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[Signature]
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Colonel, ACC
Acting The Adjutant General

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US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSIOR-65 (R1)(U)

THRU: Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310


a. (U) COMMAND.

(1) Commanders.

CG, USARV
1 Feb 69 - 30 Apr 69
GEN Creighton W. Abrams

DCG, USARV
1 Feb 69 - 30 Apr 69
LTG Frank T. Mildren

CG, Engineer Troops, Vietnam (Provisional)
1 Feb 69 - 30 Apr 69
MG David S. Parker

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
CG, US Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam
1 Feb 69 - 30 Apr 69

BG E. P. Yates

(2) Distinguished Visitor Summary: During the reporting period, 55 parties of distinguished visitors visited this headquarters.

SIGNIFICANT VISITORS TO USARV

PERIOD: 1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME/DATE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ch (MG) Francis L. Sampson 4 - 14 February 1969</td>
<td>Chief of Chaplains, DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIG Charles F. Flint, OBE 5 - 8 February 1969</td>
<td>Engineer-in-Chief, Australian Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Russell K. Pierce, Jr. 8 February 1969</td>
<td>Commander, Air Weather Service, MAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Ralph E. Haines, Jr. 8 - 16 February 1969</td>
<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG John D. Lavelle, USAF 11 February 1969</td>
<td>Dir, DCPG, OSD</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG John M. McNabb, USAF 11 February 1969</td>
<td>CG, Technical Training Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Leonard Sullivan (GS18E) 12 February 1969</td>
<td>Dep Dir of Research &amp; Engineering for SEA Matters, DOD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Nils F. Wikner (GS18E) 12 February 1969</td>
<td>MACV Science Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Burnside E. Huffman, Jr. 17 February 1969</td>
<td>CG, II FFORCEV Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Charles T. Horner, Jr.</td>
<td>CG, 2d Logistical Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 - 23 February 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Robert D. Terry</td>
<td>CG, USASTRATCOM-Pacifi, ACoS, C-E, USARPAC</td>
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<td>20 - 27 February 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mrs. Joy Berlemann (GS16E)</td>
<td>Mrs. United States Savings Bonds</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 February 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM J. N. Shaffer, USN</td>
<td>DCS for Military Assistance, Logistics &amp; Administration, PACOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 February 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Hal D. McCown</td>
<td>COMUSMACTHAI and Ch, JUSMAG, Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 February 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG Lawrence Craigie, USAF (Ret)</td>
<td>Dir of Military Requirements, Lockheed Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Yoshio Okawara</td>
<td>Asst Dir General, American Affairs Bureau, Japanese Foreign Ministry</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 March 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Coleman P. Cook (GS16)</td>
<td>Spec Asst for Planning, OASA (I&amp;L)</td>
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<td>6 - 13 March 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Wayne A. Smith (GS16)</td>
<td>ODCSLOG, DA</td>
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<td>6 - 13 March 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Fred Kornet, Jr.</td>
<td>Dir of Ammo, ODCSLOG, DA</td>
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<td>9 - 11 March 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Delk M. Oden</td>
<td>CG, US Army Aviation Center, Ft Rucker, Alabama</td>
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<td>9 - 16 March 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Raymond C. Conroy</td>
<td>MACV J4 (Designate)</td>
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<td>10 March 1969</td>
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LTG Serm Na Nakorn
12 - 13 March 1969

BG Morton M. Jones
12 - 13 March 1969

Mr. David R. Israel (GS18)
12 - 13 March 1969

Dr. Benjamin Balser (GS16E)
12 - 17 March 1969

MG Ben Sternberg
13 - 15 March 1969

LTG William F. Cassidy
18 - 26 March 1969

MG Robert A. Hay, OBE, MBE
19 March 1969

Mr. Robert G. Rothwell (GS16)
20 March 1969

BG Frank K. Everest, Jr., USAF
22 March 1969

CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board (Party of 6)
23 - 25 March 1969

MG Ward S. Ryan
24 March 1969

BG William E. Potts
24 March 1969

Assistant Chief of Staff,
Operations, Royal Thai Army

USA Vice Director, DCPG

Dep Dir for Engineering, DCPG

Professor of Psychiatry,
Columbia

ACofS, G3, USARPAC

Chief of Engineers, US Army

COMAFV

Associate Director, Defense Division, USGAO, Washington DC

Asst Dir, Operational Test & Evaluation, Office Director of Defense Research and Engineering

Chief, KMAG

MACV J2 (Designate)
AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army
Vietnam for Period Ending 10 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65
(R1) (U)

BG Charles W. Ryder, Jr.  
25 - 31 March 1969  
ACofS, G1, USARPAC

BG D. A. Raymond  
26 March 1969  
Director of Construction Operations, OASD (I&L)

BG William A. Hamrick  
2 - 11 April 1969  
Chief, Medical Service Corps

HON Phillip R. Lynch  
3 April 1969  
M. P., Australian Minister of the Army

Mr. B. White  
3 April 1969  
1st Secretary to the Australian Minister of the Army

MG Shelton E. Lollis  
5 - 10 April 1969  
CG, USATACOM

MG John W. Kaine  
5 - 13 April 1969  
CG, 77th ARCOM

MG Michael B. Kauffman  
5 - 13 April 1969  
CG, 124th ARCOM

MG Noble F. Schlatter  
5 - 13 April 1969  
CG, 86th ARCOM

MG Herman H. Hankins  
5 - 13 April 1969  
CG, 95th Div (Tng)

BG William H. Booth  
5 - 13 April 1969  
CG, 81st ARCOM

BG Edward Bautz, Jr.  
11 April 1969  
ACofS for Operations, J3  
(Designate), HQ MACV

BG Thomas J. Camp, Jr.  
12 April 1969  
Dir of Organization, Unit Training & Readiness, OACSFOR DA
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army
Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65
(R1)(U)

COL (P) Thomas F. McCord
13 - 19 April 1969

MG Autrey J. Maroun
14 April 1969

MG Karl W. Gustafson
16 - 21 April 1969

LTG William B. Rosson
19 April 1969

Mr. LaVern J. Duffy (GS18E)
21 April 1969

Mr. Carmine Bellino (GS18E)
21 April 1969

MG Joseph R. Russ
24 April 1969

GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster
25 April 1969

MG William A. Enemark
25 - 30 April 1969

b. (C) PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.

(1) Military Personnel Management.

(a) (C) Strength Ceiling. As predicted in paragraph 1b(1)(a), Head- quarters USARV ORLL dated 13 February 1969, the Army chargeable

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strength in RVN (operating + patients + IDY in-country) reached its peak on 3 February 1969. On that date it was 365,933 or 2,371 beneath the DoD Program E imposed strength ceiling. It rose no higher because of careful management actions taken to control it. These actions included supervision of accurate, up-to-date strength reporting and selective pre-DEROS departure of a group of February rotatees.

(b) (C) Infantry Shortage. Infantry casualties increased greatly as the result of the enemy’s post-Tet offensive which began 23 February. The rate of replacement input over this period and into April was inadequate in MOS 11B/C/H to compensate for the losses sustained. Therefore, OPO, DA was contacted and requested to provide all possible early assistance. OPO agreed to adjust AIT flow and add 300-500 airborne personnel to RVN input, however, it is anticipated this action will not affect the infantry strength until late May and June. In the interim 1,400 infantrymen assigned to 1st Logistical Command and the two engineer brigades in December 1968 have been levied for reassignment to the combat units. Six hundred of these had moved to combat units by the end of April. These actions should permit the infantry strength to recover by June, providing there is no substantial rise in casualty rates in the interim.

