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<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
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<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 09 MAY 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (Army), Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<td>AUTHORITY</td>
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<td>AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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  7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH ARMORED SQUADRON, 1ST AIR CAVALRY
APO San Francisco 96357

AVBARN-JC

9 May 1969

SUBJECT: (U) Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS J55CR-65) (R1) (UIC: WZ6AAA)

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(U) Under the provisions of AR 525-15, AR 870-5, USARPAC Reg 525-15, and
USARV Reg 525-15, the Quarterly Operational Report-Lessons Learned is
submitted.

GEORGE E. DERRICK
LTC ARMOR
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 7TH ARMORED SQUADRON 1ST AIR CAVALRY
APO San Francisco 96357

AVHABN-JC

8 May 1969

SUBJECT: (U) Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
For Period Ending 30 April 1969, (RGS C:FOR-65) (R1)
(UIC: WO25 AA)

1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. There were no changes or additions to the unit mission.

B. Organization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSIGNED UNITS</th>
<th>M/R VICINITY</th>
<th>UNIT VICINITY</th>
<th>APO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th Sqdn, 1st Air Cav</td>
<td>WO25 AA</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Troop</td>
<td>WO25 TO</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop A (Air)</td>
<td>WO25 AO</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop B (Air)</td>
<td>WO25 DO</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop C (Air)</td>
<td>WO25 CO</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop D (Ground)</td>
<td>WO25 DO</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DETACHED UNITS</th>
<th>M/R VICINITY</th>
<th>UNIT VICINITY</th>
<th>APO</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>83rd Mod Det</td>
<td>WO27 AA</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
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<td>261st FA Det</td>
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<tr>
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<td>811th Sig Det</td>
<td>WO46 AA</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
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<td>819th Sig Det</td>
<td>WO46 LA</td>
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<tr>
<td>376th TC Det</td>
<td>WO46 TO</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
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<tr>
<td>371st TC Det</td>
<td>WO46 AA</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>96357</td>
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<td>574th TC Det</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det 3, 13th Security</td>
<td>at Hch for maint &amp; log only</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>346th ASD</td>
<td>at Hch for maint &amp; log only</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team 2, 69th Inf Det</td>
<td>at Hch for maint &amp; log only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Command:

The following are personnel occupying major command and staff positions.

(a) LTC George R. Crook
    Squadron Commander

(b) Maj John H. Rhein
    Squadron Executive Officer

FOR C: FOR-65

6/93 24/1

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DOD DR 5200.10
C. Command (Cont'd)

(a) Capt Raymond A. Fields  
(b) Capt Robert K. White  
(c) Maj David E. Thompson  
(d) Capt Donald V. Cable  
(e) T/Sgt Gary G. Cashion  
(f) Capt John F. Kunishi  
(g) Capt Charles K. McManus  
(h) Maj James H. Weaver  
(i) Maj Warren T. Hadnal  
(j) Maj Philip G. Shonkoff  
(k) Maj William P. Gillis, III  
(l) Maj David V. Leins, Jr.  
(m) Capt Ronald D. Grandol  

D. Unit Strength as of 30 April 1969:

1. Military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>O/H</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HRT</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>192</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>18+1</td>
<td>23+1</td>
<td>30+2</td>
<td>25+2</td>
<td>121+59</td>
<td>107+61</td>
<td>169+62</td>
<td>155+64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>18+1</td>
<td>15+1</td>
<td>3+42</td>
<td>27+2</td>
<td>121+59</td>
<td>101+69</td>
<td>169+62</td>
<td>147+72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>18+1</td>
<td>20+1</td>
<td>3+42</td>
<td>26+2</td>
<td>121+59</td>
<td>111+64</td>
<td>165+62</td>
<td>159+76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>127</td>
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<tr>
<td>7/1</td>
<td>82+3</td>
<td>95+3</td>
<td>97+6</td>
<td>85+2</td>
<td>671+177</td>
<td>586+194</td>
<td>850+186</td>
<td>780+283</td>
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INCL

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2. Civilians:

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<tr>
<th>SUB UNITS</th>
<th>TECH REPS</th>
<th>US CIV</th>
<th>VI CIV</th>
<th>3/4 NAT</th>
<th>COMPT</th>
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<td>0 2 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>11 11</td>
<td>0 0</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>0 0</td>
<td>8 8</td>
<td>0 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>8 8</td>
<td>0 0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8 8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0 0</td>
<td>43 43</td>
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3. Overall assigned/attached strength during the reporting period as follows:

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<th>WARRANT OFFICER</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEN</th>
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<tr>
<td>28 Feb 69</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>773</td>
</tr>
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<td>31 Mar 69</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>770</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Apr 69</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>807</td>
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</tbody>
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E. Aircraft Authorized/On Hand

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<tr>
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<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td></td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td>9 8</td>
<td>10 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>8 8</td>
<td>9 8</td>
<td>10 10</td>
<td>27 26</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>8 8</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>10 2</td>
<td>27 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1 ACS</td>
<td>31 29</td>
<td>27 25</td>
<td>30 28</td>
<td>88 82</td>
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INCL 3

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### F. Cumulative Totals:

