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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Jan 69 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

1. (C) INTRODUCTION: This Operational Report – Lessons Learned covers the period 1 Nov 68 through 31 Jan 69. During this period, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG (Phase II), conducting operations within III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ) with the Regiment (-) under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. The Regiment conducted operations within its Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI), and elements of the Regiment conducted operations in BINH LONG, GIA DINH, LONG KHAH, BIEN HOA, BINH DUONG, BINH TUY, PHUOC LONG, and HAU NGHIA Provinces.

Elements of the Regiment were OPCON to Capital Military Assistance Command and functioned in direct support of the 18th ARVN Division at different times throughout the reporting period. Troop and platoon size units conducted operations with the 1st Australian Task Force (1st ATF), 18th ARVN Division, 5th ARVN Division, 1st Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, 5th Special Forces Group, and BIEN HOA Tactical Area Command (BIEN HOA TAC).

During portions of the reporting period, elements of the following 1st Infantry Division battalions were OPCON to the 11th ACR: 1-18th Inf Bn, 2-28th Inf Bn, 1-26th Inf Bn, 1-28th Inf Bn, 1-2 Inf, and 2-2 Inf Bn. The 51st Ranger Bn (ARVN) was DS to the Regiment.

Operation TOAN THANG (Phase II) was characterised by cordon and search operations of selected villages, reconnaissance in force missions, and night ambush patrols. The Blackhorse Regiment uncovered and destroyed numerous base camps and caches. The Regimental Headquarters was located at BIEN HOA throughout the quarter.

Significant actions in the campaign were the insertion of the 51st Ranger
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Bn into B-52 strike areas on 27 Nov, the insertion of the Aero Rifle Platoon into a B-52 strike area on 1 Dec, the operations of Troop B and C while OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division in the vicinity of AN LOC from 1 Nov 68 to 23 Dec 68, the Air Cavalry and 2nd Squadron contact on 30 Dec, the capture of a large number of important prisoners of war by the Air Cavalry Troop on 31 Dec, and the seal of TAN BINH by elements of the 2nd Squadron and 3rd Bn, 8th ARVN Inf Regt, from 12 Jan to 18 Jan.

The Blackhorse Regiment was responsible for Blackhorse Base Camp security, ground, rocket, and mortar defense of LONG BINH/BLEN HOA Area, security for Rome Plow missions in the LAM SON, the pacification of the villages of TAN BINH, BINH MY, and BINH CO, opening and securing LTL 16 from TAN UYEN (XT9622) to the SONG BE Bridge (XT925442), and prevention of exfiltration from the CATCHERS MITT toward SAIGON.

2. (C) ORGANIZATION: The basic structure of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment remained the same throughout the reporting period (See INCL I).

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

   a. General: During the reporting period, the 11th ACR operated primarily in central Sub-Region 5 and Military Region 10, VC BA BIEH Province.

   b. Order of Battle: Since 1 Nov 68, enemy forces have not conducted widespread offensive operations in III CTZ. Possibly the most significant activity has been the movement of elements of the 5th VC Div Headquarters from WAR ZONE C into WAR ZONE D. This movement was detected during December and January.

   The remaining VC/NVA divisions have remained in their normal areas of operation: the 9th VC Div along the western border of III CTZ; the 7th NVA Div in MR-10, and the 1st NVA Div in the vicinity of THE FISHHOOK. During December, some movement toward the CMD was detected; Allied pre-emptive operations, however, successfully prevented an offensive.

   As the quarter ends, VC/NVA intentions remain unknown. It is felt, however, that the enemy is hoping for a political victory and, therefore, will not commit his military forces in large scale attacks.

   (1) VC Sub-Region 5: Enemy initiated activity in VC Sub-Region 5 was limited; enemy elements attempted to subsist in traditional base areas and avoid contact. The DONG MAI Regiment deployed one battalion in the AN SON Area, two battalions in the CATCHERS MITT, and one battalion in the area north of CHANH RUO. The headquarters of Sub-Region 5 remained north
of the SONG BE and east of PHUOC VINH. The local force companies of Sub-
Region 5 have been generally inactive.

During November through mid-December, the K1 Bn, DONG NAI Regiment, operated
in the AN SON Area. Around 12 Dec, however, it was replaced by the K2 Bn
and returned to the CATCHERS MITT. Reports from agents and PW's indicate
that the K1 is presently located in the vicinity of XT0146.

The K2 Bn was identified in the CATCHERS MITT on 19 Nov. A PW from the
Bn stated that his unit had moved west from a base camp located at XT95392
on 19 Nov. The mortar attack on BINH MY on 20 Nov served as a screening
action for the movement of the K2. Information obtained from subsequent
PW's in the AN SON Area revealed that the K2 Bn took the following route
out of the CATCHERS MITT: from the SUOI Area (XT9737), west along the SUOI
BONG TRANG (vic XT8336), south to resupply points at XOM NOI (XT8030) and
AN LOI (XT8330), southeast to TAN HIEP (XT8920), and then south to AN SON
(XT8208), BINH NHAM (XT8608), and DONG AN (XT8940). The K2 Bn is now located
in the AN SON Area where it is reportedly working with C63 Local Force
Company.

The K3 Bn, DONG NAI Regiment, remained in the BA DA SECRET ZONE for much of
the period. Documents taken from 16 VC KBA in a B-52 strike on 25 Nov at
XT081326 identified the K3 Bn. With the establishment of FSB MOSBY at the
BA DA Crossroads in mid-December, elements of the K3 Bn relocated to the
western CATCHERS MITT. In an ambush near PHUOC HOA (XT917432) on 8 Jan,
two members of C3, K3 Bn, were captured. The prisoners stated that their
units were located at BAU MY DONG (XT952375). It is possible that the
remainder of the battalion is dispersed throughout the northern CATCHERS
MITT.

Elements of the K4 Bn, DONG NAI Regiment, have been contacted sporadically
during the quarter. The K4 Bn has remained dispersed in company size units
north of CHANH LUU. The unit has restricted their activities to necessary
logistical operations and avoiding detection. It has been determined that
NHA DO (XT8636), PHUOC HOA (XT9233), and AN LOI (XT8330) have been used by
the Bn as primary sources of supply. The K4 Bn was last identified in a
contact with 2/11th ACR at BONG TRANG on 30 Dec. PW's from this encounter
placed the K4 north and west of PHUOC HOA where it remained during Jan 69.

The most significant intelligence gathered from the DONG NAI Regiment resulted
from a 1 Dec contact at XT998385, when the Air Cavalry Troop and elements
of B/1-18th Inf killed 32 NVA from Headquarters elements of the Regiment.
Documents from the encounter revealed that the DONG NAI Regiment intended
to attack BINH CC (XT9189), FSB JACK (XT9933), and DOC BAN TAY (XT9926) on
7 or 8 Dec. This two phase attack was to consist of attacks on friendly positions along Hwy 16 and a second phase assault on SAIGON. The documents also revealed that the support elements of the Regiment would assemble by 6 Dec in the vicinity of NHA NAI (YTQ431). These support elements included engineers, a recoilless rifle company, a mortar company, and a medical element. On 6 Dec, airstrikes and RIF's were conducted in the NHA NAI Area; several small base camps were found and radio equipment was uncovered. It is likely that the compromise of the plan and Allied operations in the NHA NAI Area forced the DONG NAI Regiment to cancel its attacks on Hwy 16.

The local force companies of VC Sub-Region 5 have had limited activity. At the end of the quarter, the disposition and strength of these units are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DISPOSITION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C63 Local Force Co</td>
<td>Northern LAI THIEU District</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C62 Local Force Co</td>
<td>Vic XT8528</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C65 Local Force Co</td>
<td>Vic XT8129</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C301 Local Force Co</td>
<td>Vic PHUOC HOA</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C303 Local Force Co</td>
<td>Central CATCHERS MITT</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout the period, rear service elements conducted logistical activity in the northern and western portion of the CATCHERS MITT. Detachments from the 81st Rear Service Group were contacted in the Binh My Area as they were moving to and from AN LOI with food supplies. Documents uncovered after a B-52 strike on 7 Dec contained hand drawn maps which depicted truck offloading points of the 81st Rear Service Group at YTO946 and YT1247. These areas were later confirmed by visual reconnaissance and LRRP operations. Activity in the northern CATCHERS MITT decreased with the establishment of FSB MOSBY at the BA DA Crossroads in mid-December.

In the western CATCHERS MITT, district rear service units and main force supply details changed their sources of supply from Binh My and Binh Co to AN LOI, NHA DO, and PHUOC HOA. It is also probable that the villagers of THAI HUNG (XT1113) and DAI AN (XT1122) have provided food for VC units in the southeastern portion of the CATCHERS MITT. On 11 Nov, the 51st ARVN Rangers engaged a supply squad from TAN UTEN District Medical Section near DAI AN Village.
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(2) VC BA BIEN Province: The enemy situation in VC BA BIEN Province has shown little change. Mining activity decreased, but attacks on isolated ARVN outposts continued. The 274th VC Regiment moved from the HAT DICH into the BINH SON Rubber Plantation Area and was identified in a contact at YS245995 on 21 Dec.

The DL440 and DL445 Local Force Bns conducted limited operations during the period. They conducted no major attacks and avoided contact by remaining in jungled areas. The DL445 Local Force Bn was identified on 11 Nov in a contact six kilometers west of the MAI TAO Mountain Region (YS649910). The DL440 Local Force Bn was contacted at YS515054 on 5 Jan, and it is felt that the DL440 is presently located in this area and moving supplies out of WAR ZONE D.

(3) MILITARY REGION 10: Elements of the 11th ACR have operated with the 1st Inf Div and 1st Cav Div (AM) in VC MILITARY REGION 10. Elements of the 11th ACR were involved in two significant contacts with the 141st NVA Regiment. On 27 Nov, C/1/11th ACR and B/2/12th Cav killed 58 VC/NVA (BC) in an engagement with the 141st NVA Regiment at XT42157. A company of the 141st NVA Regiment ambushed A/1/11th ACR at XT766796 on 11 Jan. B/2-2 Inf reinforced and the contact resulted in 31 NVA KIA (BC).

Enemy activity in the area has been focused on the protection and maintenance of base areas and infiltration routes. The regiments of the 7th NVA Div have remained in central MR-10 during the period, and conducted convoy ambushes and attacks on isolated fire support bases.

c. Major Engagements:

(1) On 8 Nov, B/1/11th ACR engaged an unknown enemy force in a heavy contact at XT705845. Results: 22 NVA KIA (BC), 30 NVA KIA (POSS), and 2 AK-47's captured. Friendly forces observed approximately 30 bodies being carried from the battlefield.

(2) At 1135 hours on 11 Nov, B/1/11th ACR engaged an unknown size enemy force at XT686666. Support was received from D/1/1st Cav and TAC AIR. The contact yielded 38 VC KIA and the identification of Infiltration Group D-269 which was further identified as an element of the 141st NVA Regiment of the 7th NVA Division.

(3) On 21 Nov at XT967413, the 51st ARVN Rangers supported by the Air Cavalry Troop engaged an unknown size enemy force entrenched in a base camp. The Rangers were engaged with SA/AW, RPG's, 60mm mortars and claymores. Artillery, LPT, and TAC AIR supported. Contact broke
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when the 51st ARVN KHA, and 7 ARVN WHA were extracted. Results: 1 US KHA, 3 ARVN KHA, and 7 ARVN WHA

(4) On 20 Jan at 0132 hours, 1/11th ACR CP received a ground and indirect fire attack by an unknown number of VC. 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds and 14-20 RPG rounds were received from the southwest. The perimeter wire was breached and the Viet Cong entered the perimeter. The attack was repulsed with SA and 50-caliber rounds. Artillery, LFT, and Spooky supported. Contact broke at 0205 hours. Results: 2 US KIA, 13 US WIA, and 1 OH-6A and 2 ACAV's damaged. Numerous blood trails were observed between the CP and BINH NT Village.

(5) On 27 Nov at XT962415, the 51st ARVN Rangers engaged an unknown number of VC/NVA in bunkers. Artillery and LFT supported. Results: 6 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1 SMG, 3 AK-47's, and 2 carbines CIA. Later in the day at XT953405, 5 VC/NVA were engaged by the Rangers. This contact yielded 1 ARVN KIA, 3 VC KIA (BC), and 1 AK-47 captured.

(6) On 27 Nov, C/1/11th ACR and B/2/12th Cav received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of XT942157. As the contact continued, artillery, ARA, and TAC AIR supported. The engagement resulted in 8 US WIA and 58 VC/NVA KIA (BC). Documents taken during the contact identified the 141st NVA Regiment.

(7) On 1 Dec at XT898385, the Aero Rifle Platoon and B/1-18th Inf engaged an estimated NVA company in a bunker complex. Artillery, LFT, TAC AIR, and Spooky supported. Results: 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA, 32 NVA KIA and 2 Chicom radios, 1 field telephone, and 6 AK-47's CIA. Documents captured at this time revealed that the unit contacted was a control element of the DOMI NAI Regiment.

(8) On 1 Dec, an AP from D/1-18th Inf observed movement and engaged an unknown size element with SAW fire. Fire was returned and artillery and LFT supported. A search of the area on 2 Dec revealed that 8 NVA had been killed by artillery and mortar fire.

(9) The 2/11th ACR CP at BANDIT KILL (XT859362) received six rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 2 Dec. The mortars were fired from vic XT8537. The incident resulted in 1 US KIA and 10 US WIA.

(10) On 3 Dec at XT955370, B/1-1 Inf engaged 25-30 NVA with small arms and automatic weapons. The enemy returned fire, and LFT, artillery, and TAC AIR supported. Results: 16 NVA KIA (BC), 9 NVA KIA (POSS), and 1 US KIA.

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11) An AP from H/2/11th ACR observed and engaged 10 NVA on 10 Dec at XT922419. The engagement resulted in 3 NVA KIA (BC) and the capture of 2 AK-47's, 1 RPD LMG, 5,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition and 150 lbs of rice.

12) Enemy artillery hit the 1-18th Inf NDP at XT987260 on 18 Dec. Twelve rounds of 60mm impacted within the perimeter, resulting in 5 US KIA and 8 US WIA.

13) On 11 Jan at XT766796, A/1/11th ACR on convoy escort was ambushed by an estimated VC company. Artillery and ARA supported. As 2/2-2 Inf moved to reinforce, it was ambushed at XT780810. This engagement resulted in 2 US KIA, 14 US WIA, 3 ACAV's destroyed, 5 APC's damaged, and 31 NVA KIA (BC). The enemy contact identified the 141st NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division.

14) From 11 to 17 Jan, 2nd Squadron, 3-8th ARVN Inf, and PHU CLAO District Force conducted a cordon and search of TAR BIHH. This "soft seal" operation produced 102 VC FV's, ralliers or detainees. All persons apprehended were evacuated through GVN channels. Initial interrogation revealed the following results: 30 VC ralliers, 4 VC FV's, 51 ralliers (considered militia personnel), 6 VC suspects, 8 civil defendants, and 3 innocent civilians. Many of the people captured were members of the local infrastructure.

