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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (8 May 69) FOR OT UT 691265

14 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 29th General Support Group, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 29th General Support Group  
APO US FORCES 96491

AVCA SGN SG OF

10 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly  
Period Ending 31 Jan 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

THRU: Commanding General  
US Army Support Command, Saigon  
ATTN: AVCA SGN GO S  
APO 96491

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

## SECTION I

### OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

#### A. COMMAND

1. (U) During the 92 day period, the 29th General Support Group continued operations as a major subordinate command of the US Army Support Command, Saigon, providing broad and varied logistics support to US Army and Free World Military Assistance Forces--primarily in the III Corps Tactical Zone--in addition to general support maintenance for both III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Additionally, several maintenance contracts for generators and other non-standard items of equipment were administered. The Group Headquarters continued to exercise tactical responsibility for defense of the eastern perimeter of Long Binh Post, including approximately 15 kilometers of defensive positions, three sub-sector operations centers, and associated communications.

2. (C) Principal organizations supported logistically were the 1st, 25th, and Thai Infantry Divisions, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), one brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, the 199th Inf Bde, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and various other combat and combat support units including the 23rd and 54th Artillery Groups, the 79th and 159th Engineer Groups, such elements as the 18th MP Brigade (-), the 1st Signal Brigade (-), the 1st Aviation Brigade (-), the 44th Medical Brigade (-), the 5th Special Forces (-), as

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well as major logistical organizations including the 4th Transportation Command (TML), the US Army Depot, Long Binh, the 48th Transportation Group, and the 64th Quartermaster Battalion (POB). In addition, the Group provided organizational maintenance in support of some 58 units and over 500 vehicles operated in the Saigon area while providing field maintenance support to the US Embassy; Headquarters, COMUSMACV; Headquarters, USARV; Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command; and Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon.

3. (C) The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) displaced from I CTZ to III CTZ at the beginning of this reporting period. This ambitious operation was dubbed "Liberty Canyon".

4. (C) In spite of extremely short notice (two days prior to arrival of the first increment) and the accelerated transfer of nearly 22,000 troops (entire move was completed in less than two weeks), the logistical problems associated with receiving the 1st Cav were minor. This was due to several factors. First, the deployment concept allowed 29th Group to support the Cav from existing installations; namely, Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, Quan Loi, Song Be, and Long Binh. Secondly, effective liaison and coordination between 29th Group DISCOM and the Division G-4 was established almost immediately and continued throughout the operation. Thirdly, both the 1st and 25th Divisions were very cooperative in lending support and facilities while the 1st Cav was in the initial phase of its move. Fourthly, the 1st Cav employed its organic support capability to the maximum. And, lastly, the 29th Group's broad logistical base infrastructure and flexibility allowed rapid and effective response to this unexpected additional support requirement.

5. (U) The Long Binh Maintenance Facility was established under the 266th S&S Bn on 1 November. The 549th Lt Maint Co, 5th Lt Maint Co, and the 61st HEM Co, which comprise the LBMP, are units previously assigned to the 185th Maint Bn and 79th Maint Bn. The 266th S&S Bn now has the responsibility of providing direct support maintenance, supply (less Class V and IX) and services to all combat service support units in the Long Binh area. The consolidated maintenance facility should help increase the effectiveness of its maintenance operation. Likewise, the 185th Maint Bn has the responsibility of providing direct support to all tactical, non-divisional units in and around the Long Binh - Saigon complex; these units include the 11th ACR, the 199th Lt Inf Bde, and the 3rd Bde, 82nd Airborne Div, among others.

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6. (C) Command attention continued during the past quarter in the areas of artillery, combat vehicle, and engineer construction equipment maintenance for combat and combat support units. In the logistical support units, similar emphasis continued on increased availability and improved maintenance for five ton trucks and materiel handling equipment. Artillery deadline for the two field artillery groups was again very low this quarter (deadlines remained under 3%). Combat tank and ACAV availability was much higher this quarter due in part to the 11th ACR emphasis on maintenance as well as close coordination and support provided by the 185th Maint Bn (deadline rates were 4% for tanks and for ACAVs). Dump truck availability for the two engineer groups, engaged in extensive land clearing and road construction, improved with respect to equipment availability (9% truck deadline). There was little or no relief realized on the deadline rate for MHE or five ton trucks (deadline rates 24% and 24% respectively). Hopefully we should experience a decrease in the deadline rate of five ton trucks due to the paving of the highway between Cu Chi and Tay Ninh.

7. (U) The overall deadline rate did not improve significantly from the previous quarter. However, the shortages of components and repair parts was not as significant as it was in the previous quarter. A shortage of personnel in certain MOSs was the limiting factor in some instances. The accelerated rotation of personnel during the Christmas holidays accompanied by a slow-down in the replacement pipe line significantly reduced the Group's maintenance capability. Command emphasis on improved supply responsiveness is resulting in more repair parts. Receipts of badly needed repair parts and assemblies from sources out-of-country have brightened the supply picture; however, the problem of shortages has not been solved. Several critical, fast moving items such as clutch discs, filters of all types, tire tubes, and component repair parts kits are still in short supply.

8. (U) The Long Binh Army Depot MHE deadline continues to rise. The majority of the deadline is at organizational level which is due to a shortage of both repair parts and personnel in the depot MHE maintenance shops. This situation has been the main reason for the slow rate at which the MHE has been evacuated to the DS maintenance shops. Several assistance visits have been made to the Depot in an effort to alleviate this situation. Controlled cannibalization has been employed in an effort to partially relieve the problem.

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9. (U) Critical shortages of FADAC memories plagued the maintenance support of this equipment for most of the quarter. Limited relief was realized in January with the receipt of 14 memory units. FADAC deadline for memory discs now stands at four, or 3% of the supported density.

10. (U) The M107/110 SP artillery R&R program was initiated in December as a preventive maintenance, quarterly service, and personnel training program. Most of the guns are being serviced on site rather than in maintenance shops either because of movement limitations or tactical considerations. The quality of the work produced in this manner is comparable to that resulting from maintenance performed in a fixed maintenance facility. Necessary parts have been requisitioned. However, only a limited amount of these parts have been received to date. The main items which are critically short are filter elements. The availability of loader rammers, spade cylinders, rammer cylinders, swing cylinders, hydraulic motors, and elevation and traverse mechanism assemblies in maintenance DX facilities has enabled the R&R program to proceed on schedule in III CTZ.

11. (U) In early December, the 11th ACR was refitted with M48A3 combat tanks in exchange for their M48A2C tanks. After one squadron had been completed, the initial exchange schedule and rate of turn-in had to be accelerated due to a change in the tactical situation. Even with the accelerated change-over, the exchange was completed without mishap. This was accomplished through close coordination between the 185th Maintenance Battalion, 29th Group, US Army Support Command, Saigon, USADLB, and the 11th ACR.

12. (U) In January the 610th Maintenance Battalion lost the maintenance support mission for the 1st and 2nd Land Clearing Platoons. The maintenance support of land clearing units was assigned to the 62nd Land Clearing Battalion, a unit of the 79th Engineer Group. The 610th will now be able to enhance its engineer maintenance capabilities in other parts of their area of responsibility, such as Lai Khe and Phuoc Vinh.

13. (U) 29th Group was tasked with hosting training and/or providing maintenance support for several newly introduced vehicles. Some of the more significant ones are the X1706 Armored Car, XM571 Articulated Cargo Carrier, Vulcan Automatic Cannon, and the M551 Armored Recon Vehicle. The Group is preparing to provide direct support to the 1/11th ACR and back-up support to the 25th Div when the M551 is issued. All

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phases of technical training from crew operation to GS maintenance began on 27 January.