1. Results:

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>KIA</th>
<th>CONF/POSS</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>CONF/POSS</th>
<th>FUM</th>
<th>STRUKTURES</th>
<th>HUNKERS</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>FUM / DEST</td>
<td>FUM / DEST</td>
<td>FUM / DEST</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>10096</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>/63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>15 /224</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>/52</td>
<td>15 /7</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>11532</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>/63</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9 /236</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>/85</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>11492</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>/97</td>
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<td>0 /31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>/11</td>
<td>21 /1</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>618</td>
<td>/223</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>24 /491</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>/128</td>
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**AIRCRAFT E. TYPE**

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<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>Dest</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dom</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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2. Losses: 1 February thru 30 April 1969

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<td>1624</td>
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4

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2. Losses (Cont'd)

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<tr>
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<td>Tot 1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

G. PERSONNEL

1. During this reporting period, an infusion of 24 officer/warrant officers was conducted with 2/17 ACS, 101st Airborne Division (AM). This infusion was designed to provide experienced pilots to 2/17 ACS which only recently arrived in country, and did not materially assist this squadron in off-setting its rotation humps. Only a 24 hour overlap was allowed between the time of arrival and required departure time for infused officers. This short time overlap hindered the combat effectiveness of the affected troops. Recommend a minimum of five days overlap be allowed in future infusions of this nature to permit the new officers to be operational before departure of the infused officers. Additionally, two infused officers from 2/17 ACS had recently been subjected to disciplinary action UP Article 15, by the Division Commander. Recommend that screening of infused officers be centralized to assure equitable exchanges are made.

2. This headquarters continues to experience difficulty in obtaining assignment instructions for lower grade (E-1 to E-6) enlisted personnel. An estimated 65% of lower grade personnel returning to CONUS from this squadron are being reassigned to the CONUS Rota Sta for further assignment, creating an administrative burden for the CONUS replacement facility and an adverse moral factor for the affected individual.

3. Military Justice activities for the period 1 February to 30 April 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>SCHEDULED</th>
<th>COMPLETED</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
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<td>Special Courts-Martial:</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Summary Courts-Martial:</td>
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<td>212 Elimination Action:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Squadron Level Article 15's:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5

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4. The Squadron continues to utilize 100% of its allocations for Australia and Hawaii. Approximately 75% of the allocations for other R&R sites are presently being filled. In addition a greater number of personnel are taking seven-day ordinary leaves U.S.A.R. Aug 550-1 in addition to their R&R.

5. During the reporting period, awards and decorations have been recommended and approved as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
<th>DISCH/UPGRAD</th>
<th>DIS APP</th>
<th>PENDING</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISN</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>AX</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car/Achieve</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* SS Donor/coal to an Approved DFC

II. OPERATIONS:

1. During the reporting period the three air cavalry troops of the Squadron conducted two types of missions. General support to the 7th, 9th, 21st Armored, the 9th US Infantry Division, and Operation Blackhawk, a continuing armed visual reconnaissance mission designed to interdict, harass and destroy enemy troops and supplies infiltrating across the Cambodian border into the Delta by way of the 44th STZ.

2. Troop D operated for the majority of this period OPCON to the 44th STZ, providing perimeter security in the vicinity of Vinh Long, (X5 099330), Chi Long (X5 020650), Tri Ton (X5 005520), and Hoc Hoa (X5 030510); and convoy security between Vinh Long, Can Tho (X5 853110), Chi Long and Tri Ton. From 13 February to 10 April the second platoon was given the mission to support the US Special Forces in taking Mount GOTO (X5 995468). While involved in this mission, the platoon still retained the mission of perimeter defense for the artillery fire support base at Tri Ton.
2. (Cont'd)

Their 106mm RR fired continually day and night in support of two battalion-size elements on the mountain. The operation successfully concluded on 10 April with the overrunning of the last enemy resistance. Large caches of supplies were recovered from natural caves in this mountain that the Viet Cong had controlled for the past 20 years.

3. During February, additional ramps, helicopter runways and maintenance areas were constructed on the south side of Vinh Long Airfield, enabling the Squadron to consolidate the aircraft of the air cavalry troops.

4. The perimeter security of Vinh Long Airfield continued to be the responsibility of the Commanding Officer 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry. This additional mission necessitated extensive coordination with the various lodger units on the post in order to provide an effective all-round defense against the enemy threat. New towers, bunkers and fighting positions, to include interior positions, were constructed. Communications were greatly improved with the laying of land lines from perimeter points to the TOC.

