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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

ACAM-P (M) (18 June 69) FOR OT UT 69B019 23 June 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL George S. Patton, CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period 15 July 1968 to 6 April 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U), dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of COL George S. Patton, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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G. A. STANFIELD
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SITJXT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by COL George F. Patton, Commanding Officer of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the period 15 July 1968 to 6 April 1969.

2. COL Patton is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C.D. Wilson
C.D. WILSON
STJ, AG
Assistant Adjutant General
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

7 April 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHOC-DST
APO San Francisco 96257

Country: Republic of Vietnam (RVN)
Debriefing Report by: Colonel George S. Patton
Duty Assignment: Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Inclusive Dates: 15 July 1968 to 6 April 1969
Date of Report: 3 April 1969

1. INTELLIGENCE:

a. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's Area of Operation (AO) is comprised of two types of terrain. Each has distinctive characteristics which dictate enemy activity and the nature of our intelligence collection effort. (For all map references, refer to Inclosure 1).

b. The populated farming region in the northern LAN SON, Binh Duong Province, represents the first type of terrain. The horseshoe of local villages within this farming region, CHANH LONG, HOA LOI (I), CHANH LUU, BIEN MY, and BIEN CO, acts to provide food supplies in support of enemy tactical operations north of SAIGON. In the past, this area has supplied both the 7th NVA Division and the DON XIA Regiment. 11th ACR operations in this area have developed frequent contacts with VC resupply elements from main force units and local force guerrillas based in the villages. The intelligence effort is directed at the identification of routes of resupply and the destruction of the VC infrastructure, the political leadership at the village level.
The second type of terrain is dense jungle which provides refuge for the DONG NAI Regiment, elements of the 81st Rear Service Group, and VC Sub-Region 5.1 One such jungled area, north of TAN Binh, provides some sanctuary for the K3 and K4 Battalions of the DONG NAI Regiment. These units have remained in the jungle attempting to avoid detection at all costs while relying on food supplies gathered periodically from the northern LAM SON.

A second jungle area is located east of Highway 16. It is a base camp complex known as the CATCHERS MATT, and is traversed by a network of trails leading into it from western WAR ZONE D and emptying into the northern LAM SON.

Located in the southern portion of the CATCHERS MATT are the traditional rocket firing positions targeted against BIEN HOA Airbase during the TET and May Offensives of 1968 (the BIEN HOA ROCKET BELT is the area north of the DONG NAI River and east of TAN UYEN). Local force units of TAN UYEN District also seek refuge from Allied operations in the southern CATCHERS MATT and have frequently been contacted in the area north of THAI HUNG (XT1113) where they draw food supplies. Our intelligence effort in the CATCHERS MATT is focused on base camp locations, routes of movement, rocket firing positions, and the selection of B-52 targets.

d. Adjacent to the 11th ACR AO are two areas of special interest:

(1) The area south of the DONG NAI River is characterized by light enemy activity. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the primary avenue of approach into the BIEN HOA - LONG Binh Complex and was used by major VC/NVA forces during the TET and May Offensives of 1968. Our intelligence collection in this area focuses on the detection of enemy build-ups or movement into the area. During mid-August to mid-December 1968, this AO was the responsibility of the 11th ACR, and, in the main, was occupied by a ARVN ranger battalion under Regimental operational control.

(2) On the northeastern side of the 11th ACR AO is VC WAR ZONE D. The men and supplies reaching VC units within our AO normally move through this area. Our Zone D intelligence effort is aimed at the detection of routes of supply and general interdiction and counter-infiltration operations.

e. The day-to-day operations of the Regiment are literally dictated by intelligence and the collection of timely intelligence. In our judg-

1VC Sub-Region 5, located in the pie-shaped area between Route 13 and the DONG NAI River, is the central area command HQ for the DONG NAI Regiment, 81st Rear Service Group, and several local force companies.
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ment, the key to any success we have enjoyed relates to our ability to identify good intelligence, and to react to it rapidly. Since July 1968, the watchword of the Regiment is to react to good intelligence now rather than attempt to develop a perfect intelligence fix. In this regard, the best is the enemy of the good. A good plan now is better than a perfect plan two hours from now.

f. The 11th ACR has developed several techniques which have contributed to successful intelligence collection. The most significant has been the reorganisation of the 541st Military Intelligence Detachment into Battlefield Intelligence Collection Centers (BICC's) (Incl 2). A BICC was placed with the Regimental Headquarters and each Squadron. This augmentation to the S-2 section gives the Regiment the capability to rapidly collect, analyse, and exploit good combat intelligence. A limited data bank capability is also maintained.

g. Prisoners and HOI CHAnH are best sources of intelligence in the populated areas of the AO. Interrogation teams with the Squadron BICC's habitually interrogate prisoners as soon as the tactical situation permits. Ground elements or the Air Cavalry Troop or both have been able to react rapidly to this fresh information. The 11th ACR has found that it is essential that prisoners be exploited in the field. The nature of this conflict is such that the average local force VC is so compartmented information-wise, that his contribution to the "big picture" will probably be marginal. Conversely, his knowledge of the local area coupled with his unexplainable willingness to give information contributes significantly to the "little picture". Accordingly, immediate tactical exploitation is mandatory. These persons have frequently directed US forces to caches, fortified positions, and other enemy personnel in the area.

h. A special technique was developed to attack Viet Cong Infrastructure. The 5-2, Major Andrew P. O'Meara, who was later wounded and evacuated on 13 February 1969, felt that within a Viet Cong village it would be possible to draw a line and block chart depicting the theoretical Viet Cong organisation in the village. This chart could then be used to aid in the interrogation and identification of key local VC leaders. The pilot model of this technique was Operation TREASURE ISLAND conducted against TAN HINH Village (XTB 57363) during January 1969. The CDC representatives assigned to HQ, VII FFDV, have documented this operation (Incl 3).

i. In the CATCHERS MITT, the majority of the intelligence is collected by the Aero Scout Section of the Air Cavalry Troop, using the OH-6A Light Observation Helicopter. The Aero Scouts, operating at twenty feet and thirty to forty knots, fly daily visual reconnaissance missions over the CATCHERS
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MITT, obtaining detailed information on VC/NVA base camps and routes of movement. They are the primary intelligence gathering sources available to the Regiment. Their contribution cannot be over-stated.

The Scouts provide the primary input data required for the development and justification of B-52 targets and mobile Aero Rifle Platoon insertions. Thus, the S-2 Section and the Aero Scout Platoon of the Air Cavalry Troop must maintain close liaison at all times. This element is the primary reconnaissance agency of the 11th ACR.

j. Two other factors have contributed to the identification of good intelligence. First, the S-2 Staff has been maintained as a stable team; personnel changes have been kept to a minimum. Second, other members of the Staff, the Chaplain, the Surgeon, certain medical personnel involved in MDCAPS, and all S-5 personnel have made significant contributions in the field of intelligence and, in some ways, are considered members of the S-2 Section.

k. As the combat experience of US units in Vietnam grows, one simple phrase summarizes this experience—This is an S-2 war. The primary problem facing the commander in Vietnam is locating the enemy. Once located, the concentration of combat power is seldom a problem.

In this conflict, the enemy is an NVA recruit, a guerrilla or a political leader (a member of the Viet Cong Infrastructure). He operates in special environments—inaccessible jungle bases, the villages of rural Vietnam, and the urban centers. He is master of his environment, and, as such, is capable of avoiding detection for long periods of time. Only operations based on good intelligence have uncovered him. The production of good intelligence is the mission of today's S-2 in Vietnam; in many ways, however, the S-2 also dictates operations.

