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**AUTHORITY**

AGO ltr 11 Jun 1990; AGO ltr 11 Jun 1990

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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Charles M. Gettys, CG, Americal Division, Period June 1968 to May 1969 (U)

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U), dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG Charles M. Gettys, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
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AVHGC-DST

1 3 JUN 1969

S U R J E C T : Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report submitted by MG Charles H. Gettys. The report covers the period June 1968 to May 1969 during which time MG Gettys served as 33, Americal Division.

2. MG Gettys is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate joint colleges and service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

1 Incl
as (trip)
2 cy wd Hq, DA

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subject: Senior Officer Debriefing Program

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

In accordance with paragraph 2, AR 1-26, and paragraph 5a, USARV Regulation 1-3, the debriefing report attached as inclosure 1 is submitted.

CHARLES M. GETTYS
Major General, USA
Commanding

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DEBRIEFING REPORT
MG CHARLES M. GETTYS
CG, AMERICAL DIVISION, JUNE 1968-MAY 1969

PART I
INTRODUCTION

PART II
THE ENEMY

PART III
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
A. AMERICAL EFFORTS
B. GVN EFFORTS

PART IV
OPERATIONS

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PART I - INTRODUCTION

The American Division's area of responsibility extends approximately 95 miles north to south, and 40 to 50 miles east to west. The territory encompasses the two southern provinces of Ictz, Quang Ngai and Quang Tin, and one district, Quang Son, of Quang Nam Province.

The topography, inland from the shore of the South China Sea, is relatively flat until it meets irregularly with the central mountain range. The economy is based largely on rice production, the fishing industry, and numerous independent cottage type industries. The population is approximately 1.12 million, most of whom are ethnically Vietnamese. The rest are Chinese, Cambodian, and Montagnard. Generally, the people are provincial in their attitudes, judging events from the viewpoint of their own village world. Political events and personalities are important only insofar as their influence is felt in a specific village, hamlet or family. A year ago, local governments were unknowns to the average family and unknowns are to be treated with indifference. Ideologies, such as democracy and communism, were abstractions which were meaningless until the ideology became associated with tangible events or practices, e.g., conscription and taxation. However, with the continual presence of the American Division conducting operations on a daily basis with the 2d ARVN Division and Province Forces in support of the pacification effort, the outlook of the people is changing. The people are disenchanted with the enemy and are beginning to identify more and more with the RVN. Tangible events in the military, economic, political, and sociological fields have brought about this change.

PART II - THE ENEMY

Enemy forces in the American Division TAOI are of four basic categories: NVA, Main Force, Local Force, and Irregular or Guerilla Forces. Main Force and NVA units may be considered the same, as the percentage of NVA personnel in Main Force Units is generally in excess of 80%.

The operational area of MF/NVA units is determined by Military Region Headquarters which further exerts general operational control in the assignment of objectives and missions for major subordinate units throughout a multi-province area. Tactics utilized by these MF/NVA units are generally of the more conventional variety and involve an extensive use of supporting fires from organic and attached recoilless rifle, mortar and rocket units. Sapper tactics have been used increasingly in attacks on fixed targets while the use of stationary force in conjunction with a mobile reactionary force against the flanks of friendly units is a favorite countersweep tactic. Extensive reconnaissance and preparation of the battlefield are characteristics of all offensive
operations in order to assure a current and accurate assessment of both friendly strengths and locations as well as any physical characteristics of the area in terms of staging and assembly areas, ambush sites, routes of advance and withdrawal, etc. An extensive logistical system has evolved to support these units with large personnel resources devoted to transportation of arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and food. The system has severe limitations, however, due to the necessity of reliance upon foot troops, bicycles, and sampans as means of transportation. The process is time-consuming, requires large numbers of personnel and the establishment of forward area caches for resupply of operational units. This system is vulnerable to discovery of these caches and/or interception of enemy LOC's. Communications at lower echelons are primarily accomplished by means of telephones and runners; radios are reserved for higher echelons where the distances involved would be prohibitive for the former two means.

Local Force units throughout the Americal Division TAOI vary in size from platoons to battalions (both sapper and infantry) and are controlled by a district or province headquarters organization. Tactics utilized by these forces are generally based on the raid or the ambush and are very seldom of the type to allow a prolonged engagement. Primary targets of these units are small fixed installations, the Revolutionary Development program, New Life Hamlets, and RF/PF units. The larger units often conduct coordinated attacks in conjunction with NVA units with each unit attacking separate objectives. Their armament is generally light, seldom larger than 82mm mortars and/or 57mm recoilless rifles. Much of their efforts and activities are directed toward general population control, in which they are aided by complete familiarity with both the area and the populace. They are able to disperse among the local populace to avoid detection; they rarely remain in one location for more than a few days. Supplies are obtained from the district or provincial logistical system in the case of weapons and ammunition, with food and some medicine procured (voluntarily or through coercion) from the local populace. Transportation needs are met by organizing labor groups from among the local populace for as long as needed. Communication is primarily accomplished by messenger, with radios utilized between a battalion headquarters and province level.

