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AUTHORITY

OAG, D/A ltr, 2 May 1975 OAG, D/A ltr, 2 May 1975

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

13 June 1969

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (10 Jun 69) FOR OT UT 691349

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days, of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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C. A. STANFIEL
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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21 February 1969


THRU: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA GO-O
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United States Army Vietnam
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TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (C) Section I, Operation: Significant Activities. a. (C) The US Army Support Command, Da Nang (USASUPCOM, DNG) continued to provide logistical support to all US Army units operating in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). Mortuary and property disposal services were provided to all US Forces in ICTZ and in support of Free World Military Armed Forces (FWMAP) as directed. During the reporting period, the USASUPCOM, DNG was engaged in logistical support operations for 92 days. The logistical operations conducted involved employment of the Support Command's units in direct support of the American Division operations in Southern I Corps, 1st Air Cav Division operating in the Pho Trach area, 101st Airborne
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Division operating in the vicinity of Phu Bai, 1st Bde, 5th Mech Inf Division operating in the vicinity of Quang Tri and 3d Squadron, 5th Armored Cav Regt operating in the vicinity of Quang Tri. In addition, all non-divisional Army units operating within ICTZ were supported. Class I was provided to Marines in the Phu Bai area, and the Naval Detachment at Sa Huynh. Inclosure 1 contains organizational chart.

b. (U) Command Group Activities.

(1) The following key personnel changes occurred within the USASUPCOM, DNG:

(a) On 6 November 1969, Brigadier General James W. Gunn, CG, USASUPCOM, DNG received the silver stars of a Brigadier General in a promotion ceremony conducted by Lieutenant General Frank T. Mildren, Deputy Commanding General, USARV.

(b) Colonel Warren H. Jepson assumed duties as Deputy Commander, USASUPCOM, DNG on 16 November 1969, replacing Colonel Thomas A. Mort.

(c) Major John A. Cooper assumed duties as Secretary of the General Staff, USASUPCOM, DNG on 16 November 1968.

(d) Major Herman J. Vanbebber assumed duties as Secretary of the General Staff, USASUPCOM, DNG on 20 January 1969, replacing Major John A. Cooper.

(e) Major Eugene R. Lanzillo assumed the duties as ACofS, SP&O on 5 November 1968, replacing LTC Allen Williams.

(2) The USASUPCOM, DNG continued to be a key point of interest for distinguished visitors. During this period, the headquarters was visited by:

(a) LTG Ferdinand J. Chesarek, Asst Vice Chief of Staff, DA.

(b) Mr. Gerald B. Russell, Deputy ASA (I&L), DA.

(c) Mr. Richard L. Saintsing, Deputy ASA (FM), DA.

(d) Honorable D. E. McGiffert, Under Secretary of the Army.

(e) LTG Frank T. Mildren, Deputy Commanding General, USARV.

(f) Other distinguished visitors are listed in inclosure 2.

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(3) The USASUPCOM, DNG hosted the 1st Logistical Command Commanders Conference on 20 January 1969. All Support Command Commanders and Depot Commanders were present.

c. (U) ACofS, Comptroller (inclosure 3). On 20 December 1968, the account of the 192d Finance Section (Disbursing) (FS) was inactivated. In conjunction therewith, the 64th (113th) FS was transferred to Da Nang to assume the finance support mission previously performed by the 192d FS. An element of the 64th (113th) FS remained in Phu Bai and was designated a Class B Agent Finance Office to service the troops in that area. Additionally, 26 enlisted personnel and one officer were transferred from Phu Bai to Quang Tri to form a Class B Agent Finance Office in support of the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division effective 15 January 1969. The latter move will provide more responsive finance service to the troops in the area. Effective 16 December 1968, the 64th FS and 113th FS were assigned to the 80th General Support Group with the 113th FS further assigned to the 64th FS. Operational control of both units remained with Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang.

d. (U) ACofS, Personnel and Administration (inclosure 4). The Army motor vehicle accidents exceeded the expectancy rate in December, and the Military disabling injuries exceeded the expectancy rate in November. A civilian safety director has been assigned to give the command professional guidance in its attempt to reduce these rates. A complete Army education program has been made available at Da Nang with the assignment of a civilian education director. Civilian education service officers have also been assigned to Phu Bai and Quang Tri and complete programs are planned there as well.

e. (C) ACofS, SP&O Security Division (inclosure 5). Command emphasis was placed on convoy security and project alert. On 4 January 1969, a security officers conference was held at headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang. The purpose of this conference was to create a better understanding of the security problems facing the command. The 524th MI Detachment continued to provide counterintelligence support for the command and its subordinate units. Enemy activity throughout IOTZ continued at a light to moderate level. With the decrease of enemy activity on the battlefield came an increase in terrorism in an effort to intimidate the Vietnamese people. USASUPCOM Regulation 525-2 was published in January 1969 to provide guidance for subordinate units in the conduct of rear area damage control. A weekly intelligence summary is published by this office and distributed to subordinate units. In January improvements were made in the security of the Support Command Compound, by stringing additional wire and building firing bunkers. Enemy interdiction of LOC's remained at a moderate level with the Cua Viet River being primary target.

f. (U) ACofS, SRO, Plans Division (inclosure 6). The TDA for Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, USASUPCOM, DNG was received from 1st Logistical Command on 25 January 1969. A number of changes were made by Department of the Army. An MTDA is in the planning stages and will be submitted next month. A total of ten (10) units were deployed to I Corps Tactical Zone and four (4) units were deployed from ICTZ during the reporting period.

g. (C) ACofS, SRO, Operation Division (inclosure 7). During this period the Logistical Operational Control Center was established, within this structure, a system of obtaining daily reports became of prime importance as the Da Nang Support Command moved from an operational concept of Supply Points. With the phasing out of various FSA's in the Northern and Southern I Corps, Supply Points have been established, and will continue to be established in the future. Supply Points in Da Nang and Chu Lai are being considered. Project Redistribution was initiated during this period, to return equipment on loan from the Qui Nhon Support Command.