15) On 26 Jan at TS510980, A/1/11th ACR, dispatched as RRF to the MACV MATS Compound which was under attack by two VC companies, received mortar, B-40, and SA/AM fire from inside the village. VC forces withdrew in an unknown direction. Results: 5 civilians KIA, 5 civilians WIA, 6 RF WIA, 3 US WIA, 3 VC KIA (1 KBA and 2 POSS).

16) On 29 Jan at XT830410, 3/2/11th ACR engaged an unknown size VC unit. During the engagement, an ACAV hit a mine (est 15 lbs pressure detonated). The ACAV received moderate damage and there were 2 US WIA. Contact broke immediately and a search of the area was made with negative results.

17) On 30 Jan at XT635385, the Aero Rifle Platoon was inserted into a heavily booby-trapped base camp and engaged an unknown size enemy force. 1/2/28th Inf and Recon/2-28th Inf reinforced. Results: 11 US WIA, 1 NVA PW, and 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

18) On 31 Jan at XT634434, the Aero Rifle Platoon was inserted into an area from which a LCH had received ground fire and engaged an unknown size force. Results: 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 2 VC/NVA KBA (BC), 1 PW, and 1 1x12.7mm AA/MG and 2 lbs of documents.
d. Intelligence Sources:

(1) **Human Sources:** Human sources include PW's, ralliers, and agents. Prisoners and ralliers are used on a daily basis. Interrogation provides information on enemy locations, capabilities, and intentions. If the information is of immediate tactical value, the PW's or ralliers are returned to the field where they are able to point out enemy personnel and positions. Knowledgeable PW's and ralliers have been obtained from other US and ARVN units adjacent to the 11th ACR AO, and, in turn, the 11th ACR has provided PW's and ralliers to MACV, II FFV, and the 1st Inf Div. Ralliers have also been employed in a PSTOPS role and have persuaded other VC into surrendering. Agents have been of little value in 11th ACR operations.

(2) **Captured Documents:** Captured documents have been useful in compiling blacklists and gaining information on enemy morale and intentions. Although tactical exploitation of documents was rare, they have been useful in identifying units contacted during operations.

(3) **Visual Reconnaissance:** Visual reconnaissance missions by the Air Cavalry Troop have provided most of the Regimient's tactical intelligence in jungled portions of the AO. Visual sightings have provided targets for airstrikes, B-52 strikes, artillery, ground operations, and immediate Aero Rifle Platoon insertions and materials for map compilation depicting locations of enemy fortifications and movement patterns. Visual reconnaissance missions have been flown throughout the AO on a daily basis.

(4) **Technical Detectors:** Technical detectors include SLAR, Red Haze, Sniffer, ground sensors, and ground radar. SLAR and Red Haze have been of some value in 11th ACR operations. Artillery has been fired on these readings. Sniffer missions have provided us with marginally exploitable information.

Ground sensors have been employed along major trails and infiltration routes. During the period, artillery has been placed on areas of heavy sensor readings. Ground radar has been used with limited success; it has little function in the 11th ACR intelligence collection effort.

(5) **Aerial Photography:** Aerial photography has been employed daily in locating targets for ground operations and B-52 strikes. Photographs have been used also to determine suitable landing zones for combat assaults.

e. **Enemy Losses Credited to the 11th ACR during the Reporting Period:**
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11th ACR

11th ACR to other Units

| VC/NVA KIA (BC) | 135 | 215 |
| VC/NVA KIA (FOSS) | 25 | 33 |
| VC/NVA PW's | 51* | 20* |
| HOI CH'NH | 89* | 0* |
| Detainees | 102* | 59* |
| Individual Weapons | 99 | 33 |
| Crew Served Weapons | 10 | 13 |
| Mines | 55 | 1 |
| Structures | 42 | 6 |
| Fortifications | 1,963 | 215 |
| Documents (lbs) | 197 | 0 |
| Grain (Tons) | 19 | 2.25 |

4. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analysis and Evaluation:

(1) The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment applied heavy pressure on the enemy during the reporting period. The Regiment conducted reconnaissance in force and cordon and search operations and night ambush patrols which uncovered base camps, numerous supply caches of ammunition and weapons, and resulted in a large number of enemy KIA's and PW's. Combat elements of the Regiment operated in conjunction with the 1st Australian Task Force, 5th ARVN Div, 18th ARVN Div, 1st Inf Div, 1st Cav Div (AM), 2nd Bde, 82nd Abn

*Totals include 30 VC ralliers, 4 VC PW's, 51 ralliers (considered militia personnel), 6 VC suspects, 8 civil defendants, and 3 innocent civilians evacuated through GVN channels.
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Div, and 5th Special Forces Group. Troop size elements were OPCON to BIEN HOA TAC for RRF missions.

(2) The enemy has avoided large contacts with the Regiment in the Blackhorse TAOR and AO. Enemy contact was characterized by light encounters of small VC/NVA forces. The enemy has continued to use mines and harassing mortar fire. Due to his heavy personnel losses, the enemy is actively trying to rebuild his forces.

b. Area of Operations: Operations this quarter were conducted within the III CTZ and covered five provinces (LONG KHANH, BINH TUY, PHUOC LONG, BINH DUONG, and BIEN HOA).

c. Operations: Operation TAN THANG (Phase II) began this reporting period with Regimental HQ located at BIEN HOA (YT024147). 1st Squadron (-) was OPCON CMAC to provide RRF via TAN SON NHUT (XT581897). A/1/11th ACR (-) with a platoon of D/1/11th ACR OPCON was OPCON to the Regiment to provide RRF for LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Complex (YT028147). One platoon of A/1/11th ACR was OPCON 3/11th ACR. B/1/11th ACR was OPCON 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, to conduct RIF operations via LOC NIINH (XY772119).

2/11th ACR (-) continued to secure Blackhorse Base Camp (XY40960) and provide RRF for the Blackhorse TAOR DS to 18th ARVN Div. Troops F and G were DS LONG KHANH Province Force on rice denial operations via VO DAT (YT502008).

3/11th ACR conducted RIF and NAP operations in the LAM SON. B/2/16th Inf was OPCON to 3/11th ACR. 1-28th Inf was OPCON Regiment, conducting RIF and NAP operations in LAM SON. 2-2 Inf (-) was OPCON Regiment, conducting RIF and NAP operations and securing Rome Plow's in the LAM SON. The 51st ARVN Ranger Bn was DS, conducting RIF and NAP north and east of BIEN HOA.

On 2 Nov, Troops F and G were released from DS LONG KHANH Province to 2nd Squadron. On 3 Nov, C/2/11th ACR began rice denial operations via VO DAT. On 8 Nov, A/1-28th Inf was placed OPCON 3rd Squadron. I/3/11th ACR was placed OPCON 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div, on 9 Nov. 1st Platoon, A/1/11th ACR was released from OPCON 3rd Squadron, and 1st Platoon, D/1-28th Inf, was placed OPCON 3rd Squadron.

On 10 Nov, I/3/11th ACR was released from OPCON 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, to 3rd Squadron, and C/1-28th Inf was placed OPCON 3rd Squadron. On 11 Nov, the 1st Platoon, D/1/11th ACR, was released from OPCON A/1/11th ACR to OPCON C/1/11th ACR. A/1/11th ACR was released from OPCON Regiment to 1st Squadron, and C/1/11th ACR was placed OPCON Regiment to assume the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA RRF mission.
On 12 Nov, B/1/11th ACR was released from OPCON 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div (AM), to OPCON 3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM). B/2/11th ACR and F/2/11th ACR were placed DS 1st ATF; 1st Platoon, D/1/11th ACR, was released from OPCON, C/1/11th ACR also was placed OPCON L/3/11th ACR, and 1st Platoon, L/3/11th ACR, was placed OPCON 3rd Squadron, and L/3/11th ACR(-) was placed OPCON to the Regiment to assume the LONG BINH/BTEN HOA RRF mission.

On 13 Nov, G/2/11th ACR was released from OPCON Regiment to OPCON 3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM). 1st Platoon, C/1/11th ACR, was released from OPCON 3rd Squadron to C/1/11th ACR. A/1-28th Inf was released from OPCON 3rd Squadron to 1-28th Inf. On 14 Nov, B/1-28th Inf was placed DS 51st ARVN Ranger Bn.

On 15 Nov, B/1/11th ACR was released from OPCON 3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), to OPCON Regiment for a standdown in LAI KHE (XT7334). 2nd Platoon, D/1/11th ACR, was placed OPCON CMAC. 1st Squadron(-) was released from OPCON CMAC to Regiment for employment in the LAM SON. C/1-28th Inf was released from OPCON 3rd Squadron to 1-28th Inf, and A/1-28th Inf was placed OPCON 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div.

On 16 Nov, B/2-16th Inf was placed OPCON 1st Squadron. 1st Platoon, H/3/11th ACR, was placed OPCON B/1/11th ACR; H/11th ACR(-) and How Btry, 3rd Squadron, were placed OPCON 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div. C/1-28th Inf was placed OPCON 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, and B/1-28th Inf was released from DS 51st ARVN Ranger Bn.

On 17 Nov, 1st Platoon, B/1/11th ACR, was placed OPCON 1st Squadron and B/1/11th ACR(-) was placed OPCON 3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM). C/2/11th ACR returned to Blackhorse Base Camp. B/1-18th Inf was placed OPCON 3rd Squadron; 1st Co, 51st ARVN Ranger Bn was placed DS 1-28th Inf; and H/3/11th ACR(-) and How Btry, 3rd Squadron, were released from OPCON 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div, to 3rd Squadron.

On 18 Nov, L/3/11th ACR(-) was released from OPCON Regiment to 3rd Squadron; 1st Platoon, D/1/11th ACR, was released from OPCON L/3/11th ACR to D/4/11th ACR. 1-18th Inf was released from OPCON Regiment to 1st Inf Div, while 1-18th Inf(-) was placed OPCON Regiment, relieving 1-28th Inf in place, and 1st Co, 51st ARVN Ranger Bn, was released from DS 1-28th Inf.

On 20 Nov, K/3/11th ACR was placed OPCON 1st Squadron. On 21 Nov, B/1-18th Inf was released from OPCON 3rd Squadron to 1-18th Inf. On 22 Nov, 2-2 Inf (H)(- was released from OPCON Regiment to 1st Inf Div. On 26 Nov, the 266th Chemical Platoon was placed OPCON 1st Squadron, and B/2/11th ACR and
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F/2/11th ACR were released from DS 1st ATF and returned to Blackhorse Base Camp. On 29 Nov, G/2/11th ACR was placed OPCON 3rd Squadron, and H/2/11th ACR move to BIEN HOA.

On 30 Nov, K/3/11th ACR was released from OPCON 1st Squadron, and F/2/11th ACR was placed OPCON 1st Squadron. 1st Platoon, D/1-18th Inf was released from OPCON 1st Squadron and D/1-28th Inf was released from OPCON 3rd Squadron to OPCON 2nd Squadron. M/3/11th ACR(-) was placed OPCON 2nd Squadron; 2nd Squadron moved to LAM SON to conduct RIF and NAP operations. 3rd Squadron(-) moved to Blackhorse Base Camp to provide security for Base Camp and RRF for the Blackhorse TAOR. G/2/11th ACR was released OPCON 3rd Squadron to 2nd Squadron. On 1 Dec, B/1-28th Inf was placed OPCON to 1/11th ACR, and 266th Chemical Platoon was released from OPCON 1st Squadron. On 2 Dec, B/1-28th Inf was released from OPCON 1st Squadron and returned to 1st Inf Div.

On 3 Dec, K/3/11th ACR and L/3/11th ACR were placed DS to 1st ATF south of Blackhorse Base Camp. On 6 Dec, 1-2 Inf(-) was placed OPCON to Regiment for employment in the CATCHERS MITT; 1st Platoon, M/3/11th ACR was released OPCON B/1/11th ACR to Regimental control. 1st Platoon, H/2/11th ACR was placed OPCON B/1/11th ACR; H/3/11th ACR(-) was released OPCON 2nd Squadron to OPCON 1st Squadron. 1st Platoon, Co 2, 51st ARVN Ranger Bn, was placed DS 1st Squadron, and 1st Platoon, D/1-18th Inf, was released from OPCON 1st Squadron. On 7 Dec, 1st Platoon, 51st ARVN Ranger Bn, was released from OPCON 1st Squadron to OPCON to Regimental control to 3rd Squadron. On 9 Dec, B/1/11th ACR and the Recon Platoon, 1st Platoon, 1-18th Inf, were placed OPCON 1-2 Inf.

From 10-11 Dec, E/1/11th ACR was placed OPCON 1-28th Inf for employment near PHUOC VINH. On 11 Dec, B/1/11th ACR and Recon Platoon, 1-18th Inf, were released from OPCON Regiment to the 1st Inf Div. On 12 Dec, M/3/11th ACR(-) was released from OPCON 1st Squadron to OPCON Regiment for employment in the BIEN HOA Area. On 16 Dec, 1st Platoon, H/2/11th ACR, was released OPCON B/1/11th ACR to OPCON A/1/11th ACR. B/1/11th ACR(-) was released OPCON 1st Cav Div (AM) to 1st Squadron. A/1/11th ACR(-) was placed OPCON 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, for employment in the vicinity of AN LOC and 1st Platoon, A/1/11th ACR was placed OPCON 1st Squadron. 1st Platoon, Co 2, 51st ARVN Ranger Bn was released from OPCON 1st Squadron to the 51st ARVN Ranger Bn.

On 18 Dec, A/2-2 Inf (M) was placed OPCON 2nd Squadron. M/3/11th ACR returned to 3rd Squadron for operations at Blackhorse Base Camp. One platoon of F/2/11th ACR was placed OPCON to 1-18th Inf. L/3/11th ACR was released from DS to 2nd Squadron and the 51st ARVN Rangers were released from DS.
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RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Regiment. F/2/11th ACR(-) remained OPCON to 1st Squadron.

On 19 Dec, a platoon of K/3/11th ACR was released from DS 1st ATF and placed OPCON 5th SPG; C/1-18th Inf was released from OPCON 1st Squadron to 1-18th Inf; and C/1-26th Inf was placed OPCON 1st Squadron. On 20 Dec, F/3/11th ACR(-) was released from DS 1st ATF to 3rd Squadron. On 22 Dec, 1st Platoon, A/1-18th Inf was placed OPCON 1st Squadron, and A/1/11th ACR(-) was released from OPCON 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, to OPCON 1st Cav Div (AM).