Irregular or Guerrilla forces are part-time soldiers organized at hamlet and village level in cell to platoon size units. They are controlled by the party apparatus at those levels and have the missions of terrorism, sabotage, espionage, collection of taxes, dissemination of propaganda, security of the hamlet or village, and assisting organized military units in transportation, combat, or intelligence activities. They generally do not engage Allied forces except to snipe at advancing troops to slow the advance and allow party members and other guerrillas to escape and hide. They are lightly armed, seldom having anything larger than small arms.
and they experience few logistical problems as they are part of the local populace. Transportation needs are met by recruiting the necessary labor groups from the populace. Communications are simple, using runners and a system of warning shots or gongs to notify the party apparatus of the approach of Allied troops. These guerrilla forces are the prime supporting arm of the local VC.

PART III - INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

A. American Division Efforts

The current intelligence effort has made possible more meaningful operations by the Division through the implementation of filing systems enabling the quick retrieval and dissemination of past and current information derived from PW, document translation, and agent reports. The establishment of work folders on each unit in the American TA0I is a primary tool in assembling and maintaining information on enemy units in the areas of composition, disposition, strength, training, tactics, logistics, combat effectiveness, and other miscellaneous data. Each folder provides a concise summary of items of intelligence interest on one unit, thus greatly reducing the time required to evaluate new reports on a unit in light of past information or to produce a comprehensive evaluation of the unit for further dissemination. In addition, the maintenance of all source plots on overlays of the entire American Division TA0I for all incidents, anti-aircraft fire, visual reconnaissance sightings, imagery interpretation reports, LR and SLAR readings, radar sensor readings, and agent reports has made available substantial evidence of enemy buildup in an area. The use of pattern analysis techniques with these overlays has provided the information necessary for the execution of successful preemptive operations. The same techniques have provided intelligence justification for B-52 strikes and for the employment of artillery fire, in a harassing and interdictory role; the widespread and rapid dissemination of evaluated intelligence to field units has produced effective results by keeping subordinate elements of the Division informed of the latest developments relevant to the enemy's capabilities and probable courses of action.

Exploitation of detainees and captured documents has continually produced valued intelligence. Close coordination between interrogation and counterintelligence personnel has enhanced the VCI collection effort, both in compilation of blacklist material and VCI elimination data. Prior to conducting interrogations, blacklists are screened for available data to be used in verifying detainees statements. Position lists are provided to insure maximum VCI personality collection. Coordination is also effected with source handling elements of the counterintelligence section to exploit any possible opportunity for verifying or supplementing agent reports.
Interrogation and document reports are found to provide both highly reliable current tactical information and input for a broad Order of Battle database. Tactical use is frequently made of returnees/exploitable detainees in conjunction with interrogation teams and combat elements. In the past months, Americal units have located a number of weapons caches including small arms, mortar rounds, 840 Rkts, 122mm Rkts and assorted demolition material. On 29 Mar 69, Americal troops were led by a detainee to a cache which contained 22,000 AK47 Rds, 100 RPG Rds, 9 60mm Mort Rds and 3 B40 Rkts. Returnees are found to provide valuable information with particular frequency. In addition to caches, a number of hospitals and dispensaries have been located, particularly in the northern portion of the TAOL.

Close integration of the 8th ARVN MID officer personnel assigned to the Division has been executed. One ARVN officer is assigned to each of the Brigade interrogation teams. This officer not only conducts interrogations and submits reports, but also works with the section OIC in performing necessary administrative duties and exercising operational supervision. The officer is at the same time an asset to the interrogation section in his capacity as a capable interrogator and also learns the administrative and operational skills which will be required when he controls an interrogation section himself.

The quality and quantity of intelligence information reports continues to increase throughout the Americal Division TAOL. During the four months period, Jan thru Apr 69, 312 reports were submitted by operational personnel in the Division headquarters area alone. Fifty seven percent of these reports were given a numerical evaluation of 3 (possible true) by the Order of Battle Section. Existing agent nets are being expanded throughout the A/CA and two additional agent nets were recently activated in the division headquarters area. Six coded principal agents with an average of fifteen sub-agents in each of their nets are presently employed by CI personnel in the division headquarters area. In the 11th Bde area, CI Team #1 utilizes four coded sources and their nets, while in the 196th Bde area, CI Team #2 is presently engaged in spotting and recruiting potential agents. This is in addition to the casual informants in the areas. In the 19th Bde area, CI Team #3 has one coded source and a number of casual informants. One source, although presently being utilized because of his access and capability, is still uncoded pending completion of a favorable investigation. Because of the low quality of potential agents available within the area, only the very basic requirements have been applied in the acquisition of agents. Spotting for higher caliber agents is a continuous requirement levied on operational personnel. Communications problems continue to exist between US operational personnel and their agents and this handicap has a considerable effect on the desired level of training of the agents and the timeliness of the information received. Some of the problems encountered are difficulty in using
technical and nontechnical means of communication because of the low quality of available agents, unsecure conditions in the area which prevent establishment of drops and safehouses, and placing all areas outside of US base perimeters "Off Limits" to US military personnel except Military Police on duty. All other US personnel seen during unusual times and at unusual places will come under scrutiny from inhabitants and opposition agents alike.