h. (U) ACofS, SRO, Civil Affairs (inclosure 8). During this period, 55,000 board feet of lumber, 250 sheets of tin, and 11 pallets of cement were delivered to the Village of Hoa Long (068 704), the hamlets of Son Thuy II (068 713), Kim Son (068 713) and the Refugee Camp in Hoa Long Village. This material was utilized in the construction of the area destroyed by Viet Cong Terrorists during August and September. This Viet Cong Terrorist activity has tended to alienate the people toward massive Civil Affairs building projects. However, some progress has been made, as evident in the repair of 27 homes and one (1) school; a room was added to the school built the previous quarter, five (5) wells were built in the New Life Refugee Camp, and accumulated garbage and waste was collected and disposed of. Tours of interesting and historical areas of Da Nang were conducted for United States Army personnel, US Army personnel participated in fifteen (15) Christmas parties throughout the I Corps area (Da Nang, Phu Bai and Quang Tri). For Vietnamese children and orphans, these parties were sponsored by Civil Affairs, Da Nang Support Command. The Da Nang and the Tien Sha Chapter of the Boy Scouts continued to receive support from the Da Nang Support Command, CA Section. Four (4) campouts were conducted in the areas of Red Beach and China Beach. The Da Nang Support Command provided transportation and eating utensils for the outing.

i. (U) ACofS, Supply (inclosure 9). Sufficient stocks of Class II and IV supplies were on hand in the depot and DSU/GSU's to support current operations. Project Fill was initiated in early November to reduce zero balances on critical items in the depot and DSU/GSU's in the command. Over 3,900 zero balance lines have been reported. A fill rate of approximately 11 percent has been experienced. Project Count II continues. The depot has completed approximately 90 percent
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of its second inventory. A project is underway to replace 69 gas operated M8A2C Tanks with M8A3 diesel operated Tanks in the 1/5 Infantry Division (Mech). Program 6 units are fully operational and are performing valuable services. ACofS, Supply acted on 51 Reports of Survey, one (1) combat loss, and 28 Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss during the period.

j. (U) ACofS, Food (inclosure 10). Throughout the reporting period, there were sufficient stocks of class I supplies located at all supply points, and FSA's to sustain operations. During the month of December, the Quang Tri Class I issue point was closed. Class I assets, which were minimal, were transferred to Phu Bai. Also, during the month of December, the bakery located at Quang Tri, was moved and re-established operations in Phu Bai.

k. (C) Assistant Chief of Staff, Petroleum (inclosure 11). Total bulk petroleum issued for the period was 19,968,000 gallons. Of this amount, 2,399,080 gallons were pumped through the 18.2 mile Tan My/Hue/Phu Bai Pipeline and 3,102,387 gallons were pumped through the 4.5 mile Dong Ha/Quang Tri Pipeline. A total of 16,001,000 gallons were line hauled in ICTZ. During this time frame, the pipeline from Hue to Quang Tri became operational for single product use. Incomplete manifolding of pipe into the farm complex, caused the line to operate inefficiently. However, some 452,600 gallons of JP-4 have been pumped through the Hue/Quang Tri Pipeline and stored/issued from the tank farm at Quang Tri.

Indications are that after the initial flaws have been corrected and the full complement of pumps become operational, this line will possess an increased potential for the future support of I Corps units. Total tonnage of packaged products issued during the months November - January equaled 1,559 S/T. NOTE: May - July equaled 1,019; August - October equaled 693 S/T.

l. (U) ACofS, Ammunition (inclosure 12). Construction on the Quang Tri and Camp Evans ASP was completed during the reporting period. Installation of guard towers and perimeter lighting at Da Nang ASP # 2 was completed. The 205th Ord Pit (Ammo) was released from Da Nang Support Command on 11 November 1968. Major improvements in on-hand stocks resulted from changes in ordering procedures which established push supply on Intensively Managed Items. Support of Operation Liberty Cannon indicated the need for pre-establishing stringent controls and monitoring of ammunition service during major troop shifts.

m. (C) ACofS, Transportation (inclosure 13). During the month of November transportation support to the 1st Air Cav Div terminated upon the successful conclusion of Operation Liberty Cannon. On 14 November
the 235th Trans Platoon arrived in Da Nang and began convoy support to LZ Baldy. In early December the 363d Trans Co transported airfield matting to Au Hoi to assist III MAF in preparation for Operation Taylor Common and during the latter part of December the 57th Trans Bn (HHD) deployed to Chu Lai in support of the Americal Division. The Shore Platoon, 26th Trans Co processed 35,309 S/T of Army cargo through the major airfields in the ICTZ and the Movement Control Center (MCC's) processed 17,154 TCMD's aggregating 197,140 S/T of the Army cargo, during the reporting period. Railway operation commenced in the NICTZ during the month of January. A trial shipment of 60 S/T of lube oil was shipped from Da Nang to Hue on 30 January. Regular military shipments are anticipated when construction of spur lines are completed in Da Nang and Phu Bai.

n. (U) ACofS, Retrograde and Disposal (inclosure 14). The Property Disposal Activity (PDA) changed accountable officers and had an increase in enlisted strength of five (5) personnel during the period. The 633d CC&S Company was filled to 100% of authorized strength under "type 1" authorization. An R/M was submitted by 633d CC&S in December 1968 to increase the lift capability commensurate with current workload which has increased fifty (50) percent during the reported period. The personnel ceiling for the PDO was increased to 15 enlisted men and 1 DAC.

o. (U) ACofS, Maintenance (inclosure 15). LTC Patrick W. Wilson succeeded LTC H. A. Dillon as Director of Maintenance on 13 November 1968. A Quarterly Maintenance Service Program for M107/M10 Artillery Pieces was implemented on 1 November 1968. The 596th Light Maintenance Company moved from Quang Tri to Phu Bai on 13 December 1968. The 510th Engr Plt, attached to 67th Maint Co was scheduled to return to Qui Nhon on 30 December, but was extended until 3 January 1969.

p. (U) Command Engineer (inclosure 16). Primary emphasis was given to the development of the Master Cantonment Plan for US Army Support Command units located in the Da Nang East area and subsequent preparation and submission of Military Construction Line Item Data (DD Form 1391) for essential facilities. The acceleration of this program has resulted in favorable consideration by higher headquarters of many projects urgently required for effective mission accomplishment. On 19 January 1969, a new policy was enacted by III Marine Amphibious Force which assigned coordinator responsibility for Base Development/Area Coordinator functions for all Army units in Da Nang Complex to CG, US Army Support Command, Da Nang. Pending development of approval of a command MTDA which includes the position of Headquarters Commandant/Area Coordinator, the Command Engineer will execute primary staff supervision over area coordinator functions in Da Nang which includes base development approval for all Army (Da Nang) Military Construction Army (MCA) projects except.
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for joint-use facilities approval which is retained by Commander Naval Force Vietnam (COMNAVFORV), Representative, DNG, establishment and maintenance of a central MCA Project file (DD Form 1391), and utilization of Army controlled facilities in Da Nang.