5. During April, the Squadron was directed to support the 44th STZ with all three cavalry troops in a maximum effort to interdict enemy forces and supplies infiltrating from Cambodia. This was essentially an expanded Operation Blackhawk (area 1). This period was unique in that it was the first time that all the troops were able to operate under centralized Squadron control.

   a. Air Cavalry troop infantry Platoons were used in conjunction with Vietnamese Camp Strike Forces to exploit situations developed by air reconnaissance. Infantry forces would form blocking positions along enemy infiltration routes. They were supported by aero scouts and aero weapons when closing on suspected enemy camp sites and cache locations.

   b. The intensive reconnaissance and surveillance accomplished as a result of all air cavalry troops operating under Squadron control resulted in some notable improvement in results obtained. On 5 April and again on 7 April several extremely large caches of enemy material were captured. The following list reflects the results for the two days, cumulative results for the reporting period are at enclosure 1. (Results: Operation Blackhawk 5th and 7th April)
## CONFIDENTIAL

### 5 b. (Cont'd)

**Troop B Cache Found on 5 April 1969 at coord WT 760160**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 AK-47's</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 M1 carbines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 lbs of documents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mauser rifle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 SAR Rifles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CRC 9 radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 60mm mortar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 M1 rifle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 East German machine gun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 82mm base plate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 .30 cal machine gun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 RTI radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 NS 16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 East German BAR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 60mm sights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Flint Throwers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 lbs of T.T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 primer cord</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000 assorted grenades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 kilos of primor cord</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 kilos of fuse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>355 GEX rifles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 60mm mortar rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 boxes of CRC ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 rounds of AK-47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 81mm mortar pod</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 75mm recoilless rifles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 US M-1 rifles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 82mm mortar (Complete)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Troop A Cache Found on 7 April 1969 at coord VB 668534**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 Telephones</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Kilos of medical supplies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Cans RPG-Fg rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Cans RPG-2 rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Cans rifle grenades, gas type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 Cans hand grenades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 tins batteries, D-81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Cans A or FF 7.9 Volt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Cases 1.5 Volt batteries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 60mm mortar rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Cans rifle grenades, TNT type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68 Tin small arms ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 each Chi Com pistol holsters and shoulder slings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Night missions were conducted throughout the period in support of the 44th STZ in CHAU Doc and XIE, PAMO Provinces. Missions were conducted nightly from 1700 hours to 0300 hours. Emphasis was placed on sampan traffic along the border canals. An attempt was made to utilize a C-123 searchlight system mounted in a UH-1H (Dang Ship) for canal surveillance, but smoke from burning rice paddies made it unsafe and impractical. Further missions were conducted with flares.

6. Squadron operations in support of the 9th US Infantry Division emphasized insertion of the maximum number of troops during daylight hours in preplanned areas of interest rather than exploiting the aerial reconnaissance capabilities of an air cavalry troop. A "people sniffer" was employed on several missions with variable results. Toss 66 gas dispensers were used in conjunction with the "people sniffer". The gas containers carried on the command and control aircraft were dropped on the area from 1000 feet. As the gas dispersed, the ace scouts would perform a reconnaissance of the area to detect any movement. This technique worked very well although the scout pilots find the protection mask very irritating if worn for any length of time. The irritation is caused by the high temperature during the day causing the face to perspire under the mask.

7. Night hunter-killer missions were conducted with the 9th US Infantry Division. The force consisted of one command and control aircraft, two AH-1G's to provide necessary fire support and a flare ship for emergency illumination. The team was employed in the following manner: The sniper's primary duty was to sight, evaluate and engage the target. Immediately after the sniper engaged the target, the door gunner fired at the target with the door mounted machine gun until the AH-1G's could positively identify the area. Rapid reaction by the AH-1G's is essential since time on target by the door gunner is limited. AH-1G's provide area coverage rather than point target engagement because visual contact with the target is seldom made. VT fuse on the aerial rockets insures a greater area of coverage when engaging personnel moving in sampans. After the target is engaged a visual damage assessment is made by the snipers using their starlight scopes. Flare aircraft were used when natural moonlight was not sufficient for the starlight scopes. Flares provided excess light making the aircraft more vulnerable to enemy ground fire. The best mission results occurred when natural light was utilized rather than flares.

Results for the hunter missions were 68 confirmed KBA's, 107 possible KBA's and 45 sampans destroyed.
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6. A notable improvement in effectiveness of operations conducted jointly with Vietnamese forces has been apparent. The use of organic US infantry with the air cavalry troops supporting the 44th STZ has been an incentive and an example to the local forces. These forces have been more responsive to suggestions when US infantry have been involved with them in combat actions. They appear to better realize their own capabilities and to assume a highly desirable aggressive attitude.

9. The breakdown of days the units were engaged by type activity during the reporting period is as follows:

   Training days........... 0
   Troop Movement......... 0
   Operations............... 99
   Total days............... 99

1. TRAINING

   During April 19 and 20, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry hosted the USARV new equipment training team for the MK III "People Sniffer". Selected operators were instructed in the use and maintenance of the equipment. They participated in a service mission to develop their technique under the supervision of the factory representatives.

J. INTELLIGENCE

1. During the past reporting period emphasis was placed on the timely and accurate gathering of intelligence data. As a result of frequent visits and mutual assistance between 3-2/3 Air Cavalry Sections and the MACV S-2/3 sections a firm liaison has been established, and is now being expanded into certain R&D areas as well as the pacification programs. This is enhancing air cavalry operations and assisting in improving American, Vietnamese relationships within Vinh Long Province.