The security services provided by the MID have vastly improved over the past year and this is mainly attributed to the consolidation of the MI detachments that were assigned to each brigade. CI support is now provided directly to over 50 separate units within and attached to the Americal Division. CI inspections, surveys, and liaison have vastly improved the security posture of the Americal Division. Liaison with local GVN officials, at all levels, has increased over 100% in order to obtain more accurate and timely intelligence information. Joint operations with the National Police and other GVN agencies have proven highly successful. On three different occasions joint operations were conducted at the gates to Chu Lai Base to apprehend all draft dodgers being apprehended. As of now, all 86 persons are undergoing military training. All agencies have shown a great enthusiasm and degree of cooperation in working with the Counterintelligence personnel, and this was particularly noted when five CI personnel were recently presented citations from the Quang Tin Province Chief for their cooperation with province security elements. The on-base informant program, which has been fairly dormant in the past, is now showing very favorable results.

During the last quarter, seven VCI were neutralized on post, and several investigations are still in process. Security education has been stressed at all levels of command. Through the cooperation of units employing Vietnamese Nationals, the PMO and the IRO, the CI Section has been able to implement more stringent control measures over the approximately 6,000 indigenous employees on Chu Lai Base. Through these control measures, security violations concerning indigenous employees have been reduced by 50%. Investigations of espionage and subversion are almost nonexistent. During the last seven months there has been only one reportable incident of sabotage in which an explosive was placed on a moored barge. The Counterintelligence Section of the MID is well aware of the threat imposed by hostile intelligence. Effective measures to thwart the enemy's collection capability, through the use of informants, strict security control measures, liaison, and security education have proven very successful.

The VCI collection effort continues to expand and an extensive blacklist has been compiled and is available to units of the Division for use during operations through hamlets and villages. Interrogation reports, agent reports, ralliers, and other types of detainees provide the largest input to the blacklist. Liaison is maintained with each district to insure that any changes in the blacklist are received and noted for the Division blacklist.
B. GVN Efforts

The VCI has received increasing emphasis from the Americal Division which has placed additional operational requirements upon the Counterintelligence Section. The Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program is supposed to be a civilian GVN program whose primary mission is to attack and defeat the VCI, and as a secondary mission to neutralize the guerrilla and paramilitary threat. The program is supplemented with US DIOCC Advisors, but the primary interest is basically that of the GVN. In most districts, the program has met with relative degrees of success. Among the more successful DIOCC's are Duc Ho, Tam Ky, and Tu Nghia. However, efficient operation of the DIOCC's is still hampered by petty jealousies among Vietnamese staff sections within the DIOCC's or among the GVN civilian agencies, such as the National Police, Static Census Grievance, and the MSS. For example, the S2 in the Tien Phouc DIOCC is very inactive and the DIOCC advisor has to rely on the assistance of the National Police and the District Chief to provide intelligence. There is also a problem of corruption and graft within the Vietnamese agencies. Tra Bong, for example, has had the former CIDG Team Chief replaced for making payoffs to certain Vietnamese agencies. The problem exists at all levels within the GVN structures. The cooperation between the Rural Development Cadre and the Vietnamese seems good, and the pacification effort has been greatly aided when the RDC Teams assist the DIOCC's. The RF/PF units are active within the districts for the most part. Generally speaking, the districts have an average of two to three RF companies and approximately 10 to 15 PF Platoons. The amount of counterambush patrolling and night patrols varies from district to district. In some districts, such as Thang Binh, there is aggressive night patrolling and extensive use is made of ambushes to harass the VC movement. However, in some districts, such as Tra Bong, the CIDG and RF/PF units will not go beyond certain areas. It has been stated by the Commanding Officer of the Special Forces Camp at Tra Bong that the CIDG will often report patrol positions several kilometers out from the camp, when in reality the CIDG's are often located in the hamlet at the base of the camp. This criticism has been made by other US Advisors in the DIOCC's. The Provincial Reconnaissance Units seem to be utilized effectively in some DIOCC's such as Duc Ho, but in others they are either unused or not present. In Minh Long there are no PRU's, nor are there any at the new DIOCC at Que Son. The PRU at Tien Phouc has been present for only three weeks and as of 1 May is still in the process of becoming operational. The amount of intelligence produced varies from district to district. The accuracy of the information obtained and the reliability of the source are generally exaggerated in an effort to enhance the value of the report. Also, troop strengths seem to be exaggerated or inflated to lend additional significance to the information. These observations have been cross-checked against Americal Division OB holdings and have also been noted at province level. Due to a particular failing upon the part of the districts as a whole within

*District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC)
Quang Ngai Province, for which the Americal Division seems to be receiving a share of the blame, the Americal Division is shouldering a bigger portion of the task of attacking the VC political infrastructure, as well as continuing the war against VC/NVA military units. Part of the failing in Quang Ngai may be due to the fact that the four mountain region DIOC's have only been in operation since 15 Feb 69, and for the most part are still co-located with the Special Forces Camps due to the lack of security.