q. (U) Command Chaplain (inclosure 17). Three training conferences were conducted with all command chaplains attending. There was a steady increase in Chapel attendance during this period. Designated offerings in the amount of RVN $336,170 were received for Vietnamese schools and orphanage, $11,728 for churches and $10,237 as miscellaneous.

r. (U) Headquarters Commandant (inclosure 18). Average strength of the Command during this reporting period was 221 personnel. As of January a total of 226 personnel were assigned to this Command, broken down as follows: Officers - 74, Warrant Officers - 5, Enlisted Men - 147. Seven (7) billets were completed in November and a eighty (80) man 'bunker' was started. In December the Navy Seabees completed construction of four (4) Navy "Sea Huts". CPT Paul J. Charles replaced 1LT D. F. Weibel as Commanding Officer of HHD, USASUPCM, DNG. A new EM Club was opened on 23 December 1968 and a new movie screen erected. A volley ball court was erected in December 1968. Increased security actions were taken in January in preparation for a possible TET offensive. A through inventory of all installation and organizational property was conducted. New equipment was received and installed in the Company Mess Hall. Remodeling of the orderly room and expansion of the unit dayroom was completed in January.

s. (U) Command Judge Advocate (inclosure 19). The summary of military justice activities is given in inclosure.

t. (U) Provost Marshal (inclosure 20). No major operational changes occurred during the period 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969. Personnel losses and gains had no major impact on the operational capabilities of the section. Numerous coordination visits were made to this staff section by commander's and provost marshal of other units during this period. Coordination/liaison visits by members of this staff section to units in outlying areas were made frequently during the quarter. This command was instrumental in obtaining assignment of the first U.S. Army Military Policemen to the Armed Forces Police Detachment, Da Nang, manned by the US Marine Corps.

u. (U) Signal Office (inclosure 21). The summary of signal activities is given in inclosure.
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2. (C) Section II, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

   a. (U) Personnel:

   (1) Item: Prior to this reporting period education services in the command were supervised and provided only by additional duty education officers.

      (a) Observation: Such additional duty officers were unable to provide the full range of education services required by the Support Command and supported units.

      (b) Evaluation: It was necessary to replace these additional duty education officers with full time professional civilian GED officers. This has been accomplished.

      (c) Recommendation: None

   (2) Item: Safety:

      (a) Observation: It was noted that despite strong command emphasis, accident rates remained unacceptably high.

      (b) Evaluation: Assignment of a full time civilian safety adviser was required to give the command professional guidance in the conduct of its safety program. Such an advisor has been assigned.

      (c) Recommendation: None

   (3) Item: Command emphasis:

      (a) Observation: On 15 December 1968 and 22 December 1968, the Da Nang Support Command sponsored Christmas parties for the Vietnamese children and orphans. The Vietnamese sponsor was Captain CHANH, an ARVN Officer. The highlight of the party was the appearance of the Commanding General of the Da Nang Support Command.

      (b) Evaluation: The appearance of the Commanding General added importance to the occasion. The General's appearance reinforced to the Vietnamese children and the ARVN Officer the importance of the party to the command, and that those invited on the compound were honored guests worthy of special treatment.

      (c) Recommendation: That an attempt be made to encourage important members of the command and staff to participate in these type functions.

   b. (C) Operations:

(a) Observation: On 16 January 1969 a nine vehicle convoy was ambushed on highway QL-1 between Duc Pho and Sa Huynh in Quang Nhai Province. Automatic weapons fire was received from the left side of the road while the convoy was passing through a high mountain pass. The lead gun jeep immediately returned fire and led the convoy from the killing zone. The convoy commander in the lead jeep immediately radioed the rear jeep causing it, along with two five ton trucks, to stop outside of the kill zone. These three vehicles received no enemy fire. The driver of a bob-tailed tractor was wounded in the lower torso and after being treated at the scene was evacuated. It should be noted that this individual, along with others in the convoy was not wearing the proper body armor.

(b) Evaluation: It should be noted that in this instance, that communications were adequate, and the convoy commander took appropriate immediate action at the onset of the ambush. Individuals, however, were not wearing the proper body armor, i.e., flak jackets and steel pots. The convoy commander should have instructed all individuals to wear these articles prior to the departure of the convoy.

(c) Recommendations: In addition to adhering to the provisions of LC Reg 525-3, it is strongly recommended that commanders at all levels take steps to insure that individuals proceeding in convoys wear body armor, as this may preclude unnecessary casualties.

(2) Item: Timely Changes in Weapons Density:

(a) Observation: During Operation Liberty Canyon delays in reporting weapons densities to support elements caused many shortages/or excesses of ammunition items in I Corps.

(b) Evaluation: As units of 1st Air Cav Div deployed to another Corps area and other units assumed responsibility for vacated areas, a delay in reporting changes in weapons densities caused many management problems. No lead time was given to support elements to redirect shipments already in supply channels. Consequently the supporting ASP's located nearest the new units were operating under shortages of many ammunition items plus excessive transportation requirements.

(c) Recommendation: That procedures be established to notify support elements at earliest date when a move is to be made to include weapons densities of incoming units to vacated areas thus allowing for aggressive management procedures to re-compute stockage objectives and re-direct incoming shipments.
ITEM: Distribution of Food and Clothing to Needy:

(a) Observation: During community relations activities, it is necessary to search out those people who are in need of clothing and food. If distribution of these items are made to people who do not actually need them, the material will go to waste or be sold.

(b) Evaluation: The best way to determine those persons or families who are in need is to contact a charitable institution in the area of operations, i.e., missions or church groups.

(c) Recommendation: Distribute clothing and food stuffs to institutions, missions, and church groups for holding and further distribution to the poor and needy.