On 23 Dec, A/2-2 Inf (M)(-) was released from OPCON 2nd Squadron and one platoon of A/2-2 Inf (M) was placed OPCON to 2nd Squadron. L/3/11th ACR was released from OPCON BIEN HOA TAG to 3rd Squadron, and C/1/11th ACR was released from OPCON 1st Cav Div (AM) to OPCON BIEN HOA TAG. From 24-25 Dec, 2nd Co, 51st ARVN Ranger Bn was placed DS to 2nd Squadron, and one platoon of E/2/11th ACR was placed DS 51st ARVN Ranger Bn. On 30 Dec, the platoon of K/3/11th ACR OPCON to 5th SPG was released to 3rd Squadron.

On 31 Dec, H/3/11th ACR(-), one platoon of E/2/11th ACR, and one platoon of G/2/11th ACR were placed OPCON 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div. On 1 Jan 69, 1st Platoon, D/1-18th Inf, was released OPCON 1st Squadron to 1-18th Inf. On 2 Jan, the platoon of F/2/11th ACR OPCON to 1-18th Inf was released to F/2/11th ACR, and the platoon of E/2/11th ACR OPCON to 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, was released to E/2/11th ACR. On 6 Jan, the platoon of A/2-2 Inf (M) OPCON to 2nd Squadron was returned to 2-2 Inf (M); and H/3/11th ACR(-) and the platoon of C/2/11th ACR were returned to 2nd Squadron from OPCON 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div.

On 10 Jan, a platoon of C/1-26th Inf was placed OPCON to 2nd Squadron; F/2/11th ACR was released from OPCON 1st Squadron to 2nd Squadron; and C/1/11th ACR was released from OPCON BIEN HOA TAG. On 11 Jan, B/1/11th ACR(-) was placed OPCON 1st Inf Div; the platoon of C/1-26th Inf OPCON 2nd Squadron was released to C/1-26th Inf. 1st Platoon, F/2/11th ACR, was placed OPCON 1st Squadron, How Btry, 1st Squadron, and 3rd Platoon, A/1/11th ACR, were placed OPCON 3rd Squadron at Blackhorse Base Camp. One platoon of M/3/11th ACR was placed OPCON I/3/11th ACR; I/3/11th ACR was placed OPCON 1st Cav Div (A:) for employment via DONG XUAI. B/2-28th Inf was placed OPCON 1-18th Inf.

On 12 Jan, one platoon of K/3/11th ACR was placed OPCON How Btry, 1st Squadron. 3rd Squadron was placed OPCON Regiment and B/1/11th ACR was returned to 1st Squadron. 1st Platoon, F/2/11th ACR, was returned to F/2/11th ACR, and L/3/11th ACR was placed OPCON 1st Inf Div for security of FSB THUNDER I (XT789433).
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-ME

10 February 1969

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RCS CSFOR-65 (H1)

From 13-14 Jan, one platoon, D/1/11th ACR, was placed OPCON 1st Cav Div (AM). On 14 Jan, A/1-28th Inf was placed OPCON 2nd Squadron, and G/2/11th ACR was placed OPCON 1st Inf Div for employment at FSB REMAGEN (TTO05565). The 168 LCC was released from OPCON 2nd Squadron to 1st Inf Div. 1-18th Inf was released from OPCON Regiment to 1st Inf Div, and 2-28th Inf (-) was placed OPCON Regiment with B/2-28th and D/2-28th Inf assigned and D/1-18th(-) and B/1-18th Inf OPCON. On 15 Jan, K/3/11th ACR and a platoon of F/2/11th ACR were placed OPCON 1st Squadron. In addition, a platoon of B/1/11th ACR and a platoon of C/1/11th ACR were placed OPCON 3rd Squadron.

On 16 Jan, 1st Squadron(-) moved to Blackhorse Base Camp to take up security and RRF missions DS 18th ARVN Div; 3rd Squadron moved to the LAM SON to conduct RIF and NAP operations. C/1-26th Inf, one platoon of D/1-18th Inf, K/3/11th ACR, B/1-11th ACR(-), and D/1/11th ACR(-) were released OPCON 1st Squadron to 3rd Squadron. One platoon of A/1/11th ACR, C/1/11th ACR, and How Btry, 1st Squadron, were released from OPCON 3rd Squadron to OPCON 1st Squadron. One platoon of F/2/11th ACR was released from OPCON 1st Squadron to OPCON 2nd Squadron.

On 17 Jan, A/2-28th Inf was placed OPCON 2-28th Inf. B/1-18th Inf was released from OPCON 2-28th Inf. One platoon of A/2-28th Inf was placed OPCON 3rd Squadron, and one platoon of D/1-18th Inf was released from OPCON 3rd Squadron to D/1-18th Inf.

On 18 Jan, one platoon of F/2/11th ACR and one platoon of H/3/11th ACR were released from DS 3rd Bn, 8th ARVN Inf, and 3rd Bn, 8th ARVN Inf, was released from DS 2nd Squadron. On 19 Jan, 4th Bn, 8th Inf (ARVN) was placed DS to Regiment for employment in the LAM SON.

On 20 Jan, B/1/11th ACR(-) was released from OPCON 3rd Squadron to 1st Squadron; D/1-28th Inf was released OPCON 2nd Squadron to 1st Inf Div; and, C/1-2 Inf was placed OPCON 2nd Squadron. 1/3/11th ACR was released from OPCON 1st Cav Div (AM) to 3rd Squadron, and L/3/11th ACR was released from OPCON 1st Inf Div to DS 8th Inf Regt, 5th ARVN Div.

On 21 Jan, D/1/11th ACR(-) was placed OPCON C/1-26th Inf. On 22 Jan, one platoon of F/2/11th ACR and one platoon of H/3/11th ACR were placed DS 4-8 Inf (ARVN). On 23 Jan, A/1/11th ACR was released from OPCON 1st Cav Div (AM) to 1st Squadron. On 24 Jan, D/1/11th ACR was released from OPCON 3rd Squadron to 1st Squadron. Throughout the reporting period, one platoon of the 919th Engr Co was attached to each Squadron.

f. Training:
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(1) Replacement training throughout the quarter prepared new replacements to assume their duties as cavalry troopers. The training school's five day cycle was revised and increased during the quarter to a six day cycle. Monthly attendance during the quarter was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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(2) The pilot training program for Kit Carson Scouts continued during the quarter to familiarize selected NOI CHANN with weapons, equipment, and tactics used by the 11th ACR. The principal objective of the training is to enhance their value and engender a strong sense of belonging to the Regiment. Upon completion of the three day course, students were assigned to units for duty.

(3) Specialized Training:

(a) Recondo School: Two members of the Regiment attended the MACV Recondo School during the quarter.

(b) NCO Academy: The 9th Infantry Division NCO Academy was available during the first part of the quarter to selected NCO's and potential NCO's of the Regiment. During the quarter, four Blackhorse Troopers attended the academy.

(c) Jungle Environment Survival Training School: A three day survival course is conducted at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands, for aviation personnel. During the quarter, one aviator from the Regiment attended the course.

(d) Jungle Survival School: A four and one-half day course is conducted at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands. Three aviators from the Regiment attended this course.

(e) Aircraft Maintenance: The Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS), 765th Transportation Group, VUNG TAU, trained 10 mechanics from the Regiment and attached units during the quarter.

(f) Signal Maintenance: AN/GRC-106 Maintenance Courses were...
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CONDUCTED BY THE 1ST SIGNAL BRIGADE, LONG BINH. ONE INDIVIDUAL FROM THE REGIMENT ATTENDED.

(g) AN/GRC-163 NET: An AN/GRC-163 New Equipment Training School at the US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade, LONG BINH, trained four personnel of the Regiment during the quarter.

(h) Audio-Visual Courses: Five personnel from the Regiment attended the Audio Visual Training School at the US Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade, LONG BINH.

(i) AN/PPS-5 Radar School: The AN/PPS-5 Operator and Organizational Maintenance Course, US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade, LONG BINH, trained nine personnel from the Regiment.

(j) G-2 Air: One man from the Regiment attended the G-2 Air Orientation Course which provides G-2/S-2 air personnel with an orientation on mechanics and procedures of aerial reconnaissance in Vietnam. The school is conducted by the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS).

(k) MACCORDS Advisory Orientation Course: The MACCORDS Advisory Orientation Course, SAIGON, is directed to G-5/S-5 personnel who are involved in civil affairs work. One individual from the Regiment attended this course.

(l) SSB Radio Operator's Course: An AN/GRC-106 SSB Radio Operator's Course is conducted at the US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade, LONG BINH. Ten radio operators from the Regiment attended the school.

5. (C) COMBAT SUPPORT:

a. Army Aviation:

(1) Organization and Employment:

(a) Aviation Platoon, HHT/11th ACR:

1 Organization: The platoon consists of a command and control section with two OH-6A and two UH-1D aircraft, and a transport section with four UH-1D and two UH-1C aircraft.

2 Employment: The platoon operates from a location near the Regimental CP and performs command and control, liaison, resupply, and limited troop transport for the Regimental Headquarters and subordinate organic and OPCON units of the Regiment.
(b) Squadron Aviation Sections:

1. Organization: Each of the three Squadrons has an organic aviation section consisting of two OH-6A aircraft and two UH-1C aircraft.

2. Employment: The aviation section operates from a location near the Squadron CP and performs command and control, liaison, observation, and reconnaissance, limited troop transport, resupply, and emergency evacuation missions for the Squadron.

(c) Air Cavalry Troop:

1. Organization: The Troop consists of a Troop Headquarters with two UH-1C aircraft, an Aero-Scout Platoon with nine OH-6A aircraft, and Aero Rifle Platoon with five UH-1D aircraft, and an Anti-Tank/Rocket Platoon with nine AG-1G aircraft.

2. The Troop operates from a forward base area in or near the Regimental AO. It performs combat operations in an assigned AO or near the Regimental AO and operations in support of the subordinate, organic or OPCON units of the Regiment.

When operating in an assigned AO, the Troop uses the "PILE ON" concept. First, the Aero Scouts perform visual reconnaissance. When a target is located, the Aero Rifle Platoon and anti-tank/rocket elements are employed. A ready reaction force (RRF) of one rifle platoon drawn from one of the OPCON infantry battalions is available for immediate commitment. This force "piles on" while direction and control are transferred to the Regimental level until necessary forces are built up to accomplish the mission.

When the Air Cavalry Troop supports a Squadron or OPCON unit, it is given mission-type orders. This allows the Troop Commander flexibility in selecting the size and type elements of his unit required to accomplish the mission.

The Air Cavalry Troop is employed throughout the Regimental AO on missions developed through close coordination between the S-2, S-3, and the Troop Commander. The Troop is the primary intelligence gathering element of the S-2, employing aerial visual reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, sensor (Sniffer) missions, night observation devices, and firefly missions. It is an ideal force for immediate follow-up in bomb damage assessment (BDA). Employment of the Troop is based on intelligence or enemy contact; it can be employed to fight and destroy enemy forces as well as to develop the situation or gather intelligence information.
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RCS GSFOR-65 (R1)

(2) Training:

(a) Aviator Training: Command emphasis has been placed on orientation checkouts for newly assigned aviators and quarterly proficiency checks. In addition, an intensive transition program is being conducted to cross-train aviators in the OH-6A. This cross-training will provide greater flexibility in assigning aviators within the Aero Scout Platoon.

(b) Mechanic and Crewchief Training: On the job training was conducted by the direct support unit (398th Transportation Detachment) to qualify crewchiefs and improve mechanics' proficiency. Mechanics were sent to formal component courses at VUNG Tau as school quotas were made available.

(c) Inspections: All aviation elements of the Regiment, including the direct support units, successfully completed the USARV Aviation CMMI with satisfactory ratings in all areas.

(3) Construction: Construction of a maintenance hangar is still in progress at Blackhorse Base Camp. Anticipated completion date is 1 Mar 69. Concrete pad construction at the refueling point has been completed and the point is fully operational.

Since most of the aircraft operate out of BIEN HOA to support the Regiment, extensive work has been accomplished to facilitate operations in the area. The landing area has been graded and paved and revetments built; an airfield tower is also in operation to control traffic.

b. Chemical:

(1) General: The Chemical Section provided defoliation, personnel detection, RCA, and chemical staff support to the Regiment during the reporting period.

(2) Personnel Detection: During the reporting period, "Sniffer" missions provided area surveillance and, combined with other intelligence gathering media, targeted B-52 strikes. All results were forwarded through S-2 channels for analysis and target planning. "Hot spots" were sometimes engaged immediately with gunship and artillery fire. The XM-2 personnel detector, installed in an OH-6A, was used for all missions. 31 "Sniffer" missions were flown in support of 11th ACR, 1st Inf Div, and II PAVN operations.
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(3) Defoliation Operations:

(a) Thirty hectares of the base camp perimeter were defoliated with the M9 PDDA and/or hand sprayer. Ground based defoliation operations were severely hampered because of M9 PDDA maintenance problems.

(b) 82 RANCH HAND (USAF) defoliation sorties were flown in support of Regimental operations in the CATCHERS MITT.

(4) RCA Operations:

(a) 14 non-persistent CS drops were conducted by the Air Cavalry Troop. The E-158 cluster was used for all drops with 97 E-158's expended. CS, followed immediately by gunship, artillery, and/or air strikes, has been effectively used in conjunction with Air Cavalry "PILE ON" operations.

(b) Recent air strikes using CBU-19's on A-37 high performance aircraft have been programmed on B-52 targets prior to the B-52 TOT. Insufficient data is available at this time to confirm the effectiveness of this employment.

(c) Bulk OS in "JEEPO" containers continues to be used for tunnel and bunker contamination.

(d) Personnel in the aviation sections at Squadron level have been trained in the employment of the E-158 cluster. CS drops have been conducted in support of Squadron operations using organic personnel and aircraft at the Squadron level.

(e) C&C ships and the Air Cavalry Troop Scouts continue their heavy and effective use of CS grenades to flush the enemy out of suspected hiding places. In an action on 30 Dec, the Regimental Sergeant Major captured one armed VC after dropping 8 CS grenades on him from the Regimental C&C aircraft. Information gained from this PW and subsequent PW's led to the eventual capture of 12 PW's and 13 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

(5) Flame:

(a) During the reporting period, the M132 "ZIPPO" has been used with increasing effectiveness. In a close combat support mission of 30 Dec, mechanized flame throwers were extremely effective in suppressing enemy fire and accounted for at least one confirmed enemy body count.
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RCS CSFQR-65 (R1)

(b) Dropping sling loaded 55-gallon drums from UH-1D aircraft has added greater chemical capability to the Air Cavalry Troop. Ignition is accomplished by firing tracer ammunition into the target area. This capability is sometimes more responsive than TAC napalm strikes. Rigid drums are prestocked at NDP's for immediate employment.