2. OPERATIONS:

a. General: 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment tactical operations are characterized by three key words which are the underpinnings of all tactical exercises. They are "Variety, Imagination, and Boldness." To be successful, each operation, whether it be a simple ambush or multi-battalion operation, must contain each of these ingredients.

Subordinate commanders must be given great latitude and freedom of action in the employment of their units, i.e., areas of operation, missions, and a minimum of detailed guidance. They must act on a mission basis within the framework of a general plan.
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b. Missions: Missions assigned to the 11th ACR have been many and varied. They include: route and bridge security; Rome Plev security; counter-infiltration operations; area and zone reconnaissance; area security; economy of force; reconnaissance in force; pacification; mounted and dismounted day and night ambushes; and base camp security. While most of these missions are those normally assigned to an armored cavalry regiment and permit an armored unit to fully exploit its inherent ground mobility, others are incompatible. For instance, the Regiment is responsible for the security of several pacification hamlets in addition to the Blackhorse Base Camp. Missions of this type require the establishment of stabilized and permanent or semi-permanent positions which must be manned twenty-four hours a day, thus tying down considerable mobile combat power and reducing freedom of movement.

c. Command Relationships: The Regiment has usually been OPCON either in whole or in part to a US infantry division, while elements have been OPCON to ARVN units. Certain elements have been under the direct OPCON of CG, II FFV.

d. Forces Available: The Regiment normally has two organic reconnaissance squadrons, the Air Cavalry Troop, and one or two infantry battalions under its direct control. The remaining reconnaissance squadron has been at various times OPCON to Capital Military Assistance Command, BIEN HOA Tactical Area Command, DS to the 5th and 18th ARVN Infantry Divisions and/or the 1st Australian Task Force, and responsible for securing Blackhorse Base Camp. The recon squadrons have had an additional one or more infantry companies under their OPCON when forces are available. Since the rifle squad in each recon platoon was deleted when the Regiment was configured for Southeast Asia, there is no organic element which can be dismounted to protect ACAV's and tanks in the jungle or which can follow and clear bunkers during a mounted attack. As a general rule, the ideal organization for the squadron is one additional rifle company, either ARVN or DS in an OPCON status.

e. Techniques of Employment:

(1) The 11th ACR has made a concerted effort to employ its forces in accordance with established armor doctrine which has proved sound in general terms. As an example, in the dry season, armor can and often should be employed in mass. Tank - ACAV - infantry teams led and advised by Aero-Scouts are being successfully employed in the jungle. Their mission is to destroy enemy base camps, assess damage inflicted by B-52 strikes, and to reinforce troops in contact. The key ingredient to such coordination is close coordination between the ground commanders and air cavalry elements.
A task force of three tank company teams was successfully employed in this manner. This operation, which took place in early March 1969, was actually a reinforced tank battalion in the attack. Results were gratifying.

(2) Certain innovations have been developed, however, to cope with given tactical situations. Some of the more significant are described below:

(a) Day and night random armored movement: As mentioned above, subordinate commanders have considerable freedom of action. Much of the 11th ACR area of operations has fairly good trafficability, even in the wet season, and there are few obstacles to movement. Commanders are thus able to move their units freely, establishing no particular pattern, building no permanent positions, and stopping in one place only long enough to rest, refuel, and conduct maintenance.

Normally, a troop will be assigned an operational AO for an unspecified period of time. It will move within the area at random, developing its own intelligence and responding to the latest intelligence from higher headquarters. A concerted effort is exerted to make all movement appear random and to exploit habits and patterns exhibited by the enemy. When a unit loses its effectiveness in an area, it is replaced by another and the process repeated. Platoon size elements move even at night, dropping off stay-behind dismounted ambush patrols and setting up mounted ambushes at several places during the course of an operation. Both the ARAAV and the ACAV have proved difficult to detect at night.

(b) Change for Change's Sake: There is a tendency in US units to hit upon a successful technique and continue to use it even when results begin to fail off. To combat this trend, a VIB (Variety, Imagination, and Boldness) Committee has been formed at Regimental Headquarters. The committee consists of the Regimental S-2, S-3, S-5, Artillery LNO, and the Air Cavalry Troop Commander. Additional officers attend meetings as appropriate.

The committee's task is to analyze problem areas and propose new ideas for problem solutions. In addition, the committee acts as a clearing house for suggestions submitted by individuals and units throughout the Regiment. Committee meetings are informal and ideas are tossed out at random and discussed freely. No idea, no solution, is discarded out of hand regardless of how unorthodox it may at first appear. Typical solutions to problems have included:

1. Thunder-running a road at night with six Cobra gunships to alleviate mining harassment.
2. A riverine - air cavalry operation at night to stop sniping from riverbanks, using infantry, engineer bridge boats, a large starlight scope in a helicopter, and artillery and gunship support.

3. A cordon and search of a village conducted entirely by the Air Cavalry Troop with the mission of seizing a Viet Cong senior officer. The cordon force consisted of Aero Scouts and gunships circling at tree-top level while the search was conducted by the Aero Rifle Platoon.

(c) Use of Boundary Changes: It is readily apparent that the enemy is well aware of the Free World forces' use of geographical boundaries, i.e., roads, rivers, etc., or political boundaries (district or province) as AO boundaries. Accordingly, the enemy channels his routes of supply and movement along these corridors. Additional problems arise in obtaining clearances for artillery or TAC AIR strikes along these corridors. Because of these and other related factors, the Regiment requests AO boundaries which will overlap geographical/political boundaries by 500 to 1,000 meters. This method has proved very effective in interdicting enemy movement and resupply efforts.

(d) Cover and Deception: Passing false radio traffic prior to the initiation of an operation has confused enemy radio monitors. In addition, tangible evidence, such as falsely marked maps and overlays have been left in areas where the enemy is likely to find them. Both methods were successfully employed in the TAN BINH and CHANH LUU seal operations.

(e) Rotation of Units: This practice not only allows all units to gain familiarization with the terrain of the AO, but also tends to infuse "new blood and new ideas" into an area. Many times after activity has slowed down in an AO, the introduction of a new unit has produced results due to actions associated with gaining familiarity with a new area. Continuity of knowledge, however, must be carefully maintained when rotating units. Involved units must give special attention to the exchange of intelligence holdings.

(3) Route Security:

(a) The 11th ACR has the mission of securing many miles of road within its AO. The primary threat to convoys along these routes is mining rather than ambushes because all roads have been cleared of vegetation for about one kilometer on either side.

(b) Radar and 1/4-ton vehicles, mounting the M-60 machinegun, have been used extensively to preclude tying down ACAV's and tanks on escort and outpost duties. During daylight, 1/4-ton vehicles of the Regimental
Scout platoon patrol and outpost the road. At night, radar mounted on towers and ACAV's provide continuous surveillance. Jeep mounted Scouts have an increasingly important role in this theater.

Surveillance radar is also fully integrated into the tactical plan. In addition to the detection of nighttime mining activity, radar provides an effective counter-infiltration screen across the most vulnerable portion of the AO.

(4) "Pile-On" Techniques: The preponderance of successful daytime contacts have been initiated by an Aero Scout either receiving ground fire or observing hostile movement. To exploit such intelligence, pile-on techniques have been developed, employing the Air Cavalry Troop, air lifted infantry elements, and, when terrain permits, tank - ACAV - infantry teams. On several occasions, operations of this nature have resulted in an engagement which escalated to battalion size within a few hours. A detailed discussion of this technique is contained in "Commander's Note #7" (Incl 4). The key role in such an operation is, again, played by the Air Cavalry Troop.

