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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL Harold R. Aaron, CO, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Period 4 June 1968 to 29 May 1969 (U)

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1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U), dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of COL Harold R. Aaron, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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12 JUN 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report submitted by COL Harold R. Aaron. The report covers the period 4 June 1968 to 29 May 1969 during which time COL Aaron was the Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

2. It is recognized that, as Commanding Officer of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), COL Aaron concerned himself with the operation of his unit. However, the varying missions assigned to US and Free World Military Assistance Force (FWMAF) and 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)/Civilian Irregular Defense Group may cause the comparative statistics and casualties indicated by COL Aaron to be erroneously interpreted. In many of the actions mentioned, US/FWMAF combat, combat support, and combat service support units were also involved.

3. COL Aaron is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. Wilson
Assistant Adjutant General

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SECRET 2909410
Country: Republic of Vietnam

Debrief Report By: Colonel Harold R. Aaron, Infantry, 026207

Duty Assignment: Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces

Inclusive Dates: 4 June 1968 to 29 May 1969

Date of Report: 15 May 1969

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1. (C) GENERAL: The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is assigned to CG, USARV, for command (less OPCON), with COMUSMACV retaining OPCON of the organization. The primary purpose of 5th SFGA is to advise and assist the Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) in the conduct of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Program. This program establishes a paramilitary indigenous force sponsored and supported by the United States. In this program, as well as in the other Group missions, 5th SFGA has the basic objective of the maximum combat efficiency at the lowest possible cost in man, money and matériel.

2. (C) MISSIONS: The following major missions are assigned to the 5th SFGA by COMUSMACV by MACV Directive 10-11 and MACV/JGS Combined Campaign Plan (AB-144):
   a. Exercise control of subordinate USASF detachments.
   b. Advise and assist the Vietnamese Special Forces.
   c. Sub-sector advisor in I and IV CTZs.
   d. Provide intelligence to COMUSMACV.
   e. Conduct special operations.
   f. Conduct MACV Recondo School.
   g. Provide logistical support to the CIDG program.
   h. Organize, train, equip and command Mobile Strike Force Commands (MSFC) with the VNSF.

3. (C) ORGANIZATION OF US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES:
   a. The group has a structure parallel to that of the VNSF. Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Signal Company are in Nha Trang. Special Forces Companies or C Detachments are located in each of the four Corps Tactical Zones. Subordinate to these units are a total of thirteen B Detachments and forty-six A Detachments. The four Special Forces companies are under the command (less OPCON) of CO, 5th SFGA, with the senior advisors or field force commander in each CTZ exercising OPCON of the units. The VNSF are in command of the A camps and CIDG troops, while the USASF are advisors and not commanders.

4. (C) ORGANIZATION OF VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES (VNSF):
   a. General: The VNSF are organized into a Special Forces Command composed of a headquarters, one SF group, an airborne ranger battalion of six companies, a Special Forces Training Center, a signal company, a headquarters and headquarters company and Project Delta. The Special Forces

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Group is organized into four C Detachments (one per Corps Tactical Zone), eleven B Detachments and fifty-three A Detachments.

b. Missions: The VNSF are tasked by the Joint General Staff (JGS) with the following missions:

(1) To plan and conduct unconventional warfare operations as directed by the JGS.

(2) To plan, conduct and support counterinsurgency operations (same as the CIDG program) within the Republic of Vietnam.

(3) To collect, process and submit intelligence information to the JGS.

(4) To implement political warfare activities in consonance with the POLWAR program.

(5) The C Detachments are further tasked with advising the Corps Tactical Zone commanders in the employment of Special Forces and the CIDG.

5. (C) SCOPE OF USAF/VNSF OPERATIONS:

a. In the Nha Trang area, 5th SFGA also contributes the major share of the US element to the Installation Defense Command which assists the CG, Vietnamese Special Forces High Command in coordinating local defense. A Command Liaison Detachment is maintained in Saigon to provide staff coordination and liaison between 5th Group and US military elements in the Capital District - Long Binh area. Three separate B Detachments fulfill special requirements. Detachment B-51 at Dong Ba Thin advises the VNSF at their Special Forces Training Center. Detachment B-52 advises Project Delta, a long range reconnaissance unit. Detachment B-55 commands jointly with the VNSF a countrywide Mobile Strike Force Command stationed in Nha Trang. Attached and supporting units include: the MACV Recondo School which trains long range patrol personnel for all FWMAF units and conducts the Combat Orientation Course for newly arrived USASF personnel; the 31st Engineer Detachment which coordinates construction projects and dispatches advisory teams to assist camps requiring new construction or rehabilitation; the 403d Special Operations Detachment; Signal Augmentation personnel; the 21st Military History Detachment; and Detachment B-57 which is a provisional Military Intelligence unit.

b. The current scope of USAF/VNSF operations is considerably larger than is often recognized. The table below shows the authorized personnel strength of 5th SFGA and the combat elements it advises:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
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<tr>
<td>VNSF</td>
<td>3,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Strike Force (CSF)</td>
<td>42,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/FF)</td>
<td>5,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Strike Force (MSF)</td>
<td>10,502</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>3,480</td>
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These forces represent the equivalent of four ARVN divisions and they defend a 13,351 square mile Tactical Area of Responsibility. The VNSF command the CIDG which is a paramilitary force composed of civilians who are hired as soldiers. At present their only military standing is that they are draft exempt while they are in the CIDG program. The CIDG consists of the CSF and the MSF. The former are normally recruited to serve in a camp in their own local area. They are familiar with the terrain, local inhabitants and the political and economic conditions in the area. The MSF is recruited and trained as a mobile reaction, reconnaissance and exploitation force. They receive more intensive training and incentive pay than the CSF. In addition, 48 percent of this force is airborne qualified. Their primary mission is to reinforce camps and operations as required and to conduct separate mobile operations. The RF/PP shown here are only those advised by US Army Special Forces in its sub-sector role. The 5th SFG does not support them logistically as they are under the Military Assistance Service Fund program.

6. (S) DUTIES OF THE COMMANDER: Before the reader can comprehend the duties of the Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFGA), he must be familiar with the intricacies of the command. Time and again, it has been found that US personnel involved with 5th SFGA activities at field force, USARV and MACV have been ignorant of the scope of this command and its role. The Commander of the 5th SFGA is under the command of the Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam (USARV), and under the operational control of the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). He advises Major General Doan Van Quang, CG, VNSF High Command, in his command of the CIDG and exerts considerable influence over this officer since the CO, 5th SFGA controls the support for the program: an annual budget ($139 million, FY69) and a supply complex of five major logistical installations deployed throughout RVN. His four principal subordinate commanders are under the operational control of the Senior US Advisors to the four Vietnamese Corps Commanders and coordinate operations with RVN military organizations of all services, Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF), and conventional US forces. One other USASF commander, CO, 5th Mobile Strike Force Command (MSFC), is under the joint command of CO, 5th SFGA and CG, VNSF-RC. In addition to the coordination and cooperation with all elements mentioned above, the CO, 5th SFGA, has a very close administrative relationship with the MACSOG and Observation Group (MACSOG), since 75 USASF are OPCON to MACSOG.

7. (C) CIDG PROGRAM:

a. The CIDG program consists of two principal forces - the Camp Strike Force (CSF) and the Mobile Strike Force (MSF). The CSF is composed of over 42,000 indigenous personnel recruited from local areas to serve as civilian paramilitary forces in the general area of the camps for which they are contracted to serve. In many cases, these personnel are of ethnic minority groups in the more remote regions of RVN. They are under the command of the VNSF but are keenly aware that they are paid and logistically supported by the USASF. The MSF is made up of over ten thousand indigenous personnel recruited to fight for extended periods of time anywhere in RVN. These troops are the elite and most consistently reliable forces of the CIDG program. In theory, the MSF are commanded jointly by the VNSF and USASF; in practice, by USASF.
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b. The CIDG soldiers are light infantrymen armed primarily with small arms, light automatic weapons and light mortars. They require considerably less logistical support on the battlefield than is required for the US. Their light equipment allows them to fight the VC/NVA on their own ground. They operate best as platoon or company size forces on reconnaissance, blocking and interdiction operations and on long range (ground) patrols in force. They are less capable of performing lengthy, heavy attack missions beyond 10 - 15 days.

c. Inherent in the nature of the program, the CIDG forces are more vulnerable to infiltration by enemy personnel and their sympathizers and by draft evaders and deserters. Ferreting out these individuals is the responsibility of CG, VNSF High Command who issues CIDG ID cards and performs security checks and obtains polygraph assistance from 5th SFOA as required.

d. With the large scale introduction into RVN of conventional North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces, with their more sophisticated family of weapons, a constant reappraisal of CIDG missions and tactics has been essential. Observations of and remedial measures taken by this writer will be included in this debrief. Pursuant to the scaling down of forces and with the cessation of hostilities possibly more imminent, observations and studies of this command’s efforts in implementing the former requirements and planning for the latter are also included.

8. (C) MOBILE STRIKE FORCES:

a. The MSF units provide CIDG camps with their primary means of reinforcement. The missions assigned to the MSF commands are:

1. Constitute CTZ reserve ready reaction force for CIDG camps threatened or under attack.

2. Conduct reconnaissance operations in support of RVNAF and FWNAF.

3. Conduct mobile guerrilla operations.

4. Conduct battalion size, small scale, conventional operations.

5. Conduct raids, ambushes, combat patrols, and search and clear operations in designated areas.

6. Constitute a reaction exploitation force responsive to hard intelligence produced by organic reconnaissance units.

b. Each Corps is authorized a MSF unit organized under a brigade concept. Each of these brigades is authorized a Headquarters and Service Company, a Reconnaissance Company with special action platoons and Recon Teams, and two to five battalions of three rifle companies each. USASF and VNSF B Detachments control each brigade and A Detachments control the 552 man rifle battalions and the recon company.
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c. During the months of August and September 1968 when seven Special Forces camps received heavy ground attacks, MSF units were committed to reinforce battered camps, to relieve enemy pressure on camps by clearing surrounding areas, and to recapture portions of camps seized by enemy units. In all cases except Camp Thuong Duc in I Corps, surrounded by elements of 3 NVA regiments, these MSF units were able to defeat the enemy attack without requiring conventional US or ARVN units.

d. The effective employment of MSF units in each of the CTZs is of continuous concern to 5th SFGA. These light, mobile fighting forces are capable of highly successful combat operations when properly employed and supported. A study has been made of the effectiveness of operations conducted by MSF in each of the CTZs for the period 1 October to 31 December 1968. For example, a comparison between II and III CTZ indicates that the employment of the 2d MSFC in II CTZ during this period resulted in eighty-one contacts with only one enemy killed for every four contacts made and an enemy to friendly kill ratio of less than one to one. The 3d MSFC in III CTZ, during the same period of time, had 46 enemy contacts with an average of five enemy killed per contact and an enemy to friendly kill ratio of 7.7 to one. Of course, significant differences do exist in military objectives, economy of force restrictions and density of enemy forces in these two Corps areas. There are, however, differences in employment techniques and orientation against enemy concentrations that contribute to variations in the degree of military successes achieved. In II CTZ, the 2d MSFC was deployed in scattered areas of the CTZ, with companies attached to US units and Task Force South to participate in operations as augmentation to conventional forces. The 2d MSFC was never employed as an independent unit with its own area of operations. The organic reconnaissance company, capable of fixing enemy forces and exploiting hard intelligence, has not been effectively utilized due to inadequate air assets and insufficiently planned and coordinated employment. In addition, elements of the 2d MSFC, when deployed to augment conventional forces, were seldom targeted against areas where hard intelligence could be exploited. The 3d MSFC, on the other hand, has always been deployed as an independent unit into separate areas of operations, with adequate air assets to support the operations of its recon company, special platoons and rifle battalions in accordance with approved MSF concepts of employment. Areas of operations assigned the 3d MSFC are based on hard intelligence and independent employment permits extensive use of organic intelligence and reconnaissance assets to further develop intelligence exploitation. The flexibility, firepower, and capabilities of the 3d MSFC were recently demonstrated during Operation Centurion VI in War Zone D. Reports were received of anticipated enemy infiltration through an area of operations being used by a US Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) unit adjacent to the Centurion VI AO. A battalion from the 3d MSFC was immediately inserted into the AO and placed OPCON to the US 1st Cav Division. On 24 March, the unit made contact with elements of the 5th NVA Division attempting to infiltrate into the Saigon - Long Binh area. The ensuing battle resulted in 190 NVA killed and 80 weapons captured, as well as a temporary disruption of enemy plans for a concerted drive toward the Bien Hoa - Saigon area.
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9. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS:

a. In June 1968, a close appraisal of the operational techniques of the CIDG camps revealed inadequate operational guidance, non-standard requirements for coverage of TAORs and a general tendency to restrict operations to local security. At that time, the average camp maintained approximately 20% of its force on offensive operations and 10% on local security outposts. The effective denial of base areas, infiltration routes, and border crossing sites required the implementation of an aggressive patrolling concept. After extensive USASF/VNSF staff meetings, a goal was established that each camp should be required to maintain 50% of its present for duty strength on offensive operations at all times with the remainder of the CSF personnel performing local security missions, camp hardening requirements and administrative duties. This goal was monitored and pursued through vigorous command emphasis and on-site accounting of personnel. As a direct result, the average country-wide percentage of camp strike force present for duty strength on offensive operations climbed to 35 percent in September 1968 and gradually surpassed the 50 percent goal, reaching 53 percent in February and 58 percent in April 1969. This program accounted for greater coverage of camp TAORs; increased contacts and enemy casualties; added restriction on enemy movement, supply, and base capabilities and brought a general improvement in the aggressive spirit of the CIDG forces. A monthly average of 18,000 operations were conducted resulting in an average of 480 contacts with the enemy. During the first eleven months of my command, 6,687 enemy were killed, 738 captured and 5,440 weapons were captured. Friendly losses were 1,513 killed for a favorable enemy to friendly kill ratio of 4.4:1.

b. Throughout this period there has been an increasingly favorable USASF to enemy casualty ratio. The following figures reveal the US to VC/NVA kill ratio for the previous two years and 1 January - 30 April 1969:

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<th>1967</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1969</th>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

Such figures are an excellent proof for the economy of force argument that 5th SF/GA provides a means of waging effective war against the enemy at a minimum cost in American lives. In the output parameter of enemy KIA alone, 9,257 enemy were killed during 1968 at a cost of only 96 American lives. Translated into ratios, this means that 96 enemy were killed by CIDG elements during that period for every American casualty. For the period 1 January - 30 April 1969, this ratio stands at 115:1. Conventional US units, organized primarily as maneuver elements without comprehensive responsibilities in the areas of Civic Action, Pacification and Population Control, and having well-trained troops with optimum fire support and aviation assets, usually account for more enemy KIA than equivalent CIDG forces. These enemy losses; however, take a far greater proportion of American casualties than in

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the CIDG program. Looking at II CTZ for an example, Company B, 5th SFGA, has 600 Americans and approximately 15,000 indigenous personnel. The US 4th Infantry Division has about 18,000 Americans. During March 1969 the US 4th Infantry Division killed 731 enemy at a cost of 129 Americans KIA and 563 WIA, for a ratio of enemy to friendly KIA of 5.6:1. The CIDG elements in II CTZ, during the same period, killed 230 enemy at a cost of 3 Americans KIA and 11 WIA, plus 39 indigenous KIA and 123 WIA. Total enemy to friendly KIA ratio for Company B during this period was 5.5:1, while USAF enemy to friendly KIA ratio was 76.7:1. It should be noted that the above comparison is a representative example and that some monthly totals reflect even greater enemy to USAF KIA ratios and, occasionally, even greater enemy KIAs by Company B elements than by the 4th Infantry Division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>US KIA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US WIA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG KIA</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG WIA</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Frd Cas</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy KIA</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Cptr</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Wpos Cptr</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>116</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enemy to US KIA</td>
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<td>5.6:1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In addition to this economy of manpower factor, considerable cost savings are realized in the equipping and maintaining of a CIDG soldier as compared to a US soldier. The price of initial issue for a CIDG soldier is about 71 percent of the cost to equip a US soldier, while daily maintenance, subsistence and pay runs about 16 percent of the US cost.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIDG</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INITIAL ISSUE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ 22.67</td>
<td>$ 81.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124.00</td>
<td>124.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146.67</td>
<td>205.87</td>
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CIDG

COST PER DAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0.55</td>
<td>Base Pay</td>
<td>$8.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.29</td>
<td>Jump Pay</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.29</td>
<td>Combat Pay</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.38</td>
<td>Cost of Living</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1.30</td>
<td>Foreign Duty Pay</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.81</td>
<td>Patrol Ration</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$12.78</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that CIDG salaries are considerably less than those paid to ARVN and RF troops in similar units, almost across the scale of pay grades. The productiveness, motivation and responsiveness of these forces continuously challenged that of their regular army counterparts.

c. The CIDG program has been able to field more than 42,000 fighters at comparatively little cost in personnel and material to the United States. It has demonstrated that paramilitary operations could have been established with a scope potentially greater than that which exists at the present. The potential is now limited largely by the manpower base of the GVN. Present manpower requirements of the GVN preclude a force larger than now exists since the GVN has a claim on the desirable manpower ages of 18 - 24 years and CIDG recruits must be between 24 - 38 years of age. In 1964, I believe the CIDG program could have consisted of 100,000 CIDG soldiers, resulting in a more formidable and a more economical force to serve US objectives.

10. (C) SUMMARY OF MAJOR COMBAT ACTIONS:

a. Throughout Vietnam, especially along the borders, are located A camps manned by small 14-man teams of United States Special Forces and a similar team of Vietnamese Special Forces who advise approximately a battalion of indigenous soldiers. These camps protect key points which the enemy must utilize for infiltrating troops and supplies. They constitute a barrier which protects major Vietnamese population centers. An attack against a camp is often a prelude to an attack against an important civilian area or to a buildup around a major military base. The successful enemy assault on Camp Lang Vei in early February 1968 was an attempt to draw the noose tighter around the huge Marine base at Khe Sanh. Similarly, the pullout during March 1968 from Camp Kham Duc eliminated the last government stronghold in western I Corps Tactical Zone and opened up infiltration routes to the populous coastal areas.

b. Since last June there have been a number of major enemy attacks on CIDG camps. The following brief summaries narrate some of these attacks and indicate the importance of the outcome. The most important development has been the growing ability of Camp Strike Force troops, reinforced by Mobile Strike Force units, to defend themselves against enemy attacks with-
out requiring conventional US or ARVN units. The best example of this promissing trend was the battle of Duc Lap in late August when the camp, with the assistance of NSF from Pleiku and Nha Trang, defeated two NVA regiments in a pitched battle.