14. (U) Initially, 29th Group was to be involved in only the general support aspect of the Sheridan (M551) Program. The decision to equip the 1/11th ACR with Sheridan resulted in the 29th Group, and more specifically, the 185th Maint Bn, becoming much more involved in the support program. A great deal of planning and coordination was accomplished in December and January. Through the efforts of the 1st Log Cmd Project Officer, 29th Group was able to obtain maintenance personnel who previously had received Sheridan training. These individuals plus the 29th Group mechanics who presently are being trained by the NET Team at Blackhorse Base Camp, will greatly enhance the Group's capability to support the M551.

15. (U) The requirement for 36V "iron clad" batteries for electric MHE used in port discharge operations became critical this quarter. Two blanket purchase agreements were initiated with civilian contractors to rebuild these batteries and alleviate the critical supply requirement. In addition, an in-house capability for rebuild of these batteries was developed in one of the heavy equipment maintenance companies of the Group. This in-house capability has exceeded all anticipated production and should be capable of providing sole-source support for these batteries once the existing backlog has been eliminated.

16. (U) During the reporting period, demand accommodation for general supplies was 55% and demand satisfaction was 40%. By direction of the CG, 1st Logistical Command, all DSUs and DSSAs of the 29th Group conducted extensive stock location surveys and 100% wall to wall inventories which resulted in an overall location accuracy of 92% and an inventory accuracy of 80%. Continuing emphasis in these areas during the next six months should enable DSUs and DSSAs to reduce warehouse denial rates, more rapidly locate stock, obtain more accurate inventories, and increase demand satisfaction.

17. (U) The 79th Maint Bn (GS) was tasked to increase five ton multifuel production by 33 engines per quarter for the remainder of FY 69 due to a projected shortfall of receipts of new engines from CONUS. The FY 70 general support program for Saigon Support Command was developed by 1st Logistical Command. Plans had included inactivation of the 79th and replacing it with a contract operation to handle general

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support maintenance. Consolidated efforts by 29th Group and Saigon Support Command reoriented the 9.8 million dollar FY 70 program to a military program; thereby precluding an eight million dollar expenditure for a civilian contract. Multifuel engines will not be rebuilt in Vietnam during FY 70 and the task is not included in the new program.

18. (U) 29th Group began a system of providing mobile contact team support for MACV Advisor Teams in III CTZ. Mission, equipment, remote location, and insufficient air transportation had resulted in a situation of practically no maintenance support for some of the teams. Coordination between II Field Forces, III Corps MACV G-4, the Advisor Teams, Saigon Support Command, and 29th Group yielded a workable plan by which we can provide better support to all Advisor Teams. More responsive air transportation is being arranged by III Corps G-4 and II Field Forces. The plan includes formal maintenance instruction for the Advisor Teams as well as repair service. This system is now in operation in the more remote provinces and early reports indicate that it is working well.

19. (U) Prior to 15 November 1968, bakery facilities were being operated in both Long Binh and Cu Chi. The Cu Chi bakery, operated by the 277th S&S Bn, was experiencing frequent maintenance problems with their M-1945 trailer-mounted bakery plant. Consequently, the bakery was severely restricted in output, and was not obtaining maximum utility from assigned personnel and equipment. In an attempt to overcome the shortages of bread caused by the loss of production at Cu Chi, the Long Binh bakery, operated by the 266th S&S Bn, was actually overproducing, that is, the bakery was reducing processing time and producing larger quantities of bread at a sacrifice of quality in order to meet total issue requirements. In order to overcome these related problems, the bakery equipment and personnel from Cu Chi were brought to Long Binh and integrated with the 266th S&S Bn facility. This centralization of facilities has permitted more intensive management of both personnel and equipment resources, and has resulted in an improvement in the quality as well as quantity of bread provided from our military facilities. As part of a general upgrading program, the bakery now has installed two commercial type ovens and one commercial mixer, and has a third commercial oven awaiting installation. This equipment, utilized in the central facility, is further contributing to an improvement in both the quality and quantity of bread being produced. It is the goal of the 29th Group to produce all of the bread required by military personnel in the III Corps Tactical Zone, thus eliminating the present

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requirement for the procurement of bread from civilian contractors.

20. (U) Following coordination with USASUPCOM, Saigon, and US Army Depot, Long Binh, the requisitioning cycle for Class I supplies at selected 29th Group supply points was reduced from 14 to seven days. This action will enable the supply points to reduce the stockage levels for Class I supplies. These lower stockage levels will significantly decrease opportunities for pilferage as well as minimize the loss of supplies in the event that the supply points are subjected to enemy attack. Responsiveness of the transportation system supporting the supply points is making this system work. The program is being expanded to as many Class I Supply Points within the 29th Group as is practical.

21. (C) In November, the Group added two additional Ammunition Supply Points at Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi to meet the ammunition requirements of the newly arrived 1st Air Cavalry Division in the III Corps Sector. A total of 15,615 short tons were handled during Liberty Canyon by the new ASPs. The ASPs continued to operate after Liberty Canyon was terminated and have handled 29,361 short tons as of 31 January.

22. (U) The largest ammunition depot in-country, which is operated by 29th Group, ended the year with over 1,100,000 tons lifted. Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot's performance for the quarter was:

	REC'D	ISSUED	REWAREHOUSED	LIFTED*
Nov	33,078	39,178	43,256	121,000
Dec	40,883	46,920	30,286	118,089
Jan	35,774	36,636	23,725	100,058

\*Includes operations such as classification, destruction, and renovation not included in other figures.

23. (U) Urgently needed engineer effort to upgrade pads, berms, roads, and drainage in the LBASD continued to be delayed this quarter due to engineer troops being committed to higher priority projects. USARV Engineers requested that a civilian contractor be used in lieu of Engineer troops. Although the use of contractor hired Local Nationals will create possible security problems, it is evident that this is the only source of engineer effort available at this time. The project will be accomplished by completely clearing one portion of the Depot at a time so that adequate security measures may be implemented. A design contract has been let and actual construction should begin in February.

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24. (U) Despite a recurring problem of insufficient numbers of chain binders, the last piece of equipment was removed from the old Tay Ninh retrograde yard in late December. This represents a six month hauling effort in which more than 2500 tons of retrograde were removed from Tay Ninh. Lack of chain binders continues to plague efforts to retrograde equipment from Tay Ninh as it is received. Continuous command emphasis is being applied to keep the backlog from growing.

25. (U) Increased emphasis was placed on internal measures. Particular attention was being paid to observing the actions of Local National hire personnel and contractor-hire personnel who work on US facilities. Because of recent terrorist incidents on US installations, command action has been taken to insure that all 29th Group personnel are aware of the dangers of booby traps in areas where large numbers of troops regularly gather. Such places as messes, clubs, and theatres are being checked constantly for unusual appearing equipment or arrangements. Troops in metropolitan areas are being cautioned against crowding together at bus or taxi stands.

26. (U) Construction of a new bunkerline in the 29th Group sector commenced in January. The resulting new bunker line will add eight bunkers to the 29th Group responsibility, bringing the total to 82. The completion date is scheduled for late March. During the quarter, another 60 foot observation tower was built behind the Group's sector. The tower overlooks Ho Nai Village and Red Catcher Road, possible enemy infiltration routes into Long Binh Post.

27. (U) Communications within the Group have been expanded significantly. A Radio/Wire Integration (RWI) capability has been implemented, and emphasis has been placed on Land Line Teletype in lieu of Radio-Teletype Communications as the latter has proven to be generally unreliable and difficult to maintain. The Group now has Land Line Teletype communications from the Group Headquarters at Long Binh to Long Giao and Quan Loi. Additionally, plans include a circuit to Phuoc Vinh in the near future.

28. (U) During this period, units of Saigon Logistical Support Activity (Prov) began moving from scattered locations in Saigon to Camp Davies, an installation in the Southwest portion of Saigon, which is being vacated by the US Army Depot, Long Binh. The 223rd Supply and Service Company has completed its move to Camp Davies, and the 536th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company has moved about one third of its operation. Consolidation at Camp Davies will afford better

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living and working facilities for our personnel in addition to providing better means of command and control for the provisional battalion's staff. The move will be completed during February.

