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AGAM-P (M) (3 June 69) FOR OT UT 691115 6 June 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

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[Signature]

C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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Defense Documentation Center
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Documents Control Officer, Bell Aero Systems Co.
Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969  
RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

Section I: OPERATIONS

1. (C) OPERATIONS:
   a. GENERAL
      (1) The reporting period covers the conclusion of the following operations:
         (a) Operation JEB STUART III (terminated 031200H Nov 1968).
         (b) Operation COMMANCHE FALLS (terminated 071200H Nov 1968).
         (c) Operation LIBERTY CANYON (terminated 201200 H Nov 1968).
         (d) Operation NAVAJO WARHORSE I (terminated 171200H Jan 1969).
      (2) The reporting period covers the initiation of the following operations:
         (a) Operation SHERIDAN SABRE (initiated 071200H Nov 1968).
         (b) Operation NAVAJO WARHORSE I (initiated 151200H Dec 1968).
         (c) Operation NAVAJO WARHORSE II (initiated 171200H Jan 1969).
      (3) The I ACD completed Operation JEB STUART III in NICTZ at 031200H Nov 1968. This highly successful operation was terminated after 170 days of continuous combat operations intended to deny the enemy the rice assets of the NICTZ coastal plain and the use of Base Areas 101 and 114. Cumulative final results of the operation were:
         (a) US: 212 KIA, 1,512 WIA (1337 evac), 31 aircraft destroyed.
         (b) Enemy (NVA/VC): By US: 1626/390 KIA, 149/102 PW captured, 1,078 individual weapons captured, 124 crew served weapons captured, 235,796 rounds of small arms ammunition captured, 5,515 large caliber rounds captured, 475.65 tons of rice captured.
      (4) Operation COMMANCHE FALLS, a combined US and ARVN effort to eliminate Viet Cong infrastructure along the MY CHON RIVER from THON MY CHON to the coast, was terminated at 071200H Nov 1968. Cumulative final results of the operation were:

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(a) Friendly:
1. US: 20 KIA, 57 WIA (50 evac), 2 MIA, 5 aircraft destroyed.
2. 1st ARVN Regiment: 21 KIA, 102 WIA (86 evac).

(b) Enemy:
1. By US (NVA/VC): 24/13 KIA, 1,118 large caliber rounds, 9 crew served weapons captured, 159 individual weapons captured, 22,173 small arms ammunition captured, 191 mines and grenades captured, 16.3T rice captured.
2. By 1st ARVN Regiment (NVA/VC): 256/61 KIA, 184 individual weapons captured, 19 crew served weapons captured, 42,990 small arms ammunition captured, 3,918 large caliber rounds captured, 4,51 tons of rice captured.

2 Personnel captured by combined forces (NVA/VC): 13/24 (US, credited with 7/1; ARVN with 4/0).

(5) At 261442 H October 1968, the 1 ACD was alerted to begin redeployment from NICTZ to III CTZ. Thus began Operation LIBERTY CANYON, which was to see the 1 ACD move on twenty four hours notice over 570 miles by land, sea and air. The mission was to withdraw from active combat operations in NICTZ, move to III CTZ for immediate commitment against an increasing threat in the northwestern Cambodian border area.

(a) Combat elements of the Division's 3d Brigade were the first to move and upon closing in the new area, were placed under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division, while combat elements of the 1st Brigade on closing, were placed under operational control of the 25th Infantry Division.

(b) The division headquarters deployed to PHUOC VINH and operational control of the 3d Brigade was returned to the 1st Air Cav Division, on 7 November 1968. On 9 November 1968, the division assumed operational control of its 1st Brigade from the 25th Infantry Division.

(c) Combat elements of the 2d Brigade closed in the new area and became operational under division control on 12 November 1968, with the last combat essential equipment of the division closing into III CTZ on 15 November 1968.

(6) From the outset of operations in III CTZ the Division conducted extensive reconnaissance in force operations throughout TAY NINH, BINH LONG and PHUOC LONG Provinces in an effort to stem enemy infiltration and exfiltration along ADAM'S ROAD, SERGE'S JUNGLE HOG and south from the FISHHOOK.

(a) In mid-December the operations were extended into HAU NGHIA and portions of KIEN TUONG and LONG AN Provinces, with particular emphasis on infiltration and supply routes in the ANGEL'S WING and PARROT'S BEAK areas. Making maximum use of its airmobility and fire power and utilizing all available tactical air and artillery support, the division sought to neutralize enemy assembly areas, destroy fighting positions, locate and capture weapons' caches and other vital logistical support areas, interdict enemy supply routes, as well as secure important friendly lines of communications and bridges in the division area.

(b) These operations were effectively supported by FWMAF units operating in the division area of responsibility or in direct support of division efforts. Success of overall operations was greatly enhanced by the 2d Bn, 2d Infantry (Mechanized) and troop size units from 1st and 3rd Squadrons, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment under operational control of the division during most of the report period.

(c) Light and heavy enemy contacts were made almost daily throughout the division area and the enemy was decisively defeated at every opportunity.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

(d) At 07120H Nov 1968, Operation SHERIDAN SABRE was initiated in the SHERIDAN SABRE AO. This operation was continuing at the close of the reporting period. Results at the close of the reporting period were:

1. Friendly: US: 219 KIA, 1,387 WIA (1222 evac), 6 MIA, 14 aircraft destroyed, 12 APC's destroyed, 3 indiv weapons lost.
2. Friendly: RVNAF: 32 KIA, 217 WIA (205 evac), 1 MIA.
3. Enemy by US: 2,692 KIA, 41 Pl, 19 Civil Defendants, 15 returnees, 165 crew served weapons captured or destroyed, 472 individual weapons captured or destroyed, 8,732 large caliber rounds of ammunition captured or destroyed, 711,590 small arms rounds captured or destroyed, 51.6 T of Rice captured, 42 mines and booby traps and 975 grenades captured or destroyed.
4. Enemy by RVNAF: 206 KIA, 12 PW, 19 Civil Defendants, 15 returnees, 165 crew served weapons captured or destroyed, 86 individual weapons captured or destroyed, 294 large caliber rounds captured or destroyed, 7,550 small arms rounds captured or destroyed.

(7) Operation NAVAJO WARHORSE I and II are Ist Brigade operations and are reported separately below.

a. lst Brigade Operations:

(1) During the reporting period the lst Brigade deployed from I CTZ to III CTZ (TAY NINH WEST) and initiated offensive combat operations to interdict enemy infiltration routes and destroy enemy forces, installations, and equipment in TAY NINH Province.

(a) On 15 December 1968, lst Brigade began redeployment to CU CHI COMBAT BASE to interdict enemy infiltration from Cambodia through the "ANGEL'S WING" and "PARROT'S BEAK" Areas into HAU NGHIA Province.

(b) Further redeployment of forces of 1/8 Cav was initiated to LZ ELROD to interdict infiltration into KIEN TOUNG Province in IV CTZ. Leaving an element of 1/8 CAV (TASK FORCE DUKE) in the NAVAJO WARHORSE II AO, the lst Brigade further redeployed to the SHERIDAN SABRE AO to interdict enemy infiltration routes through southeastern TAY NINH Provinces leading towards the TAY NINH and DAU TIENG COMBAT BASES.

(2) To facilitate control and provide essential supporting bases, fire bases were established at LZS MUSTANG, BEVERLY, ANN, MICHAEL, and INA in the SHERIDAN SABRE AO; LZ'S TRACY, CLARE, RAY, and ELROD in the NAVAJO WARHORSE I & II AO's; and LZS WHITE and GRANT in the SHERIDAN SABRE AO.

(a) Throughout the period of this report, offensive operations were conducted in conjunction with US NAVY FORCES and ARVN Marine, Airborne, CIDG, Regional, and Popular Forces.

(b) In the NAVAJO WARHORSE I and II AO's maximum coordination was effected with US NAVY RIVER PATROL FORCES to deny the enemy use of water infiltration routes, joint operations were launched along these waterways to eliminate enemy traffic, to neutralize bases, and to seek out caches. These "NAV - CAV" operations proved invaluable in the flooded and marshy regions of HAU NGHIA and KIEN TOUNG Provinces in supplementing helicopter lift and increasing...
mobility of the 1st Brigade.
(c) Elements performing base construction and security were held to a minimum in order to provide maneuver troops for offensive operations.  
(d) Emphasis was placed on "rushmaster" operations with "rushes" ranging from squad to platoon size. "Mini-Cav" Operations were used extensively during the period to insure maximum coverage of the large areas encompassing the Brigade AO's.

3. Throughout the reporting period the 1st Brigade maintained close and continuous coordination and cooperation with the many and varied RVNAF forces in the AO. The brigade S-2 attends a daily joint briefing with sector S-2 agencies in TAJ MINH CITY.

b. 2d Brigade Operations:
1. During the reporting period 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969, the 2d Brigade participated in operation COMANCHE FALLS PHASE III (0700H November 1968 - 071200H November 1968), operation LIBERTY CANYON (071200H November 1968 - 120900H November 1968), and operation SHERIDAN SABRE (120900H November 1968 through the end of the reporting period).
(a) In operation COMANCHE FALLS (PHASE III) the 2d Brigade consisted of 1/5 CAV, 2/5 CAV, 3/5 Armd Cav, 1/77 Armor, and elements of the 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN).
(b) The operation commenced with the 2/5 CAV, units of 3/5 Armd Cav and units of 1/77 Armor establishing a cordon around the MY CHANH Village complex. The maneuvering elements of the 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN) simultaneously air assaulted into LZ's and began search operations in the MY CHANH objective area. The operation was characterized by light enemy resistance. The searching ARVN elements and 3/5 Armd Cav found a cache containing 12 tons of unpolished rice.

2. The operation ended at 071200H November 1968 for the 2d Brigade and organic units. The AO was released to 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), along with non-organic units attached to THE FIRST TEAM.

(2) OPERATION LIBERTY CANYON
(a) The 2d Brigade began their move to III CTZ 071200H November, and closed at PHUOC VINH, on 120900H November 1968. The brigade, during the time of the operation, was comprised of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company.
(b) The displacement of the 2d Brigade from II CTZ to III CTZ was carried out in a minimum amount of time, and there were no unusual incidents recorded during the operation.

(3) Operation SHERIDAN SABRE:
(a) Operation SHERIDAN SABRE began at 120900H November continued through the end of the reporting period. The units operating with the 2d Brigade were 2/7 CAV, 2/8 CAV and 36th ARVN Ranger Bn. At 140700H November, 5/7 CAV became OPCON to 2d Brigade. On 16 November, 36th ARVN Ranger Bn was replaced by the 52d ARVN Ranger Bn in the previously assigned ARVN AO. On 17 November OPCON of 2/7 CAV went to 3d Brigade. At 161500H November the brigade gained OPCON of 5/1/11 Armd Cav. The CIDG units operating in the 5/7 CAV area became OPCON to 5/7 CAV on 20 November. On 8 December elements of the 5th Div (ARVN)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

became OPCON to 2d Brigade. On 9 December elements of the 2/2 Mech Inf, an additional armored cav troop and 2/12 CAV began operations with the 2d Brigade. On 14 December 1 armored cav troop left OPCON of 2d Brigade. At 201800H December, 2d Brigade gained OPCON of an additional armored cav troop. On 22 December, OPCON of 2/12 CAV went to 3d Brigade. Also on 22 December, the 2d Brigade lost OPCON of 1 armored cav troop. On 28 December the 3dth ARVN Rangers replaced the 52d ARVN Rangers, closing in their AO at 1430 hours. On 23 January, 2d Brigade lost OPCON of 1 armored cav troop. On 28 December the 34th ARVN Rangers replaced the 52d ARVN Rangers, closing in their AO at 1430 hours. On 23 January, 2d Brigade gained OPCON of 1 ARVN BN, and 4/1/11 Arm Cav was replaced by B 2/31 Arm Cav. On 300600H January, 2/8 CAV was replaced by 2/5 CAV, with 2/5 CAV assuming responsibility for that AO.

c. 3d Brigade Operations:

(1) During the period 1 October – 31 January 1968, the GARRY OWEN Brigade completed Operation JEB STUART III in I Corps Tactical Zone, deployed to QUAN LOI and commenced operations in III Corps Tactical Zone (Operation LIBERTY CANON, 26 October – 9 November 1968).

(2) The 3d Bde mission in III Corps has been the screening and interdiction of the ADA'S and SERGES JUNGLE Roads (Operations TOAN THANG II and SHERID-3ABRE). During the period, Brigade elements engaged company size elements on ten separate occasions and engaged smaller enemy elements almost daily.

(a) The Brigade accounted for 38 VC and 485 NVA killed, 105 individual and 33 crew-served weapons captured, 2 PW and received 5 Ho Chi Minh's.

(b) Brigade operations were characterized by a high degree of air mobility, employment of all available organic and non-organic combat resources and close operational coordination with VNAF Forces.

d. 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Operations

(1) All elements of the Squadron were fully operational in the III CTZ by 1 November 1968.

(a) A Troop is located at TAY NINH WEST; B Troop is located at QUAN LOI; C Troop is located at PHUOC VINH. D Troop initially moved to PHUOC VINH and participated in Base Defense, then on 18 November 1968, they moved to QUAN LOI (LZ ANDY) to perform road reconnaissance and convoy escort mission on QL-13.

(b) During the reporting period the A, B and C Troops remained under 1/9 CAV control but were co-located with the 1st, 2d and 3d Brigades respectively.

(c) During NAVAJ W/JHORSE I & II, A Troop supported 1st Bde elements in the NAVAJ W/JHORSE AO on a mission request basis.

(2) During the reporting period 1/9 CAV conducted extensive reconnaissance and surveillance operations throughout the 1 ACD AO. All troops continued to conduct intensive first and last light reconnaissance around TAY MINH, QUAN LOI and PHUOC VINH.

(a) Except for special operations, emphasis has been directed to reconnaissance of the known enemy infiltration routes from Cambodia in the vicinity of the ADAMS HIGHWAY, SERGES JUNGLE TRAIL, THE FISHHOOK and the ANGEL'S WING areas.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

(b) Mortar patrols, "Sniffer" missions, bomb damage assessment and insertion of the Troop's organic infantry platoons (Blues) into known or suspected enemy locations and to secure downed aircraft, continue to be routine missions by the 1st Squadron, 9th CAV.

(3) Many of THE FIRST TEAM'S successful engagements were initiated by sightings or contacts by the elements of the squadron.

(a) On 22 November 1968 while on a general reconnaissance north of LOC NINH rubber plantation, a small village was observed that did not appear normal. Closer examination revealed approximately 40 military age males and 25 bicycles in the village.

(b) C Troop, 1-11 Armored Cav was notified and began moving into the area. The armored Cav Troop made heavy contact killing over 50 'VA on 27 Nov 68;

a. Combat Support Elements Operations:
   (1) Division Artillery: Submitted separately
   (2) 11th Aviation Group:

       (a) Headquarters, 11th Aviation Group relocated from NA to IIC

       (b) Troop, 11th Aviation Group relocated from PHUOC VINH along with 11th General Support Company.

       (c) 227th (ASH) relocated its Headquarters and C Company to PHUOC VINH; B Company to QUAN LOC; and A and B Companies to LAI KHE.

       (d) 229th (AHB) relocated its Headquarters, A and B Companies to PHUOC VINH.

       (e) 228th (ASH) relocated its Headquarters and A and B Companies to PHUOC VINH.

(b) COMANCHE FALIS III (2 Nov - 6 Nov) This Operation was initiated during the preparation for movement of the 229th Avn Bn to the Southern III Corps Area. The initial assault was made into the MY CHANH River Village Complex NE of LZ NANCY with 2 Battalions of the 1st ARVN Div and 1 Battalion of the 2nd Bde.

1 The entire operation was executed smoothly. The LZs and PZs were large and accommodating due to prior recon. Minimum delay between sorties was executed.

2 The operation continued to be supported with limited LCC and CC aircraft from the 11th Aviation Group until final extraction on 9 Nov 68.

In addition, the group conducted several LRP insertions and extractions. Night illumination, medevac, "lightning bug", and numerous PSYOP missions were also conducted during the period.

(c) Air traffic control at the Division Base Airfield during the first two months of the period was accomplished by USAAV units. Data as to total traffic volume for those months is not available. The Division assumed complete responsibility for this function in January 1969. Air traffic information for January 1969 is as follows:

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2 During the period the 1st Cavalry Division has occupied PHUOC VINH airfield both the GCA and NDB approaches have been flight checked.

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Quarterly Statistics:

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(3) 13th Signal Battalion: Operations: Significant

(a) Operation LIBERTY CANYON. The start of the reporting period saw the 1st Cav Division in the midst of deployment from northern I CTZ to a new TAOR in III CTZ. The following communications support was provided to the Division Advance Command Party at LONG BINH during the period 29 October 1968-10 November 1968:

1. SU voice circuit to CAMP EVANS.
2. SU teletype circuit to CAMP EVANS.
3. 1 Station in D-3 RATT net.
4. 1 Station in D-1 FM command net.
5. Dedicated voice circuits from the LONG BINH dial telephone exchange to PHUOC VINH, TAY VINH, QUAN LOI, and SONG BE.
6. Common user voice service off the LONG BINH dial telephone exchange. Additional communications support provided at CAMP EVANS to facilitate movement control were:
7. One dedicated voice circuit from TAM MY beach area to SKYKING. This circuit was subsequently reterminated on the EVANS switchboard.
8. Common user service for air movement personnel at QUANG TRI airfield.