(1) Tien Phuoc, A-102: On the evening of 22 February 1969 the enemy launched widespread coordinated attacks-by-fire and ground probes on population centers and military installations throughout Vietnam. These were designed to commemorate the enemy's massive Tet Offensive of 1968 and were also the beginning of a 1969 Winter-Spring Offensive which sputtered on and off over the next two months. Just before midnight, Camp Tien Phuoc, which protects the approach routes to Tam Ky city as well as the industrial complex of the An Hoa area, was hit by 82mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire. At 0200 hours on 23 February, a camp outpost was overrun by an unknown size enemy force partially composed of female personnel. At dawn the OP was quickly recaptured by a CSF counterattack supported by camp artillery. At first it was thought the camp was simply being harrassed by local VC units, but all operations initiated from the camp met stubborn enemy resistance from fortified positions. A POW captured near Tam Ky identified the enemy as the 70th Main Force Battalion, the 72d Local Force Battalion and the 1st Regiment of the 2d NVA Division. Two NSF companies from Da Nang reinforced the camp in late February. Gradually the ground contacts and attacks-by-fire decreased over the next month and the threat to Tien Phuoc and the nearby urban areas declined. Confirmed results of the numerous clashes showed 83 enemy killed at the cost of 31 CIDG lost. An additional 152 enemy were killed by artillery adjusted by USAF.

(2) Ha Thanh, A-104: Increased contacts in Ha Thanh's TAOR during early August 1968 and attacks-by-fire with ground probes indicated that elements of the 3d NVA Division were infiltrating toward the city of Quang Ngai, the capital of Quang Ngai Province. If the NVA could overrun or neutralise this camp, the way to the city would be open. On 23 August, as part of the Communist Third Country-wide Offensive in 1968, outposts of Ha Thanh were probed by an estimated enemy battalion. One OP was seized, but friendly troops counterattacked and retook it after three hours of bloody fighting. Results showed 24 VC/NVA killed and 24 weapons captured. Friendly casualties were 1 CIDG killed and 25 wounded. Enemy forces, however, continued their buildup. Reinforcements were requested and elements of the 1st Mobile Strike Force at Da Nang as well as units of the Americal Division were flown in on 24 August. On the night of 25 August, after a heavy mortar and rocket barrage, two NVA companies launched a ground attack on the camp. Several sightings of vehicles moving toward the camp from the southwest were made during the night. These may have been tanks, which the NVA had used quite effectively against Camp Lang Vei. Excellent use of camp assets as well as support from AC-130 aircraft and air strikes drove these vehicles off. The ground attack was also repulsed. Additional Mobile Strike Force elements from Nha Trang arrived on 26 August. Local security and NSF operations made almost continuous contact with company and battalion size enemy units. Some 40 enemy were confirmed killed during this period as opposed to 12 CIDG. Undoubtedly, the enemy lost many more troops from artillery and air strikes. Mortar and rocket attacks bombarded the camp and surrounding villages until 28 September when the enemy withdrew, removing the threat to Ha Thanh and Quang Ngai city.

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This camp has been an area of relentless and heavy enemy pressure since it is located only 15 kilometers from Da Nang, the second largest city in RVN, and sits along the main avenue of approach to that city. The camp's TAOR is crisscrossed by enemy lines of communications and transportation running from hidden bases in Laos past the camp to the rich farmlands which circle Da Nang. Throughout September 1968 enemy forces entrenched themselves in the mountains which overlook the camp on the north, west and south. On 28 September, just after 0200 hours, elements of the 21st NVA Regiment captured OPs Alpha and Bravo located some 600 meters southwest of the main camp. Their attack was supported by the 141st NVA Regiment as well as the 368B NVA Artillery Regiment. Later that day, camp forces retook the OPs and destroyed the enemy forces which tried to hold. A total of 68 enemy were confirmed killed at the cost of 21 CIDG. Some fifty enemy weapons were seized. During the next few days enemy forces occupied several villages around the camp and drove out the civilians. Radio transmissions monitored on a captured Chinese Communist radio by US Special Forces indicated that all enemy units were taking high casualties due to air and artillery. They had lost many top cadre and were desperately calling for reinforcements and medical supplies. Because of these radio interceptions, one resupply unit was subsequently caught in the open northwest of camp on 2 October and suffered almost a hundred casualties. Probes against all friendly positions and attacks-by-fire continued through early October. By then, however, it was evident the enemy had abandoned any thought of assaulting the camp or of trying to press an attack against Da Nang. On 6 October a multi-battalion US operation entitled MAUI PEAK was launched to mop up enemy resistance. Both ARVN and USMC battalions cooperated, making contact with enemy units trying to withdraw from the area. A total of 293 enemy were killed by ground forces and another 127 by air, while only 34 friendly soldiers were killed and 79 wounded. Enemy figures were confirmed by American count. Operation MAUI PEAK relieved the pressure on Camp Thuong Duc and the enemy retreated to hidden base areas.

This camp is another link in the chain of CIDG camps protecting Tay Ninh city. It also lies near major enemy infiltration routes just across the Vietnamese-Cambodian border and thus can monitor enemy movement. Besides this strategic importance, Ben Soi is also significant because in July 1968 it was turned over to sole VNSF control. On 25 August, just after midnight, the camp was shelled by enemy 82mm and 60mm mortars. An hour later two enemy battalions of the 271st VC regiment attempted to pierce a defense of outposts surrounding the camp. Effective 4.2 inch mortar and artillery support along with stiff friendly resistance broke the enemy attack. Two CIDG were killed and one VNSF died later of wounds. Although the enemy dragged away a considerable number of their casualties, 29 bodies were found during sweeps the following day. Enemy pressure continued against the camp throughout the next month and only subsided in late September as the enemy's Third Offensive of 1968 petered out. The significance of the Ben Soi battle was that a camp solely operated by the Vietnamese Special Forces was able to defeat a major enemy attack.

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headquarters of the B3 Front, tasked with responsibility for all enemy activity in the highlands, is located here. Important infiltration routes, passing through the camp's TAOR, connect the "Ho Chi Minh" trail with secret base areas deep inside Kontum Province. The enemy made little attempt to hide their buildup around the camp so that friendly forces were able to prepare for the upcoming attack. To counter a possible tank threat, anti-tank mines had been placed along a key highway into the area. On the night of 3 March an estimated NVA battalion supported by five PT-76 tanks from the 202d NVA Armor Regiment and extensive mortar and artillery fire launched an attack on the west hill of Ben Het. The camp received 639 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar fire. The tanks drove straight up the key highway into the mine field. Two tanks struck mines and were immediately disabled. Camp weapons supported by Allied artillery and TAC air then destroyed these. The remainder of the tanks had to retreat. One battalion of the 2d MSFC was subsequently inserted into the area to relieve pressure on the camp. The results for the nine days of fighting were 45 Communists killed along with the two PT-76 Russian tanks destroyed. Four USASF and ten MSF/CSF were killed.

(6) Dak Seang, A-245: On 18 August 1968 the first major enemy attack within II CTZ in over 100 days was launched. Elements of the 101D NVA Regiment shelled the camp with mortars and B-40 rockets at 0330 hours. Three enemy companies assaulted the west wall while a reinforced company hit the east wall. Twenty minutes later the enemy withdrew, only to renew the assaults at 0425 and this time they breached the perimeter wire. Sky spots were requested and gunships and an AC-47 were enroute. Air support was late in arriving because the weather was foul with low visibility, fog, rain, and a strong wind. The enemy withdrew at 0450 hours. The AC-47 arrived at 0455 and gunships a few minutes later. The latter, however, were forced to withdraw because of the weather. Artillery and air assets fired on enemy withdrawal routes. Total results were 41 NVA killed, 20 captured, and 55 small arms and 14 crew-served weapons seized. Friendly losses were four CSF killed and one USASF, two VNSF, and four CSF wounded. Though the camp protects the northern approach to Kontum city, the enemy's reason for attacking may simply have been to gain a quick victory using darkness and bad weather as protection against superior Allied air and artillery support. The significance of the battle was that an A camp was able to repulse a major ground attack with a minimum of outside assistance.

(7) Duc Lap, A-239: At 0130 hours on 23 August 1968, Camp Duc Lap received a ground probe from the 95C NVA Regiment supported by intensive mortar and rocket fire. At the same time, two battalions of the 320th NVA Regiment assaulted Government District Headquarters some six kilometers west of the camp. The 66th Regiment supported these attacks. The camp and District Headquarters had long thwarted Communist infiltration from the Nam Lyr base area in Cambodia into the highlands of the Republic. Duc Lap especially protected the southwestern approaches to Ban Me Thuot city. At dawn on 23 August, the camp forces found that they were surrounded by well equipped, heavily armed NVA soldiers. Two companies of the 2d Mobile Strike Force from Pleiku were hell-lifted north of the camp. They were driven back after attempting to assault fortified enemy positions on the heights northeast of the camp. That night, after a fierce three hour
battle, enemy units seized the smaller northern hill of the camp and began an assault on the main hill. On 24 August the two Pleiku MSF companies, joined by a third, tried to break the siege. One company got through into the camp and reinforced the defenders. The other two companies withdrew to hills northwest of camp. Early on 25 August the enemy made a last desperate attack to take the camp. Rallied by the Americans and Vietnamese Special Forces soldiers, the CIDG forces held on. During the morning two companies of the Nha Trang Mobile Strike Force landed two thousand meters west of Duc Lap. Immediately they marched for the camp and entered through the only approach still open at the southwest corner. After a quick briefing, the Nha Trang companies assaulted the enemy entrenched on the small hill. The two Pleiku companies, advancing through the gate on the west, joined the assault. For five hours the Mobile Strike Force pressed forward against bitter enemy resistance. Finally, at 1900 hours, the last enemy soldiers had either been pushed out of the camp or killed. Throughout the entire battle of Duc Lap District and camp, 839 enemy were confirmed killed while only 117 friendly soldiers were lost. The attack against Duc Lap easily rivaled the attacks against Camps Ashau, Lang Vei and Kham Duc. In these earlier battles the enemy had been victorious since camp forces were not strong enough to hold out, and Allied units either could not or would not reinforce the CIDG soldiers. Camp Duc Lap did require artillery/air assistance, but no other troops were needed except the Mobile Strike Forces which are an inherent part of the CIDG program. The battle definitely proved the worth of the MSF concept of having mobile reaction units capable of moving rapidly and in force to threatened areas. The camp itself accounted for 305 enemy casualties at a cost of six USASF. Certainly this fifty-to-one ratio demonstrates the high economy of force which the 5th SFGA provides.

(8) Katum, A-322: This camp forms part of the protective ring of western III CTZ for the key city of Tay Ninh, province capital and home of the Cao Dai, a very influential Vietnamese politico-religious sect. At 0110 hours on 18 August as part of the Third Offensive, Katum was attacked by the 5th VC Sapper Battalion armed with AK-47s, B-40 rockets, RPG-2 rockets, 82mm mortars, 107mm rockets, CS agents and small arms. Dressed in black shorts and camouflaged jacket, the enemy penetrated the outer berm of the star-shaped camp. Forced to retreat once by overwhelming friendly firepower, they regrouped and attacked again. After ten hours of see-saw battle, the camp forces threw back the invaders who withdrew to the northwest leaving 36 of their comrades dead. Friendly losses were 15 killed. Unfortunately, some 15 civilian dependents of the camp soldiers had also been killed by enemy fire. Throughout the next week the enemy pounded the camp with 82mm mortars and 122mm rockets. During one ten minute period over 150 rounds of 82mm mortar fire hit within the perimeter. The camp was reinforced first by one CSF company from Camp Trang Sup, then later by the First Battalion of the 3d Mobile Strike Force. During the last part of August and all of September enemy attacks-by-fire attempted to wear down the defenders and destroy their morale. On 25 September at 0255 the camp came under heavy mortar and rocket attack. Approximately 110 RPGs were fired at friendly positions. Enemy troops, again from the 5th VC Sapper Battalion, began a determined ground assault at 0330 hours and the northwest star point of the camp...
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was seized at 0345. The VC then began using flame throwers and satchel charges on the bunkers. The camp 105mm howitzer fired point blank into the star point. Supported by this as well as by the camp mortars, friendly troops counterattacked and drove the VC out at a loss of only 12 CSF killed and 17 wounded. Communist casualties were 141 dead and nine captured. Four enemy flame throwers, 35 AK-47s, two radios, six RPGs, two machineguns, 10 bangalore torpedoes, 1,000 pounds of demolitions, and 1,000 B-40 rockets were seized. This decisive allied victory ended the threat to the camp.

(9) Thien Ngon, A-323: This camp protects the south-eastern approach to Tay Ninh city as well as routes leading toward Saigon. On the night of 27 September 1968, the camp began receiving sporadic rocket and mortar fire. At 2200 hours the fire increased. Between midnight and 0430, two enemy battalions of the 9th VC Division three times launched ground attacks, twice against the northeast side of the camp and once against the south-east. Each attack began with rockets and mortar barrages. Then sapper squads raced into the wire and tried to breach lanes for the following infantry. Almost from the beginning of the attack AC-47s and AC-130 ships were on station, putting out a steady rain of fire upon the enemy. Other support included 105mm artillery, the American 105mm howitzer in the camp, a VN flareship and a FAC overhead to coordinate fire. TAC air and artillery continued to chew up the enemy as they tried to retreat at dawn. Friendly losses were 5 CSF killed while 8 CSF and 4 US artillerymen were wounded. The enemy lost 140 killed and 3 captured. Also seized were 50 AK assault rifles, 1 37mm recoilless rifle, two Chinese Communist radios, 20 RPG launchers and one 60mm mortar. The successful defense of the camp plus the large number of casualties inflicted on the enemy thwarted VC/NVA plans to attack Tay Ninh.

(10) Loc Minh, A-324: Located north of Saigon, this border camp blocks enemy infiltration from secret bases in Cambodia along routes such as the Serges Jungle Highway into War Zone D, a long time Communist stronghold. Beginning on 9 August 1968, reports indicated NVA units were building up along the Cambodian border north and west of the camp. Enemy troops in propaganda talks to outlying villagers boasted they would overrun Loc Minh camp and fly their flag over it. On 28 August at 0115 hours, a battalion composed of elements from the 165th and 141st Regiments of the 7th NVA Division attacked the camp with 57mm recoilless rifles, 122mm rockets, 60mm mortars, small arms, and B-40 rockets. Contact was broken at 0230, then renewed at 0500 hours. Poor weather hampered air support, but the attack was repulsed by 0630 hours. Throughout the following day, camp forces swept the area and pushed back the enemy. That night at 0105 hours, an estimated reinforced company assaulted the camp and attempted to breach the wire at the northwest corner. They were driven back. Contact continued with the enemy until 22 August. Elements from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Brigade of the US 1st Infantry Division assisted in mopping up enemy remnants. A total of 60 enemy were killed by camp forces who lost 4 men dead and 24 wounded. Intelligence reports indicated that a considerably greater number of enemy casualties were carried away and buried in rear assembly areas.

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11. (C) TRAINING:

a. Combat Orientatior Course (COC): On 8 April 1968 the first 5th SFGA RVN Combat Orientation Course was opened. This is a 12 day course for all 5th SFGA replacement personnel except sergeants major and field grade officers, and is conducted by the MACV Recondo School. The course became necessary due to the input of non-Special Forces qualified replacements from USARV as well as the increasing number of junior officers and NCOs without combat experience. Training is given in map reading, medical techniques, VC tactics, Project Sonjial, evasion and escape, mines and booby-traps, VC expedient booby-traps and the VNSF/USASF counterpart relations. To support this course and keep it current, a system of individual training records, student critiques and staff visits to deployed detachments was initiated. The course has been revised three times since its opening and revision will continue to be made as new requirements from the field are identified. From 4 June 1968 until 25 April 1969, 815 officers and 1,557 enlisted men have completed the COC.

b. Basic Airborne Course (BAC): Authorization was received on 12 March 1968 to conduct basic airborne training for non-qualified 5th SFGA personnel. Detachment B-51 at Dong Ba Thin has trained 1,741 personnel from 4 June 1968 through 25 April 1969. The current maximum input of the US Basic Airborne Course at Dong Ba Thin is thirty students. Each time the BAC is conducted, there are more applications submitted than can be accepted by 5th SFGA.

c. MACV Recondo School: The MACV Recondo School continued its mission of training selected personnel from US and FMAF units in the special techniques and skills necessary to conduct successful long range reconnaissance operations in South Vietnam. From 4 June 1968 until 25 April 1969, 815 students completed the course out of 1,109 students that started. The MACV Recondo School has added the following facilities: an outdoor classroom capable of seating 100 personnel, a boat house for RF-15s, student dayroom, water tower, additional billeting space for cadre, a warehouse and a reconstructed defense system. The PAX has been extensively revised and made more comprehensive. The students have also been allocated more time for individual study. Student losses for various reasons are about 12.8% compared to 40% in June 1968.

d. Mobile Strike Force Training Center: The MSFTC at An Khe piloted its first MSF company through a three week refresher course beginning on 3 February 1969. The MSFTC is currently capable of training three companies in one training cycle and can billet a total of six companies. To date it has trained a total of three CSF companies and one MSF company, totaling 511 personnel.

e. Vietnamese Armed Forces Language School (VFLS): This command on numerous occasions has attempted to procure qualified interpreters for the CIDG program. The VFLS quotas for ARVN NCOs assigned to 5th SFGA is insufficient to support present operational requirements. To rectify this situation, the VNSF-HC and the 5th SFGA have asked and received permission to

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1 Project Sonjial is a mine emplacing program designed for enemy trail and base area interdiction; mines having timed self-destruct and anti-disturbance features.
VNSF and CIDG personnel to the Vietnamese Armed Forces Language School in Saigon every month for twelve months beginning January 1969. This course of instruction is approximately eighteen weeks in duration. To date, 38 VNSF and 76 CIDG students have been enrolled in the AFLS. The first class enrolled on 13 January 1969 is tentatively scheduled to graduate on 14 June 1969.

2. VNSF and CIDG Training: VNSF training and CIDG advanced training at Dong Ba Thin has continued without a major organizational change during the period 4 June 1968 through 25 April 1969. Programs of instruction and lesson plans have been revised and updated to reflect changing weapons and requirements. The lesson plans of the following courses are currently being translated into English to determine needed updating and revision: CIDG Leadership Course, Combat Reconnaissance Platoon Course (CRP) and the Camp Commanders Course (CCC). The CCC has continuous command emphasis in order to insure that the course is conducted in an efficient manner. The major problem in the CCC is following the training schedule and having the VNSF instructors present on the platform at the prescribed time. On many occasions instructors from the VNSF-HC and the VNSF C Departments fail to show up for classes they are to teach, thus the class is cancelled. The classes that are presented are presented well. The efficiency of the VNSF instructors does not carry over to instruction presented to the CIDG Leadership Course and the Combat Reconnaissance Platoon Course. In the case of both courses, too often classes scheduled for fifty minutes are presented in thirty minutes. This problem results from a lack of interest on the part of the VNSF training center cadre that are in responsible positions to insure that instruction is presented well. At the present time both courses are being monitored by USASF personnel on a 100% basis. Problems that arise are being brought to the immediate attention of the VNSF training committee chiefs and the CG, VNSF-HC. At the time of this writing VNSF and CIDG training at Dong Ba Thin is of prime concern to me and I believe this situation will be rectified prior to my departure.