The bilateral dissemination of intelligence has increased immensely with US and ARVN exchanging ideas and intelligence more freely than ever before. A noticeable emphasis has been put on better qualified ARVN personnel in the intelligence field. This effort has produced a better intelligence product, thus making allied operations more successful.

PART IV - AMERICAL DIVISION OPERATIONS

The Americal Division headquarters is located at Chu Lai about 30 miles south of Da Nang. The Division's Tactical Area of Operational Interest (TAOI) is one of the largest in Vietnam, encompassing all of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin provinces and the Que Son district of Quang Nam Province. The TAOI is shared with the 2d ARVN Division headquartered at Quang Ngai City. The TAOI is tactically organized into combined Operational Zones (OZ). In the northern sector the 196th Infantry Brigade shares an OZ with the 5th ARVN Regiment. In the center sector the 198th Infantry Brigade operates with the 6th ARVN Regiment while south of Quang Ngai City the 11th Infantry Brigade shares their OZ with the 4th ARVN Regiment. The division cavalry squadron, 1-1 Cavalry, occupies a large OZ in the northern sector along the coastal plain.

The Operational Zone concept is a new innovation which went into effect on 18 March 1969. Prior to this time, Americal and 2d ARVN Division units had separate operational areas for which they had unilateral responsibility. As a result of the realignment, combined planning, combined operations, and combined responsibility is the rule throughout the TAOI. It is expected that this concept will give ARVN greater responsibility throughout the 12th DTA and will upgrade the operational capability of the 2d ARVN Division through constant operation with US units and more ready access to Americal combat support and combat service support assets.

The Division Support Command is responsible for the vital Chu Lai base area. This responsibility is handled by the Chu Lai Defense Command (CLDC). CLDC serves to organize and coordinate the defense of Chu Lai by tenant combat support and combat service support units. Tactical units are not committed to the internal security of the base.
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For the past year emphasis has continued to be on maintaining a flexible offensive posture poised to respond to enemy threats anywhere in the TAOI. Because of the large area of responsibility and the limited forces available it has been found necessary on many occasions to conduct an austere economy of force missions while concentrating significant combat power in response to an enemy threat. The ROAD concept lends itself ideally to this tactic. Infantry battalions are frequently shifted from one brigade to another. On occasion companies from one battalion are placed OPCOM to another battalion in a different brigade. This is accomplished with minimum turmoil due to the responsive, flexible organization of the ROAD battalion, DISCOM and Div Arty. By way of example, in the past year the 196th Infantry Brigade has had OPCOM of ten of the eleven infantry battalions in the division at one time or another. A critical adjunct of flexibility of organization, however, is flexibility of mind. Commanders must constantly be on the alert for opportunities to concentrate forces to defeat the enemy regardless of the tactical redispersion necessitated.

The principle enemy targets in this area are the heavily populated provincial capitals of Quang Ngai and Tam Ky. The majority of the significant battles fought in the TAOI have been in response to enemy threats against these two cities. Fortunately, these battles were preemptive operations which engaged the enemy well west of the cities. As a result of these operations the enemy has not been able to deliver anything except standoff attacks by fire against either of these cities. The division cavalry squadron has been used to great advantage during these preemptive operations. Normally occupying a relatively quiet OZ in the northern sector of the TAOI, it can be rapidly assembled and moved to any location on the coastal plain within a few hours.

In addition to these preemptive coastal operations, major emphasis has been placed on operations into the mountainous areas to locate and destroy previously immune enemy units and base areas. Operations such as Pocahontas Forest, Champagne Grove, Fayette Canyon and Vernon Lake II have served to seriously attrit enemy forces in their staging areas and deny their freedom of movement. These operations will be intensified to provide the screen behind which GVN forces can consolidate and expand their control of the strategically important populated coastal areas.

Pacification support has been another major area of interest for the Americal Division. It is axiomatic that the final measure of success will be the degree of pacification brought to the countryside as opposed to enemy body count statistics. Two pacification support operations of note have been Operation Hardin Falls and Russell Beach. Hardin Falls involved one Cavalry troop operating with province forces on a long-term basis to pacify and solidify GVN control in five VC controlled
hamlets during the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. Russell Beach was a large-scale operation involving Americal, ARVN, and USMC forces in clearing a long-held VC stronghold on the Batangan Peninsula. A highlight of this operation was the removal, screening and relocation of some 12,000 detainees. In addition to these major operations, Americal supported pacification by close and continuous coordination with province and district officials on the development and implementation of pacification programs. (See Part V - Pacification)

Americal has achieved a great deal of success in small unit operations. When the enemy breaks down into small units to avoid engagements, we increase the tempo of small unit operations to actively seek him out and destroy him. Squad and platoon-size patrols are conducted extensively. Reaction forces are maintained in readiness to exploit any significant contact. Emphasis is being placed on night small unit operations to tear away the cloak of darkness the enemy has enjoyed. In order to maximize the number of small units operating in the field, normally a battalion is restricted to one Fire Support Base. Only one company is therefore committed to security and the remaining three companies are free for extended combat operations.