2. During the month of February the S-2 section undertook a land acquisition and perimeter expansion project. This was done as a result of new construction within the airfield proper, developing particularly along portions of the perimeter. It was felt that to afford the airfield the best possible protection, the perimeter must be moved out from its present position to a distance that would preclude enemy personnel immediate access to post facilities should they ever breach the perimeter defense. To date the expansion has been approved, work is underway constructing a new perimeter fence with defensive positions and a new perimeter road is programmed for the near future.
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3. During this reporting period continual use was made of last light reconns of the airfield sensitive zone. These reconns are normally flown between 1600 and 1900 hours daily. Periodically, to avoid setting patterns, two recon missions were flown at different times. The last light missions have proven to be most effective in keeping enemy harassment at a minimal level. It is flown over known routes of infiltration and at random areas around the airfield where enemy indirect fire positions are likely to be established. On several occasions troops have been used in conjunction with last light to check sampans traveling in the sensitive zone and to search buildings and villages for signs of enemy activity. As a result of this action it has been noticed that the Vietnames now conduct more frequent operations in the area and the Vietnamese people are much more willing to report VC activities. They now know that the ARVN troops and American troops will protect them and are really trying to assist them.

4. During the month of April the 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry was operating almost exclusively in the 44th STZ. In order to best serve the Squadron and facilitate coordination between the squadron and the 44th STZ the S-2’s set up a forward CP in Cao Lanh. The CP was manned by S-2 and S-3 personnel and functioned as the TOC for squadron operations in the zone. A close liaison was established between the S-2/S-3 personnel from the Squadron and their 44th STZ counterparts. This served to enhance the overall operation and contributed immensely towards the success of the mission. The operation was so successful that it is being extended into the month of May.

5. During the month of April Troop D returned from 120 days in the field. This returned the ambush and patrolling capability to the Squadron. It also gave us mobile fire power for use in defense of the airfield. To date one major patrol has been run at night. This is significant in that except for the interpreters, this was an all American patrol and ambush. This was coordinated with ADVF and ARVN by the S-2/S-3 section. Negative contact was made on this first patrol but it was successful in all other respects. It also served to inspire the Vietnamese into setting up more ambushes and patrols around the airfield sensitive zone, giving the airfield that much more protection against enemy attacks. During April, a new more detailed and complete Airfield Defense and Physical Security Plan was produced. Plans are now being drafted to expand the Squadron mauz, to accommodate more captured enemy weapons, equipment and documents. The mauz is still proving its worth not only as a show piece but as a training aid for new personnel.
K. SAFETY:

1. During the reporting period there were six accidents involving Squadron aircraft. A brief account of these accidents follows.

a. Troop B, AH-1G, 19 Feb 69. Aircraft was engaged in a test flight when one tail rotor blade separated from the aircraft. Pilot entered autorotation due to severe vibration. After descending about 400 feet, the vibration ceased. At this time it is suspected that the remaining tail rotor blade and 90 degree box separated from the aircraft. During the flare, prior to touch down the pilot inadvertently left some throttle rolled in and with pitch pull the aircraft began spinning violently to the right. The aircraft hit main rotor first, rolling onto the left side, sustaining major damage to the aircraft. The crew escaped with no injuries.

b. Troop A, UH-1H, 5 Mar 69. The pilot of C&C ship was trying to get out of a revetment at a congested uncontrolled stage field. Upon lifting off another aircraft was hovering towards the C&C aircraft. In an attempt to avoid a mid-air collision the pilot of the C&C aircraft flared, putting the tail rotor in contact with the ground. Major damage to the aircraft, no injury to the occupants.

c. Troop B, OH-6A, 19 Mar 69. While on short final to the stage field (50 knots and 50 feet) the aircraft had engine failure. The lower stabilizer caught on a barbed wire fence causing the aircraft to land nose low. The aircraft was a total loss, the crew was not injured.

d. Troop A, AH-1G, 13 April 69. Aircraft relieving another on station, had full fuel load and full armament. The aircraft was flying straight and level at about 200 feet, due to haze, when the main rotor separated from the aircraft. The AH-1G went in a nose low attitude exploding on impact, the pilot was thrown clear of aircraft on impact, still in his seat. It has been determined that accident was not due to transmission seizure; cause is still unknown. Both occupants killed.

c. Troop A, AH-1G, 14 April 69. Pilot was experiencing vibration in his pedals during gun runs and elected to return to the stage field. Pilot terminated his approach to a hover and experienced tail rotor failure. The pilot was slow in determining the failure and in initiating the proper emergency procedure. The aircraft hit blade first on its left side sustaining major damage to the aircraft with no injuries to the crew.
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f. Troop A, All-1G, 24 April 69. The ship was returning from the AO when the pilot felt a severe vibration in the collective followed by the collective moving uncontrollably to the down position. The pilot made an excellent autorotation using his flare as the only decelerating force to arrest his rate of descent. On touch down the skids broke. The aircraft remained in the up-right position, sustaining damage to the skids, cross tubes and undercarriage. The crew received no injuries. This accident was due to the lower retaining nut on the collective servo being forced off, stripping the threads but the safety was still intact. This is the fourth instance of this failure in our squadron this month.