The establishment of training centers for the CIDG Camp Strike Forces at To Chau (TV CTZ) and Trang Sup (III CTZ) have brought rewards from the training of CIDG commensurate with the effort expended. The same is true of the training of Mobile Strike Forces at An Hie. The regional training centers reduce lost time for travel and permit training adapted to the terrain in which the CIDG will operate. The emphasis that has been placed on training of Combat Reconnaissance Platoons has improved the intelligence gathering of the CIDG and in establishing contact with the enemy. The emphasis on training of POLWAR teams for the camps has been of great value in improving CIDG morale, motivation and indoctrination.

12. (C) AVIATION SUPPORT:

a. Helicopter Support: The 5th SFQA, which advises the VNSF and influences the equivalent combat strength of four ARVN divisions in remote locations throughout RVN, has no organic aviation assets. Throughout the reporting period command & liaison, light resupply, personnel transportation, and to some extent, tactical operations have been hampered by the lack of sufficient light Army aviation support. A small amount of aviation support is allocated by MACV for daily use of 5th SFQA as follows:

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(1) Company C with one MSFC and nine A Detachments receives two UH-1 helicopters.

(2) Company B with one MSFC, three B Detachments and nineteen A Detachments receives two UH-1 helicopters. One U-1A and one UH-1 are provided by IFFV above the MACV directed commitment daily.

(3) Company A with one MSFC, three B Detachments and fifteen A Detachments is allocated two UH-1 helicopters. Each of these helicopters are limited to six hours of operation per day.

(4) Company D with one MSFC, two B Detachments and twelve A Detachments receives two UH-1 helicopters. To operate at maximum efficiency, each B and C Detachment requires at least one helicopter for command, liaison and light resupply missions daily. Helicopters for tactical operations are allocated by the OPCON Field Force/Corps depending on the mission and priorities. Support varies greatly for these operations from Corps to Corps and operation to operation. The MSFCs operate most efficiently when provided adequate aviation support. Generally, the minimum requirement for an operation employing the reconnaissance companies is four UH-1 helicopters and two gunships.

b. Light Aviation Support: Two UH-1 helicopters are provided HQ, 5th SFGA daily. These helicopters are limited to use in the II CTZ. Two U-1A Otters are provided daily by IFFV. One is used as a courier to two of the four C Detachments daily and the other supports the remainder of the Group staff. Detachments B-32, B-34, B-35, B-37 and the Mobile Strike Force Training Center at An Khe. Each of these U-1As fly more than 125 productive hours monthly in support of 5th SFGA. While their support is invaluable, they are not suitable as transportation for the commander and key staff personnel because of their slow cruising speed, limited use in marginal weather and present full utilization on essential missions.

c. Tactical Airlift Support: The number of C-7As supporting 5th SFGA logistical operations has been reduced from eleven to eight. On occasion there has been a backlog of supplies at Co C in Da Nang due to insufficient C-7A support. Company D in IV Corps needs to supplement USAF airlift with CH-47 support, since seven of its A Detachments do not have airfields. IV Corps provides this support only on a sortie by sortie basis. Occasionally, adequate CH-47 support was not provided on a timely basis. A block of CH-47 time allocated per day would be a preferred arrangement. A similar problem with CH-47 support exists in I Corps. Most CIDG camps and runways were built with the idea that the C-7A would be the airlift for resupply operations. Should the USAF fail to replace the C-7A with an aircraft with equal short field capabilities or fail to maintain an adequate number of C-7As, a major construction effort will have to be initiated to lengthen Special Forces runways.

d. Tactical Air Support: Sufficient Tactical Air Support (TAC Air) is available in RVN. In an effort to make subordinate units use more TAC Air, especially pre-planned air, command emphasis has been placed in this
area. With a view towards having a Forward Air Controller (FAC) in support of every B Detachment, the number of USAF FACs supporting the Group have been increased. The overall use and employment of TAC Air by the 5th SFGA has improved significantly within the past year.

e. Airfields: The airfield is the CIDG camps' link with its supporting Forward Supply Point (FSP). The 5th SFGA has primary responsibility for the control and maintenance of forty-four airfields located at CIDG camps throughout RVN. A joint directive has been published and distributed to the units concerned outlining responsibilities and criteria for the control and maintenance of Special Forces airfields. US units operating in A Detachment TAORs occasionally cause an airfield supporting a camp to be closed by driving tracked vehicles over the runway, damaging the surface, or by constructing fences, bunkers or emplacing artillery in such a way as to present an obstacle to aircraft. In any case, these airfields must be kept operational at all times to ensure the line of communications is never broken.

f. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. The following were the major causative factors for the insurgency in RVN:

(1) The ultimate goal of the Communists of overthrowing the government of South Vietnam and taking control of the entire country.

(2) The historical pattern of the exploitation of the peasant class by foreign elements and elite domestic political, economic and local groups.

(3) Failure of the GVN to establish effective control throughout the country and win support as the force having the welfare of the people as its major goal.

b. Since there are numerous available reports and studies on insurgency in RVN, it is only necessary here to examine certain areas:

(1) Insurgent Organization: Control is exercised by the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) and its subordinate organizations and directed by Hanoi down to the village cell leader. While communications are quite effective at higher levels, they tend to break or slow down at lower levels. Nevertheless, through strong political and military influence and North Vietnamese direction, control at all levels remains reasonably effective.

(2) Command and Control of Field Forces: North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units have greatly improved their command and control procedure. There is now a much more unified central control of all NVA units in South Vietnam, and increasingly since November 1968, there have been major relocations of units from one area to another. This increased control has been dictated in large measure by the increased political aspects of the struggle since the bombing halt in November 1968 and the continuation of the Paris Peace Talks. VC Main Force (MF) units are often subordinated to NVA units and
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benefit from their organization and are often augmented by NVA personnel. VC Local Force (LF) units are still the weakest controlled but have been utilized quite effectively in exercising control over the contested areas, gathering food and taxing the people.

(3) Military Trends of the Past Twelve Months: After the abortive May 1968 offensive, the enemy was forced to pause and undertake major resupply and replacement activities primarily in out-of-country sanctuaries. This period of lull continued for almost three months with the enemy constantly producing propaganda to the effect that a new offensive was imminent. In August the enemy launched significant attacks directed against population centers and military installations. These attacks were, however, largely without success and again proved very costly to the enemy. During these attacks, Special Forces camps at Dak Seang and Duc Lap were selected by the enemy as targets of propaganda value. While the attack against Dak Seang never reached serious proportions, largely due to employment of young, poorly trained NVA personnel, the enemy made a prolonged and very costly attempt against Duc Lap. Since his defeat there and at Katum, Ha Than and Thuong Duc, his activities around the camps have greatly decreased. Although the enemy continued to maintain his forces and remain in positions which threatened major objectives in I, III and IV Corps, it was in III Corps that he concentrated his forces. Border camps such as Katum have been the target of constant and frequently quite heavy attacks-by-fire to contain personnel in the camps as the enemy moved his forces in and out of country. In the north of November, once again preceded by a major propaganda campaign, the enemy launched his Third Offensive or Winter-Spring Campaign. The announcement of the bombing halt in November and the subsequent preliminary agreements in the Paris Peace Talks resulted in the emergence of the political factors to a position overshadowing the military. Activity remained at the reduced level until late February when the so-called Final Phase of the Winter-Spring Offensive was launched. For the first week the enemy conducted widespread attacks-by-fire against both population centers and major military installations. Several Special Forces camps were threatened but the enemy did not attempt to overrun camps at this time. In early March the enemy deployed PT-76 tanks against Ben Het. Two of the tanks were immobilized by AT mines and destroyed by US tank and artillery fire from Ben Het. Major factors responsible for the lack of enemy success during the past 12 months are:

(a) The failure to win the support of the people, especially in urban areas.

(b) The increasing ability of the Free World Military Assistance Force (FWMAF) to protect the populace and conduct operations against enemy buildups and base areas.

(c) The enemy's extreme vulnerability to allied air and artillery strikes.

(d) The continuous heavy losses in men and material which FWMAF have inflicted on the enemy at every opportunity.

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(e) The shifting of major objectives to the political/diplomatic sphere. At present it is probable that the enemy will attempt to maintain his forces in present locations where they threaten primary targets (especially Saigon). He will continue to make contact to attrit FMAF forces and await favorable political developments.

(4) Weapons and Equipment: During the past 12 months the enemy has made significant improvements in his arms and equipment. Although he has not yet made wide use of it, he now has a helicopter capability. There have been numerous sightings and reports of enemy helicopters from I, II and III Corps. Analysis indicates that he has used these aircraft in a command and control role, conducting limited reconnaissance, and in some cases for aerial resupply. He has also demonstrated an armor capability. PT-76 tanks, as previously mentioned, were used in March 1969 on the attack of Ben Het. There have also been frequent reports of enemy armor in I and II Corps as well as in Laos and Cambodia. He now has a 105mm Howitzer capability. He has made extensive use of 122mm rockets and mortars, and there have been a significant number of reports of even larger rockets and artillery pieces. In I Corps, 122mm towed artillery pieces have been captured. The enemy's antiaircraft artillery capability has increased significantly and he has taken heavy toll of allied aircraft, particularly helicopters. Although his main AA capability is the 12.7mm, he also has 23mm and 37mm weapons. Use of the 57mm and 85mm have also been reported. He has also used the B-40 rocket quite effectively in an antiaircraft role. The enemy has continued to improve existing road networks and construct new ones. These activities have taken place primarily along border areas in I Corps and III Corps and to some extent in western II Corps. He has increased his use of motor vehicles to move troops and supplies; reports have also indicated that on occasion troops have been flown to out-of-country base areas from North Vietnam. He has maintained and improved these out-of-country bases and staging areas.

(5) Movement Trends: The trend of major movement has been from North to South with units going primarily into III Corps via Laos and Cambodia. During the past 10 months enemy infiltration into III Corps has been continuous. Seven NVA regiments have relocated from II Corps during this period. These regiments were organized to form the 1st NVA Division and to reinforce the 5th and 7th NVA Divisions. The large troop movements were generally reported to move along the Cambodian border from the II Corps boundary to Camp Duc Hue. From SW and captured documents, it has been noted that the primary staging areas for infiltration are the Nam Ly base area, along the Adams Road complex, and the Serees Jungle Highway for movement into Binh Long Province and Phuc Long Province, as well as War Zone C. It is suspected that the 1st NVA Division travelled along Route 131 in Cambodia and infiltrated into III Corps in the "Fishhook" area. The major infiltration route used in Cambodia runs along Route 131, Route 7 and then to Route 24. This route consists mainly of hard-surface highway and enables the enemy to move troops and supplies into the Corps at a rapid rate. At present there are approximately 60,000 to 65,000 VC/NVA troops throughout III Corps and its border areas. The massive increase of troops over the past 10 months clearly shows that the III Corps area is the enemy's primary objective. Infiltration of new NVA units is expected to continue at an even higher rate than in previous months.

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The year of June 1968 through June 1969 was a period of tremendous growth and improvement in the intelligence collection operations of the 5th SFIA. Prior to June 1968, intelligence collection was haphazard, with little uniformity in methods and procedures employed in the widely dispersed detachments of the Group. Emphasis on, and appreciation of, the value of intelligence varied considerably from unit to unit, and the number of personnel assigned to intelligence collection was not adequate to cope with the increasing responsibilities.

In June 1968, after a thorough review of the entire intelligence program within the 5th SFIA, increased command emphasis was placed on better implementation and full exploitation of programs and systems already in effect and the development of new methods and new areas to improve the efficiency and expand the capabilities of the intelligence effort.

The initial review and analysis showed that while programs for operational planning, source administration, and intelligence funds control had been established, they had not been put into effect in all detachments and were not being closely monitored. In June 1968, the 5th SFIA had 584 coded agents working in 41 collection and 4 counterintelligence operations and they produced 806 Intelligence Information Reports. Operation plans which make continuity of operations possible in this environment where frequent turnover results from loss or rotation of personnel, were found to be outdated and badly in need of revision, or else nonexistent for those operations. Also, many of the intelligence operations were found to exist only on paper.

It was found that a number of detachments were not following the procedure for source administration which had been established in the interest of operational and personnel security. Furthermore, the system for accounting for intelligence funds expended by the detachments provided only a very general picture of what we were getting for our money. Negative reports were not required, so that funds could accrue from month to month resulting often in unnecessarily large amounts of cash on hand and causing funds mismanagement.

A vigorous program to improve the efficiency of intelligence operations was initiated. A requirement to plan and implement an aggressive collection operation was levied on all detachments with a collection capability, and all detachments were required to plan and initiate counterintelligence operations. A suspense date of 15 August 1968 was given for the submission of operation plans covering each of the new operations and the updating of old plans for existing operations. The existing regulations covering source administration, collection operations and funds control were revised to set more effective procedures and give more precise guidance on these matters. A new system for accounting for intelligence funds was established, a system which incorporated source administration, collection operations and intelligence funds information into one report form, thus reducing the paperwork requirement at the operational level and at the same time providing all the information required for effective monitoring of those functions.
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(6) The revitalization program was carried out with great success and resulted in a vastly improved and highly effective intelligence collection organization. At the end of 1968, the 5th SFGA had 1,519 coded agents working in 79 collection and 91 counterintelligence operations. They produced 1,680 Information Reports (IRs) in the last month. This is an increase of 935 agents, 38 collection and 87 counterintelligence operations, and 1,074 IRs over the figures of a year ago. The figures given become even more meaningful when considered in light of the fact that the number of operational camps of the 5th SFGA has been reduced. In the past year the 5th SFGA Intelligence Program has grown in quantity as well as quality. However, with the continued assignment of school trained intelligence officers and enlisted men, the command emphasis has shifted to quality. An aggressive re-evaluation and analysis of each coded agent and his Intelligence Reports has been inaugurated. With this re-evaluation and continual monitoring, nonproductive agents will be eliminated, resulting in an even more productive intelligence effort.

(a) With the assistance of Military Intelligence Augmentation units, the intelligence collection organization of this command has been significantly expanded as represented by the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY 1968</th>
<th>APRIL 1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of coded agents</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>1,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection operations</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterintelligence operations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information reports produced</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>1,680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Polygraph operations have been expanded so that a facility is now located with each C Detachment. From June 1968 to the present, the use of polygraph has identified 938 VC/NVA, of which 255 have been neutralized (apprehended, KIA).

(c) SOA Det B-57, 5th SFGA, through the use of nine field stations near the Cambodian border, is credited with collecting fifty to sixty percent of all information reported under the Black Beard program. Teams of three or four men collect information under the cover of CA/PO Augmentation teams to A Detachments.

14. (C) STANDARDIZATION OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURES: Soon after my assumption of command, it was determined special command emphasis must be directed in two areas - standardization of and compliance with existing procedures. On my orientation trips to Vietnam, it became evident that the CIDG camps were not developing or operating according to a common standard for administration, logistics, defense, offensive operations, intelligence, etc.
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a. I recommended that a joint VNSF/USASF Command Readiness Team (CRT) be established and this was accepted by CG, VNSF High Command. The next step was to develop checklists and establish the initial standards. USASF personnel with considerable experience in RVN with A Detachments and highly qualified in the various Special Forces, administration and logistics skills were formed into two teams. The VNSF-HC provided a Major, their Inspector General, who headed a similar group for the VNSF composed of VNSF personnel. In the first cycle of inspections, 54 A Detachments were inspected. Thirty-six detachments were considered satisfactory and eighteen were found to be unsatisfactory. Seven B Detachments were inspected of which five were satisfactory and two unsatisfactory. The first cycle of inspections was conducted from 7 August 1968 to 15 December 1968. In camps where the VNSF camp commander was at fault, his relief was recommended. Detachment B-24, with such sensitive locations as Dak Saang, Dak Pek and Ben Het, had the most unsatisfactory camps. Common and gross deficiencies noted in many camps were inoperative weapons, especially crew-served camp defense weapons, no intelligence operation plans, no underground antennas, and no emergency food and water supplies. In some camps, the USASF A Detachment Commanders were considered incompetent and were replaced. The second cycle was started on 16 January 1969 with application of higher standards than were applied in the first cycle of inspections. As of 15 April 1969, thirty-six A Detachments had been inspected with only five receiving an unsatisfactory rating. The inspections, all unannounced, determine after a 48 hour appraisal, the operating efficiency of the CIDG force, their commander, and their advisors. Battle tips and lessons learned are passed on from the inspection team to camp personnel. Deficiencies are corrected on the spot by the CRT where practicable. Thus, the inspection team does more than just evaluate the detachment. It serves as a training vehicle for camp Special Forces personnel, especially for recent arrivals in country. The command readiness inspections must continue.

b. The CRT inspections have also pointed out the need for Camp Commander (VNSF) training. Action to provide this instruction was implemented by the Commanding General, VNSF High Command and courses were started. Five Camp Commander Courses have been conducted through 5 May 1969 during which time 102 students have graduated. Seventeen of these students have been recommended for elimination from the VNSF for incompetence, lack of motivation, and for blatant graft and corruption. As of 20 April 1969, only two of these officers have been eliminated from the VNSF by the Commanding General, VNSF High Command.

c. Additionally, standardization was effected throughout the logistical system. At the time I assumed command there were sixteen types of individual weapons in use by the CIDG program. As soon as all authorized M-16s have been received, only three types of individual weapons will be in use -- the M-16 rifle, M-79 grenade launcher, and the .45 caliber pistol. By reducing the number of different types of weapons, the maintenance of weapons has been significantly improved with an accompanying reduction in cost. Operationally, standardization of weapons reduces problems inherent with resupply and redistribution of ammunition. Similar standardization, such as reduction in different manufacturers of typewriters -- from eight down to two -- and generators, has been effected throughout the Group for all types of supplies and equipment.
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16. (S) MANAGEMENT OF MONETARY AND MATERIAL RESOURCES: For many years, Group budgets for PARASOL/SWITCHBACK have been developed and material requisitioned with little background experience and no attempt to compile and develop experience data. The lack of warehouse and storage space early in the program meant that material flowed across the beaches in a never ending stream and into the A Detachment camps. The bountiful nature of the system developed among the USASF the attitude that the supply was unlimited and anything that was desired could be obtained and often was, whether it be a luxury or essential item. Supply conservation and discipline within this Group and the CIDG was non-existent. Strong controls were instituted.

a. The VNSF and CIDG also began to take advantage of the "horn of plenty" and often for personal gain. The VNSF, instead of developing expertise in the use of the RVNAF logistical system and its Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) support, took the easy path of becoming parasites living off the CIDG supply system, often with the acquiescence of their USASF advisors. These practices resulted in a general breakdown of the Vietnamese logistical support of the VNSF. Vietnamese logisticians and their advisors would not adequately support the VNSF because they knew that the USASF advisors would come to the aid of their VNSF counterparts to GVN did not. The result has been a long famine of supply demands over the years. It will be some time before the VNSF logistical system will begin operating as it should, but at least the corrective measures have been initiated to force the VNSF to use their system. Continued assistance with advice and liaison should develop within the VNSF a functional logistics system.
b. Control of construction had been equally nonexistent. USAF would
scrounge or requisition material for construction for a variety of require-
ments whether they were essential or not. In many cases, construction in
camps, conceived as temporary installations, was completed that would last
not five years, but thirty to forty years or longer. One of the first
steps I took upon assumption of command was to personally approve or dis-
approve all construction requests.

c. To further reduce costs, a single management system was established
with program directors assigned under the provisions of 5th SFSA Regulation
37-100 (see Inclosure 2). These program directors budgeted, reviewed and
analyzed funds, both OMA and PEMA, for which they were responsible. For
example, the S5 supervises that portion of the OMA funds (5th SFSA Cost Code
907) pertaining to civic action, psychological operations and the herioc
action bonuses. The S1 monitors the pay and allowances of all CIDG troops.
Charts are maintained by cost code, such as pay and allowances, of OMA fund
expenditures for each USAF company. By basing the expenditures on cost per
CIDG solders, a reasonably effective gauge for analyzing expenditures was
devised. I review these charts with each company commander in order that
areas of excessive expense can be explored and corrective action taken as
appropriate.

d. Purchases on the local economy have been curtailed drastically.
Coordination has been maintained with the Economic Counselor of the American
Embassy, Saigon, to insure they are aware of the scope of our local pur-
chases. A self-imposed ceiling of 4.6 billion piasters for local purchase
for FY69 was established by the Group and accepted by the Ambassador. This
expenditure is still eight percent of total US local purchases in RVN.

e. Excess equipment has been removed from the camps and detachments.
This equipment and material has been used to adjust stockage levels equitably throughout the 5th SFSA, establish floats allowing direct exchange of
equipment in need of repairs, reduce need for PEMA purchases, and permit
cancellation of many outstanding requisitions for PEMA items. Material
excess to the needs of the Group has been reported to USARY and MACV for
disposition.

f. Many additional areas have been explored with the aim of reducing
costs or to avoid expenditures. Trailers, signal spare parts, medical
items of a sophisticated nature, and other items of little or no use to
the Group have been returned to Army stocks.

g. Subsistence procurement of fresh food for the CIDG has been cen-
tralized where feasible in order to obtain the best quality food at the
most economical price.

h. The resultant savings from our judicious use of PARASOL/SWITCHBACK
funds and material is shown by the table on the following page.
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SAVINGS (Millions)

Cost avoidance/reduction
Cancellation of outstanding orders
Reduction of inventory stockage levels
Turn-in of excess equipment and supplies
Sale of excess items

TOTAL:

$34.9
$7.4
$0.8
$1.1
$0.3

$44.5

With the budget for FY69 established as $139.4 million, this represents a savings of thirty-two percent with 2½ months remaining in the fiscal year.