(6) Inspections: During this reporting period, the Chemical Staff NCO functioned as a member of the Regimental AGI team, inspecting protective masks and defensive procedures. Approximately 60% of the protective masks in the Regiment were inspected.

c. Engineer:

(1) Introduction: During the reporting period, elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) participated in Operation TCAN THANG (Phase II), while providing direct combat engineer support to elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(2) Operations:

(a) 1st Platoon: 1st Platoon provided direct support for the 1st Squadron. At the beginning of the reporting period, the 1st Platoon was located at TAN SON NHUT Air Base with elements of the 1st Squadron providing general area security. While at TAN SON NHUT, 1st Platoon constructed a mine barrier around the bridge at XT713072 and conducted RIF's in conjunction with elements of the 1st Squadron. On 13-14 Nov while on a RIF mission with A Troop, 1st Platoon destroyed an enemy platoon size bunker and tunnel complex at XT713096 and a large tunnel complex vic XT6910.

On 15 Fv, 1st Platoon moved to FSB HOLIDAY INN with elements of the 1st Squadron. While at HOLIDAY INN, it cleared LTL 16 from TAN UYEN to HOLIDAY INN and from HOLIDAY INN to CLAYMORE CORNERS. During the month-long mission, 900 kilometers of roadway were swept for convoys to PHUOC VINH.

1st Platoon also constructed three observation towers at BINH CO and, with a dozer from Company Headquarters, constructed a berm around the village for local defense. Other projects included a hooch for the village chief of BINH CO and roads around the perimeters of both HOLIDAY INN and BINH CO.

On 16 Jan, 1st Platoon moved back to Blackhorse Base Camp and assumed minesweeping responsibility along LTL 2 from Base Camp to the junction of Routes #1 and #2 with negative results.
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(b) 2nd Platoon: 2nd Platoon provided direct support for the 3rd Squadron. On 16 Nov, it moved from FSB HOLIDAY INN to FSB JIM, where it continued providing general area security. On 26 Nov, 2nd Platoon uncovered and destroyed a base camp at XT999407, consisting of 16 bunkers. The GEV attached to the platoon also cleared fields of fire at the SONG BE Bridge and built up FSB’s MOOSBY, HAWK, and JIM.

On 1 Dec, 2nd Platoon moved to Blackhorse Base Camp assuming the responsibility for sweeping Route #2 from Blackhorse to the junction of Routes #1 and #2. While at Base Camp, they constructed a chapel for the 3rd Squadron and a fire direction control bunker for How Battery, 3rd Squadron. 2nd Platoon also built a bunker on and a road leading to BANANA HILL.

Since 15 Jan, 2nd Platoon has been at FSB HOLIDAY INN to assume minesweeping responsibility for Route LTL 16 from TAN UT2N to HOLIDAY INN and from HOLIDAY INN to CLAYMORE CORNERS. With the help of a D7E Dozer and Grader from Company Headquarters, 2nd Platoon is constructing rice paddies at BINH CO by leveling and terracing the area around the local river.

(c) 3rd Platoon: 3rd Platoon provided direct support for 2nd Squadron. From 1 Nov to 1 Dec, 3rd Platoon resumed minesweeping missions at Blackhorse Base Camp. 3rd Platoon also constructed an Adams hut for the Red Cross girls and nurses of the 7th Surgical Hospital and a 20’ x 60’ conference room for 2nd Squadron Headquarters.

On 1 Dec, 3rd Platoon moved to FSB JIM (XY880397) where they constructed a 25’ observation tower and installed 6,000’ of triple standard concertina around the perimeter of FSB JIM. 3rd Platoon also assumed minesweeping responsibility for LTL 16 from one kilometer south of CLAYMORE CORNERS to one kilometer south of the SONG BE Bridge at PHUOC BINH.

(d) 4th Platoon: 4th Platoon provided direct support for the 11th ACR. They are newly authorized under the 919th Engineer Company’s present TOE, MTOE 5-127G, and has only been fully operational for thirty days. During this period of time, 4th Platoon has constructed two troop billets for their personnel and are presently constructing maintenance pads for 1st Squadron in conjunction with elements of Company C, 169th Engineer BN.

(3) Regional Force/Popular Force Upgrading and ARVN Training: The 919th Engineers continued RF/FF upgrading by releasing 300 sheets of
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RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

MBM matting for bunker construction, 1,200 sandbags, 3,050 BF of 6"x6" lumber for timber trestle bridging, and 476 rolls of concertina with 1,000 steel "U" pickets for barrier materials. The company has also sent a D7E dozer to SUI CAT to upgrade a regional outpost there.

d. Artillery:

(1) During the quarter, 11th ACR howitzer batteries at FSB's JIM and LUKE's CASTLE supported aggressive pacification and interdiction of VC infiltration routes in the LAM SON and RIF's, AP's, and NAP's in the CATCHERS MITT. The remaining battery at Blackhorse Base Camp continued support of 18th ARVN Division operations.

(2) The following 1st Infantry Division units provided additional artillery support in the Blackhorse AO: B/1-7th Arty (105mm); B/2-33rd Arty (105mm); C/2-33rd Arty (105mm); F/8-6th Arty (4.2in). General support was provided by A/7-8th Arty (8in), C/7-8th Arty (8in), A/2-35 Arty (155mm), C/2-35 Arty (155mm), and C/7-9th Arty (105mm).

Tactical operational control of artillery in AO MUSTANG came under one roof when 8-6th Arty operations displaced to FSB HOLIDAY INN on 14 Dec. The 7-8th Arty Fire Support Coordination Center was also released from their support role to support BIEN HOA TAC. 8-6th Arty continued to provide a liaison team to the 11th ACR.

(3) Types of Missions Fired:

(a) Defensive concentrations
(b) Registrations
(c) Targets of opportunity (to include contact)
(d) Preparations
(e) Counter-mortar
(f) Harassing and interdicting fires
(g) Illumination
(h) Navigational (marking) rounds
(i) Intelligence targets
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(j) ARVN support

(k) Special preplanned fires

Artillery continued timely support of all operations. Counter-mortar fire effectiveness increased considerably with constant testing and training of gun sections; in a counter mortar test at BIEN HOA, 3rd How Btry reacted in a record time of 29 seconds.

The effective use of medium artillery in base camp areas has preempted enemy fires on every occasion. Aerial observers continued to be readily available to provide effective observation.

(5) New Techniques: The use of an entire battery rather than a platoon to fire intelligence targets at night has proved effective where the S-2 has a priority type target. The employment of six guns to fire on electronic sensors resulted in the first confirmed kill on this type target in Vietnam.

The Regiment continued its policy of firing priority intelligence targets with "breakfast" and "supper" interdiction fires (0500 to 0800 and 1700 to 2000 hours). These time on target type missions were also fired with an entire battery.

(6) Total Expenditures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed Targets</td>
<td>2,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired Targets</td>
<td>7,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Battery</td>
<td>1,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>2,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>12,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>5,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Support</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>31,402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. (C) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:

   a. General: The 29th General Support Group provided logistical support to the Regiment during this quarter. The 185th Maintenance Battalion and the 266th Supply & Service Battalion provided Class I through IV. Class V was supplied by the 3rd Ordnance Battalion.

   b. Supply and Maintenance:

      (1) Class I: There were no problems with issue of Class I.

      (2) Class II and IV:

         (a) Barrier material and supplies were drawn from PAMEX 208 yard. Concertina was difficult to obtain throughout the period because of supply shortages.

         (b) The Squadrons' PLL's averaged 1300 line items during the period. Approximately 55% of the line items were at zero balance as replacements could not keep up with the fast turnover. Fuel, air, and oil filters were in short supply during the first two months of the period but the supply caught up with demand during January and stocks are now adequate. All size inner tubes have been in short supply throughout the period.

         (c) The Regiment suffered the following combat losses during the quarter: 34 ACAV's; 13 Tanks; 1 Mortar Carrier; 1 MCV; 2 LRV's; and 1 M548.

         (d) Field Maintenance Support: Field maintenance was provided by the 551st LEMCO at Blackhorse and by a 15-20 man contact team with forward units. The contact team has automatic and small arms maintenance and limited turret and instrumentation repair capabilities. Backup support was provided by the 185th Maintenance Bn, LONG BINH.

      (3) Class V and Ammunition Storage:

         (a) The Regiment drew ammunition from 3rd Ordnance Bn Depot at LONG BINH and from the 1st Infantry Division ASP at LAI KHE.

         (b) The 5-7 day delay between submission of ammunition requests to the Depot and delivery to Base Camp caused a shortage of ammunition for the 3rd Squadron while that unit was OCPON to the 1st ATF. The only immediate solution for the shortage was the transfer of
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Organic Squadron vehicles to the Depot. In the future, the Regimental Dump will stock high turnover ammunition in addition to basic loads.

(c) The Squadrons continue to stock one day's supply of ammunition at the pickup zone to insure a smooth resupply cycle to the units and a back up for responsive combat essential resupply.

(d) The shortage of hand held flares, M79 illumination, and 4.2 illumination continued to be a problem. The shortage was intensified by the placement of 155 illumination on ASR in January. The Regiment was able to provide 155 illumination only by drawing down the stock in the ammo dump at Blackhorse Base Camp.

4. Aerial and Convoy Resupply:

(a) The opening of roads in the Regimental TAOR during the reporting period enabled the Regiment to use LLOC for resupply and to relegate aerial resupply to a backup role. In November, the Regiment required 30 to 35 CH-47 sorties per day to resupply one Squadron and its OPCON infantry battalion from BIEN HOA. During December, however, one aircraft, flying 16 sorties per day, was able to back up the resupply of 2nd Squadron from LAI KHE, 1st Squadron from BIEN HOA, and three troops of 3rd Squadron from Base Camp. A field water purifier operated by IFFV engineers at SONG BE Bridge enabled 2nd Squadron to deliver water without dependence upon aerial resupply.

(b) Blackhorse Base Camp was supplied by wheeled convoys from LONG BINH four days a week. During the latter part of the period, "free flow" resupply to Blackhorse was used extensively.

5. Maintenance:

(a) Maintenance support was adequate during the period except for shortages of some repair parts.

(b) The Regiment continued maintenance support of units OPCON to 1st Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division.

e. Medical:

(1) The general physical health of the Regiment continued to reflect progress. Medical statistics indicate a decline in most controllable and non-controllable conditions that have caused inflation of the Regimental non-effective rate. Emphasis has been placed on higher
standards of sanitary discipline and control of VD and malaria. As a result of better organized and supervised medical teams throughout the Regiment, a continuation of desirable accomplishments will be evident.

(2) Non-battle injuries reported through medical channels vary from insignificant abrasions and lacerations to injuries of a more serious nature, requiring hospitalization and evacuation out of the Republic of Vietnam. During the reporting period, total non-battle injuries averaged 129 cases per month, a 40% decrease from the previous quarter. The number of injuries requiring hospitalization decreased 30% from the previous period. Man-days lost as a result of non-battle injuries averaged 127 per month, a 16% decrease.

(3) Diseases Diagnosed during the Period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infectious Hepatitis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiratory</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermatological</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The following medical care facilities were used during the reporting period by 11th ACR personnel: 7th Surgical Hospital, LONG GIANG; 24th Evacuation Hospital, LONG BINH; 36th Evacuation Hospital, VUNG TAU; 93rd Evacuation Hospital, LONG BINH; 3rd Field Hospital, SAIGON; 6th Convalescent Hospital, CAM RANH BAY; and 12th Evacuation Hospital CU CHI.

(5) A concentrated effort has been directed toward more effective MEDCAP's. The medical treatment given in the past has been lacking in follow-up treatment. The success of follow-up treatment programs has been evident.

The help of Vietnamese health workers, who can administer rudimentary medical attention, has been of great value. Their medical care training
has developed a noticeable concern and involvement in the personal health standards of the villages. It is recommended that special effort be made to involve more Vietnamese in their own health development program. Vietnamese involvement and interest will create a stabilizing factor that will allow the Americans to eventually relinquish their dominant medical role.

Preventive medicine is gaining command emphasis throughout the 11th ACR. Due to this upsurge of interest and concentrated supervision, 66% more sanitary inspections have been made within the Regiment during the quarter.

Inadequate basic training of lower echelon personnel assigned to preventive medical teams has particularly hampered field sanitary efforts. During the quarter, classes have been conducted by the 20th Preventive Medicine Unit, VIEN HOA, for all field sanitation team members. Notable progress has been realized and will continue to be realized as individual involvement is stressed.

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. General: During the quarter, the operational strength went from a low of 4,272 in December to a high of 4,416 at the end of the quarter.

During the reporting period, an infusion program was initiated to provide the Regiment with Sheridan qualified tankers. Approximately 67 personnel from E-3 through E-6 with MOS 11ET and 20 personnel with MOS 45GT were assigned to the Regiment from the 1st, 4th, and 9th Infantry Divisions.

b. Strength:

(1) Strength figures by month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASGD</th>
<th>PDX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>4,194</td>
<td>4,311</td>
<td>4,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>4,194</td>
<td>4,272</td>
<td>4,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>4,194</td>
<td>4,277</td>
<td>4,064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Hospital Returnees: During the quarter, 213 personnel were returned to duty after hospitalization. This figure does not include personnel who were treated and released immediately.
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(3) Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>NKA</th>
<th>NDD</th>
<th>NWI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. MOS Shortages: During the reporting period a shortage of 17K series MOS developed. Replacements have been slow. The replacement stream has been able to meet the 11 series requirements.

d. Replacements: The quality of replacements remained at an acceptable level. The training cycles conducted by the Replacement Training School provide a thorough orientation of personnel to their new environment. The training program gives refresher training in basic skills with emphasis placed on troop leading procedures, tactics, and safety.

e. Services:

(1) Religious: During the quarter, a total of 388 religious services were conducted with a total attendance of 11,828. 206 confessions, 261 communions, 4 memorials, and 4 baptisms were also conducted. The 388 services were divided as follows: 150 Protestant and 238 Catholic services. This increase in services is attributable to the holiday season and the availability of a helicopter on Sundays. With the helicopter, it is possible to do most of the services on Sunday, leaving the rest of the week available for visits and counseling. The five Regimental chaplains made a total of 154 hospital visits, 244 visits to quarters, and 909 visits to troop duty areas and conducted 1,128 interviews and counseling sessions.

(2) Red Cross: During the reporting period, the Red Cross Field Unit at Blackhorse handled 800 cases. The reporting and communications services totaled 996, including birth and death notifications, health and welfare reports, and verifications of emergencies for leave consideration.

(3) Special Services: During the last quarter, Special Services provided 6 USO shows. There were five movies every week at the Amphitheater and 11 units in Base Camp showed five movies a week. Whenever possible, movies were sent to troops in the forward area.

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(4) Postal:

(a) The total value of money order sales, including fees, totaled $789,472.22 for the quarter. 13,138 money orders were sold and 980 money orders were cashed for a value of $56,871.91. The total stamp sales for the period was $19,020.00.

(b) Breakdown of incoming and outgoing mail:

1 Airmail was received at the 7th APU 82 days and surface mail 4 days. Average transit time of air mail was 5 days; surface mail, 46 days.

2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Dispatched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pouches (Letter Mail)</td>
<td>766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacks (Parcel Post, etc.)</td>
<td>5,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Mail</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured Mail</td>
<td>1,621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The parcel post, money order, and locator windows are now open from 0800 to 1630 seven days a week. The post office is working one 12 hour shift daily. We also have two money order men in the field approximately 5 days a month to service personnel forward.

