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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (21 Apr 69) FOR OT UT 691148

23 April 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

as

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  US Army Aviation Test Activity
  52d Combat Aviation Battalion


      (1) Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion, LTC Richard L. Stoessner, Commanding, remains at Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN. LTC Stoessner succeeded LTC William C. Chamberlain as Battalion Commander on 21 January 1969. On the same day the Battalion was reorganized under the provisions of USARPAC GO 771, dated 22 November 1968 (see paragraph j). Inclosure 1 reflects Organizational Structure and Station List for subordinate units as of 31 January 1969.

      (2) There has been no change of mission during the period. The 52d CAB continues to provide aviation support to Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) in the Central Highlands of Vietnam (see Inclosure 2). The battalion also controls all activities and functions of Comp Holloway, Holloway Army Airfield and Kontum Army Airfield.

   b. (C) Personnel.

      (1) Awards and Decorations: During this reporting period, 2,264 awards were processed and 4,226 were approved and received. This included the receipt of two Silver Stars, 38 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 8 Soldier's Medals, 47 Bronze Stars, 7 Bronze Stars for Valor, 3,922 Air Medals, 32 Air Medals for Valor, 48 Army Commendation Medals, 53 Army Commendation Medals for Valor, and 9 Purple Hearts.

      (2) Command and Staff Changes: The following Command and Staff position changes took place on the dates indicated:

      | POSITION | RANK, NAME, SVC NO | EFFECTIVE DATE |
      |----------|-------------------|----------------|
      | BN CO    | LTC Richard L. Stoessner 090504 | 21 Jan 69 |
      | FO/ROT UT| LTC William C. Chamberlain 070173 |

   Inclosure

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BN S-1
CPT Carl L. Nolin 05336679  30 Jan 69
MAJ James T. Kehrens 05513055  23 Dec 68
MAJ Glenn E. Morgan 04031245

BN S-2
(Vacant)

BN S-4
MAJ William A. Bloomsma 05307178  11 Nov 68
CW3 Robert E. McKown 02211130

BN SPTT OFF
1LT William E. Waggner 05431703  24 Jan 69
1LT Glenn E. Spolis 05339109

CO, 94th MED DET
CPT Curtice T. Martin 02332452  11 Nov 68
CPT Merrill J. Mirman 05260680

CO, 755th MED DET
CPT Joseph F. Homann 05718690  25 Nov 68
CPT James H. Peterson 05716299

BN SURGEON
CPT James H. Peterson 05716299  26 Nov 68
CPT David L. Acus 05542617

CO, 154th MED DET
CPT John B. Hanna 05716126 (NEW UNIT) 2 Dec 68

(3) Personnel turnover for the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The battalion total strength is 1906, short 132 enlisted men and 39 officers/warrant officers, as of 31 January 1969. Unit strengths are shown in Inclosure 3.

(a) Public Information.
   (a) Printed Releases  14
   (b) Pictorial Releases  8
   (c) Hometown Printed Releases  240
   (d) Hometown Pictorial Releases  65

Inclosure
AVGD-CC (10 February 1969)


(e) Taped Interviews

(f) The Battalion Newspaper "Dragon Fire" continues to be published on a regular basis. The articles range in scope from Command Information to human interest stories. The paper generally consists of six pages with a unit distribution of one paper per two men. There is no photographic capability, which decreases impact of the paper, however, the paper is well read within the battalion.

(g) During this period the battalion, assisted by the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, initiated a program to produce local radio and television shoes of approximately fifteen minutes in length. The initial program covered the battalion in general, while future monthly programs will highlight the individual units within the battalion.

(5) Civic Action.

(a) During the period covered by this report the Civic Actions Office coordinated with each company in the battalion so that many groups of children in the Pleiku area had a happier Christmas. Children of the RF 68th Infantry Battalion and the Nhue Phoc Buddhist School, young people of the Pleiku Leprosy Center and two Montagnard Villages received battalion-sponsored Christmas parties.

(b) The MKDAC and DENTCAP programs continued to expand with over eight hundred ambulatory patients cared for by US doctors.

(c) Intelligence. The S-2 Section continues to publish a daily Intelligence Summary of significant activities in the Pleiku-Kontum area. Intelligence information is gathered from II Corps and 4th Infantry Division G-2 offices, intelligence briefings from other supported units and mission reports submitted by aviators and Air Mission Commanders.

(5) Enemy Activity. Attacks against Allied Installations during this quarter were primarily stand-off attacks by fire with 60mm and 82mm mortars, and 122mm and 840 rockets. There were no ground attacks during this quarter. The frequency of the attacks remained constant during the quarter. Significant activities during the period:

130255 Nov: Camp Holloway received 17-20 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. There were 4 US WIA, 1 UH-1D destroyed, 3 CH-47s with light damage, 8 UH-1H with moderate damage, 2 UH-1H with light damage and numerous buildings with varying amount of damage.

132020 Nov: 52d Security Detachment patrol encountered and exchanged fire with an estimated enemy platoon near the perimeter of Camp Holloway. Casualties were negative on both sides.

180030 Nov: Camp Holloway received 3 122mm rockets with negative casualties or damage.
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222035 Nov: 52d Security Detachment patrol made contact with 6 VC and exchanged small arms fire resulting in negative casualties. They engaged an estimated enemy platoon at 2330 hours with negative friendly casualties. Estimated 5 VC KIA.

031645 Dec: 57th Avn Co gunships fired on deserted village resulting in the destruction of 14 structures and four large secondary explosions. Gunships received small arms fire with negative damage to aircraft.

041140 Dec: 189th Avn Co gunships supporting CIDG team received credit for 9 NVA killed by air.

131430 Dec: 189th Avn Co gunships destroyed 4 sampans on the Ya Krong Boloh River.

141645 Dec: 57th Avn Co at Kontum City Airfield received 8 rounds of 122mm rockets inside their perimeter resulting in 4 US WIA, 2 buildings received moderate damage and one received light damage.

161550 Dec: 57th Avn Co expended ordnance on an abandoned village resulting in five secondary explosions. ARVN artillery fired which resulted in 13 secondary explosions.

220150 Dec: 57th Avn Co received 14 unknown type mortar rounds. All rounds landed on or near the airstrip resulting in light damage to the strip. No friendly casualties.

221837 Dec: Kontum Airfield received nineteen rounds of 122mm rockets resulting in 4 friendly WIA (RF), 4 C-1 aircraft damaged and one aircraft revetment damaged. Enemy casualties were unknown.

081843 Jan: Kontum Airfield received 10 rounds of 122mm rockets resulting in negative casualties or damage.

152330 Jan: A 52d Security Detachment patrol received approximately 15 rounds of small arms fire which resulted in negative friendly casualties. Fire was returned and area was swept and fresh blood and AK-47 shell casings were found. Enemy casualties were unknown.

171200 Jan: 179th Avn Co had one CH-47 shot-down and destroyed by B-40 rocket at AS 798116, 23km north of Kontum. No friendly casualties.

221430 Jan: 179th Avn Co had two aircraft receive minor damage from one round of 60mm mortar while supporting 42d ARVN.

221615 Jan: Twenty kilometers north of Kontum, an insertion slick of the 170th carrying a LRR was hit with one B-40 rocket round while on the LZ. Casualties were 7 US WIA and 1 Kit Carson Scout WIA. Aircraft received moderate damage and was extracted by CH-47 aircraft. An extraction slick from same unit received ground fire with no damage.
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(2) Movement. Recently captured documents and contacts give evidence that the 24th NVA Regt has returned to Pleiku Province in the NW border area. On the East side of the province there are indications that the 5th BN, 958 NVA Regt has moved, from its base area in Binh Dinh Province, into VC Valley with an estimated strength of 400 men.

(3) New Units. There have been no confirmed reports of new units in the Kontum/Pleiku Provinces in the last three months.

(4) New Weapons. During the reporting period there was an increase in the sightings of unidentified rotary wing aircraft. There were two tentative identifications made of the aircraft; one was identified as a Russian KA-18 (HOG), and the other was identified as a Czech trainer model HC-2.

(5) Situation.

(a) Kontum: The 40th Arty Gp is still located in the Tri-Border area approximately 50 km NW of Kontum City. The K-30 BN/40th Regt is north of Poloi Klong, 20 km W of Kontum. The K-32 BN/40th Regt is SW of Bon Hot operating in conjunction with the 101st NVA Regt located W of Dak Song. The 406th Sapper BN is presumed to be NE of Kontum City and the 28th Sapper BN 20 km SW of Kontum City.

(b) Pleiku: The 408th Sapper BN is located approximately 15-20 km NE of Pleiku City. The 24th NVA Regt is presumed to have returned to the NW border area of the province. The 304th LP BN is approximately 25 km West of Plei Meong and 8 km North of Plei Djerong. The K-31 BN/40th Regt is along HWY 14, 29 km North of Pleiku and the H-15 LP BN is along HWY 19, approximately 10 km east of Duc Co.

(6) Capabilities.

(a) Kontum Province: The enemy has the capability to conduct ground attacks against US/allied bases in the vicinity of Dak Song, Ben Het, and Dak To with up to multi-battalion strength, supported by RR, mortar, rocket and artillery fire. He can also conduct stand-off and sapper attacks against Kontum City and interdict highways QL 14N, 512 and other major friendly lines of communications.