ITEM: Project Support:

(a) Observation: During the Civil Affairs projects in the Village of Hoa Long (068 701), it was discovered that programs were best received by the people when they themselves directed the project. A farming project conducted by Civil Affairs, Da Nang Support Command was most successful. The people were shown how to grow new crops (Chinese Cabbage, radishes, potatoes, and corn) and the techniques involved in their planting. The people were given seeds and left on their own.

(b) Evaluation: The people took active leadership and acted in cooperation through the initial stages of the project. This was the first cooperation that this CA Office had witnessed.

(c) Recommendation: That program leadership and project planning be left to the people as much as possible. Although initial progress may be slower, the long range effectiveness of the project will be greatly increased.

ITEM: Security as the First Step in Civic Action:

(a) Observation: In Son Thuy II (068 713), and hamlet within Hoa Long Village, and a main avenue of approach for Viet Cong sappers, it was noted that the people were reluctant to cooperate on Civic Action projects. This is understandable due to VC reprisals. Although the security forces were present in the hamlet during the daylight hours, they were withdrawn to a nearby compound during the night hours for better observation of the area.
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(b) Evaluation: Although the people knew the troops were ready at hand, the people disliked the troops leaving the immediate hamlet area. Not understanding the true reason, the people thought the troops were afraid of the hamlet at night.

(c) Recommendation: Effective security should be the main consideration in establishing Civic Action Programs in insecure and contested areas of Vietnam.

(6) Item: Supply Points:

(a) Observation: Task Force 26-U was officially terminated as an FSA 24 November 1968, thereby completing the change over from FSA's to Supply Points in the NICTZ. This provides NICTZ a system of Supply Points located at Phu Bai and Quang Tri; an ASP is also located at Camp Evans. Supply Points as originally planned for Da Nang and Chu Lai are still under consideration.

(b) Evaluation: The establishment of Supply Points at Quang Tri and Phu Bai has created a satisfactory system of resupply within NICTZ.

(c) Recommendation: That Supply Points be considered for SICTZ support.

(7) Item: Operation Liberty Canyon:

(a) Observation: Movement of the 1st Air Cav Div (AM) was termed a highly successful move, as this was the first such movement of an entire division within Vietnam.

(b) Evaluation: Some of the important considerations of the move are as follows:

1. A total of 2700 S/T's of retrograde material was turned over to the 26th General Support Group. 400 S/T's of unidentifiable but serviceable repair parts were also turned in. A large amount of Class II & IV was expected to be turned in to the 26th GSG. However, 1st Air Cav Div (AM) still took sizeable quantities with them in the move. If this move had been an out of country move, 1st Air Cav would probably have left these supplies behind.

2. Large amounts of assorted ammunition were found abandoned at Camp Evans and other locations after the departure of the 1st Cav. No paper work was available on this ammunition and much of it was loose and unserviceable. The 336th Ordnance Battalion, was able to identify 11

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over 130 S/T's of this ammunition, valued at approximately $530,000. Approximately 100 S/T's of unidentified ammunition had to be destroyed. Several large caches of 2.75mm rocket rounds and 155mm rocket rounds Improved Conventional Munition (ICM) were found to be already fused.

3 A semi-trailer broke down on the road to Tan My ramp partially blocking the road and tying up traffic for approximately 10 hours.

(c) Recommendations:

1 Movement plans should be developed for all units supported by 1st Logistical Command. These plans should include predetermined staging areas, the amount of cargo and number of personnel to be moved, type and amount of transportation required and the type and amount of retrograde, Class I, Class IV and other equipment that is expected to be turned over to supporting units.

2 To eliminate traffic bottle-necks, road patrols with radio communications should be on duty. Vehicles maintenance service equipment could also be located to quickly remove vehicles that break down.

3 Support Commands should prepare for the specific locations, and designated units for the processing of turn-in equipment and supplies so that it may be accomplished with minimum delay.

(8) Item: Movement of Units:

(a) Observation: Close coordination by the Operation Division was necessary to move units with a minimum of difficulty within ICTZ.

(b) Evaluation: All moves have been successful with little difficulty involved.

(c) Recommendation: That unit commanders continue to brief their personnel on the security aspects of unit moves and insure all personnel wear their protective personal equipment when traveling in convoys.

(9) Item: Resupply Activities:

(a) Observation: There has been developing a trend towards relying heavily on emergency cargo shipments to accomplish resupply when ever a slight delay is encountered in normal transportation movements.

(b) Evaluation: Movement priorities are assigned to all shipments within ICTZ and for each type of shipment there is a certain amount of reaction time which must be allowed for. It is not justifiable to wait until a required delivery date (RDD) is past and than react to have the
cargo shipped as an emergency shipment. Plans must be made giving full allowance for movement reaction times.

(c) Recommendation: That contingency planning be made by customer units to have resupply shipments upgraded in sufficient time before being forced to resort to emergency cargo shipments.

(10) Item: Logistical Supply Activity (LSA):

(a) Observation: The flow of supplies into the ICTZ has reached a predictable and manageable stream. The need for temporary supply area is becoming undesirable while the need for permanent supply activities is desirable.

(b) Evaluation: There are no further plans to move large forces into ICTZ, thereby a stable supply situation is created for the even flow of supplies and equipment into all supply activities.

(c) Recommendations: That the remaining FSA's in SICTZ be converted to LSA's as soon as possible.

(11) Item: Loss of Funds:

(a) Observation: Due to the dispersion of troops, class A Agent Officers travel great distances to pay their troops. While delivering the payroll by jeep a class A Agent was ambushed between Phu Bai and Hue.

(b) Evaluation: The use of single vehicle convoys to transport class A Agent through communist infested territory runs a high risk of loss of life and funds. Where possible, Agents should be transported by air. As an alternative they could join multi vehicle convoys where more security can be provided.

(c) Recommendation: That class A Agent make maximum use of air transportation while transporting funds. Where air transportation is not available, maximum use should be made of multi vehicle convoys.

(12) Item: Security of Funds:

(a) Observation: A Class A Agent placed his payroll and funds in his desk drawer and left the unit area. In addition, he had his funds placed in a safe but did not insure that the safe was guarded by an Army guard.

(b) Evaluation: The Agent's failure to provide proper security for his funds resulted in the loss of $890,000 in Government Funds.
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(c) Recommendation: That additional command emphasis be placed on security of funds while in the possession of Class A Agent.