As has been mentioned earlier, a concerted effort has been made to extend the division's combat power west into the previously immune remote base areas. One technique that has been used is the displacement of heavy artillery to the west. Previously 8" and 175mm guns were positioned along the coastal plain. Almost 50% of their coverage was lost over the South China Sea. Composite batteries have since been moved into Special Forces Camps located from 20-30 kilometers inland. This has enabled us to increase the depth of our interdiction program while continuing coverage of the coastal and Piedmont regions.

The attachment of the 16th Combat Aviation Group to Americal on 1 December 1968 has had a most favorable impact on the management of aviation assets. Prior to this time, Americal had a standard division aviation battalion and an OPCON Combat Aviation Battalion consisting of three Assault Helicopter Companies and two Assault Support Helicopter Companies. Both of these battalions were attached to HQ, 16th CAG for centralized management. In essence the Americal became a pocket airborne division with over 200 helicopters assigned. This concept has paid dividends in terms of more efficient utilization of aircraft and a higher availability rate as a direct result of a centralized maintenance effort. I believe this concept has considerable merit for application to all non-airborne ROAD Infantry Divisions.

Although the enemy continues to present a significant threat in this area, because of aggressive Americal operations he has been unable to achieve a single military or political objective. His future looks no brighter. As GVN forces continue to grow stronger and to dominate the coastal plain, Americal will turn its attention further to the west, targeted against his staging areas and command and control installations, with the objective of completing his destruction in the Southern I Corps Tactical Zone.
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PART V - PACIFICATION

The GVN Pacification Program is the key to success in Vietnam, and all operations of the American Division have complemented or supported this vital program. An analysis of the pacification situation in the American Division area is best described by using President Thieu's eight objectives for Pacification 1969 as an outline.

1. Security of 90% of the Population

This first objective is the keynote to the success of the entire program. The American Division works on a daily basis with ARVN and provincial forces to aid the GVN in bringing more of their people under GVN control. American liaison teams were placed at each district headquarters to increase the cooperation and exchange of information and improve the friendly reaction time to enemy attacks on population centers. The Province Chief of Quang Ngai feels he has 71% of his population under GVN control at the present time and his plan envisions an additional 23% by the end of 1969. The province advisors at Quang Ngai, using HES report, say that 65% of the population is under GVN control. In Quang Tin the figures are 70% (Province Chief) and 60% (Advisors) and the Province Chief plans to secure 20% more in 1969. In each province a gain of about 10% was made over the past year. With the Accelerated Pacification Program (1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69) and the Pacification Campaign 1969 (1 Feb 69 - 31 Dec 69) spurring them on, increased effort by the province officials to achieve this security objective is very evident.

2. Elimination of the Viet Cong Infrastructure

Closely allied with the security objective is the elimination of the VCI. Quang Ngai Province has 5,510 active VCI and Quang Tin 6,955 at the beginning of 1969. Each province has a goal of eliminating 1,320 by the end of the current year. As of 1 Apr 69, 109 VCI had been eliminated in Quang Ngai and 243 in Quang Tin. The American Division is working closely with the DIOCC's to improve their capability to target and plan operations against the VCI and is conducting combined cordon and search operations with provincial forces to eliminate the threat.

3. Organize More Peoples Self Defense Forces

The Peoples Self Defense Force is growing in numbers as evident from this chart:

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<td>Armed</td>
<td>5,034</td>
<td>6,091</td>
<td>9,034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In spite of the Post-Tet '69 Offensive, some progress was made in this program. However, I do not feel this force has been fully tested and its effectiveness is questionable.

4. Establish Local Government

A major effort has been made by both provinces to establish elected officials at the hamlet and village level. Quang Tin Province will complete all village elections in May, with the exception of the newly established district of Hiap Duc. 135 or 31% of the hamlet elections remain to be held in Quang Tin. In Quang Ngai 38% of the village and 30% of the hamlets have held elections. Province plans are to finish all elections this year. 86% of the registered voters turned out to choose their own government in elections held to date this year in the American area. The new GVN Self Help Program, closely allied with the elections, is in the early stages of being implemented. The new procedures involved are complicated and intensive training programs for village officials are currently being conducted in both provinces. The village officials appear enthusiastic in accepting the new program.