(b) Pleiku Province: The enemy has the capability to selectively attack Duc Co, Plei Djerong, Plei Meong or Plei Ne CIDG Camps and Edap Meong, Than Phu and LeTrung villages. He can conduct stand-off and sapper attacks against Pleiku City and allied installations along highways QL 19E and QL 14N and interdict Highways 509, TL 6C, 437, TL 7C and LTL 7B with a company size VC element, employing small arms, automatic weapons, recoilless rifle, rocket and mortar fire, as well as mines and anti-tank grenades.

(7) Miscellaneous.
During the reporting period six high intensity ground fire area reports were declared and passed out to the units of the battalion. The following areas were reported: (a) YA 9468, (b) YD 2408, (c) XU 249301 within a radius of 2.5 NM, (d) BR 7773738 within a radius of 2.5 NM, (e) YA 8525 and (f) YA 658259 within a radius of 2.5 NM. Two VC/NVA weapons information sheets were distributed to the battalion units during the past quarter. One of the informational sheets was on the 140mm rocket which gave a general description of the weapon and general characteristics of it. Another informational sheet was distributed which described the RPG-7 Rocket Launcher. This informational sheet gave the general characteristics of the weapon, the general functioning of the weapon, the penetrating power of the weapon, the employment of the rocket launcher as an antiaircraft weapon and how to protect bunkers and emplacements from the weapon.

(1) During this reporting period, the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion supported combat, combat support and pacification operations throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone. Priority mission during the quarter was to provide aviation support to the US 4th Infantry Division in Kontum, Pleiku and Dak Lak Provinces. Two UH-1 airborne companies, one CH-47 medium helicopter company and a platoon of CH-54 aircraft provided this support for 92 days. Omega operations were supported by one assault helicopter company and elements of the escort aviation company for 92 days. Other units or activities receiving daily support include the Highway 19 Coordinator, CORDS, MACV, 5th Special Forces Group, the ARVN 24th Special Tactical Zone, II Corps Hqs, and IFFV Artillery units in the Pleiku-An Nhon area. Six 52d COB UH-1H aircraft, OPCON 268th Combat Aviation Battalion, supported the Capitol ROK Infantry Division (CRID), 41st Artillery Group and other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) in the central coastlands for 62 days. Both the 119th and 189th Aviation Companies provided aircraft and personnel for these missions. While performing Combat Assault, Combat Resupply, Medical Evacuation, Reconnaissance, Fire Support, Combat Support, Liaison, Logistics and Administrative missions, the FLYING DRAGONS flew over 31,000 hours during this period, including 13,457 hours of Combat Assault. Mission accomplishment has been satisfactory, however operations have been hampered by lack of experienced aviators and other factors included in this report. Misutilization of aircraft allocations is still encountered frequently, and flying hour programs exceeded to overcome planning deficiencies of the supported units (US and ARVN). Many times supported units continue to request additional aviation support (which is not available due to previous commitments) to accomplish operations planned beyond allocated or available aviation assets. Some units continue to use unimproved landing or pick up zones for platoon and company size operations, reducing the lift capability of the aircraft and causing blade strikes and sheet metal damage incidents to supporting aircraft.

(2) An increasing number of missions require single ship support,
therefore proficiency in formation flight, platoon size airlift and Airmobile Task Force Operations has been declining. Training enroute to and returning from assigned missions is standard practice, but flexible support requirements preclude regularly scheduled flight platoon training. Several significant exceptions to these routine missions were as follows:

16 Nov 68: 189th Avn Co lifted an eight company Combat Assault near Duc Co in western Pleiku Province.

18 Nov 68: 189th Avn Co extracted five companies from Duc Co AO.

20 Nov 68: 189th Avn Co inserted six companies into positions in Pleiku Province.

24 Dec 68: 57th, 170th, and 189th Avn Co air assaulted two US battalions into VC valley, 40 km ESE of Pleiku.

13 Jan 69: 170th Avn Co, with eight UH-IH aircraft, moved 519 troops during a Combat Assault conducted by the ARVN 24th Special Tactical Zone in Kontum Province.

15 Jan 69: 170th Avn Co supported a 5th SFGp/CIDG Combat Assault in NE Pleiku Province, lifting 136 troops with five UH-IH helicopters.

(3) Medium helicopter support requirements during this quarter have been heavy, requiring CH-47 Chinooks to exceed the DA and USARV flying hour level established for maintenance support and replacement spare parts. The 179th Assault Support Helicopter Company flew over 3500 hours during the quarter, averaging 1173 hours per month. Other 17th CAB CH-47 Chinooks flew an additional 284 hours supporting SFMAF in the 52d CAB AO, 5th US Special Forces Group, IFFV Artillery, 937th Engineers and other units have been supported while enroute to 4th Division Bases, effectively reducing non-productive flight time for both CH-47 and CH-54 aircraft.

Air items and rigging equipment encountered by both cargo helicopter companies are often substandard, causing a considerable amount of dropped loads due to faulty or out-of-date slings or straps which break in flight. Several aircraft have received damage to rotor blades and engines from unsecured personal equipment, Class II or IV supplies and supplies and other debris in close proximity to pick up and landing zones. Dust suppression programs have been initiated by supported units and are monitored by air mission commanders and Liaison Officers from this battalion.

(4) Increased aviation support has been allocated to ARVN units during the last month of this quarter. Liaison Officers from the 52d CAB to the Senior US Advisor have advised and trained the supported units in the use of both utility and cargo helicopters in expanded operations. In coordination with the Senior Advisor, bi-lingual lectures, demonstrations, fact sheets and planning guides have been presented to ARVN Commanders, staff and troops. The placement of one Chinook-qualified LNO and one
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(1) The AH-1 qualified LNO at the regimental headquarters has improved relations, support and safety during ARVN operations requiring US Army Aviation support. The USARV 1968 HANDBOOK FOR CH-47 (CHINOOK) UTILIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT IN VIETNAM has been of great value in preparing briefings and planning artillery moves.

(5) The 361st Avn Co (Escort) AH-1G Cobras have provided daily support to the Onega clandestine operations as well as providing aerial fire support to troops in contact (US 4th Inf Div, 5th Special Forces units, ARVN 24th STZ and Regional Forces); in defense of Allied installations, airfields and outposts; and aerial escort and reconnaissance for road convoys, air assaults, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) and aerial Medical Evacuation operations. The speed and varied armament capability of the Cobra has allowed this unit to reinforce other armed helicopter operations over a large area from a central base location. The AH-1G has proven reliable for both day and night fire support.

(6) Armed Helicopter turn-around time has been reduced and safety factors increased by the construction of a battalion arming point separate from the airfield runway. The improved surface area has a landing/take off lane and four revetted arming pads aligned into prevailing winds and away from cantonment areas. This centralized location, which is separated from other aircraft revetments and POL areas, allows better ammunition storage and accountability, consolidated rearming personnel, and immediate armament repairs with minimum ground crews.

(7) Pathfinder support was increased throughout the quarter. 52d Pathfinders established air traffic control on fire support bases, provided rigging and hook up assistance, coordinated US, ARVN and CIDG Combat assault loading and repelled into selected areas to improve landing zones.

(8) The 52d Security Detachment continues to provide observation, illumination and fire support on the perimeter of Camp Holloway, conducts patrols and ambush operations in the Camp Holloway Defense AO and maintains a small force at Kontum Airfield to support the 57th Avn Co compound defenses.

(9) The Area Movement Control Center (AMCC) continues to provide flight following, communications relay and limited flight consolidation services, but cannot function as desired because of sole user aircraft allocations approved by higher headquarters. AMCC does provide standby passenger and cargo transportation to local units and activities within the AO, and is a most effective Search, Rescue and Recovery Control Center.

(C) Training. On the-Job training (OJT) continues to be the primary method of instruction for battalion personnel in all MOS fields. Individual training is conducted by units as required by 350 series directives. Aviator training and flight standardization are included in paragraph 11 of this report.

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(1) Junior Officers and Warrant Officers have little or no experience to prepare them for unit additional duties or command positions. Battalion staff members conducted a battalion school to assist these officers and key enlisted members in their development. This school, from 13 thru 21 December 1968, was attended by individuals assigned primary or alternate positions as unit Motor Officer, Mess Officer, Supply Officer, Armament or Small Arms Officer, Communications Officer or CBR Officer. Subjects presented were oriented to each of the duties mentioned and included Reports of Survey, Prescribed Load Lists, Signal Maintenance, Material Readiness Reports and other related matter.

(2) Ten members of the battalion attended Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS) courses in-country during the reporting period.

(3) Individuals returning from the USAF SEA Survival School conducted unit refresher training on survival, evasion and escape for aircrew members. Use of survival equipment and proper communications procedures were stressed during these classes.

(4) A significant number of replacement personnel were not familiar with the M-79 grenade launcher or the M-60 machine gun. Unit classes were required to qualify these soldiers with weapons employed on the camp perimeter and those mounted on UH-1H helicopters. Additional instruction was presented on care and cleaning, immediate action, techniques of fire and MACV Rules of Engagement prior to individual familiarization firing.

f. (C) Logistics.