(5) Combined Operations: The 11th ACR has enjoyed continued success in combined operations with the ARVN. Both US and ARVN units, however, when working with each other, have habitually been held in an OPCON status, not DS as is most common. Although placing US or ARVN maneuver elements DS to one another has become accepted practice in this theater, the concept leaves exact command relationships unclear and permits an opportunity for certain ARVN units to beg off and avoid contact. The single word "OPCON" precludes this unhappy circumstance. Therefore, whenever the 11th ACR has sent one of its elements to work with an ARVN unit, it has been placed in an OPCON status. In line with this, whenever an ARVN unit works with the 11th ACR it has been considered OPCON; some 11th ACR elements, however, have habitually been placed OPCON to the ARVN unit, even if only a platoon. The system works well—ARVN and US commanders understand it and very few problems arise. Judging from our experience with the concept, the term "DS" should be considered for elimination. The essential ingredient to working with ARVN units is a plentiful supply of good interpreters. Good commanders will do the rest as they have done throughout our history.

f. Conclusion: Armor has a role in Vietnam and can be effectively employed, even in the jungle. The armored cavalry regiment, when employed in general accordance with established doctrine, is one of the most effective fighting organizations in the theater, regardless of the assigned mission. Essential to its success, however, are the organic aviation
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

assets. The Air Cavalry Troop forms the principal slice of these resources. Its employment is discussed below.

3. AIR CAVALRY TROOP:

   a. Background: In July 1968, the Air Cavalry Troop, formerly a fireteam or gunship troop, was totally reorganized and the concept of using the scouts and the entire Troop as the eyes and ears of the Regiment was initiated. The basic concept involves employment of air cavalry assets over the entire Regimental Area of Operations.

   b. Organization: The basic elements of the Air Cavalry Troop are the white (Scouts), the blue (liftships), the red (Aero-Weapons Platoon), and the Raiders (Aero Rifle Platoon). All teams are composed of these four basic elements.

   c. Operations:

      (1) Pink Team: The workhorse of the Air Cavalry Troop is the "pink team", consisting of one OH-6A and one AH-1G Cobra (one white and one red). This team was devised to stretch the limited OH-6A assets as far as possible.

      The white elements visually reconnoiters its targeted area at tree-top level, while the red element is normally posted at altitude to maintain communications, plot coordinates, insure that accurate reports are given, and provide immediate protection. A white team (two OH-6A's) is less effective, because the two scouts spend most of their time looking out for one another and must continually climb up to orient themselves when they need a map fix location.

      (2) Purple Team: The purple team, consisting of a red, white, and blue element, the latter carrying an Aero Rifle squad, conducts what are called "skunk hunts" (previously known as a "Columbus" operation). This mission is effective for early morning or late afternoon reconnaissance patrol checks of identification cards, vehicles or suspicious activity. Purple teams have enjoyed considerable success in picking up VC suspects, making "pile-on" contacts, and policing the LAM SON.

      (3) "Pile-On": The basic fighting concept of the Air Cavalry Troop is the "pile-on" operation. The "pile-on" may take two forms—the dry season employment of armor and the wet season airmobile operation. The use of armor has been most successful.

The first dry season "pile-on" was employed on 3 February 1969 when a tank
company and reconnaissance troop were led into a target area developed by
the Air Cavalry Troop. Airstrikes were called in, and the armor rolled
right through the middle of the base camp. ARP's to the rear of the
track vehicles swept the area. This "pile-on" resulted in 22 VC KIA (BC)
and 7 PW.

The "swath" technique is another innovation. In this situation, the ARP's
make initial contact and attempt to define the limits of the base camp or
enemy force. Armored vehicles seal the area of enemy operations and, depend-
ing on the location of the friendly forces, attack through or beside the
ARP's position to the center of the enemy base camp. Armor elements then
slice the base camp up into small pieces of "pie" that can be methodically
cleared as convenient. This technique is particularly successful in areas
where the enemy is in bunkers and does not have the capability to deliver
effective fire on friendly units.

Successful employment of the "swath" technique is a team effort. Normally,
ACAV's and dismounted infantry follow the tank elements closely while they
reconnoiter by fire. Care must be taken to insure that the tanks deploy
in the correct direction and do not fire on friendly troops. The technique
is less successful when the enemy is well entrenched in good RPG launch
positions.

The wet season "pile-on" is more difficult. More firepower, airstrikes,
and artillery are required. In this case, the Aero Rifle Platoon gains
contact and the "pile-on" is accomplished with airmobile forces.

The 1 December 1968 contact is a classic example of this technique. Two
ARP squads gained contact and a company of the 1-18th Infantry "piled-on".
Rapid exploitation yielded a body count of 32. The action also illustrates
some of the disadvantages which arise without the firepower and mobility
of armor. It is a slow process to call in airstrikes, employ artillery
during the night, and then sweep the area bunker by bunker. This varia-
tion is also usually more costly in casualties than the dry season "pile-
on".

(4) Bomb Damage Assessment: The Air Cavalry Troop is charged with
gathering hard intelligence for B-52 strikes and for bomb damage assess-
ment (BDA). Usually, one team of scouts (two whites) and an overhead Cobra
make an initial BDA to ascertain whether the area merits ground insertion.
If new bunkers, fresh activity, or bodies are spotted, the decision is
normally made to insert the ARP's or an even larger rifle element.

The ARP's can cover a two square kilometer BDA area in about four hours or
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

less. Ground elements work in close coordination with the Aero Scouts and are directed from target to target by the Scouts.

(5) Firebug Missions: This mission, effective only during the dry season, has been particularly successful in the CATCHERS MITT and SONG BE Corridor for area denial and uncovering trails. For this mission, an aircraft armed with ten cases of incendiary grenades flies from dry spot to dry spot, setting fires with incendiaries. This technique opens areas up for more detailed aerial observation and denies future concealment of enemy resupply or infiltration activities.

(6) CS Drops: A UH-1H can carry 20 cannisters of CS gas in its pods for massive CS drops. Not only have CS drops been used to locate the enemy, but they have also been followed up by Cobra fireteams. The red team waits until the gas settles and then makes firing passes through the area. The effectiveness of the action is evaluated by the scouts after the CS gas has diffused. It is a good technique.

(7) "Thunder Runs": This technique can be carried out at night or during the day along rivers, roads or known trail networks. Having selected a section of road or river for a night "thunder run", the scouts thoroughly reconnoiter the target area during the day. At a prescribed time, all available Cobras in one firing pass expend on the selected area. The mission is very closely controlled and coordinated. There should be no night reconnaissance. The "thunder run" should be a straight-in, low level pass not over a thousand feet and a diving, one-time run through the area. Results gained from these runs cannot be fully evaluated, but POW debriefs indicate that they are worthwhile.

(8) Night Vision Devices: The two basic night vision devices, the "firefly" and the "SNOD", are effective. Although there has been no great success with them, both have their place in the theater of operations.

The "firefly" gives away the helicopter's position, but can deny the enemy use of a particular portion of road or river. No determined effort has been made to use the firefly every night or over extended periods of time. It has been used, however, to locate river crossing activities at identified fording sites, and in area denial operations.

The "SNOD" is a light intensification device. It has provided only limited success in inflicting casualties. Although the Air Cavalry Troop has destroyed three sampans with its aid, it has failed to provide many human targets. The SNOD requires at least 60% illumination before it can be
effectively employed. Given the proper natural illumination, however, it can be very effective.

(9) The Raid: This type of mission was used on 30 December 1968 to apprehend an intelligence chief in the vicinity of HOA LOI (I) Village. The Troop had good intelligence, moved in rapidly, landed right by the house, and captured the official. Raids can be made with the Air Cavalry Troop, but good intelligence and thorough map or photo reconnaissance beforehand are essential. Every element must be in position and act without hesitation.