(2) (U) Civilian Personnel Management.

(a) (U) Limitations on the Number of Civilian Employees which may be Utilized by USARV. USARPAC message 10264, 19 March 1969, imposed an employment limitation on this command of 35,804 US citizen and Vietnamese employees paid from appropriated funds effective 31 May 1969. This message included instructions that CONUS recruitment for US citizen employees would continue, but accessions resulting from such recruitment would be offset by vacancies to meet the restrictions imposed. At time of receipt of these instructions, it was determined that the estimated strength of US citizen employees as of 31 May 1969 would be 749 employees. Therefore, the employment limitation for Vietnamese employees effective 31 May 1969 would be 35,055. The on-board Vietnamese employee strength at time of receipt of these instructions was 37,340 employees; 2,285 employees in excess of the 31 May 1969 limitation. Included in the instructions received were provisions to honor firm
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(r1)(u)

commitments of employment and to attempt attainment of the new manning
level by attrition and not by reduction in force actions. it was estimated
at this time that 1,305 vietnamese citizens had been given firm commit-
ments of employment. subsequently, the command was authorized to fill
existing vacancies in the kit carson scout program which amounted to some
637 additional manpower requirements. command messages were dispatched
to usarv organizations limiting hiring of new employees to those prospec-
tive employees with firm commitments of employment and chieu hoi
returnees to be utilized in the kit carson scout program.

(b) (u) conduct of first da-sponsored personnel management exec-
utives conference (pme) in vietnam. in accordance with usarpac letter,
gppe-cc, 3 december 1968, subject: request for approval to conduct
executive training, a pme was conducted in vietnam during the period
6 - 14 february 1969. the conference staff consisted of representatives
from usarv, usnavforv and 7th air force. forty-two conferees
attended the conference. representatives were present from usarv,
usnavforv, 7th air force, rvnaf, government of vietnam, and usaid.
nine guest speakers appeared before the pme group; the appearance of the
us ambassador added a great deal of prestige to the conference. the
following objectives were established for each participant at the start of
the conference:

1. broaden his perspective of managing people.
2. increase his awareness of his personal behavior in relation to others.
3. sharpen his insights into group or organizations' behavior.
4. increase his appreciation of contemporary organization and the
   environment in which executives work.

the conferees indicated orally and by written comments that the conference
was highly successful. other indicators of success included an invitation
from the civil service directorate, gvn, to stage pme exclusively for
their personnel, and the national defense college officials in the group
requested assistance in conducting pme for their faculty.

9

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Morale and Personal Services.

Chaplain Activities. There was a 12 percent increase in the number of personnel receiving character guidance instruction from the previous quarter. Attendance at religious services remained relatively constant despite the increased activity of tactical units during the post-Tet offensive. The number of opportunities for worship increased 3.25 percent over the previous quarter. Contributions by Chaplain's Funds to Vietnamese religious/charitable causes during the 3d Quarter FY69 totaled $70,088.42.

Medical Service and Medical Supplies.

(a) Stratification Report. In February, the first Stratification Report of Class VIII items for the 32d Medical Depot was accomplished. The report enabled the medical depot to accomplish interdepot stock leveling and identify command excesses. The excesses beyond the authorized retention level were offered to RVNAF and USAID medical depots to satisfy any valid requirements they might have. During this reporting period $95,000 worth of excess medical materiel was transferred to RVNAF and $3,000 to USAID. Excesses not required by RVNAF and USAID were shipped to the US Army Medical Depot, Ryukyu Islands. In March, $160,970.00 worth of excess materiel was returned to Okinawa.

(b) Command Medical Stockage List. In order to reduce the number of line items of medical materiel stocked in the medical supply system in USARV, and to better control medical materiel, a program was initiated in February to develop a Command Medical Stockage List (CMSL). The CMSL will consist of those standard and non-standard medical items professionally determined to be essential for the accomplishment of the medical mission in this command. In conjunction with the CMSL, a Therapeutic Formulary is being prepared for distribution to all medical units within the command. The Formulary lists each pharmaceutical authorized for stockage by therapeutic grouping and restriction code. The professional consultants have identified those items which are authorized for hospital use only and those which may be issued for general use. The CMSL and Therapeutic Formulary Program will result in:
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(RI)(U)

1. Better control of medical materiel.
2. Reduction of depot inventories.
3. Reduction of storage requirements.
4. Improved inventory management.
5. Conservation of supply dollars.
6. Increased supply responsiveness.

(c) (U) Area Dermatology Service. During this reporting period the
dermatology service was reorganized to provide group level care rather
than care limited to one hospital area. The dermatologist now travels
within the medical group, holding clinics at all major group hospitals and
at major divisional units within groups. This effectively brings specialized
skin care to all hospitals and divisions rather than requiring transport of
large numbers of troops and patients to the dermatologist. At the same
time, the teaching accomplished during these visits improves the unit's
and the hospital's capability to handle these problems within their own
resources. Further expansion of this program is anticipated.

(d) (U) Medical Communication Channel. A technical communication
channel between hospital medical services and divisional medical units
was established on 1 March 1969 under the operational title of MEDCON.
In order to establish professional dialogue between these two levels of
medical care, mutual liaison visits were encouraged on a regular basis
between physicians operating at each level. Chiefs of Medicine and
Division Surgeons will coordinate these professional activities which are
designed to enhance appreciation of problems in each sphere or activity
and to develop together the solution to these problems. The MEDCON
liaison visit represented a new philosophy of field medicine. It afforded
the opportunity for physician-to-physician discussion through a new
technical channel paralleling channels of patient care/evacuation and
afforded to personnel at all levels the opportunity to broaden their under-
standing of the total care of the military patient.
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(e) (U) RVNAF Physicians Training. An in-country training program for RVNAF military physicians in US military medical facilities started 15 March 1969. Twenty VN licensed military physicians were selected for a six-month program under a closely monitored preceptor. Each trainee was assigned to another US physician who served as the trainee's immediate preceptor. The trainee was required to work side by side with and maintain the same hours as his US physician preceptor.

(f) (U) Medical Supply and Medical Services, MUST Hospital. In January, the fifth US Army MUST hospital (i.e., 2d Surgical Hospital, Lai Khe) became operational. Although several MUST medical peculiar items requisitioned for the 2d Surgical Hospital were not received from CONUS, the hospital was able to utilize organic TOE medical equipment to satisfy their immediate requirements. Improved repair parts supply support resulted in a decrease in the command's MUST Utility Packs deadline rate from 27 percent in January to 17 percent in March.

c. (C) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(1) (U) The Monthly Intelligence Review (MIR) continued to provide the intelligence community with a detailed review of countrywide enemy activity and associated items of special interest. The average length of this periodical was 45 pages.