(1) Class I. Station property for garrison messes is still difficult to obtain. In addition, some of the messes that have the required equipment do not have sufficient power available to operate effectively.

(2) Class II.

(a) Though some improvement has been noted in the supply of repair parts (since revision and updating of PLL's), demands have not been sufficient at this time to assure adequate levels of repair parts. It is believed that with additional emphasis on maintenance of PLL records a sufficient improvement will be noted during the next quarter.

(b) Status of Requisitions. Numerous difficulties have been encountered during the past quarter in obtaining accurate and timely status from the DSU's. On some occasions 52d CAB units are told by the stock control representatives that they do not have the time to process follow ups. In some instances, the status obtained is useless for planning and reporting due to omissions of support document numbers and expected dates of delivery.

(c) Priority Requisitions. An extremely long time lag has been noted in the processing of high priority requisitions by the Direct
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Support Units. In some cases up to sixteen days were noted on 02 priority requisitions between the time requisitioned by the unit and the document date assigned by the DSU.

(d) Turn Ins. Certain types of supplies and equipment are not accepted for turn in at the DSU. The using units are therefore required to transport this equipment, which is sometimes insignificant, to Qui Nhon Depot resulting in a waste of manpower and transportation. This applies both to serviceable and unserviceable items as shown in Section 2.

(e) CCIL Reports. The CCIL report cannot be used effectively without supporting document numbers and exceptional advice. Since there is no way to trace organization document numbers through the depots, only those items that contain a valid DSU document number can be used effectively. Though every effort is made to obtain the required information, many critical items go unreported for excessive periods of time.

(f) Transportation of Critical Supplies and Equipment. On several occasions items required to remove aircraft and other essential primary equipment from deadline or bulk products required to prevent grounding of aircraft were located in distant areas. When mission requests were submitted to transport the items, negative results were obtained. In one instance, four days elapsed and the supplies were shipped by ground convoy that resulted in the loss of a major part of the required item.

(3) Class III.

(a) Numerous problems have been encountered in POL since the last reporting period. Insufficient quantities of JP/4 have been on hand at the DSU over the past several weeks. Contaminated fuel, produced by a combination of low levels and poorly maintained storage tanks in the DSU storage yard, has added considerably to the maintenance workloads in aircraft and to maintaining POL dispensing equipment.

(b) Total JP/4 dispensed by the Battalion during the reporting period was 4,500,000 gallons, of which 1,620,000 gal. were dispensed at Kontum Airfield by the 57th Aviation Company. In addition to the JP/4, 75,000 gals of AVGAS was dispensed at Kontum Airfield for use by transient aircraft and other tenant units outside of the battalion.

(4) Class V.

(a) The rapid increase of ammunition requirements in the battalion was due to the employment of new aircraft weapons systems and the necessity of aerial fire power for the type of missions assigned to the Battalion. In addition to these requirements, storage of ammunition and rearming points become a problem for a unit currently not authorized an ammunition section nor an ammunition officer. A Battalion ammunition officer position was established in the S-4 Section. This position is currently filled by a rated Warrant Officer as an additional duty.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion For Period
Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (u).

(b) Ammunition Requirements for the Battalion.

1. Basic Load: A new basic load was computed for all units in the
battalion according to USARV Reg 735-28. The battalion consolidated basic
load shows: 4,578 2.75" Rkt, 16,306 40 mm and 2,046,680 7.62mm rounds.

2. Base Camp Defense Stocks: Defense stocks were computed for the
Battalion according to USARV Reg 735-28 and experience of previous attacks.

(c) Ammunition Expenditures: A comparison of ammunition expenditures,
during the same period of time, of a conventional Artillery Battalion
versus an Aviation Battalion, illustrates the urgent need for an authorized
ammunition officer and section for an Aviation Battalion. Expenditures
for the reporting period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF AMMUNITION</th>
<th>AVIATION BATTALION</th>
<th>ARTILLERY BATTALION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>175mm Shell</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 inch shell</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75 inch Rkt</td>
<td>35,542</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm HE</td>
<td>22,527</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm HE</td>
<td>3,563</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 Cal</td>
<td>10,256</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm</td>
<td>2,805,586</td>
<td>830,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.56mm</td>
<td>98,712</td>
<td>100,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total rounds handled</td>
<td>2,976,186</td>
<td>968,257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Currently, the battalion has been assigned only one Cobra unit with a
total of 12 AH-1G's. In the event that another armed Aviation Company
should be assigned to Camp Holloway, ammunition expenditures will increase
30% if activity continues at the same rate. Furthermore, it should be
considered that sometime in the future, the Cheyenne (AH-56) with a 7-ton
ordnance lift capability in the STOL configuration, will be operative
out of units assigned to aviation battalions.

(d) Ammunition Storage. The modular system of ammunition storage
was adopted at Camp Holloway after considering the quantity of ammunition
to be stored by each unit in the Battalion. The following areas were
taken under special consideration for the design and construction of the
storage areas:

1. Safety regulations and prescribed distance from runway, inhabited
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Buildings and POL storage areas.

1. Security was insured by the construction of a chain linked fence.

2. Safe and expedient access to the storage area.

(e) Arming Points: Initially, gunships at Camp Holloway were armed in their parking areas. On two occasions, rockets were fired accidentally resulting, luckily, in only minor damage. Due to the safety hazards involved and new regulations pertaining to storage of ready ammunition, an arming point (See Inclosure 6) was designed including safety measures and facilities to expedite arming of gunships. Emphasis was placed in the following areas:

1. Distances - Safe distance from POL, runway, aircraft parking areas, inhabited buildings, bulk ammunition storage areas and EOD pit, were calculated according to USARV Reg 700-7.

2. Storage of ready ammunition - Conexes barricaded on four sides are utilized to store ready ammunition.

3. Runway - A 150 meter runway, oriented into prevailing winds in the area (60 and 240 degrees) was built to insure safe take-off of armed UH-1C gunships.

4. Blast Wall - A 9½ foot blast wall perpendicular to the runway with safe clearance from the latter, was designed to stop accidentally fired rockets or minigun rounds. The walls are so constructed that pedal turns are never necessary. The height of the blast walls was calculated for the AH-1G where the rocket pods are installed at an angle with the horizontal axis of the aircraft. One blast wall was built for each company sized unit adding to a total of four blast walls in the arming point.

5. Arming Pads - Each company sized unit has four rearming pads, two on each side of the blast wall allowing the gunships to hover always into the wind.

(f) Difficulties were encountered in this area at Kontum where the 57th Avn Co is based, due to limited geographical assets and engineer help. Many improvements are under way to insure safe rearming of gunships.

(g) During the recent withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Dak To, 52d Bn was faced with the problem of supplying ammunition to gunships operating out of that area. A forward area arming point was developed and data is being recorded for future long range operations, where arming is on a
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self operating basis.

9. (C) Aircraft Maintenance.

(1) Maintenance efficiency throughout the quarter was hampered by continued difficulty in obtaining EDP items. The Tech Supply Warrant Officer added to the Battalion Maintenance section has assisted units by establishing the correct ASL, providing inter-unit coordination and acting as inter-battalion liaison to locate and obtain critically needed parts. Even with this additional effort and continued command attention, lack of replacement parts combined with slow delivery time has caused excessive down time on battalion aircraft. EDP replacement items arrive an average of 12-14 days after requisition submission. Some units are at zero (0) balance on 15-20% of the ASL, because of these delays.

(2) Aircraft Statics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Authorized</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1D</th>
<th>UH-1C</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>CH-47A</th>
<th>U-6A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Aircraft Assigned</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Aircraft Per Co</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability Rate (%)</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDP Rate (%)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Aircraft Availability, Flying Hours and other data are shown in Inclosure 5 to this report.

h. (U) Accident Prevention.

(1) The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion experienced (10) accidents during the quarter, with most of them occurring late in the period. The following is a summary of the occurrences during this period:

(a) 1 November 1968: 170th Avn Co, UH-1H, #66-16110, Major Accident. The aircraft made a normal take off, and at 200 feet and 55 knots the test pilot heard a loud "POP" from the transmission area followed by loss of directional control. The aircraft made a 270 degree right turn, then hit the ground on the forward portion of the left skid and rolled on left side. CAUSE-Mechanical failure of the tail rotor drive quill.

(b) 13 November 1968: 361st Avn Co (Escort), AH-1G, #67-15628, Major Accident. Aircraft Commander experienced loss of directional control while the aircraft was in the revetment. While control was lost the aircraft tail rotor contacted a 55 gallon barrel which was part of the revetment. CAUSE - Aircraft Commander failed to evaluate and promptly overcome loss of directional control.
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(c) 13 November 1968: 170th Avn Co, UH-1H, #67-17253, Major Accident. While on take off from LZ the right skid of the aircraft caught on a stump causing the aircraft to roll to the right and come to rest inverted. CAUSE - Pilot failed to use proper take off procedures.

(d) 20 November 1968: NH, UH-1H, #66-16175, Major Accident. While flying 80-85 knots over jungle terrain, aircraft experienced complete loss of anti-torque control and began to turn to the right. Aircraft would not streamline and continued right turns, completing approximately five revolutions. The aircraft commander entered autorotation. The aircraft was not turning when it settled in a small clearing. CAUSE - Material failure of number 2 tail rotor drive shaft hanger bearing.