(b) Operation SHERIDAN SABER. Tactical operations in the SHERIDAN SABER A0 commenced on 7 November and are continuing. Significant communications provided in support of this operation are:
1. One 12 voice channel equivalent trunk group to each brigade.
2. FM radio retransmission sites on NUI BA DEN (XT 23583) and NUI BA RA (YU 18068). NUI BA DEN provides manual retransmission capability for Division FM secure nets D-1 and D-2, and automatic retransmission for Division FM net D-11 and 1st Brigade FM Admin/Log net. The retransmission site on NUI BA RA is in support of 3d Brigade operations in the eastern portion of the TAOR.
3. AN/MRC-112 VRF system from PHUOC VINH to DAU TIENG to provide telephone communications from the 11th Aviation Group to the 229th AHB. The system was strapped through to TAY VINH from DAU TIENG on 22 January 1969 in anticipation of the 229th AHB's relocation to TAY VINH.

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1. One MRC-112 system from PHUOC VINH to LZ ODERSA in support of Special Forces and 1st ACD units at DONG XOAI.
2. One MRC-112 system from QUAY LOI to LZ ELPROM (3d Bde to 1/12 Cavalry).
3. One MRC-112/CRG-163 system from QUAY LOI to LZ ELPROM (3d Bde to 1/5 CAVALRY).
4. One MRC-112/CRG-163 system from QUAY LOI to LZ ELPROM (3d Bde to 1/7 CAVALRY).

(c) Operation NAVAJO WARHORSE. Communications support to the 1st Brigade during operations in the NAVAJO WARHORSE consisted of:
1. One 12 voice channel system from PHUOC VINH to CU CHI.
2. Two common-user voice circuits from SKYKING to 1st Brigade Rear at TAY NINH.
3. FM Retransmission on NUI BA DEN to link 1st Brigade Forward and Rear.

(4) 8th Engineer Battalion:

(a) During the reporting period, the majority of the 8th Engineer Battalion's effort was directed toward support of the 1st Cavalry Division in operations TOAN THANG II, and SHERIDAN SABRE. The move from I Corps to III Corps during Operation LIBERTY CANYON was begun on 29 October with the movement of C Company and completed on 14 November with the movement of B Company. Initial engineer effort in III Corps was directed at improving or renovating base camps in TAY NINH, PHUOC VINH, SONG BE, and QUAN LOI to accommodate the division's aviation resources. Although most of the actual construction work was done by non-divisional resources, all coordination that was affected during this period can be best classified as direct combat support. In addition to normal minesweep, demolition, and other engineer support provided to units in the field, the Battalion constructed or improved 31 fire bases for the division (See TAB AG for listing). All elements devoted maximum effort toward preparation for maintenance inspections conducted during the period 6-10 January. On 13 January, the 8th Engineer Battalion received its AGI and again, passed with high ratings.

(b) Headquarters and Headquarters Company remained at PHUOC VINH during the reporting period. In Operations SHERIDAN SABRE and TOAN THANG II, it supported the line companies by placing construction equipment and water points on them. The three line platoons of HHC were also involved in various construction tasks in the development and maintenance of the division base camp at PHUOC VINH. On 23 January, work was initiated on the construction of a Montagnard refugee camp in SONG BE. The scope of work included construction of a 3.5 Km access road and clearing 60 acres for gardens, houses, and streets.

(c) Company A supported the 1st Brigade during the reporting period. The base camp was located at TAY NINH during the majority of the reporting period. A forward CP was established on CU CHI in late December to support operation NAVAJO WARHORSE. In both base camps, the majority of base camp development and maintenance work was accomplished by non-divisional engineer resources. In early December, the company renovated 20 buildings and constructed a recreation area for the 1st Brigade R&R center at TAY NINH. Direct combat support included demolition and minesweep teams to support infantry units. Fire bases or logistical bases to include helicopter refuel capability were constructed at LZ ST BARBARA and the Special Forces camps at THIEN NGQON and KATUM. New firebases or logistical bases to include helicopter refuel capability were constructed at LZ ST BARBARA and the Special Forces camps at THIEN NGQON and KATUM.
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bases MUSTANG, MICHAEL, TRACY, CLARA, RAY, ELROD, GRANT, INA, and WHITE were opened by A Company, supported by dozers and backhoes of CONC from 4HC.

(d) Company B remained in direct support of the 2d Brigade, closing at PHUC VINH on 14 November. The CP remained at this location until 22 January, when it moved to QUAN LOI in order to better support the 2d Brigade. General support for the division was provided by B Company in base improvement at PHUC VINH. A platoon of B Company constructed an M8A1 maintenance pad for 15th TC in GU CHI in December and converted 32 tent frames into sea huts in LONG THANH for the 15th TC BN. In addition, a company area was built in PHUC VINH. Work continues on these projects at the close of the reporting period. Direct combat support included demolition and minesweep teams to supported infantry units. Fire bases were rehabilitated at LZ DOT, LZ RITA, and LZ JAKE during this period.

On 13 December, B Company constructed a new fire base, LZ SHIRLEY.

(e) Company C remained in direct support of the 3d Brigade with its CP at QUAN LOI. Technical assistance was provided by C Company to units of the 3d Brigade involved in perimeter expansion and improvement, aircraft revetment construction, and construction or repair of mess and TOC facilities in QUAN LOI. Direct combat support was rendered to as many as ten maneuver battalions at one time, and included minesweep and demolition support to infantry units on the ground. The main company effort was directed at opening new fire bases. On several occasions, two new fire bases were constructed on consecutive days. New fire bases JOE, BILLY, KELLY, BUTTONS, SUE, JANET, ODESSA, ELLENO, ELLEN, GRANITE, JILL, CAROL, and JUNE were constructed by C Company during the reporting period.

(f) The engineer effort expended during the reporting period by non-divisional engineer units has been invaluable. Both the 588th Engineer Battalion in TAY NINH and the 31st Engineer Battalion in PHUC VINH and QUAN LOI responded quickly with massive construction efforts in order to prepare new base camps in III Corps and to accommodate division aviation assets as they arrived in the new area of operations. Considerable earth work was required to construct hardstands for revetment, maintenance, and flyover areas. Hundreds of HU-1, O6A, and CH-47 revetments were constructed in a minimum of time at TAY NINH, DAU TIENG, PHUC VINH, QUAN LOI, and SONG BE. Construction support by these two battalions continues on a mission request basis. At the close of the reporting period, the 31st Engineer Battalion was rehabilitating and surfacing the PHUC VINH airstrip with M8A1 steel matting. This unified effort and "Can Do" attitude exhibited by non-divisional engineer troops added immeasurably to the overall effort. It freed elements of the 8th Engineer Battalion from general support missions, thereby greatly increasing the quantity and quality of direct combat support rendered to each of the three line brigades.
2. (C) Significant Activities

a. General: See paragraph 1a.

b. Significant activities occurring in Operation JEB STUART III, COMANCHE FALLS (PHASE III), SHERIDAN SABRE and NAVAHO WARHORSE I & II during the reporting period:

(1) 30 Nov: Division aircraft, under the control of 1st Brigade, while extracting a civilian irregular defense group unit vic XT 091885 west of KATUM, came under heavy small arms and B-40 rocket fire. The aircraft crews engaged the enemy with organic weapons and when the contact broke, 10 of the enemy had been killed, one friendly wounded and one aircraft destroyed. The CIDG unit and advisors were also successfully extracted.

(2) 12 Nov: Company C, 1st Bn, 8th Cav on a reconnaissance in force mission vic XT 362814 southeast of KATUM on 12 November, located a bunker complex consisting of 37 bunkers, 13 cooking areas, 2 wells and 1 classroom for approximately 100 people. Also found in the area were 30 mortar rounds, 700 pounds of rice and assorted items of NVA military equipment and tools.

(3) 13 Nov: Company B, 1st Bn, 5th Cav located a large bunker and tunnel complex vic XT 375893 east of KATUM and found 43 mortar rounds of varying caliber, and other assorted items of military equipment. The same day in the vicinity of XT 098878 west of KATUM, the 5th VN Marine Bn operating in direct support of division efforts, came in contact with an estimated enemy platoon. After an intense exchange of fire, the enemy evaded. Found in the immediate area of contact were 128 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, 112 grenades, 120 boxes of TNT, 20 rifle grenade launchers, and several claymore mines, grenades, fuzes, small arms ammunition and other items of military equipment.

(4) 14 Nov: the 36th VN Ranger Bn, under operational control of the division, came under direct and indirect fire vic XT 562854 northwest of TONG LE CHON. With tactical air and US artillery support, the Rangers repulsed the enemy after continuous probing of the perimeter for more than 7 hours. Three companies of the 5th Bn, 7th Cav air assaulted into the garrison to relieve the besieged Rangers. In the encounter a total of 287 enemy were killed and 6 enemy captured. Friendly casualties (ARVN) were 9 killed, 1 missing and 41 wounded. A search of the contact area resulted in the capture of 10 B-40 rockets, 2 B-41 rocket launchers, 7 light machine guns, 3 60mm mortars, 53 AK-47 rifles, 2 chicom carbines, 5 chicom radios, 2,000 rounds AK-47 ammunition and an undetermined number of B-40 rockets, 60mm mortar rounds, grenades, chicom claymore mines, and documents.

(5) 16 Nov: Companies B and E, 1st Bn, 7th Cav on a reconnaissance in force mission, came under heavy small arms, grenade and rocket fire from an estimated company size enemy force west of KATUM vic XT 100888. Supported by ARA, tactical air and artillery, the two companies engaged the enemy and after intermittent contact throughout the daylight hours, contact broke at sunset. 37 enemy were killed, 2 crew served and 11 individual weapons captured. Friendly losses were 11 wounded.

(6) 18 Nov: Scouts from the 2d Brigade operating vic XT 858892 northwest of TONG LE CHON, spotted a large enemy force carrying SKS rifles and chicom grenades. The scouts engaged the enemy with organic weapons until they had to vacate the area to rearm. Artillery was called in during the interrum period and upon return to the area, the scouts engaged the remaining enemy, resulting in a
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total of 38 enemy killed and no friendly casualties.

(7) 22 Nov: Vic XT 422793 southeast of KATUM, Company D, 1st BN, 8th Cav located an enemy hospital bunker complex. Assorted items of new surgical and medical equipment were captured.

(8) 25 Nov: Company B, 7th Cav, operating vic XT 332792, south west of THIEN Nhon, came in contact with an unknown size enemy force. With the support of ARA and Scouts from the Division's lst Brigade, the enemy force was engaged and when the contact broke, 52 enemy had been killed and 7 taken prisoner. Enemy equipment captured was listed as 5 crew-served weapons, 1 B-41 and 8 B-40 rocket launchers, 20 individual weapons, 45 rocket rounds, mortar rounds, grenades, small arms ammunition, 3 chicom radios and several documents captured. Friendly casualties were listed at 5 killed and 13 wounded.

(9) 27 Nov: Vic Xu 742157 north of LOC NINH, Company B, 2d BN, 12th Cav and Troop C, 1st BN, 11th Armored Cavalry, under operational control of the division, were on a reconnaissance in force mission, where they encountered a large bunker complex occupied by estimated company size force. After intense fighting for more than 6 hours, the enemy was routed, leaving behind 57 enemy killed, 5 crew-served weapons, 4 RPG-2 rocket launchers and 13 individual weapons. Friendly casualties were 20 wounded.

(10) 28 Nov: Company C, 2d BN, 2d Infantry (Mechanized) and 2d BN, 9th Regt (ARVN), both units under operational control of the division's 3d Brigade were operating vic Xu 765155 north of LOC NINH when they encountered a bunker complex, occupied by an estimated platoon size enemy force. After intense fighting, the positions were overrun and contact halted for a short period of time. Suddenly, the friendly units again came under heavy small arms and RPG fire. A FAC controlled airstrike was called in on the area, and contact finally broke after nearly seven hours of heavy exchange with organic weapons. Enemy losses in this contact were 70 killed, 2 crew-served weapons, 5 RPG-2 rocket launchers and 25 individual weapons captured, while friendly forces reported 14 wounded.

(11) 29 Nov: Company C, 2d BN, 2d Infantry (Mechanized) encountered an estimated battalion size enemy force on a hill vic Xu 763162 northeast of LOC NINH. The enemy was occupying a bunker complex and used small arms, B-40 rocket and mortar fire in the contact. Company C, supported by ARA and artillery attacked and seized the hill after heavy fighting of nearly 4 hours, sustaining 7 killed, 16 wounded and 1 personnel carrier destroyed. Enemy losses were 76 killed, 1 crew-served weapon, 2 RPG-2 and 2 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 10 individual weapons captured.

(12) 3 Dec: Company D, 2d BN, 7th Cav conducted an air assault and closed into an area vic XT 934026, northeast of HON QUAN. Although the landing zone showed no signs of enemy activity, the company came under heavy B-40 rocket, 82 mm mortar, 50 cal MG, automatic and small arms fire. In addition, the enemy employed command detonated claymore mines. FAC controlled air strikes, ARA and artillery support enabled the company to repulse a number of ground attacks by the estimated battalion size force. Company A, 2d BN, 7th Cav air assaulted into the landing zone to reinforce Company D. The contact broke after more than five hours of fierce battle. Enemy losses were undetermined, although 1 RPG rocket launcher and 3 RPG rounds were captured. Friendly losses were listed as 24 killed, 1 missing, and 52 wounded.

(13) 3 Dec: Companies C and D, 2d BN, 8th Cav were operating in an area vic XT 467875, east of KATUM. The area had been the target of a B-52 strike,

In searching the area the companies found 9 enemy killed and captured 20 anti-tank rifles, 12 B-40 rockets, 14,000 rounds of AK-47 and 1,000 rounds of 9mm ammunition. In addition, a large assortment of communications equipment, mines, charges, and fuses were captured.

(14) 4 Dec: Companies C and D, 2d Bn, 8th Cav came under heavy mortar, automatic and small arms fire in vic XT 468375. Supported by ARVN, the units routed the enemy after more than 3 hours of intense fighting, sustaining 18 slightly wounded casualties. Enemy losses were 21 killed, 1 wounded PW, 2 B-40 rocket launchers, 5 rifles and assorted machine gun parts captured. Continuing on their mission, the companies then encountered an enemy bunker complex occupied by an unknown size enemy force. The enemy was engaged and forced to withdraw, leaving behind 19 killed, 1 machine gun, 15 rifles, 11,640 rounds of small arms ammunition, and assorted electronic equipment. Friendly losses were 3 killed and 1 wounded.

(15) 4 Dec: Company B, 1st Bn, 12th Cav located a cache vic YU 017100 west of PHUOC BINH. Inside the bunker were 300 rounds 60mm mortar, 300 rounds 82mm mortar, 100 rounds 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition. The ammunition appeared to be brand new.

(16) 7 Dec: On a reconnaissance in force mission vic XT 999826 northwest of DONG XOU, Company A, 2d Bn, 5th Cav uncovered a large cache. The bunker was filled with 50 bicycles, 8,000 lbs of rice, 876 B-40 rockets, 100 B-41 rockets, 256 rounds 57mm recoilless rifle, and 60920 rounds of small arms ammunition.

(17) 9 Dec: While conducting a reconnaissance in force vic XT 685845 southwest of HON QUAN, Co A, 5th Bn, 7th Cav came in contact with an estimated enemy company. Troop C, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, provided fire support in the 5 hour long battle. The enemy was decisively defeated, leaving behind 93 killed, 1 PW, 2 RPG-2 and 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 12 individual weapons, 53 B-40 rockets and 34 rounds 60mm mortar. Friendly casualties were 14 killed and 17 wounded.

(18) 14 Dec: Operating vic XT 182655 north of TRANG SUP, Troop A, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry spotted 30 enemy and engaged with organic weapons resulting in 20 killed.

(19) 22 Dec: A weapons cache with 3 122mm rockets, 40 rounds 120mm mortar, 1 machine gun, and 21 rounds 60mm mortar was located by Company E, 1st Bn, 8th Cav, while operation vic XT 408107 west of CU CHI.

(20) 23 December: Company C, 1st Bn, 8th Cav, located a large weapons cache vic XT 407114 northwest of HIEP HOA. In the area they found and destroyed 80 rounds 82mm mortar, 138 B-40 rockets, 37 bangalore torpedoes, 155 rounds 60mm mortar, 27 claymore mines, 195 grenades, and other assorted large and small caliber ammunitions.

(21) 24 Dec: Company C, 1/8Cav again found another cache in the same vicinity containing 270 grenades, 101 rounds 60mm and 48 rounds 82mm mortar ammunition, and 86 B-40 rocket rounds.

(22) 26 Dec: Conducting aerial reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations in the vicinity of XT 575998 northwest of AP PHU LOC, Troop C, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry spotted approximately 60 enemy troops in what appeared to be a training center with classroom facilities. The helicopters suddenly received automatic weapons fire and in turn engaged the area with organic weapons.
In this encounter, 41 enemy forces were killed with no friendly casualties reported.