29. (U) A magazine platoon from the 661st Ordnance Company (Ammo) was attached to the 3rd Ordnance Battalion on 22 November.

30. (U) On 4 December the 229th Supply and Service Company was transferred from the 266th Supply and Service Battalion to the 610th Maintenance Battalion where it is providing support to 1st Cav and non-divisional units in and around Phuoc Vinh.

31. (U) The 506th Supply and Service Company was transferred from the 185th Maintenance Battalion to the 266th Supply and Service Battalion on 4 December.

32. (U) On 19 December the 505th F&C Supply Platoon was attached to the 277th Supply and Service Battalion at Tay Ninh.

33. (U) The 534th F&C Platoon was attached to the 610th Maintenance Battalion on 14 January. This Unit recently arrived in-country and will store and issue Engineer IV materials in support of 1st Div and non-divisional units operating in the 1st Div TAOI.


34. (U) EOD support in the Phuoc Vinh area is now provided by the 99th Ordnance Detachment (EOD). This unit was attached to the 610th Maintenance Battalion on 28 December.

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35. (U) The facing sketch indicates the 29th General Support Group's area of operations in III Corps Tactical Zone. The 277th Supply and Service Battalion has both Supply & Service and Maintenance units attached and provides across-the-board logistical support to the 25th Division TAOI plus one brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The same across-the-board support is provided to the 1st Division TAOI plus two brigades of the 1st Cav by the 610th Maintenance Battalion. Likewise, the 266th Supply and Service Battalion, the Saigon LSA (Prov) and the Bearcat LSA (Prov) supervise all logistical activities in the Long Binh, CMAC, and Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Force (Division) respectively. The 185th Maintenance Battalion performs a similar mission for various non-divisional tactical units, including the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, and the 54th Artillery Group on a non-geographic basis. The 79th Maintenance Battalion (GS) provides General Support Maintenance from Long Binh for both III and IV CTZ. The Group has 36 companies plus 21 separate platoons and detachments based in 16 geographical locations in III CTZ.

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29th G S GP  
 UNIT LOCATION

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Period Ending 31 Jan 1969 (RCS GSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

B. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE, AND DISCIPLINE

1. (U) Although the over-all personnel situation has improved over the last quarter (87% of authorized as opposed to 78%) we continue to have shortage in the following MOSs to the extent that our capability to perform is affected: Weapons Support Radar Repairman (26C2 & 26C3), Turret Artillery Repairman (54G3), Ammunition Apprentice (55A1), Ammunition Foreman (55Z5), Engineer Equipment Repairman (62B3), Mechanical Maintenance Apprentice (63A1), General Vehicle Repairman (63C3), Clerk and Clerk-Typist (70A & 70B), and Supplyman (76A). Additionally, MOS 76P4G3 (NCR 500 NCOIC) is very critical to our needs.

2. (U) The Group Headquarter's staff has been augmented because its personnel authorization is insufficient to accomplish additional mission responsibilities, such as Civil Affairs, Civilian Personnel, and S-4.

GROUP HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL STRENGTH

<u>AUTHORIZED</u>			<u>ASSIGNED</u>		
O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
22	1	77	29	4	117

3. (U) Check sheets for administration and funds were forwarded to all units to assist them in preparing for Annual General Inspections.

4. (U) The military personnel strength of the 29th General Support Group at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

a. Authorized

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
265	118	7382	7765

b. Assigned

206	108	6719	7033
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c. Since the last reporting period the 29th Group gained 382 Enlisted Men. However, the manpower shortage remains critical in the areas mentioned in para B1 above.

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5. (U) During the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969 the total number of Vietnamese personnel authorized under the table of distribution has remained unchanged at 945 personnel. However, a change to Program 6 (civilianization of military spaces) became effective 10 November 1968 authorizing an additional 548 Vietnamese personnel, bringing the total authorized under the TDA Program 6 to 1493 personnel.

a. Indicated below are the total number of TDA and Program 6 Vietnamese personnel presently employed by the 29th General Support Group.

(1) TDA.....1461  
(2) Program 6.....472

b. Daily Hire authorization for the same period remained unchanged at 705. This Headquarters is utilizing all 705 spaces daily.

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6. (U) PERSONNEL STRENGTH

a. During this quarter continuous liaison was maintained with the 537th Personnel Service Center to insure the number of personnel authorized within the Group as reflected by their records was correct.

b. On 31 January 1969 the authorized and assigned strength, both military and civilian were as shown on the following chart.

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29TH GS GP  
PERSONNEL ASSETS AS OF 31 JAN

UNIT	OFFICERS		WO		EM		VGS (INDIGENOUS)		DAILY HIRE (AIK)	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
HQ CO	22	29	1	4	77	121	13	13	20	20
3RD ORD BN	31	23	11	10	1244	1117	163	168	70	70
79TH MAINT BN	36	20	31	25	878	826	257	358	55	55
185TH MAINT BN	36	29	23	20	1018	911	78	116	45	45
266TH S&S BN	53	33	22	19	1699	1596	330	587	45	45
277TH S&S BN	28	22	9	8	690	651	180	122	100	100
610TH MAINT BN	35	24	9	10	1034	720	253	61	45	45
SAIGON LSA	13	12	9	9	402	449	263	403	15	15
BEARCAT LSA	10	14	4	3	332	328	0	6	15	15

TOTAL	265	206	118	108	7383	6719	1537	1834	410	410
	ASSIGNED MILITARY 7033									
	ASSIGNED LN 1947									

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
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7. (U) OFFICER STRENGTH

As of 31 January the officer strength was at 78.0% (208 assigned against an authorization of 265). A significant item of note is the fact that of the total assigned officer strength there are 134 lieutenants with less than two years service and 52 captains with an average time in grade of 18 months or 3 1/2 years of total service. What is lacking in experience is partially compensated by the determination and "Can Do" attitude of these officers. However, a good part of the existing problems can be traced to the lack of experience at the operating level.

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
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8. (U) WARRANT OFFICER STRENGTH

The warrant officer strength is at 91.0% (108 assigned against an authorization of 118). Maintaining the assigned warrant officer strength at a high level is one of the main contributing factors to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. These personnel, being specialists in their particular fields, have a wealth of experience and knowledge.

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


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9. (U) ENLISTED STRENGTH

Our enlisted strength was a real matter of concern during January when we were at 81% of our authorized strength. Although the picture looks better now, there is still a serious shortage in those MOSs shown in Paragraph B1.




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10. (U) Reenlistment rate for 29th General Support Group was 27.7% (53 out of 191 eligible). During the 2nd quarter the following units were assigned full time reenlistment NCOs: Saigon LSA, 3rd Ord Bn; Bearcat LSA, and 610th Maint Bn. The 277th S&S Bn had no full time reenlistment.

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11. (U) The following R&R spaces to areas shown were utilized by personnel of HHC, 29th General Support Group during this quarter: Hawaii, 10; Australia, 11; Bangkok, six; Hong Kong, two; and Taipei, two. Total R&Rs numbered 31.
12. (U) Military Police citations were issued to nine individuals of HHC, 29th General Support Group during this quarter. Offenses included: Off Limits, two; pass violations, three; stolen vehicles; motor vehicle accidents; AWOLs; and unauthorized discharge of firearms, one each.
13. (U) Promotion of enlisted personnel assigned to HHC, 29th General Support Group during this quarter were as follows: Sgt, two; Sp/5, 15; Sp/4, eight; and PFC, two.
14. (U) Key personnel changes during the quarter were as follows:
  - a. Colonel Louis Rachmeler, OrdC, assumed Command of the 29th General Support Group on 22 November 1968, replacing Colonel Thomas McDonald, OrdC.
  - b. Major Zemalkowski, S-4, SigC, was replaced by Major Igeary W. Webster, SigC.
  - c. LTC Richard Wasson, OrdC, Chief of Maintenance Section, was replaced by Major Larry Bachelor, OrdC.
  - d. 1Lt Edwin Futa, OrdC, HHC Commander, was replaced by 1Lt William White, AGC.
  - e. LTC Robert U. Boyd, Inf, Chief of Administration, was reassigned with no replacement.
  - f. LTC Holady C. Neafus, Jr. was assigned as Deputy Commander.
  - g. 1Lt Eggert Madsen, OrdC, Civil Affairs Officer, was replaced by 1Lt Michael Winkler, AR.
  - h. Sergeant Major Charles Watson was replaced by Command Sergeant Major Jack B. Moore.