(e) 16 December 1968: 189th Avn Co, UH-1H, #66-15153, Major Accident. While at a 1° hover over a cement pad prior to landing, the aircraft started a turn to the right. With full left pedal applied the aircraft continued to turn for 90 degrees before a hovering autorotation was attempted. The aircraft hit the pad, bounced into the air and rolled over, coming to rest inverted. CAUSE - Failure of flex coupling in tail rotor drive shaft.

(f) 30 December 1968: 57th Avn Co, UH-1H, #66-15079, Major Accident. The aircraft commander experienced failure of search light and landing light during lift-off. The ship went IFR due to dust and darkness and before visual reference could be regained the aircraft crashed outside the revetment area. The darkness and the extreme dust combined to make the aircraft IFR when the lights were lost. CAUSE - Loss of visual reference.

(g) 31 December 1968: 170th Avn Co, UH-1C, #66-15235, Major Accident. While taking off on a test flight, aircraft had a complete engine failure. An autorotation was immediately initiated, but due to the flight path being directly over a FOL storage area, pitch had to be prematurely nullled to avoid contact with large fuel bladders and surrounding berm. CAUSE - Engine Failure

(h) 14 January 1969: 119th Avn Co, UH-1H, #67-18573, Major Accident. The aircraft made approach and terminated at high hover over LZ. LZ was a new and incomplete single ship LZ requiring a vertical descent terminating at a hover. Ground had not been cleared, preventing touch down. Pilot was monitoring gauges, and was cleared for descent by crew. Weight shifted and pilot reported RPM bleeding off. Aircraft settled into ground from an altitude of approximately 10 feet. CAUSE - Pilot failed to maintain control of the aircraft.

(i) 19 January 1969: 170th Avn Co, UH-1H, #67-17452, Major Accident. Aircraft was on a left down wind approach at approximately 150' to 200' AGL, at 60 knots, an engine failure occurred and a autorotative descent terminated with a hard landing. CAUSE - Engine Failure
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion For Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

(1) 20 January 1969: 119th Avn Co, UH-1C, #66-1431, Major Accident. Aircraft experienced a dual hydraulic failure, while passing through translational lift, control was lost, and the aircraft hit the ground and rolled on its right side. CAUSE - Failure of number one and two hydraulic systems.

(2) Experience Chart; Aviation Company (AML) consisting of 16 Officers and 47 Warrant Officers. Only one officer (Commanding Officer) is on his second tour and one officer has extended. No Warrant Officers are on second tour assignments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>6.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers four months or less in country</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers four months or less in country</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Dusty areas at Kontum and Holloway AAF continue to be peneprared to reduce hazardous conditions such as caused one major accident this past period.

(4) Monthly Flight Safety meetings have been held by all units, with the Battalion Accident Prevention Officer, Flight Surgeon, Unit Commander and others actively participating in these open discussions with unit aviators.

l. (C) Flight Standardization.

(1) The Battalion Standardization Officer flew 221 hours qualifying new instructor pilots, administering 90 day standardization rides, aircraft commander check rides, and in-country orientation rides for newly assigned aviators. All flight time was accumulated since 18 November 1968, when the present Battalion Standardization Officer assumed his duties.

(2) Lack of training aircraft, especially UH-1C models, has reduced the amount of training conducted by all instructor pilots.

(3) Rotation of instructor pilots, to include the Battalion Standardization Officer, created a situation which left much to be desired in the field of aviator training. This situation has been improved, largely due to assistance by the 17th CAG Standardization Section. At the end of this reporting period, the battalion has 21 standardization and instructor pilots, with at least one instructor pilot per unit qualified in all

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assigned aircraft.

(4) Two aviators have attended the 1st Avn Bde Instructor Pilot course, in-country. Several other IP applicants, selected as best qualified in their units, have been rejected by the Brigade Standardization section because they do not meet the prerequisites established for instructor pilot training.

(5) Instrument and hooded flight training has decreased during this quarter, following shutdown of the Holloway GCA Facility and the increased flying time required by assigned missions. There was no Rotary Wing Instrument Examiner available to renew instrument ratings until the final week of January 1969. Basic instruments, ADF procedures, use of the transponder and a Ground Controlled Approach are all included in aviators' initial in-country orientation flight, but instrument proficiency within the battalion continues to wane.

(6) Aerial gunnery proficiency was developed by utilizing gunnery instructor pilots and inexperienced aviators to test fire weapons systems after maintenance performed. A continuing need for armed helicopter pilots has required aviators with minimum training to obtain most of their instruction from the aircraft commander on combat missions rather than an elaborate instructor/training environment. Current prerequisites for armed helicopter pilots are not compatible with the existing experience level of our assigned aviators.

J. (C) Organization.

(1) On 22 Nov 68, the 52d Security Detachment and the 68th Inf Detachment (Radar) were released from attachment to Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, reverting to control of the 52d Security Detachment.

(2) On 2 Dec 68, the 15th Medical Detachment, a new unit, was attached to the 57th Assault Helicopter Company, Kontum, RVN.

(3) On 21 Jan 69, the 52d Combat Aviation reorganized under the provisions of USARPAC GO 771, dated 22 Nov 68. Battalion units affected and current MTOE are shown below.

(a) 57th AHC: Redesignated 57th Aviation Co (Airmobile) MTOE 1-077G, 615th TC Det: deactivated 882d Sig Det: deactivated

(b) 119th AHC: Redesignated 119th Aviation Co (Airmobile) MTOE 1-077G, 525th TC Det: deactivated 70th Sig Det: deactivated

(c) 170th AHC: Redesignated 170th Aviation Co (Airmobile) MTOE 1-077G, 405th TC Det: deactivated 448th Sig Det: deactivated
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(d) 179th ASHC: Redesignated 179th Aviation Co (Medium Helicopter) MTOE 1-258G.
402d TC Det: deactivated

(e) 189th AHC: Redesignated 189th Aviation Co (Airmobile) MTOE 1-077G.
604th TC Det: deactivated
6th Sig Det: deactivated

(f) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment: Reorganized MTOE 1-256G.

(4) The Post Headquarters section continues to support tenant units of Camp Holloway. Airfield Operations, Base Defense, Post Development, Repair Utility services, Post Exchange, Special Services and Law and Order Activities are coordinated and supervised by the Deputy Post Commander (344 ASD CO), assisted by a Post Engineer (0-2), Special Services Officer (W-1), three enlisted assistants and two civilian employees. Projects accomplished during the quarter include the opening of the Camp Holloway Swimming Pool, construction of the Battalion Armory Point, pencilling of POL, maintenance and aircraft parking areas, and consolidation of the civilian employee file system.

(5) The tenant population of Camp Holloway was increased during the quarter. The USAF 20th Special Operations Squadron arrived on station in January with nine UH-1P aircraft, aircrews and support elements closing at Hollowly AAF on 18 Jan 69. This 42 man unit is also provided assistance by Post Headquarters, as well as by the 52d CAB.

k. (0) Other.

(1) Chaplain.

(a) During the quarter, Protestant services were conducted by the Battalion Chaplain in both the battalion chapel and the 604th TC theater. Catholic services were conducted by the Pleiku Sub Area Command Chaplain. Religious services for the 57th AHC were conducted by the MACV Protestant Chaplain and the ARVN Catholic Chaplain stationed in Kontum City.

(b) Civic action projects include distribution of over 200 cases of surplus vegetables and canned goods. Ten cases of classroom chalk and fifteen boxes of clothing were distributed to various schools and orphans in the area. Six special offerings, totaling $452.40, were designated to local orphanages and the CIA leprosarium in Pleiku. An additional $300 was donated to the American Bible Society by the Chaplains' Fund.

(2) Surgeon.

(a) During the quarter, frequent unannounced training exercises were conducted for battalion medics, emphasizing the field of mass and
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individual casualty treatment and disposition.

(b) The dispensary floor has been covered with asphalt tile and the battalion surgeon's office has been remodeled, as physical improvement of the dispensary continued through the quarter.

(c) The Camp Holloway Swimming Pool was opened on 25 December. Medics check the sanitary standards twice daily and also serve as lifeguards during off duty time.

(d) The battalion disease prevention program continues to receive concentrated attention. All mess halls are inspected monthly and the post barber shop sanitation inspection is conducted every two weeks. Emphatic command support, bi-monthly replacement troops orientation lecture and a locally published venereal disease information flyer have been instrumental in the continued low levelVD rate (only 2% incidence) during this three month period.

(e) A Medcap program was recently reinstituted after a similar program was abandoned following the TET offensive early in 1968. Medical assistance is presently provided to three refugee villages, the Buddhist school in Pleiku and the Christian Missionary Alliance Leprosarium.

(f) There are approximately 2,000 patient visits per month at the Camp Holloway dispensary. The 154 Medical Detachment at Kontum has approximately 400 patient visits per month. Most patients require only minor treatment, which is performed at the dispensary. However, between 30 to 40 patients per month are referred to the 71st Evacuation Hospital at Pleiku.


a. (c) Personnel.

(1) Unit Personnel Shortages.

(a) OBSERVATION. Personnel qualified in critical MOS vacancies are not available for assignment at the unit level.