(23) 27 Dec: On a screening mission vic XT 679918 northwest of AN LOC, Company E, 3d Bn, 2d Infantry (Mechanized) (CP 44) came in contact with an estimated enemy company. TAC air and ARA were called in and Company C from the same battalion assisted in sweeping the area. After an encounter of more than 3 hours, a search of the area revealed 52 enemy forces killed, 2 prisoners, 4 RPG-7 and 1 PRG-7 rocket launchers, 10 B-40 and 15 B-41 rockets, 3 rifles and 15 grenades captured. Friendly losses were reported as 2 killed and 27 wounded.

(24) 28 Dec: Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry conducted an aerial reconnaissance in the vic XT 909789, PHUOC BINH area and received heavy automatic fire from an enemy location. The troop engaged the enemy with organic weapons and requested a tactical air strike. After the enemy fire ceased, a search of the area was conducted revealing 59 enemy killed. In a continued aerial search additional small groups of the enemy were sighted. In each case the Troop engaged with organic weapons, resulting in an additional 12 enemy forces killed. No friendly personnel or equipment losses were reported.

(25) 31 Dec: Company C, 2d Bn, 12th CAV located a large ammunition cache vic XT 392178 north of HIEP HOA. Within two separate storage sites in the general area, the unit picked up 84 B-40 rockets, 45 122mm rockets, 1.32 rounds 82mm and 571 rounds 60mm mortar, 90,150 rounds small arms ammunition.

(26) 2 Jan: C/1/8 CAV at XR 434048 had four EM's wounded by a booby-trapped hand grenade. Continuing on after medevac, the company found a cache containing 300 60mm rds, 265 82mm rds, 30 anti-tank mines, 1 SKS rifle, 6 82M fuses, 26 75mm RR rds, 102 chicom grenades, 70 57mm RR rds, 1 AT mine, 10 booby trapped hand grenades, 1 B-40 rocket and 2" of documents.

(27) 3 Jan: C/5/7 CAV at XR 458047, found a cache hidden in 55 gal drums. It contained 1 SKS rifle, 35 75mm RR rds, 13 90mm RR rds, 45 57mm RR rds, 77 B-40 rockets, 198 chicom grenades, 1.29 rifle grenades, 11,450 rds of 7.62mm small arms ammunition, 1190 rds of 12.7mm ammunition.

(28) 8 Jan: B/2/2 Mech made contact with an estimated enemy company vic coordinates XR 814793. Results of the engagement were 27 NVA KIA and 1 PW.

(29) 1 Jan: A/1/11 Arm Cav while on convoy escort made contact with two enemy companies (estimated) in an apparent ambush posture vic XT 766976. Elements of 2/2 Mech Inf and ARA supported the ensuing engagement. Results were: US: 3 KIA, 15 WIA. Enemy: (NVA): 31 KIA, 1 PW. A/1/11 Arm Cav while searching the contact area on 12 January found an additional 10 NVA KIA.

(30) 1 Jan: B/1/8 CAV found a cache at XT 169038 containing the following items: 15 60mm mortar rds, 6 charges for 82mm mortar, 6 primes for 82mm mortar, 2 anti-tank grenades, 11 75mm RR rds.

(31) 19 Jan: C/5/7 CAV at XR 545828, received and repulsed a ground probe resulting in 5 NVA KIA and 3 NVA PW (all wounded). Later in the day, contact with an estimated enemy squad at the same location resulted in 1 US WIA. A 60mm mortar, 1 PRG-7 rocket launcher, 2 PRG-7 rocket launchers, 1 light machine gun, 9 AK-47 rifles, 30 122mm rockets, 90 82mm mortar rounds, 120 60mm mortar rounds, 102,220 rounds AK-47 ammunition, 1 NVA field radio, 1000 lbs of explosives, 10 land mines, 14 chicom grenades and other various items of field equipment were found in two caches.
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(32) 21 Jan: C/5/7 Cav in the vicinity of XT 544823 and XT 547826, found 15 bunkers containing an estimated 30 tons of large and small caliber ammunition. The cache included 147,620 rounds of small arms ammunition, 808 large caliber rounds, 270 hand grenades/mines, 2,025 pounds of explosive, 11,760 feet of time fuse, and 1250 fuse lighters.

(33) 24 Jan: E/1/8 Cav at XS 385784 found 1 hoth measuring 96' x 6' x 51/2' and 1 bunker measuring 3' x 4' x 3' with 11/2' cf overhead cover. Near the structures they found a cache containing 1 AK-44 rifle, 440 rifle grenades, 26 82mm mortar rounds, 85 60mm mortar rounds and 3 anti-tank rounds. The cache was buried in 4 55 gal drums.
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SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:
   a. Aviation Tactics:
      (1) Observation: Upon initial deployment into the SHERMAN AO, the enemy concentrated his attacks against aircraft and went to such an extent as to construct tree firing platforms. As the scout aircraft flew over at tree top level, the enemy placed heavy automatic weapons fire on the aircraft from only a few feet away.
      (2) Evaluation: The tree platforms were found in the vicinity of bunker complexes, surrounding possible LZ or PZ locations and along major trails. The tree platforms performed multi-purpose functions: sniper platforms (used against ground and air elements), observation platforms, and storage platforms.
      (3) Recommendations: That aircraft participating in the same missions fly at varying heights (no two aircraft at the same altitude), and instruct crew members to examine tree tops very closely to detect movement or weapons. Infantry personnel should likewise not only scour the ground but designate individuals to observe all trees throughout their operations.
   b. Aviation Support:
      (1) Observation: Lightning Bug missions have been a cause for great concern during the reporting period.
      (2) Evaluation: Two problems encountered during Lightning Bug missions were an inadequate lighting system (seven C-130 aircraft landing lights), and difficulty in navigating at night with few prominent terrain features visible.
      (3) Recommendations: That the lighting system employed on Lightning Bug aircraft be improved in intensity and range of light beam. Lights similar in quality with search lights would be more successful than the present system. Stronger lights may also assist pilot navigation at night.
   c. Pickup Zones (PZ's):
      (1) Observations: Frequently, during the reporting period, the engaged units and aircraft during extraction. Friendly aircraft were engaged more often when last CAV elements extracted ARVN or CIDG forces. On one occasion while extracting a CIDG force after ground contact, the enemy allowed the first four aircraft to depart, then engaged the remaining smaller force and two aircraft resulting in friendly casualties.
      (2) Evaluation: Hasty reconnaissance and poor security of PZ's create hazardous conditions for extraction. Because a limited number of aircraft normally participate in a final extraction and a time delay from start to finish results, enemy units in the vicinity of a PZ have sufficient time to react and inflict casualties on the extracting unit.
      (3) Recommendations: Commanders must insure that thorough reconnaissance and security procedures of PZ's are established, even in areas of negative contact. Ground Commanders should provide security 360 degrees around the PZ, establish QP's, and patrol beyond the PZ security force before extraction if time permits. Patrols and scout aircraft should pay special attention to the approach and departure routes for aircraft. En Commanders should establish artillery extraction targets near the PZ from which rapid adjustment may be
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made. Flight Commanders should receive a thorough briefing regarding enemy activity, recent enemy contact, and disposition of friendly troops. Only when Commanders are sure that the area is secure should extraction begin. Long, low level approaches or departures from the PZ should be discouraged and the final lift should utilize the maximum number of aircraft that can be accommodated on the PZ at one time.

d. Deception Plans:

(1) Observations: During operations in the NAVAJOWAR496 AO, 1st Cav elements saturated known infiltration routes with troops, obstacles (flame mines, knife rests, and others) and sensitive, electronic sensor devices were employed. Daylight movement of the enemy was terminated. However, night infiltration continued to be difficult to detect even though the use of tactical radar greatly alleviated the problem. Visibility in the AO was unlimited during most of the day and it is believed that the Cambodian based enemy frequently observed the maneuvers of 1st Cav elements. The enemy could watch friendly elements close on their night locations and receive log. The enemy would then mark friendly locations and maneuver around or away from 1st Cav Troops.

(2) Evaluation: Friendly observation of enemy troops was limited by variations in ground contour, scattered tree "squares," and canal/rice paddy dikes. However, enemy observation of aircraft was unlimited. Numerous trails and feeder streams crisscrossed the AO, presenting a multitude of secondary infiltration routes. To counter these enemy advantages, Battalions employed more night and day ambushes fully covering the secondary routes. False extractions and the insertion of LRRP teams during unit extraction was initiated to deceive the enemy observers. Also, units were instructed to move their night locations well away from the place where log was received. Interdiction of enemy infiltrators proved more successful and ambushes increased their frequency of contact as a result.

(3) Recommendations: That units engaged in operations in generally flat, open terrain employ false extractions and LRRP insertions during extractions to deceive enemy observers. Units should also be instructed to move night locations after logging, and use smoke to screen insertions of troop units. Units should be encouraged to "double-log" for periods of two or three days. Secrecy of the friendly unit's movements is thereby improved because no helicopters approach the unit FOB for an extended period.

e. Log Helicopter Security

(1) Observation: Log birds on supply missions to units which had experienced recent contact often received ground fire on their final approach into LZ's. On one occasion a log bird was completely destroyed and all crew members were injured.

(2) Evaluations: Enemy troops, after breaking contact, often leave stay behind elements to harass friendly troops and engage incoming resupply aircraft.

(3) Recommendations: Whenever ground to air fire can logically be anticipated, field units should adjust artillery fire 360 degrees around their locations and bring the fire in as close as safety permits prior to the log bird's arrival. Units using this tactic have reported no incidents of hostile fire directed at their log bird.

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f. Night marking of friendly positions for identification by combat and combat support aircraft.

(1) Observations: There is no standard means by which ground commanders may mark friendly positions during darkness or reduced visibility.

(2) Evaluation: Each ground commander is required to rely on his own ingenuity, with the resultant loss of efficiency in ground to air coordination.

(3) Recommendations: The strobe light, a survival item issued to many aviators, provides an excellent means of marking friendly locations at night. Its high intensity flash can be seen from great distances. This item should be issued to ground troops in sufficient quantity to provide at least two strobe lights per rifle platoon.

g. Availability of Napalm for Immediate Airstrikes.

(1) Observations: In many of the contacts since arrival in III Corps, 1 ACD units have encountered the enemy in base areas at extremely close quarters.

(2) Evaluation: During these actions, friendly forces found that much of the support normally available cannot be employed effectively because of the close proximity of friendly forces to the target area. In these situations tactical air support ordinance is necessarily restricted to napalm and 20mm cannon. Bombs are of little immediate value in that they cannot be employed directly on the target for fear that they may endanger friendly troops. An immediate request for 100% napalm bombs requires, on the average, three hours from time of request to TCF.

(3) Recommendations: Consideration should be given to maintaining tactical fighter aircraft with full napalm loads on strip alert for these frequent situations.

h. Night Hawk Operations

(1) Observation: During the hours of darkness NVA/VC forces are able to move bulk supplies and large size forces along high speed trails which are normally denied to them by scout teams during the day.

(2) Evaluation: In order to deny the enemy this freedom of movement, a night aerial reconnaissance technique was developed. The recon team, consisting of either one slick ship and two gunships, or 2 slick ships w/gunships on alert, would fly over the area of operation solely to observe and engage lights being used by the NVA/VC. Using Starlight scopes, the observation ship is able to spot flashlights, headlights, campfires and mark these targets with tracer ammunition which directs gunships onto the targets. This technique forces the enemy to turn off his lights to avoid detection and slows down movement. This technique also has the advantage of surprise in that no aircraft illumination is used and the enemy is unable to accurately determine the exact position of the aircraft.

(3) Recommendation: That divisions be made aware of the success of this method of night operation.

i. Airborne/Heleborne Psy Op Missions

(1) Observations: 50% of all Psy Op Loudspeaker Missions are flown in daylight from altitudes of 1500 feet or above.

(2) Evaluation: When operating in double and triple canopy jungle much of the sound is dissipated. Winds have a great deal of effect on the
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Message often causing distortion; generally, night broadcasts are the most effective as the enemy target audience is far more receptive, and is less likely to take counter measures.

(3) Recommendations: Maximum use should be made of night airborne/heliborne Psy Op Missions, especially between the hours of 1900 and 2130. All heliborne Psy Op Missions should be flown at an altitude of 800 to 1000 feet at 60 knots to gain maximum effect on the ground under all conditions. Risk to the aircraft has proven to be minimal.

J. Inadequacy of C-47 Loudspeaker platforms.

(1) Observation: IIFORCEN has only C-47 aircraft for use on night aerial loudspeaker missions.

(2) Evaluation: The C-47 is not a satisfactory loudspeaker platform due to its fast speed.

(3) Recommendation: That an aircraft more suitable for night loudspeaker missions be made available for PSYOPS missions. The O2-B, used with satisfactory results in I CTZ, may prove as effective in III CTZ.

k. PSYOPS Leaflet stockpile.

(1) Observation: When the 1 AOR moved to III CTZ there were no leaflets prepared for dissemination in the Division AO. It took six to eight weeks to stockpile a sufficient supply of leaflets to meet various quick reaction contingencies.

(2) Evaluation: A Division needs to have a preplanned stockpile of leaflets when moving into a new AO in order to meet quick reaction PSYOPS requirements.

(3) Recommendation: When plans for moves are announced, immediate liaison should be made with supporting PSYOPS units in the new AO to assure that leaflets are ready for immediate use when the division arrives.

1. Chain-Saw Operations:

(1) Observation: Chain-saws are easily clogged or slowed down by the viscous latex which seeps from cut rubber trees.

(2) Evaluation: The preponderance of rubber trees in III Corps area coupled with the short supply of chain-saws could lead to major problems in LZ construction.

(3) Recommendations: Latex is easily removed by running the chain-saw blade in a container of oil every 15-30 minutes during use. Changing the pitch as often as possible and cleaning immediately after use will also prolong the life of chain-saws.

3. TRAINING: NONE

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Dissemination of Enemy Tactical Doctrine to Combat Troops.

(1) Observation: A marked difference between I & III CTZ enemy tactics slowly became evident after deployment into III CTZ.

(2) Evaluation: Among the new tactics noted are: (1) The relative scarcity of booby traps and mines, (2) enemy employment of tree snipers often as high as 30-50 feet, (3) Employment of enemygrenadiers in trees and (4) the technique of infiltrating small groups to the flanks and rear of friendly units in contact to harass and give the impression of a much larger enemy.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

force. Although troops were briefed thoroughly on enemy organization, equipment and probable dispositions; information on enemy tactics encountered at the squad and platoon level would have been extremely helpful.

(3) Recommendation: Consideration should be given to more extensive collection of information on enemy small unit tactics which would better prepare the individual soldier and small unit leader to meet the enemy forces in a particular area or of a particular enemy unit.

b. Interrogation

(1) Observation: IPW teams encountered difficulty in providing timely and exploitable information gained from detainees due to the large number of enemy units engaged by the 1 ACD and its large AO.

(2) Evaluation: During operation TOAN THANG II, IPW Teams kept abreast of current and specific tactical situations. As a result, the teams were able to question the detainees more easily and gain information which was immediately exploitable by 1 ACD ground units.

(3) Recommendation: By keeping abreast of the tactical situation and familiarizing themselves with known nicknames of areas, IPW teams may improve their mission accomplishment.

c. MI Spot Checks

(1) Observation: During the recent move of THE FIRST TEAM from Camp Evans to III Corps, several classified documents were discovered in spot checks of evacuated areas.

(2) Evaluation: When evacuating an LZ or base camp, a most thorough check of the area must be made for classified documents and waste.

(3) Recommendation: Units should request the CT Teams from the MI Detachment to conduct spot inspections upon completion of the unit's checks when a major move is anticipated.

5. LOGISTICS: See TAB AD for Lessons learned - Operation Liberty Canyon (P. A6)

6. ORGANIZATIONAL: NONE

7. OTHER: NONE

SECTION III: HQS, DA SURVEY INFORMATION

Escape, Evasion and Survival: NONE

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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TAB C: Enemy Activities
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TAB AC: Logistics
TAB AD: Operation Liberty Canyon
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1 - 14th Mil Hist Det

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This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 1st Cavalry Division for the period ending 31 January 1969, with the exception of paragraph 2j (2), page 18. Nonconcur for the following reasons:

a. Tests have shown that C-47 aircraft has the capability of broadcasting audible and intelligible messages from altitudes up to 4,000 feet. Speed should not affect the broadcast since a circular flight course is flown, allowing the pilot to observe his target area continuously and to assure good target saturation. This data and information was taken from the NAVFORV publication, "Loudspeaker Operations in Vietnam."

b. Para 2j (2) is not consistent with reports from other OPCON units. Efforts are continuing to improve the night loudspeaker capability within II FFORCV.

