 29 Coordinator has been an excellent source of information concerning enemy activity on that route.

2. During the reporting period there have been two major attacks and numerous sniper incidents in Sub-Installation Bravo, a 50 square mile defense sector which 8th Transportation Group is responsible. On 21 November 1968, an estimated VC platoon overwhelmed 8th Group night shuttle convoy with rockets, automatic weapons, small arms and grenades resulting in 3 US KIA, 10 US WIA, 11 vehicles damaged and 1 enemy KIA. The second major attack occurred in the early hours of 23 January 1969 when an estimated VC sniper squad attacked an adjacent unit, the 66th MP Company, with rockets, automatic weapons and automatic weapons resulting in 1 US KIA, an NCO club completely destroyed, 2 enemy KIA, 21 hand grenades, 3 stick charges and 3 unexploded 81mm rounds CLF. In scattered actions throughout Sub-Installation Bravo during the reporting period, 5 more VC were confirmed as KIA.

3. An intensive physical security inspection campaign has been conducted in Sub-Installation Bravo by field grade officers, unit security officers, company grade officers and NCOS in cooperation for a possible Tot offensive. The 8th Transportation Group SITOC(SE: Sub-Installation Tactical Operations Center) has coordinated this campaign and implemented it with many security directives including comprehensive physical security regulation.

4. Units within Sub-Installation Bravo also upgraded physical security plans. These units also continued to feed spot intelligence reports to SITOC.

5. 8th Transportation Group instructed all Sub-Installation Bravo units to conduct comsec checks between the guard towers and the CP every 30 minutes in order to keep the guards alert and provide continuous training of comsec equipment. However, subordinate units of this command were instructed to make provision for the serving of hot soup and coffee to guards on night duty once before and once after midnight.

F. LOGISTICS: (U)

1. Since the last reporting period, 8th Transportation Group has experienced increased difficulty in obtaining necessary replacements of mission essential vehicles required to perform our line haul mission.

2. The mobilization of our light and medium truck companies during this period
subject: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Actor Transport) for the period ending 31 January 1969, RCC CSFOR-65 (R-1)

came to a complete halt. The high burn rate of multifuels has caused an appreciable loss to our overall load carrying capacity. At present 8th Transportation Group total assets on hand are 60% of total authorized strength for 5 Ton Cargo Trucks and 80% for 5 Ton Tractors, of which 7.3% are multifuel vehicles.

3. Since the implementation of the Centralized Trailer Maintenance Facility, the deadline rate has been reduced, better accountability has been established, and the overall trailer maintenance posture of the 8th Group 12 ton S&P semitruck fleet has greatly improved.

4. Within the last 92 days 8th Transportation Group has established both a CMII and JGI term. Personnel making up the term have come from the various staff sections of this headquarters. A detailed schedule has been implemented whereby every unit within 8th Group is inspected on a recurring basis.
US Army officers were involved in a reconnaissance mission in Korea to determine the effectiveness of an armored vehicle concept. The concept was initially developed to provide an improved means of armament and protection for the armored vehicles within a convoy. The concept involved the use of armored vehicles equipped with machine guns, mounted on the rear of the lead vehicle, to provide coverage for the convoy. However, the concept was later modified to include the use of armored vehicles mounted on trucks, known as "gun trucks," which were used to provide protection for the convoy. The modified concept was found to be more effective than the original concept, as it allowed for better coverage and protection for the convoy. The modified concept was successfully implemented in Korea by the 6th Transportation Group.
3.OBSERVATION: With Transportation Group has experienced ambushes where men have been wounded and had to be evacuated out of the kill zone by gun trucks in order to reach a secure area where medics could then pick them up.

3.EVALUATION: 8th Group now requires each gun truck to carry two litters and a first aid container in order that the gun crew may be prepared to both administer first aid and to evacuate our wounded out of the kill zone to a more secure area.

3.RECOMMENDATION: That this requirement be adopted throughout RVN in convoy operations.

C. TRAINING (U)

3.ITEM: School Trained 5 Ton Tractor Drivers

3.OBSERVATION: Very few of the many 5 ton tractor driver replacements that arrive at this Group are school trained for their job.

3.EVALUATION: Much valuable time that could be spent fulfilling operational requirements is devoted instead to training 5 ton tractor driver replacements who have never been school trained in that capacity. Moreover, it would probably improve the safety factor if replacement drivers were schooled in how to drive a 5 ton tractor and how to pull a 12 ton S&P prior to arrival in RVN.