2. Safety Record (Feb 69 to 31 April 1969)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOTAL HOURS FLOID</th>
<th>ACCIDENT</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp A</td>
<td>6909</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp B</td>
<td>6320</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp C</td>
<td>6661</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1 ACS</td>
<td>27,489</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

L. COMMUNICATIONS:

1. The console was rebuilt in the TOG with the heat problem in mind. The layout of the console gave the radios plenty of room and was built in a "U" shape to give the operator easier access, with the radios all on one level. The revamping of the communication console brought the high rate of radio failures down considerably.

2. In March the communication section had reached its goal that it set last quarter with the voice-secure equipment. All aircraft within the squadron that have been modified for the KY-28 have them installed. All troop TOC's within the squadron have KY-3's installed in them to include all forward stations. Voice-secure communications within the squadron has been outstanding. All tactical communication nets have been operating with voice-secure for the past two months.

M. LOGISTICS:

1. During this reporting period, the S-4 continued logistical support of the 7/1 ACS. Much progress was made in area development and many items were obtained that have helped the Squadron to accomplish their combat mission.
2. In early February, Troop D of this Squadron had three Browning M-34 sights that were inoperable because they had turned in the M-34 sights for repair. After the sights had been turned in, the supporting maintenance informed us that the M-34 sights were uneconomically repairable and recommended that we requisition M-53 sights to replace them. Hand carry requisitions were taken by the 5-4 to the 506th Depot and sights were obtained, however sight mounts were not available in country. A Red Ball Requisition was submitted for the mounts. The mounts were made available in the first week of March.

3. In the last ORLL it was stated that the Squadron had taken full responsibility for the perimeter and that requirements for additional weapons and barrier materials had been submitted. To date most of the requirements have been filled. Construction of a new perimeter fence is presently being accomplished and is expected to be completed by the middle of May.

4. In early March all the maintenance and signal detachments of the Squadron and all aircraft were moved to the south side of the airfield. As a result of this action new facilities were necessary. New rovoturns were constructed for the aircraft. At the present time 16 20'x24' buildings are being constructed for the scout, lift and weapons sections and for the maintenance detachments. Completion of these buildings is expected to be accomplished by the end of May. Power for these buildings is also expected at this time.

5. On 15 April construction was started on 21 barracks. Completion of the first barracks is expected by 1 June. This will eliminate the crowded conditions that now exist.
II (C) Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

A. Personnel: None

B. Operations:

1. Airmobile operations for Air Cavalry Troops

   (a) Observation: Air Cavalry Troops have been called on to perform airmobile operations.

   (b) Evaluation: The mission of the Air Cavalry Troop is to extend by aerial means the reconnaissance and security capabilities of the unit it is supporting. Air Cavalry Troops have a limited lift capability.

   (c) Recommendations: Airmobile units should be utilized for airmobile operations allowing the Air Cavalry Troop to continue its reconnaissance mission.

   (d) Command Action: Liaison visits to units supported by the Squadron have been made and this subject was discussed in detail.

2. Extractions of Ground Troops

   (a) Observation: On many occasions ground elements have waited for extended periods of time in the pick up zone before being extracted.

   (b) Evaluation: Waiting in the PZ gives the enemy an opportunity to set up mortars and automatic weapons to strike when aircraft land for extraction.

   (c) Recommendations: Ground Commanders should keep the troops in the tree line, with security out, until contacted by the command and control aircraft.

   (d) Command Actions: Ground Commanders are briefed by the air mission commander on insertion and extraction techniques prior to operations.

3. Communications in Tactical Operations Center

   (a) Observation: Communications in the Troop and Squadron TOC's was poor during the first part of the reporting period, especially the voice secure sets.
(b) Evaluation: High temperature and humidity were the primary causes of weak communications. The consoles housing the radios did not allow enough air circulation around the radios and the TOC was too warm.

(c) Recommendation: A bigger console allowing more air space for the radios and a better cooling system for the TOC should be employed.

(d) Correct Action: A new console has been built allowing more air space around the radios. The TOC is air conditioned and a fan is utilized to circulate air through the radio console.

C. Training:

1. Slow airspeed right turns in OH-6A.

(c) Observations: Slow airspeed right turns (below 10-15 knots) can be extremely hazardous.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the inherent characteristics of the OH-6A, the tail rotor has a tendency to lose its effectiveness during slow airspeed right turns.

(c) Recommendations: The possibility of this condition occurring in the operational area is greatly increased due to the flying tactics necessary to complete the mission. Therefore, this condition should be more highly stressed in the operator's manual and in transition training.

(d) Correct Actions: All OH-6A pilots are instructed on the hazards of slow airspeed right turns with emphasis being placed on awareness of the consequences of such turns.

2. Aviators Standardization.

(c) Observation: The Squadron is behind in 90-day standardization check rides.

(b) Evaluation: Individual aviator standardization almost came to a standstill during February and March due to the lack of instructor pilots, nonavailability of aircraft and nonavailability of approved training areas for touchdown autorotations.

(c) Recommendations: That instructor pilots in the OH-6A, AH-1G and UH-1H be assigned to individual units and that more allocations to the various instructor pilot schools in RVN be made available. Also that more training areas for touchdown autorotation be approved.
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(d) Command Action: The squadron has submitted more allocation requests for the various IP schools in RVN. The squadron asked for and received permission to use the airfield at Can La for touchdown autorotations.