FOR THIS COMMANDER:

B.G. MACDONALD
ILT, AGC
Asst AG.
AVHGC-0ST (15 Feb 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: *Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January
1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375
27 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and concurs with the report as modified
by the preceding indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Cav Div (Ambl)
II FFV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cav Div for Period Ending
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 20 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forward indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Ant AG
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

TAB A: Task Organization

1. Task Organization
   a. 1st Air Cavalry Division
      HHC, 1 ACD
      1/9 Cav
         62d Inf Plt (Combat Trackers)
      8th Engr Bn
      13th Sig Bn
      Co E, 52d Inf (LRP)
      514th MP Co
      26th Chem Det
      151st Chem Plt
      871st Radio Research Unit
      191st Military Intelligence Det
      583d Military Intelligence Det
      14th Military History Det
      42d Public Information Det
      Special Security Det
      Det 31, 5th Weather Sqdn (AF)
   b. 1st Bde
      1/8 Cav (-)
      2/12 Cav
      TF Duke (C/1-8, H/1-8)
      25th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
      41st Public Information Det
   c. 2d Bde
      HHC, 2 Bde
      2/2 Mech
      2/5 Cav
      5/7 Cav
      2/2 Cav
      34th Rgr (ARVN) (DS)
      31 AEN (ARVN) (DS)
   d. 3d Bde
      HHC 3d Bde
      1/5 Cav
      2/7 Cav
      1/12 Cav
      2/505 AEN
      TF Wood
         D/1-9
         E/1-7
         D/1-7
      34th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
   e. Div Arty
      1/7 Cav (-)
      HHC, Div Arty
      2/19th Arty (105)
      2/20th Arty (ARA)
      1/21st Arty (105)
      1/30th Arty (155)
      1/77th Arty (105)
      E Btry, 82d Arty (Avn)
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

TAB A: Task Organization (Cont)

f. 11th Avn Op
   HHC, 11th Avn Op
   227th Aslt Hal Bn
   228th Aslt Spt Hal Bn
   273rd Hvy Hal Co (-)
   478th Hvy Hal Co (-)
   229th Aslt Hal Bn
   11th GS Co

g. Division Support Command
   HHC & Band, Div Spt Cmd
   15th Admin Co
   15th S&S Bn
   15th Med Bn
   15th Trans Acft Maint Bn
   27th Maint Bn
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB B: Weather and Terrain

1. Operation TOAN THANG II
   a. The terrain in the Division AO is generally flat. Some portions of Tay Ninh are rice and marshlands while the north and east are forested. Minh Long Province is flat with dense forests in the north and forests mixed with rubber plantations in the south. Phuoc Long Province consists of a rising plain to the west and a mountain range in the northeast. The province is generally heavily vegetated, primarily with multicanopied forest. Four rivers, the Van Co Dong, the Saigon, the Be, and the Dong Nai, flow through the 1 ACD AO. These rivers present an obstacle to ground movement due to their depth and steep banks. There are three prominent land masses in the area; Mui Ba Den, The Razor Back, and Mui Ba Ra.

b. Weather:
   
   (1) Two significant tropical cyclones, MAKIE and NINA, threatened the Division's AO during the month of November in a late season surge of activity. Both storms dissipated before coming close enough to influence the AO; however, they represented a potential hazard to operations for 7 days. During the month of December one known Air Strike operation was terminated due to the early formation of stratus and fog during nocturnal hours. Climatology for the Division AO doesn't indicate stratus and fog to form at such an early hour. The month of January was dominated by the NE Monsoon. This resulted in patchy ground fog and stratus in the mornings and scattered cumulus in the afternoons. There were two periods of unseasonable weather when the intertropical convergence zone moved north of its normal winter time position just south of the equator. During the first of these from 1-4 January the AO experienced isolated light rainshowers and foggy mornings. The second period 14-16 January was accompanied by a surge of cooler air from the north that met the warmer tropical air causing scattered thunderstorms.


   (4) Relative Humidity: November - 77%, December - 70%, January - 72%.

   (5) Rainfall: November - 1.58 inches, December - 0.27 inches, January - 5.36 inches of precipitation.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB C: Enemy Activities

1. During the first seven days of November, the 1st ACD terminated operations JSB STUART III and COMANCHE FALLS III in northern I Corps. Total enemy personnel losses for the combined operations were 2,126 enemy killed and 288 enemy captured. Total enemy weapons captured or destroyed were 1,237 individual, 133 crew served, and 2 antiaircraft weapons. Also captured were 496,46 tons of rice.

2. At 1:00 hours on the 7th of November the 1st ACD initiated Operation TOAN THANG (Phase II) in northern III CTZ. During the first six days of the new operation, contact was light and scattered with the enemy avoiding any significant engagement. There were several attacks on US and ARVN installations but no heavy ground contacts.

3. During the rest of the month, there was an increase in enemy activity throughout the 1st ACD AO, commencing with a heavy mortar, rocket and ground attack against the 36th ARVN Ranger Battalion at LZ Dot on the night of 14 November. Attempts to overrun the position were repulsed by the 36th ARVN Ranger Battalion, 1st ACD gunships, artillery, and US TAC Air. There were 287 enemy killed, six PWs, 55 individual weapons and 21 crew served weapons captured.

4. On 25 November Southwest of LZ Ann the enemy attempted to overrun elements of the 1/7 Cav. This attempt failed after a prolonged fight between an enemy battalion and a 1/7 Cav company in their night FOB. The enemy withdrew leaving behind 90 enemy bodies, 7 PWs, 20 individual weapons and 16 crew served weapons.

5. North of Loc Ninh, during a three day period, starting 27 November, elements of the 1st ACD, 11th ACR and 2/2 Infantry (Mech) made continuous contact with enemy units in heavily fortified bunker complexes. The enemy withdrew having suffered heavy casualties. The enemy losses for this three-day period were 205 enemy killed, and 36 individual weapons and 14 crew served weapons captured. Also during this period, there were numerous contacts with large enemy forces in bunker complexes in the vicinity of the Fishhook and North of Base Area 355.

6. During the month of December the enemy generally tried to avoid contact, however attacks by indirect fire increased. On the 3d of December at 1025 hours, vic XU 9302, B Co, 2/7 Cav began receiving sporadic to heavy small arms, 82mm mortar, RPG and .50 cal fire, and command detonated claymore mines which lasted until 1500 hours. This action included a number of ground attacks. Although B Company engaged the enemy with their organic weapons, ARA, air strikes and artillery, he was able to evade from the area taking his dead and wounded with him. US casualties were 24 killed and 57 wounded.

7. On 4 December between 0245 and 1230 hours, C and D Companies, 2/8 Cavalry, vic XT 4687, fought a sharp battle with an unknown size enemy force killing 39 of the enemy and capturing 1 PW, 19 AK-47's and 10,040 rounds of SA ammo.
8. On 7 December between 1605 and 1700 hours, LZ Jake (XT 6281) received 100 rounds of 82mm mortar and 107mm rocket rounds resulting in 7 185 WIA and 4 ARVN WIA.

9. On 8 December A Co 2/5 Cavalry, vic XT 9982, found an enemy cache that contained 1,132 large caliber rounds, 100 grenades, 60,920 SA rounds and 43 bicycles.

10. During the day of 9 December, A Co, 5/7 Cavalry and C Co, 1/11 ACR, vic XT 6865, teamed up to kill 93 enemy and capture 1 PW during a viciously fought battle in the Rubber Plantation southwest of An Loc.

11. On 10 December, LZ Dot, vic XT 8556, received 110 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 40 107mm rocket rounds resulting in 2 ARVN WIA's. L7 Andy also received 40-50 107mm rounds resulting in 4 US wounded.

12. On the 14th of December, A Trp 1/9 Cavalry, vic XT 1865, spotted 30 VC in a clearing, engaged with rockets and miniguns, killing 14. Artillery was called in and resulted in 6 additional enemy killed.

13. On the 15th of the month: LZ Jake, vic XT 6281, received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire which destroyed 4,000 gallons of J-4, 250 gallons of MO-Gas and killed 2 CIDG, 9 CTRG and 7 Americans were also wounded.

14. 12 kilometers southwest of Bu Gia Map on 18 December, B Trp 1/9 Cav spotted an estimated enemy battalion. Air Strikes killed 41 of the enemy. A Co, 2/8 Cavalry found 9 tons of rice in 200 lb bales vic XT 525794 on 21 December.

15. Between the dates of 23-26 December, vic XT 4010, C/1/8 Cavalry found a cache that contained 715 grenades, 21,460 SA rounds, 649 large caliber rounds, and 1x120mm mortar (complete).

16. On the 26th, a C/1/9 LOH and Cobra spotted approximately 80 individuals attending what appeared to be a NVA class. They were engaged with organics and Air Strikes, resulting in 41 NVA confirmed killed.

17. On the 27th of December B Company, 2/2 Mechanized (Opcon 1 ACD) engaged an estimated NVA Company, vic XT 6791, resulting in 52 NVA killed and 2 NVA PW's captured.

18. On the 28th B/1/9 Cavalry, vic XT 9878, received heavy A/S and .50 caliber fire. Three A/S were put into the area resulting in 59 NVA killed.

19. THE FIRST TEAM ended the year on a good note when B/2/12 Cavalry found a large cache that contained 65 122mm rockets, 75 B-40 rockets, 140 Chicom grenades, 162 82mm mortar rounds, 571 60mm mortar rounds, 1600 12.7mm machinegun rounds and 88,550 AK-47 rounds.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB C: Enemy Activities (Cont)

20. Operations in the 1 ACD AO continued with light to moderate contact throughout the month of January. These contacts were characterized by indirect stand-off attacks against fire bases and installations, with heavier attacks against the bases located south of the Fishhook area. Ground contacts were characterized by sharp engagements with enemy squad, platoon and company size units in well-fortified bunker complexes. These engagements were concentrated along the Song Be River, south of the Fishhook, and in northern Base Area 355. During the month there was an increase in movement by enemy troops during daylight hours resulting in a number of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry sightings and engagements.

21. On two separate occasions, the enemy attempted to ambush mechanized units moving along route QL13. The first ambush, north of An Loc (XT 737947) resulted in 27 enemy killed and the second, south of An Loc (XT 766796) resulted in 31 NVA killed. US losses were light.

22. The 1 ACD continued to relieve the enemy of the much needed supplies by uncovering some of the largest food, weapons and ammunition caches found in the Vietnam War. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry in operations along the booby trap infested Vam Co Dong River uncovered numerous ammunition and weapons caches stored in 55 gallon drums buried in the ground.

23. Five kilometers east northeast of LZ Rita (XT 544823) the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry found fifteen tons of ammunition which included: 762 large caliber rounds, 167,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 126 rifle grenades, 650 pounds of C4 and a large stock of demolition equipment.

24. North of Base Area 355 (XT 413649) the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, during a three day period, uncovered a rice cache which contained over 90 tons of rice. The rice was stacked in 270 pound bags and stored under bushes.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB D: Aerial Surveillance.

1. Mission Statistics for the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION TYPE</th>
<th>ASTA</th>
<th>73D SAC</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>548/489</td>
<td>198/186</td>
<td>12,976 Hot Spots</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLAR</td>
<td>79/59</td>
<td>36/35</td>
<td>2,010 MTI's</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHOTO</td>
<td>75/55</td>
<td>26/23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO (hand held)</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. General Comments: Due to the relocation of the Division the ASTA platoon did not begin flying missions until 7 November 1968. Flying weather was ideal and the only problem experienced was maintaining the antiquated SLAR systems in a mission-ready status.

3. SLAR: During the quarter 75% of the scheduled SLAR missions were completed. A total of 19 ASTA missions were cancelled, two for aircraft maintenance, nine for sensor malfunction and eight for other causes.

4. IR: During the reporting period the ASTA platoon completed 99% of its scheduled missions. Six missions were cancelled due to aircraft maintenance, twelve due to sensor malfunction, four due to weather and thirty-two for other causes.

5. PHOTO: The ASTA platoon completed 73% of the scheduled missions. Nineteen missions were cancelled by the requesting unit.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB E: Intelligence Activities

1. Counterintelligence (CI) Operations.
   a. Background Investigations
      (1) Cases on hand at beginning of reporting period: 1
      (2) Cases received during reporting period: 11
      (3) Cases closed during reporting period: 9
      (4) Cases on hand at end of reporting period: 2
      (5) Cases processed past suspense dates: 0
      (6) Leads completed: 24
   b. Security Services
      (1) Announced security inspections: 18
      (2) Courtesy inspection and checks: 8
      (3) Unannounced security checks: 7
      (4) Unannounced sanitary fill checks: 11
      (5) Fingerprinting: 67
      (6) Tech services (locks, combination changes, etc): 34
   c. Liaison contacts:
      (1) Local GVN Officials: 436
      (2) Military Officials: 1,003
      (3) Other intelligence units: 1,594
   d. Black Personalities Screened: 3
   e. Interrogations: 0
      (1) NVA: 0
      (2) VC: 0
   f. Brightlight Reports: 0
   g. Collection
      (1) Overt: (a) Spot reports: 863

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB E: Intelligence Activities (Cont)

(b) Translations: 0

(2) Covert (Casual): None

h. Personnel Security Activities:

(1) Number of validations: 1,332
   (a) TCP SECRET: 144
   (b) SECRET: 1,188

(2) Interim Clearances Granted: 120
   (a) Interim TCP SECRET: 103
   (b) Interim SECRET: 17

(3) Cryptographic Access Granted: 0

(4) Requests for USAIRR checks submitted: 184

(5) Local Files Checks submitted: 8,227

(6) Requests for BI submitted: 7

(7) Requests for NAC submitted: 19

2. IPW

a. Detainees: 265

   (1) IPW: 41
      (a) NVA: 27
      (b) VC: 15

   (2) Returnees: 15
      (a) NVA: 9
      (b) VC: 6

   (3) CD: 19
   (4) IC: 327

b. Documents

   (1) Batches: 309

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

TAB F: Training/Combat Developments

1. Division Training:

   a. The 1st Air Cavalry Division Training Center at AN KHE conducted individual training for all division replacements and during the quarter 556 officers and 4,471 enlisted men received a three day course of instruction. The training center also trained elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade upon request from that unit. Training assistance is also being provided to USA/SAF/COM, QUI NHQN.

   b. The Combat Leaders Course graduated 92 personnel in grade E-3 thru E-5 during the period. Because of the relocation of the division training center from CAMP EVANS to AN KHE there was an approximate 45-day period when the combat leaders course was suspended and revised. The 10-day POI provides training for combat experienced junior NCO's who have demonstrated potential to become squad, section and fire team leaders. Subjects stressed are air cav tactics, map reading, communications, weapons, medical training and leadership.

   c. New Equipment Training, AN/PPS-5 Radar: A team of two NCO's from USA/COM, Ft Monmouth, N.J. presented two cycles of a 32-hour block of instruction on the operation and organizational maintenance of the AN/PPS-5 Radar. Students receiving the instruction were from:

      1st Air Cav Div - 18 each
      25th T.O. (Arty) - 2 each
      82d Abn Div - 4 each

   d. IFFV FOCG/1st Arty Gp: Five officers from 1st Air Cav Div attended a 32-hour block of instruction at the Forward Observer Training Course sponsored by the 41st Artillery Group at AN KHE. The purpose of the course was to improve the performance of forward observers assigned to tactical maneuver units.

2. Training from Non-Division Units: The following school quotas were filled:

   Aviation Schools - EM 158
   Aviation Schools - OFF 22
   Jungle Survival School - 6
   Recondo School - 10
   Orgn AC Armament School - 15

3. Combat Developments:

   a. The following projects were completed during the quarter:

      (1) M66A1 Noise Suppressor: Device to reduce muzzle flash and noise. Ninety-five devices were requested based on the test. The IRP Co received 50 and each infantry battalion received 5 to be used in the recon platoon.

      (2) 2.75 Fleschette Rocket: Tests were completed and aviation unit personnel trained in the employment of the rocket. The use of the rocket in the 1st Air Cav Div has proven highly effective against enemy personnel in the open. It is also being used on LZ preps.

      (3) AQM CS Rounds: M79 launched CS projectile: Testing was completed during the period. Operational requirements were stated in the Class V report.
(4) Landing Zone Director Signal System: A complete evaluation was made during the period. This system is designed for signalling during periods of reduced visibility. The unit consists of two hand held paddles with individual carrying cases and a strap-held apron assembly with two additional paddles. Each paddle is battery operated, 12 inch long electroluminescent lamp. The 1st Air Cav Div has submitted requirements for a basis of issue as a result of the evaluation.