(13) Item: Retrograde Objectives:

(a) Observation: In the month of January 1969 a retrograde objective by items and tonnage was instituted by the 1st Logistical Command. The list of items was not received in this headquarters until 10 January 1969. The list contains a quota for items that this command did not have on hand.

(b) Evaluation: It is not realistic to assign a quota by item to a unit that has not previously reported a quantity of that particular item as being on hand.

(c) Recommendation: That before assigning a quota, by item or tonnage, the previously submitted reports, Daily Report of CCS Activities and Exception Data Report (every 5 days), be taken into account. That the listing be provided at the end of the month preceding the report month in order to give a more realistic time for complete execution of instructions.

c. (U) Training: None

d. (C) Intelligence:

(1) Item: Indigenous Personnel:

(a) Observation: On 25 January, Phan Rang Airbase in Southern II Corps was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. The perimeter was penetrated resulting in 11 friendly wounded, 2 aircraft destroyed and an additional 9 damaged. The enemy lost 16 killed. One prisoner of war along with two individual and three crew served weapons were captured. The POW, who was wounded, stated that many of the local Vietnamese who participated in the attack were employees on the base. One enemy killed was tentatively identified as a base employee.

(b) In the III Corps, an explosion occurred in the mess hall on 3 January 1969. Fifteen individuals were killed and 26 more wounded. The explosion was caused by a device constructed of several pounds of an unknown type explosive with steel balls from an Air Force bomblet and a US claymore mine. The detonating device was a Chinese Communist chemical delay pencil. The device was positioned behind a tray rack approximately 4 feet from the floor.

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21 Feb 69

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nan; for period ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

(c) Evaluation: These two incidents demonstrate the value of indigenous employees to the VC/NVA forces. Many of these employees who have access to military facilities may be sympathetic to the enemy. They have the capability to provide him with both the intelligence and the means to conduct successful attacks and terrorist incidents.

(d) Recommendations: Commanders at all levels be urged to take immediate action to implement measures minimizing the above type of threat. Physical searches of indigenous personnel and the facilities where they are employed must be routinely conducted. An aggressive installation informant program should be an integral part of action taken.

e. (U) Logistics:

(1) Item: Turn-in of Ammunition:

(a) Observation: During Operation Liberty Canyon, units moving out and relocating within the Corps did not practice sound ammunition discipline during turn-in to support ASP's.

(b) Evaluation: At various unit locations, units mishandled and abandoned ammunition to the extent that explosive and security hazards were created. Some items had been unpackaged so long that packing material was not available. Ammunition was found abandoned which could furnish the enemy with ready made explosives for use against allied forces. Some units moved so fast that responsibility for the turn-in of on site ammo was transferred to sister units. This created an over-load on resources that resulted in considerable mixing of data, poor packaging, and damage due to mishandling during unloading. In some cases ammo, in lieu of proper turn-in was sling dropped into the ASP's.

(c) Recommendations: That rigid controls be established and enforced in using units to insure turn-in to supporting ASP's of unserviceable ammunition and/or excess serviceable ammunition to include packing material.

(2) Item: Prepositioning of Basic Loads for Incoming Units:

(a) Observation: During Operation Liberty Canyon various units moving into areas vacated by the 1st Cav had heavy withdrawals from NICTZ ASP's for basic load thus creating shortages of ammunition in NICTZ.

(b) Evaluation: Heavy withdrawals for basic loads by units replacing 1st Air Cav Div, without prior notification to the supporting ASP's, resulting in unreasonable draw-down while the old stockage objective was still in effect. This created critical stockage positions on many
AVCA DNG-1000


ammunition items.

(c) Recommendations: That rigid controls be established and enforced in using units to maintain basic loads at USARV levels as established in USARV Reg 735-48 or to include basic load requirements in data developed during movement planning within RVN.

(3) Item: Minor New Construction:

(a) Observation: Unrealistic limitation on use of O&MA funds for minor new construction in relation to maintenance costs.

(b) Evaluation: The intent of O&MA minor construction is to provide the commander a means of satisfying urgently required minor construction needs which can not, for operational reasons, be delayed for inclusion in pending or future CMA Appropriations. The dollar expenditure for minor new construction is currently limited to 25% of the O&MA funds used for maintenance. This expenditure limitation in this theater of operations is unrealistic in that operational/cantonment facilities constructed, for the most part, are simple wood structures which are designed and constructed for a limited period of use. In this connection, AR 120-10 states that the level of maintenance for real property facilities currently in active use will be that necessary to protect them from deterioration for their expected period of active use. Since the expected period of active use is short, it follows that maintenance expenditures should be minimal. To fully implement and enforce this policy in the spirit of applicable regulations tends to limit severely, the funds authorized for minor construction. This restriction, in actuality, is not saving funds but rather forces larger than necessary expenditures for maintenance activities in order to generate greater funds for minor construction.

(c) Recommendation: That the 25% maintenance cost restriction on minor new construction be removed which would provide maximum essential for maintenance, thereby assuring a reasonably responsive system to satisfy the needs of the commander.

(b) Observation: Lack of information on construction directives.

(b) Evaluation: Currently, COMUSMACV troop construction directives to 3d Naval Construction Brigade do not key a particular line entry (project) to the sponsoring unit which is required to provide detailed siting data and specify facilities designed prior to the issuance of the

Tasking order to the unit performing the work; consequently, a delay occurs while the identity of the sponsoring unit is being determined, i.e., frequently the Line Item Identifier information is not available to units at this level and must be obtained from parent organizations (the channels used for submission of Military Construction Line Item Data, DD Form 1391) or from Headquarters, USARV by telephone.

(c) Recommendations: That the sponsoring unit be identified with each line entry on the construction directive.

(5) (U) Items: Pilferage and Damage:

(a) Observation: Several incidents of pilferage in transit damage to cargo were experienced at the deep draft, lighterage and aerial port facilities. With regard to water facilities, it was apparent that security was inadequate for dockside stored Army cargo. This necessitated the positioning of Army personnel at these facilities for security purpose. At the aerial port, there was one instance where several pieces of lounge furniture for an Army EM club were lost, the Air Force failed to obtain proper identification from an individual who purported to be the consignee.

(b) Evaluation: Action has been taken to recover the furniture.