(b) Evaluation. Units are below strength in the vital 35, 67, 68, and 76 MOS fields. Avionics, Helicopter Repair, Aircraft Engine and Tech Supply Specialists available are relatively inexperienced, adding to the problem. Supervisors are required to spend excessive amounts of time conducting OJT; work production is reduced and administration suffers as a result. Individuals cross trained in the field are marginally effective in these technical specialties.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Provide adequate input into the Comus training base to provide necessary qualified replacement personnel. Control
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Assignment and MOS changes to assure efficient utilization of experienced aviation/electronics repair specialists. Place command emphasis on equitable distribution of personnel assets available in the field.

(2) Dilatory Assignment Orders.

(a) OBSERVATION. Many reassignment orders are not received by personnel in adequate time prior to DEROS.

(b) EVALUATION. A survey of DEROS reassignment orders reveals only 60% arrive 45 days prior to DEROS; 25% between 20 and 45 days; and 15% of DEROS personnel have less than 20 days notice. Married personnel desiring concurrent travel, all personnel with hold baggage and individuals pending Inter Theater Transfer suffer undue hardships due to delayed orders. Families preparing for overseas movement are experiencing unnecessary anxiety and creating potential morale problems.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Place higher priority on timely assignment orders. Re-emphasize the "person" in all personnel action thru dynamic command and staff supervision.

(d) COMMAND ACTION. DEROS suspense files are maintained for all assigned personnel and 60 day losses are checked against orders received. Tracer action is initiated for those individuals without orders at this time. Daily phone checks are made when no orders are available for 30 day losses.

(3) Worship Service Attendance.

(a) OBSERVATION. Chapel Attendance is a morale indicator.

(b) EVALUATION. Attendance at worship services improves the moral and mental attitude of assigned personnel. Higher morale is evidenced by improved performance of duty and decreased disciplinary problems. Unit sponsorship of weekly worship services insures all individuals are aware of the time and place of religious services, and has increased chapel attendance 43% for this unit in the last quarter.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Commanders support and encourage attendance at worship services within his command. Correlate chapel attendance to other morale indicators and job performance.

(4) Aviator DEROS Humps.

(a) OBSERVATION. The large number of replacement aviators assigned recently will cause a recurring abrupt loss of experience.

(b) EVALUATION. The combat effectiveness and the professional and safe manner in which a unit accomplishes its missions is greatly reduced by the DEROS of a large proportion of experienced aviators. While the
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maximum DEROS within one month is acceptable, it is unacceptable for two or three consecutive months. Early replacement assignment will smooth out this hump in succeeding years and allow smoother transition for replacements. Effective control of DEROS humps should be on a theater-wide basis.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Assign aviators and other key individuals so as to retain continuity in experience and a smooth DEROS profile.

b. (c) Operations.

(1) Command Relationship Relative to Geographic Location of Units.

(a) OBSERVATION. Aviation elements OPCON to units removed from base airfields suffer maintenance, administrative and operational difficulties while separated from the parent unit.

(b) EVALUATION. Platoon, Platoon (+) and Company (-) aviation elements of this battalion have been placed OPCON to other aviation units at locations far removed from this station. Inadequate means of communications, poor maintenance support, unreliable transportation and over-extended span of control have contributed to difficulties encountered. Spare parts and replacement engines and other components were required to be transported from this remote station to these units located less than 10 km from Transportation Direct Support Units for the OPCON headquarters. Operations and maintenance reports are delayed and/or duplicated by two headquarters. Unit Commanders are removed from problem areas in the supported area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Attach aviation elements widely separated from the parent unit for periods in excess of 7 days to Aviation Headquarters in the supported area of operations. Gaining headquarters provide maintenance support and submit daily operations and maintenance reports of attached aviation elements.

(2) Cargo Helicopter Utilization

(a) OBSERVATION. CH-47 and CH-54 helicopter support is most efficient when centrally controlled.

(b) EVALUATION. CH-47 and CH-54 support is usually allocated to units by aircraft per day instead of by mission or hours available. This loss of control by the aviation headquarters results in duplication of routes, dead blade time, misutilization and creates bottlenecks when unscheduled maintenance becomes necessary. Centralized control allows increased productive time, concentration of assets on priority moves, and overall improvement in cargo helicopter support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Place CH-47 and CH-54 under the AMCC concept with allocation of flying hours, not aircraft, to supported units. Retain
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General Support centralized control at Combat Aviation Battalion headquarters.

(3) Fire Support Base (FSB) Moves.

(a) OBSERVATION. Fire Support Base (FSB) moves exceed the number of sorties requested or required by USARV and local planning guidance.

(b) EVALUATION. Artillery units have increased the number of sorties required to move a fire support base during this quarter. Current planning guides schedule 24 sorties for the artillery battery and 4 sorties for the infantry unit, using CH-47 type loads. Due to accumulated "nice to have" items, excessive Class II and IV material and non-necessities, the moves average 35 sorties plus 8 sorties to move the infantry. Also noted is a tendency to move "luxury items" early in the day, then declare Combat Essential missions to move ammunition after the supporting aircraft have flown into scheduled maintenance. This practice decreases the overall availability of CH-47 support and denies other bona fide missions required throughout the area of operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Allocate CH-47 support on a flying hour or sortie basis (see paragraph 2b (2)). Require commanders to verify type loads for cargo helicopters during fire support base moves. Coordinate planned operations to coincide with aviation and other support assets available and allocated. Revert to "lean and mean" artillery move doctrine.

(4) Protection for Downed AH-1G Crewmembers.

(a) OBSERVATION. The aviation Company (Escort) TOE does not provide adequate small arms for AH-1G Cobra crewmembers.

(b) EVALUATION. The compact size of the AH-1G cockpit and the absence of door gunners on board does not permit Cobra crews to carry defensive firepower when forced down in hostile territory. Recent experience has shown that two .38 caliber pistols are not adequate protection. The CAR-15 rifle, which will fit in the cockpit easily, provides improved accuracy, greater stand off range, larger volume of fire and reduced reloading time to downed aviators. Request for the CAR-15 have been submitted; however, the weapons have not been made available.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Authorize two CAR-15 rifles per aircraft in the TOE of AH-1G units. Authorize and expedite issue of this weapon to Cobra equipped units presently in RVN.

(5) Chase ship for Gunships.

(a) OBSERVATION. AH-1G and UH-1C gunships cannot recover downed aircrews with ut loss of mission capability.

(b) EVALUATION. US armed helicopters working with non - US Aviation
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units experience language barrier problems, especially on downed aircraft crew recovery. In support of operations beyond the classification of this report, extremely hazardous conditions require a dependable recovery system for downed aircraft. WNAP aviators are often flying the troop lift, but are not able to effectively communicate with downed US crewmen. The addition of one UH-1H with US crew and a man to pickup armed helicopter crewmen downed on this mission ensures reliable communications, efficient coordination, and speedy recovery while allowing the remaining gunships to continue their primary mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Allocate at least one recovery UH-1, with US crew, to accompany US gunships supporting non-English speaking aviation units in high-risk areas.

c. (U) Training. UH-1 Emergency Procedures.

(1) OBSERVATION. Loss of directional control is not adequately emphasized as a flight emergency during flight training.

(2) EVALUATION. Only one type of tail rotor failure is covered by the USARV standardization guide. During the past 90 days, this battalion has experienced ten major accidents; of the ten, four were contributed to some type of tail rotor malfunction. Tail rotor failures more than double any other cause which resulted in an aircraft accident.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. Increased emphasis should be placed on effective emergency procedures for directional control loss. This emphasis should begin with the rewriting of that portion of the USARV standardization guide.

d. (U) Intelligence. None.

e. (C) Logistics and Aircraft Maintenance.

(1) Supply Status of Requisitions.

(a) OBSERVATION. Numerous difficulties have been encountered during the past quarter in obtaining accurate and timely status from Direct Support Units (DSU).

(b) EVALUATION. Paragraphs 4-7 and 4-8, AR 735-35 outlines the procedures to be utilized in furnishing and obtaining follow-up reconciliation of supply requests. On 14 January the supply sergeant of a company from this battalion went to the Stock Control Office of the DSU with approximately 150 DA Forms 2765 (AFI Cards), requesting DSU numbers and exception advice. He was promptly advised by the personnel at Stock Control that they did not have the time to process his follow-ups, but if he wished he could bring the unit document register and obtain the information himself from the records of the DSU. Approximately the same type of thing was experienced by two other companies of the 52d CAB on separate
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occasions. It is suspected that past follow-up advice has been fabricated without documentation. Stacks of AF cards requesting status have been returned with back order advice (BB) in columns 65-66 without expected delivery dates. Some of these requisitions were found to have been cancelled or rejected previously.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Review Direct Support Unit procedures to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of status furnished to customer units. Direct Support Units implement procedures to assure timely and accurate accountability for outstanding requisitions.

(2) Priority Requisitions.

(a) OBSERVATION. High priority requisitions are not processed on a timely basis in accordance with AR 735-35, AR 725-50 and AR 711-16.