5. Rally more Hoi Chanhs

The Chieu Hoi Program in the American area has been very successful. Since August 1968 over 1,000 Hoi Chanhs have rallied to the American area. The program is picking up momentum, particularly in Quang Tin Province where over 400 have rallied to date in 1969, with the Third Party Inducement Program accounting for approximately 85% of these ralliers. Intensive use of ground broadcast equipment with Kit Carson Scouts, to complement aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops, has proven to be very effective.
6. **Increase Propaganda and Information Efforts**

Psychological operations elements of the division work closely with the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) to aid in spreading the Pro-GVN word to the people. Daily cooperations with the 2d ARVN Division Public Affairs section, the provincial JUSPAO representatives, the VIS, and civic action units have created a unified effort in this important field. Local community relations councils, created to enhance Vietnamese/American relations, also play an important role. The Volunteer Informant Program is an extremely effective tool in saving American lives. During the period June 68 to April 69, 8,795 informants turned in an average of 10,000 munitions and weapons per month, to include a complete 105mm howitzer.

7. **Resettle Refugees**

The refugee problem in the American area is acute. Quang Tin has 76,000 and Quang Ngai has approximately 200,000 refugees. In Quang Tin the province chief is making some progress, having resettled 2,800 into the Hiep Duc District, 1,000 to Tien Phouc District, and 450 to Hau Duc District. He plans to resettle 20,000 in 1969. In Quang Ngai, 12,000 refugees were resettled on the Batangan Cape as a result of Operation Russell Beach. Quang Ngai Province plans indicate 88,000 will be resettled in 1969. Both province chiefs indicate a large majority of the refugees have indicated a desire not to return to their original hamlets. This desire may change once the security situation improves.

8. **Stimulate the Rural Economy**

Neither province is self-sufficient in food production. Prior to 1965 food production exceeded consumption. Province plans call for increased rice production, and opening up of more fishing along the coast. The IR-8 rice variety is catching on in both provinces. Lateral roads to Hiep Duc, Tien Phouc, the Batangan Cape, and Tra Bong were opened with the help of American Division Engineers in 1969. These roads, connecting many of the rural inhabitants to the primary highway, QL-1, will definitely enhance the rural economy. The only major industry in sight is a sugar mill in Quang Ngai City which is scheduled for completion in March 1970. This mill will employ 3,000 Vietnamese and produce 150 tons of sugar a day. As more area is secured under GVN control, the two provinces in the American area can become self-sufficient.

In summary I feel the provinces need more RF and PF units to provide the local security necessary to reopen more of the contested areas. Their present manpower resources are inadequate to provide the necessary protection for an expansion of the usable land. Pacification progress is slow but is evident in both provinces.
PART VI - PERSONNEL

1. Strength

The Americal Division strength is being maintained at the 100% authorized level, peaking to 101%. This status is being maintained through the timely fill of replacement personnel on a one-for-one basis of both normal and unprogrammed losses. The cooperation received from both the AG Officer and Enlisted Replacement Divisions, Headquarters, USARV, has contributed immeasurably to this end.

At present we are experiencing a slight decline in Infantry strength for which reassignments from nondivisional units by USARV appears to be compensating.

We continue to experience a critical shortage of qualified captains and senior lieutenants in the Infantry Battalions, and supervisors (non-commissioned officers in grade E6) throughout the Division. This is both a USARV and Army-wide shortage, and every attempt is being made to fill these important positions from overages at the lower grades. Nevertheless, the shortages are significant in infantry and artillery positions.

2. Standdown Program

It is absolutely essential for rifle companies to be brought in from the field on a periodic basis for refitting, refurbishing, and to offer the troops a period of relaxation. All three brigades have a location in the Chu Lai area to accommodate one rifle company at a time. Rifle companies are brought in for this program every 60 days.

While on standdown the companies generally employ the mornings for such activities as administrative records checks, finance records, inventory of serial numbered items of equipment, especially weapons, a review of immunization records, health records, and dental records checks. Awards ceremonies and other such activities as the commander may direct are also conducted. The afternoons are devoted to relaxation for the troops. During this time they go to the beach, PX, USO, clubs, and visit as they desire. Rules for consumption of beer are generally relaxed and they are allowed to begin drinking before 1700 hours. Cook-outs are held and whenever possible, entertainment is provided, either by visiting USO groups or by commercial entertainment.

This is an important activity, so much so that brigade commanders have been directed to continue with this program regardless of the tempo of tactical operations. The morale, general efficiency, and well-being of the troops more than compensate for the three days out of 60 that they spend on standdown.
3. **FAST Team**

American troops in remote firebases are receiving supply, maintenance, and administrative support from Forward Area Support Teams (FAST). Operated by the Division Support Command, the teams consist of personnel from the post office, post exchange, and personal services branch of AG, in addition to a medical team, maintenance team and supply team.

The teams are flown by helicopter to the LZ’s and remain there for an average visit of six hours. During this period troops at the LZ may buy PX items; have weapons and equipment repaired; DX clothing; have their personal, medical, and finance records reviewed and updated; and purchase money orders.

FAST Teams visit an average of two to three LZ’s per week and are very enthusiastically received. They have done much to keep the morale of American Troops high.