(6) (U) Items: Intransit Damage:

(a) Observation: In transit damage to Army cargo has been caused by the lack of proper MHE and faulty handling practices.

(b) Evaluation: Action has been taken to notify the responsible agencies of the cause and extent of the damage, liaison has been established to preclude further improper handling and unnecessary damage.

(7) (U) Items: Loss of Beer and Soda:

(a) Observation: A considerable volume of beer and soda product is being lost due to the inability of the cardboard corrugated containers to withstand the weather as well as handling required for reshipments and/or transshipments. Correspondingly, the deterioration of the outside container leaves the inside contents accessible for pilferage and loss.

(b) Recommendations: That action be taken to utilize CONEX containers for shipment of beer and soda or procure shipping containers that can withstand handling requirements and weather conditions in Vietnam.

(6) (U) Item: Bakery plant, trailer mounted, Model 1945:

(a) Observation: Several months ago a bakery plant was requisitioned to replace the Chu Lai bakery which is in salvageable condition. 1st Logistical Command message 440104 (02905U62 Nov 68) states that this item is back ordered at USA MECOM with a delivery date of March 1969. The message further states that a similar item is due in for depot stock with arrival at Cam Ranh Bay 27 November 1968 and that the Chu Lai requirement will be filled by using this asset when it arrives. The latest information available from USAMECOM is that all bakery components were shipped from several CONUS locations to Cam Ranh Bay, and that final shipment should arrive CRB 11 January 1969. All components for the bakery, with the exception of the mixer - makeup trailer, have arrived at CRB, and the mixer - makeup trailer will arrive 31 January 1969 aboard SS American Champion.

(b) Recommendations: It is recommended that all components be staged at CRB and shipped in one lot to Chu Lai. Further recommend that future shipments of this nature be consolidated in CONUS and complete shipment be loaded on same lift.

(9) (U) Item: Excessive Forklift Deadline:

(a) Observation: To assist in lowering of excessive deadline rates for forklifts parts availability. Provisions of this program include the reduction of lubrication and service intervals by one half, assigning permanent operators to specific forklifts (who remain with forklifts even when it's assigned TDY from parent unit) and the policy of daily motor stables, supervised by a unit officer. Other factors emphasized, to increase the availability of repair parts, are the extensive coordination between ACoS; Maintenance and ACoS; Supply to assure 100% validity of Redball requisitions and critical items list transmitted to ICCV for special handling. The cannibalization of CRC "H" forklifts provided a limited number of necessary parts.

(b) Evaluation: Past deadline rates for Northern I Corps had exceeded 50%; however, present deadline rates are safely below the MACV 20% objective standing at 13% for NICTZ. The overall I Corps rate is presently 11%. Lack of repair parts continues to hamper further reduction of deadlines, as evidenced by a 85% NORS vs 15% NORM for currently deadlined forklifts. The long range plan of repair parts availability should continue to provide an ever increasing number of repair parts as the supply system adjusts to present demand data.

(c) Recommendations: None
f. (U) Organization:

1. (U) Item: TDA for Da Nang and Chu Lai PDO activity:

   a. Observation: As reported last quarter there has never been a Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) submitted for the Da Nang and Chu Lai Property Disposal Activity. The Da Nang Activity had been operating from the assets within resources of 80th General Support Group and the activity at Chu Lai has been inactive.

   b. Evaluation: The Director of Retrograde and Disposal became aware of this adverse condition and requested a proposed TDA be submitted by 80th General Support Group to this headquarters. The proposed TDA was received, reviewed and forwarded by this headquarters to 1st Logistical Command for approval on 16 December 1968.

   c. Recommendation: The proposed TDA be approved ASAP to reduce current backlog at Da Nang and commence operation of the Chu Lai Activity.

2. (U) Item: MTO&E for 633d CO&S Company:

   a. Observation: The retrograde objective imposed by 1st Logistical Command was increased from a constant 1000 short-tons per month to 1500 short-tons for December. At this point it was decided that a hard look would have to be taken at the organization to evaluate the handling of the increased workload.

   b. Evaluation: On 12 December 1968, the personnel picture was reviewed with regards to the type "B" unit authorizing a total of only 91 personnel. After careful consideration of all factors, i.e., personnel assigned, current workload, projected workload, T-DAY and etc., it was decided that the 633d CO&S Company be staffed at 100% strength "Type B" authorization.

   c. Recommendation: That a constant review be conducted by all concerned since the out-shipment tonnage of retrograde materiel set an all time high in December and again in January but the on hand figures continue to increase despite the record out-shipments.

3. (C) Item: Pipeline Maintenance:

   a. Observation: The 173d petroleum operating company was tasked with the mission of pipeline maintenance for 66 miles of pipeline, of which 43 miles is buried. The items necessary to operate this line is another pipeline construction truck, a ditch digging machine and a fire
truck for proper control of any fires along the pipeline route.

(b) Evaluation: Coordination was enacted between this directorate and the 259th QM Battalion to secure the above items. A modification to the TOE of the 173rd is being written to accommodate these necessary items. An additional pipeline construction truck has not been located, however, one fire truck and one large ditch digger were located in the salvage yard in Da Nang. These items are being repaired and prepared for shipment to the 173rd Petroleum Operating Company. A smaller more mobile ditch digger will be requisitioned by the 173rd Petroleum Company.

(c) Recommendations: Adjust operating company TOE's to reflect this additional equipment, fire truck, ditch digger, and at least two (2) pipeline construction vehicles.

3. (0) Others:

1. Item: Project Leadership:

(a) Observation: Often times in Civic Action projects, the CA personnel do not realize who the true leaders are in a hamlet or village. Many times, the true leaders will not readily come forward, mainly because the newly arrived CA personnel are not considered trusted friends. Leadership in Vietnam is a guarded function, hasty action on the part of leadership has resulted in VC reprisal to that leader.

(b) Evaluation: The CA personnel should spend time in a village or hamlet in order to get acquainted with the people. They must demonstrate sincere interest in the area. Once this trust is obtained, the Vietnamese leaders will cooperate and the project (if accepted) will develop smoothly with the support of the people.

(c) Recommendation: Emphasis should be given to the developing of trust and the demonstrating of a sincere interest in the people and the area. In this way, an understanding can be obtained which will facilitate solving the problem areas, and attain efficient operation of the program.

