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AGAM-P (M) (2 May 69) FOR OT UT 691303 7 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS
APO San Francisco 96308

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AVII-GCT

4 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period Ending 31
January 1969. RG5 CSFGR-65 (R1) (U)

Commanding General
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Section 1. OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. COMMAND

1. (U) On 15 Dec 68, an award ceremony was held for MG Leo H. Schweiter, XXIV Corps Chief of Staff, departing for a CONUS assignment with the United States Army Combat Developments Command. MG Schweiter was presented the Distinguished Service Medal by LTG Stilwell and the Vietnamese Army Distinguished Service Order, 1st Class with fourragere, by MG Truong, CG, 1st ARVN Division.

2. (U) COL Harry L. Givens, Jr., USMC, served as Acting Chief of Staff from 15 Dec 68 until BG Alexander R. Bolling Jr. arrived on 18 Jan 69 to assume the duties of Chief of Staff. BG Bolling formerly commanded the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Intelligence Planning: During the report period, no specific intelligence plans were published. During the previous report period, the "Northeast Monsoon 1968-1969" operations order was published with special emphasis on targeting and destruction of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). Included was a special annex titled "Attack Against the Infrastructure". The plan is still in effect.

2. (C) B-52 Bombing Program: During October 1968, a B-52 strike supported a 1st ARVN Division operation in the southern portion of the DMZ, leaving enemy forces disorganized and confused. The enemy yielded readily to ARVN ground forces, who reported 17 NVA killed by the B-52 strike and 95 NVA KIA by ground contact. Two thousand 82mm mortar rounds and one metric ton of rice were discovered and destroyed. In October 1968, enemy activity in the Thor area of the DMZ necessitated targeting the area for B-52 strikes. Bomb damage assessment (BDA) revealed numerous secondary explosions, destruction of enemy supply areas, weapons, and crew-served weapons positions. The DMZ area has not been struck by B-52's since the 1 Nov 68 bombing halt. During November 1968, B-52's supported the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) as they withdrew from enemy contact in the vicinity of Base Area 101. Ground follow-up revealed 18 enemy killed by air (KBA), several secondary explosions, destruction of enemy defensive positions and structures, and disrupted lines of communication (LOC's). In December 1968, B-52 strikes supported 3d Marine Division operations that permitted the landing of heliborne forces without casualties or aircraft losses. Ground follow-up revealed documents, supplies and several enemy killed. Since October 1968, enemy activity in the A Shau Valley prompted B-52 strikes in the valley and adjacent Base area 611. BDA revealed several secondary explosions, sustained fires, destruction of enemy supplies and disrupted LOC's.

3. (C) Counterintelligence:

a. Liaison. Increased emphasis was placed on personal liaison visits to obtain timely information regarding activities conducted by Vietnamese civil agencies. The agencies, Phung Hoang Committees, Police Special Branch, and...
Consul Grievance, are primarily involved in eliminating VCI and local guerrillas. A delay existed in the information flow from Vietnamese agencies since reports were submitted in Vietnamese to province level, translated into English, and then disseminated to interested US agencies. Liaison visits are now made weekly to US advisory personnel at each district within XXIV Corps, which has resulted in an accelerated flow of information and has produced a greater understanding of district level operations.

b. Volunteer Informant Program (VIP). Reports of VC/NVA intentions to infiltrate agents as workers on allied bases to conduct espionage and sabotage activities, and to outfit personnel in ARVN and National Police uniforms have increased. Consequently, attention was focused on security procedures for indigeneous employees. A VIP for Phu Bai Combat Base is presently being developed to encourage employees to provide information of VC/NVA activities. Rewards have been offered to employees who provide information. Leaflets have been prepared for the Phu Bai Combat Base, and plans exist to distribute other VIP leaflets and display posters and notices at pass control points and on unit bulletin boards. All these publications request employees to furnish information on the enemy.

4. (C) General Enemy Situation:

a. In Quang Tri Province during the report period, action was characterized by light to moderate contacts with enemy ground forces, usually company-size or smaller. Since 1 Nov 68 bombing halt, the enemy has maintained a continual build-up of supplies, personnel and facilities north of the Ben Hai River. The 27th NVA Regiment's Area of Operation (AO) was extended to cover the void created by the withdrawal of the 320th NVA Division from the central DMZ. The 27th NVA Regiment continues to employ mortar fire, ambushes, small unit probes, and snipers. In the remainder of the DMZ, the enemy has concentrated on mortar and rocket attacks, mines, and small-size ground probes. There have been no attacks in Quang Tri Province by artillery fire since 10 Nov 68. The 246th NVA Regiment has been identified as operating in the Khe Sanh area. PW's have stated the activities of the 246th NVA Regiment are concentrated on transporting supplies throughout the Khe Sanh area and providing security for local supply caches. Offensive activities by the 246th NVA Regiment have been limited to attacks by fire and small scale encounters with friendly reconnaissance teams. There is evidence that organic battalions of the 246th NVA Regiment periodically rotate AO's. Elements of the 2d Battalion presently operate in the Khe Sanh area; the remainder of the regiment is reported to be in Vinh Linh Secret Zone, NVN. There were no major changes in the status of enemy units operating in the vicinity of Base Area 101. 7th Front elements continue to resupply, train, regroup and replace personnel. Except for ambushes, these elements avoided direct contact with Allied forces, primarily concentrating on proselytizing, propagandizing, conducting attacks by fire, sniping and interdicting LNC's. A general offensive, predicted for December, did not materialize; however, there are indications of an enemy preparation for possible "Winter-Spring" or "Tet Offensive." Enemy units operating from the DMZ and Khe Sanh area are capable of initiating and sustaining a limited offensive. An offensive would probably not be launched except in coordination with attacks by units located in the vicinity of Base Area (BA) 101. The units in BA 101 have
difficulty operating, even on a day-to-day basis. Harsh living conditions and lack of proper medical attention cause much sickness. Rice from the lowlands cannot be obtained in ample quantities. Artillery and air strikes harass the enemy and popular support from local inhabitants falls short of enemy desires. Though the enemy is capable of launching an attack from BA 101, it is doubtful that he could sustain an offensive at this time.