3.RECOMMENDATION: That CONARC institute a training program to ensure that replacements for 5 ton tractor driver TOL positions are school trained prior to arrival in RVN.

L. INTELLIGENCE: (U)

3.ITEM: Guard Tower Coordinates

3.OBSERVATION: The SITOC has the grid coordinates of each numbered guard tower in Sub-Installation Drive posted in its operations bunker.
(b) EVALUATION: Ready access to these grid coordinates has proven invaluable in calling in artillery fire into the area where hostile fire has been detected. Since the guard tower number pin can be swiftly translated into grid coordinates, fire direction and adjustment are rapid.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units have ready access to the coordinates of their manned positions in order to rapidly provide accurate fire missions to both artillery and gunships.

E. LOGISTICS (U)

1. ITEM: Lower Priority of Issue

   (c) OBSERVATION: The 5 ton trucks have become unserviceable due to wear and tear, and accidental damages have greatly reduced the 8th Transportation Group's overall desired capability in performing our line haul mission.

   (b) EVALUATION: In the overall operation of the task vehicle fleet it is becoming increasingly clear that the present wash out ratio will seriously hinder our load carrying capability in performing our line haul mission.

   (c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

       1. That a higher priority be placed on the issuing of replacement task vehicles to insure movement of all types of supplies in the combat zone.

       2. That wash out criteria should be established for each specific type of vehicle so an orderly withdrawal can be made of these vehicles and suitable replacements be made available on a timely basis.

       3. That a number of vehicles equivalent to 10% of our overall fleet be held in depot stock for combat losses and other emergency replacements.

2. ITEM: Dieselization of 5 Ton Truck Cargo and 5 Ton Truck Tractor

   (c) OBSERVATION: The multifuel 5 ton vehicles have become an increased maintenance problem because of age, mileage, wear and tear, and other malfunctions. This causes a very high number of multifuels to be washed out at a time when there are no Mack Diesel Trucks in this Support Command available as replacements. The 8th Group has only of the 5 ton cargo trucks authorized and 97 on hand, 1/2 of which are multifuels. In most cases these multifuel vehicles should be returned for rebuild and/or washed out of the system. The 563rd Transportation Company, a medium truck unit containing multifuel 5 ton tractors, is operating at below 50% capability.

   (b) EVALUATION: To eliminate a serious maintenance problem and to get better performance out of a task vehicle, these multifuels should be replaced by Mack Diesel Trucks/Tractors. Not only would this standardize maintenance support in the combat zone but also would enable execution of these vehicles while still rebuildable.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That an intensive effort be made to proceed with the dieselization program for all vehicles engaged in combat service support.

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3. ITEM: **Centralized Trailer Maintenance Facility**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The progress made since the last reporting period has proven that the Centralized Trailer Maintenance Facility has accomplished more than previously expected. Through an expedient running repair shop and the establishment of scheduled services, the overall trailer downtime rate has been reduced to 21%.

(b) **EVALUATION:** At the present time 20% of the trailers in the fleet have received their scheduled service through the maintenance facility. Consequently, it is probable that the downtime rate will be even lower when all of the trailers fleet have received scheduled services.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That consolidated trailer maintenance be considered as an Army wide planning of trailer transfer operations.

4. ITEM: **Inspection Terms**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Prior to the initiation of the 8th Group Command and Control, units being inspected by higher headquarters were in most cases marginal and in some cases unsatisfactory. This was due in part to the shortage of qualified personnel at company level.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Every unit of the 8th Group has been inspected either as a courtesy or as a Pre-CPM. As a result of these inspections units have received higher scores by visiting headquarters and the overall proficiency, which includes supply accountability, records management, utilization of manpower and equipment, better living conditions, mess management and maintenance management, is considerably higher. These inspections have also served as a very important tool in the training of newly assigned personnel and establishing goals which are consistent with the accomplishments of our mission.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That continual emphasis be placed by group and battalion headquarters on skilled advice and inspections of subordinate units in order to insure that high standards are being maintained.

F. **ORGANIZATION:** None

G. **OTHER:** None

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SECTION III

Headquarters, Department of Army Survey Information

This organization has had no escape, evasion and survival experience during the reporting period or prior reporting periods.