(2) (U) A weekly Intelligence Conference was held each Friday at 1330 hours. The agenda of the conference included summaries of the significant operations, enemy activity, and enemy order of battle updating. Weekly Intelligence Conference Notes were provided to all attendees including representatives from the local intelligence community and from the general and special staffs of Headquarters USARV.

(3) (U) The Current Analysis Special Intelligence (CASI) Branch provided material to support a review of all-source intelligence which was presented to the Command Group and designated USARV staff members daily. In addition, CASI Branch presented an all-source briefing each Saturday to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, Commanding
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(RJ)[U]

General, 1st Signal Brigade, and designated members of the USARV and
subordinate staffs. Special briefings for the Deputy Commanding General,
USARV, the Chief of Staff, and other members of the USARV staff were
conducted as required.

(4) (C) During the period 15 January - 19 March 1969, an evaluation
of centralized OV-1 Mohawk assets in a direct support employment con-
cept was conducted. As a part of the test a consolidation of the Mohawk
aircraft, personnel, and equipment of the two Aerial Surveillance
and Target Acquisition (ASTA) Platoons of the 1st Infantry Division and 1st
Cavalry Division (AM) was made at Vung Tau airfield with the 73d
Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC). Direct sole-user telephone circuits
were installed between the 73d SAC and the 1st Infantry, 1st Cavalry (AM)
and 25th Infantry Divisions. SLAR and IR ground sensor terminals were
placed in operation at the three supported divisions. A report on the
evaluation is being prepared by II FFORCEV.

(5) (C) Significant changes in operating procedures for the KAC-Q
Numberal Code were initiated in mid-March 1969.

(a) Operational Security (OPSEC) analysis was used to pinpoint
those areas where the enemy was alerted to planned operations. Two
insecure areas which were identified involved the passing of future artillery
targets and the submission of unit locations in periodic SITREPs using
either clear text transmissions or base point systems such as the point-of-
origin.

(b) PW interrogation reports also identified these means of passing
targeting data and unit locations as weak areas which were exploited by
VC/NVA forces to avoid target areas and contact with US forces.

(c) The use of KAC-Q with the Autokey method of encryption provided
excellent security for numerical data. However, units found the Autokey
procedures difficult to follow under conditions of poor visibility or while
riding in moving vehicles.

(d) The Commanding General, United States Army Security Agency
recently approved the use of a modified straight line encryption procedure
for KAC-Q.
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(e) The new procedures were tested in the 1st Infantry Division beginning in mid-March. Initial results indicated that there was a significant reduction in the amount of communications intelligence made available to enemy forces, and that the new procedures were much easier to follow than the old Autokey system.

(f) Instructions on use of the modified straight line system were issued throughout Vietnam for use by all Army units.

(6) (U) The third quarterly issue of Combat Intelligence Lessons (CIL) was published on 1 April 1969. The continued increase in demand for the publication required an increase in the distribution.

(7) (U) On 17 March 1969, the DCG was briefed on the proposed reorganization of military intelligence detachments (MID) supporting the field forces/corps, divisions and separate brigades/armored cavalry regiment in Vietnam. The reorganization was approved and the MID MTOE package was delivered to G3 for processing prior to forwarding to DA for approval.

(8) (C) On 26 April 1969, all major tactical unit commanders were sent a survey questionnaire on the tactical operational value of the OV-1 (SLAR) and OV-C (IR) Mohawk. The survey addressed the immediate operational value and reliability of the intelligence information collected by those two systems. The responses to the survey will be collated, analyzed and presented to the DCG, USARV on 25 May 1969.

d. (C) PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

(1) (C) Movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Rear Elements from An Khe to Bien Hoa.

(a) Between 28 October and 10 November 1968, COMUSMACV redeployed the tactical elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) from operations in I CTZ to III CTZ. It appeared the move would be one of a rather permanent nature due to the buildup of enemy forces in III CTZ and the considerable deescalation of the enemy's operations in I CTZ.
(b) On 26 December, MG Forsythe, Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) stated that a move of his rear elements from An Khe to somewhere in III Corps was urgently needed. It was estimated that 750 men were lost each day to the forward elements due to the overextended LOC which required R&R, DEROS, Leave, and in/out processing personnel to travel between the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) POE-POD at Cam Ranh Bay, the base camp at An Khe, and the Division's forward elements in III CTZ.

(c) A survey was conducted by USARV G3 in February 1969 which determined that the Bien Hoa Army Base (BHAB) was best suited for the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) base camp. The decision was based on the following rationale:

1. BHAB was constructed to accommodate a force in excess of 7,500 men while only 3,500 were permanently assigned.

2. BHAB already contained some 1st Cavalry DISCOM, Supply and Service Medical and Engineer elements.

3. BHAB is contiguous to the Bien Hoa aerial port.

(d) COMUSMACV gave tentative approval of the move provided the defense of An Khe would not be impaired after the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Rear was re-deployed south. To preclude a defense gap at An Khe, a 184 man Vietnamese mercenary security force was formed, and USARV authorized a provisional Security Detachment to augment and direct the Vietnamese unit. These forces were assigned the mission of replacing the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) elements defending the "Green Line" perimeter of Camp Radcliff, An Khe effective 1 April 1969. COMUSMACV gave final approval to the move on 17 March 1969.

(e) The movement of men and equipment commenced on 1 April 1969 by air and sea. Currently the operation is 75 percent complete with an estimated completion date of 5 May 1969.

(2) (C) The Deployment of the M551 Sheridan. In January 1969, 60 M551 Sheridans were deployed to Vietnam. The 3d Squadron, 4th
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CAVALRY, 25th Infantry Division, and the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment each were issued 27 vehicles. Six Sheridans were retained as maintenance floats. Crew training, organizational maintenance, Direct Support and General Support training were provided on site by a 26 man New Equipment Training Team sent to USARV from CONUS. The first troop committed to combat was Troop B, 3/4 Cavalry on 8 February. The Army Concept Team in Vietnam began a 90 day operational evaluation of the Sheridan on 8 February. Should the evaluation be favorable, an additional 252 Sheridans will be issued to the Armored Cavalry units in Vietnam in FY70. As of 27 March, the two Sheridan equipped cavalry squadrons had participated in 454 missions, 12.6 percent of which resulted in contact with the enemy.

(3) (C) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF). During the period 22 July - 5 August 1968, the 1st Increment (one Infantry Brigade plus division command, combat support, and combat service support elements) of the RTAVF deployed to Vietnam. During August - September 1968, the Queen's Cobra Regiment returned to Thailand. The 2nd Increment, RTAVF, deployed to Vietnam during January - February 1969, completing deployment on 14 February 1969, and bringing the RTAVF to its full authorized strength of 11,266 (including a 5 percent overstrength). The RTAVF was under the operational control of the Commanding General, II FFORCENV. Administrative and logistical support was provided by USARV.

(4) (U) Government Owned Contractor Operated Equipment (GOCC) TDA. TDA documentation of GOCC equipment furnished to contractors has been completed for FY69 contracts with some exceptions. The exceptions were those contracts which expire in FY69 and are not currently planned for extension. Pacific Architects and Engineers R&U contract requirements for FY70 are presently being prepared. The latter M: TDA is scheduled for submission during June 1969.