16. (C) LOGISTICAL OPERATIONS:

Unlike a conventional combat unit, the 5th SFGA is positioned in over seventy different locations throughout Vietnam. Most of these camps are located in the more remote areas of Vietnam; therefore, we must rely almost exclusively on aerial resupply, either air land or air drop. The total supported strength is over 45,000 personnel, CIDG and USASF. Large stockpiles of supplies cannot be left in camp, as the quantity of supplies on hand should never reach a point where an enemy attack would be encouraged. Because of this, we must maintain a continual flow of supplies, unlike conventional units which have a large buildup prior to their operations. The logistical and financial support for the 5th SFGA and the CIDG program is unique and cannot really be compared with other conventional American units. The source of SWITCHBACK funds provides for greater flexibility and responsiveness than regular DA funding channels.

2. A Theater: PARASOL office was established in 1963 on Okinawa called the Counterinsurgency Support Office or CISO. CISO is responsible for logistically supporting the 5th SFGA. CISO may go to any depot on Okinawa or CONUS. Since many items are peculiar to our requirements, CISO utilizes what is referred to as QRP, Quick Reacting Procurement, in addition to normal requisitioning procedures. If the item is not standard in the supply system or if it must be obtained sooner than normal leadtime allows, the QRP system is used. CISO sends a TMX to the Army Material Command with an Information copy to the Department of the Army. AMC forwards the request to their purchasing and contracting office which in turn contacts the CONUS manufacturers and arranges for direct shipment to the 5th Special Forces Group.

3. With the buildup of forces in RVN, we found that many items which were ordered from Okinawa were readily available from depots of the 1st Logistical Command, an example being barrier material. Therefore, Intraservice Support Agreements between the 5th SFGA and USARV were established in September 1968. Under the provisions of these agreements we may draw
common Class I through V supply items and maintenance support on a reimbursable basis from the 1st Log Command. We also have an Inter-service Support Agreement with the Naval Support Activity in I Corps. As a result of these agreements, we have authorized the forward supply points to draw common supplies from the various US agencies within their Corps area. This decreases the amount of cargo which must be transshipped within RVN.

d. 5th SFSA personnel operate the logistical system to support the CIDG program on an almost totally unilateral basis. They control the requisitioning, issue, and storage of all supplies as well as the funds required for local purchase of commodities. In camps that have been transferred to VNSF control, the USASF still control issues and funds.

e. Each A Detachment normally appoints a supply officer and NCO as an additional duty. At the B Detachment, one S4 officer and NCO are authorized. The C Detachment has an S4 Section of six people authorized. However, each C Detachment S4 is actually operating a Forward Supply Point (FSP) and has an augmentation of from 20 to 30 additional personnel. The focal point of the USASF logistical system is the Logistical Support Center located at the 5th SFSA Headquarters in Nha Trang, which operates as a depot and ships in bulk to the Forward Supply Points who in turn supply their customers.

f. To provide a rapid response to urgent supply requests, an internal Red Ball priority system has been established. This is a method of identifying high priority requests with a distinctive marking to insure special handling from the time a request is received, pulled from the warehouse, packaged or rigged, placed on line and loaded on aircraft. Once the supplies have been placed on line, the movement section assumes responsibility. Their primary mission is to prepare the loads for aerial delivery, either air land or air drop. The movement section also schedules aircraft and insures that the supplies are transported to the aircraft at the required time. Additionally, this section offers bulk cargo to the transportation movement agency for movement by sea. COMUSACV presently authorizes us eight C-7A Caribou aircraft in direct support. By utilizing these aircraft for our shorter hauls and the C-123 and C-130 aircraft from the Aerial Port for our longer hauls, we are able to get maximum utilization of aircraft.

g. The effectiveness of the USASF logistical system can be stated simply. The CIDG supply system is probably the most responsive and flexible system in the Republic of Vietnam.

17. (C) POLITICAL WARFARE (POLWAR):

a. On 26 June 1968, I sent a letter to all commanders in the 5th SFSA establishing three objectives for the POLWAR program (See Inclosure 3). These objectives are:

(1) Establish and maintain a high degree of loyalty, discipline and morale within the CIDG.
(2) Gain the support of the civilian population by improving civilian-military relationships.

(3) Combat the VC/NVA through effective use of psychological warfare.

This letter also outlined seven specific areas in which these objectives were to be implemented. These included improving counterpart relations; training of US Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations (CA/PO) personnel; proper utilization of school trained CA/PO personnel; integrating the POLWAR effort with the operational and intelligence gathering efforts; improving the quality, quantity and reaction time of psychological operations; increasing the coordination both within the 5th SFGA and with the 4th PSYOPS Group and Military Assistance Command Civilian Office for Revolutionary Development Support (MACCORDS) and improving the effectiveness of our reporting and evaluation system. Using this letter as the initial impetus, the POLWAR program of the 5th SFGA was revamped, revitalized and expanded. In addition to increasing the individual productivity of CA/PO personnel at all levels, new programs and procedures were developed which changed the scope and enhanced the effectiveness of the entire POLWAR program.

Among these new programs were the improved motivation and indoctrination program, the resource management program, the quantitative analysis system, and an agriculture program.

b. When the 5th SFGA adopted the VNSF POLWAR concept, the key stone of that concept was the motivation and indoctrination of the CIDG soldier. The welfare, loyalty and education of the CIDG became the first priority of the USASF, replacing the civilian population as our first concern. These efforts were brought together under the motivation and indoctrination program. In every area of its responsibilities, M&I has improved the quality of its efforts and engendered significant results during the past year. Sixteen men POLWAR Teams have now been established at each A Detachment and CTZ Mobile Strike Force Command in-country. Eighty percent of these teams have received formal Political Warfare schooling at ARVN and CIDG training centers or at the C Detachment level. As an advisor to these teams, the CA/PO officer has been able to diversify his efforts. Troop motivation is now jointly supervised and supplied by the USASF and VNSF and implemented by the POLWAR Team. Lectures and rallies are conducted to ensure that Camp Strike Force soldiers are informed about current national and local developments. The primary guidance for these gatherings is provided by Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), Vietnam Information Service (VIS), GVN and VNSF directives and regulations. VIS films are shown whenever available. Camp celebrations held in conjunction with successful operations or outstanding achievements are authorized once a month, and provide tangible proof of GVN’s recognition of a job well done. Establishment and upkeep of bulletin boards, and distribution of signs, posters, magazines and newspapers are other functions of the POLWAR Team. One magazine directed expressly toward, and of particular interest to, the CIDG soldier is the "Directions" magazine sponsored by the Group S5 and VNSF High Command. Fifteen thousand copies are printed monthly and distributed to every detachment with stories which illustrate the CIDG soldier’s role in the overall CIDG program. Large
quantities of gifts were distributed to all detachments for the celebration of Christmas, Tet and the Children's Festival. Housing for dependents of the CIDG has proved to be an excellent morale builder with the CIDG troops, both in reducing the AWOL rate and in boosting the rate of enlistment. The primary responsibility for the construction of dependent housing has been delegated to the Staff Engineer with the Group S5. Insuring the progress and monitoring the progress of the program, with special emphasis to its effect on CIDG morale. A country-wide priority has been established for dependent housing construction and is up-dated periodically to maintain its validity.

c. Another step in the motivation and indoctrination program was the creation of a coordinated country-wide CIDG Soldier of the Month program. Under this program, the CIDG soldiers selected from their companies compete at the A, B and C Detachment levels from all four CTZs, and will culminate in the annual selection of the "Outstanding CIDG Soldier" of the command. Prizes awarded the CIDG as he continues to the various levels of competition include a cigarette lighter, an engraved bracelet, a wrist watch, a radio, and at the national or command level, a trip to Saigon to participate in National Day celebrations. The traditional motivation and indoctrination programs, now incorporated in this broad program, have continued to expand. Comparing the first 6 months of 1968 with the last 6 months, rallies and lectures held increased 36%, movies shown increased 27%, cultural drama team performances 47% and publications distributed 19%.

d. One major problem in the training of POLWAR Teams was the reluctance of GVN to train Montagnard personnel at the POLWAR academies. Difficulty was experienced by S5s at all levels in enrolling Montagnards in these schools. This problem was finally resolved when Company B's S5 organized a POLWAR Training School at C2 in Phu k. A POLWAR oriented toward the Montagnard personality and written in their dialects has been prepared and the Montagnard POLWAR Team members are now being trained.

e. Another major innovation in the POLWAR program was a revitalization of the PSYOPS program. The S5 receives daily distribution of intelligence summaries and situation reports, and field units are queried immediately when opportunities for PSYOPS exploitation are spotted. This process stimulated the efforts of C, B and A Detachments, greatly increased the speed of PSYOPS exploitation and substantially expanded the number of PSYOPS opportunities which were actually exploited.

f. A major improvement in the Group Psychological Operations capability was accomplished in the increased speed of leaflet dissemination. Through close coordination with the 4th PSYOPS Group and its direct support PSYOPS Battalions in each CTZ, the time required to react to intelligence and disseminate a standard leaflet was cut from a period of days to two hours. The development and dissemination of specific quick-reaction leaflets was cut to 24 hours. An example of the success of this increased emphasis on immediate exploitation and quick-reaction time is that 72 Ho Chi Minh leaflets were from quick reaction exploitation.
The POLWAR program was further enhanced by the inclusion of formal provisions for PSYOPS support for all combat operations. A PSYOPS EEL Annex was added to the 5th SFGA Collection Plan and a POLWAR Annex is required for all operation orders. The increased sophistication of POLWAR incorporation in combat operations was demonstrated by the significant PSYOPS success during the Mai Coto operation in IV CTZ which resulted in 20 Hoi Chahns rallying from a stronghold held by the VC for more than 20 years. One of the Hoi Chahns had lived on, and operated from, the cave complex found in the mountain for over ten years. The PSYOPS campaign during this operation included continuous leaflet/loudspeaker overflights, the employment of multiple loudspeaker teams with the Mike Force maneuver elements and highly successful motivation and indoctrination measures directed toward maintaining the high morale of the CIDG assault troops.

A comparison of PSYOPS activities for the first and last halves of calendar year 1968 reflect the command emphasis that has been placed in this area. Air disseminated leaflets increased from 11,60 million to 153,0 million or 38%. Ground disseminated leaflets increased from 4.8 million to 8.0 million or 67%. Air loudspeaker broadcast hours increased 53% from 500 to 3,150 with ground loudspeaker hours up 55% from 3,185 to 5,110. The net effect of this increased PSYOPS output was a rise in Hoi Chahns from 343 to 855 or 149%.

Civic Action programs were aimed at improving the well-being of the civilian population and winning their loyalty to the GVN. The Group policy was that CA activity would no longer be conducted in built-up areas, but stressed the areas at the A Detachment level. Again comparing the first and second halves of the calendar year 1968, construction and repairs of schools, market places, hospitals, dispensaries, bridges, etc., increased from 1,931 to 3,955 or 105%. The assistance to institutions such as schools and orphanages, a vital aspect of the long term nation-building effort, increased from an average of 100 institutions assisted to 229 per month or 129%. The amount of refugees supported per month increased from 29,496 to 48,525 or 65%; however, by March 1969 this number had decreased to 16,300 as the Group attempted to turn over the care of refugees to the civilian and GVN agencies who have this function as their primary mission. The number of nurse's aides trained rose 8% from 621 to 668. The number of other occupational students trained increased 95%. The number of health and school kits distributed increased 5.

A Civic Action/PSYOPS course for replacement personnel slotted for 85 positions for now being conducted at Group level and has taught over 100 officers and men this past year. This course consists of 24 hours of instruction on Motivation and Indoctrination, Civic Action Project Planning, PSYOPS Intelligence, PSYOPS Development and Counterpart Relations. To provide personal input to the 5th SFGA for Civic Action/Psychological Operations Officers, it has been policy to send Special Forces qualified officers to either the PSYOPS Course at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, or to the Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, Georgia. To a large degree, this training was not readily applicable to the POLWAR concept as practiced by the GVN and the VNSF. The PSYOPS department at the Special Warfare School is in the
The Group Commander recommended to the Department Director that SF officers to be trained as Civic Action/Psychological Operations Officers should be assigned to this course prior to an RVN tour. A letter was concurrently submitted to the Department of the Army notifying them of the above situation and requesting their assistance in this matter. This will not only give the incoming Special Forces CA/PO Officer more specialized and area-oriented training, but also provide a basic language capability from the POI of the new "POIWAR Advisor's Course".

1. The S5 Section has played a key role in the process of converting CIDG camps to Regional Force camps under MACV Advisors. Camp conversion checklists were developed, lesson plans on all aspects of Regional Forces were written in English and Vietnamese and these lessons presented to the CIDG along with motivation classes to encourage them to convert to RF status. Constant liaison with concerned MACV staff sections has been made to solve any problem and effect a smooth transition. Camps at Tay, Cung Son and Tan Rei have been converted and all of the CIDG physically present and qualified at these three camps converted to Regional Force status when the camps changed over. When ARVN and MACV personnel arrive on site prior to conversion to begin recruiting, the CIDG will have been fully briefed on RF rank, pay and allowances, and benefits and motivation lectures will have been held. This procedure of gradual education on RF service worked extremely well in the first three conversions and should prove successful again in June.

2. (CNF) COMMAND AND CONTROL OF INDIGENOUS FORCES: Doctrines on counter-insurgency operations (and unconventional warfare) advance the proposition that indigenous troops must be led by personnel of like ethnic origin. Where adequately trained leaders exist, this may be valid. However, where leaders are not available in adequate number, the advisor must become the commander.

4. While the "name of the game" is to get the VNSF and CIDG to fight this way, it must be recognized that the control and operation of the camps exclusively by USASF could improve operational effectiveness and the kill rate by 25%, and this is a conservative estimate. This concept of leadership by "advisors" has been demonstrated successfully in South Vietnam at all CIDG echelons from a reconnaissance team to a brigade size force, such as the Mobile Strike Force Commands which contain three to five infantry battalions. In Project Delta (B-52) the joint Special Forces long range recon force, the US/SVN reconnaissance teams are led by US personnel, while the Detachment B-52 Commander (USASF) actually commands the Delta force with US personnel performing the primary staff functions. In the Mobile Strike Force Commands, USASF NCOs command companies and USASF Captains command the battalions with exceptional results in most instances. The USASF sergeants live with and work with their companies, know the indigenous soldiers and have earned their respect and loyalty. Therefore, they lead and the indigenous troops willingly follow with little problem.
d. With proper leadership at the top, the potential indigenous leaders (VNSF) should participate, observe examples set by the US in operations and learn to accept the responsibilities of command. Then, when he becomes sufficiently proficient, the VNSF officer or NCO would assume command of the unit, with the USASF reverting to the status of advisor.

c. Unfortunately, USASF leading by example often is not enough. The chart (Inclusion 4) indicates greater USASF participation in combat operations as compared to VNSF. A noticeable change is taking place. One excuse given by some of the VNSF in this taking place is that our personnel are fresh and vigorous since they serve a one year tour. Their people are tired and cautious after fighting the war for many years. The result of this outlook has been a larger number of USASF casualties than VNSF which is attributable to: (1) USASF aggressiveness and leadership in contact with the enemy; (2) the fact that the USASF stand out and are better targets in relation to the smaller VNSF; and (3) the USASF are usually operating or controlling the radio for artillery and air strike adjustment and are a natural focal point for enemy marksmen.

d. The lesson learned from CIDG operations is quite clear. In future Vietnamese and SWITCHBACK programs, the USASF must initially command the operations with indigenous SF advice, assistance and liaison. As the indigenous prove themselves to be capable, then they should assume command and control positions. After they assume command, if incompetence or lack of integrity occurs, the US Special Forces Commander should have the authority to remove the incompetent indigenous SF elements.