1 Incl as

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8-on Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

2-on Commander-in-Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOF-OT
APO 96558

3-on Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST

2-on Commanding General
1st Logistic Command
ATTN: GO-0
APO 96384

2-on Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
ATTN: AVG, QN-GO-II

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R-1)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON, APO 96238 2 & MAR 1969

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA 00-0, APO 96384

The Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969 from the 8th Transportation Group (MT) has been reviewed and is considered adequate with the following comments:

a. SECTION 1, paragraph E5: Concur. More widespread employment of this policy might improve guard post security at other installations.

b. SECTION 2, paragraph B1: Nonconcur. The positioning of the hardened vehicles (gun trucks) will vary according to road conditions, number of vehicles in the convoy, and numbers of hardened vehicles available. The positioning of the gun trucks does not change the concept.

c. SECTION 2, paragraph B2: Concur. This policy would also clarify a number of chains-of-command.

d. SECTION 2, paragraph B3: Concur. Recommend higher headquarters initiate action on this matter.

e. SECTION 2, paragraph C: Concur. The burden of training drivers should not be placed upon units in the field. Action by higher headquarters is required.

f. SECTION 2, paragraph D: Concur. Failure to have accurate coordinates of fixed positions readily available could easily prove crucial in event of attack.

g. SECTION 2, paragraph E1: Concur with recommendations (c) 1 and 2. A policy presently in effect establishes higher priority for combat losses and replacements for washouts when organizational shortages reach the critical stage. Nonconcur with recommendation (c) 3 of paragraph E1. This matter is controlled by the Department of the Army, Distribution and Allocation Committee. The supply system is currently unable to fill existing shortages; due to this critical posture, distribution is limited to established authorizations only.
h. SECTION 2, paragraph E2: Concur. The Mack diesel truck has increased the operational-ready rate of the five-ton truck fleet.

i. SECTION 2, paragraph E3: Concur. The observation and evaluation sections of this paragraph illustrate the potential value of consolidated trailer maintenance facilities.

j. SECTION 2, paragraph E4: Concur. The information on inspection improvement is correct.

k. SECTION 3. Escape, Evasion and Survival information for this reporting period was not required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

RICHARD A. DANIELS
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 8th Transportation Group for Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. 24 APR 1969

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "hardened vehicles" concept, section II, page 6, paragraph b(1). Concur with paragraph b, 1st Indorsement. The concept of the hardened vehicles in convoys is not, and never was an issue. The observation points out that variation and avoidance of patterns are techniques used successfully to foil enemy ambush plans. These innovations will be submitted for publication in the USARV Transportation Newsletter for dissemination to TC units throughout Vietnam.

b. Reference item concerning litters and first aid containers in gun trucks, section II, page 7, paragraph b(3). Concur with actions taken to facilitate evacuation of casualties.

c. Reference item concerning school trained 5 ton tractor drivers, section II, page 7, paragraph c. Concur. Problems resulting from the shortage of trained heavy vehicle drivers have been reported to higher headquarters and programs designed to bring relief are being considered at Department of the Army and CONARC level. Until this problem is resolved and a training program is implemented, training of drivers will have to be accomplished within RVN.

d. Reference item concerning low priority of issue, section II, page 8, paragraph e(1). Concur with paragraph g, 1st Indorsement.

e. Reference item concerning dieselization of 5 ton truck cargo and 5 ton truck tractor, section II, page 8, paragraph e(2). Concur. A maximum effort is being made to dieselize primarily the 5 ton tractors in Qui Nhon Support Command. The dieselization of 5 ton trucks is also receiving maximum attention, even though the criticality of this item Army wide makes it difficult to fill all requisitions with diesel vehicles. Therefore, some replacements may be either gas, multifuel or diesel.
f. Reference item concerning centralized trailer maintenance facility, section II, page 9, paragraph e(3). Concur. Decisions to operate centralized trailer maintenance facility should be made based on local operating conditions. This concept is being used in varying degrees throughout RVN and has proved successful.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

LANNY K. KELSEY
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon
8th Trans Group
AVHGC-DST (7 Feb 69) 3d Ind

28 APR 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the period ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) and concurs with the report as modified by the preceding indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
8th Trans Grp
1st Log Comd
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 8th Trans Op (Motor Transport) for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CRFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 31 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

G. E. HOLEYFIELD
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 31 Oct 68 to 31 Jan 69.

CO, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)

7 February 1969

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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