2. Item: Cooperation of Directorate with Unit:

(a) Observation: Many material supplies, food stuffs, and items of equipment are available within command channels.

(b) Evaluation: Liaison can be established with other directorates and the resulting cooperation and coordination can enable access to items which are not presently at the CA's disposal.

(c) Recommendation: Civil Affairs Officer and personnel know capabilities and mission of the other elements in the command and utilize system excesses and command ability in performing Civic Action Missions.

(3) Item: Project Emphasis:

(a) Observation: The programs best accepted by the people are those which are considered important by the people and which can be independently supported by them.

(b) Evaluation: Although schools and dispensaries do provide a much needed service to the people, many times these projects are dependent upon the military units which initiate construction (REASON: The people do not have the qualified nurses, and teachers). Many times, a water well would be a more worthwhile project. A village water supply may be more important to the people's needs (and considered so by the people), than elementary education or dispensary facilities.

(c) Recommendation: Priorities should be placed on Civil Action projects which the people themselves emphasize and which they can independently support.

3. (U) Section III, Escape, Evasion, and Survival: None

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JAMES W. QUANN
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Incl 2 - 10, 12 - 21 wd Hq, DA

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AVCA GO-MH (21 Feb 69) 1st Ind


DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375.


2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning wearing of protective clothing, section II, page 9, paragraph b(1). Concur. The recommendation made, however, is redundant to the provisions of LC Reg 525-3. Appendix A of LC Reg 525-3 specifies that all personnel in a convoy will wear, among other things, a steel helmet and flak vest.

b. Reference item concerning timely changes in weapons density, Section II, page 9, paragraph b(2). Concur. A change of weapons density in any area in RVN is a prime concern to the ammunition supply system. Weapons and tube densities have a direct bearing on initial supply and resupply of ammunition items. A new unit deploying with weapons other than those presently being supported, or the addition of weapons totalling more than presently being supported, cannot be supplied adequately from existing stocks. These changes may affect shipments and requisitions throughout the entire ammunition supply system and in some instances may require submission of a combat essential supply mission request, which is a court of last resort and the least desirable method of supply. Recommend that MACV and USAV release unit movement information to the logistical supporting units at the earliest possible date.

c. Reference item concerning distribution of food and clothing to the needy, section II, page 10, paragraph b(3). Concur. Concurrence in principle only, in the fact that the US personnel must go through local officials or other civic groups within the area.

d. Reference item concerning project support, page 10, section II, paragraph b(4). Concur. The best projects and the ones most desired and respected by the Vietnamese are the ones that they help initiate.

e. Reference item concerning security as the first step in civic action, section II, pages 10-11, paragraph b(5). Concur. It is a proven fact that the VC will take reprisal action against the villagers who accept US and GVN aid. Conducting civic action in an area which will only result in the VC taking reprisal, without giving the people full time support, will only place hardships on the people and in the end, alienate them.
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1 APR 1969


f. Reference item concerning supply points, section II, page 11, paragraph b(6). Nonconcur. The Da Nang Support Command considers supply points as being much larger operationally than an FSA or LSA. The Americal Division is presently receiving adequate logistical support in SI CTZ from the Da Nang Support Command. There is no need to increase logistical support activities in SI CTZ at the present time.

g. Reference item concerning Operation Liberty Canyon, section II, pages 11-12, paragraph b(7). Concur. Brigade and larger size units are preparing movement plans and these plans are being forwarded from HQ, 1st Log Comd to the support commands.

h. Reference item concerning resupply activities, section II, pages 12-13, paragraph b(9). Concur. Periodic review of TCMD's by the MCC will give sufficient advance notice of approaching HDD before emergency shipments become necessary.

i. Reference item concerning Logistical Support Activity (LSA), section II, page 13, paragraph b(10). Concur. The remaining FSA in SI CTZ is at Due Pho which was established on 13 April 1967. There is no plan to close out this FSA and as a result the Due Pho FSA should be considered a permanent activity.

j. Reference item concerning retrograde objectives, section II, page 14, paragraph b(13). Nonconcur.

1. The observation is accurate in that the objectives were dispatched by letter on 6 Jan 69. Retrograde Division, ACoS, Maintenance, HQ, 1st Log Comd produced the first objectives in Jan, as an interim measure, pending the development of a Closed Loop Retrograde Management capability in the USAICCV. Late arrival of objectives has been corrected as the USAICCV has dispatched Closed Loop objectives by message to all commands covering the remainder of FY 69.

2. The stated evaluation, that it is not realistic to sign a quota by item to a unit that has not previously reported a quantity of that particular item as being on hand, is invalid. Quotas are established based upon the Closed Loop Retrograde Program and assigned to support commands based upon the incoming material distribution pattern established by the USAICCV. Support commands cannot and must not depend upon on hand quantities to meet Closed Loop objectives; they must continuously screen all units in their assigned support area to insure that all available unserviceable materiel is in the retrograde channel. Support commands will likely
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Experience continued retrograde shortfalls if they depend solely upon the voluntary evacuation of unserviceables by the owning units. Admittedly, some of the individual line item objectives were excessively high since a portion of the shortfall for the fiscal year was included in the January objectives. The current objectives, published by USAICCV, appear too realistic and attainable.

(3) With regard to the recommendation cited, tonnage quotas are established based upon the on hand tonnage at the end of the previous month and the receipt experience from the previous month. Based upon Da Nang Support Command's Daily Status reports, their monthly tonnage objective should be at least 6,000 short tons. However, their limited processing capability has been taken into consideration with the resulting 4,000 short tons monthly objective. Limited improvement in capability and continued high receipts and backlog will result in their monthly tonnage objective increasing to 5,000 short tons in April 69.

(4) The late arrival of Closed Loop line item objectives should have little or no effect on the ability of the support command to meet the objective. The basic objective of the GC&S and the support command for any month, is to retrograde all available materiel. Closed Loop materials hold the highest retrograde priority and must be moved to a rebuild facility with minimum delay.

k. Reference item concerning indigenous personnel, section II, pages 14-15, paragraph d(1).

(1) The observation that base employees participated in the 25 January attack on Phan Rang Air Base is incorrect. Contacts by Security and Intelligence Division, HQ, 1st Logistical Command, with OSI at Phan Rang revealed the initial report was erroneous and there was no evidence of employee participation in the attack.