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15. (U) Non-Judicial Punishment for the Command:

	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>
HHC, 29th Group	7	7	3
3rd Ord Bn	36	35	31
79th Maint Bn	26	14	18
185th Maint Bn	30	16	21
266th S&S Bn	51	32	57
277th S&S Bn (Tay Ninh LSA)	12	14	9
610th Maint Bn	18	27	44
Saigon LSA	9	7	9
Bearcat LSA	3	5	5
29th Gen Spt Gp	<u>192</u>	<u>157</u>	<u>197</u>

16. (U) Personnel within the Command tried by Courts-Martial:

a. General Courts-Martial: One member of this Command was tried by General Court-Martial during the reporting period. The individual was charged with voluntary manslaughter and the court was convened by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command.

b. Special Courts-Martial:

	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>
HHC, 29th Group	0	0	0
3rd Ord Bn	4	4	5
79th Maint Bn	7	1	0
185th Maint Bn	1	3	2
266th S&S Bn	5	3	1
277th S&S Bn (Tay Ninh LSA)	2	3	1
610th Maint Bn	2	1	1
Saigon LSA	0	1	2
Bearcat LSA	0	0	2
29th Gen Spt Gp	<u>21</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>14</u>

c. Summary Courts-Martial:

	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>
HHC, 29th Group	0	0	0
3rd Ord Bn	4	4	2
79th Maint Bn	3	0	2
185th Maint Bn	0	0	1
266th S&S Bn	0	1	2
277th S&S Bn (Tay Ninh LSA)	0	1	1
610th Maint Bn	0	1	1
Saigon LSA	0	1	0

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	Nov	Dec	Jan
Bearcat LSA	$\frac{0}{7}$	$\frac{0}{8}$	$\frac{0}{9}$
29th Gen Spt Gp			

17. (U) Legal assistance provided totaled 246 actions, including 186 interviews, 43 instruments drafted, and other miscellaneous services.

18. (U) During this reporting period, the Staff Judge Advocate Section also supervised claims administration, elimination actions under AR 635-212 and AR 635-200, reviewed all Article 15s administered by this command, performed monthly visits to prisoners in the USARV Installation Stockade, audited unit funds, and conducted investigations within the Group.

19. (U) Hamlets supported by 29th Group increased from 17 to 19 through Civic Action programs during this quarter. A variety of self-help projects have also been completed. These included the building of a playground and the procuring of school kits at Tam Hiep, and the building of a school (in progress) at Trai Quang Trung. An increase of Civic Aid within the Group will accompany the coming of Tet Nguyen Dan.

20. (U) The Group's four chaplains conducted 90 worship services during the quarter with an average attendance of 35 at each service. Character Guidance lectures were presented to 6,760 men, while 1,141 men were seen for counseling.

21. (U) The Chaplain's activities have been handicapped due to the Group's units being stationed in scattered locations and the lack of air transportation. However, a plan is being considered which would relocate 29th Group Chaplains in more strategic locations to overcome the problem of transportation.

## C. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) The development of the Winter Spring Campaign characterized the enemy's activities in the III CTZ. Capture... enemy documents reflected two phases of the Winter-Spring Campaign. During Phase I the enemy's goals are the following: (a) increase anti-GVN political activities in an effort to separate the people from their government; (b) increase VC influence over rural areas in an effort to control food supplies and routes into the cities; (c) conduct military activity commensurate with level of negotiations in Paris. Phase II is expected to be a TET type offensive designed to force the US to withdraw from SVN.

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Throughout the early part of the reporting period enemy activity reflected stockpiling of supplies, regrouping and reorganizing units, and making preparation for the Winter-Spring Offensive. Enemy main forces continuously avoided contact with friendly units. The preponderance of attacks were attacks by fire and harassing action. Captured enemy documents indicated the enemy expected the bombing halt and was encouraging his cadre to establish solid political bases in the population centers.

In mid-December enemy activity was highlighted by widespread harassing attacks by fire on several population centers and numerous loading zones, fire support bases and Regional Forces/Popular Forces Observation Points throughout the III CTZ. This activity signaled the beginning of the enemy's Winter-Spring Campaign following policies outlined in earlier captured directives. His main forces continued to avoid contact while placing maneuver elements into intermediate base areas in preparation for Phase II of the Winter-Spring Offensive.

Throughout January enemy ground activity continued at a low level and his main forces avoided contact with allied units. However, attacks by fire were recorded regularly on allied installations in the Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces. Friendly operations discovered many enemy caches and engaged his forces in scattered contact.

Presently, it seems the enemy will continue his offensive campaign using all available means from military actions to propaganda. His over-all tactical posture suggests such potential targets as Saigon or Bien Hoa/Long Binh complex.

2. (C) Major incidents occurring at locations of interest to this command during the reporting period were:

a. On 20 1943 Nov 68, Phuoc Vinh, Vic:XT967490 received 10-15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Results: Frd one KHA 12 WHA; two buildings, three 1/4 ton trucks damaged, En-unknown. 29th Group suffered no damages or casualties.

b. On 22 0900H Nov 68, Tay Ninh convoy, vic:XT558168 received one RPG round and small arms fire. Results: No damages or casualties sustained by the convoy.

c. On 25 Nov 68, Phuoc Vinh base camp, vic:ST961482, received five rounds of 107, rocket fire. Three rounds impacted within the perimeter. No casualties or damage.

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d. On 070050H Dec 68, Tay Ninh West Base Camp, vic: XT1652, received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Results: 1st Cav Div (AMBL) suffered 18 WHA; En-unknown.

e. On 090305H Dec 68, Chu Chi Base Camp, vic: XT660180, received 12 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. Results: The 25th US Infantry Division suffered two WHA and one barracks heavily damaged.

f. On 141930H Dec 68, 29th Group NE sector of defense, vic: YT108105 of the Long Binh Post perimeter, received a probable enemy attempt to probe or reconnoiter the post perimeter. It is believed that approximately six to nine enemy personnel employing semi-automatic weapons fire were involved in this incident. Friendly personnel returned fire using 700 rounds of small arms and ten rounds of M-79. There were no friendly casualties. Enemy casualties are unknown.

g. On 171710H Dec 68, vic: ST4947, the Dau Tieng Base Camp received 30 rounds of mixed 60mm/82mm mortar fire. At 2235H the base camp received an additional 11 rounds of mortar fire. Results: 29th Group no cas/dam; other friendly, three US WHA; enemy unknown.

h. On 16 1900H Dec 68, guards in 3rd Ord tower number 26 on Long Binh Post, vic: YT069081, sighted a single individual within the confines of Ammo Pad Nr 16. Search teams with dogs later discovered a hiding place that had been recently used (YT072082). Further search revealed a spot in the depot fence where a man had apparently recently crawled through (YT065080). An EOD team was dispatched to check ammo pads. Results: Negative.

i. On 17 1104H Dec 68, vic: YT430450, (6KmWSW of Dau Tieng) the Dau Tieng resupply convoy received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from both sides of the road. Two companies from the 2nd Battalion, 22nd (Mech) Infantry returned fire with organic weapons. One company from 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry reinforced a light fire team and TAC AIR supported the friendly forces. The contact was broken at 1340H. Results: Friendly, six US KHA (five US KHA-48th Trans Gp), 11 US WHA, three APCs damaged, one 2 1/2 ton truck and five S&Ps destroyed. Enemy, 103 KIA.