D. Intelligence: None.

E. Logistics:

1. Shortage of Nomex Flight Suits.
   
   (a) Observation: During this reporting period a critical shortage of nomex flight suits has been experienced.
   
   (b) Evaluation: At the present time approximately 40% of the aviators and crew members of the squadron do not have nomex flight suits. Some odd sizes are available in limited quantities, while the more common sizes are not available.
   
   (c) Recommendation: That sufficient nomex flight suits in appropriate sizes be made available as required.
   
   (d) Command Action: High priority requisitions have been submitted and follow up requisitions have been hand carried to the 506th Depot by the squadron S-4.

F. Other:

1. Main rotor blade damper arm and retaining pins on OH-6A.
   
   (a) Observation: Main rotor blade and damper arm retaining pins are working loose during flight.
   
   (b) Evaluation: Due to vibration characteristics of the OH-6A, the retaining pins are working loose. Loss of those pins during flight can render the aircraft uncontrollable.
   
   (c) Recommendation: That all OH-6A pilots inspect the retaining pins as part of the preflight and post flight inspection.
   
   (d) Command Action: Pilots have been instructed to inspect these pins both before and after flight.
2. OH-6A Tail Rotor Assembly (165 832 6605)

(a) Observation: After installation of the OH-6A tail rotor assembly, high frequency vibrations have been experienced. Approximately 50% of all new assemblies require balancing on initial installation. The assemblies require rebalancing periodically to eliminate high frequency vibrations, and to extend possible life of tail rotor assembly bearings.

(b) Evaluation: All tail rotor assemblies are balanced at the factory. However, upon installation, it was found that a harmonic vibration is encountered. If balancing is not completed as soon as the vibration is noted, the life of the tail rotor is shortened appreciably.

(c) Recommendation: When high frequency vibrations are experienced on the OH-6A, a tail rotor balancing kit (FSN 4920-134-0009) should be used to balance the tail rotor assembly. Presently there are two tail rotor balancing kits available for use in the Delta. One is located at Dong Tam and one is in Vinh Long. These two kits are used to support approximately 82 aircraft in four different locations in the Delta. The required frequency of use has proven that the two available kits are not adequate to support this number of aircraft. There should be at least one kit available to each Direct Support Maintenance Unit, with a planned support of 10 aircraft for each kit.

(d) Command Action: All aviators have been instructed in the procedures for determining when a high frequency vibration is present. The direct support TC detachments and all maintenance officers have been furnished the above information. The Squadron has requested authority for stockage of three tail rotor balancing kits, one for each TC detachment.

3. XM-18E1 Armament Subsystem.

(a) Observation: After 10 hours on the SM-18E1 subsystem an abnormal amount of subsystem failures were noted. These failures were: failure to feed, failure to extract, and failure to fire.

(b) Evaluation: After considerable evaluation it was determined that the lubrication being used (LSA FSN 9150-889-3522) was absorbing an excessive amount of sand and foreign objects, causing malfunctions of the subsystem.
(c) **Recommendation:** The use of LSAT (FSN 9150-949-0323) eliminated the majority of subsystem failures. The subsystem should be thoroughly cleaned and lubricated every 25 hours. All worn parts replaced as required including all pins and shear pins. The battery control box and batteries be thoroughly serviced as prescribed by appropriate technical manuals.

(d) **Command Action:** All armament personnel have been instructed to use the proper lubricant and the proper procedures for serving the XM-18E1 armament subsystems.

4. T-63-A5A Engine (2840-903-6025)

(a) **Observation:** That static oil leaks occur during the first few hours of operation on new or newly overhauled engines.

(b) **Evaluation:** The leaks were confirmed to originate between the reduction gear case and oil pump inlet. Cause is a dimensional problem of an oil transfer tube (P/N 6820651) which is approximately .005 inch too long, causing the pump inlet area to be held off the mounting pad.

(c) **Recommendation:** The manufacturer has supplied via local Allison Technical Representatives quantities of transfer tubes which have been reduced in overhaul length by approximately .025 inch. The engine should be checked by applying a 30 inch column of oil in the tube to the oil inlet for an 8 hour period to engine installation. If leakage is noted, corrective action should be noted prior to installation.

(d) **Command Action:** The above information.

5. Lower Retaining Nut on Collective Servo AH-1G. (FSM 5310-929-5820)

(a) **Observation:** During the month of April the Squadron has experienced four instances where this nut has not backed off but has been forced off stripping the threads and taking the safety off with it. The safety for this nut affords no protection at all.

(b) **Evaluation:** When this nut starts to strip off, the first sign is that of a severe vibration in the collective lever followed shortly by the collective moving uncontrollably to the down position. This leaves the pilot with only the flare to arrest his rate of decent. There has been only one instance where this failure has resulted in a major accident, the others resulted in bent or broken skids and crosstubes. From the time of the first sign, until the collective is all the way down is only a matter of a few seconds, not enough to make a precautionary landing.
(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that a thorough investigation be initiated into the production and quality control of this part. It is further recommended that a thorough evaluation be made as to stress criteria that should be set for this part and that new systems be developed to withstand the loads applied to it.