19. (CONFIDENTIAL) COMPETENCE OF THE VNSF: Included as Inclosure 5 is a synopsis of a study regarding the growing professional competence of the VNSF. Considering the lack of highly qualified officers supplied the VNSF from ARVN, progress is being made by the long term development and training of Aspirants and 2d lieutenants that have come into the VNSF program over the past four years. Competent and experienced commanders have emerged, but little action is taken to remove the incompetents who are Captains and Majors today. This is due to the reluctance of the Commanding General, VNSF High Command, to admit to JGS that he cannot train or lead the officers. As a result he has pursued a program of "re-test and re-education" despite the fact that at least twenty of his officers have basic character deficiencies, particularly of courage and integrity and continue to be substandard officers after being transferred from one camp to another. For VNSF camps where USASF have been withdrawn, the commanders and the VNSF A Teams have been carefully selected and are doing a competent job. These particular camps, however, are chosen for transfer to VNSF control based on past performance of the camp and its leaders. Camps are transferred when the VNSF exhibit the ability to positively lead and control the camp in the absence of USASF. This comprehensive study, evaluating the VNSF and the progress they made in the past years, resulted in the finding that there had been improvement. The ratio of the VNSF to USASF casualties continued to increase indicating that the VNSF are bearing a greater portion of the burden of fighting. The VNSF to USASF ratio of leading camp operations has improved, pointing to a growing aggressiveness on their part.
part to find and fight the enemy. Much improvement is still needed, however, since USASF still suffer higher casualties and lead more operations. The VNSF intelligence effort has also made progress. No longer is there an absolute faith in secret agents, but other intelligence indicators, such as Order of Battle and aerial photography, are employed. The fact that more camps were transferred to sole VNSF control this year than in all the years before signifies improvement although the total number of seven is still small. We are presently considering the transfer of more camps to VNSF control which should come about this year. It should be noted that most camps in II CTZ have substantial numbers of troops from Vietnamese minority groups such as the Montagnards. Country-wide, a large percentage of CIDG troops are of minority group origin. The VNSF definitely improved in their overall staff procedures, although emphasis is still needed in the areas of logistics and funds management. Many of the problems in these areas stem from poor practices on the part of the USASF in the past. The VNSF are still weak in their ability to train themselves and the CIDG. The CIDG soldier, properly trained, is a good fighter. The training in the camps, because of VNSF lethargy, is perfunctory and little attention is given to this by the VNSF High Command which is content to embellish and use its training center for the VNSF at Dong Ba Thin.

20. (CNF) GRAFT AND CORRUPTION:

a. For the first time since the 5th SFGA entered the Republic of Vietnam a positive and objective program against graft and corruption has been established. This program is aimed at eliminating the problem of graft and corruption in the VNSF and, to a limited extent, in the USASF. Since the end of March 1969, we have had a Military Police Captain assigned as Chief of this section which was previously handled by the S2 Collection and Counterintelligence sections. He works under the S2 and should, in the near future, be provided several enlisted personnel, preferably with MP or CID background, to aid him in the accomplishment of his mission.

b. The Graft and Corruption (G&C) Section compiles and maintains all correspondence involving graft and corruption and related aspects. Command emphasis placed in this area has resulted in numerous allegations which are under investigation.

c. There has been, over the past several months, a great deal of evidence compiled on the misuse of funds, e.g., the VNSF "padding" of payrolls by allegedly reporting more personnel than are actually assigned. A reported method of "padding" the payroll is using the local villagers as fictitious CIDG by giving them uniforms and weapons and slipping them into camp a few days before payday. Another method allegedly used to obtain money fraudulently is to claim death gratuities on a person not deceased. The camp commander then takes back a percentage of the money paid.

d. An attitude of some USASF that "corruption is part of the Vietnamese way of life" led to loose accounting procedures and a tendency to overlook
instances of corruption. A considerable tightening of accounting and auditing procedures, as well as exposure of illegal conduct led initially to a worsening in USASF/VNSF relations; however, a firm hard line has paid off. Not only has the American taxpayer been saved money, but a campaign has ostensibly been started by the VNSF against corruption. I attribute this to the pressure of the MACV/JGS IG investigation of the problem. POLWAR teams at the various detachments have held motivation classes and discussions on this problem and its evils. Advisory relations after the initial set-back have returned to a more normal level. Here too, though, pressure is needed from the highest Vietnamese military authorities in order to eliminate corruption and establish honesty within the military.

21. (C) PLANS AND ORGANIZATION:

a. Subordinate units in coordination with their Vietnamese counterparts submitted input for the Special Forces CY 1969 Concept of Operations. Based upon this, 5th SFGA finalized and submitted to COMUSMACV its concept of employment which was ultimately incorporated into the MACV/JGS CY 1969 Combined Campaign Plan (AB-144) as Annex K. Major areas of emphasis were the movement of camps to the border areas of South Vietnam, closure, conversion to RF or relocations of interior camps; and the transfer of selected camps to VNSF control. General plans for CY 1969 call for the following:

1. Opening of seven new camps in the border areas.
3. Closure or conversion to RF status of nine existing camps.
4. Transfer of three camps to VNSF control.

b. During the period 1 July through 31 December 1968, 5th SFGA pursued goals under the Review and Analysis System for RVNAF Progress to have a minimum of one transferred camp in each CTZ as a training vehicle for the VNSF.

1. Camp Kinh Quan II, IV CTZ, was transferred to the VNSF on 15 November 1968, giving them two camps in IV CTZ and five camps country-wide.

2. Evaluation of this program indicates this is an extremely valuable means of improving the quality and training of the VNSF, not only at the A Detachment level, but also at B and C Detachment levels through experience gained in supporting the transferred A Detachment. Improvement in the quality of VNSF leadership will be evidenced as they assume control of more camps.

3. CY 1969 goals included the transfer of Camps Gia Vuc, I CTZ, and Plateau Gi in II CTZ. These transfers occurred in January 1969 giving I CTZ its first VNSF camp. This marked the achievement of the goal of a minimum of one VNSF camp in each CTZ. The 5th SFGA now supports seven VNSF camps country-wide.

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The areas of administration, logistics, supply economy and honest funds management will continue to be problem areas in camp transfers. Emphasis in these areas has resulted in improvement in the pre-transfer training given the VNSF.

A total of eight new CSF TOEs were published on 30 September 1968 and distributed to the field. The TOEs authorized the modern family of weapons, i.e., the M-16, M-79 and M-60 and introduced two new units: the 81mm and 4.2 inch mortar sections.

The 5th SFSG completed a manpower survey on 8 October 1968. This survey was directed toward identifying manpower resources within 5th SFSG that could be more efficiently utilized. As a result of this study, a MTOE concept letter was submitted to USARV on 11 November 1968 which re-organized 5th SFSG and provided a reduction of 100 Special Forces spaces. Due to increased emphasis on Phasedown planning and the projected phasedown of the CIDG program, the concept letter and all actions on it were suspended at the request of this headquarters.

By mid-November 1968, it was evident that a phasedown of the CIDG force levels would be forthcoming. MACV and 5th SFSG developed a plan for reductions to occur during a six to nine month time frame. This planning continued until 23 February 1969 when a joint conference was held with the Vietnamese Joint General Staff in Saigon. A bilateral plan was agreed upon on 26 February 1969. Implementation date for the plan is 1 July 1969.

As a result of the CIDG strength reduction a drawdown on USASF personnel is imminent. It is anticipated that the Group strength will be reduced from 2,262 to 2,275. The CIDG strength will be reduced by approximately 45 percent; however, due to the administrative and logistical burden and the requirement to maintain special projects and operations, the reduction of USASF personnel is not of the magnitude of CIDG reductions. In conjunction with the phasedown, an MTOE change is required. This MTOE action will not only reduce the total strength of the Group, but will place Group under the Golf series TOEs and encompass those elements now augmented to Group by TDAs.

In preparation for conversions programmed under AB-144 and Phasedown, and to assure the orderly transition to RF status, a CIDG Conversion Procedure Checklist/Guide was produced and distributed to potential conversion camps and their immediate headquarters. This guide has proven invaluable to USASF and VNSF detachment commanders at all echelons in implementing conversions to date.

The objective of all US efforts in RVN has been preparation of the Vietnamese to accept the responsibilities of defending themselves. Conversion of CIDG camps to Regional Force (RF) camps and transfer of certain other camps to full VNSF control are the principal objectives of the USASF efforts in the Republic. During the past year more CIDG camps have been converted to RF, and as many camps transferred to VNSF control, than in the previous seven years. Since
1 June 1969, six camps have been converted to RF control. An additional three camps are scheduled to be converted to RF status before the end of FY69. Not only have the conversions been effected more rapidly, but they also have been accomplished with greater efficiency.

23. (U) CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL EMPLOYEES: The depletion of Special Forces personnel assets worldwide to support 5th SFGR has been a major concern of mine in the past year. Through the use of Vietnamese civilians and Third Country Nationals, 5th SFGR is able to maintain its base level support within an acceptable balance using non-USASF personnel. There are 3,115 Vietnamese and 214 Filipino civilian personnel employed in support of the country-wide mission. To give but two examples of monetary savings from the hiring of civilians, consider the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monthly Pay and Allowances</th>
<th>Savings to US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E4 (US)</td>
<td>$396.10</td>
<td>$286.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VGS-5 (SVN)</td>
<td>$110.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5 (US)</td>
<td>$492.10</td>
<td>$377.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VGS-6 (SVN)</td>
<td>$115.00</td>
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</table>

NOTE: Above comparisons are between relatively equal ranks.

The savings from the hiring of Filipinos is not as great, but there is still a definite savings realized. Vietnamese employees perform primarily labor and clerical type jobs, while the Filipinos are primarily technicians in the maintenance field. Filipinos provide maintenance support down to and including B Detachments. The Filipinos' skills have enabled 5th SFGR to establish and maintain a maintenance program at a considerably higher level than most military units in Vietnam.

24. (U) ENGINEER SUPPORT: Prior to the start of FY69, a relaxed construction policy was in effect. Under this policy, construction standards varied greatly from camp to camp and often depended on the proximity of a material source. The locations of facilities were normally planned to alleviate immediate needs with little thought to future expansion. As a result, considerable money and effort had been expended and in many cases, inadequate, overcrowded facilities resulted with little or no room for expansion. In FY69 a new policy was initiated which placed strict controls on all construction at the Group level. All construction had to be reviewed by the Staff Engineer and approved by the Group Commander. Money previously was allocated to the camp for construction; however, there was no way to determine the expenditures on any particular project, often resulting in over-expenditure of funds and incomplete structures. The Staff Engineer set up a reference system such that each new construction project was given a Cost Accounting Code (CAC) 906 project number. Adoption of this system by the Comptroller provided an accurate picture of expenditures on any single project and thus minimized the waste or misuse of funds. The switch from broad, general construction
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directives to the specific approval for each structure resulted in "paper type" construction in many cases. The camps would obtain construction approval on many projects, but would not actually finish them. Emphasis by the Staff Engineer was placed on actual versus theoretical construction. This resulted in the culmination and subsequent termination of many projects. Continued emphasis on construction accomplishment as opposed to construction approvals will minimize such "paper type" construction projects in the future.

25. (C) SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS:

a. Effectiveness of Signal Communications Advice, Training and Operations. Communications advice is well accepted due to the generally lower technical knowledge of VNSF communications personnel. Such limited technical knowledge is particularly evident in the lower ranks at the A and B Detachment levels. VNSF Corps Signal Officers and Communications Chiefs have exhibited a surprisingly keen insight into all aspects of Special Forces communications and are extremely receptive to technical advice and guidance. Most Vietnamese realize that the radio is that all-important link from the ground to TAC air and artillery. The inadequacy of communications training on new equipment and communications concepts in general is one of the problems areas in camp transfers. It is imperative that subordinate commanders insure that VNSF radio operators are thoroughly familiar with all aspects of Special Forces communications techniques and equipment operation prior to the actual transfer of the camp to VNSF and the withdrawal of USASF personnel.

b. Secure Voice Program. The command emphasis placed on security of transmissions at the lowest level initiated an active program to provide secure FM voice to the operational detachments. The installation of the KY-8 and KY-38 systems provide an integrated bilateral capability to deny intelligence to the enemy. All detachments in III Corps, 50% of the detachments in II Corps, 76% of the detachments in III Corps and 40% of the detachments in IV Corps have this operational capability for an overall 68% capability. One hundred percent deployment of this secure capability is pending receipt of X-mode cables and adaptor cards.

c. Handbook Publication. The absence of specific guidance of communications standards found at the A Detachment level prompted the publication of a one hundred page Communications Handbook for all Special Forces radio operators. For the first time in the history of the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam, the isolated and widely dispersed operational A Detachment camps were provided with a complete technical guide for perfecting the ideal configuration for communications support. This publication provided the basis for a forty hour communications course for all incoming operators, provided experience factors collected from over four years of lessons learned, established specific goals with detailed check lists, and served as a single source for all communications data necessary for maximum combat efficiency. The degree of achievement has been affirmed by the Group Combat Readiness Team that uses this document as a teaching vehicle to improve the standards within each A Detachment.
26. (U) MEDICAL PROGRAM. At all levels the medical mission of this command is to train our counterparts in sound, competent medical practices and at the same time treat patients. This is accomplished through direct and indirect advisory efforts and OJT programs. Regularly, at the CIDG hospital, and sporadically at the B and A Detachments, didactic teaching methods are utilized.

a. The effectiveness of US military support is excellent at the present time. Our main need is to insure that we eventually convert the system to the ARVN and insure that their system is both complete and competent.

b. Inadequacies regarding training and equipment are as follows:

(1). Training. Many of the medical officers, both VNSF and ARVN, are poorly trained. Often they are poorly motivated towards the treatment of our main troop source, the Montagnard. The ARVN Surgeon General is aware of this situation, as is the VNSF High Command Surgeon. With the reopening of the medical school in Hue and the expansion of the medical training program in Saigon, more well-trained doctors will be available for service. Realizing the importance of the CIDG program, both the ARVN Surgeon General and the VNSF High Command Surgeon will endeavor to fill the VNSF medical section with competent personnel.

(2). Equipment. All equipment used in the treatment of the CIDG comes from USASF supply channels and is therefore adequate. VNSF equipment is scarcely used and frequently in short supply. This is due to improper requisitioning procedures and the apparent inadequacy of the ARVN Medical Supply (VAMSEL) system. Since VNSF medical supplies cannot be used for CIDG, there is, of course, little justification for the requisitioning of such supplies.

c. MEDCAPs.

(1). Medical Civic Action by the VNSF is carried out as a MEDCAP I activity. MEDCAP I activities are medical Civic Action programs initiated by the VNSF using ARVN medical supplies with advisory support from USASF medical personnel. Accurate numbers of missions are not available; however, the totals are quite small and the actual impact of this program is negligible at the present time.

(2). MEDCAP II programs are carried out by USASF medical personnel using USASF medical supplies. An average of 200 missions a month since June has been conducted with an average of 45,185 patients receiving treatment monthly. The impact of this program is two-fold. Foremost is the initial high impact "rapport establishment" phase which can be used for immediate and long range intelligence collection systems as well as support of imminent Special Forces combat operations. Secondly are the long term benefits of this program which include:

(a) Training for VNSF and CIDG medics.
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(b) Training for village and rural health workers.

(c) The establishment of a sound, ongoing base of medical competence in the villages and hamlets which are visited on a regular basis.

These medical civic action missions can be, and frequently are, used to disseminate propaganda materials in support of the national government, as well as the provincial and local governments. The USASF MEDCAP II effort is a program well worth the time, money, men and material expended.

d. Degree of Involvement. Basically, the mission of the medical section of the 5th SFGA is two-fold. First, our medics maintain the fighting strength of our own USASF personnel. Secondly, they advise and support the VNSF in maintaining the fighting strength of the CIDGs and VNSF personnel within their areas of responsibility. In actuality, when both VNSF and USASF medics are available, the CIDGs are usually treated by the USASF medics. ARVN regulations preclude the use of any ARVN medical supplies for CIDG; therefore, all medical supplies used for CIDG come from USASF supply channels. An active treatment and training program is conducted in association with the Special Forces company CIDG hospitals located in all four CTZs. Both USASF and VNSF eventually assume complete operational control of the CIDG hospital program and use the ARVN VANSEL medical supply system for their direct support.

e. The VNSF has a High Command Surgeon and Company Surgeons similar to the USASF structure. The High Command Surgeon is directly responsible to the CG VNSF-HC, for the health of the command. Furthermore, he is responsible to BG Xuan, the ARVN Surgeon General, and reports to him in person each month to discuss VNSF medical activities and requirements. This close association with General Xuan will eventually be the key to the assumption of complete responsibility by VNSF of the CIDG hospital program. When CIDG hospitals become the responsibility of ARVN, General Xuan will likely delegate the operational control of these hospitals to the VNSF Surgeon and his staff with supply support coming from the ARVN VANSEL system.

2. (C) NHA TRANG INSTALLATION DEFENSE COMMAND (NTIDC).

a. The Nha Trang Installation Defense Command was formed in accordance with IFFV Regalation No. 10-4, and is divided into eight vital sectors of responsibility; two of which are under US control, five under Vietnamese control, and one under joint US and RVN control. The mission of the NTIDC is to maintain an intelligence, operations and fire control element which plans, coordinates and controls all defensive operations, to include ground, air, naval and artillery fires within an 11,000 meter radius of the city. Also, NTIDC maintains a vital communications link with all forces contributing to the defense of the installation, as well as other essential elements such as Province, District and Sector Headquarters.

b. Major General Quang, CG VNSF-HC, is the overall commander for Nha Trang's defense. IFFV has designated the CO 5th SFGA, as the Nha
Trang US Installation Defense Coordinator. Within the IDC bunker, Vietnamese, Korean and US representatives work in mutual cooperation to accomplish the NTIDC mission. Each nation makes its own unique contribution as well as pooling information into a coordinated intelligence collection effort. NTIDC is the central pool for collecting, evaluating, processing and disseminating intelligence reports for the defense of Nha Trang.

The success of the NTIDC is without question, for the city of Nha Trang has yet to experience a rocket attack, and it has been more than a year since VC/NVA launched an attack on the city. There are many reasons for this; however, not the least of these is the present organization of NTIDC and the rapport that has been established between all units in the city and between the three nations represented.

28. (CONFIDENTIAL) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Areas of Interest Requiring Major or Continued Emphasis.

(1) Command of CIDG. The CIDG program consists of raising and maintaining a small army. It has many of the problems found in maintaining either the United States or the Chinese Nationalist Army. The scope of the problems, while not as great, require the same techniques for solution as problems of a large army. The solutions in SVN will have variations from the US because of the cultural and ethnic background of the members of the CIDG force. The present Commanding General of the VNSF High Command has had experience leading large formations (regiment and division) and operating with conventional ARVN forces in combat. Despite this experience, he has the competence that would be equivalent to a senior-Major in our army. He lacks the ability to command and manage a force of this size. He is unable, for example, to provide a roster of the forces and an accurate strength of the force. Systematically, he is unable to recruit personnel for the force, channel the recruits into training establishments, and to provide for their continued progression and development. His chain of command structure is overly centralized and he permits little authority to be delegated to his subordinate commanders. He enjoys, reportedly, the favors of the Chief, JGS, and the President, a former comrade. While in this job, he must be pushed and guided. After four years in his present position, I hope he will be replaced by his present Deputy.

(2) Graft and Corruption. There has been established a positive and objective program against graft and corruption. Command emphasis on this problem has resulted in numerous allegations which are under investigation. This emphasis should continue and continued coordination with MACV IG should take place.