j. On 171915H Dec 68, vic: YT960490, the Phuoc Vinh Base Camp received five rounds of 107mm rocket fire. The 229th S&S Co received one round in the motor pool area re-

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sulting in the damage of one RT forklift, one 1/4 ton truck,  
and one 2 1/2 ton truck. There were no friendly casualties.

k. On 200525 Dec 68, the Tay Ninh Base Camp, vic:  
XT160520, received two unknown type rounds impacting in POL  
tank yard. Results: Neg dam/cas.

l. On 201310H Dec 68, the Tay Ninh Base Camp, vic:  
XT150523, received five rounds of 75mm RR fire. Three  
rounds impacted in the POL/aircraft refueling area while two  
rounds impacted outside the perimeter. Results: one US WHA,  
one hose, one 500 gal collapsible bladder damaged.

m. On 212145H Dec 68, the Tay Ninh Base Camp, vic:  
XT160520 received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Results:  
one US KHA, four US WHA; one vehicle destroyed, three ve-  
hicles damaged.

n. On 232330H Dec 68, the Tay Ninh Base Camp received  
two rounds believed to be 75mm RR in the 228th S&S Company  
motor pool. Results: Minor damage to PLL parts building.

o. On 271630H Dec 68, the Tay Ninh Base Camp received  
two rounds 75mm RR fire (XT1751) Results: Neg cas/dam.

p. On 281030H Dec 68, vic:XT1651, the Tay Ninh Base  
Camp received three rounds of 75mm RR fire. Return fire  
with artillery and light fire team in suspected enemy fir-  
ing positions. Results: Frd-neg cas/dam, En-unknown.

q. On 291940H Dec 68, vic:XT157507, the 277th S&S Bn  
at Tay Ninh Base Camp received five rounds 75mm RR fire.  
Results: neg cas/dam.

r. On 292015H Dec 68, vic:XT961482 (Phuoc Vinh): The  
229th S&S Co received 30 to 50 rounds mixed 60mm/82mm mortar  
fire in four separate attacks from 2015H to 2120H. Results:  
five US WHA; Mailroom, NCO billets, GR building and ammo  
supply point office received minor damage; supply room and  
ten gas drums destroyed.

s. On 032335H Jan 69, vic:XT168520 (Tay Ninh West):  
The north side of Tay Ninh Base Camp received four rounds  
of suspected 75mm RR fire which impacted outside perimeter.  
Results: Neg cas/dam.

t. On 071515 Jan 69, vic:XT295500, a tractor and trail-  
er from the 228th S&S Co returning to Cu Chi from Tay Ninh  
hit a mine. The driver was slightly wounded, while extent  
of damage to tractor was minor.

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3. (U) The 524th MI Detachment conducted a Counterintelligence Survey Inspection of units from the 3rd Ordnance Battalion, 79th Maintenance Battalion, 185th Maintenance Battalion, 610th Maintenance Battalion, 266th Supply and Service Battalion, and Saigon Logistical Support Area. The counterintelligence measures in all units inspected were satisfactory. However, security measures of the 590th Maintenance Support Company of Bearcat Logistical Support Area and the 228th Supply and Service Company of the 277th Supply and Service Battalion received unsatisfactory reports from SUPCOM AGI inspection.

4. (U) During the reporting period the weather was characterized as clear and less humid, but hotter, than during the wet season. With the beginning of the dry season in November the rain fall has averaged less than two inches per month. The temperature ranged from a high of 96° to a low of 67°. The weather had little effect on the operations of the Group.

### D. S-4

(U) During the quarter the 29th Group continued to make maximum use of the Organizational Maintenance Supply Inspection team (OMSI). The team is under the supervision of the Group S-4. The team conducted 15 OMSIs, six Pre-Annual General Inspections, 22 courtesy inspections and 17 technical assistance visits to 29th Group units. In addition the team conducted 10 Annual General Inspections for the Saigon Support Command, eight Annual General Inspections and 19 Command Maintenance Management Inspections (CMMI) for the II Field Forces for a quarterly total of 97 inspections and technical assistance visits.

E. LOGISTICS. The Group continues to perform its mission of providing logistical support to the United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces in its area of responsibility.

### 1. (C) SUPPLY a. Class I


(1) (C) During the quarter, seven Class I supply points were operated by the Group in support of approximately 104,596 troops. These facilities were resupplied from US Army Depot, Long Binh by the 48th Transportation Group, 29th General Support Group organic vehicles, and contract commercial transportation under the direction of Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon.

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29TH GS GR  
Class I  
Troops Supported

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(2) (U) Class I issues for the quarter totaled 9,732,939 million rations which represents an increase of approximately 900,000 rations over the previous quarter, due primarily to the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division (Air-mobile) in the III Corps Tactical Zone. The requisitioning cycle at selected Class I supply points has been reduced from 14 days to seven days. The impact of the reduction upon the Class I depot and the customer is presently being evaluated. Should there be no adverse effects, the seven day requisition cycle will be incorporated in those sites which can be sustained by the required transportation. The outward result should be the reduction in stocks stored which is the primary objective of the exercise.


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MILLIONS OF RATIONS



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b. (U) Class II, IV, VII


(1) During the reporting period, five Class II & VII supply points, two Class IV supply points and seven Class IX supply points were operated by units of the Group in eight locations throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone.

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29TH GS Gr  
Class II, IV, VII Support  
ASL Lines

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
(2) During the quarter, the 29th General Support Group Class II, IV and VII supply points received 87,858 requisitions of which 48,927 were authorized stockage list items (ASL). Demand accomodation was 55%. Initial fill of ASL requisitions from stock was 19,655 for a demand satisfaction of 40%. Demand satisfaction continues to be low primarily because of high zero balances at DSUs and depot. 29th Group's DSUs and DSSAs completed a wall to wall inventory in January. The results of this inventory indicated an overall location accuracy of 92% and an inventory accuracy of 80%. The Group will continue to strive for increased accuracy in stock accounting procedures in an effort to improve demand accomodation and demand satisfaction.

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c. (U) Class IX


(1) Seven Tech Supplies are presently being operated by units of the 29th Group to provide repair parts. An eighth is due to begin operation next quarter at the Saigon LSA.

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29TH GS CF  
Class IX Support  
ASL Lines


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d. (C) Class III


(1) During this reporting period, the Group operated six Class III supply points with a total bulk capacity of approximately 1,277,000 gallons. These Class III activities were resupplied primarily by the 64th Quartermaster Battalion, using line haul procedures. The Bearcat Logistical Support Activity and the Class III supply point at Phu Loi are resupplied using organic transportation. The introduction of the 1st Cav Div into the III Corps Tactical Zone was accomplished without interruption of the 29th Group Class III supply point operations.

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29TH GS GR  
Class III Support  
Storage Capacity

\*Divisional Class III Support

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
(2) Issues of Class III for the quarter totaled 18.4 million gallons. This represents an increase of 2.9 million gallons over the last quarter's issues. This increase is caused by the increased JP4 issues in support of 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) elements throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone. All 29th Group Class III supply points completed decanting of package liquid fuel products to meet new stockage objectives established in December. These lower stockage levels reduce the quantity of fuel in forward areas and thereby decreases possibility of pilferage and loss due to enemy action. Further reductions of Class III stocks in forward areas are being considered as the number of convoys increase and transportation becomes more reliable.

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e. (C) Class V


(1) In November the Group added two additional Ammunition Supply Points to the two already operating at Tay Ninh and Tan Son Nhut. ASPs at Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi were established to meet the demand for ammunition in support of the newly assigned 1st Air Cavalry Division to the III Corps Sector. A total of 15,615 short tons were handled during Operation Liberty Canyon by the new ASPs. The ASPs continued to operate after Liberty Canyon was terminated and have handled 29,361 short tons as of 31 Jan 69. The ASPs are operating at locations indicated on the facing chart. Numbers on this chart indicate the stockage objectives in short tons at each location.