(b) EVALUATION. Julian requisition dates on 02 and 05 requisitions indicated a delay of sixteen days in some instances between the date of requisition by the user and the julian requisition number assigned by the DSU. In comparison, requisitions bearing a 12 or 17 priority have been processed in the same or shorter periods of time. Little or no attention is given to priorities. Priority 02 requisitions for Nomex Flight Safety Items were returned to a company of the 52d CAB containing document dates of 9002 with CQ rejection codes indicating that items are ICC controlled. Nomex Flight Clothing is no longer a controlled item and must be requisitioned through normal supply channels.

(c) RECOMMENDATION.

1. Give 02 and 05 requisitions immediate attention and processing to provide using units with the full value of the priority requisitioning system.

2. Review direct support procedures to determine the effectiveness of support rendered by the DSU.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: A letter containing this information was forwarded to the DSU on 17 Dec 1968.

(3) Turn Ins.

(a) OBSERVATION. Certain categories of supplies and equipment are not accepted for turn in by the DSU. Using units within this area are required to transport these items to Depot for classification and turn in.

(b) EVALUATION.

Problems have been encountered on turn in of excess and unserviceable equipment. Initially a DA Form 2407 is required for each type of equipment for classification. In the case of sized items each size
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must be on a separate work order. The DA Form 2407 and the equipment are then taken to the DSU for classification. The unserviceable items are turned in to one DSU. A second turn in is required for the serviceable items at another location.

2. The following items are not accepted by the DSU's for classification or repairs:
   a. Medical supplies and equipment.
   b. Non-powered hand tools.
   c. Office furniture.
   d. Mattresses and bedding.
   e. Mess tables and chairs
   f. Special services and non-appropriated fund property.

2. Due to the equipment above not being accepted by DS units, each company and supported unit is required to make turn-in's of these items to DSU located approximately 80 miles away, for appropriate credit to the property books. This establishes a requirement for separate transport of insignificant equipment by several units and utilization of additional personnel in disposing of these items. Additional vehicles are also required causing increased traffic on an already overcrowded MSR with half empty vehicles round trip.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Review turn-in policies to determine if a central clearing point, to include a Property Disposal, can be established at DSU level for evacuation of equipment not presently provided by the DSU's.

(4) CCIL Reports

(a) OBSERVATION. The CCIL report is not effective unless supporting DSU document numbers can be furnished.

(b) EVALUATION. The CCIL cannot be effective if the proper status and DSU numbers cannot be furnished to the user. As an example the CCIL report carried a request for cal 38 pistols, 107 ea, for one of the Assault Helicopter Companies since Feb 1968. Efforts to obtain these items through CCIL reporting met with negative results.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Implement immediate command action to assure timely return of status automatically on 02 and 05 priority requisitions.

(d) COMMAND ACTION. A command letter was written and hand carried to Depot which obtained release of the items within three days.

(5) Transportation of Critical Items.

(a) OBSERVATION. Several critical problems have arisen concerning the transport of deadline repair parts and supplies. As an example, turbine oil required to prevent grounding of aircraft was requisitioned by an LSHC. The item was not available at the DSU Bn but was located and released at Qui Nhon in a quantity of 2794 quarts. A request for air transportation was disapproved four consecutive times. After a period of five days the oil was transported by ground transportation. Eighteen hundred quarts were received by the 52d Aviation Bn, the balance was lost enroute.

(b) EVALUATION. If air transportation had been approved on mission request, the full amount ordered could have been obtained precluding a critical shortage of the oil throughout the battalion. Other repair parts and supplies are on hand in various locations but cannot be obtained due to the non-availability of transportation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Evaluate similar situations to establish priority for the use of available aircraft to transport deadline parts and supplies.

(6) Petroleum Oils, and Lubricants.

(a) OBSERVATION. Considerable problems have been encountered in POL dispensing operations.

(b) EVALUATION

1. This battalion is responsible for dispensing fuel at two separate locations, Kontum and Camp Holloway, both of which are major airfields. Because of shortages of personnel and equipment the requirement has caused a hardship on assigned personnel and equipment. In addition, the 57th Avn Co in Kontum is required to maintain an AVGAS dispensing facility though it is a unit dependent solely on JP/4.

2. The two airfields indicated above are operational due to complete utilization of all available assets to include back-up equipment.

3. If sudden losses of equipment and/or personnel were to take place, one or both of the above airfields would become non-operational. The following is a summary of equipment and personnel available to the 52d CAB for operation of the airfields indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) MOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) 76W40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 76W420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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b Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drum Cells 10,000 g.g cap</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump 350 GPM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump 250 GPM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separator 350 GPM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separator 50-75 GPM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Tank M49 series</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump 100 GPM</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump 30-40 GPM</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At present, Aviation Support Detachments, commanded by Lieutenant Colonels, provide merely VFR Control facilities, nothing else.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Operation of POL dispersing facilities be turned over to the Airfield Support Detachments. ASD TOE's be augmented to provide the appropriate POL handlers and equipment under the direction of the airfield commander (ASD Commanders).

7. POL Support.

(a) OBSERVATION. Problems have arisen frequently in drawing sufficient quantities and an acceptable grade of JP/4 fuels from the Support Tank Farms.

(b) EVALUATION. Considerable amounts of sediment are being drawn through the pipeline between the 52d CAB and the DSU Tank Farm resulting in contamination of fuel and grounding of aircraft. Often the storage tanks at the DSU are at a low level when fuel is pumped from Qui Nhon to the tank farms. The tanks are not cleaned regularly and sediment deposits accumulate at the bottom. When the tanks are refilled at low level the pressure from incoming fuel stirs the sediment causing contamination for a period of several hours. On several occasions tank levels became so low that fueling operations were shut down.

(c) RECOMMENDATION.

1. Place command emphasis on POL supply in the Bulk Storage Yards to assure a good quality and timely resupply of JP/4.

2. Establish minimum safety levels to assure sufficient quantities
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AVGD-GG (10 February 1969)

of JP/4 fuel in the event of emergencies.

2 Thoroughly clean storage tanks at the DSU tank farm on a regularly scheduled basis to reduce the risk of contamination by accumulated sediment.

(b) Ammunition Turn In

(a) OBSERVATION. A large quantity of serviceable 2.75" warheads are disposed of due to damage to rocket motors.

(b) EVALUATION. Due to damage in rocket motors, rockets are classified unserviceable. An average of 100 rockets a month fall into this category. Initially damaged rockets were turned in to the EOD. An attempt to use warheads resulted in a large stock of loose warheads. Difficulties were encountered because ASP did not have, at that time, stock rocket motors (J231). Some of the loose warheads were turned in to ASP for costly shipment to Okinawa.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A minimum of 100 rocket motors (J231) should be kept on stock by supporting ASP.

(c) COMMAND ACTION. ASP was notified of the problem and will call battalion when rocket motors are available.

(9) Conservation of 7.62 Ammunition

(a) OBSERVATION. An average of 20,000 loose 7.62 (A165) rounds a month result from inspections and clearing munitions.

(b) EVALUATION. Experience has shown that every time a minigun is cleared 8 to 12 loose rounds are extracted from the weapon. According to TM 91005-257-12 pages 3-5 para 4, the M18 system have to be inspected after firing 20,000 rounds or 30 days during inactive periods; experience has further shown that when the system is exposed to dust, it has to be inspected more often resulting in an average of 1,500 loose rounds extracted from the pod during each inspection. These rounds are either burned or shipped out of country with both procedures being uneconomical.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. An in-country automatic linker would be the ideal solution.

(10) Survival Equipment

(a) OBSERVATION. Procurement and repair of survival equipment is inadequate.

(b) EVALUATION. Much needed items such as batteries for survival radios and strobe-type distress marker lights are extremely difficult to obtain. No local facilities are available to repair survival radios.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION. A survival equipment repair and supply section should be authorized for each aviation battalion in Vietnam to ensure that survival equipment is kept in the best possible condition.

(11) UH-1 and AH-1G Tail Rotor Hubs.

(a) OBSERVATION. UH-1 and AH-1G tail rotor hubs should receive the required 100 hour inspection at Direct Support Maintenance.

(b) EVALUATION. The inspection of UH-1 tail rotor, as required by TB 55-1500-206-30/1 is currently being conducted by General Support Maintenance Units. On several occasions, excessive down time has been experienced by units in this battalion because of the non-availability of inspected tail rotor hubs at the Trans Co (DS). As outlined by TB 55-1500-206-30/1 the inspection will be accomplished by direct support maintenance activities with assistance of general support as required. Letter, 34th General Support Group (A&S), Subject UH-1 and AH-1G Tail Rotor Hubs, dated 15 Jan 69, require all hubs to be evacuated to GS level for inspection.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Locate adequate inspection equipment and repair parts at direct support companies to accomplish the tail rotor hub inspection at that level.

(12) Excessive Transportation Time of EDF Parts.

(a) OBSERVATION. In many cases, it has taken an excessive time to receive EDF parts.

(b) EVALUATION. In the past it has taken excessive time to receive sorely needed items that were on EDF. On 20 January 1969, a CH-47A Forward Swashplate was released from NACC to the Support Depot. It was 27 January before this item was received at this station. This is one of many situations that occur frequently.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Make better utilization of available aircraft to transport critically-needed parts to isolated locations. With prior coordination, many parts could be transported on aircraft that are now traveling the route empty.

(f) Organization

(1) Post or Corp Headquarters Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. This battalion is tasked to operate two Army Airfields and maintain non-tactical activities and functions in addition to its combat aviation role.