(3) Employment of Camp Strike Forces. CSF combat operations in many cases are not in reaction to intelligence. Planned operations should utilize all the assets available to exploit an area of hard intelligence, i.e., a report is received either from organic units, FWAF, intelligence agents, SLAR report, etc., of enemy activity in a particular area. Elements of the Combat Reconnaissance Platoon could be inserted into the area while a reaction force is on standby at camp to react if needed. This will

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require an air asset, and, with the number of FWMAF operating within or adjacent to the detachment’s TAOR, this can usually be procured. CSF company, platoon and squad size operations in the past have conducted search and clear operations or chance contacts and moved through the AO in file formation. This does not thoroughly sweep an area. The use of appropriate formations and common sense tactics could result in more contacts and better area pacification. A recent example of sound tactics is a company operation from BU PRANG, A-236, in I1 CTZ, making contact with an estimated NVA battalion on 19 April 1969. The CSF company broke contact and withdrew to an area of defense. The company then directed airstrikes against the enemy causing them to break contact and withdraw. Another CSF company from BU PRANG was inserted into the area, then both companies conducted a sweep of the area and pursued the enemy. This operation resulted in 27 NVA killed, a small amount of weapons captured, as opposed to two CSF killed and three wounded. These aspects of CSF tactical employment should continue to be stressed to subordinate detachments.

(4) Detachment TAOR Boundaries. The enemy’s knowledge of the TAORs of CIDG camps, through observation of CIDG operational areas, allows him to avoid contact with friendly forces. If TAOR boundaries were changed from time to time or operations were conducted outside of the TAOR, this would tend to confuse the enemy and increase contacts. Examples of successful contacts outside of TAORs abound throughout the country. In order to change the TAOR boundaries, a request is submitted to the OPCON HQ. In turn, province and Corps officials are consulted prior to the request being granted. Continued emphasis should be placed on subordinate detachments to adjust TAORs periodically and conduct operations outside of TAOR boundaries when feasible.

(5) Use of Bilateral Chain of Command. The USASF A Detachments are given guidance through US channels to accomplish certain missions that are beyond their immediate control, since they are not in command of the camp or the CSF personnel. These requirements include repairing runways, improving construction, coordinating combat operations and various other details. The work load placed upon the A Detachments for MOPSUMs, communication checks, planning and accompanying combat operations, training, etc., requires the full cooperation of VNSF counterparts. If the guidance sent to the detachment is not paralleled through VNSF channels, the assistance required from the VNSF Camp Commander is seldom rendered. Commanders and staff officers should coordinate with their counterparts prior to issuing instructions, orders or giving guidance to insure that the same message is being disseminated through VNSF channels. Bilateral dissemination of information will often insure compliance and cooperation at the execution level.

(6) CSF Operational Efficiency. Each CIDG camp is rated on a daily basis as to its operational efficiency, which is computed by dividing the total number of personnel on combat operations by the present for duty (PDY) strength of the camp. The 5th SFGA goal is to have at least 50% of PDY strength on combat operations at all times. Local security missions,
training, administrative camp details and camp hardening requirements account
for the remaining 50%. Monthly averages for operational efficiencies by
Special Forces company and Corps Tactical Zone are as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co C, I CTZ</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B, II CTZ</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co A, III CTZ</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, IV CTZ</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF (Country-wide)</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The operational efficiency is presently being altered to depict total present
for duty personnel on combat offensive operations overnight. This will allevi- 
viate duplication of reports and false or incorrect reporting. This also will 
encourage detachments to conduct more overnight operations. This policy 
has resulted in increased enemy KIA and should be continued. This is a mat-
ter that demands continual command emphasis, because it seems that everyone 
has "good reasons" to justify them not having to comply with this policy.

(7) Transfer of CIDG Camps to VNSF Control. The VNSF have a training 
school for their A Detachment Camp Commanders, the Camp Commanders Course 
(CCC). Thus far 102 have graduated from this course since it was estab-
lished in October 1968. In spite of this, the VNSF still control, without 
the assistance of USASF, only seven camps. Due to the impending phasedown 
and possible future strength reductions, it will become increasingly impor-
tant for camps to be transferred to VNSF control. As VNSF camp commanders 
and teams become proficient in camp management and capable of performing 
their mission without USASF A Detachment assistance, these camps should 
be transferred to VNSF control. This should be done on an individual camp 
basis rather than as a mass transfer basis. A camp should not be trans-
ferred before the camp commander and his team are completely capable of 
handling the situation without USASF A Detachment assistance.

(8) VNSF Logistical System. Conversions and transfers of Civilian 
Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps have pointed out the weaknesses of 
the Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) in the logistics field. In the past, 
the USASF had done little to assist or train personnel in this field. 
Maintenance has been performed by Filipino technicians. Supply of the 
CIDG has been the responsibility of the USASF. This has resulted in the 
VNSF remaining relatively dormant in the logistical field. In addition, 
due to the availability of the more responsive supply system which supports 
the CIDG, the VNSF have cajoled their USASF counterparts into supplying 
their needs as well. All of this resulted in the failure of the Vietnamese 
logistical system to adequately support the VNSF. Since I directed that 
the unauthorized practice of supporting the VNSF would cease, the VNSF have 
taken an increased interest in improving their logistical system. They have
began to pressure higher logistical installations to fill their requirements. They have taken steps to better educate their personnel in supply procedures. However, this latter effort is somewhat handicapped by shortages of personnel, especially at the A Detachment level. The policy prohibiting "scrounging" for the VNSF by USASF must continue. Now that the VNSF realize the necessity for accumulating demands, it is only a matter of time before their system can be fully functional. Support from USASF sources will not always be available and a solid logistical base must be established by the VNSF logisticians.

(9) Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Vietnamese Special Forces—National Training Center (VNSFNTC) Located at Dong Ba Thin. VNSF and CIDG advanced training at Dong Ba Thin has continued without a major organizational change during the reporting period. Programs of instruction and lesson plans have been revised and updated to reflect changing weapons and requirements. Lesson plans are currently being translated into English to determine needed updating and revision. The Camp Commanders Course (CCC) has continuous command emphasis by Detachment B-51 in order to insure that the course is conducted in an efficient manner. The major problem in the CCC is following the training schedule and having the VNSF instructors present on the platform at the prescribed time. On many occasions instructors from the VNSF HC and the VNSF C Detachments fail to show up for the classes they are to teach, thus the class is cancelled. The classes that are presented are presented well. The efficiency of the VNSF instructors does not carry over to instruction presented to the CIDG Leadership Course and the Combat Reconnaissance Platoon Course. In the case of both courses, too often classes scheduled for fifty minutes are presented in thirty minutes. This problem results from lack of interest on the part of the VNSF training center cadre that are in responsible positions to insure that instruction is presented well. At the present time, both courses are being brought to the immediate attention of the VNSF training committee chiefs. Training at Dong Ba Thin should be monitored very closely to ensure that all courses are taught in a professional manner and the CIDG courses are not relegated to courses of secondary emphasis.

(10) Combat Orientation Course (COC). COC is a twelve day course for all 5th SFGA replacement personnel except sergeants major and field grade officers, and is conducted by the MACV Recon School. The course became necessary due to the input of non-Special Forces qualified replacements from USARV as well as the increasing number of junior officers and NCOs without combat experience. Training is given in map reading, medical techniques, communications, combat intelligence, patrolling, weapons, FAC procedures, VC tactics, Project Sonja, evasion and escape, mines and booby traps, VC expedient booby traps, and the importance of VNSF/USASF counterpart relations. To support this course and keep it current, a system of individual training records, student critiques, and staff visits to deployed detachments was initiated. The course has been revised three times since its opening and revision will continue to be made as new requirements from the field are identified. This course should be continued and monitored to ensure updating as new ideas are introduced from the field.
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(11) MACV Recondo School. The MACV Recondo School's mission is training selected personnel from US and FWMAF units in the special techniques and skills necessary to conduct successful long range reconnaissance operations in SVN. Attendance at this school is on a voluntary basis. The selection of better students and an outstanding cadre coupled with professional instruction has resulted in a reduction of failures from 40% to 12.8% in the past eight months. Well qualified, professional instructors with field experience should continue to be assigned to MACV Recondo School and only qualified students be permitted to attend.

(12) Aviation Support. Command, liaison, light resupply, personnel transportation, and, to some extent, tactical operations have been hampered by the lack of sufficient light Army helicopter support. The 5th SFGA has no organic aviation support. A small amount of aviation support is allocated by MACV for daily use by the 5th SFGA, but this is insufficient. Helicopters for tactical operations are allocated by the OPCON Field Force or Corps depending on the mission and priorities set by that headquarters. Support varies greatly for CIDG operations from Corps to Corps and operation to operation. The MSFCs operate most effectively when supported by at least two helicopter gunships and four troop lift helicopters of the UH-1 series. 5th SFGA is provided two U-1A "Otters" daily. One is used as a courier to two of the four C Detachments daily and the other supports the Group staff, B-57s, B-55, B-52 B-51 and the MSFC. Each of these aircraft fly more than 125 productive hours monthly in support of the Group. While their support is invaluable, they are not suitable for transportation for the commander and other key personnel on long trips because of their slow speed, limited use in marginal weather and present full utilization on essential missions. There are four U-21s available for flights in support of IFFV daily. The use of one is limited to CO, IFFV. The remaining three are used to support twelve Generals, major unit commanders, and the IFFV principal staff. Scheduling priority is based on rank and the nature of the mission. Although IFFV does a commendable job of managing its limited U-21 assets to provide the maximum support to all users, the support available to the 5th SFGA is less than adequate. On occasion, U-21 support has not been available for the CO; more often, requested time schedules cannot be met. Confirmation of requested U-21 support is made between 1700 and 2000 hours the night before the flight, making it difficult to adjust plans should the requested support fail to be provided. While U-21 support has been requested and provided from MACV sources from time to time, MACV is not required to support 5th SFGA and cannot always do so. Because of the magnitude of the CIDG program in Vietnam and the wide dispersion of the units involved, rapid, dependable air transportation for the commander and staff is essential to the 5th SFGA advisory mission. The 5th SFGA must continue to advise MACV, USARV and OPCON Field Force/Corps Headquarters of the need for adequate aviation support.

(13) Tactical Airlift Support. The number of C-7As supporting 5th SFGA logistical operations has been reduced from eleven to eight. On occasion, there has been a backlog of supplies at Company C in Da Nang due to insufficient C-7A support. Company D in IV CTZ needs to supplement USAF airlift with CH-47 support since seven of its CIDG camps do not have airfields. IV
Corps provides this support only on a sortie by sortie basis. A similar situation sometimes exists in I CTZ. Most CIDG camps and runways were built with the idea that the C-7A would be the type aircraft most used for resupply. Should the USAF fail to replace the C-7A with an aircraft with equal short field capabilities or fail to maintain an adequate number of C-7As, a major construction effort will have to be initiated to lengthen Special Forces camp runways. MACV, USARV and the 834th Air Division must be kept informed of 5th SFGA tactical airlift requirements and continued emphasis placed on proper utilization of those assets currently available by 5th SFGA elements.

(14) POLWAR Teams. A small percentage of POLWAR Teams are still untrained, while other teams contain members lacking formal POLWAR training. On occasion, POLWAR Teams have been employed by the VNSF Camp Commander and the USAF Camp Advisor on work detail and other irrelevant activities. In some areas such as II and IV CTZ, POLWAR Teams have been unable to communicate with all ethnic and linguistic diversity existing in the camp's TAOR. This was not taken into account when selecting team members. The present "POLWAR Course" levels of instruction are geared too high, and the Vietnamese instructors have given insufficient consideration to the educational development and background of trainees from minority groups. Emphasis on training of new teams and encouraging implementation of refresher courses for trained teams, as is currently being done by some companies, is required to assure competence of POLWAR Teams. Proper employment of POLWAR Teams is a command responsibility and must be implemented through directives and command inspections. POLWAR Team members should present as much as possible a cross section of all major ethnic groups with whom the team comes in contact. Finally, careful evaluation should be made through interviews and records maintained of personnel educational background in teams already formed.

(15) Control and Maintenance of Airfields. The 5th SFGA has primary responsibility for the control and maintenance of forty-four airfields located at CIDG camps throughout RVN. Much progress has been made in recent months in this area although erosion and constant use make airfield maintenance and repair a continuing problem. Priority of construction and repair efforts should be given the repair of airfields to keep them operational at all times.

(16) Availability and Capabilities of M1F Personnel. With only 80% assigned of authorized, MOS M1F trained personnel are highly essential to the successful accomplishment of the 5th SFGA mission. MOS M1F personnel are qualified in both the operational and intelligence areas. This headquarters has contacted Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam regarding our shortfall in M1F requirements. Throughout 1968 and thus far in 1969, only 75 to 80 percent of our monthly requisitions in MOS M1F have been filled. Other units in USARV receive only 50% of their fill in MOS M1F. USARV has requested assistance from Department of the Army regarding the shortages of M1Fs in 5th SFGA. As a temporary measure, DA is applying I2B's who have completed a short intelligence course at Fort Holabird, Maryland, against the 5th SFGA M1F requisitions. The course of instruction does not fully qualify an individual for a position as Intel-
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Intelligence Sergeant on an A Detachment, but it does qualify him for an 11F assignment in a Command and Control Detachment. Assigning these personnel to the C&C Detachments releases more fully qualified 11F personnel for assignment to A Detachments. To be fully effective, an 11F should be thoroughly trained in Order of Battle, Counterintelligence, EW Interrogation, Collection, Aerial Surveillance and Intelligence Administration. At present, 11Fs are not this well trained. He must also make every effort to insure that his counterpart is equally knowledgeable and competent in all facets of intelligence. To insure that the proper training is available for Intelligence Sergeants (MOS 11F) programmed for assignment to 5th SFQA, this command has prepared a six-week Program of Instruction (POI) for incorporation into the current Intelligence Specialist Course for Special Forces personnel at the USAIS, Fort Holabird, Maryland. A copy of this POI has also been forwarded to the USA John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare. This POI covers all functional areas of intelligence, to include Order of Battle, Collection, Counterintelligence, Imagery Interpretation and Army Security Agency. In addition, classes on the Army Functional Files System, geography and government of the Republic of Vietnam, counterpart relations and basic Army intelligence regulations were included. The policy of assigning bonafide 11F personnel with S suffix to A Detachments and the retrained 12Bs to C&C Detachments should continue. In time, the programs as outlined above should provide well qualified 11Fs in sufficient number to sustain the quality and quantity of 11Fs 5th SFQA requires.

(17) Maximum Effective Use of Combat Reconnaissance Platoons (CRP). CRPs are the eyes and ears of the camp commander, and should be utilized to the maximum in the field of intelligence gathering and not as assault forces. To insure continued success of the CRPs, it is required that saturation patrolling be given continued emphasis. CRP operational efficiency and proper utilization should be of maximum command concern.

(18) Agent Evaluation Program. Every intelligence program which employs coded agents must affect a continual evaluation of all agents to identify and terminate or re-target unproductive ones. A monthly review of the agent’s activities and production is accomplished by the Military Intelligence Specialists at the B and C Detachments. The agent’s activities and evaluation, made by the A Detachment Intelligence Sergeant, is reviewed by these intelligence specialists and if a change is thought advisable, it is recommended. The military intelligence specialists at both the B and C Detachments must make frequent liaison visits to the A Detachments. It is essential that the intelligence specialists be as knowledgeable of the A Detachment’s operational area and their problems as the A Detachment Intelligence Sergeant. This continual evaluation of agents has a built-in cost effectiveness feature, for by identifying and terminating or re-targeting the unproductive agents, fruitless expenditures are eliminated. A request has been made to each company to organize an intelligence evaluation team. These teams will analyze the collection and counterintelligence goals, set for nets and coded agents, and determine if they are realistic. Numbers and quality of IIRs will be the determining factor for recommending retention, training or termination.
(19) Biographic Reporting. A Biographic Reporting Program to meet DIA and MACV requirements for the collection of background and personality data on foreign officers and intelligence personnel is necessary. In the past year command emphasis has been placed on this program. In addition, dossiers on all VNSF officers and NCOs are compiled and stored in the Collection Branch, S2 Section, 5th SFGA. These dossiers are of great help in preparing newly assigned personnel for assumption of their counterpart roles. This makes it possible for SF personnel to know their counterparts better, thus becoming more effective in their role as advisors.

(20) Polygraph. For the past year, the polygraph program has proven to be extremely valuable, not only in screening civilian employees, but also in direct support of combat operations. It provides the most timely method of verifying information from prisoners of war, ralliers, and detainees. Since October 1968, 1201 VC/VCI/NVA have been identified through polygraph examinations. HQ, 5th SFGA, and each company has a need for a polygraph operator. Thus, the Polygraph Branch should consist of 5 examiners, one administrative clerk and five interpreters. At least two of the five interpreters should be fluent in one or more Montagnard dialects and Cambodian. The supported company should be levied for one interpreter. This would allow the examiner and his interpreter to process an individual while at the same time the company interpreter would complete the pre-examination interview. Thus, the number of examinations per day could be doubled.

(21) Agent Communications (B-57). Unilateral intelligence collection activities have been greatly hampered by lack of a suitable clandestine radio transmitter/receiver. Various radios, such as the AN/PRC-25, AN/PRC-74, HT-1, DELO 5300 and 3200 models have been considered and tested. These have proven to be unsatisfactory for reasons of limited range, undesirable weight or size, excessive transmission skip zones or extremely high cost. What is needed is a relatively inexpensive radio with ranges of five to 50 kilometers and capable of being operated by indigenous personnel. Simplicity is a governing factor as the indigenous agents have poor educational backgrounds and often are illiterate. This headquarters has sent a letter to the Limited Warfare Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Aberdeen, Maryland, with an information copy to the Intelligence Material Development Office outlining the requirements of the type radio desired. These offices were requested to provide this command with such a radio.

(22) Maintenance at the A Detachment Level. Maintenance of every type of equipment at the A Detachment level is a constant problem. Primarily this is due to the lack of experienced operators and the lack of skilled maintenance personnel in the A Detachment. In addition, much of the equipment is operated by indigenous personnel who have no concept of the need to maintain equipment. This is compounded by the fact that the average A Detachment Commander is inexperienced in the requirement for a closely supervised maintenance program due to his short length of Army service. He is also preoccupied with operational matters, and the past group policy of "maintenance by replacement" which he has heard about is now passé. The Eastern Construction Company Incorporated (ECCI) Filipino technicians at the C and B Detachments can provide limited maintenance assistance, primarily of the 2d and 3d echelon levels. However, unless a vigorous, closely
supervised maintenance program is established and maintained at the A Detachment level, the problem will continue. The Logistical Support Center, in an effort to resolve a portion of this problem, has initiated classes on generator maintenance for all personnel who attend the Group's "Combat Orientation Course". This short class has proven effective as illustrated by the fact that problems with generators at the A Detachment level have been drastically reduced. Continued command emphasis must be placed on maintenance programs in the field detachments and the present generator maintenance class for incoming personnel should be continued.

(23) Vehicle Utilization. A survey of vehicle utilization in the Group revealed that an excessive number of vehicles were issued to the SFOB, and the A, B and C Detachments. This excessive number of vehicles, which were not utilized to their full capacity, was imposing excessive requirements on the existing Group maintenance facilities. The number of vehicles in operation was materially reduced, after consultation with each company and Group Headquarters Staff Section, without impairing operational efficiency. This resulted in two important savings of personnel and funds to the Group: (1) the vehicle maintenance requirement was reduced, and (2) the requirement for purchase of repair parts and vehicle replacement was reduced. The 5th SFGA must continue to review the requirement for vehicles by all subordinate units with the purpose of insuring that the only vehicles issued are those that are actually required.