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
(2) Group Class V activities issued a total of 122,734 short tons during the quarter. Issues last quarter totaled 93,159 short tons. Receipt for the period 109,735 short tons. Receipts were less than issues by 12,999 short tons. Rewarehousing for the quarter was 97,267 short tons.

The increasing trend in tons-lifted was continued from the previous quarter. The addition of the 1st Cavalry Division resulted in an increased requirement for ammunition in support of operations, reaching a peak in December and dropping slightly in January as the combat operation stabilized. Establishment of additional ammunition supply points added to the total lift. Receipts dropped in November as a result of management establishing new and more realistic stockage levels by re-evaluating usage factors and stocks in-country. Lots were consolidated into a block storage configuration in November, causing a peak in rewarehousing.

Management efforts to reduce unserviceable, suspended, and slow moving stocks, and more frequent adjustments of stockage objectives will continue as will the emphasis placed on out-of-country retrograde of ammunition.

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
AVCA SGN SG OP

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b. Laundry Production

The ten Group laundry sites processed a total of 1,992,173 pounds of organizational and individual laundry during the reporting period. This is a 29% increase over the previous quarter. This increase in laundry production is the result of the introduction of the 1st Cavalry Division into the III Corps Tactical Zone and the increased tactical operations which take tactical troops away from base camps where contract laundry and local hire service is available.

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 iod Ending 31 Jan 69 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)




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c. Bath Production

151,000 personnel were processed through the eight shower points operated by the Group. This represents a 65% increase from the previous quarter. This increase is the result of increased field operations being conducted by tactical units in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

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
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d. Graves Registration

As a result of the introduction of the 1st Cav Div into the III Corps Tactical Zone, the 29th Group increased its graves registration collecting points from five to six. Remains processed through the Group collecting points during the quarter totaled 786. This total is a 54% increase over the previous quarter and reflects the increased troop population and increased enemy contact in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

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
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3. (U) FIELD MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION

a. Automotive

The past quarter reflected a downward trend in the number of automotive job orders received. The number of job orders completed during the quarter was slightly less than the number received due primarily to a shortage of 63 series MOS personnel. A reduction in the backlog during this period was due to the retrograde of uneconomically repairable vehicles.




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b. Artillery

Artillery maintenance support has remained on about the same level since July. In December and January the major problem was the M114A1, 155mm towed howitzer. Problem with this weapon has been a shortage of recoil mechanisms and obturator spindles. Some relief on recoils was realized about the middle of January and the obturator spindles are now starting to come in. Except for the above mentioned items, problems in supporting artillery have been minor.



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
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c. Fire Control

No major problems are being experienced regarding the maintenance support of fire control equipment. Receipts increased to a new high as a result of requests from artillery units for monthly inspections of all fire control. Completions have also risen resulting in a nearly constant backlog. None of the backlog represents a weapon down for fire control.

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
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d. Signal

In the communications and electronics (C&E) equipment commodity area, receipts, production and backlog experienced a continued average increase over the averages of the past nine months. The increase in receipt averages during the period is primarily due to a revision of evacuation procedures at the beginning of the period which effects evacuation of all C&E items through D6/65 maintenance channels. Previously, many items were evacuated directly to CC&S and retrograded to off-shore facilities. The capability for completions is still bound primarily to availability of repair parts, particularly in the area of modules for FM radio equipment (AN/VRC-12 series).

An increase in percentages of completions during the period in spite of a lack of response from the supply system is due to the establishment of a GS collection and inspection point which, by means of controlled substitution, has made critical repair parts and modules available for repair of customer and command assets equipment.

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65 PERCENT


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e. Heavy Engineer Equipment

During the last half of this reporting period the 610th Maint Bn relinquished support of the Land Clearing Teams, causing substantial decrease in total receipts. The formation of the 62nd Engr Bn (Land Clearing) and the relocation of several engineer battalions has caused a shift in the engineer support effort to the Phuoc Vinh - Lai Khe area instead of the Phu - Loi Di An area. The shift should place greater demands upon our maintenance contact teams at Phuoc Vinh and Lai Khe and may require the teams to be augmented.

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
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f. Quartermaster Heavy

During the past quarter, the USA Long Binh Army Depot has shifted almost entirely from the Saigon area to the Long Binh area. The lack of critical repair parts (engines, lift cylinders, hydraulic pumps) has caused the deadline rate to rise. The decrease in backlog is primarily due to the number of pieces of MHE washed out of the system and the recent influx of personnel. The rebuild program of hydraulic components recently initiated by Vinnell Corp should help materially in limiting the deadline rate.

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


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g. Power Generation

Repair parts continue to be the primary cause for the large backlog in power generation equipment. However, the backlog has decreased this quarter as the result of a concentrated effort to adhere to the closed loop retrograde policy. Also, the recent increase of MIL STD engines has helped to reduce the generator deadline. The decrease in receipts can be attributed to the fact that many of the "war weary" have been eliminated by washouts and replaced with closed loop assets from rebuild.



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h. Deadline and Equipment Status

Selected equipment status of major units directly supported by the 29th Group is identified below. Reflected are the quantity of equipment authorized, on hand, deadlined at organizational and field maintenance and % of equipment available (availability is expressed as a percentage of equipment on hand). Data was obtained from reports provided by major units and is current as of 20 January 1969.

ORDNANCE AUTOMOTIVE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>ORG D/L</u>	<u>FM D/L</u>	<u>AVAIL (%)</u>
11 ACR	892	832	43	9	94
23rd Arty Gp	781	717	28	30	92
54th Arty Gp	513	533	13	40	90
79th Eng	1024	938	19	43	93
159th Eng	1020	1024	25	49	92
29th GS Gp	1314	1233	75	98	86
89th MP	477	482	20	35	88
4th TC	216	246	5	20	88
48th T Gp	964	816	39	87	85
USADLB	239	355	46	5	86
64th QM	333	299	8	30	87

FORKLIFTS

4 TC	304	204	40	23	69
USADLB	481	345	43	32	78
29th GS GP	123	117	4	29	72

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ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>ORG D/L</u>	<u>FM D/L</u>	<u>AVAIL (%)</u>
79th Eng	1218	765	55	13	90
159 Eng	1133	963	80	8	90

COMMEL

11 ACR	472	464	11	5	96
23rd Arty	279	261	3	11	94
54th Arty	882	866	0	38	95
89th MP	569	671	0	75	88

ARTILLERY

11 ACR	18	18	2	0	94
23rd Arty	101	101	0	0	100
54th Arty	66	66	1	0	98.5

SECTION II

LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. PERSONNEL - None.

B. OPERATIONS

1. (U) ITEM: Programming of Test Equipment for Maintenance Support of New Equipment.

a. OBSERVATION: The 29th General Support Group has on several occasions been tasked to provide mission support for new equipment, i.e., Radar Sets AN/PPS-5, Radio Set AN/GRC-100, and Rawin Set AN/GMD-1. Support missions such as these, especially in the COMMEL area, require tools and test equipment, and in some cases personnel not authorized by present TOE/TDA. Because of the excessive time required for approval of MTOE/MTDA action, the maintenance support mission is greatly hampered in the interim.

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b. EVALUATION: The rapid development and deployment of new equipment creates maintenance support problems if proper tools, repair parts, test equipment, and personnel are not provided in a timely fashion. Special tools, pertinent publications, test equipment, and trained personnel must be programmed and provided to the units prior to introduction of new equipment or hardware into a theater if the equipment is going to meet any success operationally.

c. RECOMMENDATION:

1. That the mission support plan authorize all required tools, test equipment, and personnel not on hand in the DSU/GSU prior to the introduction of new equipment into a theater.