(5) Disposable Food Container: Based on a request from 1st Log Cmd, 1 AOI submitted requirements for the disposable food container. Use of this container will negate the requirement to back haul during critical tactical operations; also reducing "blade" time on aviation resources.

b. The following projects are continuing:
(1) Portable Maintenance Lamps: Assist in night maintenance on aircraft. Lamps utilize aircraft battery.
(2) Ballistic Blankets: The blankets are used in cases where revetments are not available or as a temporary protection during maintenance, rearming and refueling.
(3) Flak Blankets: Smaller version of the ballistic blanket, used primarily for protecting critical aircraft components.
(4) Mosquito Repellent Fatigue: This item will be tested for the purpose of reducing malaria cases.
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969  
**TAB G:** Personnel Roster

**KEY PERSONNEL ROSTER**

1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DATE ASSIGNED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>MG GEORGE I. FORSYTHE</td>
<td>19 Aug 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC-A</td>
<td>BG RICHARD L. IRBY</td>
<td>2 Aug 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADC-B</td>
<td>BG WILLIAM E. SHERID III</td>
<td>31 Oct 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/S</td>
<td>COL CONRAD L. STANSBERRY</td>
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<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>LTC ROBERT N. MACKINNON</td>
<td>26 Nov 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>LTC JOHN B. BLUNT</td>
<td>24 Dec 68</td>
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<td>G2</td>
<td>LTC FREDERICK BARTETT</td>
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<td>G3</td>
<td>LTC JOHN V. GIBNEY</td>
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<td>LTC GUINN E. UNGER</td>
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<td>G5</td>
<td>LTC WILLIAM D. MAC MILLIAN</td>
<td>4 Jan 69</td>
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<td>G5</td>
<td>LTC JAMES V. BAMBERRY</td>
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<td>LTC RICHARD JENNINGS</td>
<td>21 Dec 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>COL ROBERT J. BAER</td>
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<td>COL ROBERT H. MACKINNON</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Bde</td>
<td>COL CONRAD L. STANSBERRY</td>
<td>26 Nov 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Bde</td>
<td>COL CHARLES H. CURTIS</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>LTC Pritchard G. Adams</td>
<td>15 Nov 68</td>
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<td>LTC JOHN B. BLUNT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12</td>
<td>LTC G. L. MC GARRIGLE JR.</td>
<td>24 Dec 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>LTC GREGGORY TROUTMAN</td>
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<tr>
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<td>LTC ROBERT J. PETERSEN</td>
<td>24 Dec 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>LTC JAMES W. DINGERMAN</td>
<td>29 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/12</td>
<td>LTC PETER L. FORRAD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/5</td>
<td>LTC RAYMOND MALADOWITZ</td>
<td>15 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/5</td>
<td>LTC JERRY J. BURCHAK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7</td>
<td>LTC WILLIAM D. MC MILLAN</td>
<td>4 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7</td>
<td>LTC GUINN E. UNGER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/7</td>
<td>LTC ADDISON DAVIS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2/7</td>
<td>LTC GEORGE D. HARDESTY JR</td>
<td>1 Dec 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/7</td>
<td>LTC JOHN P. MC GRAW</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/9</td>
<td>LTC WILLIAM G. ROUSSE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/9</td>
<td>LTC JAMES M. PETERSON</td>
<td>7 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVARY</td>
<td>COL WILLIAM R. WOLFE JR.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2/19</td>
<td>LTC ROBERT C. MORRISON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/20</td>
<td>LTC CHARLES D. FRANKLIN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2/20</td>
<td>LTC JOHN H. SCHNITZER JR.</td>
<td>27 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB G; Personnel Roster (Cont)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DATE ASSIGNED</th>
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<tr>
<td>1/21</td>
<td>LTC JACK E. WAKEFIELD</td>
<td>9 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/21</td>
<td>LTC JAMES B. ASHEW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/30</td>
<td>LTC RICHARD M. JENNINGS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/30</td>
<td>LTC DWIGHT L. WILSON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/77</td>
<td>LTC RICHARD W. THOMPSON</td>
<td>21 Dec 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/77</td>
<td>LTC JAMES K. RAMBERY</td>
<td>20 Dec 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Gp</td>
<td>COL ELMORE J. SWENSON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Gp</td>
<td>COL FOX RICE</td>
<td>5 Dec 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227th Avn Bn</td>
<td>LTC GEORGE R. THAYER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227th Avn Bn</td>
<td>LTC EDWARD CONINGTON</td>
<td>20 Dec 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228th Avn Bn</td>
<td>LTC DEAN R. PAQUETTE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228th Avn Bn</td>
<td>LTC DAVID D. DUKES</td>
<td>16 Dec 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPT CMD</td>
<td>COL WILLIAM C. DYSINGER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th TC</td>
<td>LTC ALBERT W. SCHLIM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th S&amp;S</td>
<td>LTC LEROY JORGENSEN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Maint</td>
<td>LTC FRANK P. RAGANO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Med</td>
<td>LTC GUTHRIE L. TURNER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Sig</td>
<td>LTC BILLY J. THRASHER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Eng.</td>
<td>LTC FRANCIS J. WILTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

TAB H: C-1 Activities

1. C-1 activities remained centralized at Phuoc Vinh throughout the reporting period.

2. During the period, Brigade VIP Centers were established at Ouan Loi and Tay Ninh to provide rest and refitting facilities for the infantry units. Rifle companies with normal attachments were rotated into the centers for 48 hour periods as the tactical situation permitted. Recreational facilities were provided and finance and AG record teams were organized to solve administrative problems.

3. Throughout this period the division strength remained at approximately 100% of authorized. Critical shortages included infantry Captains, supply personnel, 05 and 13 series MOS', and aircraft maintenance personnel. The division was authorized to assign 11B's in lieu of the basic artillery personnel to DIVARTY units. This action was necessitated by the acute shortage of artillery personnel. The infantry personnel who qualify after substantial OJT will be reclassified and awarded the basic artillery MOS.

4. The limited aviation infusion program initiated in Nov 68 was completed in Dec 68, one month ahead of schedule. This program involved the reassignment of 35 aviators from the division. It was through this program that the division was able to obtain Cobra pilots in exchange for UH-1 aviators. In addition, this program also enabled the division to somewhat reduce the large number of DEROS losses that were occurring in March and April 69, since aviators with March and April DEROS were primarily the ones selected and reassigned.

   a. In an effort to spread out the DEROS losses and to provide experienced aviators for the brigades, an infusion program was also effected within the division. Inexperienced aviators were reassigned from the brigades in exchange for experienced aviators from division aviation units.

   b. Throughout the division the experience level among the aviators became noticeably reduced during this period. 73% of all aviators assigned to the division were on their initial aviation assignment, whereby only 18.9% of the aviators assigned were second-tour, Vietnam veterans.

5. Personnel services for the division were expanded and improved.

   a. A mobile PX Van was air lifted to Song Be establishing a post exchange branch to support elements of the division located in that vicinity.

   b. Red Cross girls, although not available for permanent assignment to the division supported forward LZ's/firebases along the Cambodian border, visited three days per week from Lai Khe.

   c. Approximately 600 SKYTOPERS from the division were air lifted to Long Binh and Cu Chi to attend the Bob Hope Christmas Show. In addition...
approximately 200 SKYTROOPERS were moved by air from remote LZ's/firebases to attend Evangelist Billy Graham's Services in Long Binh.

d. The "flying PX", a Huey helicopter carrying small radioes, tape recorders, watches, cameras, snack items and essential items, continued to provide support to SKYTROOPERS on the forward LZ's/firebases.

e. The education program was expanded to include periodic trips by the education advisor to major firebases within the AO to provide testing service and correspondence courses.

f. American Red Cross "Christmas Ditty Bags" were distributed to every SKYTROOPER in the division for Christmas.
### TAB I: Division Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Nov</th>
<th>31 Dec</th>
<th>31 Jan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFFICERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth</td>
<td>1367</td>
<td>1367</td>
<td>1367</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asgd</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>1442</td>
<td>1413</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WARRANT OFFICERS</strong></td>
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<td>Auth</td>
<td>704</td>
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<td>Asgd</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>653</td>
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<td><strong>ENLISTED</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Auth</td>
<td>17394</td>
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<td>17394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asgd</td>
<td>17832</td>
<td>18168</td>
<td>18280</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

TAB J: Casualty Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>MHA</th>
<th>MHA</th>
<th></th>
<th>DEATH</th>
<th>INJURY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOVEMBER</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NON-HOSTILE</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECEMBER</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMMENTS: 1. The following problem areas exist in the area of casualty reporting:
   a. Delayed casualty reports being submitted from the field.
   b. Casualty reports being received with incomplete information.

2. These errors have been reduced through the issuance of an SOP for battalion and separate unit casualty reporters and letters to units requiring documentation and corrective action taken regarding delayed reports.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

TAB K: Replacement Report


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>NCO</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>1391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2296</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>2016</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>4542</td>
<td>5703</td>
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</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB Lt: Unit Listings

HHC, 1st Brigade
1st Bn, 8th Cav
2nd Bn, 8th Cav
1st Bn, 12th Cav
25th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
41st Public Info Det

HHC, 2nd Brigade
1st Bn, 5th Cav
2nd Bn, 5th Cav
2nd Bn, 12th Cav

HHC, 3rd Brigade
1st Bn, 7th Cav
2nd Bn, 7th Cav
5th Bn, 7th Cav
34th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

HHC & B, Support Command
15th S&G Bn
15th TC Bn
15th Med Bn
27th Maint Bn

HHC, Division Artillery
2nd Bn, 19th Arty
2nd Bn, 20th Arty
1st Bn, 21st Arty
1st Bn, 77th Arty
1st Bn, 30th Arty
E Btry, 82nd Arty

HHC, 11th Aviation Group
227th Avn Bn
228th Avn Bn
229th Avn Bn
11th Avn Co (CS)

HHC, 1st Cav Div
14th Mil History Det

1st Bn, 9th Cav
62d Inf Plt (CT)

8th Engr Bn

13th Signal Bn

1st Pers Svc Bn (Prov)
15th Administration Co
42d Public Info Det

184th Chemical Plt
26th Chemical Det

191st MI Det
583rd MI Det

545th MP Co

E Co, 52d Inf (attd to 1/9 for rats, qrs and admin)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB M: Reenlistments and Extensions

1. REENLISTMENTS AND EXTENSIONS 1-30 November 1968
   a. Three (3) First Term RA extended their enlistments.
   b. One (1) Career RA extended his enlistment.
   c. Eleven (11) AUS Personnel extended their ETS.
   d. Reenlistments accomplished during this period are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>TOTAL SEPARATIONS</th>
<th>ELIGIBLES</th>
<th>REENLISTMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Term RA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUS Personnel</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>ER &amp; NG Personnel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career RA Personnel</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Reenlistments accomplished during this period are shown below:

2. REENLISTMENTS AND EXTENSIONS 1-31 December 1968
   a. Four (4) First Term RA Extended their enlistments.
   b. Six (6) Career RA extended their enlistments.
   c. Twelve (12) AUS Personnel extended their ETS.
   d. Reenlistments accomplished during this period are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>TOTAL SEPARATIONS</th>
<th>ELIGIBLES</th>
<th>REENLISTMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Term RA</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS Personnel</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER &amp; NG Personnel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career RA Personnel</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Reenlistments accomplished during this period are shown below:

3. REENLISTMENTS AND EXTENSIONS 1-31 January 1969
   a. Six (6) First Term RA Extended their enlistments.
   b. Ten (10) Career RA extended their enlistments.
   c. Two (2) AUS Personnel extended their ETS.
   d. Reenlistments accomplished during this period are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>TOTAL SEPARATIONS</th>
<th>ELIGIBLES</th>
<th>REENLISTMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Term RA</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS Personnel</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER &amp; NG Personnel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career RA Personnel</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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## OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1969

**TAB N:** Enlisted Promotion Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>NOVEMBER</th>
<th>DECEMBER</th>
<th>JANUARY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>E7</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>132</td>
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<td>E6</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>1397</td>
<td>1179</td>
<td>1262</td>
<td>3838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>2264</td>
<td>2695</td>
<td>2127</td>
<td>7086</td>
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</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB 0: Awards and Decorations

1. During the months of November and December there was a significant decrease in the number of award recommendations submitted to the Awards and Decorations Section. This was fortunate for the operations of the section since necessary accommodation had to be made at the new location at Phuoc Vinh which interfered with the normal working schedule. However, remodeling of the office, construction of an adequate bunker and the securing of equipment necessary to replace that left in Camp Evans took place in a minimum amount of time and operation continued on schedule.

2. In the month of January LIT Haggardt was replaced as OIC by LIT Traugott. At the same time a large influx of award recommendations entered the section reflecting the encounters with the enemy that occurred during the months of November and December. The large inflow of awards coupled with an inadequate number of working staff has caused a small back-log of awards to accumulate at the end of the reporting period.

3. The number of awards processed during the reporting period 1 November through 31 January is as follows:

- Silver Star: 129
- Distinguished Flying Cross: 162
- Soldier's Medal: 48
- Bronze Star Valor: 301
- Air Medal Valor: 128
- Army Commendation Medal Valor: 164
- Bronze Star Medal: 2821
- Air Medal: 3442
- Purple Heart: 1472
- Army Commendation Medal: 2829
- Total: 11496

4. The section's administrative functions were performed smoothly and without significant error during the reporting period. However, the lack of adequate replacements for DEROS personnel and a heavy detail schedule have taken their toll upon the output of the section causing a small lag in the processing of awards that extra working hours has been unable to completely overcome. It is hoped that the necessary replacements soon to enter the section will enable the section to perform its duties in the exemplary manner to which it has become accustomed.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB P: Special Services

1. Several problems were incurred by this office following the relocation of
   the 1st Air Cav to III Corps. A listing of the major problem areas and their
   solutions follow.

   a. Supplies - An extremely limited quantity of special services supplies was
      brought forward from Camp Evans to Phuoc Vinh due to the lack of cargo space
      available. An initial delay of expendable and non-expendable supplies was
      incurred when the Cav arrived in Phuoc Vinh because the Supply Depot was closed
      for inventory, however, this problem was eliminated after approximately forty-
      five days when the Saigon Supply Point again resumed issuing supplies.

   b. 16MM Film Accounts - Relocation into a larger AO created transportation
      problems in the daily exchange of films. Initially films were returned to
      Phuoc Vinh for exchange, but as film accounts increased a circuit was
      established at Cua Loi and a circuit is planned for "av Minh.

   c. VIP Centers - with uncertain opening dates were supplied with personnel
      and special service equipment as requested.

   d. Swimming Pool - Numerous problems were incurred with the recently ob-
      tained Phuoc Vinh swimming pool. Due to the lack of operation of the pool prior
      to the Cav's relocation, the liner had deteriorated and the pool's pump was
      inoperative. A new pump was obtained, but soon removed for installation in
      the Phuoc Vinh Compound Area. Efforts are being made to obtain a new pump and
      pool liner.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB Q: R&R Program

1. Information concerning the R&R Program for the period 1 November to 31 January 1969 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R&amp;R Site</th>
<th>November Allocated</th>
<th>November Used</th>
<th>December Allocated</th>
<th>December Used</th>
<th>January Allocated</th>
<th>January Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>378</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>262</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>228</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>229</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>195</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
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<td>Manila</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL  1512  1383  1593  1499  1671  1519

Utilization % 91.5 24 24

2. During the latter part of the stated time period emphasis has been placed on reducing the number of No-Shows for the Division.

3. Steps are also being taken to better control personnel enroute to and from An Khe for their R&R. This is in an effort to reduce the time an individual is away from his unit.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB R: Postal Activities

1. Christmas Mail Rush:
   
   The APO with the assistance of TDY personnel was able to handle the Christmas mail rush without any great problem.

2. Hospital Mail Section:
   
   The hospital mail section has encountered some problems due to the large number of personnel hospitalized during the covered period, however an NCO has been assigned as supervisor and additional personnel laid on to overcome the problem.

3. Locator Section:
   
   The locator cards have not been as accurate as desired during the reporting period. Special emphasis is now being placed on this problem to obtain better locator cards. Actions taken are as follows:
   
   a. Cards not completed until after individual receives assignment in Replacement Detachment.
   
   b. DB items and announcements at Adjutant's Call to show the units the importance of locator cards for both arriving and departing personnel.

4. Closing of Airstrip to C-130 Traffic Phuoc Vinh:
   
   The closing of the airstrip and non-receipt of mail direct from Tan San Nhat has caused problems in transport of mail. No C-7A aircraft have been specifically designated to carry mail to Phuoc Vinh. The problem has been corrected somewhat by using rotary wing aircraft, of this division, returning to Phuoc Vinh in the evening hours.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB S: Army Emergency Relief

The Army Emergency Relief Section 19091 conducted the following transactions for the period 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Loans</th>
<th>Grants</th>
<th>No of Transactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>$700.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>$300.00</td>
<td>$250.00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$880.00</td>
<td>$250.00</td>
<td>5</td>
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## CONFIDENTIAL

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

**TAB T:** VIP Visits

### NOVEMBER 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CG, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>BG J. B. Kidd, MG Robert R. Williams</td>
<td>Deputy JO3, CINCPAC, CG, 1st Aviation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>MG Walter B. Richardson, BG Frederic Davison</td>
<td>Deputy CG, II Field Force, Vietnam, CG, 199th Infantry Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster</td>
<td>Deputy CG, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>BG Ngo Dzu, LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr., MG Robert R. Williams</td>
<td>Director, JOC, CG, II Field Force, Vietnam, CG, 1st Aviation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>BG Albert Harrow</td>
<td>CG, Saigon Support Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>MG George S. Eckhardt</td>
<td>Senior Advisor, IV Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CG, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CG, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>CCL Stanley Tesko</td>
<td>CO, 26th General Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Mr L. James Binder, MG Donn R. Pepke, CCL Alton G. Post</td>
<td>Editor, Army Magazine, Chief, Aviation Maint Center, 34th General Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Honorable William G. Bray, Honorable Harvey G. Macken</td>
<td>House Armed Services Committee</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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**CONFIDENTIAL**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CO, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MG Joseph M. Heiser</td>
<td>CO, 1st Logistical Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CO, II Field Force Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG George M. Seignious</td>
<td>US Embassy, Paris, France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>MG David S. Parker</td>
<td>CO, Engineer Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Pham Quoc Thuan</td>
<td>CG, 5th Inf Div, Army of the Republic of South Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CO, II Field Force Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>MG George M. Seignious</td>
<td>US Embassy, Paris, France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>MG Robert R. Williams</td>
<td>CO, 1st Aviation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>MG Walter B. Richardson</td>
<td>Deputy CO, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mr Joseph Alsop</td>
<td>Syndicated Columnist, Washington Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr James C. Graham</td>
<td>Member of Board of National Estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mr Joseph Alsop</td>
<td>Syndicated Columnist, Washington Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Robert R. Williams</td>
<td>CO, 1st Aviation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Walter B. Richardson</td>
<td>Deputy CO, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>GEN Creighton Abrams</td>
<td>CO, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COL George S. Patton Jr.</td>
<td>CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CO, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Robert R. Williams</td>
<td>CO, 1st Aviation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GEN Creighton Abrams</td>
<td>CO, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CO, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Robert R. Williams</td>
<td>CO, 1st Aviation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Walter B. Richardson</td>
<td>CO, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CO, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>MG Robert R. Williams</td>
<td>CO, 1st Aviation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>MG Robert R. Williams</td>
<td>CO, 1st Aviation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CO, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Thomas A. Riienzi</td>
<td>Deputy CO, 1st Signal Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Walter B. Richardson</td>
<td>Deputy CO, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>LTG Richard C. Stilwell</td>
<td>CO, XXIV Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Walter B. Richardson</td>
<td>Deputy CO, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB T: VIP Visits (Cont)