(24) Third Country Support Through Use of Filipino Technicians. It was determined to be necessary that the 5th SFGA provide up to general support and limited rebuild maintenance capabilities in order to properly support the CIDG program. Special Forces personnel lacked the necessary skills to operate a maintenance facility of this size. The problem was solved by a contract with the Eastern Construction Company, Inc. (ECCI), Quezon City, Republic of the Philippines, to provide the necessary qualified personnel to man the 5th SFGA maintenance program. The purpose of the 216 authorized Filipinos is two-fold: to support the SFOD, C and B Detachment maintenance facilities, and to teach the indigenous personnel the skills and trades they need to support 5th SFGA maintenance activities. Skilled personnel were provided in the following areas: airboat repair, vehicle painting and body repair, all types of vehicle repair, all types of engine rebuilding, office equipment repair, air-conditioner and refrigeration repair, machine shop and welding and crew-served and individual weapons repair. 5th SFGA should continue the program of employing Filipino technicians through the ECCI. To provide the needed skills in our maintenance program, emphasis should be given the training of Vietnamese civilians to eventually replace the Filipino employees.

(25) C Detachment Funds Officers. The financial administration of CIDG funds at the C Detachment level is a full time job which encompasses payment of civilians and CIDG troops, the control and safeguarding of cash, purchases on the local market, negotiating contractual arrangements with local vendors, and supervising the administration of funds at the B and A Detachment levels. The duties and responsibilities of a C Detachment Funds Officer are complex and are not included in the curriculum of any
service school. Therefore, this is a formidable task, especially to an officer with no prior financial management experience. In addition, the Funds Officer is usually assigned so many other essential tasks that he rarely can find the time to properly supervise financial management and fund control. The 5th SFGA MTOE should be reviewed to include the requirement for four officers, whose basic branch is Finance, for assignment as Funds Officer at each C Detachment. C Detachment Funds Officers should be appointed as a primary or special staff officer at each C Detachment level. Duties associated with financial management constitute a full-time job and no other duties should be assigned. The efficient, continuous management of financial assets is a vital facet of the commander's mission.

(26) Medical Training. Intensive attempts are being made to draw the VNSF medical personnel into treatment of CIDG patients. This program unfortunately is proceeding slowly for several reasons: lack of medical competence by many of the VNSF doctors and medics; lack of desire on the part of Vietnamese to treat Montagnards, Nungs, Cambodians, etc.; and lack of trust on the part of the CIDG in the medical capability of the VNSF. We must continue to integrate VNSF doctors, nurses and medics into the treatment of CIDG. This increases their medical competence as well as their interest in the individual CIDG soldier. Training programs for VNSF nurses and medics have been instituted in all four CTZs. These programs are usually run in association with the company CIDG hospital and are conducted by both USASF and VNSF medical personnel. Because of their extensive training, USASF medics are the best in the world and often the responsibility they feel toward the patient hampers them in releasing the treatment of patients to those they feel are less competent than themselves. USASF medical personnel must remember that they are advisors to the VNSF. They cannot, however, neglect their responsibility to the patient for sound, competent medical care in the saving of life and limb.

(27) Prevention of Hepatitis. The group hepatitis rate continues to be among the highest in Vietnam. By nature of the areas of operations and our work with indigenous personnel, USASF personnel are constantly exposed to the hepatitis virus in the food and liquids they consume. To increase protection against the hepatitis virus all personnel within the command will take gamma globulin as prescribed by the component surgeon. Due to the unique mission of USASF personnel, their exposure to contagious disease is probably higher than any other unit in Vietnam. Although there have been many epidemics of diseases among indigenous personnel in areas where USASF have been operating, USASF casualties have been kept low by a strictly enforced immunization program.

(28) The New "Stabo Rig". The McGuire Rig was designed because of the need to extract personnel from the double and triple canopy jungle where the helicopter troop ladder or set down methods were impossible. It has been responsible for saving many lives in RVN; however, it does have a number of disadvantages. When mounting the rig, an individual must stand erect and therefore expose himself. He is not free to use his hands to fire his weapon or otherwise protect himself when being dragged through
the trees. He may be knocked out of the rig. Moreover, it is almost impossible to use the rig for the extraction of a seriously wounded person. A new extraction rig has been developed by 5th SFPA and is currently being tested by the MACV Recondo School (see Figures 1-3, Inclosure 6). Following is a description of the new extraction rig now called the "Stabo Rig": a harness was constructed from Type III nylon webbing that utilizes pull-down leg straps for body support and is worn similar to a parachute harness. Ammo pouches and other load bearing equipment are mounted on the harness which is worn by the individual. Before the arrival of the aircraft, the pull-down leg straps are passed between the legs and fastened to the "D" rings mounted on the front of the harness. During extraction a nylon rope tied with a double bowline is lowered from the aircraft. Snaplinks on the nylon rope are attached to floating "D" rings on the harness shoulder straps. The individual can be either in a prone or kneeling position during hook up. His hands are free at all times to use his weapon or radio. The time for extraction is greatly shortened. Wounded personnel can also be extracted by this method. If aircrew members were to be provided the basic harness, any helicopter would have the capability of effecting an extraction. An "Ensure" report was submitted to USARV in November 1958, which, in effect, presents the idea and the stages of development and testing. The 2d Log Command in Okinawa is presently producing 1,000 such rigs for further field testing and use by 5th SFPA. I believe the "Stabo Rig" is a giant step forward in jungle extraction and should be pursued vigorously.

(29) Utilization of Assault Helicopters to the Periphery of the TAOR.
Once a CIDG camp has been established and has conducted aggressive reconnaissance and combat operations in its assigned TAOR, the enemy moves his base areas, way stations and infiltration routes to the periphery or just outside the limits of the TAOR. CIDG operations conducted along the periphery of camp TAORs when deployed by assault helicopter, allowing the enemy a minimum of reaction time, have met with considerable success. Many cache sites, base areas and way stations have been found in this manner and CIDG units have obtained impressive kill ratios. CIDG units should continue to conduct operations along the periphery of camp TAORs and outside of camp TAORs using available air assets. OPCON headquarters should be kept apprised of the advantage of the operations and encouraged to make the required air assets available.

b. Recommendations:

(1) That the areas of emphasis listed in sub-paragraph a above continue to receive attention by the Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

(2) That DA, through the appropriate command, conduct an analysis of the CIDG program in terms of revising existing PARASOL policies and developing a handbook or field manual on the conduct of a paramilitary program with the myriad tasks and problems to facilitate more efficient performance and management of PARASOL programs in the future.

(3) That paramilitary operations and their utility to conventional units be a subject for instruction at Army branch schools, certain specialist schools such as the Army Intelligence School, USAC&GSC, and USAWC.
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SUBJECT: LOI - Implementation of CIDG Pay Card System

SEE DISTRIBUTION


2. General: 
   a. The payment of CIDG personnel is a USASF responsibility. This responsibility includes the proper safeguarding, accounting, and payment of US Government funds to legitimate members of the CIDG.
   
   b. The validity of CIDG soldiers as legitimate, effective, and operational members of the force is the responsibility of the VNSF.
   
   c. All members of the CIDG, both CSF and NSF, will be issued a serially numbered Identification Card by the VNSF. For every CIDG issued an ID Card, a like numbered Strike Force Pay Card, hereafter referred to as a Pay Card, will be prepared for retention by the USASF A, B, or C-Detachment Commander.

3. Distribution of CIDG ID and Pay Cards Forms to Principle Issuing Units:

   a. The VNSFHC has distributed CIDG ID Card Forms in serially numbered blocks to its C and Separate Detachment Commanders as follows:

      C-1 From 000001 to 010,000
      C-2 From 010,001 to 040,000
      C-3 From 040,001 to 060,000
      C-4 From 060,001 to 080,000
      B-55 From 080,001 to 083,000
      A-502 and MAC Recondo From 083,001 to 086,000
      B-51 From 086,001 to 087,000
      B-52 From 087,001 to 087,500

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b. Pay Cards will be distributed in serially numbered blocks to USASF Commanders in the same sequence as indicated in paragraph 3a above for CIDG ID Cards. Pay Cards are accountable and will be receipted for between this headquarters and all subordinate detachments on DA Form 470, Receipt for Accountable Forms (AB 370-1). Pay Cards will be afforded the same degree of protection as that given government funds. Each USASF C, B, and A-Detachment Commander will appoint, on orders, a Document Control Officer who will be responsible for the receipt, safeguarding, preparation, and accounting of the Pay Cards, to include cards voided by reason of death, desertion, or release from the CIDG program. One copy of each appointing order will be forwarded by the appointing authority to the next higher headquarters. C and Separate Detachments will forward appointing orders to this headquarters, and 1 May 1969, ATTN: AVLB-AC, and immediately upon the appointment of new Document Control Officers.

4. Sub-Distribution and Preparation of Pay Cards.

a. Pay Cards will be further sub-distributed by the USASF in such a manner that for every CIDG issued an ID Card or the VNSF, a corresponding numbered Pay Card will be prepared and maintained by the Document Control Officer at the camp to which the CIDG is assigned.

b. VNSF and USASF Commanders will coordinate to insure that:

(1) CIDG ID and Pay Cards are distributed to camps in the same sequence.

(2) Both the USASF and VNSF understand that payments to CIDG will not be made solely upon the presentation of a CIDG ID Card. USASF paying officials must have on file a like numbered Strike Force Pay Card for every CIDG ID Card issued.

(3) ID Cards and Pay Cards are prepared at the same time. The USASF will make four identical 2 X 1 1/2 snapshots of each CIDG. The first and second photos will be glued respectively onto the front portions of both the CIDG ID and Pay Card in the block captioned "..."). The third photo will be glued onto the Individual Earnings Record (5th SRR Form 124-R). The fourth photo will be glued onto 5th SRR Form 124-R, preparation of which contained in separate instructions. Pictures of CIDG will be made without a hat or cap, without dark glasses and with collar turned down.

c. The Pay Card is printed in both Vietnamese and English. The front portion of the card will be completed exactly like the CIDG ID Card. The right thumb print of the CIDG will be affixed on the blank back side of the Pay Card on the left of the card. Pay Cards will be maintained and properly safeguarded by the immediate USASF Detachment Document Control Officer.

d. Both the ID and Pay Cards will be laminated by the USASF.
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5. Voiding of Pay Cards: a. In the case of CIDG KIA, or released from the CIDG program, the Document Control Officer will stamp "VOID" on the applicable Pay Card and annotate the reason for voidance below the "VOID" stamp, this is, KIA or "Released."

b. CIDG missing in action will be carried in an active status for a period of 60 days from the date missing in action. If after 60 days a CIDG is still missing his Pay Card will be "VOID" stamped and annotated "MIA" below the "VOID" stamp.

c. For CIDG deserters, that is, CIDG AWOL for a period of 15 or more days, the Document Control Officer will "VOID" stamp the applicable Pay Card annotating "Deserter" below the "VOID" stamp. Deserters will be reported to the local Province Chief indicating the serial number of the CIDG ID Card in each deserter's possession.

d. All Pay Cards voided at the A and B-Detachment level will be forwarded to the Funds Officer of the B-Detachment for appropriate annotation of the CIDG payrolls in accordance with 5th SFGA Regulation 37-1. C-Detachment Funds Officers will follow the same procedure for those CIDG paid directly by their office. Voided pay cards will be retained on file at the B or C-Detachment for reference purposes to include input for the next monthly SUM report.

e. In order to prevent the occurrence of incidents between the USASF, VNSF, and CIDG, Pay Cards should not be voided and forwarded to funds officers until USASF and VNSF camp officials are in agreement on the change in status of any CIDG.

6. Replacement of Lost ID Cards: Loss of an ID Card by a CIDG will necessitate the issuance of another CIDG ID Card by the VNSF and the preparation of another Pay Card by the USASF, both numbered identically. The Document Control Officer will "VOID" stamp the old Pay Card, annotating the word "Lost" below the "VOID" stamp. Voided Pay Cards will also be forwarded to the appropriate funds officer.

7. Payday Procedures: On payday, a pay formation will be called with personnel in the sequence indicated on the payroll. When the pay formation has been called the USASF Detachment Agent/Funds Officer will pay the CIDG according to the following procedure. Each individual on the payroll will be required to produce a current serially numbered CIDG Identification Card complete with a picture of the bearer. The USASF Agent/Funds Officer will establish the identity of the person to be paid by comparing the CIDG ID Card with the Pay Card maintained by the USASF Camp Commander. If the numbers, personal data, and pictures on the ID Card and Pay Card match and the person is identifiable with his picture, the USASF Agent/Funds Officer will pay the individual. Each individual will affix his signature or fingerprint on the appropriate block on the payroll. Also, the Pay Card of the individual will be punched by the USASF Agent/Funds Officer in the appropriate monthly pay period. A CIDG cannot and will not be paid twice for the same monthly pay period. The procedures to be followed for Supplemental Payrolls are the same as for Regular Payrolls.
SUBJECT: LOI - Implementation of CIDG Pay Card System

8. **Individual Earnings Record**: Use of the Strike Force Pay Card does not preclude the monthly maintenance of the Individual Earnings Record (ASFFL-66 Form) on each CIDG by the C or B-Detachment funds officer as prescribed in 5th SMA Regulation 37-1.

9. **Use of Strike Force Pay Card**: The pay card should be used by USASF as a source document for muster roll calls.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[HORACE E. JORDAN, LTC, INF, Adjutant]

DISTRIBUTION:

1 Inc

as

A
Văn bản: \textit{Subject:} CIDG ID and Pay Cards

\textit{Reference:} Memo No \texttt{001150/LLDB/PI/BKQ} dated 5 February 1969

I. \textbf{GENERAL:}

11. The CIDG is a para-military force that is commanded and administered by the Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF), and financed and supplied by the United States Army Special Forces (USASF). The payment of CIDG personnel is a USASF responsibility. This responsibility includes the proper safeguarding, accounting and payment of funds to legitimate members of the CIDG.

12. All members of the CIDG who are administered by the VNSF will be issued a serially numbered Identification card; additionally, for every CIDG issued an ID card, a like numbered Strike Forces Pay Card, hereafter referred to as a Pay card, will be prepared for issuance and retention by the A, B or C Detachment (USASF).

II. \textbf{STOCKAGE AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIDG ID AND PAY CARDS}

21. The G1, VNSF/HC, and the S1 5th SFSGA, will closely coordinate their requirements for ID and Pay Cards to ensure that a six month stockage level is continually maintained.

22. The G1, VNSF/HC will distribute ID card forms in serially numbered blocks to VNSF C Detachment and Separate Unit commanders and will advise the G1, 5th SFSGA, of intended distribution and block
biet lap. The thuc may nhap thanh lot cho Phong 1/LLDB/HK trong vien phan phoi the luong BKQ cho cac Toan C/LLDB/HK va cac Don-vi biet lap theo cong mot so thu tu lien tuc voi the tuy tham BKQ.

2) Voi chien hinh va quan niem tron, cac CHT/C va CHT/Cac Don-vi biet lap LLDB/ VN cung nhu LLDB/HK can phoi hop chat cho lam the nao de vien phan phoi den cac don-vi tron theo so the tuy tham va the luong cua moi BKQ cung co mot so thu tu giong nhu.

III. THIET LAP THE TUY THAN VA THE Luong

31) De bien viecdoi chieu va nan danh, the tuy than va the luong BKQ phai duoc thiet lap can cu the ly linh cung mot can nan. Viec chup anh cho BKQ se du, cac Toan LLDB/HK trach phiem theo hiem theo BKQ chup anh luot anh chup nat tren, khong duoc nang kinh van va so gai thap. Anh duoc dan vao khung lien he d'mat truc cu 2 loai the (Tuy than BKQ va the luong).

32) Ngoai ra de bap dan cho the khoi nhu nat va sach se. cac Toan LLDB/HK se thuc hien viec boi nhu cho cac 2 loai the tren, sau khi thuc hien va thiet lap xong.

33) Trong truong hop the tuy than BKQ bi xuat, ngoai bien phap ky lut ap dung doi vo BKQ duong se. Don vi quan tri phai trinh xin gioi chuc so them quyen cap phat thay the dong tho thong bao cho Toan Co-van Hoa-ky, lien he de thiet lap the luong khac de co mot so thu tu nhu nhau.

IV. THE THU NGAY LANH Luong

Den ngay phat luong, BKQ sap hang lanh luong va duoc goi theo so thu tu trong so luong va-SI quan tai ngan LLDB/HK phai sap dung theo cac thu tu sau day:

- 7 days to advance of the date that the ID card forms are to be distributed. This will allow the SI, 5th SG to distribute Pay cards to USASF C and Separate detachment in the same block sequence of the CID, ID card forms.

73) The VNSF and USASF C and Separate detachment commanders will coordinate their stockage and distribution of ID and Pay cards in such a manner that for every CIDG issued an ID card by the VNSF, a corresponding numbered Pay card will be prepared and maintained by the USASF.

III- PREPARATION OF ID AND PAY CARDS:

31- To facilitate the reference and recognition, the CIDG ID and Pay cards will be prepared at the same time, indicating the same personnel data. The USASF detachment will be responsible for taking identical photographs for each CIDG. Two identical pictures will be made without a hat or cap, with dark glasses and collar turned down required for each CIDG. The half centimeter size photo will be glued onto the front portions of both the ID and Pay cards in the required block.

32- Additionally, the ID and Pay cards will be laminated to protect from the elements and rough handing. These cards will be laminated by the USASF after their preparation.

33- Loss of an CIDG ID Card will cause the bearer to be punished and will cause the issuance of another ID card by the VNSF and the preparation of another Pay card by the USASF . Both number identically.

IV.- PAYDAY PROCEDURES:

On payday a pay formation will be called with CIDG personnel in the sequence indicated on the payroll, the USASF Agent/ Fund officer will pay the CIDG according to the following procedures:
Each CIDG member on the payroll will be required to produce a current specially numbered CIDG Identification card completed with a picture of the bearer.

The USASF Agent/Fund officer will establish the identity of the person to be paid by comparing the CIDG ID card with the pay card maintained by the USASF.

If the numbers, personal data and pictures on the ID card and Pay card match and the person is identifiable with his picture, the USASF Agent/Fund officer will pay the individual.

Each CIDG member will affix his signature or fingerprint on the appropriate block on the payroll. With these criteria accomplished, the USASF Agent/Fund officer will punch the appropriate block of current month on the pay card.

A CIDG cannot and will not be paid twice (02) times in the same month or period. The procedures to be followed for Supplemental payrolls are the same as for Regular Payrolls.