4. **Reenlistment Program**

In October 1968, it was noted that the American Division reenlistment rates were far below the DA objectives (combined average of all enlistments/reenlistments was approximately 36 per month). From the aforementioned it was evident that the reenlistment program in the division needed to be reorganized. Since then the following steps have been taken to improve the reenlistment program within the division:

a. Letters were sent indicating command interest in the reenlistment program.

b. Publication of American Reenlistment Regulation.

c. Placement of primary duty career counselors at the major subordinate commands to assist them in organizing a reenlistment program.

d. Placement of primary duty career counselors at standdown areas for the purpose of interviewing those troops which were in the field.

e. Placement of primary duty career counselor in the American Combat Center for the purpose of orienting those newly arrived personnel on the reenlistment options available to them in Vietnam. Also orientation by means of a class for newly arrived officers and NCO’s.

f. Utilization of all news media available in the division for the purpose of reenlistment publicity.

g. Publication of a Unit Commander’s Reenlistment Guide to give the unit commander an idea of what is required of him in the reenlistment program and for his use as reference.
h. A Reenlistment Awards Program was initiated on 1 January 1969 to recognize the major subordinate command, battalion, and individual company that led in reenlistments percentages for the quarter.

i. A reenlistment newsletter is now published each quarter.

j. Reenlistment inspection by division reenlistment personnel to insure that each unit is following up on their reenlistment program.

Since the implementation of the aforementioned, the Americal Division has one of the best reenlistment programs in Vietnam today. Command support at all levels has insured this and the results can be clearly seen in the statistics from the month of October 1968, with 53 reenlistments for 3.0% increasing to an all time high of last month, April, with 100 reenlistments for 14.9%.

5. Provost Marshal Activities

The Military Police effort in support of the tactical operations of the Americal Division continues with no major problems being encountered. The vehicle accident rate of the Division continues to compare favorably with USARV rates. The highest rate occurs at the Chu Lai Base camp where exposure is also the greatest. More accidents are due to careless practices or misjudgement on the part of the operators. Few accidents are due to maintenance deficiencies of the equipment.

Major discipline, law and order problems are as follows:

a. Narcotics. The proximity of the sources of marijuana to US military forces and the lack of aggressive combative action on the part of local police forces combine to aggravate the narcotics problem. In addition to marijuana, hard narcotics (opium and heroin) have recently started to be introduced into the area. In early March, a strong enforcement program was initiated in the Americal Division by Military Police with cooperation of province level national police. Concurrently, an education program was initiated for commanders. The hard enforcement, combined with strong commander's interest, has resulted in a rapid increase in apprehension of narcotics users. Concurrently, a concentrated effort is being made to locate and identify sources of narcotics. Strong action by the command to reduce exposure of military members to local narcotics sellers has created a drop in drug accessibility.

b. Prostitution. Prostitution is, by itself, a minor problem in the Americal Area of operation and the main threat posed by this activity is the tie-in with pushing of narcotics by prostitutes. A strict off-limits program, and command and control of movement of US Army personnel, have proved effective in combating prostitution.
c. Black Market. Blackmarketing of US goods has never been a problem of any great significance in the Americal AO. Recent controls on commodities allowed to be taken off post by LN's has almost eliminated black market activities in the area. Most black market goods now appearing on the local economy are being brought into the area from Qui Nhon and Da Nang.

Crimes against the person, personal property and government property remain very low in the Division.

6. Surgeon

a. Malaria. Malaria is the greatest disease problem in the Division. In terms of rate the Americal malaria rate varies from 3d to 5th highest in USAFV; the vivax percent is the highest in USAFV. The malaria rate for March 1969 was for the first time lower than that of the corresponding months of the previous year. However, rates are expected to rise in the coming months.

The generally high malaria rate and vivax percent reflect poor malaria tablet discipline and application of personal protective measures. Were these measures strictly enforced, malaria could be well controlled in the division.

Measures to monitor the malaria control program include periodic review of unit malaria tablet rosters, interviews with malaria patients, and the urinary chloroquine test performed by unit surgeons. Periodic aerial insecticide spray missions are utilized to control mosquitos. A command information fact sheet on malaria is currently being published.

b. Water-borne disease. Water-borne disease (e.g., amebic dysentery, hepatitis and various diarrheal conditions) is a moderate problem in the Americal. Units operating in the Antenna Valley are especially susceptible to these conditions, primarily because individuals do not properly treat surface water before drinking. Routine prophylactic gamma globulin is administered to all units operating in Antenna Valley to reduce the incidence of hepatitis infections. A command information fact sheet on proper unit and individual water treatment is in the process of publication.