(2) Concur with the recommendation. The 524th Military Intelligence Detachment has the responsibility for the installation informant program within 1st Logistical Command. The detachment is currently involved in an effort to increase the number of informants in key installations throughout the command.

(3) Searches of indigenous personnel and facilities would enhance overall security and such measures would normally be implemented by the Provost Marshal.

1. Reference item concerning turn-in of ammunition, section II, page 15, paragraph e(1). Concur. Situations as described in paragraph e(b) can be

forestalled by liaison visits from the local and support command technical assistance teams. During the visits the unit can be advised of proper procedures for handling ammunition. They can also be informed of the current policies to be followed when turning in excess or unserviceable Class V. Liaison visits with responsible ammunition personnel in the field would afford the best opportunity to advise units of the provisions of UCM 735-28 and the problem areas that result in maintaining excesses to their basic loads. No action required by higher headquarters.

m. Reference item concerning prepositioning of basic loads for incoming units, section II, pages 15-16, paragraph e(2). Concur. Liaison visits with responsible ammunition personnel in the field are made by local technical assistance teams to insure proper maintenance of basic loads. No action required higher headquarters.

n. Reference item concerning minor new construction, section II, page 16, paragraph e(3). Concur. The 25% limitation and the apportionment of O&M funds by calendar quarters has the tendency to make the post engineer organization unresponsive to urgent operational requirements in the interest of achieving management goals primarily applicable to a peacetime environment. In addition, such funding limitations place operationally required facilities in competition with community facilities. Since the operational facilities are usually needed by only one organization as opposed to the entire community, the planning and work boards do not allocate priorities commensurate with the importance of such facilities. A way must be found to free operationally required facilities from the same constraints which may be wise to impose on community facilities.

o. Reference item concerning loss of beer and soda, section II, page 17, paragraph e(7). Nonconcur. The number of CONEX containers available for intra-RVN shipments is not sufficient to allow shipment of beer and soda. An alternate suggestion would be to band the containers upon arrival in the PX storage area. This will strengthen the containers to enable them to better withstand further handling.

p. Reference item concerning Bakery Plant, Trailer Mounted, Model 1945, section II, paragraph e(8). Nonconcur. In instances which component parts of an item are manufactured at different points and are not assembled before shipment, it is economical to ship the components from the nearest port. Staging component parts of items in CONUS ports would limit port throughput and necessitate additional control procedures.

q. Reference item concerning pipeline maintenance, section II, pages 19-20, paragraph f(3). Nonconcur. It is believed that the unique conditions of the I CTZ pipelines are sufficient to justify the proposed MTOE for the 173rd QM Operating Co. However, the additional issue of these items to all
petroleum operating company TOE's does not appear to be desirable or feasible as these units normally operate above-ground coupled pipelines and have fire-fighting equipment available on an on-call basis. No further action is required.

3. (U) Concur with the basis report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4859

LANNY K KELSEY
1LT AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM, Da Nang
AVHGC-DST (21 Feb 69) 2d Ind

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375-1 APK 1965

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Da Nang.

2. Reference item concerning TDA for Da Nang and Chu Lai PDO activities, page 19, paragraph 2f(1) and 1st Indorsement; concur. The proposed Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) as submitted by the unit has been returned by 1st Logistical Command for additional justification. This headquarters will expedite staffing and processing of the TDA when received from 1st Logistical Command. No action is required by higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy f urn:
US Army Spt Comd, Da Nang
1st Log Comd
GPOP-DT (11 Feb 69) 3d Ind (U)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Shortt
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND
DA NANG

26TH GEN SPT GP

US ARMY FIELD DEPOT
DA NANG
34TH SUP & SVC BN

39TH TRANS BN

57TH TRANS BN

80TH GEN SPT GP

336TH ORD BN
(Awai’d)

63D MAINT BN
HQ & Main Spt Co.

513TH MAINT BN
HQ & Main Spt Co.

259TH QM BN

INCLUSION 1
1. (C) During the past three months, several significant activities have been in evidence concerning the ACofS/Petroleum. The buried pipeline from Tan My to Quang Tri was accepted by this command. It is the responsibility of the 173d Pipeline Operating Company to perform all maintenance on the line within their capability, other types of repairs of major necessity will be completed or assisted to by Support Command Maintenance Units or the Seabees. At the present time there are some repairs to be performed on the pumps at the Hue in and Camp Evans Booster Stations. Bulk petroleum issues for this reporting period showed a leveling off of JP/4 issue and consumption, this is attributed to less aircraft and fewer major operations. For the first time, an agreement was enacted between this office and the ARVN Forces, for petroleum support in Phu Bai and Quang Tri. Consisting of MOCAS and DIESEL only. The 737th Medium Truck Company (ie., one platoon) moved from Quang Tri to Chu Lai. One Platoon remained at Phu Bai. One of the platoons that moved to Chu Lai was reequipped with 12 ton S&F trailers for conversion to dry cargo hauling in that area. The Petroleum Trucks of the 1018th S&S Company moved from Da Nang to Duc Pho for supply operations in that area. An additional package facility was established at Phu Bai to support military elements in the area up to including Camp Evans; the Quang Tri package facility will continue to supply customers in that immediate area. Several personnel from the 173d Petroleum Operating Company were sent to the Qui Nhon Support Command for OJT in tank farm and pipeline operations.

2. (C) Because of sporadic off loading conditions at Sai Huynh, over 250 thousand gallons of fuel were hauled from Qui Nhon. The Duc Pho supply area approaches critical status whenever adverse climatic conditions are present. Wet weather reduces the amount of bulk product that can be carried over roads; excessive wind and high seas prevent proper discharging of bulk petroleum product at Sa Huynh. A new supply system for this area is presently under consideration.

### PIPELINE DAMAGES

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#### TAN MY/PHU BAI

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Inclosure 11

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
Numerous repairs were necessary due to construction of new buried pipeline and the shifting of the old line to another location. Several sections had to be abandoned in place because of the difficulty in moving them.

Corrective entries should be made to the ORLL for the preceding quarters. Total line haul for the period May thru July was 1,839,000 and August thru October 9,963,000 instead of 2,819,000.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, United States Army Support Command, Da Nang

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.

CG, United States Army Support Command, Da Nang

21 February 1969

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N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C 20310