(d) Command Actions: The Squadron has submitted an EIR reference this subject and special emphasis has been placed on the thorough daily inspection of this part. Several defective retaining nuts have been found, however due to the type of failure, it is sometimes difficult to detect failures in advance. There have been 3 EIR's submitted by Squadron reference this part.

1 Incl
1. Enemy Equipment Captured or Destroyed.
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This headquarters has reviewed the report for the 71st AD dated 8 May 1969. The report is considered adequate.

1. a. Personal: None

2. a. Actions and Corrective Observations: 
   
   b. Recommendations:
   
   1. Defensive Observations for Air Cavalry Troops:
      a. This headquarters concurs with the recommendations and action taken.
      
      b. It should be noted that the needs of the supported unit are paramount and that an Air Cavalry Troop is capable of accomplishing a wide variety of tasks.
      
   2. Recommendations for Ground Troops:
      a. This headquarters concurs with the recommendations and action taken.
      
   3. Recommendations for Ground Forces:
      a. This headquarters concurs with the recommendations and action taken.
      
   c. Training:
      
      1. Defensive and Night Turns in CH-6 (a): The criticality of low altitude low airspeed right turns in the CH-6 is discussed in chapter 6, change 8, in 55-1220-214-10, 12 February 1969.
      
      2. Aid to Ground:
         a. This headquarters concurs with the recommendations and action taken.
         
   d. Intelligence: None

   e. Administration:

   shortage of extra flight suits:

   Recent issues of extra flight clothing have alleviated the shortage...

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 17 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10
CONFIDENTIAL

... (8 May 44) 1st Ind 26 May 16G)

... Operational report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Armored

... fuels, motor parts, etc., as items have been directed by 16th

... 1600 to 1600 to satisfy site requirements.

1. Other:

(1) 1133-63-113 motor, uninstalled, 415 324 6552: This

... Headquarters concurs with the recommendations and action taken.

(2) 1133-63-113 motor, assembled, 415 324 6552: This Headquarters

... concurs with the recommendations and action taken.

(3) 1133-63-113 motor, uninstalled, 415 324 6552: This Headquarters

... concurs with the recommendations and action taken.

(4) 1133-63-113 motor, uninstalled, 415 324 6552: This Headquarters

... concurs with the recommendations and action taken.

(5) 1133-63-113 motor, uninstalled, 415 324 6552: This Headquarters

... concurs with the recommendations and action taken.

J. E. L. R. C. (28 Apr-903-605): This Headquarters concurs with the

... headquarters concurs with the recommendations and action taken.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 Lt, ATTAX Absorl

1 G6, 1st Arm Bde, ATTAX Albr-0

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1. This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate and concurs with the contents as endorsed.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 10 (1), page 5. The infusion of the 2/17th CS with three (3) of the Aviation Brigade resulted in a few undesirable conditions. The problems arose because of unknown pilot qualifications and training status available to the infusion committee when the program was finalized. In the future consideration will be given to overlap when possible, consistent with the situation on infusion programs of this nature.

   b. Paragraph 10 (2), page 5. Late receipt of assignment instructions has been a command-wide problem for several months and has resulted in substantial dissatisfaction and hardship on the part of the individuals concerned. However, 65% is a high percentage compared with other units. Headquarters USARV has recently completed a comprehensive study and revision of procedures. Revised instructions have been disseminated to all units and the subject is currently a matter of command emphasis. In addition, this headquarters will send a team to check and analyze reporting effectiveness within the 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry. No recommendation is made at this time because higher headquarters is aware of the problem and the effect of actions already taken to correct the deficiencies is not yet apparent.

   c. Paragraph 2, page 16. 1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 95-6 authorizes a minimum of one (1) SIP per organic company or troop, per type, model, and series of aircraft assigned. In addition, IP strength should be maintained as deemed necessary by the unit commander. Close supervision on the part of the unit commander is necessary to insure that the unit or units under his command has a continuous IP/SIP replacement program in effect in order to provide an adequate number of instructors to meet the training demands. The maximum number of allocations for the various instructor pilot schools in HSV is currently being given to the groups within the Brigade.
d. Paragraph E 1, page 17. It has been recognized for sometime that there are shortages of MX flight suits throughout the command. At the present time 50% of the shortages listed by this unit are available within country. The unit has been informed to hand carry requisitions from their direct support activity to USAICOV for clarification of the exact location of this equipment.

e. Paragraph F 1, page 17. Recommendation and command action stated is pertinent and deemed appropriate. Recommend further that EIR's be submitted in every case of retaining pins working loose. This item will be made a part of the next lst Avn Bde G-4 Maintenance and Supply Newsletter.

f. Paragraph F 2, page 18. It has been recognized fact for sometime that there is a shortage of tail rotor balancing kits for OH-6A helicopters. Until a few months ago there were none in country. Most of the 34th Group DS Companies have one in their inventory of special tools. An additional number of these kits are due into RVN shortly and are programmed one each for DS maintenance units including the DS Detachments in the Cavalry Squadrons. Recommend that DS detachments requiring these kits requisition them through 34th General Support Group USU channels. The shortage of balancing kits is recognized, has been addressed by 34th General Support Group and is in the process of being corrected.