(5) (U) TDA Augmentation to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was submitted in March. The augmentation for the four separate infantry brigades will be submitted during May 1969. The seven division augmentation TDA will be submitted by September 1969. These TDA contain tabular authority for minimum essential equipment for base camp operations not provided for in presently existing TOE/MTOE.
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(6) (U) Headquarters USARV MTDA. DA approved the Headquarters USARV MTDA on 27 November 1968. The approved printed document was received from USARPAC on 1 February 1969. An updated Headquarters USARV MTDA is currently being finalized for submission in early May 1969.

(7) (U) Reorganization of the 1st Logistical Command. In accordance with guidance received from DA, a closed loop package of TDA/MTDA reorganizing Headquarters 1st Logistical Command and the Qui Nhon, Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands was prepared and is being finalized for submission in early May 1969. The package submission implements USARPAC Manpower Utilization Surveys, Program 6 Civilianization and current local national augmentation of TOE units.

(8) (U) DA Directed Standardization Program.

(a) The Phase II Standardization Program for designated USARV combat, combat support and combat service support units was submitted, approved by DA, and implemented by General Orders.

(b) MTOE for Phase III Standardization Program for USARV COSTAR units have been submitted to DA. DA approval and implementation is expected at an early date.

(9) (U) Reorganization of the Americal and 101st Airborne Divisions.

(a) Reorganization of the Americal Division which began with Phase I in December 1968 was nearly completed during the quarter. Phase II, the actual reorganization, began on 15 February and ended in March. Phase III, the final review and adjustment phase, will be completed in May. To date, no significant difficulties were encountered.

(b) The conversion of the 101st Airborne Division to an Airmobile Division was completed in March with the deployment of the remaining elements of the 2/17 Air Cavalry Squadron.

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(10) (U) **Quick Reaction Lessons Learned.** During March 1969, USARV G3 was tasked to provide quick reaction lessons learned for several recent actions or incidents. The lessons learned for three of these actions were published on 30 March 1969. Other publications included USARV Regulation 160-5 (Counter Sapper Training), two Combat Lessons Bulletins, and Training Newsletter 1-69. Input was received from the units involved in the actions. The data was reviewed, sanitized, compiled, published, and disseminated to interested commands and agencies.

(11) (U) **NVA/VC Small Unit Tactics and Techniques.** In August 1968, DA tasked USARV to provide a compilation of NVA/VC small unit tactics and techniques in a single volume. DA intended to use the study to determine whether changes in current US Army doctrine were warranted. A study group was formed under G3 with representation from G2, G3, G4, C-E, Aviation, Provost Marshal, and Surgeon offices of Headquarters, USARV. Data was collected from various sources in RVN and CONUS. The study was published on 22 March 1969 and distributed to USARV units (down to battalion level), MACV, DA, major commands, and interested CONUS service schools. The study was published in loose-leaf form to facilitate updating.

(12) (U) **ENSURE Program.** During the reporting period, 12 ENSURE requests were submitted to DA for new or improved equipment. Significant ENSURE actions during the period were:

(a) A request for 662 Landing Zone Directors Signal Systems for the 1st Aviation Brigade, the two airmobile divisions, and divisional aviation battalions. The system is designed to assist units in directing night helicopter landings at forward bases. A BOI to meet total USARV requirements is currently under development.

(b) A request for a device to detect swimmers at or near bridges in RVN. The concept will provide bridge security forces with an around-the-clock capability to detect swimmers who attempt to emplace explosives or otherwise sabotage the bridge.
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(c) A request for airmobile dozers for all infantry division combat engineer battalions and separate brigade combat engineer companies. The dozer can be airlifted into fire support bases to assist in preparing fortifications.

(d) DA approved a requirement for 2145 belly armor modification kits for the M113A1 APC. These kits will commence arriving in June - July and a continuous review of mine incident rates will be made to insure priority of issue.

(e) As a result of a conference at USARPAC in February 1969, an organizational concept for the Air Cushion Vehicle unit was developed. The unit will be organized along the lines of an Armored Cavalry Troop with one platoon OPCON to XXIV Corps and the Troop (-) OPCON to the 9th Infantry Division.

(f) DA approval for 1435 Accurized M14 rifles with LWL/ART scopes to fulfill total USARV requirements for sniper weapons. The introduction of these weapons beginning August - September 1969, should significantly improve sniper operations in RVN.

13) (U) ENSURE Requests. The following is a summary of ENSURE requests submitted during the period 1 February - 30 April 1969.

(a) Travel Lift for ACV's - Pending DA validation.

(b) Director Finding (D/F) Equipment, Tower Mounted for Air Traffic Control - Pending DA validation.

(c) Hover Position Indicator for CH-54 - Pending DA validation.

(d) Parsons Model 77-1A Trenchliner - Approved.

(e) Ripper Attachment for Caterpillar D9G Tractor - Pending DA validation.

(f) Landing Zone Directors Signal System - Pending DA validation.
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(g) Underwater Swimmer Detector - Pending DA validation.

(h) Airmobile Dozer - Pending DA validation.

(i) D9G Tractors with Flame Plow Kits - Pending DA validation.

(j) Improved Illumination Ammunition - Pending DA validation.

(k) Tactical Automatic Dial Telephone Switching Equipment - Pending DA validation.

(l) Airborne Radar Warning System (ENSURE 138, Add-on) - Pending DA validation.

e. (C) LOGISTICS.

(1) (C) Ammunition Supply.

(a) Eight ammunition items were under Available Supply Rate (ASR)/Allocation management at the end of April as compared to twelve at the end of January. Items under ASR/Allocation management at the close of the period were:

*  Ctg. 40mm, HE
*  Gren. Hd, Off
*  Sig. Illum, Gd. WSP
*  Ctg. 81mm, HE

**Ctg. 105mm, HE
**Ctg. 4.2", HE
**Proj. 155mm, HE
**Proj. 8", HE

* Items under DA ASR management.

** Items under MACV allocation management.

(b) As a result of enemy action directed at the Qui Nhon Ammunition Depot on three occasions during the quarter, portions of that depot's
missions were transferred to the Cam Ranh Bay Ammunition Depot. The transferred missions included storage of 8,000 short tons (ST) of the Qui Nhon Ammunition Depot stockage objective and 6,000 ST of the Da Nang Support Command stockage objective. The latter tonnage was stored at Qui Nhon due to insufficient capacity in the Da Nang Support Command.

(c) Phase II of the USARV Class V Retrograde Program was completed in February. During that month, 13,562 ST of ammunition were retrograded, including 2,528 ST transferred to ARVN.

(d) During the period of increased enemy activity in February and March, the concept of Rolling Ammunition Supply Points (RASP) was developed and implemented. This concept involved preloading stake and platform trailers with fast moving Class V items on the complete round concept and positioning them in locations where the ammunition would be readily accessible to temporarily isolated friendly units.

(2) (U) Services Activities.