(10) Other Missions: Other missions conducted by the Troop are typical ones normally accomplished by any helicopter unit. They include fire support, troop airlift, casualty evacuation, etc.

d. Problem Areas: Two difficulties have arisen in the employment of air cavalry support. Solution of these problems requires emphasis at all echelons of the command.

(1) The first difficulty involves the tendency of ground units to request specific types of support from the Air Cavalry Troop. The ground commander, rather than simply requesting support, usually specifies what he has determined to be his requirements. More often than not, fire teams are requested.

It must be stressed that the ground commander should only request support and allow the Air Cavalry Troop Commander to determine what air assets should be employed. The Troop monitors the Regimental frequency. If a unit is being hit by a night mortar attack, a red team will normally scramble. During daylight contacts, however, a pink team is usually dispatched. White elements have proved effective in monitoring enemy escape routes and providing visual reconnaissance; they should normally accompany any daylight fireteam requirement.

(2) Employment of the Aero Rifle Platoon: The ARP’s should be extracted as soon as contact has been established and the other forces have arrived and have assumed control on the ground. At that time, the ARP’s should be extracted and held back for other possible missions.

4. LOGISTICS:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I supply was adequate throughout the period. Rations are drawn by troop mess personnel from the ration breakdown point nearest
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the Squadron Forward Supply area. Evening meals are prepared in the Forward Supply Area (FSA) and flown forward along with C-rations for lunch and A-rations, which are prepared on site, for breakfast. Infrequently, a troop in a static position may be able to maintain its kitchen in the field. Class II and IV supplies are drawn through direct support companies or directly from the depot.

(2) The Regiment maintains continuous liaison with support personnel at all levels. The S-4 is in close contact with USARV, 1st Logistical Command, and 29th General Support Group and its subordinate elements. The Squadrons have Material Readiness Expeditors (MRE's) who carry requisitions to the direct support companies and pick up major items released from the depot. Their activities are monitored and controlled by a Regimental MRE officer who works for the S-4.

(3) Class III is drawn from the nearest POL point and transported by the organic 5,000-gallon tanker either directly to the troops in the field or in most cases to the landing zone (LZ) for aerial delivery. Fuel is transferred to 500-gallon bladders at the LZ and then carried by CH-47 to the field unit where it is again transferred to an M48 with a tank and pump unit. The changeover from the M48A2 to the M48A3 tank drastically reduced Class III supply problems.

(4) Barrier materials are drawn, as required, directly from FMER yards as the Regiment has no support unit to store these supplies. This practice proved unresponsive at times due to drawn out administrative procedures or zero balance at the depot.

(5) Class V is drawn from the nearest Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) and transported by organic trucks either directly to the field or to the LZ for aerial shipments. The Squadrons maintain a one-day supply of high turnover ammunition on the hulld at for rapid response to combat essential requests and for normal resupply. A five-day supply is maintained at Blackhorse Base Camp for base camp defense and for the resident Squadron. Low ASR's throughout the period on all types of illumination fired by Squadron weapons had an adverse effect on night operations.

b. Resupply: 85% of resupply is flown by CH-47 aircraft from secure Squadron FSA's to field units. Squadrons submit their sortie requirements to the Regimental S-4, where they are consolidated, scheduled, and forwarded to II FFV Army Aviation Element to be flown the next day. Although OPGON
units who located their trains with the Regiment normally forward their requests through the Regiment, it was found to be more efficient for OPCOM 1st Infantry Division units operating from LAI KHE to forward requests to 1st Infantry Division Aircraft Control. The CH-47 Flying Cranes were effectively used to transport heavy loads of ammunition and replacement assemblies and to recover combat lost ACAV's from inaccessible areas. As road accessibility and safety increased, the primary method of resupply has shifted to organic vehicles with aerial delivery used as a highly flexible back-up resource for the supply of units remaining overnight in the jungle.

e. Maintenance:

1. The complete mechanisation, mobility, and wide dispersion of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment require that its maintenance support has a similar flexibility. In a conventional war where definite frontlines exist, direct support maintenance elements can operate from a fixed location, lengthening or shortening their supply and evacuation as the situation changes. In Vietnam, however, there are no main supply routes. To achieve immediate direct support maintenance, the maintenance must travel with the Regiment. Although it is logistically unfeasible to move an entire direct support unit with a cavalry regiment, it is possible to move a twenty-five to thirty man contact team right into the forward fire support base. This was our solution. To create this flexibility, a contact team was authorized by the support command to satellite on the nearest maintenance unit for both repair parts and back-up maintenance. Satellite provides a single point of contact for the Regiment and also gives the contact team a much greater operational flexibility.

To ensure that maintenance and supply down time is kept to a minimum, on-site maintenance is accomplished where possible and aircraft are often used to move both parts and mechanics during fluid situations. Capitalising on all available assets under this flexible support structure, the Regiment is able to maintain a very high operational capability.

2. To augment repair parts, a continuous program of controlled substitution is used on combat lost vehicles. This is done primarily with high demand and non-supply items, and provides a self-help capability.

3. The M551 General Sheridan ACAV was integrated into the 11th ACR in January 1969. Some initial difficulty was experienced when vehicles were issued to the troops before the completion of training of support
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maintenance personnel. This left a gap of several weeks when all support maintenance was being handled by civilian technical representatives. However, as DS personnel were trained and deployed this problem was resolved.

4. The M551 direct support was consolidated into one maintenance company and one supply facility. This procedure insures that units have one point of contact for maintenance and supply. The low vehicle density makes a single point support system feasible.

d. Services:

(1) Troops showered in the field using five-gallon shower buckets.
(2) Laundry was retrograded to Quartermaster or contract laundries.

5. CIVIC ACTION:

a. Although the armored cavalry regiment is organized as a highly mobile fighting unit, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has developed methods and techniques which permit the conduct of an active and effective civic action program. While monitored and coordinated at Regimental level, the actual planning for and conduct of civic action projects are accomplished at Squadron level. Decentralization of the civic action program frees "the man on the ground" to act and react as situations requiring civic action develop.

Funds and materials are obtained from various agencies and are distributed to the Squadrons on an "as needed" basis. A recent innovation, which provides continuity to the program, is the assignment of Squadron S-5's on an area basis. This practice eliminates the days and sometimes weeks required for an S-5, new to a hamlet, to gain the necessary rapport to conduct an effective civic action program.

b. The effectiveness of the civic action program is difficult to assess. Although there are instances where Vietnamese citizens have pointed out mines, reported Viet Cong in their hamlets, and have furnished intelligence to US forces, the level of cooperation may or may not be attributable to the mutual trust and friendship developed during the construction of a school or hospital. The important aspects of a successful civic action program are intangible. The pride people take in the market place which they have per-
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sonally constructed, the hamlet unity developed during a community irrigation project, and the ties with the GVN gained when government school teachers and nurses arrive cannot be accurately measured.

e. Close and continual cooperation with district and province advisors is requisite to the success of any civic action program. These personnel form the link between the US unit and the GVN. By coordinating projects through and with the advisors, duplication of effort is eliminated and insight into the overall province/district program is gained.

Initiative for coordination, however, seems to lie over much with the US unit and not with MACV personnel. Experience over the last nine months leads to the conclusion that MACV advisors do not take sufficient initiative in bringing their problems and proposals to US unit commanders. This in no way should be construed as severe criticism of MACV personnel. Here again, the Regiment possesses the means, both air and ground, to effectively contribute to the program.

6. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

   a. The majority of the population in the 11th ACR AO is composed of either very old or very young men, as well as females of all ages. The young men have left the hamlets either to join or otherwise avoid the Viet Cong. The people are predominantly Buddhist and their bonds of trust and loyalty seldom extend beyond the family group.

   Our work in face-to-face communications has been purposely targeted at the young men and women in the hamlets. We have attempted to point out to the older generation through PSYOPs that the future of Vietnam, of their families, and of their aspirations lie in the hamlet children. It is emphasised that children are the keystones of our operations. We have attempted to convince the people that trust and loyalty must go beyond the family. Working with the older generation for a better future life for the younger generation will hopefully expand community, province, and eventually national consciousness and loyalty.

   b. The assignment of a PSYOPS team to the Regiment has enhanced its ability to inform the rural population. The mobile team has a van designed for PSYOPS; movies and slides can be shown, tapes can be reproduced through the PA system, and NOI CHANN can tell their stories firsthand. The mobility of this PSYOPS team allows it to participate in face-to-face communication with the people and pass out leaflets and
small gifts in the name of the GVN. The PSTOPS team also submits plans for leaflet drops within the AO. The team lives with the Squadrons and assists in coordinating the Regimental PSTOPS program.

c. The Regiment itself is active in the PSTOPS field. The Armed Propaganda Teams attached to Squadrons help to open channels of communication between the people and the GVN. The Squadron S-5's are well known in their areas and make daily contact with hamlet inhabitants.

The Regiment's mobility affords it a quick reaction capability that is valuable in PSTOPS. A HOI CHAHN can be picked up in the field, driven to a base camp, and flown by organic aircraft to the Regimental CP in minimum time. A quick reaction leaflet to exploit the HOI CHAHN can be prepared in six hours. Within eight hours, the leaflet can be dropped on a suspected Viet Cong base camp as the HOI CHAHN broadcasts his message on the airborne 1,000-watt loudspeaker.

d. Once again, the effectiveness of our PSTOPS program is difficult to measure. The overall impact of PSTOPS is cumulative. No one can say that for every 1,000 leaflets dropped we get 1.5 HOI CHAHN's or that for every twenty face-to-face communications conducted we gather six bits of intelligence information. Since July, the Regiment has had 43 HOI CHAHN, several of whom were significant. Civilians are volunteering intelligence information and freely communicating with US and GVN officials. The Regiment has used PSTOPS to good advantage and the program has won additional support for the GVN.

e. A final word. The civic action/PSTOPS program initiated by any US Army fighting unit cannot succeed without the personal emphasis and interest of the commander.

7. SUMMARY: In all the abovementioned areas, the 11th U.S. Cavalry has attempted to closely follow basic armor principles. We have expended our intelligence effort to meet the demands of this complex environment. We have successfully employed the BIUC concept, random armored movement, change for change's sake, the "pile-on", control at the lowest level, and the mission-type order. The logistic system has worked because of continuous direct personal contact at all echelons of support. The civic action/PSTOPS activities of the Regiment have revealed insight into VC infrastructure, provided a primary source of intelligence, and strengthened self-government within hamlets in our area of operation.
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We have maintained a very austere forward CP in the BIONI HMA Area which
is capable of movement anywhere, anytime (day or night) within two hours
from a standing start. Our major inhibiting factor at this time is the
continual requirement to maintain forces to secure Blackhorse Base Camp
(YU36968) in LONG Binh Province. These forces, consisting of a mini-
num of one reconnaissance troop, one medium tank platoon, and one 155mm
howitzer battery, maintain this base camp which is not required by the
11th Cavalry at this point in time of the war. A new study directed toward
the elimination of this installation is now under preparation by this Head-
quarters and will be submitted within 60 to 90 days.

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continues to prove its value in assisting
in the accomplishment of the national objectives in Southeast Asia.

GEORGE S. PATTON
Colonel, Armor
Commanding
Map 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Area of Operations

Incl 1
Organization of

Battlefield Intelligence Collection Centers

Incl 2
BATTLEFIELD INTELLIGENCE CENTERS

S-2 SECTION

REGIMENTAL BIIC

BIICC STAFF
1 CPT
1 LT
2 OB ANALYSTS
3 INTERROGATORS
3 ARVN INTERPRETERS

S-2, 1/11th ACR
SQUADRON BIIC
BIICC STAFF
1 LT
1 OB ANALYST
2 INTERROGATORS
1 ARVN INTERPRETER

S-2, 2/11th ACR
SQUADRON BIIC
BIICC STAFF
1 LT
1 OB ANALYST
2 INTERROGATORS
1 ARVN INTERPRETER

S-2, 3/11th ACR
SQUADRON BIIC
BIICC STAFF
1 LT
1 OB ANALYST
2 INTERROGATORS
1 ARVN INTERPRETER

AIR CAVALRY TROOP

LIAISON

1 IMAGERY INTERPRETATION SPECIALIST
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
Liaison Detachment, HQ USAFW
APO San Francisco 96375

CDCS-LV 4 February 1969

SUBJECT: Trip Report (10-69), Destruction of Viet Cong Insurgent Infrastructure at Village Level (U)

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1. (U) Introduction. This report seeks to achieve three goals. First, it documents the planning, coordination and intelligence efforts required by an Armored Cavalry Regiment in the conduct of operations oriented towards the destruction or disruption of activities by the Viet Cong infrastructure. Second, in light of established doctrine and newly devised techniques, it attempts to provide newly assigned commanders an insight into one method of accomplishing a difficult task. Third, and most important, this report seeks to highlight the requirement for a single document that will provide information on Viet Cong village infrastructure and guidance as to how this organization can be destroyed by US Army tactical organizations.

2. (U) The following personnel contributed the information provided by this report:

   Colonel Patton - CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
   Major Johnson - Acting CO, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
   Major Roberts - S3, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
   Major O'Meara - S2, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
   Captain Boyd - US Advisor, 3d BN, 8th ARVN Regt., 5th Infantry Division
   Lieutenant Lowell - 541st MI Det, 11th Armored Cavalry Regt.
   Lieutenant Griffin - S2, 2d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regt.

Incl 3
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Lieutenant Earnon - Asst SS, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Mr. Hertzog - Advisor, Vietnamese National Police
Mr. Hendrickson - District National Police Advisor
Mr. Duc - GVN-appointed Village Chief, Tan Binh Village

3. (C) The mission assigned to 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment by the Regimental Commanding Officer was to conduct a cordon of Tan Binh Village during the period 10 – 18 January 1969. Purpose of the mission was to locate enemy food and weapon caches and to destroy the political and military VC infrastructure in the village. At inclosure 1, is a copy of the operations order which provides map references for location of the village.

4. (C) For purpose of orientation, it is necessary to discuss some of the background of Tan Binh Village. The original Tan Binh was located some four or five kilometers south of its present location. Because of its VC activities, the village was destroyed during 1963, and the inhabitants moved to their present location. When resettlement was completed, the village was designated as a "STRATEGIC HAMLET" and government military forces were stationed in the village for its protection. During 1965, these military forces either withdrew or were forced out (exact determination cannot be made). At the same time the village chief (Mr. Duc) was forced to withdraw for his own protection. From 1965 to the present time, the government of South Vietnam has not had control of the village. Friendly military operations around Tan Binh consisted of sweeps through adjacent areas and the movement of convoys through the village. The MACV Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) gives the village a rating of "D" (VC controlled). During 1968, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment established a defensive position (Bandit Hill), near the West edge of the village. While occupying this position, friendly elements provided the villagers with a daily MEDCAP, held parties for the children, and conducted other PsyOps activities. Additionally, extensive ambush patrols and B-52 raids were conducted to deny free movement into the village. As a result of these activities the western edge of the village became somewhat pacified. The eastern portion, however, remained hard-core communist. This then, was the status of Tan Binh village at the initiation of the operation; a Viet Cong controlled village, some four kilometers long, located astride
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the main FMF supply route from Ben Cat to Phuoc Vinh, and a known distribution center for VC supplies.