(d) In addition to the two personnel from this unit with permanent duty station at TAN SON NHUT, the 7th APU has taken operational control of APO 96376, located in XUAN LOC. The additional burden of operating this unit, while widening the scope of responsibility of the 7th APU, has also necessitated the permanent relocation of two personnel previously assigned to the Regiment and a "shotgun" to transport money and stamped paper to the new unit. Further, one additional money order clerk must be sent to the forward areas of the units served by the newly acquired APU.

(5) Post Exchange: Several support units have departed the Base Camp compound, resulting in approximately a $100,000 monthly loss in sales. With this reduction in sales, PACEX has withdrawn the only US civilian retail manager assigned to Blackhorse. A permanent warehouse is still badly needed as merchandise continues to be damaged by the elements.
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FX Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Sep - 10 Oct</td>
<td>$177,236.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Oct - 10 Nov</td>
<td>$203,950.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Nov - 10 Dec</td>
<td>$181,730.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Dec - 23 Dec</td>
<td>$51,411.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** $614,329.41

f. Morale: A high level of morale continued throughout the quarter. The improved PX, snack bar, and special activities directly contributed to the morale of the Regiment.

g. Awards and Decorations:

1. Recent AGI inspections have indicated a need for the development of a more effective awards and decorations program at the Squadron, Troop, and small unit levels. Significant areas of concern are:

   a. The implementation of procedures whereby all individuals who have served with the 11th ACR are properly considered by their commanders for the submission of an appropriate service award at the end of their tours.

   b. Insuring that proper follow-up, suspense, and control procedures are developed so that once a man is recommended for an award he in fact receives it prior to his departure.

2. The following steps have been taken to insure the timely and accurate processing of award recommendations.

   a. An awards and decorations log book is maintained by all units to include the troop elements on every award forwarded to the squadron and Regimental awards and decorations sections. Contained in this log book is the recommended individual's name, rank, unit, date forwarded to the next higher element, date of receipt of the approved award, and General Order Number. This log will serve as the unit's awards suspense system.

   b. In addition to the awards log book, a file copy of the award recommendation form is maintained in the awards file and one is
placed in the man's 201 file. When an award is returned approved, one copy of the orders will be stapled to the file copy of the recommendation for future reference. The orders will be annotated with the date the award was actually presented to the individual.

(3) Units have established a DEROS suspense file in order to ensure that the unit commander can review the record of each member of his command in sufficient time to allow processing of awards for deserving personnel prior to their departure. The suspense file aims at having the commander initiate service awards between 90 and 75 days prior to the DEROS of the man being recommended.

(4) Awards submitted since 1 Nov 68:

(a) USA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Approved</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS&quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM&quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM&quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(b) GVN:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Approved</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Order, 5th Class</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Actions Honor Medal</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Gold Star</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Silver Star</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Cross with Bronze Star</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Honor Medal, 1st Class</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Honor Medal, 2nd Class</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Medal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. POW: During the quarter there were no detainees processed at the Blackhorse detachment of the 720th Military Police Bn.

i. Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order:

(1) Courts-Martial: During the quarter, the following court-martial cases were processed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tried</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(2) Serious incidents: There were four serious incidents reported.

(3) During the quarter, the largest number of MP reports involved larcenies and traffic violations contributing to accidents.

(4) It has been noted that there is a flagrant disregard or lack of knowledge of USARV traffic regulations.

8. (FOUO) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. General: 11th ACR psychological operations continued to be directed at villagers in the AO. The major theme was an appeal to relatives of VC to influence their sons and daughters to rally. Propaganda movies were shown in conjunction with speeches by HOI CHANH's to convince the villagers that they no longer have to live in fear of VC reprisals. The armed propaganda team, attached to Regimental S-5, continued to use face-to-face communication to convince the local populace to support the legal government of Vietnam. Radios and weekly newspapers were distributed to villagers to keep them informed on the progress of the GVN and the Paris Peace talks. The majority of leaflets were standard rally appeals, emphasizing the hardships of living in tunnels and jungle base camps and the continual threat of airstrikes and artillery.

b. Ralliers: There were 54 ralliers during the reporting period. The majority confessed that they rallied because of repeated pleas from their families or because of increased Allied operations and B-52 raids.

c. Villagers in the AO are tired of the war. Many have had personal property damaged or have lost relatives. They state that they really do not care who wins, just so the war ends. Many are becoming aware that the GVN and Allied forces have the initiative and are beginning to support them. On several occasions, important information has been volunteered by villagers.

9. (FOUO) CIVIC ACTION:

a. General: During the reporting period, the Regiment has intensified its support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. In addition to numerous improvements to schools constructed during the last reporting period, construction is now underway for a school at TAN BINH. In addition, a land clearing and irrigation project in conjunction with the introduction of IR-8 rice is nearing completion at BINH CO. A comprehensive well improvement program has also been initiated.
Flans to construct and equip aid stations at BINH MY and TAN BINH are being made. These medical facilities will permit medical attention on a continuing basis. In conjunction with this project, a nurses training course has been initiated. At present, two Vietnamese are enrolled.

b. All projects are designed to use a minimum of resources and have a high impact on the local populace. All projects were requested by the villagers and are being worked on jointly.

c. Commodities Distributed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cement (Lbs)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin (Sheets)</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber (BF)</td>
<td>84,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint (Gallons)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food (Lbs)</td>
<td>12,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycles</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap, Tooth Paste, etc.</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Buckets</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Tools</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing (Lbs)</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Saws</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


d. Impact Program: The Regiment no longer maintains its own IMPACT program. Support is rendered on an "as requested" basis with maximum coordination effected with the province RF/PF advisor.

10. (FOUO) INFORMATION:


   IIFFV's magazine, "The Hurricane", featured the 11th ACR in its January issue and has requested 17th PID to submit as many articles as possible for the magazine. Feature stories have also appeared in the "Stars & Stripes", "The Army Times", and numerous Stateside newspapers.

   In addition, the 28th Military History Detachment published a 32-page illustrated magazine to provide an introduction and orientation for replacements and a memento for those leaving the Blackhorse. The magazine will be continued on a quarterly basis.
b. Statistical Summary:

(1) November:

- Hometown News Releases (via Army Hometown News Center) 141
- Christmas Tape Recordings 126
- News and Feature Stories 18
- Photographs Released to News Media 61

(2) December:

- Hometown News Releases 229
- News and Feature Stories 32
- Photographs Released to News Media 40

(3) January:

- Hometown News Releases 90
- News and Feature Stories 28
- Photographs Released to News Media 49

(4) Total:

- Hometown News Releases 472
- Hometown Christmas Tapes 126
- News and Feature Stories 84
- Photographs Released to News Media 151

11. (C) BASE CAMP DEVELOPMENT:

a. Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc., Blackhorse Base Camp, completed 370 Maintenance Service Orders (MSO's) during the period 1 Oct - 31 Dec 68 for a total cost of $3,460.00. 70 Individual Job Orders (IJ0's) were completed and 11 are in progress for a total cost of $47,509.55.

(1) Services: Water treatment operations, generator plant
operations, ice plant operations, maintenance and repair of buildings, M&R roads, M&R airfields, refuse collection and disposal, and entomological services.

(2) Major Projects Completed: Three extensions, 7th Surgical Hospital; installation of two water pumps, installation of air conditioning, 7th Surgical Hospital; extension, 506th Supply and Service Necessity; and construction of four messhall sumps.

(3) Major projects in progress: Construction of a fence, Nurses Quarters, replacement of defective messhall sumps as required, and construction of a control tower on the Blackhorse Runway.

b. 919th Engineers: In addition to platoon construction projects (Para 5c(2)), the 919th Engineer Company has also upgraded the perimeter berm by installing needed culverts and working a dozer on the perimeter for eight days, straightening up the berm and clearing away unwanted vegetation. The following materials were released from the S-4 Yard and distributed to Base Camp units for self-help projects:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sandbags</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrugated Steel (Sheets)</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nails (Lbs)</td>
<td>1,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M8A1 Matting</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber (BF)</td>
<td>39,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertina Wire (Sleeves)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel Post Fence</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plywood Sheets</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Jan 69

RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

1. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

   a. Personnel

      (1) OBSERVATION: Emergency Leave.

         EVALUATION: It has been found that TWX notifications do not provide enough information to determine whether an emergency leave should be granted.

         RECOMMENDATION: That stateside Red Cross units provide information stating whether a leave is required rather than requested.

   b. Operations:

      (1) OBSERVATION: Cross-Country Movement during Wet Season.

         EVALUATION: Greater firepower became available, tracking was eliminated, and fewer trafficability problems were encountered when a line or wedge formation was used in cross-country movement.

         RECOMMENDATION: Do not attempt to track in areas of poor trafficability.

      (2) OBSERVATION: Charging Vehicle Batteries while on AP's.

         EVALUATION: Vehicle batteries, especially on tanks, require charging even while on AP's. Starting and stopping the engines in unison reduces the overall time the engines are running and thus reduces the possibility of enemy detection.

         RECOMMENDATION: To reduce possibility of enemy detection while on a mounted AP, engines should be started in unison to charge batteries.

      (3) OBSERVATION: Dispersion of Personnel in NDP's during Hours of Dusk.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Jan 69

EVALUATION: Mortar attacks are frequent during hours of dusk and dawn. Persons must be kept dispersed during these critical periods.

RECOMMENDATION: Maintain dispersion of personnel in NDP's during periods of dusk and dawn to preclude excessive losses to enemy mortar and rocket attacks.

OBSERVATION: Doubletalk during Radio Transmissions.

EVALUATION: Doubletalk during radio transmissions only serves to confuse friendly forces. The use of such phrases as "Tango Uniform" for TAN Uyen and "Lima Kilo" for LAI KHE tend to confuse the newer US personnel but denies no information to the enemy. It also increases the length of radio transmissions while misunderstandings are straightened out.

RECOMMENDATION: Do not allow unauthorized abbreviations on radio nets.

OBSERVATION: Daylight Ambush Patrols.

EVALUATION: The insertion of both mounted and dismounted daylight AP's in early morning hours is a successful means of combating enemy infiltration when used in conjunction with current intelligence.

RECOMMENDATION: Use of daylight ambush patrols in addition to RIF operations.

OBSERVATION: Navigation.

EVALUATION: During any contact which involves mechanized elements in dense jungle terrain, extreme care should be exercised to insure that potentially dangerous natural obstacles are identified in advance. If a contact should develop in such an area, aircraft should be used to direct the ground elements away from the hazard. When jungle busting in this type of terrain it is frequently impossible for the vehicle commander or driver to observe to their immediate front.

RECOMMENDATION: Insure that an aircraft is readily available for contacts in this type of area or that dismounted troops are used to scout routes.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Jan 69

(7) OBSERVATION: Recovery Techniques.

EVALUATION: Recovery vehicles should be securely anchored during attempts to recover heavy vehicles. Experience has proved a component failure can be costly during a recovery operation. A specific case in point occurred when a boom cable on one VTR snapped when the tank being recovered was halfway up a deep vertical embankment. The second VTR, without an anchor, was turned over when the sudden added force on the boom caused it to pivot on its lowered spade. A tank on the overturned boom caught fire and the vehicle was destroyed.

RECOMMENDATION: During recovery operations, due consideration must be given to component failure and its foreseeable consequences. Action must be taken to minimize the effects of such an eventuality.

(8) OBSERVATION: Abandoned Combat Loss Vehicles.

EVALUATION: When attempting to remove serviceable parts from an abandoned combat loss vehicle, extreme care must be exercised to insure that the vehicle has not been booby-trapped or the immediate area mined. Three individuals were needlessly injured when they attempted to remove items from an abandoned vehicle and, throwing a sprocket to the ground, struck an AP mine.

RECOMMENDATION: Indoctriante personnel in enemy mining and booby-trap techniques. Approach all abandoned vehicles assuming that they are booby-trapped and the area mined.

(9) OBSERVATION: ROME PLOW Results.

EVALUATION: Experience indicates that VC activity becomes restricted and channelized as any given ROME Plowed area is enlarged. In areas frequently used as infiltration routes, this channelization tends to increase the enemy traffic on remaining trails and provides a lucrative target for both day and night ambushes.

RECOMMENDATION: Initiate carefully planned ROME PLOW operations in known or suspected infiltration routes or base areas to take advantage of this added tactical advantage.

(10) OBSERVATION: LAW an Anti-Personnel Weapon.

EVALUATION: While operating in dense jungle, machinegun firepower was greatly limited in range due to vegetation. The LAW was employed and found to penetrate this dense vegetation and effectively
deliver a potent punch against enemy personnel within such limited fields of vision and fire.

**RECOMMENDATION**: Employ the LAW in dense jungle when machine-gun firepower may be limited by dense vegetation.

c. Training: None
d. Intelligence:

(1) **OBSERVATION**: Ambushes.

**EVALUATION**: During the period 15 Nov - 18 Dec, 39 ambush patrols from the 11th ACR and OPCON units reported enemy activity. 12 had body counts accounting for 17 VC KIA.

It was noted that most of these ambushes have been sprung along well used trails (trails which appear on the map) and along stream beds. The average number of VC engaged in these ambush patrols has been between 2 and 5 individuals.

It was found that of these 39 ambushes, 23 took place between 1800 and 2100 hours; and that between 0600 and 0700 hours, 5 of the 39 contacts took place. Activity was at its lowest in the late evening and early morning hours. The following chart correlates the number of incidents to the times during which ambush patrols were employed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>NUMBER OF INCIDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800 - 1859 hours</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900 - 1959 hours</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 - 2059 hours</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0200 - 0259 hours</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0300 - 0359 hours</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0400 - 0459 hours</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0500 - 0550 hours</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0600 - 0659 hours</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several valid observations can be made on the experiences of these successful ambush patrols:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Jan 69

(a) The Viet Cong travel in squad size or smaller units.

(b) The Viet Cong are moving during periods of half-light, at dawn and dusk.

(c) The Viet Cong travel along recognizable landmarks such as well used trails and stream beds.

(d) Several successful ambushes occurred along the JHU GIAO - TAN UXEN District Boundary. The Viet Cong travel along these boundaries with the knowledge that Allied units frequently have AO borders along political boundaries.

RECOMMENDATION: That AP's continue to locate on trails, stream beds, and other recognizable routes of movement. A program of close liaison with adjacent units to insure that AP's are operating along mutual borders should be established.

(2) OBSERVATION: Unburied Viet Cong Bodies.

EVALUATION: Since 1 Jan 69, eight unburied Viet Cong bodies were discovered within the 11th ACR AO. In the past, the Viet Cong had taken great risks to insure that their dead were removed from the battlefield and buried. It is felt that the desertion of bodies reflects loss of morale and discipline among VC units in the area. It is also possible that in their haste to avoid contact, the Viet Cong are abandoning wounded personnel and fleeing.