(a) Cargo discharged and handled in RVN ports (ST):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Discharged</th>
<th>Handled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>521,046</td>
<td>735,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>420,255</td>
<td>621,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>503,862</td>
<td>723,869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) SeaLand Container Service:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dry Vans</th>
<th>Reefer Vans</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>1,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1,561</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>1,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>1,251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(c) Motor Transport Tonnage (ST):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Port &amp; Beach</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>335,554</td>
<td>257,464</td>
<td>125,443</td>
<td>718,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>302,046</td>
<td>325,050</td>
<td>125,112</td>
<td>752,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>311,682</td>
<td>277,691</td>
<td>133,530</td>
<td>722,903</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) Service from Okinawa: (Semitrailers and Vans)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Rail Tonnage (ST):

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>17,992.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>15,637.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>16,238.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Air Passenger Movements (Out of Country):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Programmed</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Actually Moved</th>
<th>Percent Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>31,744</td>
<td>27,207</td>
<td>26,820</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>26,174</td>
<td>25,378</td>
<td>24,167</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>33,254</td>
<td>29,113</td>
<td>28,157</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(g) Intra-RVN Cargo/Passenger Movements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>50,539</td>
<td>175,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>47,560</td>
<td>158,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>45,186</td>
<td>172,430</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(h) Emergency Airlift Shipments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tactical</th>
<th>Emergency</th>
<th>Combat</th>
<th>Emergency</th>
<th>Resupply</th>
<th>Essential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) (U) Graves Registration Operations. Summary of mortuary operations is as follows:

(a) Remains processed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USA Mortuary, TSN</th>
<th>USA Mortuary, DNG</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>1143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>1689</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Personal Property Division Status:

Cases on hand 31 Dec 68 | 383

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Cases received 1 Jan - 31 Mar 69 2633
Cases shipped 1 Jan - 31 Mar 69 2399
Cases on hand 31 Mar 69 617

(4) (U) Class III Supply and Distribution.

(a) Consumption of bulk petroleum by US Forces, FWMAF, and RVNAF in II, III and IV CTZ and Army in I CTZ during the quarter was as follows:

January 2,869,700 bbl
February 2,756,600 bbl
March 2,714,900 bbl

(b) Headquarters USARV assumed the responsibility for procurement inspection of petroleum products procured in RVN effective 1 January 1969.

(c) Headquarters USARV initiated action to improve accountability procedures for petroleum received from commercial suppliers. Lessons learned from the recent GAO investigation in Thailand proved most beneficial in improving and policing the system in RVN.

f. (U) COMMAND MANAGEMENT. None.

g. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL.

(1) During the period, 273 complaints and 2,026 requests for assistance were processed. Of the 273 complaints, 76 were justified. This represents a substantial decrease in complaints and requests for assistance compared with the previous period. Increased emphasis by commanders on the "troops' open door policy", coupled with the policy of encouraging troops to initially present their problems within command channels as outlined in USARV Fact Sheet 2-69 accounted in most part for the decrease of requests for assistance and complaints. There was no indication of problem areas which could result in conditions detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of the command.
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(2) Headquarters USARV conducted Annual General Inspections of 43
USARV organizations down to battalion level during this period. Areas
most often found to be unsatisfactory or deficient were: inadequate mainte-
nance management operations, specifically in the areas of the Army Equip-
ment Records System (TAERS) and maintenance of prescribed load lists
(PLL) of repair parts; failure of commanders to authenticate requisitions
assigned 05 and higher issue priority designators; and failure to turn in
excess repair parts or to requisition parts authorized for stockage on
prescribed load lists.

h. (U) COMMAND INFORMATION. None.

i. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS.

(1) Designation of ACofS, G5. On 1 April 1969 USARV Headquarters
ACofS CORDS was redesignated ACofS, G5.

(2) Deployment of Civil Affairs Platoons. On 26 February 1969 MACV
reassessed the allocation of civil affairs platoons and instructed USARV to
extend the period of attachment of the three platoons from the 2d CA
Company to the 29th CA Company for an additional 90 days for refugee
work in I CTZ. The period was extended to 31 May 1969.

(3) Transfer of Staff Responsibility for PSYOP. Primary staff respon-
sibility for Psychological Operations at Headquarters USARV was trans-
ferred from ACofS, G3 to ACofS, G5, effective 1 March 1969. This
implemented DA DCSPER Board Recommendation 40 by combining the
similar politico-military functions of influencing people through a combi-
nation of social, economic, physical and psychological actions.

(4) Transfer of Staff Responsibility for Solatium. Primary staff
responsibility for Solatium at Headquarters USARV was transferred from
the Staff Judge Advocate to ACofS, G5, effective 1 April 1969. This better
aligned staff responsibility with staff functions, since solatium plays a
significant role in the community relations of US Army elements in RVN
and is supervised by unit G5/S5's.
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(5) Preparation of Civil Affairs Plans. CA Estimate, Handbook and Area Study for specific areas of Southeast Asia were prepared and forwarded to USARPAC as required by operating instructions from that headquarters. This included an annual update of earlier plans plus a complete rewriting of these documents in a new format provided by USARPAC.

(6) Management Improvement of the Kit Carson Scout Program. The highly successful KCS program expanded at a rate of approximately 120 KCS's per month. USARV plans for management of this program was developed in four phases.

Phase I  Initial establishment of the KCS program, AIK funded, organized and controlled at unit level.

Phase II  Introduction of formal management, O&MA funded, with centralized direction and detailed reporting.

Phase III  Advanced planning, programming support, determining future requirements, analyzing reports, exchanging ideas and lessons learned.

Phase IV  Expansion of the program, standardization, planning for transfer of KCS's to ARVN.

During this quarter the major accomplishments in the KCS program were:

(a) Review of current KCS personnel requirements for USARV units.

(b) Reallocation of KCS spaces to meet present needs, within MACV ceiling of 2200 spaces.

(c) Initiation of staff visits to units employing KCS's.

(d) Development of projected KCS requirements for FY70.

(e) Realignment of funding of the KCS program from O&MA to AIK accounts.
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j. (U) COMMAND HISTORY

k. (C) AVIATION

(1) Airfield Operation. The Joint Air Operations Group (JAOG) membership has expanded to include all military services and Air America. At a JAOG meeting hosted by the 814th Air Division on 7 April 1969, it was agreed that five working groups would be established with minimum membership being two representatives (a primary and an alternate) from each member of the JAOG. The working groups included: Airfield Facilities, Artillery Warning, Air Traffic Control, Notice to Airmen (NOTAMS); and Education. A briefing team from the education working group is currently giving briefings on RVN air operations to selected staffs and schools in CONUS.

(2) Aircraft Logistics.

(a) The program for conversion of 95 UH-1H (-)'s from the T53-L11 engine to the T53-L13 engine is 70 percent complete. Estimated completion date is May 1969.

(b) The engine conversion program for CH-47B aircraft was completed in March when T55-L7C engines were installed in the remaining 15 aircraft equipped with the T55-L7/L7B engines.

(c) USARV Regulation 95-27, Conspicuity Markings for Army Aircraft, was implemented. The regulation directed specific uniform paint markings on upper surfaces of Army aircraft to enhance safety of flight and facilitate the locating of downed aircraft. All helicopters with a two blade main rotor system had the top of one blade painted white, creating a strobe effect when the aircraft is viewed from a higher altitude in flight. Helicopters with main rotor systems in excess of two blades had the top surface of each blade tip marked in white. The top surface of synchronized elevators and horizontal stabilizers were painted with international orange. Fixed wing aircraft had standard white and international orange markings on the upper surface of wing and horizontal stabilizer assemblies.