(b) EVALUATION. Neither the Combat Aviation Battalion or the Aviation Support Detachment is authorized personnel for Post Headquarters. Organic
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assets must be diverted to provide Post Engineer, Special Services, Post Exchange, Civilian Personnel and Base Development capabilities to the tenant units of the post, which decreases the combat effectiveness of the battalion.

(a) RECOMMENDATION. Include a Post Headquarters Section in the TDA of Aviation Support Detachments. Authorize the following positions, plus an Aviation POL Section:

- Deputy Post Commander: Maj/LTC
- Post Engineer: Cpt/Maj
- Labor Management/Special Services Officer: Cpt
- Administrative NCO: E-7
- Draftsman/Clerk-Typist: E-4

(b) OBSERVATION. Combat Aviation Battalion and Aviation Company (Airmobile) are not authorized ammunition handlers.

(b) EVALUATION. The Armed Helicopter Platoons of Combat Aviation Battalions require prepared ammunition to reduce turn-around time during combat operations. Ammunition must be picked up, assembled, stored, and loaded by maintenance personnel who are critically needed in their assigned jobs. Units tasked to operate forward rearming points do not have sufficient personnel to accomplish both this task and required unit maintenance functions. Presently assigned crew chief and gunner personnel will not be available when the UH-1C(A) is replaced by the AH-1G. Assignment of an Ammunition Sergeant and four ammunition specialists to each Aviation Company (Airmobile), and the addition of an Ammunition Officer, Sergeant & Clerk to the Combat Aviation Battalion will allow better aerial fire support, improved storage and ammunition accountability, and free technical repair specialists for vital maintenance tasks.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Authorize the addition of ammunition handlers to each Aviation Company (Airmobile), Authorize the addition of ammunition personnel to the Combat Aviation Battalion S-4 Section.

(d) COMMAND ACTION. The 52d CAB constructed a central battalion rearming point for the Camp Holloway Base Camp. Currently, it is being manned by personnel of the 361st Escort Company service platoon. Both armament repairmen and ammunition handlers are available and all armed helicopters of the battalion rearm from the nearby central ammunition storage area. Qualified ammunition specialists enhance the safety of rearming operations of armed aircraft at Camp Holloway.
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(3) Motor Maintenance Sergeant (MOS 63C40)

(a) OBSERVATION. General Orders 771, Department of the Army dated 22 November 1968 modified TOE 1-256G eliminating the Motor Maintenance Sgt MOS 63C40 from the S-4 Section.

(b) EVALUATION. The loss of this key individual greatly restricts the effectiveness of the maintenance program within the battalion. The individual filling this slot is extensively utilized for assistance and coordination between units in the Battalion and the supporting maintenance activities. This has been an effective means for the improvement of the motor maintenance program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Re-establish the above position to assist the Battalion Maintenance Officer in coordinating the maintenance problems within a Combat Aviation Battalion.

(4) Unit Supply Technician (MOS 761A)

(a) OBSERVATION. TOE 1-077G was modified by General Orders 771 Headquarters, Department of the Army dated 22 November 1968 which deleted the Unit Supply Technician MOS 761A Warrant Officers from the TOE for an Aviation Company (AML).

(b) EVALUATION. The property book within an Aviation Company (AML) is valued over $8,000,000 and renders support to over 200 individuals in common supply items and aviation peculiar items. The use of rated pilots as property book officers as an additional duty is not in the best interest of the Government in a number of ways: a trained qualified Supply Technician would encounter considerable difficulty in maintaining a property record account of this type on a full time basis due to timely resupply requirements; shortages of qualified enlisted assistants and numerous logistical problems that require an experienced individual to assume support for mission accomplishments. Due to the flexibility of missions that can be assigned to an aviation company of this type, each company within a battalion could be separated by 35 to 150 miles from its parent unit or direct support which could result in extraordinary problems that can best be handled by experienced personnel trained in supply.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Re-establish the position of Supply Technician MOS 761A in TOE 1-077G to assure adequate logistical support.

(g) Other. ZIR/ZYS Retrofit.

(1) OBSERVATION. Replacement aircraft have been arriving without the ZIR/ZYS modification completed. Assigned aircraft that have not been modified are required to be flown to retrofit teams located on the coast for MAO compliance.
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(2) EVALUATION. Lack of an on-site retrofit team requires mission aircraft to be flown out of the 52d CAB area of operations to complete the required ZYR/ZYS modification. This significantly decreased the availability time of mission ready aircraft to support the battalion mission. UH-1's are not available for missions for periods of 48 to 72 hours during the ZYR/ZYS modification.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. Retrofit aircraft before issue to using units. Re-establish on-site retrofit teams to modify assigned aircraft during periods of scheduled maintenance.

RICHARD L. STOESSNER
LTC
Commanding

6 Incl
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Incl 2 - 5 wd Hq DA

DISTRIBUTION:
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3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
2 - CG, Ist Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBA-MH, APO 96384
7 - CO, 17th CAG, ATTN: AVGD-SC, APO 96240

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AVBACB-SC (12 Feb 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (HL) (U)

Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96240 24 February 1969

TO: Department of The Army (ACCFOR, DA), Washington D.C. 20310
Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350
Commanding Officer, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion, APO 96318

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as stated except as indicated below.

2. (C) The following comments and recommendations are submitted:

   a. Section 1, Operations: Significant activities: No comments or recommendations.

   b. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

      (1) Paragraph 2a (1), Unit Personnel Shortages, page 18. Concur: Critical skilled MOSs are short theater wide. OJT minimizes the impact and is practiced in all units. Equitable distribution of personnel assets is emphasized.

      (2) Paragraph 2a (2), Dilatory Assignment Orders, page 19. Concur: Command emphasis is placed on the prompt receipt of assignment orders. The late receipt of orders is under study at this and higher headquarters to determine where the breakdown is.

      (3) Paragraph 2a (3), Worship Service Attendance, page 19. Concur: Command support at the local level is considered most effective.

      (4) Paragraph 2a (4), Aviator DEROS Humps, page 19. Concur: The infusion program undertaken by this and higher headquarters will minimize DEROS humps. This program is constantly under review at this headquarters.

      (5) Paragraph 2b (1), Command Relationship Relative to Geographic Location of units, page 20. Nonconcur: Unity of command is highly desirable and is maintained whenever the tactical situation permits. The limited aviation assets within II CTZ frequently requires movement of assets to support the shifting tactical situation. No concrete policy can be established as to the duration of OPCON status.

      (6) Paragraph 2b (2), Cargo Helicopter Utilization, page 20. Noncur: Aircraft are allocated by I FFORCEV based on Corps wide availability and requirements. Area movements control centers at battalion level do not have the overview of corps wide requirements to efficiently allocate its resources.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DR 5200.10
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

(7) Paragraph 2b (3), Fire Support Base (FSB) Moves, page 21. Concur: CH-47 support is allocated on a sortie basis as determined by requestor and verified by aviation personnel at field force level. Sorties are then converted to number of aircraft required to accomplish the mission in the allotted time. Ground commanders are continuously advised as to the proper utilization and conservation of aviation assets. To require commanders to personally verify loads is not considered appropriate.

(8) Paragraph 2b (4), Protection for Downed AH-1G Crewmembers, page 21. Concur: USARV states that the CAR-15 was an ENSURE item and has been adopted as a standard item. However, weapon is not yet available because of increased production of the M-16 rifle.

(9) Paragraph 2b (5), Chase Ship for Gunships, page 21. Concur: An additional aircraft can be made available upon request. Action at the battalion level is recommended.

(10) Paragraph 2c, Training, UH-1 Emergency Procedures, page 22. Concur: Procedures for loss of directional control is taught and practiced throughout the Group. Recommend USARV Standardization Guide be changed to emphasize the various types of directional control problems.

(11) Paragraph 2e (1), Supply Status of Requisitions, page 22. Concur: Battalion S-4, in coordination with the 45th GS Commander have apparently resolved this problem. This headquarters will monitor results.

(12) Paragraph 2e (2), Priority Requisitions, page 23. Concur: Command action indicated has resulted in reducing processing time of 02 and 05 requisitions to 3 days.

(13) Paragraph 2e (3), Turn Ins, page 23. Concur: Units have been advised to initiate command letters giving specific information on each instance. Action will be taken at this level upon receipt.

(14) Paragraph 2e (4), CCIL Reports, page 24. Concur: With observation as stated; nonconcur with inference that CCIL Report is not effective. The CCIL Report, when DSU documents are furnished, is very effective in forcing units to take follow up action. Command action taken appears to have solved the problem.

(15) Paragraph 2e (5), Transportation of Critical Items, page 25. Concur: Aircraft to transport parts and supplies are allocated whenever the tactical situation permits.
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AVDACS-SC (12 Feb 69) lst Ind 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ind 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969, ROCS FOR-69 (R1) (U)

(16) Paragraph 2e (6), Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants, page 25. Concur: Airfield Service Detachments should be organized and equipped to function as complete airfield service units to include POL service, and related airfield service functions. Recommend the organization of ASD's be changed to provide sufficient personnel and equipment to fully operate army airfields in the combat area.


(18) Paragraph 2e (8), Ammunition Turn In, page 27. Concur: Rocket motors are now available and may be stocked.