5. (C) As previously stated, the Regimental Commanding Officer was determined to destroy the village infrastructure and planning was directed towards accomplishment of this mission. The actual troop movement to cordon and seal the village was not unusual and followed established doctrine and techniques, therefore, that portion of the operation will not be addressed in any detail during this report. What is of importance was the detailed planning required by the S2 personnel, plus the extensive coordination effected during the operation. In an attempt to document the planning and coordination in an understandable manner, the following paragraphs address each major section involved in the operation. Readers of this report should keep in mind, that this prior planning was not accomplished in isolation, but close coordination with all agencies involved in the operation was constantly maintained.

6. (C) Intelligence. Based on information gathered from agents, POWs and ralliers, it was determined that the C-118th Rear Service Company was transporting rice from Tan Binh to elements of the Dong Nai Regiment. In order to halt this traffic, planning was oriented towards neutralizing the VC leaders in Tan Binh. First, it was necessary for the Regimental S2 to determine what kind of enemy political and military structure existed in the village. Realizing that all governments have some kind of organization and chain of command, the S2 theorized that it would be possible to draw an organizational chart similar to those used to depict US TOE organizations. When the organizational blocks were drawn, the spaces were left blank, to be filled in as interrogation discloses the identities of the VC. This "blueprint" was used to portray a hypothetical village political and military structure. Development of the chart was accomplished by utilizing previous knowledge of VC organizations, plus research of references in the political science field. Foremost, among these source documents were Douglas Pike's book, entitled "Viet Cong," a study of "Chinese Communist Organizations" conducted by US Advisors to Mao Tse-Tung during the period 1944-1945, and a thesis written by Major O'Heara, entitled "The Viet Cong Model of Revolution." The organizational chart was composed of four basic structures: The People's Revolutionary Party Executive Committee, The Village National Liberation Front Committee, The Governmental Structure, or Village Liberation Committee, and the Village Military Affairs Committee (See Incl 2). As individuals were collected during the seal and subsequent
search, they were asked what committee or section they belonged to and did they have knowledge of any VC on other committees. As this information became available, it was added to the chart until the actual infrastructure started to form. Interrogations also revealed that sections existed within the village government that were not listed on the original chart. New sections had to be added to the chart to graphically represent this information. With the basic organization of the infrastructure available to the interrogators, it became easier to identify what role new prisoners and ralliers performed in the infrastructure. The interrogators also used the chart to determine relevant questions to ask these newly obtained personnel concerning the infrastructure. Cross interrogations confirmed the existence of the committees within the village. At inclosure 3, is the completed organizational chart of the Tan Binh infrastructure. At the close of the operation, this chart becomes an effective "blacklist" for the village and can be used during subsequent searches.

7. (C) Civil Affairs. The primary mission of the regimental and squadron S3 personnel during this operation was to perform psychological missions in conjunction with a MACV PsyOps Team, initiate self-help projects, work with MEDCAP personnel, and direct the activities of the Armed Propaganda Team.

a. Psychological Operations. During each day of the seal, PSYOPS personnel made broadcasts to the villagers persuading them to rally to the government and also convince their family and friends to do so. Children were asked to provide information on the location of supply caches. During the evening, movies with a propaganda theme were shown to the villagers.

b. Self Help. At the start of the search, 85 personnel enlisted the aid of the villagers to start construction of a village school. Arrangements are being made to provide a school teacher when the school has been completed.

c. MEDCAP. A sick-call was held daily immediately adjacent to the squadron command post. Additionally, each five days, a doctor and Vietnamese nurse visited villagers at their homes. Dental services were also available as required.

d. Armed Propaganda Team (APT). The APT consists of fifteen Vietnamese personnel trained in PSYOPS, POLWAR, and intelligence activities. All of these personnel are former VC who rallied to the government. They are intensely interested in getting more VC to rally and since they know both
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Sides of the issue, are quite persuasive. They perform a vital mission in face-to-face communication and are living proof of the manner in which the GVN treats Hoa Chans. Their approach is to persuade the relatives of a VC to disclose his hiding place or arrange a meeting so that the APT can talk to him. The "soft sell" approach is used rather than threats. When the VC has rallied, they make sure that he is fed, receives good treatment and has the opportunity to say goodbye to his family prior to evacuation. Some of the missions performed by the APT were: face-to-face communications, security for the PSYOPS Team and MEDCAP, assisting in civil affairs and self-help projects and protection of local officials. Nine VC personnel rallied to the APT during this one operation, attesting to the effectiveness of the team.

8. (C) National Field Force Police. Initially, only five national police were involved in the search, however, two days prior to the seal being lifted, the district assigned a twenty-eight man platoon to the village. Their mission is to continue the search of the village, maintain law and order, conduct ambush patrols for village protection and establish governmental goodwill in the village. It is planned that the police platoon will be retained in the village on a permanent basis.

9. (C) Village Chief. Mr. Duc was appointed by district officials as the Village Chief upon initiation of the planning for this operation. Since Mr. Duc had been Chief of Tan Binh prior to 1965, he was acquainted with many of the villagers, which tended to make his job easier. The Village Chief's job at the initiation of the seal was to go from house to house explaining to the people that the government was there to help them. Additionally, at the same time, he conducted a census of the population and livestock. Because of his persuasion, he was instrumental in convincing several VC to rally. Subsequent to the start of the seal, the chief has selected three villagers for appointment as ward leaders. At the present time, Mr. Duc is not able to spend the night in the village because of possible assassination, however, he does sleep at the squadron defensive position, and plans to move into the village as soon as security will permit.

10. (C) The ARVN battalion selected for the seal of the village was the 3d Battalion, 8th Regiment, 5th Infantry Division. Seal of the village by the infantrymen was accomplished in the normal manner, however, instead of establishing strong points with observation between these positions, the battalion had sufficient personnel to establish a continuous line of troops within their section. ARVN troops were used for the actual house-to-house search.
with no US troop participation in the village. During daylight hours, the individual soldiers were encouraged to become acquainted with the villagers in order to gain their confidence. Contrary to some other operations, the ARVN interrogations were conducted in a humanitarian manner with no harsh methods employed. Additionally, the villagers' livestock was not molested and the search of homes was conducted in a manner so as not to destroy personal possessions. Initially, several ralliers stated that they were afraid to rally to ARVN forces and waited until the Village Chief or the APT were in the vicinity. However, as the search progressed many VC did rally to ARVN forces.