c. Venereal disease. Venereal disease is not a significant problem in the Division, with rates running one-half to one-third that of USAFV. This is attributable to the policy of maintaining all civilian establishments "off-limits" except for official business.
During my tenure as Division Commander, major logistical changes were accomplished as the Americal Division reorganised under the ROAD concept. With reorganisation came the elimination of three support battalions and the infusion of personnel and equipment into the Division Support Command. Before reorganisation under ROAD, each independent infantry brigade had its own direct support battalion. The brigade, as members of a TO&E infantry division, now receives their combat service support from the Division Support Command. For example, where an infantry brigade formerly supported by its own support battalion, its combat service support is now provided through a forward support element from the S&T Battalion and a forward support company of the direct support maintenance battalion. These elements work closely with forward support activities established by the 1st Log Comd within the brigade area. The conversion to the ROAD concept was accomplished smoothly considering the magnitude of the task which involved the lateral transfer of numerous items of equipment in order to meet the new organisational balances. The lateral transfer of equipment between units and the resulting examination of the equipment with regard to its maintenance status made it possible to realistically assess the effectiveness of the division's maintenance program. Prior to laterally transferring equipment with moving parts, it was necessary to have a complete technical inspection of the equipment performed, to account for missing parts, and to insure that all organizational maintenance had been performed. These inspections brought to light that the maintenance program was only partially successful in some units. With this knowledge division was able to offer suggestions for improvement. In other cases these inspections aided in identifying equipment that was beyond the repair capability of the unit. Tactical operations were simultaneously conducted by the division during the reorganisation. Though problems were encountered, it is well to note that the efficiency of the division was not unduly impaired by the reorganisation.

Sound logistical planning in any organization is an absolute necessity. The vast area the Americal Division occupies dictates careful consideration when planning for logistical support operations. In planning, our objective in the logistics field has been to insure that sufficient supplies, especially class V, ware either on site at the appropriate forward base or were easily within reach of the combat troops. Consequently, prepositioning of supplies well forward is considered essential because the three brigades are so widely separated. Several of the brigades' maneuver battalions can be reached only by air for supply or resupply; therefore, greater dependence must be placed on organic airlift. This challenge has been effectively met; however, should all three brigades be required to conduct major operations simultaneously, the division's airlift could not meet the requirements and outside assets would have to be requested.
In conjunction with ROAD reorganization and USARV directives, extensive direct support unit improvement programs were initiated. Within the division, thus far, over 4.5 million dollars worth of excess material has been identified and over two million dollars worth has been retrograded. The program has been a valuable tool in purging the division supply system at a time when an accurate assessment of stocks and supplies on hand was essential.

Repair required to remove equipment from deadline has on occasion created a problem for the division. This problem area has decreased with the establishment of the 1st Log Comd depot at Da Nang, which now handles Red Ball requisitions more rapidly than under the previous system. Additionally, the Commanders Critical List has contributed to solution of the problem. Another problem area which is becoming critical is the replacement of generator equipment. Smaller generators of the 1.5, 3, 5, and 10KW variety are in short supply within the supply system. Engineer equipment of low density is also in short supply, although the problem is of lesser magnitude than the generator problem.

Although some difficulty was encountered, logistical support of the division was accomplished in a timely manner, and without adverse effect on the mission. Supplies continued to flow, and maintenance and other service type functions continued to be performed without undue interruption.

PART VIII - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. It is my considered opinion that there is a need for an additional 3 or 4 battalion brigade-size force in the operational area of the Americal Division. As mentioned earlier, this division's area extends some 95 miles north and south and 40 to 50 miles east and west. A rough calculation of the troop density (US and ARVN) in the Americal area in comparison with the troop density of XXIV Corps reveals that XXIV Corps troops density is more than twice that of the Americal. Additionally, the enemy facing the Americal as of this writing is considerably more than that facing XXIV Corps. As for the location of this brigade, I would recommend its insertion between the 198th Brigade and the 11th Brigade, with headquarters at the airfield west of Quang Ngai. This would narrow the area of the 11th Brigade and increase the density in the 198th Brigade. Both of these areas have strong hard core VC Elements and additional troop density is required.

B. There is an absolute requirement for additional RF and PF units in the Americal TAOI. It has been my observation that the CIDG companies operating from their Special Forces Camps have been something less than spectacular. There are large areas of their operational zones that are not patrolled and when patrols go out, they are half-hearted efforts. A specific case in point is the action around Tien Phouc in the recent offensive. Not more than 4 kilometers from the
Tien Phouc Special Forces Camps, and well within their normal operational zone, American units encountered a maze of fortified bunkers, trenches, and revetments. It was necessary for me to employ 3 US battalions in the area around Tien Phouc, in order to relieve the pressure on the camp and drive the enemy out. I am convinced that money and spaces can be taken from the CIDG effort and more gainfully employed in additional RF and PF units. This would greatly enhance the security of the pacification program.

Recommendations. It is recommended that a 3 or 4 battalion brigade be added to the American Division. At the present time, this can be most profitably employed in the area around Quang Ngai, between the 198th and 11th Infantry Brigades. Conceivably a changing enemy situation would dictate a different location, but the point is that additional forces are needed.

I further recommend that additional RF and PF units be introduced in both Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. This can be done, in my opinion, as far as money and spaces are concerned, by a comparable reduction in CIDG forces.
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