(19) Paragraph 2e (9), Conservation of 7.62 Ammunition, page 27. Concur: Unit has been requested to submit and ENSURE request.

(20) Paragraph 2e (10), Survival Equipment, page 27. Concur: Recommend unit submit change to MTOE with adequate justification.

(21) Paragraph 2e (11), UH-1 and AH-1G Tail Rotor Hubs, page 28. Concur: Recommend 34th Support Group be tasked to obtain sufficient equipment at DSU level to accomplish tail rotor hub inspections.

(22) Paragraph 2e (12), Excessive Transportation Time of LIP Parts, page 28. Concur: Action has been taken by this Headquarters to partially alleviate this problem. Group Liaison personnel are now expediting parts shipments. As faster methods are established or data is collected which justifies a change to procedures, the 34th Group will be advised so action may be taken.

(23) Paragraph 2f (1), Post or Camp Headquarters Personnel, page 28. Concur: Recommend change to MTOE be submitted with adequate justification.

(24) Paragraph 2f (2), Ammunition Handlers (KOS 55B20), page 29. Concur: Recommend change to MTOE be submitted with adequate justification.


(26) Paragraph 2f (4), Unit Supply Technical (KOS 761A), page 30. Concur: Recommend change to MTOE be submitted with adequate justification.
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AVBACB-SC  (12 Feb 69) 1st Ind  24 Feb 69
SUBJECT:  Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (M1) (U)

(27) Paragraph 2g, ZTR/ZYS Retrofit, page 30. Concur: Recommend
mobile retrofit team be established by USARV Signal Brigade.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
MARIO L. TUMAS
CPT, ADA
Adjutant

35
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 32d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS GSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384

(U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with its content as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

O. A. PHILLIPS
LT, A6C
Ass't AS

Cy furn:
17th Cbt Avn Gp

36
Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384  19 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate and concurs with the contents as indorsed, except as noted below.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 2a(1), Page 18. Brigade strength in mentioned MOS's as follows:

   (1) 35 series - 86.3%
   (2) 67 series - 105.5%
   (3) 68 series - 92.2%
   (4) 76 series - 88.6%

   Assignment of replacement gains by this headquarters is based primarily upon equitable distribution of personnel assets to subordinate commands. This headquarters will take appropriate action to review and resolve the problem stated except for the overall command shortage in MOS's listed above.

   b. Paragraph 2a(2), Page 19. Recent revision of Advanced Overseas Roster (AOR) and Officers Replacement Roster (ORR) procedures by HQ, USAVC, should decrease the problem of late receipt of assignment instructions, provided units comply with reporting procedures prescribed by new regulations.

   c. Paragraph 2a(4), Page 19. This headquarters is cognizant of the impact caused by DEROS humps and considers infusion implications in the assignment of all personnel. Although a rotation of 15% of personnel by category is acceptable by regulations, this headquarters has announced a goal of not more than 10% rotation in a calendar month for any category of personnel in any unit. Measures have been taken to insure that no more than 10% of authorized strength is allocated to a subordinate unit during a calendar month, operational priorities permitting. Group and battalion
commanders have been urged to use the same technique as a long range and most effective solution to the infusion problem.

d. Paragraph 2b(1), Page 20. Concur with recommendation to attach to gaining headquarters. Action to implement this concept is being recommended to subordinate headquarters.

e. Paragraph 2b(4), Page 21. Concur with the recommendation to authorize two CAR-15 rifles per AH-1G aircraft. Modifications to TOE's are being prepared for submission at this time.

f. Paragraph 2c, Page 22. USAFV Flight Standardization Maneuvers Guide for UH-1 aircraft pertains to aviators assigned to RVN. It is impossible to conduct actual flight training in all phases of tail rotor failures; i.e., a complete stoppage of the tail rotor, loss of tail rotor, or loss of 90 degree gear box. It is the responsibility of the IP's and SIP's to insure that emphasis is placed on the various emergency procedures for tail rotor failure as outlined in the appropriate Operators Handbook during the in-country and 90 day standardization check rides. Recommendations have been made to the Commandant, US Army Aviation School, for reinstating training in antitorque emergency procedures.

g. Paragraphs 2e(1),(2),(3),(4),(5),(7),(12), Pages 22 thru 26 and 28. The 52d CAB was recently visited by a liaison team from Customer Assistance Branch, ICCV. The purpose of this visit was to provide the 52d CAB the latest available status of requisitions at Qui Nhon support command and ICCV; further, to determine why the 52d CAB is not receiving adequate status on requisitions as indicated on unit's CCIL dated 2 Dec 68. The Brigade Supply Officer visited HQ, 1st Log Cmd, on 24 Feb 69 to discuss the problems and recommendations of the 52d CAB as stated in the ORLL, and to determine the degree of support the 52d CAB should expect from the 88th Supply and Services Battalion. Persons contacted were LTC Voll, Deputy Dir of S&S, and LTC Melton, Dir of Support Operations, ICCV. During this visit LTC Melton placed a call to the 54th GS Gp and directed MAJ Bales to visit the Commanding Officer, 52d CAB, read the ORLL, and give all possible assistance toward correcting the problems stated.

h. Paragraph 2e(6), Page 25. Nonconcur. Airfield service detachments (ASD) provide both IFR and VHF terminal service. ASD commanders can be designated Airfield Commanders if the installation commander so desires. A letter of agreement is executed between the installation commander and the ASD commander. The ASD commander, as airfield commander, would then have operational control and supervision over POL handlers and equipment. Equipment and personnel must be furnished to the ASD commander to accomplish this mission. At present the 165th Aviation Group is working on a study.
recommending a change of concept and completing MTOE action converting ADD to Aviation Operating Detachments (AOD) which would authorize equipment and personnel to accomplish this mission.

1. Paragraph 2e(8), Page 27. Concur. This headquarters has coordinated with Captain Hood, 1st Log Cmd Ammo section. He stated that units should submit their requisitions for rocket motor J106 rather than J231. J106, J107 and J108 are presently in stock.

j. Paragraph 2e(9), Page 27. Nonconcur. Coordination with HS, 1st Log Cmd, CPT Hood, reveals that due to lot number integrity being lost, the ammunition must be inspected, evaluated and a new lot number assigned for control and safety purposes. This is being done on Okinawa.

k. Paragraph 2e(10), Page 27. Repair of emergency radios is through the repair and return to stock program. Units are required to turn in unserviceable radios to AVEL support units and requisition replacement items from ATEC.

l. Paragraph 2e(11), Page 28. Nonconcur with recommendations to locate inspection equipment at direct support companies for the following reasons:

(1) The required inspection is performed utilizing ultrasonic test equipment which is in short supply in RVN. It has been difficult to maintain five (5) serviceable sets in the GS companies of the 34th GS Gp. To procure and maintain 11 additional sets in GS companies is not feasible at this time.

(2) Another reason for centralizing tail rotor hub inspection at GS level is to minimize the damage occurring to hub components through improper disassembly and assembly procedures. Even with special training and instruction, many hubs must be salvaged or sent to the FAHF for repair because of improper handling. Additionally, a high degree of skill and training is necessary to insure a thorough and complete inspection is performed utilizing the ultrasonic test equipment.

m. Paragraph 2f(1),(2),(3), and (4), Pages 28, 29 and 30. Concur with all recommendations. 1st Aviation Brigade letter, Subject: Standardized MTOE comments, dated 12 February 1969, requests comments concerning the accuracy and adequacy of the new standardized MTOEs. Responses from this letter should indicate needs such as mentioned in the enumerated paragraphs. Appropriate MTOE action will be taken when responses from the referenced letter are received and evaluated. However, additional spaces for the requested positions will be extremely difficult to obtain; spaces
AVBAGC-0

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFR-65 (R1) (U)

will have to be identified that could be deleted to finance the additional spaces requested. The Post Headquarters Section recommended in paragraph 2f(1), Page 28, might be obtained by augmenting the local ASD HOE with the necessary spaces. A letter requesting such augmentation, with detailed justification, should be sent through 1st Avn Bde to Headquarters USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-FD.

n. Paragraph 2g, Page 30. ZYS modification on aircraft being issued to units in-country could not be performed at IRGAI due to nonavailability of kits. On-site maintenance at Pleiku was moved to Qui Nhon due to low availability of aircraft. Coordination has been made to perform some ZYS at Pleiku. All retrofit will end 1 July 69 and the contract will not be renewed. Aircraft not modified by this date will not be modified. Commanders are urged to release aircraft for modification as they are requested by tail number.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DAVID R. ANDERSON

DAVID R. ANDERSON

1st AVN BDE

AG

AG
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. Reference item concerning Training: UH-1 Emergency Procedures, page 22, paragraph 2c; concur. Anti-torque failure training was discussed at the Quarterly Flight Standardization Conference on 24 March 1969. Standardization board members are submitting recommendations to USARV for changes to the standardization guide for UH-1 aircraft. These changes will be incorporated in the revised guide.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
52d Combat Avn Bn
1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 52d Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 18 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

Sgt. Maj. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Ass. AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.

CO, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion

10 February 1969

N/A

N/A

Supplementary Notes

N/A

Sponsoring Military Activity

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

Abstract

N/A