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(d) A requirement was established for skid shoes on those OH-6A helicopters used for standardization and proficiency training. Several skid shoe designs were produced by the 1st Transportation Battalion (FAMF) and tested by the OH-6A Training Team at Vung Tau. The selected design was coordinated with the LOH Project Manager's Office, and an authorization to produce 120 sets of stainless steel, three quarter length skid shoes was issued to the 1st Transportation Battalion (FAMF). Estimated completion date of this project is 30 August 1969.

(3) Avionics.

(a) OV-1 Evaluation and Support. An evaluation of consolidated OV-1 assets in support of US divisions in RVN was completed during the quarter. Emphasis on electronic support to the Infra Red (IR) and Side Looking Aerial Radar (SLAR) Ground Station Terminals (GST) resulted in improved performance and utilization in GST operations. The evaluation report is being prepared by Headquarters II FFORCEV and ACTIV.

(b) Air Traffic Control Equipment. Five AN/TSQ-71 Ground Control Approach (GCA) radar systems were received and issued to using units, bringing the inventory of GCA systems in-country to 29 systems. The programmed installation of 20 Air Traffic Control Centrals, AN/FSQ-75 was completed during this quarter.

(c) Command Control Consoles. The planned total of eighty-three AN/ASC-15 consoles were received and issued to using units. The 34th General Support Group is refurbishing the AN/ARC-122 non-secure consoles for issue to ARVN forces.

(d) Standard Lightweight Avionics Equipment (SLAE). The New Equipment Introductory Team (NEIT) for SLAE conducted training at Vung Tau. Deployment plans and mission support plans were completed. Estimated delivery date of SLAE equipped OH-6 aircraft has been changed to June 1969.

27
Emergency Radio Set, AN URC-68 (ENSURE 147). An urgent requirement exists in RVN for an emergency radio set. USARV indicated the AN/URC-68 as acceptable with a limited FM homing capability. A mission support plan was forwarded to FCOM, and USARV Circular 750-4, "Maintenance of Supplies and Equipment Radio Set AN/URC-68" was revised. The estimated delivery schedule begins with 100 radios in May, increasing to 500 radios per month by July.

OH-6A Command Console. The 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division fabricated command consoles for the OH-6A using AN/PRC-25 and PRC-77 FM radios. A console design was forwarded to ECOM with a request for parts to locally fabricate forty-two consoles.

Aircraft Armament.

Throughout the quarter, the USARV aircraft armament inventory continued to be managed under Closed Loop Support (CLS) procedures. All armament programs met their objectives, except retrograde of the M-3 and M-16 systems was slightly behind the programmed schedule. The March 1969 inventory of XM-18E1 gun pods reflected sufficient deliveries to support the required BOI of 1.55 per AH-1G. A few discrepancies existed between inventories turned in by units and the inventory records maintained at USARV. These discrepancies are being worked out with timely and accurate armament loss reports by units and close liaison between USARV Armament Branch and Units.

The XM-8 (40mm grenade launcher for the OH-6A) arrived in April 1969 for a 90 day evaluation. This evaluation will be monitored by ACTIV and if the evaluation warrants further procurement a basis of issue will be established.

The conversion of the AH-1G armament subsystem from the TAT 102 to the XM-28 was begun on 7 April. Performed by a contract team from Lockheed, this conversion for ninety-six subsystems will require approximately 24 weeks to complete.

The World Wide Aviation Closed Loop Support Conference in March 1969 disclosed the slippage of the XM-35 armament subsystem
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(20mm, 6 barrel gun for the AH-1G) from an in-country date of July 1969
until September 1969.

(e) The fabrication and issue of one hundred aircraft jettisonable
flare racks was completed during this reporting period. The racks
carry twenty-four M-24 flares outside the aircraft, and can be easily
jettisoned in an emergency.

(5) Aviation Training.

(a) The AH-1G Training Team continued operations during the
reporting period with 68 aviators completing transition training. Eighteen
aviators were qualified as Standardization Instructor Pilots (SIP) and
Instructor Pilots (IP) during non-school training time. The AH-1G
Training Team was relocated to Vung Tau on 5 March 1969 and the student
capacity was increased to 24 students per class on 30 March 1969. This
move was required to obtain sufficient billeting, maintenance and training
space to support the increased student capacity.

(b) The OH-6A Training Team transitioned 75 aviators in the OH-6A
helicopter during 31 January - 30 April 1969. Twenty-one Standardization
Instructor Pilots and Instructor Pilots were qualified during non-school
training time.

(c) The OH-58 NEIT arrived in RVN and conducted briefings on the
OH-58 helicopter at various locations throughout USARV during 21 - 30
April 1969.

1. (U) ENGINEER.

(1) Operations. The 577th Engineer Battalion (Construction) moved
from Phu Hiep to Dong Duong to accomplish LOC construction in vicinity
of Dalat.

(2) Construction.
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(a) During March 1969, the Construction Division assumed the responsibility for fiscal management of the MCA program in RVN. This function had previously been the responsibility of the Director of Construction, MACV. Assumption of this function will permit the Division to more effectively manage the entire MCA program.

(b) On 15 March 1969, MACV tasked the Construction Division to develop priority lists for Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) contract construction in II, III, and IV Corps by 1 April 1969. CG I FFORCEV, as Zone Coordinator, developed and integrated the II Corps list to include Air Force and Navy projects as per MACV direction. The lists for III and IV Corps consisted of Army projects only for subsequent integration by MACV. Additionally, MACV advised that all future lists would be tri-service integrated by Zone Coordinators. The priority list for I Corps was prepared as a tri-service list by the III Marine Amphibious Force in close cooperation with Army, Navy and Air Force members of the Da Nang Area Base Development Board. As finally developed, the priority lists for III and IV Corps consisted of seven groups. One list included waterfront construction for the entire area. The others consisted of one list each for horizontal and vertical construction in the three primary contractor mobilization locations: Saigon and vicinity; the Delta; to include Vung Tau; and Long Binh, to include Bien Hoa.

(3) Mapping and Intelligence.

(a) The First Order Traverse was still observed in the Delta. The Vietnamese National Geographic Survey (NGS) has completed all observations between Saigon to Can Tho following an inland route, and is now conducting a reconnaissance from Sa Dec to Rach Gia and Chau Duc. Results of the NGS survey are not yet available for accuracy determination. The US portion of the survey, which travels along the eastern coast and then moves inland to Can Tho, is now being observed. Nearly all stations had angles measured, but no distance observations were made due to microwave interference with the Tellurometers and the limited range of the Geodimeter now available. Steps are being taken to obtain a Geodimeter with extended range, and all towers were left up for use by
the distance-measuring teams. It is estimated that the survey effort will move to the I and II CTZ area by the end of May to resume that portion of the traverse.

(b) Aerial photography was directed toward support of the LOC program and practically no urban photography was flown. About two-thirds of the LOC requests were fulfilled, although the remaining roads will probably be the most difficult. At present, the only cities which will be flown in the near future are Pleiku, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon. The aircraft will be responsive to any tactical requests, however. The weather pattern should allow an increasing number of flights in the I and II CTZ during May, June, and July, while the Delta regions will not be available for photograph during this period due to clouds.