DECEMBER 1968 (CONT)

18 LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.  
BG A. H. Smith Jr.  
CG, II Field Force, Vietnam  
Assistant Div Commander, 1st Inf Division

20 MG Walter M. Higgins  
LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.  
C/S, 8th US Army  
CG, II Field Force, Vietnam

22 LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.  
MG Walter B. Richardson  
CG, II Field Force, Vietnam  
Deputy CG, II Field Force, Vietnam

24 President Nguyen Van Thieu  
LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.  
LTG Dao Cao Tri  
GEN Gao Van Vien  
GEN Tran Thien Khiong  
Vice Minister Nguyen Huu Dao  
LTG Bang Van Quang  
MG Tran Van Trung  
President of the Republic of Vietnam  
CG, II Field Force, Vietnam  
CG, III Combat Tactical Zone  
Joint Chief of Staff  
Minister of Interior  
Vice Minister  
Presidential Assistant  
Political Warfare, Joint General Staff  
CG, 5th Inf Div, Army of the Republic of South Vietnam  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Senior Advisor, III Corps

25 GEN James K. Woolnough  
BG Donald D. Dunlop  
MG Walter B. Richardson  
CG, US Continental Army  
Deputy CG, 1st Signal Brigade  
Deputy CG, II Field Force, Vietnam

27 Admiral John S. McCain Jr.  
Rear Admiral Maurice Rindskopf  
Commander in Chief, Pacific  
J-2, CINCPAC

30 LTG Frank T. Mildren  
BG Arthur Hurow  
C/O, 26th General Support Group  
CG, Saigon Support Command  
CG, 26th General Support Group

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**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969  
**TAB T:** VIP Visits (Cont)

### JANUARY 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>BG John G. Wheelock III</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant C/S, J-3, MACV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>B-52 Crew</td>
<td>3rd Air Div, Andeson AFB, Guam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>BG Albert H. Smith Jr.</td>
<td>Assistant Div Commander, 1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BG Elmer P. Yates</td>
<td>CG, USAECAV (provisional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>GEN Creighton Abrams</td>
<td>CG, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CG, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>LTG (Ret) Edgar C. Doleman</td>
<td>Director, COMSFA Study Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Walter B. Richardson</td>
<td>Deputy CG, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>LTG Michael S. Davison</td>
<td>Deputy Commander in Chief, US Army, Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Robert R. Williams</td>
<td>CG, 1st Aviation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CG, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CG, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>BG Donald D. Blackburn</td>
<td>Director of Plans and Programs, OORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BG C. J. LeVan</td>
<td>Director of Air Defense, AGSFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COL G. M. Snead</td>
<td>Director of Research, OORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>MG Walter B. Richardson</td>
<td>Deputy CG, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>COL Beverly M. Read</td>
<td>US Army, Vietnam, G-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>GEN Creighton Abrams</td>
<td>CG, US Military Assistance Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LTG Walter T. Kerwin Jr.</td>
<td>CG, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LG Albert O. Connor</td>
<td>Deputy C/S for Personnel, DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>BG George C. Fogle</td>
<td>SGS G3, 8th US Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>BG George C. Godding</td>
<td>Chief, Army Security Agency, USARPAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Francis B. McSwiney</td>
<td>Adjutant General, New Hampshire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>LTG Richard G. Stilwell</td>
<td>CG, XXIV Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>MG Robert R. Williams</td>
<td>CG, 1st Aviation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MG Walter B. Richardson</td>
<td>Deputy CG, II Field Force, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB U: Information Activities

1. The information office continued to increase its service to the world's news media and the 1st Air Cav Div during the reported period. The following is a breakdown of major services performed:

   a. The facilities of the Army Hometown News Center were used to process stories about individuals in the 1st Air Cav Div to the following type of news media:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Homeowners</th>
<th>Radio Homeowners</th>
<th>TV Homeowners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doc</td>
<td>2120</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>1717</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1564</td>
<td>1311</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Troop Topics emphasizing 1st Air Cav Div accomplishments were published each week and command information brochures were distributed on the following subjects:

      (1) The Cav in the News
      (2) The Weed
      (3) The Vietnamese Woman

c. One-hundred twenty-nine (129) newsmen visited the division during the quarter; 50, 40 and 39 in November, December and January respectively. They represented the agencies:

   |    | New York Times | BBC-TV  | Los Angeles Times |
   |    |                | Overseas Weekly | Group Wesinghouse |
   |    |                | Time Magazine   | Manchester Guardian (London) |
   |    | Bell Helicopter| Australian Press| Economist (London) |
   |    | Tele-News      | Reuters          | Baltimore Sun |
   |    | Stars & Stripes| 7th AF IO       | Washington Post |
   |    | Dispatch News, Inc | Newsweek Magazine | London Evening Pendant |
   |    | Scripps-Howard | Minneapolis Tribune | Chicago Tribune |
   |    |                |                  | British Independent TV |
   |    |                |                  | Agence France Press |

d. The Photo Section of the Information Office was responsible for taking 20,229 photos and making 16,850 prints from selected negatives. The Photo Section also developed a total of 4,225 color slides during the reporting period.

e. The Press Section was responsible for the release of 541 stories and features during this reporting period.

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f. The *Cavalair* was published weekly in Tokyo at the Stars and Stripes plant.

g. The Division quarterly magazine, *The Air Cavalry Division*, was also published in Tokyo, Japan. The magazine was delayed 5 weeks due to the inability of the printer, Dai Nippon, to meet the publication deadline.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB V: Judge Advocate Activities

The following information is furnished for the quarter ending 31 January 1969:

- Article 15's: 750
- Courts-Martial (Total): 99
- Summary: 25
- Special: 69
- General: 5
OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1969

TAB W: PROVOST MARSHAL ACTIVITIES

1. During the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969, the Office of the Provost Marshal processed a total of 857 offenses committed within the 1 ACD area of responsibility.

   a. Offense Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimes against persons and property:</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous offenses:</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military offenses:</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic offenses:</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>857</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Breakdown of Offender Statistics:

   (1) Crimes against persons and property: aggravated assault (6), assault (7), burglary and housebreaking (1), larceny under $50 (8), larceny over $50 (2), communicating a threat (1), damage to government property (1), negligent homicide (1), violation of US Mail Regulations (1).

   (2) Miscellaneous offenses: Included in this category were: disorderly conduct (14), marijuana (69), blackmarketing (7), unlawful discharge of firearm (20), suicide (1), self-inflicted wound (1).

   (3) Military offenses: Among the offenses listed in this category were: AWOL (62), off limits (127), pass violation (1), violation of regulations (31), weapons violations (15); listed in other offenses: careless discharge of firearms (5), drunk and disorderly (7), escape from custody (5), failure to secure government property (16); loss of government property through neglect (7), resisting apprehension (6), false official statement (1), interfering with MP's on duty (2), impersonating an officer (2).

   c. Comments on Offender Statistics:

   (1) There was a 100% increase in crimes against persons and property over the period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968. This was brought about by the move of the 1 ACD to a new area of operation and the inclusion of units formerly not associated with the Division (i.e., 31st Engr Bn, 595th Sig Plt, etc.).

   (2) The number of miscellaneous offenses also increased in all categories. Blackmarketing incidents rose from 4 for the previous period to 7 for the current period. Marijuana apprehensions increased from 45 to 69. These increases can by directly attributed to the proximity of villages in the 1 ACD AO to major LZ's. Marijuana is easily available from small children, bars,
houses of prostitution, roadside vendors and coke girls.

(3) Increase in military offenses was also noted for this period. Specific increases were noted in AWOL (increase from 37 to 62) and off limits (increase from 12 to 127). These increases also may be attributed to the move of the Division and its proximity to Saigon and other large villages.

2. Detainee Report:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Returnee</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB X: Finance Activities

1. Finance activities for period 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969 are as follows:

a. Statistical summary

   (1) Regular monthly payments: 52,545
   (2) Partial and advance payments: 16,227
   (3) Travel Payments: 6,843
   (4) Piaster Sales: 2,556
   (5) Sale of Government Checks: 2,300
   (6) Processed in 5,705 personnel.
   (7) Processed out 3,943 personnel.
   (8) Total cash and check payments value $9,394,660.52

2. The command Savings Program participation on 31 December 1968 was:

   Total participation 85.5%
   Bonds only 72.3%
   Bonds and Savings Deposits 6.4%
   Savings Deposits only 4.3%

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB Y: Chaplain Activities

1. Chaplain Assignment: The advantages of chaplains being attached to Battalions for religious coverage overrides the disadvantages of centralized Brigade assignments. Chaplains functioning at Battalion level were better able to relate to their people and move expeditiously with their Battalion during this time frame, i.e., Operation Liberty Canyon.

2. Religious Services: The number of opportunities to provide religious services decreased during this period. Reference is made particularly to the time involved in preparing for a move, marshalling at an airfield and awaiting aircraft. Closer monitoring of all movement activity, especially while at plane side, would allow a chaplain to possibly conduct several short plane side religious services.

3. Supplies: Each chaplain carries with him the essentials for conducting religious services. The Division Chaplain Section at any advanced CP is stocked with sufficient items to resupply any chaplain in the field.

4. Division Movement: While the Division is in transit from one AO to another, the Division Chaplain and NCO Chaplain Administrator should accompany the advance CP. The Deputy Division Chaplain should follow with the rear echelon.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

TAB 2: Surgeon's Activities

1. Submitted are the complete and final statistics for the stated period.

2. Medical
   a. Disease and injury statistical data:
      (1) Non-battle injuries: 312
      (2) Disease: 1049
         (a) Malaria: 307
            1. Vivax: 64
            2. Falciparum: 241
            3. Unknown: 2
         (b) FUO: 274
         (c) Psychiatric Cases: 52
         (d) Others: 416
      (3) Remaining in hospital (In Country): 237
   b. Discussion of Disease:
      (1) Malaria cases: A total of 307 cases of malaria occurred in personnel of this Division from 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69, inclusive. Of them 64 (20.8%) cases were due to Plasmodium vivax and were caused in most U.S. Forces by failure to take the weekly chlorquina-primaquine pill.
         (a) The malaria incidence is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC 1st Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB 2: Surgeon's Activities (Cont)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>HHC 2nd Bde</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC 3rd Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avn Gp</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Cmd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Sig Bn</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engr Bn</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC Div</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Admin</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>545 MF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The malaria rate is the highest for any quarter since November 1967 – January 1968. The marked rise in incidence coincides with the move of the division to III Corps Tactical Zone and heavy contact with the enemy.

(2) Other selected diseases of importance are as follows:

- Immersion Foot: 2
- Heat Exhaustion: 11
- Poisoning: 0
- Animal Bites: 1
- Hepatitis: 10
- Dengue Fever: 2
- Infectious Meningitis: 0
- Scrub Typhus: 2

(c) IRHA: From 1 Nov 68 through 31 Jan 69, the 15th Medical Battalion treated a total of 1455 U.S. Army personnel who were IRHA. Of these, 1040 admitted and 415 were CRO.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requests for Assistance</td>
<td>321</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complaints</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual General Inspections</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonappropriated Fund Inspections</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Inspections (Clearing Camp Evans)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AB: Logistic Operations

1. (C) General

a. Operation COMANCHE FALLS II and III were completed during the reporting period. See Combat Operations - after Action Report dtd 24 Jan 69 for details.

b. Operation LIBERTY CANYON was completed during the reporting period. See OPERATION LIBERTY CANYON, Operational Report dtd 27 Nov 68 for details.

c. Operation TOAN THANG, already begun in III CTZ was augmented by the FIRST TEAM upon its arrival from NITCZ. The 1st FSSE in Tay Ninh; the 2d FSSE in Phuoc Vinh, and the 3d FSSE in Quan Loi supported the 1st, 2d and 3d Brigades respectively. When major elements of the 1st Brigade deployed to AO NAVAJO WARHORSE (15 Dec 68 - 31 Jan 69) the 1st FSSE provided support from Cu Chi.

d. The Division Supply Office was located at Bien Hoa during the period. Supplies arriving at the Division Supply Office were shipped forward to the FSSE's for pick up by the units.

e. A forward Logistics Control Center (LCC), co-located with the Division base, was established by DISCOM at Phuoc Vinh in order to provide more efficient service and support to the Division. The LCC rear, along with the preponderance of DISCOM subordinates and supporting units were stationed at Bien Hoa.

2. (C) Major Problem Areas:

a. During the reporting period the availability rate of organic aircraft dropped to an unacceptable level. Brigadier General Shedd, ADC-B, was appointed chairman of a group to study the problem and determine short and long range solutions. The study group was composed of rated officers from the Division and USARV. Even while the group was meeting short range steps were taken to improve aircraft availability. From the time the study group was formed to the end of the reporting period the availability rate of mission ready aircraft improved and continues to improve.

b. Since arrival in III CTZ fighting elements of the Division have continually been shifted from one part of the CTZ to another, and when so dictated by the tactical situation, maneuver battalions have shifted from one brigade to another as the enemy was found and fixed. As a result some supported elements have found themselves closer to higher echelon supporting units than to their assigned support. In some cases established lines of communication have become more theoretical than practical. When this happened, on the spot changes to the support concept were made. The maneuver units were not deprived of logistic support however cumbersome the arrangements became. Recognition of this problem came during the reporting period. A study group is currently being formed to develop a more satisfactory execution of the support mission.
3. (C) Major Accomplishments

a. During the reporting period the move of the entire Division from NIZTZ to III CTZ was completed. Fighting elements were able to contribute significantly to Operation TOAN THANG with minimum delay upon arrival. The concept of area logistic support deserves most of the credit for the relatively smooth insertion of the FIRST TEAM into effective III CTZ operations.

b. Construction projects to improve the living conditions at the new Division base camps were prepared and submitted to USA RV.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AC: Logistics

1. (C) Supply and Services

a. Class I activities. Compared to the preceding report period, the average daily tonnage of Class I consumption increased from 42 STCN to 47 STCN.

b. Class II and IV activities. Compared to the preceding report period, the average daily tonnage of Class II and IV consumed increased from 20.6 STCN to 28 STCN.

c. Class III activities. During the period 59,634 gals of class III were issued through DLSCON facilities. Total figures are not available. Depending on the area of operation, many Division aircraft refuel at major bases such as Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, and Long Tanh where the POL points are operated by 1st Log Command. These bases supply fuel to aircraft on an area basis and maintain their stockage level as required. Consumption data by unit is not maintained and thus is not available for this report.

d. Class V activities. Compared to the preceding report period, the average daily tonnage of Class V consumed was decreased from 170 STCN to 112 STCN.

e. Food service activities. A Total of 94 formal and informal inspections were conducted during the reporting period.

f. Aerial Support activities. A Total of 18,356 STON of supplies were rigged for 5,303 sorties. A total of 393 parachutes were packed.

g. The following supplies were issued during the period:

(1) Class I
   (a) A Rations: 1,564.5 STCN
   (b) B Rations: 1,273.2 STCN
   (c) C Rations: 1,861,868 Meals
   (d) LRPP Rations: 154,313 Meals
   (e) Ice: 4,312 STON
   (f) Milk: 2,834,340 Pints
   (g) Ice Cream: 27,430 Gallons
   (h) Sundries Packs: 293.3 STON

(2) Class II and IV
   (a) Clothing and Equipment: 1,031.8 STON
   (b) Barrier Materials: 1,545.8 STON
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AC: Logistics (Cont)

(3) Class III

(a) AVGAS: 90,900 gal 263.6 STON
(b) JP-4: 4,216,000 gal 14,756.0 STON
(c) NCGAS: 341,500 gal 1,109.9 STON
(d) DF-2: 837,900 gal 2,932.6 STON
(e) Packaged Products: 105.8 STON

(4) Class V

Ammunition 10,379 STON

2. (C) Transportation and Maintenance

a. Air transportation

(1) Movements during LIBERTY CANYON are detailed in OPERATION LIBERTY CANYON, Operational Report dtd 27 Nov 68.

(2) Aerial resupply - none.

(3) Airlift and Courier Service. A daily C-130 provided service between An Khe and Phuoc Vinh or Quan Loi to transport replacements, DERO and BAR personnel. Movement within the AO was accomplished with 2 of the 8 dedicated C7A aircraft which provided a courier service to all major unit locations. The 6 remaining dedicated C7A aircraft continued to haul cargo and passengers as needed. Common service airlift was used to the maximum extent contingent upon runway conditions and urgency of need. Mail was airlifted to Phuoc Vinh or Quan Loi, sorted and airlifted to the various unit locations for delivery.

b. Sealift.