RECOMMENDATION: That more emphasis be placed on VR's after a contact.

(3) OBSERVATION: Cordon and Search.

EVALUATION: The Cordon and Search of TAN BINH Village (XT8636) produced substantial information on the composition of the local infrastructure in a typical village. Inclosure I contains a chart depicting the organizational apparatus found at the village level. As Ralliers, PWs and Detainees were acquired they were immediately brought to a central collection point and screened by interrogation teams. Those that appeared to have worthwhile information were interrogated in detail. In order to assist in the identification of the political and military structure of the village, a chart or blueprint showing the hypothetical VC political and military structure was developed. This hypothetical
structure was developed through research utilizing unclassified references in the political sciences field. The blueprint was composed of four basic structures:

(a) The People's Revolutionary Party Executive Committee.
(b) The Village Liberation Committee.
(c) The Village National Liberation Front.
(d) The Village Military Affairs Committee.

As individuals were collected during the operation, they were asked about their committee or section affiliation; they were also asked the positions of other VC in the village. Names were added to appropriate positions on the chart. Cross interrogation confirmed the existence of the committees and sections, and served to identify additional local VC leaders. By simply compiling committee rosters, an accurate Blacklist was created, and interrogators employed the chart to determine relevant questions to ask newly captured personnel concerning the Viet Cong infrastructure.

(4) OBSERVATION: Intelligence Operations

EVALUATION: Literally all of the 11th ACR operations are based on the exploitation of intelligence. In this regard, the Regimental philosophy is to act on good, as opposed to perfect, intelligence. The secret of success in this concept lies in instinct or battle sense and cannot be verbalized.

The following points, however, are emphasized from a doctrinal viewpoint to assist the CONUS base in its training and support mission for future wars of this type.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. Captured PW's should be retained at the squadron level for a minimum of four to twelve hours to assist the local commander in the further identification of enemy caches, locations, and activities: more often than not, the PW's will also lead to additional PW's and intelligence.

The nature of this conflict is such that the average local force VC is so compartmented information-wise that his contribution to the "big picture" will be marginal. Conversely, because of his usual desire to talk extensively, his contribution to the "little picture" is often significant.
2. Commanders should be extremely cautious in too frequent intelligence personnel changes. Succinctly stated, personnel turbulence within the intelligence structure will invariably result in poor intelligence.

3. Tactical exploitation of IW's, documents, and important hardware should be immediate. For example, documents captured during an engagement should be returned for read-out within thirty minutes of capture. The helicopter permits this immediacy.

4. In units where air cavalry assets are available, the S-2 should have and must maintain a wholesome and continuous working relationship with aero-scout personnel.

5. The following personnel have collateral intelligence roles in a counterinsurgency environment:

   a. The chaplain.
   b. The surgeon and medical personnel involved in MEDCAP's.
   c. S-5 Personnel.*

   *Experience during this period has shown that the policy of "change for change's sake" is a valid one. Operations cannot be stereotyped. They must be varied in nature so as to trick the enemy into an inadvertent contact. In this regard, frequent boundary, task organization, and timing changes are highly recommended. In this regard, it is sometimes profitable to do nothing except standdown for maintenance over a twenty-four hour period.

   e. Logistics: None
   f. Organization: None
   g. Signal: None
   h. PSYOPS/Civic Action: None

*The Regimental S-5 should have a Special Intelligence clearance.
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RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DISTRIBUTION:

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1 G-3 Plans, 1st Inf Div
1 USAIS
1 USAARMS
1 USAAMS
1 Army War College
1 USACGSC
1 CO, 11th ACR
1 XO, 11th ACR
1 Staff, 11th ACR
1 CO, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR
1 CO, 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR
1 CO, 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR
1 CO, Air Cav Trp, 11th ACR
6 28th MHD, 11th ACR

GEORGE S. PATTON
Colonel, Armor
Commanding
AVDB-T (MHD) (10 Feb 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, APO San Francisco 96345 14 MAR 1969
THR: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: G3 Analysis,
APO San Francisco 96266

Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC (DST),
APO San Francisco 96375

Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20315

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed the attached Operational Report Lessons
Learned of Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and concurs with it.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GARY C. TUCKER
1LT, AGC
Ass't AG

Copy furnished:
CO, 11th ACR
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AVPBC-RE-H (10 Feb 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, HQ II PFOREV, APO San Francisco 96266  21 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
        Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO:   Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
        Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational
Report-Lessons Learned of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for the period
ending 31 January 1969, as indorsed.

2. (C) Reference Section I, para 5d(2):

   a. Delete sentence reading, "The 7-8th Artillery Fire Support Coordination
      Center was also released from their support role to support BI2N HOA Tac."
      The 7-8th Artillery does not operate an FSCC.

   b. Add in place of the deleted sentence the following: "At this time
      the OPCON of the 11th ACR fires previously provided 7-8th Artillery was
      cancelled by the 1st Inf Div Arty. Because this change reduced the amount
      of fires immediately responsive to the countermortar/counterrocket require-
      ments of BIITAC, HOLIDAY INN Artillery was tasked to provide priority of fires
      to BIITAC, unless engaged in a contact mission."

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B. G. MACDONALD
1LT, AG
Assf AG

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD Dir 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST (10 Feb 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 7 APR 69

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning emergency leave, page 37, paragraph 1a(1); nonconcur. In accordance with paragraph 2-1, AR 930-5 and American Red Cross directives, the American Red Cross is only required to obtain reports and provide information for individual Army members and their commanders that is needed to assist in making decisions on such matters as emergency leave and extension of leave for emergency reasons. It must be emphasized that the American Red Cross verifies the circumstances concerning emergency, personal, or family health and welfare problems. The Commander must make any determination concerning emergency leaves based on these circumstances. Any other arrangement would usurp the commander's prerogative and place undue responsibility on the American Red Cross for decisions concerning the granting of emergency leave.

b. (C) Reference item concerning Cordon and Search, page 41, paragraph d(3); concur. Item will be published in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. Recommend no action by USARPAC or DA.

c. (C) Reference item concerning Intelligence Operations, page 42, paragraph d(4); concur. These are basic concepts in intelligence operations at lower levels which require review on a periodic basis. Item will be published in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. Recommend no action by USARPAC or DA.

d. (C) Reference item concerning Vehicular Mine Warfare, Commander's Notes, page XXIII; concur. Item will be a special topic in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. Recommend no action by USARPAC or DA.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
11th ACR
11 FFV

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD Directive 5200.10
GPOP-DT (10 Feb 69) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Armored Cav Regiment for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 7 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Shorty

CPT, AGC

Asd AG
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-ME

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Jan 69 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

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INCLOSURE I

Organizational Structure

11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
Air Cavalry Troop
919th Engineer Company (Armored)
37th Medical Company
506th Supply and Service Company (Support)
551st Light Maintenance Company (Support)
  1st Detachment, Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion
  5th Field Team, Company B, 6th PSYOP Battalion
  7th Army Postal Unit
  9th Signal Detachment (Avionics Maintenance)
  17th Public Information Detachment
  28th Military History Detachment
  202nd Military Intelligence Detachment
  398th Transportation Detachment
  409th Radio Research Unit
  541st Military Intelligence Detachment

1st Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
A Troop
B Troop
C Troop
D Company
Howitzer Battery

2nd Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
E Troop
F Troop
G Troop
H Company
Howitzer Battery

3rd Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
I Troop
K Troop
L Troop
M Company
Howitzer Battery

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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# Roster of Commanders and Key Staff Officers

## 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

### Commanding Officer

- **Colonel George S. Patton**

### XO

- **LTC Merritte W. Ireland** (1 Nov - 23 Nov)
- **LTC William C. Haponski** (24 Nov - 4 Jan)
- **Major Glenn G. Finkbiner** (5 Jan - 14 Jan)
- **LTC James T. Tuberty** (15 Jan - 31 Jan)

### S-1

- **Major Dale E. Kruby**

### S-2

- **Major Andrew P. O'Meara**

### S-3

- **LTC William C. Haponski** (1 Nov - 23 Nov)
- **Major James L. Dosier** (24 Nov - 31 Jan)

### S-4

- **Major Glenn G. Finkbiner**

### S-5

- **Captain Lemos L. Pulmer**

### CML OFF

- **Captain Richard B. Allen**

---

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CHAP

LTC Calvin G. Causey  1 Nov – 13 Jan
LTC Robert H. Hawn  14 Jan – 31 Jan

SURG

Major Gerald W. Noga  1 Nov – 5 Dec
Major Gordon S. Livingston  6 Dec – 31 Jan

AVN OFF

Major Ralph J. Powell

SIG OFF

Major Clark J. Bailey

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop Commander

Captain Gary D. Turner

Air Cavalry Troop Commander

Major Donald L. Peters  1 Nov – 17 Nov
Major John C. Bahnsen  18 Nov – 12 Dec
Major Donald L. Peters  13 Dec – 22 Dec
Major John C. Bahnsen  23 Dec – 31 Dec
Major Donald L. Peters  1 Jan – 12 Jan
Major John C. Bahnsen  13 Jan – 31 Jan

37th Medical Company Commander

Captain Philip Scossaro

919th Engineer Company Commander

Captain Bernard J. Reilly

17th Public Information Detachment Commander

1LT Cary L. Lichtman

5 A

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28th Military History Detachment Commander
Captain William B. Overbay

409th Radio Research Unit Commander
Captain Robert J. Vogler

541st Military Intelligence Detachment Commander
Captain Ralph G. Rosenberg  1 Nov - 4 Nov
Major Robert D. Foley  5 Nov - 31 Jan

1st Squadron
Commanding Officer
LTC Briggs H. Jones  1 Nov - 24 Nov
LTC Merritte W. Ireland  24 Nov - 31 Jan

XO
Major Edmund J. Sieminski  1 Nov - 18 Nov
Major William G. Privette, III  19 Nov - 31 Jan

S-1
Captain Ronald C. Wyse  1 Nov - 9 Dec
Captain Gerald R. Jacobsen  10 Dec - 4 Jan
Captain Robert O. Harris, III  5 Jan - 31 Jan

S-2
Captain Dudley W. McIver  1 Nov - 14 Jan
1LT Harold A. Fritz  15 Jan - 17 Jan
Captain Winston B. Benbow  18 Jan - 31 Jan

S-3
Major Robert F. Grossman  1 Nov - 31 Jan

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S-4

Captain Jarrett J. Robertson       1 Nov - 7 Nov
Captain Leonard K. Murphy, Jr. 20 Nov - 31 Jan

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop Commander
Captain Thomas L. Nelson

A Troop Commander
Captain Paul S. Renschen       1 Nov - 1 Dec
Captain Arthur L. West, III 2 Dec - 31 Jan

B Troop Commander
Captain John H. Hays       1 Nov - 7 Nov
Captain Jarrett J. Robertson 8 Nov - 31 Jan

C Troop Commander
Captain William W. Hanson

D Company Commander
Captain Gerald R. Jakobson       1 Nov - 10 Dec
Captain Elmer G. Gibbons, III 11 Dec - 4 Jan
Captain Ronald C. Wyse 5 Jan - 31 Jan

Howitzer Battery Commander
Captain Henry F. Simon

2nd Squadron
Commanding Officer

LTC Lee E. Duke

XO

Major Harry W. Johnson, Jr.

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<th>Captain Peter K. Becker</th>
<th>1 Nov – 7 Nov</th>
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<td>Captain John L. Kennedy</td>
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<th>Captain Thomas W. Templer</th>
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<td>1LT Peter J. Griffin</td>
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<td>Major John C. Roberts</td>
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| S-4 | Captain Ronnie L. Perry   | 1 Nov – 31 Jan |

**Headquarters and Headquarters Troop Commander**

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<tr>
<th>Captain Edward H. Alling</th>
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<td>Captain Frank S. Graham</td>
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**E Troop Commander**

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**F Troop Commander**

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<tr>
<td>Captain Thomas A. McAdams</td>
<td>8 Nov – 31 Jan</td>
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**G Troop Commander**

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<tr>
<th>Captain Murray D. Salienbach</th>
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<tr>
<td>Captain Michael J. Scannell</td>
<td>15 Dec – 29 Dec</td>
</tr>
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</table>
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1LT Timothy J. Spinder 30 Dec - 3 Jan
Captain Claude K. Hudson 3 Jan - 31 Jan

H Company Commander

Captain Gordon A. Larson 1 Nov - 26 Nov
Captain Thomas M. Montgomery 27 Nov - 31 Jan

Howitzer Battery Commander

Captain Albert P. Fulco 1 Nov - 26 Nov
1LT Michael J. Levenhagen 27 Nov - 30 Nov
Captain Mario A. Macaluso 1 Dec - 31 Jan

3rd Squadron

Commanding Officer

LTC John W. McEnery 1 Nov - 31 Jan

X0

Major Donald L. Pace

S-1

Captain John C. Speedy 1 Nov - 24 Nov
Captain Dennis E. Firestone 25 Nov - 31 Jan

S-2

Captain Terrill D. Eckert 1 Nov - 30 Nov
Captain Arlington B. Stilwell 1 Dec - 31 Jan

S-3

Major James T. Gallahorn 1 Nov - 5 Jan
Major Thomas R. Middaugh 20 Jan - 31 Jan

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S-4

Captain John N. Jaeger
Headquarters and Headquarters Troop Commander
  Captain Thomas L. Miller  1 Nov - 12 Jan
  Captain Peter A. Grundvig  13 Jan - 31 Jan

I Troop Commander
  1LT James J. Steele  1 Nov - 25 Nov
  1LT William E. Shedd  26 Nov - 31 Jan

K Troop Commander
  Major Thomas R. Middaugh  1 Nov - 12 Jan
  Captain Gerard V. Palma  13 Jan - 31 Jan

L Troop Commander
  Captain Arnold J. Zirkle

M Company Commander
  Captain Jimmie B. Quinn  1 Nov - 7 Jan
  Captain Ronald B. Schmidt  8 Jan - 31 Jan

Howitzer Battery Commander
  Captain Dennis L. Fricke  1 Nov - 15 Dec
  1LT James T. Johnson  16 Dec - 31 Jan

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INCLOSURE III

OPCON Status

1. HQ, 11th ACR, remained OPCON to HQ, 1st Inf Div, during the reporting period (1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69).