2. Should recommendation one not be feasible for some cogent reasons, then some plan should be formulated which will cut-down drastically the time necessary for the approval of MTOE/MTDA actions concerning new equipment.

2. (U) ITEM: Radar Contact Team Operations.

a. OBSERVATIONS: Employment of contact teams for support of radar systems in Vietnam is pretty much dependent upon availability of transportation. In most cases radar sets are employed in isolated areas, accessible only by air.

b. EVALUATION: Support of the AN/TPS-25 radar is provided by contact teams because of the location of the sets, the amount of radar repair work that is required, and the limited number of available trained personnel. It is essential that these teams be used as efficiently as possible. In these circumstances, guaranteed transportation is a prime requirement. In many instances, contact teams have been requested and transported to sites by the user, but have been unable to return on a timely basis from contact visits because of lack of guaranteed transportation. These delays hamper the efficient employment of our limited personnel resources.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That guaranteed air transportation be provided radar contact team personnel.

3. (U) ITEM: Artillery R&R Program.

a. OBSERVATION: The employment and tremendous use of towed and self-propelled artillery in Vietnam has necessi-

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tated the establishment of a disciplined system for performance of maintenance services. A Repair and Return Program has been established for the M107/M110 howitzer to insure their continued serviceability.

b. EVALUATION: The original concept of the R&R program was to remove each weapon to a DSU shop facility for its quarterly service. This service was to be completed by the gun crew with the assistance of the DSU. The employment of artillery in Vietnam is such that many times an artillery element will operate on an individual gun or section basis. In such instances, it is essential that each gun's down time be held to an absolute minimum. Removal of the piece from its primary location is practically impossible. The effectiveness of the program has been reduced somewhat due to the necessity to accomplish most of the services on site. Despite this shortcoming the program has moved forward real well in that all of the M107s and M110s have been serviced or are being serviced on a scheduled basis. Planning is being conducted on similar programs for other crew served weapons, such as the M114A1. Adequate repair parts should be on hand prior to the initiation of the program to insure that no down time is added to the piece by the lack of repair parts.

c. RECOMMENDATION: In as much as similar programs are to be initiated for other pieces of artillery equipment in the near future, sufficient priority should be authorized for the requisitioning of repair parts to insure timely receipt.

### C. TRAINING

1. (U) ITEM: Effective management of repair parts direct support supply activities.

a. OBSERVATION: The mechanized Direct Support Supply Activities are being directed by junior officers who have had little or no training or experience in either direct support supply of repair parts or ADP procedures. Since qualified NCOs are not available in the authorized grade, most maintenance DSUs are utilizing NCOs in the technical activities who have had no training or experience in this supply field.

b. EVALUATION: The mechanized Direct Support Supply Activity has become a sophisticated operation requiring technical supervisory skills not available in untrained and inexperienced officers and NCOs. Presently, these activities are not being effectively managed due to absence of quali-

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fied officers and NCOs. NCOs with MOS 76P4G3, mechanized stock control supervisor, are arriving in-country; however, these NCOs are, for the most part, grade E-7, and are not authorized at the operating level of the technical supply activity. Hence, these NCOs are being assigned to depot and staff level positions. The mission essential nature of the DS technical supply activity and the complexity of its operation demand a corps of professional career DS and GS technical supply supervisors. Nothing can take the place of experience and know-how. The junior officer doesn't have the experience and the NCO who has the requisite experience is not authorized at the DSU level.

c. RECOMMENDATION:

1. That a corps of specialized professional warrant officers be trained to direct repair parts supply activities. This can be accomplished by returning to the concept of the repair parts specialist warrant officer (MOS 4530) and combining these skills with ADF training.

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632A

2. That MOS 76P4G3 slot in DS technical supply activities be upgraded from an E-6 to an E-7 position. This stock control slot should be expanded to NCOIC of the entire activity. This NCO would then become a mechanized stock control and warehousing expert.

2. (U) ITEM: Lack of training for NCR 500 Stock Control Personnel.

a. OBSERVATION: An examination of the unsatisfactory performance of the repair parts direct support supply activities has revealed a general lack of knowledge of the NCR 500 mechanized stock control system, extending from management to the operating level. It has been determined that personnel now in-country and personnel arriving in-country in the foreseeable future will require in-country training in this field. It is necessary, therefore, to develop an in-country across-the-board NCR 500 stock control training program for personnel serving in Vietnam.

b. EVALUATION: Justification for such a program has been established, reference: 29th Group ORLI, for October 1968 and USARV concurrence, dated 4 January 1969. The personnel turbulence generated by the short tour in Vietnam dictates that a school be established at 1st Log Command or USARV level to insure the availability of trained personnel,

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and that courses be conducted on a regular recurring schedule. A nucleus of NCR 500 stock control procedural experts should be obtained from CONUS for instructors. These experts should also become familiar with Vietnam supply procedures before NCR 500 instruction is initiated.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That courses of instructions on the NCR 500 be developed and given in Vietnam for all levels of logistical management down through the operating level. Suggested courses are:

1. Executive Seminar

a. Length: one half to one full day.

b. For: senior officers, general and group level principal staff officers.

c. Concept of presentation:

(1) Basic familiarization with the NCR 500 system to include its capabilities and limitations, manual operations required for input and output of the various programs, and familiarization with information provided on magnetic ledgers.

(2) Discussion of results of time and motion studies of NCR 500 stock control activities in Vietnam as compared with CONUS models.

(3) Discussion of management techniques and management tools available with NCR 500 application to stock control, and the qualifications required of supervisors and operators.

2. Management Course

a. Length: two days.

b. For: Battalion Commanders, staff action officers at all levels, and Company Commanders.

c. Concept of Presentation: Courses will include material from executive seminar, but will be greatly expanded and more detailed. The purpose is to provide the students with a sufficiently detailed picture of the operation so that they can inspect the operation and use the management

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tools and techniques made available to them by the mechanized system. Included will be editing, deck management, analysis of programs, update cycle, inventories, warehouses--stock control document flow, reconciliations, and reviews.

3. Supervisor's Course

a. Length: seven days.

b. For: technical supply activity OICs and NCOICs.

c. Concept of Presentation: Course will instruct students in the organization and supervision of a repair parts Direct Support Supply Activity. Detailed instruction will be presented on every operation in the Direct Support Supply Activity, including stock control, receiving, storage and issue sections, and the document flow and interfacing among these sections. Use of reports and error code print-outs will be taught. Preventive maintenance of equipment and audit trails of requisitions will be discussed.

4. NCR 500 Operators Vietnam Supply Procedures Orientation

a. Length: seven days.

b. For: NCR 500 Operators.

c. Concept of Presentation: Review of basic DSU supply procedures and instruction on procedures peculiar to Vietnam such as Red Ball, 180 day demand criteria for ASL retention, LC Regulations, depot and USAICCV functions, inventories, reconciliations and reports.

5. Maintenance Technician Course

a. Length: three weeks.

b. For: NCR 500 Maintenance technicians.

c. Concept of Presentation: Exact duplication of present course given by Automatic Data Field Systems Control Detachment Four, soon to be discontinued as Det Four is phased out.

D. INTELLIGENCE - None.

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## E. LOGISTICS

### 1. (C) ITEM: Operation Liberty Canyon

a. OBSERVATION: The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) moved from I CTZ to III CTZ at the beginning of this reporting period. The overall operation was successful and logistical problems associated with receiving the 1st Cav Div were minor. This was due to several factors.

(1) The deployment concept finally implemented allowed the 29th Group to support the 1st Cav Div from existing logistical installations at Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, Quan Loi, and Long Binh.

(2) Effective liaison and coordination between 29th Group, the Div Support Command, and the Div G-4 was established almost immediately and continued throughout the operation.

(3) Both the 1st and 25th Divs were very cooperative in lending support and facilities while the 1st Cav was in the initial stages of the move.