(c) Terrain Scale Studies (TSS) and Hamlet Studies were produced for the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, at the rate of one TSS per month and one hamlet study per quarter.

(d) Base planning maps at a scale of 1:2400 and 1:4800 were completed during the reporting period for seven areas requested by the XXIV Corps Engineer and provided to USAECAP. USAECAP requested similar coverage of Camp Enari, and photographs were taken for this project.

(4) Supply. During the reporting period, a total of 319 pieces of commercial construction equipment were received in RVN under Military Construction Army - Lines of Communication (MCA-LOC) Program. This figure represents 49 percent of the total items purchased. A review of forecasted arrivals of MCA-LOC equipment indicates that the remainder will arrive in RVN NLT August 1969.

m. (C) COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS.

(1) (C) Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM). No additional secure voice switchboards (SECORD's) were activated during the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969. Installation was completed on the three SECORD's remaining to be activated (Nha Trang, Pleiku, and
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Qui Nhon. All subscriber terminals for these three SECORD's were installed. However, they cannot be activated until sufficient personnel are available for operation and maintenance. As of 30 April 1969, a total of 151 wide-band and 16 narrow-band subscribers (of all services) were activated. Of these subscriber terminals, USARV has maintenance responsibility for 108 wide-band and 10 narrow-band terminals.

(2) (U) Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN). Expansion of the USARV AUTODIN (including Army operated MACV and DCS facilities) continued with the activation of eight terminals at six Commcenters during the quarter ending 30 April 1969. Included was the replacement of operational transportables by fixed facilities. The expansion during this quarter increased the total number of terminals operated by USARV to 41. These terminals provided AUTODIN support to 32 Commcenters/facilities. Four Commcenters included in the USARV C-E LOI Number 1 (AUTODIN Teletype Networks RVN) dated 31 December 1968, still require an AUTODIN capability. Replacement of many of the active terminals by 24 digital subscriber terminal equipments (DSTE) is scheduled as a part of the continuing program to expand and improve AUTODIN within the command.

(3) (U) Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System Status. At the beginning of the quarterly reporting period (1 February 1969) only one Tandem Switching Center (TSC) had been activated in the Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System (SEA-ATS). This TSC was activated at Bang Pla in Thailand in December 1968. On 1 February 1969, the TSC at Can Tho was successfully activated and provided direct distance dial (DDD) service throughout RVN and Thailand to subscribers of Binh Thuy AB, Can Tho, Dong Tam, Soc Trang, and Vinh Long dial telephone exchanges (DTE). On 29 March 1969, the TSC at Korat in Thailand was activated and provides DDD service to subscribers of five exchanges in Northern Thailand. On 12 April 1969, the second TSC in RVN was activated at Da Nang. This TSC serves subscribers of Chu Lai, Da Nang AF, Da Nang East (Navy), Da Nang Red Beach, and Phu Bai DTE's.

(4) (U) Installation of Corps Area Communications System in Support of 1st Cavalry Division (Airborne). On 9 February 1969, elements of the
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) made a rapid move from Phuoc Vinh. The 1st Signal Brigade was tasked to provide a 12 channel system to support the division during and after the move. The system was activated within a matter of hours, and communications service was provided to meet the requirement.

(5) (U) Installation of Corps Area Communications System in Support of 173d Airborne Brigade. In March 1969, a survey of circuit routing indicated that a more direct and reliable path was required to support the 173d Airborne Brigade. This need was met by tasking the 1st Signal Brigade to install a troposcatter radio system from Landing Zone English to Phu Cat. The installed system provided better service to elements supporting the brigade.

(6) (C) Airborne Radio Relay Operations. The five airborne radio relay aircraft assigned to the 1st Signal Brigade were used extensively in support of Project Delta operations in the XXI Corps area of operations. Relay missions were normally flown during the hours of daylight on a continuing basis with US and ARVN personnel operating the radio relay equipment on each flight. A total of 249 hours of airborne radio relay were flown in support of Project Delta from 2 April 1969 to 25 April 1969.

(7) (U) Installation of Corps Area Communications System in Support of Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT. In late March 1969, the Navy requested support of Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT. A portion of the support requested included a requirement to enter the common user telephone system in the Saigon area, and to establish sole user circuits into the Delta area. To meet these diverse requirements, two VHF systems were installed between the Navy command post, located on a barge, and entry points of the Corps Area Communications Systems. This action was completed on 30 April 1969, shortly after the Navy barge arrived on site.

(8) (C) Allocation/Distribution of Single Sideband Radio (SSB) Equipment.

(a) The SSB equipment posture within Army units in RVN was greatly enhanced with the distribution of additional SSB assets. On 10 April 1969,
the USARV Chief of Staff approved the allocation and distribution of 330 each AN/GRC-142 SSB Radio Teletypewriter Sets. On 28 April additional allocations were approved for 61 each AN/GRC-142's. This brings USARV units to over 90 percent of their authorized fill.

(b) On 12 April 1969, the USARV Chief of Staff approved the allocation and distribution of 50 each AN/GRC-106 SSB Radios.

(9) (C) Tactical Secure Voice Program. As of 30 April 1969, 95 percent of all authorized tactical secure voice equipment, TSEC/KY-8, TSEC/KY-28 and TSEC/KY-38, was in-country and distributed to USARV and MACV units. Approximately 40 percent of this equipment arrived during the 3d Quarter FY69. The production schedule of the TSEC/HYL-3 Regenerative Repeater, which will provide a retransmission capability for the tactical secure voice equipment, is proceeding satisfactorily. The first thirty each HYL-3's, scheduled to arrive in late May 1969, will be used for testing and evaluation purposes prior to the total quantity being shipped from CONUS.

n. (U) MILITARY JUSTICE AND LEGAL AFFAIRS. None.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (U) PERSONNEL. None.

b. (U) OPERATIONS. None.

c. (U) TRAINING. None.

d. (C) INTELLIGENCE.

(1) (C) Protection of Personnel Facilities Against Sabotage.

(a) OBSERVATION: Extensive security measures are normally in effect to protect materiel, equipment and supplies against sabotage attempts.
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Less detailed attention is usually given to the protection of the individual
soldier while he is in an area normally considered to be secure from
infiltration by the enemy. Recurring reports indicate that the enemy has
or intends to establish sapper units on base camps among indigenous
employees.

(b) EVALUATION: Troop facilities are targets of terrorist activities.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That stringent measures be established at
the lowest echelon to assure that troop facilities are closely inspected
for booby traps, other explosives and incendiaries.

(2) (C) Location of Enemy Mortar and Rocket Positions.

(a) OBSERVATION: Enemy mortar and rocket fire directed against
US fixed installations is normally conducted from sites located on or in
the immediate vicinity of prominent terrain features.

(b) EVALUATION: Analysis of VC/NVA indirect firing procedures
reveals that, based upon radar sightings, shell reps, and information
provided by ralliers and PWs, over 95 percent of all mortar and rocket
attacks conducted against one USARV organization were initiated from
sites located on or no more than 300 meters from roads, road junctions
and streams. The principal reasons for this are:

1 Mathematical firing data computations are more accurate when
rendered from known locations.

2 Safety and speedy egress from the firing site.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That counterbattery programs concentrate
on these likely sites and that countermortar radars increase targeting
along these terrain features.