11. (C) Sequence of Events. At 2300 hours, on the night of 10 January 1969, the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment initiated the seal of Tan Binh Village. Phase I of the seal had only US troop participation because of the ability of the Armor unit to move into position rapidly. By 0300 hours, the seal was completed, with no major contact. At 1200 hours, on the 11th of January, the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry assumed responsibility for the southern portion of the village. (See Incl 1, Operation Order). During the early morning hours, broadcasts were made from an aircraft telling the villagers that a cordon of the village had been completed. Appeals were made to the VC to rally to the government forces. Initially, there was no reaction on the part of the VC and it is believed that they thought the seal would be kept in place for the two or three days, which is an average time length for an operation of this type. Later examination of tunnel complexes showed that personnel were prepared to stay underground for a short period of time. After arrival and positioning of the ARVN battalion, the village was divided into three sectors, in which ARVN units conducted a house-to-house search. A civilian collecting point was also established in each sector where National Policemen and ARVN personnel screened all the village inhabitants. During this time period, the armed propaganda and PSYOPS teams become operational in the village. The Village Chief also made his presence known at this time and initiated a census. As previously stated, for the first two or three days results were very poor, however, once the people realized that the seal was indefinite, ralliers began to appear. Personnel that had escaped to the jungle returned to their homes because of worry for the safety of their families. During conduct of the seal, vehicles were routed around the village via a bypass. Personnel that insisted on entering the village were not allowed to depart. No business of any kind was allowed to be conducted outside the village. Continuous spot-checks of houses and areas within the village were conducted. During the hours of darkness, the villagers were not allowed to leave their yards, except to attend the PSYOPS
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movics. While very little food and weapons were found during the search, many tunnels that were used to hide VC were detected. Due to the intense efforts of the APT, Village Chief, National Police and ARVN personnel, the VC ralliers became more numerous as each day of the seal progressed. Inclosure 4, contains a list of the total number of personnel neutralized during this operation. It is evident that the village infrastructure has been seriously damaged; and that it will require time and extensive effort to rebuild it. It must be recognized, that this cordon and search is only Phase I of the total operation. Phase II must consist of denial of the village to the enemy and education of the inhabitants. This can be accomplished by organizing an effective CVN government, establishment of the National Police in the village, protection of the people by PF/RF forces and the continuing presence of Free World Military Forces in the immediate area to keep pressure on the local and main force units. By destroying the infrastructure of Tan Binh, friendly units have effectively cut off at least one source of supplies to enemy forces in base areas. Further education and interrogation of the villagers will probably reveal the names and positions of other VC in the local area.

12. (C) Lessons Learned. a. To be effective, detailed planning must be accomplished at all echelons of command, to include exposing the interrogators to the normal organization of the infrastructure in order that they will have a starting point during interrogations. US troops, commanders in particular, require a working knowledge of the VC government at village/hamlet level.

b. Seals must stay in position longer than two or three days, in order to force VC to the surface. Lack of food, comfort, or worry about family members are some of the primary reasons that motivate the VC to rally. It appears that the advantage belongs to the side that can wait the longest. Seals must be air-tight 24 hours a day. Planned bypasses must be effected to isolate the village/hamlet from transient traffic.

c. Interrogations must be conducted in a firm, but humanitarian manner. This is of particular importance when the initial interrogation is conducted in the village where local inhabitants have an opportunity to observe.

d. Under no circumstances should friendly forces be allowed to tamper with, or take personal possessions. All livestock and other food stuffs must be left alone so as not to antagonize the villagers.

e. If dual command locations are used, (US/ARVN) IFW teams must be exchanged to ensure that immediate information is available to both commanders.
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1. To be effective, the cordon must be established rapidly. If terrain permits, mounted or airmobile forces should be used to initially seal an area.

2. Follow-on plans must be formulated to continue pacification efforts after the seal has been lifted.

3. Sufficient IPW teams must be available to handle large numbers of PWs and runniers quickly and efficiently.

4. All information gathered from the many sources must be funneled into one location so that the entire intelligence picture can be kept current.

5. Commanders must have sufficient combat forces available to react to intelligence received from the runniers.

6. Completion of the infrastructure organizational chart confirmed the regimental S2's theory, that a village government has four basic groupings. This information is contrary to most documents published by US military and government agencies, which identifies only three groupings for the VC infrastructure. Present in Tan Binh Village was the Village Liberation Committee which controlled the finance and propaganda functions within the village. Current publications place these functions under control of the National Liberation Front (NLF). In Tan Binh Village, the Liberation Committee is a separate entity and this may be true for all other villages. If this fact can be confirmed, official documents need to be revised.

ALBERT J. BROWN
COL, GS (Inf)
Senior Liaison Officer

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Copy of 35 copies
2nd Sqdn, 11th ACR
Tan Binh, RVN (K1862961)
091547H Jan 69

FRAGO 44 to OPORD 12-68 (COMPENS)
Reference: Maps, RVN, 1:50,000, TAN UTEN, KOM ROUNG, PHUOC VINH, HCM CAT.

Task Organisation:

Eff o/a 102000H Jan 69

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<tr>
<td>Engr Sect 1st Inf Div</td>
<td>168th LCC</td>
<td>Flat G/2/11 Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tm C</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tm A</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tm B</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>G/2/11 Cav (-Flat)</td>
<td>H/2/11 Cav (-2 plat)</td>
<td>G/2/11 Cav (-2 plat)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flat D/1-28 Inf</td>
<td>2 Flat E/2/11 Cav</td>
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TF ROBERTS (eff 111200H Jan 69)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task D (OAKLAND)</th>
<th>Task E</th>
<th>Task F</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D/1-28 Inf (-2 plat)</td>
<td>E/2/11 Cav (-2 plat)</td>
<td>G/2/11 Cav (-2 plat)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Flat D/1-28 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engr Sqd 1st Inf Div</td>
<td>Flat H/2/11 Cav</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Task H</th>
<th>Task C</th>
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<td>H/2/11 Cav (-2 plat&amp;Inf Sect)</td>
<td>Sect AVLB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Flat E/2/11 Cav</td>
<td>Sect AVLB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flat D/1-28 Inf</td>
<td>Sect AVLB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168th LCC</td>
<td>Sect AVLB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/919th Engr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flat G/2/11 Cav</td>
<td>Sect AVLB</td>
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</table>

TF 3/8 ARVN Regt
3/8 ARVN Regt
Flat F/2/11 Cav
Flat H/2/11 Cav

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1. SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces:

(1) The C-118 Rear Service Company has been transporting rice from Tan Binh to elements of the Dong Hai Regiment located in the Catchers Mitt.

(2) The K-4 Bn of the Dong Hai Regiment operating to the north of Tan Binh is also being supplied from Tan Binh.

(3) The VC are performing supply operations during night and day. At night the VC actually enter Tan Binh to pick up rice. During the day the VC supporters carry rice out of the village often concealed under a layer of straw.

b. Friendly Forces: No Change

c. Attachments and Detachments: 3d Bn, 8th Regt, 5th (ARVN) Div DS to 2/11th Cav, o/a 111200H Jan 15160; 11 F relieved OPCON 1/11 Cav o/a 102000H Jan 69.

2. MISSION:


b. Conduct extended cordon of Tan Binh (East & West) vic (TT65360 and TT75360) in combined cordon and search op with 3d Bn, 8th Regt, 5th (ARVN) Div. Terminate on order.

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation: (Annex A on overlay)

(1) Maneuver: Conduct cordon of Tan Binh for extended period; letting only RVN & US Forces in or out. Initially the cordon will be conducted with four teams. On order 11 M and 11 G will be replaced by 3d Bn, 6th Regt, 5th (ARVN) Div.

b. FM D:

(1) Continue current men.

(2) Place one (1) direct sqd size NAP nightly. NAP location to be reported to NCS by 1500 hrs daily.