(4) The 1st Cav Div employed its organic support capability to the maximum.

(5) The 29th Group's broad logistical infrastructure had the necessary resources and flexibility which allowed rapid and effective response to this unexpected additional support requirement.

b. EVALUATION: Problems experienced included equipment requiring repair and service as it was off-loaded from ships at Newport. Many vehicles had flat tires. Maintenance contact teams from the 185th Maint Bn and Saigon Logistical Support Activity provided assistance and the Collection, Classification & Salvage activity at Long Binh proved to be a valuable source of wheel assemblies for various types of vehicles. One fuel tanker remained at the docks and "capped off" each vehicle as it left the port. Other problems were, for the most part, due to a lack of accurate and timely supply requirements which are essential for continued responsive support. This was understandable considering the short movement notice. Combat essential missions (CEs) were initially required to satisfy some ammunition requirements peculiar to the 1st Cav, i.e., 2.75 rockets and 40mm grenades. Close coordination between 1st Cav Div and 29th Group soon minimized this problem.

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## c. RECOMMENDATION:

1. That similar operations make maximum use of existing installations and support structures.
2. That the supported unit be prepared to provide detailed support requirements, including maintenance requirements for its vehicles and equipment.
3. That close and continuous liaison between major supporting and supported headquarters be established as early as possible.
4. That the supporting units know their existing capabilities at all times in order to make timely assessments of their needs when charged with additional tasks.

## F. ORGANIZATION

1. ITEM: More flexible TO&Es for DSUs.

a. OBSERVATION: Our TO&E organizations in many cases are not adaptable to the conditions in Vietnam. We are not echeloned in the familiar combat and communication zones to permit area support as it was originally envisioned. The basic elements used to tailor a battalion are TO&E companies designed to provide either maintenance or supply and service support. However, it is often necessary to attach an element from one company to another to satisfy unique support requirements. The present direct support unit TO&Es are not flexible enough to permit quick and clear attachment and detachment of specialized teams required to efficiently satisfy extended logistical support missions in each geographic location.

b. EVALUATION: The current practice of attaching personnel from one unit to another creates a serious morale and accountability problem since personnel are often attached to a unit for an entire tour and soon lose all identity and association with their parent unit. Examples of 29th Group's requirements to attach personnel are:

(1) Supply and service personnel attached to 551st Maintenance Co.

(2) MHE repair personnel attached to 536th HEM Co.

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(3) Bakery personnel from the 277th S&S Bn (no mission) attached to the 266th S&S Bn.

(4) Laundry, bath, and graves registration personnel attached to the 610th Maint Bn.

(5) Electronics repair personnel attached to 536th HEM Co.

(6) Artillery and Engr Equip repair personnel attached to the 610th Maint Bn.

(7) Engineer Equip repair personnel attached to 536th HEM Co.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a composite company headquarters be assigned to the Group with an array of maintenance and supply & service teams attached. Required equipment would be organic to each team. In this way maintenance teams could be assigned to supply & service companies and supply & service teams could be assigned to maintenance companies as mission requirements dictate.

G. ESCAPE AND EVASION - None.

H. OTHER - None.

1 Incl  
1 - 29th GS Gp  
Organizational  
Chart

  
LOUIS RACHMELER  
Colonel, OrdC  
Commanding

AVCA SCN GO S (10 Feb 69) 1st Im (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 31 Jan 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon, APO US Forces 96491 26 February 1969

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO  
APO 96384

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969, of the 29th General Support Group is forwarded in accordance with para 9, AR 1-19.

2. (U) Reference Section I, para 5: The 3d sentence should read, "The 266th S&S Battalion now has the responsibility of providing direct support maintenance, supply (less Class III, V, VI, VIII, IX and X) and service to all combat service support units in the Long Binh area".

3. (U) Lessons Learned, observations and recommendations are concurred in by this command, with the exception above. A copy of this indorsement has been provided the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LB 2604

  
J. K. BLACK  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

AVCA GO-MH (10 Feb 69) 2nd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 29th General Support  
Group for Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65.

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

4 APR 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,  
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters,  
29th General Support Group for the quarterly period ending 31 January  
1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Programming of Test Equipment for  
Maintenance Support of New Equipment, section II, pages 73 and 74,  
paragraph b(1). Concur. Failure to provide adequately for maintenance  
support in new deployments in most cases should be reason to deny intro-  
duction of subject equipment until adequate provision is made.

b. Reference item concerning guaranteed air transportation for  
radar contact team personnel, section II, page 74, paragraph b(2).  
Concur. Six enlisted men form contact teams of two men each. These  
six men must support 43 pieces of equipment installed throughout III  
CTZ and IV CTZ. Ground time at each installation requires 2-24 hours.  
If float equipment were available, which it is not, the problem would  
not be so great. A recent staff study was submitted by the 29th General  
Support Group to 1st Log Comd, subject: Requirements for Air Support,  
in which they requested two organic aircraft for this mission. In the  
meantime, in view of the lack of dedicated air within 1st Log Comd,  
priority transport of teams such as these must be provided by the sup-  
ported Field Force element. The US Army FFV have relatively ready access  
to dedicated airlift or have the priority to insure airlift. Return of  
these teams from sites is just as essential as their initial deployment  
in the long run.

c. Reference item concerning Artillery R&R Program, section II,  
pages 74 and 75, paragraph b(3). Concur. Use should be made of high  
priority requisitions and/or Red Ball for critically needed items or  
for zero balance ASL items. However, the highest priorities have been  
authorized since the implementation of this program.

d. Reference item concerning the effective management of repair  
parts direct support supply activities, section II, page 75, paragraph  
c(1). Concur. However, Warrant Officer MOS 632A is an already established  
field and when replacement requisition is placed it should be annotated  
NCR 500 training required. Concerning enlisted MOS 76P4G3, USA Support  
Command, Saigon requested up-grade to E-7 in an undated letter.

ANCA GO-MH

4 APR 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 29th General Support Group for Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65.

Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command requested guidance from USARV and based on information furnished, Saigon Support Command was requested to initiate request for change of grade standards and authorization for MOS 76P.

e. Reference item concerning lack of training for NCR 500 Stock Control Personnel, section II, pages 76 and 77, paragraph c(2). Concur. There is a valid requirement for continuing refresher training in executive employment of NCR 500 and also supervisor and operators training. However, the three week course mentioned in subparagraph (c) 5 has never been taught in RVN. It is taught at Fort Lee.

(1) USARV has been tasked by DA to provide refresher training and is currently working on obtaining a team which will consist of four operations specialists (MOS 76P20G3) and one mechanic (MOS 34D2TG3). This team will conduct the training of replacements as well as orientation of commanders and staffs.

(2) DET FOUR, AFDSC, no longer has the capability of conducting such training.

f. Reference item concerning maintenance support required during deployment of supported unit, section II, pages 79 and 80, paragraph e(1). Concur. Recommendations listed are actually those actions which were taken which resulted in a highly successful and efficient operation. These actions have therefore been tried and proven. The supported unit, however, should be required to constantly maintain their equipment at a high level of organizational maintenance to minimize problems in on-loading and off-loading ships.

g. Reference 1st Indorsement, page 82, paragraph 1. AR 525-15 is the current regulation governing the submission of Operational Reports - lessons Learned. Saigon Support Command has been advised accordingly.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

LANNY K KELSEY  
1LT AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

AVHGC-DST (10 Feb 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 29th General Support Group  
for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R-1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 6 APR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-DI,  
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 29th General Support Group and concurs with the report as modified by the preceding indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
29th Gen Spt GP  
1st Log Comd

GPOP-DT (10 Feb 69) 4th Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 29th Gen Spt Gp for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
G. E.  
MAJ, AGC  
Asst AG




# 29TH GS GP ORGANIZATION CHART

29TH G. S. GP



JAN 69  
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