To replace the monthly signature made on the CIDG ID card designated in the above reference, para B, Part V, an official who is given authority of signing on CIDG ID card is hereby authorized by this High Command to provide a Monthly Certificate of CIDG Service which will be produced along with the CIDG ID card when checked (this kind of certificate is being issued to Regular Fund payroll).
CG, VNSF/WC and CO, 5th SFPA are expecting the VNSF and USAASF commanders' spirit of unity and responsibility that would outstandingly affect our common success.~

HAROLD R. AARON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- BCH/C1, C2, C3, C4
- BCH/8-??
- Trại Trùng Phong
- Tuan A-158
- TPHL/H/1/Delta

He thit hinh va pho bien dem cac Tuan B,
A tra tinh
- Ho-so
- Luan chieu
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APN 66-31

REGULATION
NUMBER 37-100

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Assignment of Program Responsibility

1. PURPOSE: To assign program managers and delineate responsibilities in
assisting the commander in resource management and in achieving the maximum
combat efficiency in the accomplishment of 5th SFGA mission at the lowest
possible cost.

2. POLICY: a. All supplies, items of equipment, and all contractual
services, programmed or unprogrammed, fall within one of the principal staff
officers managerial responsibilities.

b. The Group is on a completely reimbursable system and must pay for
all supplies, equipment and services received from allotted funds.

c. The management structure in the Group conforms to the Army Manage-
ment Structure, is readily adaptable to resource management within the Group
and serves as the guide in assigning program responsibility to appropriate
staff officers.

d. There are three sections within the 5th SFGA management structure:

(1) In country Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) — Primarily for
pay, subsistence, administrative personnel services, local purchases of
supplies and equipment, construction, civil affairs and psychological
operations, local maintenance of vehicles, locally procured transportation,
repair and maintenance of facilities, death gratuity payments, intelligence
expenditures, hospitalization and disability, equipment capture bonus,
herculean action and camp celebration bonus, payment for supervisory assistance
to Eastern Construction Company, Incorporated and real estate rental in
support of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group.

(2) Out of country Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) — For
ground forces support material, medical and dental supplies, general
supplies, clothing and textiles, electronics, air material, tank and
Reg 57-100, 5th SFQA, 2 Sep 68, (Cont)


d. The policy of the 5th SFQA is to review the assignment of program responsibility quarterly in order to insure that the financial and resource management program responsibilities are fixed functionally.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. The Executive Officer, 5th SFQA will be the Chairman of the Program Budget Advisory Committee with responsibility for coordinating the staff in exercising resource management.

b. The S3 has overall responsibility for conceptual planning and employment of all phases of the overall advisory effort of the VNSF and the CIDG Program.

c. The Comptroller is the Commander's principal advisor in assuring that financial resources are efficiently and effectively utilized. He is delegated horizontal responsibility and control within the staff for effective program management. He will be responsible for the conduct of conferences and issuance of directives to insure accurate and valid programming, budgeting, and expenditure of funds. The program directors designated in Inclosures 1 through 5, will assist the Comptroller as required in programming, budgeting, monitoring, analysis, and verification of expenditures as required.

4. PROCEDURES: See Annexes A through F. Annexes will be added as requirements for procedures are recognized.

Reg 57-100, 5th SFGA, 2 Sep 68, (Cont)

b. 5th SFGA FY 1969 Command Operating Program and Budget Estimate.

c. Reg 57-1, 5th SFGA 1st SF

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAI:

M. J. CEPRONF, JR.
LTC INF
Executive Officer

RAYMOND G. MAIER
MAJOR AGC
Adjutant

3 Incl

1. In Country (OMA) Management Responsibility
2. Materiel Category (OMA) Management Responsibility
3. FEMA Management Responsibility

ANNEX A - Procedure for all 5th SFGA Budget preparation and Review Actions.
ANNEX B - Procedure for preparation of Routing Supply Transactions (requisitions). To Be Published.
ANNEX C - Suggested Procedure to be used in Performance Analysis. To Be Published.
ANNEX D - Procedures for Management by Exception. To Be Published.
ANNEX E - Procedures for Reprogramming Actions. To Be Published.
ANNEX F - Procedures to be taken upon receipt of dollar guidance which is less than program requirements. To Be Published.
ANNEX G - Procedures for recognizing, classifying and recording cost reductions. To Be Published.
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*Primary Staff Responsibility

Inclosure 1 to Incl 2
### OUT OF COUNTRY (OMA)

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* Primary Staff Responsibility

63

Inclosure 2 to Inc1 2
**Program Manager Responsibility**

**Budget Project**

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*Primary Staff Responsibility*

*Enclosure 3 to Incl 2*
ANNEX A to: 5th SFGA REG 37-100; Resource Management, Assignment of Program Responsibility.

PROCEDURE FOR ALL BUDGET PREPARATION AND REVIEW ACTIONS

1. The Comptroller will prepare the attached schedule as required.

2. This schedule will be utilized in preparation of Initial Program Budget Estimates and Command Budget Estimates. It will also be used to prepare for formal budget reviews such as the mid-year and quarterly reviews.

3. This schedule lists the staff sections involved across the top line. Along the left edge of the chart are listed, in chronological order, the phases which must be completed to accomplish the budgeting or review action. An "X" will be placed in the blocks of the chart horizontally across from a particular action. The same "X" will appear vertically below the staff section or sections concerned. An asterisk appearing beside the "X" will indicate the section having primary staff responsibility for each action.

4. The right hand column will be used to provide suspense dates for completion of actions. It is imperative that suspense dates be met in order that the entire sequence of events not be thrown off schedule.

Attachment
Sequence of Events for All Budget Preparation and Review Actions
# SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

**FOR ALL BUDGET PREPARATION AND REVIEW ACTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>RESPONSIBLE STAFF AGENCY</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. REVISE, PLAN AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION</td>
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<td>2. PREP FORECAST</td>
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<td>3. IN-COUNTRY G&amp;AD BUDGET</td>
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<th>SUSP DATE</th>
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SUBJECT: POLWAR, CA and PSYOPS

All Commanders, 5th SFGA

1. REFERENCES:
   a. 5th SFGA Reg 515-1, Political Warfare.
   b. 5th SFGA Reg 515-2, Military Civic Action.
   c. 5th SFGA Reg 515-3, Psychological Operations.
   d. Ltr, AVGB, subj: S5 Assignments, 2 Jan 68.
   e. Msg, AVGB, subj: Psychological Operations.
   f. A Detachment Handbook, HQ, 5th SFGA.

2. GENERAL: The purpose of this letter is to provide information and instruction to all commanders concerning plans and policy regarding the GVN Political Warfare (POLWAR) Program. This program consists of a broad range of functions which includes PSYOPS, Civil Affairs, Military Civic Action, Troop Motivation and Indoctrination, Troop Morale and Welfare, and other similar and related functional areas. In the 5th SFGA, the total activity is referred to as the POLWAR Program. My policies and instructions concerning this program are promulgated in the above referenced documents. This letter explains actions which this headquarters is taking to provide better support for the program, and actions which you must take to produce better results.

3. OBJECTIVES:
   a. Establish and maintain a high degree of loyalty, discipline, and morale within the CIDG.
AVG-ROD
SUBJECT: POLWAR, CA and PSYOPS

b. Gain the support of the civilian population by improving the civilian-military relationships.

c. Combat the VC/NVA through effective use of Psychological Warfare.

4. IMPLEMENTATION: Command emphasis is essential to produce a program which will achieve these objectives. My message, reference 1, expresses clearly that I expect this program to receive your personal attention. It is significantly important that all your effort be coordinated and aimed at producing results. Following are some particular areas which require your attention.

a. Counterpart Relations: The means by which we accomplish our mission is by advising the WNSF, and supporting the CIDG program. This is likewise the means by which we reach objectives, and achieve goals. Therefore, ensure that you strive to implement all actions and plans in a manner which will train your counterpart, and which will increase his professional competence, responsibility, and integrity in the eyes of his subordinates and the people.

b. Personnel Training: There is presently a critical shortage of USASF school-trained CA and PSYOPS personnel. At this time, there are 25 school-trained personnel assigned to fill 98 authorized spaces in the Group. Until relief can be provided by higher headquarters, the 5th SFGA, with the support of the 4th PSYOPS Group, will conduct an in-country POLWAR course (predominantly PSWOPS) of about 5 days duration in the Nha Trang area, beginning on or about 15 Jul 68. All non-school-trained officer personnel filling the S5 or CA/PO officer positions on either a primary or additional duty basis will attend the course. The POI is presently being prepared; additional instructions will follow.

c. Assignment of Personnel: All CA/PSYOPS school-trained personnel will be assigned to perform in the S5 role; the only exception is assignment to a command position. In this regard, reference 17 remains in effect. Additionally, when school-trained personnel are not available, I want capable, and where possible, experienced, personnel assigned to the S5 function at all levels. In this assignment, primarily because of their close association with the Vietnamese people, personnel should be stabilized for as long a period as possible, with a six month standard as the minimum.
Integration of Effort: A fundamental requirement in the Group's mission is to provide security in the area. This is done by conducting aggressive, continuous tactical operations in the T'AOR. Concurrently, however, maximum emphasis must be given to getting good, current intelligence, and when gained, to exploit it promptly. The effectiveness of these two activities - operations and intelligence - may be increased many-fold by effective integration of POLWAR, CA and PSYOPS activities.

In the past, there has been a tendency to treat these functions as separate operations, thus severely limiting overall effectiveness. A PSYOPS annex to a tactical plan provides for achievement of psychological objectives that contribute to the overall PSYOPS campaign. The POLWAR program is aimed at raising the morale, and thus the fighting value, of the CIDG soldier. Refusal of CIDG soldiers to fight indicates that an effective motivation and indoctrination program does not exist. Military Civic Action, while improving military-civilian relations, is also an appropriate and highly effective vehicle for intelligence collection. Finally, PSYOPS EELI, which is the very foundation of a good PSYOPS program, must be integrated into your intelligence collection efforts. To provide for better integration of the total effort in the POLWAR program, the POLWAR and PSYOPS regulations, references 1a and 1c, have been newly revised and will be published upon completion of coordination staffs through the NVSF High Command. Additionally, a PSYOPS EELI annex is being added to the 5th SFCA Intelligence Collection Plan.

Psychological Operations: PSYOPS effort must be a planned activity, aimed at achieving specific objectives. Imagination and ingenuity in the use of leaflets, posters, pamphlets, signs, and other means can instill the desired psychological attitude in the enemy. Face-to-face persuasion, the use of agents to encourage Chieu Hoi's, ground distribution of leaflets by troops on operations, simple posters, locally mimeographed newsletters, and rallies conducted by the POLWAR team are among the numerous means available for your exploitation. I want you to use every means available to create an aura of fear, as well as respect, for the CIDG, in the minds of their VC/NVA enemies. Develop and exploit the image of the Special Forces camp as a bulwark against enemy aggression and as a haven for ralliers. Aim at developing your program so that it is a natural extension of in and out-of-country PSYOPS campaigns; or as a minimum, a smooth transition from these campaigns. Apply the full gamut of PSYOPS means to support your camp mission.

Recent experiences of 4th PSYOPS Group teams in the field demonstrate clearly that proper application of means and techniques at the appropriate
AVGB-RD

SUBJECT: POLWAR, CA and PSYOPS

26 June 1968

Time during combat operations can produce dramatic results. These teams have been notably successful in persuading large numbers of enemy forces to surrender. Likewise, for you to conduct a successful program, you must always be prepared to exploit every opportunity. To make available suggestions, ideas, and tips to assist you, the Group 35 will pull and keep updated a pamphlet of "PSYOPS Tips" taken from the reports and experiences of other detachments.

f. Coordination: I want to see more coordination with local SVN and civilian agencies at all levels. At the C Detachment level, coordination must be made with the Corps PSYOPS personnel and the PSYOPS Battalion. This battalion will soon have the propaganda development capability to assist you in leaflet campaigns against specific targets. Additionally, support is available in the form of Mobile Assistance Teams provided by the PSYOPS Battalions. On the US side, all PSYOPS effort in the CTZ is controlled by the CORDS Regional PSYOPS officer in the Corps area. At the B Detachment level, coordination must be made with province/sector personnel as well as with any PSYOPS support elements in the area. In each province, there is a PSYOPS advisor who coordinates US PSYOPS efforts in that area. At the A Detachment level, coordination must be made with local conventional units and with District/Sub-sector personnel. It is absolutely essential that local SVN officials and advisors gain an awareness and appreciation for the CIDG community in their area; otherwise there is no basis for the feeling of national security.

g. Reports: The reporting system has recently undergone many changes. The narrative portions have been revised to require a deeper analysis of achievements and progress. This is an important part of the report and it merits close attention on your part. It has been necessary to retain the statistical Civic Action report in order to meet EUARV requirements, however the particular indicators I have chosen to help evaluate your programs are generally independent from the statistical portions of the KOPSUM.

h. RESULTS: Progress in the areas of POLWAR, PSYOPS, and Civic Action, as in any other areas, can be measured by results. The results I expect to see are better intelligence collection, more voluntary information, more Chieu Hoi's, less AWOL's, higher morale, more self-help programs, more economic development projects, better government support for refugees, Improved population and resource control, better community relations, and other similar situations which represent a
strengthening of government control. As progress can be measured by results, I consider that results achieved are generally equivalent to effort expended. There are few programs that will pay greater dividends than this one — if it is done properly.

/s/Harold R. Aaron
/ct/HAROLD R. AARON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

A TRUE COPY:

MARSHALL A. LANTER
LTC, Infantry
Group 85
EVALUATION OF VNSF SYNOPSIS

1. (SNF) One of the main missions of the 5th SFGA is to advise and assist the Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) in carrying out the objectives of the CIDG program. This relationship has existed for six years since 1963 when USASF and VNSF teams were assigned the task of recruiting, organizing, and training local people to defend themselves against the Viet Cong. The eventual goal is that the VNSF will be able to assume full responsibility on their own for the CIDG program. In July 1964, Colonel Theodore Leonard, then CO of Special Forces in Vietnam, stated, "There is no instance in which an RVN Special Forces detachment has demonstrated a capability to perform the basic mission by itself."

2. (SNF) Colonel John H. Spears, successor to Colonel Leonard, echoed the latter's evaluation in October of 1964: "The Vietnamese Special Forces lacked professional competence.... The quality of the VNSF personnel, both officers and enlisted, had to be improved." USASF personnel in those early days complained constantly that they had to do all the work whether in the field or at administrative levels. In early 1966 LTC Kenneth B. Facey, Commander of Company C in I CTZ, made this starkly realistic appraisal: "The widespread lack of ethical standards, dedication to duty, patriotism, courage, and professional competence of many members of the VNSF, are such a severe handicap that in some areas the CIDG program is collapsing, and in many areas only marginally effective."

3. (SNF) Has there been any improvement since this beginning period? Are the VNSF improving? If so, is this progress at a satisfactory rate? Ever since 1956 American civilian and military leaders have attempted to answer similar questions about GVN forces. Even guarded optimistic hopes and statements have been quashed by later events. Any attempt to evaluate the progress of the VNSF must be fully conscious of this past history.

4. (SNF) A second problem in evaluating the VNSF is the lack of adequate yardsticks for measuring improvement. Coupled with this is the dearth of records and documents for the early period about USASF and VNSF activities. Some progress has been made this past year in setting up progress indicators and in establishing a base period which can be used for future evaluations.

5. (SNF) One of the most important qualities of any military unit is its willingness to fight. Normally the more aggressive a unit, the heavier will be its casualties. A commonly bruited criticism of the VNSF is that they are unwilling to make contact with the enemy. Their lower casualties in comparison with USASF losses is cited as proof of
this lack of fighting spirit. The table below gives a yearly breakdown since 1963.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>VNSF Strength</th>
<th>USASF Strength</th>
<th>VNSF KIA</th>
<th>VNSF WIA</th>
<th>VNSF MIA</th>
<th>USASF KIA</th>
<th>USASF WIA</th>
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The figures for 1969 are as of March 1969.

6. The statistics do show the VNSF behind the USASF. A harder question is whether the VNSF are improving or falling further back. The next table gives a comparison of USASF figures to VNSF. A value of greater than "1.00" indicates that 5th Group suffered more than their counterparts while a lesser value shows the opposite.

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7. (SNF) Since 1966 there seems to have been a steady improvement which would indicate that the VNSF are becoming more willing to fight.

8. (SNF) Another measure of aggressiveness is the desire to go out on operations against the enemy. A study conducted by 5th SFGA in 1968 showed that approximately 50% more USASF participated in operations country-wide than did VNSF personnel, despite similar detachment strengths. On an individual basis, USASF detachment commanders accompanied company operations three and half times as frequently as their VNSF camp commander counterparts and accompanied a total of 126 platoon operations while their counterparts never participated in a single platoon operation.

9. (SNF) A subsequent study in 1969 showed that more USASF were still accompanying operations than VNSF but that the disparity had been cut from 50% to just over 30%. VNSF camp commanders were now accompanying platoon operations and their gap for company operations had almost been sliced in half.

10. (SNF) Seven camps have been transferred to sole VNSF control, four alone during this past year. Some problems have been encountered in furnishing support whether combat, administrative, or medevac to these camps. Most of these difficulties stem from the language barrier. But despite this, these camps have functioned on a level equal to those camps where USASF are present. Certainly these transfers indicate progress especially when contrasted with Colonel Leonard's statement in 1964.

11. (SNF) Another indicator of a growing VNSF professionalism is that most camps now have more VNSF than USASF. As recently as January 1968 USASF outnumbered VNSF in 47 out of 57 camps. Americans had to bear a greater burden of the workload. By January 1969 this situation had been reversed to the point where VNSF outnumbered USASF in 37 out of
54. Camps. Much of this was due to declining US strength at the camps because of MOS shortages rather than substantial increases in the VNSF. But the reversal does indicate that the camps can operate with fewer American Special Forces personnel and the VNSF are able to handle more responsibility than in the past.

52. (SFN) Analysis of USASF field grade officers' debriefing statements as well as a study of some five hundred USASF enlisted and company grade advisers indicated that the VNSF are improving. They are more aware of their responsibilities and better trained to accomplish them. One program which has substantially improved the VNSF has been the camp commander's course which is referred to elsewhere in this report. A last indicator of progress comes from an examination of VNSF performance during battle. At Camp Ashau in 1965 the VNSF had run from the battle. In their desperate haste to board friendly helicopters, they had actually destroyed one craft. This battle prompted LTC Facey's study already cited above. A comparison of VNSF performance at Camps Lang Vei and Duc Lap during battles in 1968 shows a substantial change as VNSF stood and fought right alongside their American counterparts.

53. (SFN) In summary, the VNSF have improved. Yet this does not mean the mission of 5th Group is completed nor should progress be an excuse for a relaxing of the advisory effort. Constantly in their debriefing reports USASF stress that the VNSF need more motivation and a greater sense of urgency about the war. They need more intensive training in calling in support during combat, in being security-conscious about their communications, and in expanding their intelligence effort beyond an almost total reliance upon agent reports. USASF still bear a heavier burden on the fighting and the casualties than the VNSF. Yet the growing professionalism as well as aggressiveness of the Vietnamese Special Forces indicates that 5th SFSGA has achieved some success in accomplishing its advisory mission.
This document is a debriefing report titled "Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL Harold R. Aaron". It covers the period from 4 June 1968 to 29 May 1969. The report's author is COL Harold R. Aaron, and it was submitted on 15 May 1969. The total number of pages is 85, and there are 698022 as the project number. The distribution statement and sponsor's military activity are not specified. The abstract is blank.