g. Paragraph F 3, page 18. The comments, recommendations and action taken are deemed appropriate. The use of LSaT 9150-949-0323 has been specified as a desirable lubricant for use with miniguns in the 34th General Support Group Newsletter of January 1969 and in Lub Order 9-1005-257-12 Th 9-1005-257-12. This comment will be reproduced in the next lst Avn Bde G-4 Maintenance and Supply Newsletter.

h. Paragraph F 4, page 19. The recommendation to check static oil for leaks, as specified, on T-63-A5A engines (2840-903-9023) is appropriate and will preclude static leaks on installed engines. Further recommend that EIR's be submitted concerning the dimensional problem of the oil transfer tube, F/N 6820651. Also recommend that the stated procedure for checking for static oil leaks be written into a recommended addition to appropriate aircraft maintenance manuals and forwarded for evaluation. This item will be reproduced in the next lst Avn Bde G-4 Maintenance and Supply Newsletter.

i. Paragraph F 5, page 19. The comments, recommendations and action taken concerning the lower retaining nut on Collective Servo, AH-1G, FSN 5310-929-5820 are deemed appropriate. The lst Avn Bde maintenance office has sent messages to the field suggesting inspection be accomplished on this part on each preflight and daily inspection. It was further recommended that double safeties be used on the retaining nut. EIR action is
adequate and continued surveillance of this part is an absolute necessity. USAAR has been made aware of this problem area and has an investigation in progress with the view toward eliminating the fault with a permanent engineering fix.

FOR THE COMMANDER

W. H. PIERCE
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General
AVHQC-DST (9 May 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: (U) Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSPOR-65) (R1) (UIC: W0Z6AA)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. D. WILSON
LT. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furr:
7/1 ACS
1st Avn Bde
GPOP-DT (9 May 69) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cav for Period Ending 30 April 1969, ECS CSFOR-65 (SI) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 JUL 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORT
CFO, AGC
Acting AG
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Incl 1 (Enemy Weapons and Equipment Captured or Destroyed) to Operational Report Lessons Learned for the Reporting Period Ending 30 April 1969.

1. Captured Weapons:

- 430 CCK rifles
- 73 AK-47s
- 19 M-1 carbines
- 14 Neower rifles
- 1 M-14 rifle
- 6 M-14 rifle
- 14 French carbines
- 25 Chi Com Carbines
- 1 N-16 rifle
- 3 Submachine guns
- 8 Light Machine guns
- 3 Heavy Machine guns
- 10 RPGs
  - 1 N-2 carbine
  - 3 57mm recoilless rifles
  - 5 73mm recoilless rifles
  - 6 12.7mm mortars
  - 2 82mm mortars
  - 1 Grenade launcher
  - 1 Pistol
  - 3 Flame Throwers

2. Captured Equipment and Ammunition

- 442 Cases of small arms ammunition
- 517 Loaded AK-47 magazines
- 1750 Rounds assorted small arms ammunition
- 252 60mm mortar rounds
- 44 82mm mortar rounds
- 7 57mm RR rounds
- 101 75mm RR rounds
- 140 Rocket-Propelled grenades
- 5 Cases hand grenades
- 3729 Hand grenades (loose)
- 41 Rifle grenades
- 361 AP mines and booby traps
- 241 AT mines
- 300 Rounds salt peter
- 75 Kilos Tetra-chloric acid
Incl 1 (Enemy Weapons and Equipment Captured or Destroyed) to Operational Report Lessons Learned for the Reporting Period Ending 30 April 1969.

2. Captured Equipment and Ammunition (Cont'd)

10,000 Pounds of TNT
6,000 Kilos primor cord
4 55 gallon drums salt peter
11 105mm Artillery rounds
1 40# Box C-4 explosive
4 120mm mortar rounds
1,000 Kilos fuse
14 Sticks Commercial TNT
3,500 Fuses
2,000 Blasting caps
3 55 gal drums gasoline
1 SRC/9 radio
1 NT/1 radio
3 PRC/25 radios
1 PRC/10 radios
245 Pounds of documents
1900 Pounds medical supplies
7 VC ID's
2 VC awards
1 Sniper's telescopes
2 Anti Aircraft LG wheels
5 VC flags
1 OX cart
1 Tractor
1 60mm mortar bi-pod
25 Military packs
8 Chi Con field switch board
27 Chi Con field telephones
1 Typewriter
1 .50 cal MG tri-pod
1 Hand grinder
1 Bollard
2 Hand drills
10 Cases medical supplies
30 Rifles slings
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Incl 1 (Energy Weapons and Equipment Captured or Destroyed) to Operational Report Lessons Learned for the Reporting Period Ending 30 April 1969.

2. Captured Equipment and Ammunition (Cont'd)

- 12 Cases D-61 batteries
- 16 Cases 1.5 volt batteries
- 1 Holster
- 1 Ammo pouch
- 3 52m. sector sights
- 2 52m. sector bi-pods
- 2 62m. sector base plates

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CO, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A