Movements during LIBERTY CANYON are detailed in OPERATION LIBERTY CANYON, Operational Report, dtd 27 Nov 68.

c. Ground Transportation was requested from the Saigon Support Command Movement Control Center. Resupply convoys to Phuoc Vinh, Tay Ninh and Quan Loi were operated by the 48th Trans Gp.

d. Ground Maintenance.

(1) Operational Percentages: The percentage of equipment operational continued at a high level throughout the entire reporting period. The following percentage of equipment was operational at the end of the Quarter.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AC: Logistics (Cont)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>% OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailers</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generators</td>
<td>94.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>92.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Machines</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) CMMI: A total of 23 CMMI inspections were held. Of this total, 16 were formal inspections and 7 were courtesy inspections.

(3) Aircraft Maintenance.

(a) Average statistics by type aircraft during the reporting period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACFT</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>AVG MORS</th>
<th>AVG NORM</th>
<th>AVG M/SN READY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH-6A</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1B</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47A</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47B</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV-1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) A USARV CMMI Team conducted a scheduled inspection of selected aviation units, including all Direct Support Companies during the period 13 to 25 January 1969. The Division overall rating was satisfactory.

3. (C) Support Provided by 1st Log Command.

a. General. USASUPCOM Long Binh provided, through the 29th GS Group, unit distribution for Class I, III and V items. Limited Class II and Class IV support was also provided with the majority of the support provided through the Division Supply Office.

b. Transportation. Transportation was provided, through the transportation units of the 48th Trans Gp, for the transport of supplies from 1st Log Command supply points to the Brigade LZ's and Phuoc Vinh.

c. Services. Services were provided by the 29th GS Group. Services included Laundry, bath, EOD and graves registration.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarter-ry Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AC: Logistics (Cont)

d. Supply:

(1) Class I. Adequate.

(2) Class II and IV. Problem areas were the shortages of fast moving expendables. The reaction time required for prepositioning fast moving expendables was not available because of the short notice move of the Division. A significant problem area, after the move to III CTZ, was the nonavailability of Class IV construction materials, normally furnished thru Installation Engineer (PAE) channels.

(3) Class III. Adequate.

(4) Class V. Problem areas were excessive number of unit overdraws of ASR allocation. Inadequate quantity distance standards and storage facilities for ammunition in operational and basic loads existed in some unit areas. 2.75 rockets were placed on the ASR during the last two periods and became critically low on the January ASR.

(5) ASL - 27th Maintenance Battalion:

(a) Average Demand Accommodation: 85.3%
(b) Average Demand Satisfaction: 45.7%

(6) ASL - 15th T.C. Battalion:

(a) Average Demand Accommodation: 72%
(b) Average Demand satisfaction: 52%

(7) TOE Shortages. Shortages of TOE equipment continue to exist. The Commanders Critical Items List, initiated during the last reporting period, has brought some relief to this problem.

4. Facilities,

a. Projects completed. Job order requests were submitted to Installation Engineers for rehabilitation and upgrading of existing facilities at ten III CTZ tactical operating bases with finding under Operation LIBERTY CANYON. Eighty-five percent of the numerous projects have been completed. Ninety percent of the minimum essential requirements (MER) (Showers, latrines, A/C revetments, etc), requested upon arrival, were complete at the end of report period.

b. Projects under construction. Status of major projects as of end of report period.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AC: Logistics (Cont)

(1) Surfacing of runway and taxiway at Phuoc Vinh with M8A1 matting 60% complete.

(2) New ASP at Phuoc Vinh: 35%.

(3) Perimeter Expansion at Quan Loi: 30%.

(4) Maintenance Hardstand & Revetments for Avn GS Co at Long Than: 90%.

(5) Upgrading of tent frames to SEA Huts at all bases.

c. Planned Projects.

(1) New ASP at Quan Loi.

(2) Project request for perimeter lighting at Phuoc Vinh.

(3) Project request for construction of 214 SEA Huts at Phuoc Vinh.

(4) Project request being prepared for 416 SEA Huts at Quan Loi.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AD: Operation Liberty Canyon

1. This report covers the move of the 1st Cav Div (AM) from NICTZ to III CTZ during the period 26 Oct thru 20 Nov 1968. The report is divided into two parts. Part I is the operational report of actions taken to move the division from NICTZ and to receive the division into III CTZ. Part II discusses observations and lessons learned.

2. The initial order to begin moving the 1st Cav Div (AM) to III CTZ was received by the Commanding General telephonically 261745 Oct 1968. COMSMACV message 31920, DTG, 261245Z Oct 68 was received 261443Z Oct 68 which provided this guidance:

   b. One brigade to begin air movement 28 Oct and close 2 Nov 68.
   c. The maximum C-130 sorties per day would be 28.
   d. Sealift to begin 28 Oct 68.
   e. One brigade to begin air movement 3 Nov and close 7 Nov 68.
   f. One brigade to begin air movement 9 Nov and close on date TBA.

3. On 271930 Oct MG Forsythe, CG, 1st Cav Div (AM); accompanied by LTC Burcham, Deputy Chief of Staff; LTC Gibney, AC of S, G-3; COL Dysinger, CO, DISCOM; MAJ Wheeler, Deputy AC of S, G-4; and CPT Fisher, Aide-de-Camp, departed Camp Evans and arrived at HQ, II FFV at approximately 2230 hours.

   a. The group was briefed on the general situation by BG Cantrell, Chief of Staff, II FFV and the general area of operations in which the 1st Cav Div (AM) would operate was designated. MG Forsythe then discussed the situation with LTG Kerwin, CG, II FFV and the planning group was divided in meetings between the G-4 and G-3, II FFV. COL Dysinger, CO, DISCOM met with the G-3 group and MAJ Wheeler, Dep G-4 met with COL Evans, G-4, II FFV. While the G-4 meeting was general in nature, specifics were needed by II FFV and were provided by MAJ Wheeler. The following data was provided during the initial meeting.

   (1) The estimated 1st ACD daily consumption by class of supply and tonnage. Further this was broken down by bde slice of the division total requirements. This data was needed in order to estimate the air and ground transport required to resupply the 1st ACD. In the case of Class III the information was provided on a daily consumption basis in gallonage by division total and bde slice.

   (2) The daily stockage objectives of the 1st ACD expressed in classes of supply by division and bde slice.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AD: Operation Liberty Canyon (Cont)

(3) Organic aircraft density by type for the 1st ACD

(4) Organic ground equipment density by type for the 1st ACD. This information was not available with Maj Wheeler. Arrangements were made to obtain from USARV, a copy of the 20 Sep consolidated 1st Cav Div (AM), AMC-124, USARV Equipment Status Report which is prepared in accordance with AR 711-5. This report was used by II FFV to obtain the density data.

b. At the conclusion of these meetings, the planning group met with MG Forsythe to receive his revised guidance. This was to begin moving the division advance party and organic air and to put a freeze until further notice on all major personnel changes. A meeting was scheduled for 280700 Oct for an intelligence update and 0900 hrs for a meeting with LTG Mildren, Deputy CG, USARV.

c. During the meeting on 280800 Oct with LTG Mildren approval was obtained on the concept for deployment of the 1st ACD. Additional actions determined during this meeting were:

(1) Disposition of aviation units. Revetment requirements were developed from this stationing plan. Aviation DS maintenance units were satellited on existing GS units so the GS unit ASL could be used during the time the DS units equipment and ASL was being shipped south by sea.

(2) Priorities for non-divisional engineer effort were established as:

(a) Aircraft Revetments

(b) Minimum TOC's

(c) Upgrading of PCL Facilities

(d) Upgrading of Ammo Facilities

(3) Division Base to be located at Phoue Vinh and Division Support Command HQ's to be located at Bien Hoa.

(4) Time phasing for the brigades of the division to begin operations in the new AO.

(5) Determination of the number of C-130 sorties and LST's available daily for the move of the division.

(6) Agreement to establish a forward CP and planning group of the 1st Cav Div (AM) at Long Binh for a period not to exceed two weeks.

3. Following this meeting and for the next days a series of coordinating meetings were held with agencies such as Movement Control Center, Saigon Support Command, 48th Transportation Group, 29th GS Group, 1st Log Command and
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AD: Operation Liberty Canyon (Cont)

G-4 representatives of USARV. Primarily these coordinating meetings were for the purpose of further defining the stockage objective by classes of supply, for FSE's and daily tonnages for each location. (see para 2). Additionally, initial stockage list of fast moving items were developed and 29th GS Group was directed to obtain the items and pre-stock them at selected locations. A basic concept for initial logistics support was developed for the intrum period of time until the 1st Cav Div (AM) Support Command elements became operational.

4. At this point it became extremely important to develop a unit stationing list for organic units. This could be accomplished only after the division mission was defined and an organization developed to support that mission. The station list, when completed, was provided to the combat service support headquarters that would be in support of the division. These station list provided among other items, troop density by location and designated unit locations.

5. Coordination and agreement with the Saigon Support Command was necessary in order to arrange for truck transport of the unit equipment from the ports of debarkation to the new locations. While the 1st Inf Div was tasked to keep the roads to Phouc Vinh and Quan Loi open it was necessary to reach agreement on convoy control and to monitor daily changes in road openings. The 45th Trans Group was tasked to stage 1st Cav Div (AM) vehicles movement, provide transport for the move of organic equipment, and to arrange for 1st AOD vehicles to enter the daily convoy's north to the new locations.

6. With the move of the division into a new area of operations, USARV directed a higher priority for fill of equipment shortages against valid due outs. Meetings were held with the G-4, USARV and members of the staff identifying these shortages and expressing the division's priorities on various equipment shortages. Copies of the Commanders Critical Items List were used as a point of reference for these meetings.

7. On 270000 Oct a meeting to coordinate the move of the 1st Cav Div (AM) from NICTZ was conducted at HQ, III MAF with the division G-4 in attendance. Representatives of MACV, III MAF, Amphibious Ready Group Alpha, TMA, and USAF/COMDA NANG were present. From this meeting it was determined that three LSTs would be available for loading at Tan My on 28 Oct and two LSTs available each day thereafter until completion of the move. The aircraft carrier Princeton was made available to move aircraft and equipment from the Da Nang area. Additionally the LPD 8 (USS Debeaw) and LSD 31 (USS Point Defiance) were also made available for round trip use. The 26th GS Group was assigned the mission of providing transportation assets to haul organizational equipment from division unit locations at LZ Betty-Sharon, LZ Nanov, and Camp Evans, to loading facilities at Tan My Ramp, Quang Tri Airfield, and Phu Bai Airfield. In addition the 26th GS Group provided transportation to move personnel from LZ Betty-Sharon to Quang Tri Airfield and to conduct shuttle service for moving personnel and equipment from within Camp Evans to the Camp Evans Airfield.
Advance parties of the 3d Brigade, Division Headquarters, DIVARTY, 11th Aviation Group, 1st Sqdn 9th Cav, and DISCOM, departed from Camp Evans on 27 Oct using 4 C-130 sorties to Bien Hoa and Quan Loi.

9. Air Movement:

a. Units of the division had air movement plans available but initially lacked guidance as to what should be moved by air and what should go by sea. This was resolved early in the movement with guidance from BG Irby, Assistant Division Commander Alpha, that 1 ton vehicles and smaller along with passengers, individual combat gear, radios, and small arms ammunition, would go by air. Selected larger pieces of equipment were approved for air movement on an individual basis by the Acting Chief of Staff. All other equipment was to move by sea. Aerial ports of departure were Camp Evans, Quang Tri, and Phu Bai. The airfield at Camp Evans was used only during daylight with night operations being conducted from Quang Tri and Phu Bai.

b. After departure of the advance parties on 27 Oct, daily meetings were held with representatives of G-3, G-4, DISCOM-DTO, TALO, and the Mission Commander at which time sorties by origin, destination and unit were firm for the next day and plans were revised for subsequent day operations. On 29 Oct the division completed and published an air movement plan which served as a guide to when units would depart and the number of aircraft needed at origin and destination of these aircraft. Due to changes in the unit stationing plan in III CTZ it was necessary to make daily adjustments to the planned program. (Changes in the stationing plan were the result of later revised intelligence which caused the division commander to reorient some combat maneuver and aircraft assault units.) However, there were no cases of aircraft on the ground available for loading without loads to put on them.

c. Although the number of sorties to be flown from each departure airfield was known for each day, it was not possible to get advance notice of times of arrival for each sortie. This was overcome by positioning aircraft loads well in advance of actual aircraft arrivals, so as to have loads available when aircraft arrived.

10. Sea Movement:

a. Units of the division did not have definitive sea movement plans although they had made a sea movement into NICTZ within the past nine months utilizing eleven vessels. Since that time a significant amount of equipment had been received by the division which made the previous sea movement experience invalid. The division was offered initially more sea movement assets than it was capable of utilizing. There were two days when no LSTs arrived at Tan My - 31 Oct and 5 Nov. Although this did delay the sea movement, it provided the division with the time to stage two LST loads of cargo on the ramps in advance of ship arrivals. Experience gained indicated that the amount of regular incoming cargo which was already backlogged on the ramps at Tan My made it possible to preposition only two LST loads without choking the port with out bound cargo.
b. Communication with Tan My was poor to non-existent. It was necessary for the division G-4 Staff to make two flights per day to Tan My to keep information updated and to make plans for moving cargo forward based on the loading situation.

c. Truck assets of the 26th GS Group were utilized to move divisional non-rolling stock to the sea port. Initially the trucks were not promptly off loaded at Tan My and turned around for more cargo. This problem was resolved by the second day.

d. The planning of the sea movement was accomplished with the assistance of CPT Jones, USMC, Combat Cargo Officer, Staff Amphibious Squadron Center. He was located at Camp Evans and made available to the division staff ship loading capacities, square footage available by type of ship and provided valuable assistance and advise to the units in preparation for sea movement. The presence of this liaison officer was invaluable and essential to the sea movement.

e. CONEX containers were utilized to the utmost in packing cargo for sea movement. Units which had insufficient CONEX containers were provided pallets on which to load cargo. The division had been urged for months by USAV to turn in a substantial number of on hand CONEX containers. If these containers had been turned in, the sea movement would not have been possible within the prescribed time frame.

f. It was necessary for the division G-4 to establish a liaison movements team at Tan My. This team provided liaison between the division units movements activities the team provided information required by III MAF for loading reports submitted on each vessel at four hour intervals until completion of each loading. This team provided information for the division G-4 as to number of passengers, short tons of cargo and vehicles loaded on each vessel. A count was also taken on the number of vehicle equivalents required to haul cargo to each vessel for loading. All of this information was turned passed to the G-4 forward at Long Binh so as to serve as a guide to vehicle requirements for off loading.

10. During Operation Liberty Canyon, the 1st Cav Div (AM) used 437 C-130 sorties to move 11,550 passengers and 3399 short tons of unit cargo. Additionally a total of 31 LSTs, 3 LPDs, 3 LSDs, and one aircraft carrier were used to transport 4097 passengers and 16,593 short tons of cargo. This was a no notice move of the 1st Cav Div (AM) and the movement proceeded as directed without significant interruption. THE FIRST TEAM proved once again the mobility of the Cavalry.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AD: Operation Liberty Canyon (Cont)

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Organic Movement Control Capability.

Observation:

The number of departure and arrival airfields and seaports used for the operation exceeded the capability of the DISCOM-DTO to provide organic movement control personnel for each location.

Evaluation:

During the operation the division was utilizing eight departure and arrival airfields and four seaports. It was beyond the capability of DISCOM-DTO to provide movement control personnel for each of these locations. Several sources were tasked to provide personnel in order to augment the division's movement control capability. The division G-4 provided a team at Tan My, the forward movement control office at Long Binh, and initially a one man team at Phouc Vinh. Saigon Support Command provided a liaison team at Phouc Vinh and at the insistence of the division G-4, established a dedicated telephone circuit between movement control at Saigon Support Command and the liaison team at Phouc Vinh. This comlink proved invaluable. The liaison team at Phouc Vinh actually acted as division forward movement coordinator until DISCOM-DTO could close out a portion of its operations in NICPZ and move that element to Phouc Vinh. In order to provide control personnel at Newport and Saigon Port it was necessary to task units of the division with this mission. The 1st Brigade provided a control team at Newport and DIVARTY a team at Saigon Port.

Recommendation:

a. Upon receipt of an order to move the division determine as soon as possible the airfields and seaports of departure and arrival. Using the resources of DISCOM-DTO dispatch movement control personnel within capability to these locations to set up operations. Where requirement exceeds capability task arrival unit to establish movement control for selected locations. Supporting Support Command can also be requested to augment division personnel at selected locations.

b. Arrange for movement Control Center activities at departure and arrival areas to provide a liaison team with dedicated telephone circuit to the division. A team is needed at the departure and arrival division coordinating centers.