(3) (C) OB Analysis at Brigade Level.

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(a) OBSERVATION: Timely OB analysis is needed at brigade level to facilitate immediate reaction.

(b) EVALUATION: One organization within USARV assigned two OB analysts to two separate brigade headquarters. The men were experienced analysts with a broad knowledge of OB functions and procedures. A capability for immediate readout of captured documents and agent reports was provided the brigades and subordinate units by these analysts. Identification of enemy units in contact was expeditiously made and information forwarded to the division OB section for confirmation and further analysis.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this system be adopted when brigades have operational headquarters located away from division intelligence detachments which contain OB sections.

e. (U) LOGISTICS.

(1) (U) Item: M551 repair parts.

(a) OBSERVATION: Demand data for M551 Sheridan repair parts, in some cases, do not get recorded due to expedited action aimed at removing vehicles from deadline.

(b) EVALUATION: Since the deployment of Sheridan to SEA, several repair parts failures have occurred which resulted in extraordinary measures being taken to remove vehicles from deadline. Repair parts such as recoil seal follower rings, track adjuster brackets, pulleys, fan belts, air filter elements, etc., have been requested via telephone calls and messages to the Sheridan Project Manager. Repair parts have also been "pushed" to RVN by the Project Manager to resolve known repair parts shortages. These actions, while necessary to remove vehicles from deadline, have circumvented the supply system in that demand data often does not get recorded at unit, support maintenance or depot level. The net effect is that needed repair parts are not available in the supply pipeline in sufficient quantities to support the vehicle. The ICCV is aware of this problem and is taking action to insure that the demands are recorded.
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(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That Project Manager representatives, technical representatives and supply personnel at unit, support maintenance, and depot levels insure that all requirements for repair parts, however acquired, are recorded as demands on the supply system.

(2) (U) Item: AR 700-70, Distribution of Support Items for New Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Some items of new equipment are deployed to RVN without proper logistical support.

(b) EVALUATION: AR 700-70 requires that a 90 percent range and quantity of all non-TASL support items be shipped to the gaining command prior to the deployment of the end item. In many cases, this requirement cannot be met without delaying the deployment of the end item. When this results, the commodity manager (NICP) requests a waiver of the provisions of AR 700-70 in order to meet the deployment schedule. This headquarters has been very lenient in granting waivers primarily because field commanders desire the equipment as rapidly as possible. This practice has invariably resulted in a less than satisfactory readiness posture until the necessary logistics support becomes available. The same commanders who request that equipment deliveries be expedited are the first to condemn the lack of logistical support provided for the equipment. The final result of the waiver can be a lack of confidence by the individual soldier in the reliability of his equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In the future, this headquarters will apply a more critical review of requests for waivers of the provisions of AR 700-70.

(3) (U) Item: Installation of Pipelines.

(a) OBSERVATION: Considerable difficulty was experienced during the quarter with a pipeline on Red Beach at Qui Nhon.

(b) EVALUATION: Heavy seas damaged the line to the extent that it became necessary to abandon it and construct a new welded line inland from the beach.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That future pipelines not be constructed in
or on beaches where they are vulnerable to damage by seas, tidal action
and shifting sand.

(4) (U) Item: Introduction of an Item into the Supply System.

(a) OBSERVATION: Stocks of Turbine Engine Oil, MIL-L-7808 fell
below safety levels during the quarter due to difficulties experienced in
achieving changeover to a replacement oil (MIL-L-23699) by USARV
aviation units. Stocks remain at a critically low level in RVN.

(b) EVALUATION: Appropriate supply action has been taken, to
include requesting USAAVCOM assistance, in accomplishing the Army
changeover to the new product (MIL-L-23699). It appears that this
problem occurred as a result of inadequate coordination between supply
and aviation elements at several levels.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the introduction of a replacement
lube into the supply system be thoroughly coordinated with all interest
commands prior to the introduction being made.

(5) (U) Item: Artillery Repair and Return (R&R) Program.

(a) OBSERVATION: To document the Artillery R&R Program and
record the lessons learned.

(b) EVALUATION: Under combat conditions in the field, it is
frequently impossible to perform the complete, detailed periodic
organizational maintenance services called for by technical manuals.
The result is shortened equipment life caused by the compounded effects
of organizational maintenance shortfall. Recognizing that through mainte-
nance services are the key to optimum equipment availability, USARV has
initiated an "R&R Program" for self-propelled artillery. The program
provides for the self-propelled artillery, accompanied by the crew, to
be periodically pulled in to DS shops for intensive quarterly type mainte-
nance service. The artillery is given a complete inspection, to include
pulling packs and steam cleaning engine compartments. The major
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Advantages are that DSU facilities, equipment, and technical assistance are made available to the vehicle crew to ensure that a thorough, periodic service is performed. The R&R requires a 5 - 7 day standdown. In order to ensure that minimum downtime is experienced, it has been found necessary to perform the technical inspection at least two weeks prior to R&R in order to compensate for requisitioning lead time. Also, based on experience, DSU stocks of fast moving repair parts (e.g., seals, gaskets, and bearings) have been increased.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To date, the entire fleet of 175mm/8" weapons has received on R&R and a second cycle has begun. The first cycle of 105mm/155mm SP Artillery is currently in process. It is felt that the artillery R&R Program has been a major contributing factor to USARV's favorable operationally-ready rate for self-propelled artillery. Recommend that the program continue without change.

(b) (U) Integrated Contract Construction Priority Lists.

(a) OBSERVATION: Integrated contract construction priority lists have significant meaning if developed in relation to the locations where the contractor is mobilized. Inter-service coordination, as effected in the integrated priority list developed by Commanding General, I FFORCEV, is a great improvement over past procedures and holds promise for significant improvement in the apportionment of construction resources in the III and IV Corps areas.

(b) EVALUATION: Waterfront construction effort is very limited in RVN, thus a meaningful priority listing for waterfront effort can only be developed on a Corps-wide basis. Other priority lists are most meaningful when prepared in relation to mobilization location and type of effort involved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That integrated contract construction priority lists be prepared based on contractor mobilization locations throughout RVN and that priorities be divided for vertical and horizontal construction effort. That the waterfront priority list be prepared on a Corps-wide basis. That inter-service coordination, as effected by Commanding General, I FFORCEV, be used throughout Vietnam for the preparation of these lists.
Funding:

(a) OBSERVATION: Many commanders and staff officers lack a basic understanding of Army funding procedures.

(b) EVALUATION: Many operational support and MCA construction staff actions would be greatly facilitated if the principals had a better understanding of O&MA, MCA, and PEMA funding procedures. The basic problem is that there is a lack of understanding of what the various funds are for, how their assets are administered, and who administers them. Also, many officers have no idea how the funds are interrelated to the missions of the command.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all branch officer career courses be modified to include an orientation on basic funding procedures, their purposes, and how they work. The common-place role that funding has in the modern Army should be taught to every officer.
GPOP-DT (11 May 69) 1st Ind (U)
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HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 JUN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORRIT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
## Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, United States Army Vietnam

### Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

**Authors:**
- (First name, middle initial, last name)

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**Abstract**

N/A

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**Sponsoring Military Activity**
- OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310