2. OPCON status of the 1st Squadron and subordinate units:
   a. HQ, 1st Squadron:

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<tr>
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   b. Subordinate Units:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Nov - 11 Nov 68</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Nov - 12 Nov 68</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1st Bde, 1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
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<td>11 Nov - 13 Nov 68</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Nov - 15 Nov 68</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Nov - 23 Dec 68</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>17 Nov - 16 Dec 68</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1st Cav Div</td>
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<td>23 Dec 68 - 10 Jan 69</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>BIEN HQA TAC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Jan - 16 Jan 69</td>
<td>Btry</td>
<td>3rd Sqdn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan - 16 Jan 69</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>3rd Sqdn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Jan - 20 Jan 69</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>3rd Sqdn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Jan - 24 Jan 69</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>3rd Sqdn</td>
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3. OPCON status of the 2nd Squadron and subordinate units:

a. HQ, 2nd Squadron:

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69</td>
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b. Subordinate Units:

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<th>DATE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 Nov - 30 Nov 68</td>
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<td>F</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>1-28th Inf</td>
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<td>31 Dec 68 - 6 Jan 69</td>
<td>H</td>
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</tr>
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<td>14 Jan - 31 Jan 69</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
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4. OPCON status of the 3rd Squadron and subordinate units:

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<table>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
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</table>

b. Subordinate Units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>12 Nov - 18 Nov 68</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Nov - 30 Nov 68</td>
<td>K</td>
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</tr>
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<td>30 Nov - 6 Dec 68</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2nd Sqdn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Dec - 13 Dec 68</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>1st Sqdn</td>
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<td>13 Dec - 18 Dec 68</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>11 Jan - 20 Jan 69</td>
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<td>1st Cav Div</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>OPCON HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jan - 31 Jan 69</td>
<td>How Btry</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan - 16 Jan 69</td>
<td>K</td>
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### Army Aviation Statistical Summary

1. **Sorties Flown:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1C</th>
<th>UH-1D</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>733</td>
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<td>Troop Lift</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>356</td>
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<td>Cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aerial Fire Support and Reaction Force</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>620</td>
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<td>414</td>
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<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>75</td>
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2. **Number Passengers:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>1,695</td>
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<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>5,514</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>290</td>
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3. **Tons Cargo:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>20</td>
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</table>

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**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.**

**DOD DIR 5200.10**

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**CONFIDENTIAL**
4. Hours Flown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>HOURS FLOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>1,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>6,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>2,230</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>2,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>335</td>
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5. Results of Fire:

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<th></th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KIA (BC)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KIA (FOSS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structures Damaged</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
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6. Ammunition Expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.62-mm</td>
<td>280,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75-mm</td>
<td>4,560</td>
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<tr>
<td>40-mm</td>
<td>13,456</td>
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7. Aircraft Availability (%):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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INCLUSION V

Order of Battle

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INCLUSION VI

Operations

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10
The APC-Mounted Mine Clearing Roller was mounted on an M113A1 ACAV by the 919th Engineer Company in October 1968. The roller was tested on LTL #2 from Xuan Loc to an area south of Cao My and on LTL #16 from Dinh My to Tan Uyen. The vehicle also ran a dummy minefield course.

The assembly operation was facilitated by a project engineer from EADE. Two lugs or "eyes" had to be welded onto the front slope of the M113A1. All other operations were merely bolt replacements. Assembly time was approximately six hours.

2. The equipment was well designed for its intended purpose. The vehicle was able to do pivot steers and back up with the rollers down. The rollers could be elevated by a mechanical-electrical device for replacement of rollers and expendable arms. It is impractical to drive the vehicle any distance with the rollers elevated, however, because the final drives ride on the ground. When the air system bellows on the device are charged to 125 psi, the front roadwheel of the M113A1 is three to four inches off the ground.

3. The dummy minefield consisted of eight pressure-electric mines. The roller set off seven mines and cut the wire on the eighth. The roller was also employed on four day and one night missions. No real mines were detonated by the roller. In all cases, the equipment followed a sweep team employing P3 metallic mine detectors.

4. The roller traversed mud, potholes, logs, and natural surfaces with relative ease. The independently pressurized arms operated effectively over changes in the contour of the terrain and cleared normal potholes with no noticeable difficulty. The vehicle can operate up to 20 mph, but during sweep operations, 5 mph was considered sufficient.

5. Any mine detonator less than six inches in width can possibly pass between the rollers and explode under the tracks of later vehicles. As most mines found in the 11th ACR A0 have wide detonators, however, the rollers can under normal conditions clear a path sufficient for APC's.

6. The item was fairly easy to maintain. Some difficulty, however, was encountered with many of the large bolts, which had no lock washers and fell out during tests. The only parts of the equipment that actually failed, however, were the expendable arms, which failed when air pressure in the bellows was low and rough terrain was traversed. If sufficient air had been available, few of the arms would have broken.
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7. The item had several drawbacks, some of which are inherent in the basic concept. They include:

a. A lack of ready air supply to keep the bellows inflated. This problem area can easily be overcome by including a 5 cfm air compressor with the kit.

b. Susceptibility of any dismounted troops (especially sweep teams) to the metal fragments that would be dispersed by any mine detonation. This could hardly be designed out.

c. Inability of the rollers to be lifted so that the vehicle could be fully mobile until the sweep operations are to be begun. If the device could be swung back over the APC, then the load would be balanced and the vehicle could be fully mobile.

d. Lack of sufficient driver protection. If a mine is hit with the driver buttoned up, he will probably smash his head into the driver's hatch. Experience shows that most men that survive mine incidents are blown completely off their vehicles. Of course, the best driver protection is a bigger vehicle such as a tank.

8. The item would clearly work in a majority of mining situations. Optimum value, however, would be the employment of a tank modified with the roller. Further research is also recommended in the area of mounting a roller on an AVLB, because of its hydraulic system and small crew. Although the weight, size, and ground pressure of the AVLB precludes its use on some missions, it could handle a majority of missions encountered.

Ideally, an APC-mounted roller and an AVLB-mounted roller would be available to each squadron for use on mined routes. If further rollers are issued, however, it is recommended that they come with their own vehicle. Use of a TO&E engineer vehicle would result in the loss of an entire squad of engineers to engineer related missions.
Mine Wire Cutter

1. The 919th Engineer Company attached a right side mounting wire cutter to one of its AAV's on 6 Nov 66. The cutter was a breadboard model; that is, a trial type to test the concept, not a polished, final production model.

In order to mount the device on an M113A1, two aluminum "eyes" were welded on the front slope of the vehicle. Apparently, however, these eyes are on older model carriers. Employing a wrecker, the entire assembly time was less than four hours after the eyes were welded.

2. The device was employed on a typical Vietnam hard-surface, all-weather road, inside Blackhorse Base Camp. The test included methods of raising and lowering the blade assembly, maneuverability of the vehicle with the cutter down, and evaluation of the concept.

3. The device is well designed and proved very easy to maneuver. Due to the swivel nature of the linkage, cornering is very easy, even employing pivot steer. The vehicle can be backed up with the cutter down, but the device does not cut when being dragged backwards. Effect on steering is negligible.

The blade cuts to a depth of twelve inches very easily; the depth of the cut can be varied by adjusting the linkage. At twelve inches, the wheel contacts the ground and the device can cut no deeper. The device has a mechanism to allow the blade to retract and recatch if an immovable object is hit, but nothing was hit in the test strong enough to trip this mechanism. The first time the blade was lowered, a CEV dozer blade was used to release the catch. After that, any convenient slope was used. By running the wheel up a hill, the catch, which consists of a lifting shackle, may be released or rehooked. If a final model is made, an automatic retracting device should be considered. A cutter on each side of the vehicle would also be necessary.

4. This unit concludes that the device would be of value if during a specific mission command detonated mining activity was expected. Since the beginning of July 1968, the 11th ACR has lost 60 vehicles to mines. Of these, only four or five, however, are suspected to have been command detonated. In the opinion of this unit and members of the Regimental Staff, there are not sufficient missions to warrant production of a mine wire cutter.
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INCLOSURE IX

Commander's Notes

1. GENERAL POLICY (Dated 14 Jul 68): During my tour of command of this Regiment, I expect to have occasional conferences and meetings with all commanders and the Regimental staff. Such a meeting is now being planned. The exigencies, however, of combat in this CTZ and the valid requirement that commanders remain with their units to the maximum extent really preclude frequent meetings. I therefore propose to forward my views and guidance through "Commanders Notes". These notes will cover the whole range of Regimental activities of particular concern to me. I consider them of prime importance to this Regiment and want you to know that their content will have been very carefully considered prior to promulgation. I, therefore, enjoin you to study them carefully, execute them with vigor, and afford them your continuing personal attention.

2. SELF-INFLICTED WOUNDS (Dated 23 Nov 68):

   a. In the past three months ten members of this Regiment have wounded themselves with individual weapons. In all cases these men were medically evacuated out of the country and the majority will be lost to the Regiment permanently. There are two disturbing aspects to these incidents; both deserve strong command action. First, many of these injuries are the result of carelessness. The careless discharge of weapons is a violation of Article 134, UCMJ, and constitutes a threat to the welfare of the command. This situation will be brought under control. The second category of injuries are those that are intentionally self-inflicted in violation of Article 115, UCMJ. Strong disciplinary action in these cases is required.

   b. The speed of normal medical evacuation presents commanders with a unique problem in regard to self-inflicted wounds. Commanders must insure that prompt action is taken to determine whether or not disciplinary action is warranted. It is not enough to conclude that the man's injury is sufficient punishment. If he injured himself intentionally, he should be brought to trial for malingering.

   c. In order to insure that cases of self-inflicted wounds are properly handled and offenders receive appropriate disciplinary action, the following actions are directed:

      (1) Flagging action under the provisions of AR 600-31 will be taken immediately in all cases of self-inflicted wounds.

      (2) A line-of-duty investigation will be initiated immediately. This investigation will include taking witnesses' statements and will not be delayed pending receipt of written appointing orders.

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(3) Within 24 hours of the incident the S-1 of this headquarters will be notified by land line or radio of the preliminary conclusions of the investigating officer. This will enable this headquarters to request the hospital to delay evacuation pending preferral of charges or other administrative action. The completed line-of-duty investigation will be accompanied by a statement of contemplated disciplinary action.

d. A number of recent incidents of self-inflicted wounds have been caused by a lack of basic understanding of the proper method of clearing individual weapons, particularly the caliber .45 pistol. Additional individual training is the best solution to this problem. Therefore it is directed that each platoon size unit within the regiment conduct a monthly class, given by the platoon leader on the assembly, disassembly, general characteristics and proper clearing procedures for all individual weapons. Emphasis should be placed on the safety aspects of all weapons.

e. Upon completion of the training, a report from each subordinate unit will be forwarded to the S-3 of this headquarters.

f. It is of the utmost importance that every member of this regiment work diligently towards the reduction of these preventable incidents.

3. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS (Dated 28 Nov 65):

a. Recently, I have concluded that the flow of intelligence during enemy contacts within the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and subordinate and OPCON units is unsatisfactory. During extended periods of combat operations subordinate units under this command have been guilty of sending either inadequate or no reports to this Headquarters.

b. The mission and organization of the armored Cavalry Regiment has been specifically geared for the acquisition of combat intelligence. The effectiveness of our operations is directly proportional to the effectiveness of its intelligence reporting, not only in the historical employment of cavalry but particularly in this counter-insurgency environment. Thus combat operations of the 11th armored Cavalry Regiment against VC/NVA forces has been and will continue to be successful when its combat intelligence effectively identifies the enemy.

c. Each commander is directed to take positive steps in order to identify problem areas and correct problems related to the reporting of intelligence. Particular emphasis must be placed on submission of timely spot reports throughout enemy contacts from the scout sections/infantry squads through the entire chain of command to this Headquarters.
4. PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY (Dated 10 Dec 68):

a. Recent Reports of Survey have revealed a serious lack of property accountability within the Regiment. This situation can only lead to decreased combat effectiveness and loss of valuable time. The problem focuses in two areas: (1) Discovery of the loss and (2) Timely reporting.

b. Losses are all too frequently not discovered until there is a change of command or until the unit returns to base camp and stands down. At this time it is impossible to determine how or when the equipment was lost. A loss that could have been quickly handled with a minimum of effort under combat loss procedures then must be surveyed, requiring vital time and effort by the individuals involved.

c. Equipment accountability must receive command emphasis to minimize losses and to insure that when they occur they are immediately discovered and rapidly replaced. Accountability must be maintained down to vehicle and section level. Each vehicle commander should have a listing of the equipment on his vehicle to include serial numbers where applicable. An up to date duplicate copy should be maintained at platoon level for accurate reporting of combat loss. Vehicle inventories can be conducted on a regular basis in any situation without excessive loss of time and would serve to discover shortages without standing the entire unit down.

d. Reports of Survey will be handled more expeditiously. Experience indicates that the great majority of non-combat loss surveys are initiated while the unit is in base camp. Unfortunately, the survey is often delayed and a survey officer not appointed until just prior to the unit's return to the field, thereby making it virtually impossible for him to conduct an adequate investigation.

e. We cannot say that we do not have time to maintain accountability when we speak of the equipment with which we fight. It is the Commander's responsibility to insure that his equipment is present and serviceable when he needs it.

5. ACTIONS IN VC/NVA BASE CAMP AREAS (Dated 16 Dec 68):

a. Successful actions in enemy base camp areas, especially those situated in the jungle, require very close coordination between ground elements and supporting fires (artillery, gunships, and airstrikes), and is essentially a problem of reducing a fortified position. Base camps are usually well dug in positions with ample overhead cover, and all actions oriented toward their reduction must be geared accordingly. In addition, nearly all base camps have the majority of their defenses
oriented toward an attack from one or two sides. If a weak side can be identified, the base camp can be penetrated.

b. Nevertheless, direct assaults on base camp areas invariably result in an unfavorable casualty ratio. Therefore, they must first be attacked by fire. Where terrain permits, fire and maneuver can be employed to develop the extent of a base camp area and targets eliminated by air, artillery or direct fire of tank guns.

c. Base camps in jungle areas present more difficult problems. Seldom is it possible to maneuver in order to determine the extent of the fortified area or to flank the objective. Layers of jungle canopy often hinder effective air observation. Fire power must therefore be carefully applied in order to clear jungle canopy, destroy enemy positions, and seal off routes of egress. Adequate and responsive fire support is the key to success. Medium artillery, with fuze delay should be applied liberally in order to penetrate jungle canopy and destroy fortified positions. Light artillery can only suppress, not destroy, but can be effectively used to interdict the escape routes from the base camp. Airstrikes with bombs, napalm, and CS should be placed directly on the enemy positions.

d. If at all possible, extensive base camp areas should first be attacked by B-52's, followed immediately by air assaulted infantry who are guided through the area by aero scouts. The use of armed helicopters against troops in fortified positions is of little value.

e. Only after extensive softening up by fire and assessment by an aerial observer should troops enter to complete the reduction of a base camp. After the enemy has been routed, every attempt should be made to make the base camp valueless to the enemy. A thorough search for documents, weapons and food caches should be made. Bunkers should be blown and tunnels should be salted with CS crystals or CS gas before they are blown to make redigging impossible. After all this is done, the use of "stay behind" patrols should be considered as the enemy habitually reenters an area to recover bodies and material. If available, a bulldozer should be used to close all holes and fortifications.

f. Engineers should be habitually requested in these type operations; i.e. one squad for a company and a platoon for a battalion. In this regard, commanders should always plan for more demolition materials than they believe are required at the time.

g. In the reduction of enemy base camps judicious application of firepower plays the dominant role.
a. The vehicular mine threat in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment area of operation is a constant concern for all units operating in this area. The purpose of this issue is to inform unit commanders of conclusions and generalities derived from mine discoveries and incidents. It is felt that the present enemy practice is to make use of numerous isolated mines and groups of mines for their nuisance value and to create casualties, fear and overcautiousness. It is evident in VN that VC/NVA commanders at the lowest level of line units have the authority to install mines as required.

b. Methods of Employment on Dirt Roads and Trails:

(1) Dirt roads and trails are easily mined, since the traces normally can be completely eliminated. In instances where traces cannot be eliminated, the VC use a number of tricks in addition to the normal mine laying techniques used by both sides.