2. Liaison Officers

Observation: Liaison officers attached to the division during the move proved invaluable.
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TAB AD: Operation Liberty Canyon (Cont)

Evaluation:

a. A combat cargo officer from Staff Amphibious Squadron Center was located at Camp Evans. He made available ship loading capacities, square footage available by type of ship and provided valuable assistance and advice to the units in preparation for sea movement.

b. A logistics liaison officer was provided by XXIV Corps. This officer was most helpful in collecting movements data and forwarding that data to III MAF and XXIV Corps thus keeping them updated on the progress of the deployment.

c. Two liaison officers were provided DISCOM-DTO at Camp Evans from the transportation battalion of the 26th GS Group that were providing trucks for movement of division equipment. These LNOs were helpful in working out routine details with their battalions.

d. 1st Log Comd provided a liaison officer to the division G-4 Forward while at Long Binh. This LNO was most helpful in coordinating contacts and providing information to and from combat service support units in III CTZ with which this division had had no previous contact.

e. Movements Control Center of Saigon Support Command provided a liaison officer at Phouc Vinh when the division command and control group moved to that location. This officer actually became the division movements control officer at Phouc Vinh until DISCOM-DTO could move a team from NICTZ to Phouc Vinh. He also coordinated movement of all unit cargo and vehicles out of Newport and Saigon Port to destinations in III CTZ. The presence of this officer was invaluable to the division at a most critical time during the movement. Without this liaison officer it is doubtful that the highway movement within III CTZ would have met established unit closing schedules.

Recommendation: At the outset of any movement determine those headquarters with which the division will require continuous contact. In some cases these headquarters will automatically provide a liaison officer. However, the division G-4 should in all cases ask that liaison personnel be provided.

3. Non Divisional Truck Requirements

Observation:

Units of the division initially placed truck requirements directly on the 26th GS Group. These were for one time lift of all equipment and personnel.

Evaluation:

a. With the 26th GS Group trying to meet these requirements it necessitated fragmentation of truck assets and did not allow for the most economical utilization of transport. This practice was stopped on the second day of the
move and all divisional vehicle requirements were processed through the DTO movement control personnel to the 26th GS Group movement control center. This centralized control of request and assets proved to be effective and provided the division with adequate vehicle support.

b. Requirements for trucks to move unit equipment from Newport and Saigon port were passed by the DTO/G4 movements team at Long Binh to movements control center of Saigon Support Command. Requirements were stated in terms of the number of trucks that were required to load a specific LST. Thus movements control center knew the number of trucks that would be required to unload each LST by approximately 30 hours prior to the LST docking in Newport or Saigon port. Movements control center was instructed not to accept truck requirements from any unit of the 1st Cav Div (AM). The G4 Forward at Long Binh also established priorities for truck transport with movements control center each evening. This was necessary because the amount of unit equipment and log cargo offered for destinations within the new AO always exceeded truck availability.

Recommendation:

a. Use DTO movements control as the activity to receive request from units for non-divisional vehicle requirements. Process these request at DTO and pass them to the area Support Command movements control center.

b. As vehicle lift requirements exceed vehicle availability the G-4 must establish priorities with the movements control center designating that cargo which is to be moved.

4. Unit Movements Plans:

Observation: While units of the division did have air movement plans there were no units which had a sea movement plan.

Evaluation:

a. Units of the division did not have sea movement plans although they had made a partial water movement into NICTZ within the past 9 months utilizing eleven vessels. Since that time a significant amount of equipment had been received by the division which made the previous water movement experience out dated. The liaison officer from Staff Amphibious Squadron was extremely important to this division in assisting the units in preparing and executing sea movement plans. Experience showed that loading plans for sea movement would have been of little value. Of greatest value was listings of equipment to be shipped and when sea movement is planned the square footage of equipment is more important than cube and weight. Additionally better use of vehicles could have been realized if the amounts of cargo and personnel to be moved could have been forecasted.
b. When a movement is to be executed which involves both air and sea movement it is necessary that unit be provided guidance by the division on what is to be moved by air. During this movement the Asst Div Commander Alpha provided guidance that 1 ton vehicles and smaller along with passengers, individual combat gear, radios, and small arms ammunition, would go by air. Selected large pieces of equipment were approved for air movement on an individual basis by the Acting Chief of Staff.

Recommendation:

a. All units must prepare and maintain current air and sea movement plans. The sea movement plans need to consist of equipment listings and square footage for each piece of equipment.

b. Guidance for combined sea and air movement should be 1 ton vehicle or smaller along with passengers, individual combat gear, radios and small arms ammunition.

c. Plans should also be developed in the future to include such items as predetermined staging areas and types and amounts of retrograde, Class III and V and other equipment to be turned over to supporting agencies.

5. Advance Notification Of Times Of Arrival For Each Air-Sorties and Vessel

Observation:

Although the number of air sorties to be flown from each departure airfield was known for each day, it was not possible to get advance notice of times of arrival for each sortie. The same was true but to a lesser degree on the scheduled arrival of vessels.

Evaluation:

a. This was overcome by positioning aircraft and vessel loads well in advance of actual scheduled arrivals, so as to have loads available when aircraft or vessels arrived. This prepositioning of cargo contributed significantly to the congestion at the airfields and at Tan My.

b. On 5 Nov no LSTs arrived at Tan My, none were working and there were approximately 4 LSTs loads staged. The delay in LST return was primarily caused by delay in movement to the inland port of debarkation due to security, pilots, and tide conditions.

Recommendation:

Advance notice of times of arrivals for aircraft by sortie and vessels be provided the division. Failing to receive the advanced arrival notice, aircraft and vessel loads should be prepositioned well in advance of actual scheduled arrivals.
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TAB AD: Operation Liberty Canyon (Cont)

6. Night Highway Operations:

Observation:

In order to store sufficient cargo at Tan My it was necessary to run vehicles after darkness along C-L-1. The 26th CS Group, although directed to run these convoys, was apprehensive due to what was termed by the Group as "inadequate assurances that the roads were, in fact, secure". The Group further stated: "The 1st Cav Div (AM) maintained that the roads were secure, but failed to provide any concrete evidence of this". The internal security requirement was reduced to using gun jeeps and radios with each convoy and the 1st Cav Div (AM) provided, external security along the route. Tactical commanders are tasked with route security and accept full responsibility for this mission. Users of secure routes are not the agencies to determine the adequacy of security. Further, as a unit departs an area of operations the last elements to leave that area are probably not capable of providing route security and will need assistance from other tactical units.

Recommendation:

Support units or users of routes over which tactical commanders have been charged with route security should comply with internal security requirements and leave external security to the tactical commander.

7. Conex Containers:

Observation:

Conex containers were utilized to the utmost to pack cargo for sea movement. Had not a substantial number of Conex containers been on hand, the sea movement would not have been possible within the prescribed time frame.

Evaluation:

As a result of having completed a move into NICTZ during the past 9 months the division had 1799 Conex containers on hand at the beginning of the deployment. USARV had, up until this move, been insistent that the division turn-in sufficient Conex containers so as to reduce the number on-hand to 1324. Had the division complied with USARV's urging and turned in 475 Conex containers, the sea movement would not have been possible within the prescribed time frame. As it was units had to use pallets on which to load some cargo due to insufficient Conex containers.

Recommendation:

The 1st Cav Div (AM) retain at a minimum 1850 Conex containers. These containers are used to store selected sensitive items and held for contingency against future moves of this division or units of the division.

8. Communication:
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TAB AD: Operation Liberty Canton (Cont)

The Army Area Communication system was at best unsatisfactory when used to coordinate and maintain data relative to the division movement.

Evaluation:

a. Communication with Tan My was poor to non-existent. Although telephone service was finally established on 4 Nov, it was continuously disrupted rendering it totally inadequate. It was therefore necessary for the G4 staff to make one or two flights daily to Tan My to keep updated on information and revise plans for forward movement of cargo to the port.

b. While the division command and control group was at Long Binh, the communication with Camp Evans was marginal but satisfactory. In order to keep the division command updated as to the status of the division move, it was necessary that communication be maintained on a continuous basis with Camp Evans. Some relief was obtained with the installation of a dedicated user circuit for telephone and teletype to Camp Evans.

c. The division command and control group moved from Long Binh to Phouc Vinh. It was apparent that the communication link with Camp Evans, so necessary for control of the movement, would be lost unless personnel remained in Long Binh to coordinate and act in fact as relay for the movement information. The G-4/DTO movement group was therefore further fragmented through this necessity. This decision to leave a control group at Long Binh proved itself to be a wise one, since this group was the only communication link the division had with Camp Evans and Long Binh.

Recommendation:

During future division moves an immediate determination must be made as to the communication necessary to coordinate the move. Requirements in the form of dedicated circuits must be placed through the Division Signal Officer on the area system. If it becomes necessary the Commanding General of the division should be asked to intervene at the highest level to insuring that these circuits are made available.

9. Division CMXI

Observation:

The schedule of the CMXI team was cancelled immediately upon notification of the division move. Had not the members of this team been available, movement control at Tan My would have been non-existent.

Evaluation:

A portion of the CMXI team was dispatched to Tan My at 0600 hrs 28 Oct 68 consisting of 1-Warrant Officer, 3 NCOs, 1-light vehicle operator, and 1-1 ton truck. Team remained at Tan My for 48 hours and was replaced by...
a second team consisting of the same quantity and type of personnel less vehicle. Vehicle was left in place and personnel rotated by use of a UH-1D. A single side band radio was dispatched by 13 Signal Bn and was used as a means of communication until a telephone circuit was installed.

Recommendation:

Use of CMMI at the port of embarkation proved most invaluable.
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TAB AD: Operation Liberty Canyon (Cont)

LSD 31 11th Avn Gp
(Vehicles Only) Tan My 2 - 3 New Port 5

LST 532 1/9 Cav 5/52d Inf Tan My 2 - 3 New Port 5 - 6

LST 1083 11th Avn Gp Tan My 3 New Port 5 - 6

LPD 8 11th Avn Gp/ 1/30 Tan My 4 - 5 New Port 6
(Vehicles Only)

LST 117 191 MI/371 RRU/ALO Tan My 4 - 6 New Port 6 - 7

LST 387 B Btry 1/30
HHB 1/30 Tan My 4 - 5 New Port 7 - 8

LST 1170 27th Maint Tan My 4 - 5 New Port 7 - 8

LST 542 HHH & A Btry 1/30
HQ 2/20/11 Avn Tan My 5 - 6 New Port 8 - 9

LST 1038 15 S&S
Tan My 5 - 6 New Port 8 - 9

LST 566 27th Maint Tan My 6 - 7 New Port 9 - 10

LST 664 15 TC/1/30 Arty
Da Nang 6 - 7 New Port 9 - 10

LST 626 15th S&S Bn Tan My 6 - 7 New Port 9 - 10

LST 630 DIVARTY/15 S&S
545 MP/DISCO Tan My 7 - 8 New Port 10 - 11

LST 550 DIV HQ/HHC 1st Cav
545 MP/HQ DISCOM/15 Admin 7 - 8 New Port 10 - 11

LSD 31 15 S&S/545 MP
15 Med/ HQ DISCOM (Vehicles Only)

LPD 8 D-15 TC/13 Signal
15 Admin/2d Bde (Vehicles Only)

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AD17 87
## Non-Divisional Truck Summary - III CTZ

**Military Vehicles 9&I**

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**AMD 88**
LIBERTY CANYON STATISTICS

1. Distances (approx) miles
   a. Air
      (1) Camp Evans to Phuoc Vinh - 560
      (2) Camp Evans to Tay Ninh - 585
      (3) Camp Evans to Long Binh - 570
   b. Sea
      (1) Tan Ky to Vung Tau - 665
      (2) Tan My to Newport - 615
      (3) Da Nang to Newport - 635
      (4) Da Nang to Vung Tau - 595

2. Major Support Units
   a. U.S. Navy
      (1) 7th Fleet
      (2) MSTS
   b. U.S. Air Force
      (1) 834th Air Div
   c. U.S. Army
      (1) 1st Log Comd
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**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

**TAB AD:** Operation Liberty Canyon (Cont)

**SEA MOVEMENT STATISTICS**

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### Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

**TAB AD:** Operation Liberty Canyon (Cont)

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**NOTE:** Approx enroute time was 2-3 days.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AB: Civil Affairs

1. Population and resources control.
   a. Refugees: A large scale refugee operation was conducted during the reporting period. 1400 Montagnards at the hamlet of Bu Nho in Phuoc Long Province had been threatened with impressment as laborers for the VC/NVA. Their leaders sought assistance from Allied Forces in November 1968. Working with province officials, the 1st Cavalry Division evacuated the entire population by Chinook helicopter. They were housed temporarily in a refugee camp near Phuoc Long City. In January, division engineers began assisting in the construction of the "new Bu Nho" hamlet.

   b. Rice distribution: A total of 211.4 tons of enemy rice were captured during the quarter. Whenever the tactical situation permitted, captured rice was turned over to the GVN authorities for distribution. Distribution was made primarily to refugee camps at An Loc, Phuoc Vinh, and Phuoc Long City.

   c. Security control: Upon arrival in III CTZ, the division initiated procedures for controlling the access of Vietnamese civilians to installations within the AO. Hire of local nationals within division bases was held to essential administrative positions. Procedures for a detailed security check on permanent hire personnel were established in coordination with local GVN intelligence/police agencies and MI.

2. Civic action.
   a. Upon arrival in III CTZ, immediate coordination was made with GVN authorities, advisory personnel and outgoing unit S-5 personnel to determine needs of the area. Projects left unfinished by departing units were assisted and completed by division efforts. New projects were started with GVN approval. At present, 4 schools, an orphanage and a hospital are being assisted by division personnel on a continuing basis. Division CA plans were coordinated to
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AE: Civil Affairs (Cont)

support the GVN pacification campaign.

b. Other civic action projects initiated by division CA personnel included road repair and rebuilding, school repair and renovation, and market place rehabilitation.

c. During the period, 61 MWDCAPS were held, during which 3386 patients were treated. Close coordination with district and province officials resulted in a combined division/GVN effort to assist the local farmer in the innoculation of cattle for prevention of cholera. VMCAPS completed the innoculation of 265 farm animals.

d. 175 pounds of clothing and 960 pounds of food were distributed to needy families.

e. Christmas programs for school children were sponsored throughout the AO by division units.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AF: Psychological Operations

1. General: Psychological operations to induce defection and disaffection among NVA/VC forces and encourage popular support of GVN: were conducted in support of combat operations. Target audiences included NVA/VC and civilians in VC and GVN controlled areas. An extensive Chieu Hoi campaign was conducted throughout the division AO against NVA/VC forces. Support of the GVN accelerated pacification campaign was one of the main themes during the reporting period. In January, G5 began a program to improve and expand the division's PSYOP efforts.

2. Support:
   a. The 5th SOS supported division PSYOP with leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. Using U-10 and C-47 PSYOP aircraft, 48,599,200 leaflets were dropped in selected areas and 107.3 hours of loudspeaker appeals were broadcast over specific targets.
   b. The 6th PSYOP Bn located at Bien Hoa provided leaflets and poster printing and tape recordings, they also attached one liaison officer and three HB, loudspeaker teams to the division.
   c. Each HB team provided PSYOP support using a 250 watt ground speaker (ULH-5) and a 1000 watt loudspeaker (AEM-ABS-4) mounted on a UH-1 helicopter. The PSYOP teams broadcast 192.3 hours of heliborne loudspeaker time. They also dropped 20,796,661 leaflets.
   d. When the IACD moved from I CTZ to III CTZ the first week in November, the 7th PSYOP Bn from Da Nang assigned some assets to the 6th PSYOP Bn to support the division. This equipment for the most part was in a poor state of maintenance and had to be returned to the 6th PSYOP Bn for repair. There was no replacement equipment from the PSYOP bn resources. Consequently, the IACD operated for several weeks without the support of this equipment.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
TAB AF: Psychological Operations (Cont)

3. Chieu Hoi Campaign: An expanded Chieu Hoi campaign was conducted in support of combined Division and GVN tactical operations throughout the AO. During the quarter 194 VC/NVA rallied in the IACD AO. This was a marked increase over the previous two quarters. In Phuoc Long Province, the rally rate quadrupled after the arrival of the IACD. Two new approaches were used in the Chieu Hoi program. The first was to convince individual VC to rally. It was reported to be the most productive program used to date in the III CTZ. Another program was the Pre-TET campaign. This program reminded the VC/NVA soldier of the forthcoming holiday and the importance of finding a new life of peace and safety for the new year by rallying or allowing themselves to be captured.

4. Kit Carson Scouts: Upon the IACD arrival in III CTZ, many Kit Carson Scouts experienced difficulties in adjusting to new terrain and weather. Some scouts returned to their homes in the north, leaving only 47 scouts working with the Division. G-5 took over staff responsibility for the KCS program on 17 January. G-5 recruited 25 Montagnard KCS from Phuoc Long and Binh Long Province Chieu Hoi Centers. They began training at An Khe on 26 January.

5. Peace talks: Leaflets and loudspeaker messages informing the VC/NVA soldiers and civilians of the progress of the Paris talks proved successful. Several Hoi Chanh's mentioned that they had not been informed of these talks by their leaders but learned of them from leaflets and loudspeaker messages.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

TAB NO: LZ Coordinates

Elrod - XS 339846
Mustang - XT 366830
Beverely - XT 330900
Ann - XT 0984816
Michael - XT 042763
Ina - XT 607621
Tracy - XT 440072
Clara - XS 415972
Ray - XT 415242
White - XT 455624
Grant - XT 387623
Nancy - YD 435295
Camp Evans - YD 535322
Buttons - YU 150070
Eleanor - XT 916736
Glessa - YT 063754
St Barbara - XT 274630
Dot - XT 562854
Rita - XT 499803
Jake - XT 625813
Shirely - XT 763991
Joe - XT 629663
Billy - XT 437843
Kelly - XU 731033
Sue - XT 918956
Janet - YU 094105
Ellen - YU 036067
Granite - XU 928072
Jill - XT 959008
Carol - XT 058888
June - YT 137788