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(1) Close HAVK and move w/168th to FSB JIN.
(2) On order move from FSB JIN to cordon Tan Binh (see on overlay).
(3) Release plat to Tan H on order.

b. Tan F:
(1) On order move from HOLIDAY INN to cordon Tan Binh (see on overlay).
(2) Rtn, minus one ACAV plat, to COPCON 1/11 ACR upon relief in place by elements 3/8 ARVN Regt.

c. Tan G:
(1) Continue to sweep route Zino from CP C to CP D daily.
(2) Continue to outpost route ZINC/LEAD from CP 57 to CP100 daily.
(3) On order move from BANDIT HILL to cordon Tan Binh (see on overlay).
(4) Secure BANDIT HILL nightly.
(5) Be prepared to provide RRF within AO on order.

d. Tan H:
(1) Continue to sweep route LEAD from CP B to Southern AO boundary.
(2) Continue convoy security on route LEAD (2 tanks) daily.
(3) Continue convoy security on route ZINC (2 Tk, 2 ACAV) daily.
(4) Secure 168th LOC with one ACAV Plat during land clearing operations.
(5) Place (1) sqd/sct size NAP in area to be plowed the following day. AP locations to be reported to NCS by 1600H daily.
(6) On order move from FSB JIN to cordon Tan Binh (see on overlay).
(7) Be prepared to send plat size RRF to OAKLAND on order.
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3. TF 3/3 (ARVN) Regt will replace Tm G and Tm F from CP X to CP Y, which is the southern half of the cordon, o/a 111200H Jan 69.

h. How Day: DS

i. HMT: Continue current man.

j. AVN: Continue current man.

k. GS: Continue current man.

l. Coordinating Instructions:

   (1) Cordon will be completed by 102300H Jan 69.
   (2) This FRAGO to immediately for planning.
   (3) On order be prepared to assemble, Tm E at CP 57, Tm H at CP G, Tm G at BANDIT HILL.
   (4) Code name for this operation will be (TREASURE ISLE)
   (5) Tm Sec, Tm E, will be released to Tm H during daylight hours.

Acknowledged:

Annex A: (Op Overlay) to FRAGO 11/4 to OPORD 12-68

DISTRIBUTION: T Plus
   D 1/23th Inf
   3/8 (ARVN) Regt
   8th (ARVN) Regt

OFFICIAL:

ROBERTS
S-3

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TYPICAL VIET CONG POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUCTURE AT VILLAGE LEVEL

MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT VILLAGE COMMITTEE

VILLAGE LIBERATION COMMITTEE CHIEF:

PROPAGANDA:

FINANCE:

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

HAMELT #1 GUERILLA FORCE

FARMER'S LIBERATION ASSOCIATION

WOMEN'S LIBERATION ASSOCIATION

FINANCE/ECONOMY SECTION

SECURITY SECTION

HAMELT # 2 GUERILLA FORCE

YOUTH LIBERATION ASSOCIATION

SUPPLY SECTION

PARTY CELL STRUCTURE
**Total Personnel Detained During The Operation.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC Soldiers</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC FW's</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Personnel who are considered Militia</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Militia are low level VC Support Personnel)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Suspects</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendants</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent Civilians</td>
<td>3/200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Above figures as of 172000hrs Jan 69. Classifications based on initial interrogations.*
AVIC-CO 1 October 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes 7: Concept for Rapid Buildup of Airmobile Forces from Aerorifle Platoon Through Infantry Battalion

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) With the reorganization of the Regimental Aviation assets along TO&E lines, situations may develop in which an initial commitment of the aerorifle platoon by CO, Air Cavalry Troop leads to the commitment of a full infantry battalion, cavalry squadron, or more. We must therefore be prepared to reinforce rapidly and exploit initial contacts. Accordingly, the following sequence with concomitant command and control features is envisioned:

a. The Air Cavalry Troop or a ground unit locates a target deemed appropriate for engagement by the troop. If the target is in the troop AO, the troop commander may decide to commit the aerorifle platoon. Command and control: Air Cav Cmdr.

b. Upon determining that commitment of the aerorifle platoon is likely, Regiment directs an infantry battalion to prepare one rifle platoon, with a captain in charge, as RRF for immediate pickup and to prepare to release OPCON of the platoon to the Air Cav Trp Cmdr on lift off.

   (1) The Captain provided by the infantry battalion will normally assume command of the Aerorifle Platoon on the ground and report to the CO, Air Cav Trp. This reduces control problems of the Air Cavalry Troop CO.

   (2) The Air Cav Trp Cmdr decides whether to orbit the platoon for immediate insertion, or to load lift aircraft but remain on the ground, or merely to have the RRF platoon stand by for pickup on order. Command and control: Air Cav Trp Cmdr.
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AVIC-60

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes 7: Concept for Rapid Buildup of Airmobile Forces from Aerorifle Platoon Through Infantry Battalion

a. If it is deemed likely that the RRF platoon will be committed, Regiment immediately takes the following steps:

(1) Requests division RRF company stand by for commitment.

(2) Alerts an infantry battalion under 11th ACR OPCON to prepare a company as RRF for pickup utilizing division aviation assets.

(3) Designates a control headquarters infantry battalion or cav sqdn and directs that headquarters to plan for control of the operation to include employment of the Air Cav Trp in an OPCON or DS status. (Note: OPCON is preferable).

(4) Prepares to adjust AO boundaries. Command and control: Air Cav Trp Cmdr.

d. If the RRF platoon is committed and further reinforcement is deemed necessary, Regiment takes the following steps:

(1) Requests division RRF company be placed OPCON to Regiment or requests immediate division airlift assets be made available for commitment of its own RRF company. (Generally, whichever is most responsive will be requested).

(2) Places the division RRF company (if used) and the previously committed platoons OPCON to the battalion or squadron providing the control headquarters.

(3) Directs additional RRF forces to prepare for commitment.

(4) Places Air Cav Trp (-) either DS or OPCON to Bn/Sqdn. Command and control: Bn/Sqdn cmdr.

e. If the RRF company is committed and further reinforcement is deemed necessary the Regiment takes the following steps:

(1) Directs additional RRF forces be placed OPCON to the battalion.

(2) Requests additional division forces and aviation assets be alerted if deemed appropriate. Command and Control: Bn/Sqdn Cmdr.

2. (C) If the initial target is not in the Air Cavalry Troop AO, Regiment may take one of the following actions:

a. Grant an appropriate AO to the Air Cav Trp. Command and control: Air Cav Trp Cmdr.

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AVD-GO

1 October 1968

SUBJ: Commander's Notes 7: Concept for Rapid Buildup of Airmobile Forces from Helicopters Flight through Infantry Battalion

b. Place air Cav Trp DS or OPCON to BN/Sqdn in whose AO the initial target is engaged. Command and control: BN/Sqdn Cmdr.

3. (C) Since command and control features are of great importance to the operation, a check list (Incl 1) will be utilized by Regimental TOC personnel to facilitate operations. Subordinate units should adapt this list to their own needs.

4. (C) Fire support for the air Cav Trp is planned as for any airmobile unit. An artillery FO or otherwise qualified individual must be in communication with the TOC in order to provide responsive fire support, especially upon insertion of the Trp. Although the Trp may be inserted outside the 9.5 km planning range of 105mm fan (1st BN SOP), if a company is committed as reinforcement the following will apply:

a. Obtain permission to operate outside the 105mm fan. (an operation should not, however, be planned outside the 155mm fan).

b. Plan to move a 105mm battery or portion thereof to a supporting location. When the air Cav Trp is placed in a DS or OPCON status to a BN/Sqdn, normal BN/Sqdn fire support procedures are in effect.

1 Incl as

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COL, Armor
Commanding

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Command and Control Check List

1. (C) Report to higher Hx commitment of the aerorifle platoon.
2. (C) Designate a platoon RRF.
3. (C) Inform Air Cav Trp and Bn/Sqdn of DZ, LZ, time, frequencies.
4. (C) Resolve AO questions as appropriate.
5. (C) Designate an RRF company or request higher Hx RRF.
6. (C) Arrange airlift for RRF company to include number of sorties, PZ, LZ, time, frequencies.
7. (C) Inform fire support (Arty, Air) of status.
8. (C) Resolve command arrangements.