(2) One unusual technique takes advantage of a human character trait, which is carelessness. The VC dig up the road and leave, a normal method of cutting lines of communications. Friendly troops fill in the dug up sections and the VC return to lay mines in the refilled areas. These areas must be checked day after day even though nothing is found. The VC expect you to assume an area is clean after it has been checked, and to become careless and not recheck it. The VC may dig holes in the road, lay mines in a few of them, and refill them with dirt. After the mine detecting teams check dozens of holes and find nothing in most of them, the next hole may be expected also to be empty and may not be checked. That carelessness is what the VC expect, for they have probably mined that particular hole, hoping you will ignore it.

(3) Some mines may be planted and then covered with straw, grass, or any natural looking substance. The way to avoid casualties is to check everything.

(4) The above tricks are used in addition to the normal methods of mine laying used by most armies. The best method of mine detection can be summarized as follows: (1) Check all places newly refilled with soil, covered with straw or grass, littered with dung, or any suspicious looking spot. (2) Do not depend solely on a mine detector. The detector works on the principle of a magnetic field and has a limited range. If the batteries are weak or the detector malfunctions, the mine will not be found. Then, too, the enemy may employ non-metallic mines. To counter this tactic, the team should gingerly probe the suspected area with a metal rod or bayonet in addition to using the detector. The probing should be done at an angle to the ground to lessen chances of setting the mine off. (3) Be patient and continually check and recheck possible
mine locations. Do not fall into the trap of assuming there is no mine in a hole because it was not there yesterday. (4) Work with the local people who may be able to provide information on possible VC mine laying operations.

c. Methods of Employment on Hard Surfaced Roads:

(1) Hard surfaced roads obviously present a more difficult problem. The VC may come up with some very effective ways to trick mine detecting teams.

(2) The VC tunnel under the road from the shoulder and plant a mine. The VC prepares the mine for command detonation, usually electrical, and carefully fills in the tunnel. Traces of this burrowing activity can be eliminated because of the dirt shoulder. The leads to the mine are concealed and generally terminate in a place where a VC can hide while waiting for his victim. This setup is a very difficult one to detect and requires careful inspection of the shoulders of the road for wires or traces of digging. If wires are found, they should be checked and cut. Then the mine must be dug up and disarmed or destroyed.

(3) Tricks are employed which are similar to those used on dirt roads. One of these includes digging up sections of the road. After these areas are filled in, the VC return and lay mines in a few of them. This is the same tactic used on dirt roads and is countered in the same way by constant checking.

(4) The VC smear the road with mud. This condition forces a mine detecting team to check the area carefully. The smearing may go on for several days until one day the VC emplaces mines in the muddied sections. The mine detecting teams, having checked the areas before with no results, may become a little careless and miss these mines. Again, this carelessness is what the VC expect. The smeared areas must be carefully checked each time troops must cross them.

(5) Another trick is to dig up the road, lay the mine, and refill the hole with asphalt. A spot usually remains that contrasts with the surrounding asphalt. To avoid detection, the VC use a tire to mark across the patch and blend it in with the road surface. To counter this tactic, the detecting team must be alert for any signs of road repair. Each spot must be carefully checked with a detector and a probe.

(6) The soft earth shoulders of surfaced roads are often mined. This tactic is easily accomplished and provides an effective trap for unwary troops. This method is not limited to hard surfaced roads but also may be used on dirt roads and trails. Roadside mining is used most often in ambush sites where the vehicles and men are to be driven off the road by fire. Again, the watchword is caution and thoroughness when clearing the road.
d. Likely Places of Employment: Generally, mines are used wherever vehicles can be expected to bunch up, slow down, or present a good target. Such areas are bridges, curves in roads, single track roads or trails, junctions and hillsides. Any place that is a good ambush site is usually a good mine site, and mines are often emplaced with ambushes. Since many of the larger mines are command detonated, the VC need a place of cover and concealment for the person who will initiate the mine. Be alert for these areas, particularly when operating on roads.

e. Viet Cong Methods of Marking Mines:

(1) The marking techniques described below have been discovered throughout South Vietnam. No pattern or standard of enemy mine marking has been determined. The reported Viet Cong mine markers are only a minor indication of enemy mine locations because current information indicates that many mines are not marked in any manner.

(2) Three sticks are placed on the trail to form an arrow. The direction of the arrow does not always indicate the direction of the mine.

(3) Four sticks; three are laid to form an arrow; the fourth stick is laid across the arrow stem. The relationship between the arrowhead and the danger area is unknown.

(4) The "Y" arrangement is sometimes found farther down the trail from the arrowhead indicating the limit of the danger area. The distance from these markers to the danger area is unknown.

(5) A piece of bamboo stick 15 to 21 centimeters long is covered on one end by a larger joint of bamboo. The bamboo stick is stuck into the ground at about a 45 degree angle with the larger end of the device pointing toward a mine.

(6) The VC will break the top from a small sapling and strip most of the branches from it. One branch will be left on the sapling and it will point down the road or trail. Usually a mine is located 50 to 100 meters farther along the road or trail.

(7) A stick or length of bamboo broken at a right angle and lying across the road or trail may mean a mine 200-400 meters ahead. Similarly, a bush or small tree growing alongside the trail with the top broken over to one side and stripped of its leaves may indicate a mine ahead.

(8) A banana leaf or other similar type leaf is folded in half with a thin stick approximately the thickness of a tooth pick woven through the leaf in two places, is used to mark mine locations. The
(9) Growing grass is tied to form four growing sheaves of grass. The tied sheaves form a square whose sides measure approximately two meters. The mine is buried or concealed in the center of the square.

(10) Two leaves 20-30 centimeters in length placed parallel to each other on top of the mine.

(11) Various formations of small rocks have been placed on trails to serve as warning of mines ahead. These rock formations have been placed in circular, pyramid, and straight line patterns. The distance from these mine markers to the location of the mine is unknown.

(12) A circle of rocks approximately one meter in diameter with a smaller circle of rocks inside it, or a small circle of rocks with a single rock in the center has been used to mark mines. Mines are usually 150 to 200 meters farther along the trail or road.

(13) Three sticks or stones, one on each side of the road and one in the middle, usually means a mine is 200 to 400 meters farther along the road.

(14) Red "X" signs are placed on roads and trails leading to mined areas. This sign indicates a prohibited area and personnel must proceed with caution or by-pass this area.

(15) The VC has capitalized on our habit of following old vehicle tracks by placing mines in these tracks. These mines are sometimes marked with crossed sticks or an arrangement of small rocks on the track in front of the mine. The location of the mine in relation to these markers is unknown. The mine may be under the marker or up to 400 meters on.

f. I desire that continued command emphasis be given to insure dissemination of this information to all personnel.

7. LOADED WEAPONS POLICY (Dated 21 Dec 68):

a. A number of recent incidents which resulted in the death or injury of members of this command have caused me to conclude that there is a critical need for a uniform policy throughout the Regiment dealing with when weapons should be loaded and when not. Therefore, all units will institute the following policies in their unit SOPs. The basic rule to be followed is Specifically, the following will apply on operations and movements when contact is not considered imminent:

(1) The 90 mm tank gun may have a round chambered while on an operation. However, the tank commander must insure that the safety is on and the main gun switch off.
(2) The .50 cal machine gun may be in the "half load" position.

(3) The M-60 (7.62 mm) machine gun may have a belt loaded; however, the safety must be on.

(4) All individual weapons may have magazines loaded but will not have a round chambered. The only exception to this rule is an individual on a patrol, whether moving or stationary, should have a round chambered with the safety on. There is no reason for any weapon to have a round chambered while approaching a friendly position or while occupying an NDP. All weapons will be cleared prior to entering any friendly base camp NDP, or FSB. Further, when approaching any friendly position, weapons will be oriented away from friendly forces.

b. The above requirements are necessary in order that we prevent accidental discharge of weapons and the resulting needless injuries and loss of life. Commanders are directed to insure that these policies are put into effect immediately and that they are constantly checked. I will personally inspect for implementation of this policy.

8. COMMUNICATIONS COMBAT POSTURE (Dated 22 Dec 68):
   a. A keynote to any unit's success in battle is its ability to "move, shoot, and communicate." A lack of the capability to do any or all of these items is like going into a prizefight with one hand tied behind your back. To commit your men to planned combat without operational intercommunications and radio equipment is to reinforce disaster.

   b. As I stated in an earlier Commander's Note, the ability to move, shoot and communicate is directly related to the amount of supervised maintenance effort expended by the unit. I expect commanders at all levels to insure the following:

      (1) That proper operator and organizational maintenance is performed upon all communications equipment.

      (2) That appropriate routine and emergency supply procedures are initiated at all levels to provide the required repair and replacement parts for inoperative equipment.

      (3) That accurate reports be rendered up the chain of command to inform the commander and his staff of the true communications posture together with the actions taken to correct existing deficiencies.

      (4) That no combat vehicle is deployed outside the NDPs without intercom and an operational radio if one is, in fact, authorized.
9. **MALARIA PREVENTION** (Dated 5 Jan 69):

a. From our steadily increasing malaria rate and from personal interviews with the troops, it is apparent that the present level of malaria prophylaxis in the Regiment is unsatisfactory.

b. The attention of all Commanders is directed to 11th ACR Regulation No 40-1 (19 Aug 68) and change 1 (17 Oct 68). Special command emphasis will be placed on the maintenance of rosters for the distribution of both the weekly C-F tablet and the daily Dapsone tablet. These rosters should be maintained by the chain of command starting at Platoon level. They are to be collected and checked at company or troop level, kept for 1 year and destroyed. I will personally inspect those rosters and expect addressees to do the same.

c. Greater attention must also be paid to the employment of personal protective measures: sleeves rolled down at night, use of insect repellent, mosquito bed nets. Field conditions may influence the degree to which these measures are practical, but every effort should be made to take as many precautions as possible. For example, while mosquito netting would not be available on an ambush, the liberal use of insect repellent should be required. There is no reason why every man in a fixed NDP should not sleep under net.

d. I re-emphasize that malaria prevention is a command function, and the observance of the above procedures is one index of unit morale and discipline.

e. Should the Regiment or any part of it, move into a particularly endemic area without the precautions outlined above, the result could be a disastrous malaria epidemic. It is each commander's responsibility to insure that his unit is properly protected.

10. **PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM** (Dated 7 Jan 69):

a. In order to insure that the Regiment maintains a high degree of readiness, I am anxious that commanders at all levels be aware of their responsibilities in the implementation of their maintenance programs.

b. A recent message from LG Kerwin, CG, II FFV, emphasizes the importance of our maintenance program. "Operations and maintenance are directly related. A balance must be maintained between the two in each unit's effort and each commander must weigh the emphasis to be placed on each of these areas. Time for maintenance must be programmed and the same quality of organization must exist for maintenance as for operations. The chain of command becomes the chain of maintenance responsibility and the team work required to perform the operational
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mission must continue in the maintenance effort. It is important that the squad, section or platoon perform maintenance on its equipment as a team, supervised by the non-commissioned and commissioned officers in the chain of command."

c. 11th ACR Regulations 750-2 and 750-3 provide the basis for a sound maintenance program. Any maintenance program, however, is only as good as the people who are implementing it. I expect every man in the Regiment to be familiar with the first echelon maintenance procedures on the vehicles with which he is associated and to perform his duties with the same skill and enthusiasm as he performs his operational duties.

d. The performance of proper maintenance on all equipment cannot be neglected. Scheduled services must be performed on a regular basis. Although the tactical situation must necessarily dictate the timing of all maintenance, this is not to say, that the tactical situation can be used as an excuse for failure to perform necessary maintenance. There are no situations which prevent a unit from performing its minimum maintenance duties.

e. There is an increasing shortage of vehicles and repair parts in the theatre. If the Regiment is to maintain its current readiness status, there must be an increased emphasis on proper preventive maintenance procedures. The failure of any equipment due to improper operation or faulty maintenance procedures cannot and will not be tolerated.
TYPICAL VIET CONG POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUCTURE AT VILLAGE LEVEL

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MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
Uy ban quan su vu

HAMLET #1
GUERRILLA FORCE
Lp #1 lục lượng
du kích

FARMER'S LIBERATION ASSOCIATION
Hiệp hội nông dân giải phóng

HAMLET #2
GUERRILLA FORCE
Lp #2 lục lượng
du kích

NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT VILLAGE COMMITTEE
Nét trên giải phóng xã ủy

WOMEN'S LIBERATION ASSOCIATION
Hiệp hội phụ nữ giải phóng

YOUTH LIBERATION ASSOCIATION
Hiệp hội thanh niên giải phóng

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
1. In early 1967, the 11th ACR was allotted 5 of the 25 Belly Armor Kits for the H-113A1 introduced into the theater for testing. The kit consists of a 3/4" steel plate extending along the belly from approximately six inches up the front slope to just behind the crew commander's hatch. The plate is bolted in place and weighs approximately 1,200 lbs.

2. Due to the low density of Belly Armor Kits in the Regiment, it was Aug 68 before the first ACAV equipped with the armor struck an AT mine. There were no casualties and no damage. The second mine hit was in Sep 68, again with no casualties and only light repairable damage.

3. In Sep 68, the 11th ACR requested that all its ACAVs be equipped with the additional belly armor. In Oct 68, USARV directed that all the 1st Inf Div and 9th Inf Div kits be transferred to the 11th ACR for further testing. At this time 16 11th ACR ACAVs were equipped with the armor. To date, there have been no additional mining incidents involving these vehicles.

4. The equipment is well designed. It is easily installed, offers no maintenance problems, and had negligible effect on the design operating characteristics of the vehicle. It has two primary advantages: First, its use can greatly reduce the number of casualties inflicted by mines. Secondly, damage caused by mines can be kept to a minimum. In the two cases to date, at most only light damage was inflicted on the ACAV. As a consequence, the crews have greater confidence in their equipment, and the combat effectiveness of the H-113A1 is greatly improved by the use of the Belly Armor Kits.

5. The Commander judges that the Belly Armor Kits significantly reduce equipment damage, save lives, and instill greater confidence in the vehicle. Accordingly, he has requested that an additional 309 Belly Armor Kits be made available immediately.
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.

**CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment**

**Unauthenticated**

**HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310**

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