b. Thua Thien Province. Enemy activity has been extremely light throughout the report period. Heaviest enemy activity occurred during early November 1968 and steadily decreased. The 4th NVA Regiment remained in southern Thua Thien Province and was active throughout Phu Loc District. While he avoided decisive engagements, several attacks by fire and ambushes were executed. Elements of the 4th NVA Regiment were primarily concerned with rice-gathering and reinforcing the VCI. Captured Pn's indicated that the 4th NVA Regiment might launch an attack on Truc River Bridge and Phu Loc district headquarters, possibly in concert with a multi-regiment "Tet Offensive." The 5th NVA Regiment has, to date, avoided contact. In early November 1968, the K32 Rocket Artillery Battalion launched attacks against Phu Bai Combat Base and Camp Eagle and then remained inactive until 1 Jan 69, when Camp Eagle was hit by six 122mm rockets. In the Hue coastal lowlands, the frequency of rocket attacks increased the last week of the report period as Hue City and Camps Eagle and Evans, all received 122mm rocket attacks. During December 1968, several members of the K2 Bn/5th NVA Regiment were captured in the lowlands, south and east of Hue City. Their mission was to reconnoiter the area for a future attack. While the attack has not materialized to date, it could still be initiated as part of a county-wide "Tet Offensive." Overall, activity by the 5th NVA Regiment has been limited to avoiding detection and contact by Allied forces. There are indications that battalions of the 5 NVA Regiment are understrength and short of food. Troop morale is reported to be low. Sensor readings reflect possible enemy activity in the vicinity of BA 114. In addition, captured documents combined with recent agent reports, indicate that elements of the 6th NVA Regiment have been located in that vicinity. In the A Shau Valley, the enemy continues to repair and improve Route 548 in SVN and Route 922 in Laos. Traffic on Route 922 was considered light during November 1968, but increased to a moderate level in January 1969. Traffic on Route 548 remained light throughout the report period. This was attributed to the choke points on Route 548 which required the enemy to construct by-passes. In the lowlands, cordon operations sapped the dwindling strength of enemy local force units by eliminating the VCI. Rice denial operations kept the enemy from replenishing food supplies. Several large rice caches were found in the lowlands south of Hue City and smaller caches were found in the vicinity of the "Graveyard" and in BA 114. In southern Thua Thien Province, Pn's and captured documents indicate the enemy is critically short of rice. Allied operations make it increasingly difficult for the enemy to move into coastal lowlands. The 4th and 5th NVA Regiments remain in southern Thua Thien Province avoiding contact when possible. Documents and interrogations indicate the 6th NVA Regiment may have moved into the area west of BA 114. Other forces in Thua Thien Province, consisting of eight local force units, are grossly understrength and considered combat ineffective. The enemy retains the capability to attack by fire, interdict LOC's and conduct limited ground attacks against specific objectives. Enemy forces will probably continue to avoid contact, receive replacements, train and resupply in preparation for a "Tet Offensive."
C. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. (C) The XXIV Corps Area of Operation (AO) remained the same during the report period. Boundaries of the 3d Marine Division and the 101st Airborne Division (AM) were changed to compensate for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) deployment to III CTZ.

2. (C) Operation Comanche Falls (Phase III) commenced on 2 Nov 68 southeast of Quang Tri City in the My Chan area. Two battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), a tank battalion from the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) and three 1st ARVN Division battalions conducted air and ground assaults into the area. US forces established a cordon, and GVN forces searched the cordon area. 1st Cavalry Division (AM) units were phased out of the operation by 15 Nov 68. The operation continued until 15 Nov 68. Results were:

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<td>WIA 4</td>
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<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
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3. (C) Operation Jeb Stuart III: The 1st Cavalry Division (AM) aggressively pursued the enemy along the coastal plain in northern Thua Thien and southern Quang Tri Provinces by conducting clear and search/cordon operations in coordination with GVN forces. Jeb Stuart III terminated on 7 Nov 68 as elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) departed XXIV Corps AO. Results from 1-7 Nov 68 follow:

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<td>WIA 9</td>
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4. (C) Operation Lancaster II: The 3d Marine Regiment conducted extensive clear and search operations from the Rockpile north to the DMZ and west to the Laotian Border, preventing elements of the 320th NVA Division from massing troops and supplies south of the DMZ. Lancaster II terminated on 23 Nov 68. Results from 1-23 Nov 68 were:

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5. (C) Operation Napoleon/Saline: Elements of the 1st Brigade 5th Infantry Division (MECH) and 1st Amtrack Battalion conducted clear and search/cordon/RIF operations in the vicinity of Quang Tri City and the coastal plain area north to the DMZ. US forces, in close coordination with GVN forces, successfully kept the Cua Viet LOC secure and greatly enhanced the Revolutionary Development Program in the area. Napoleon/Saline terminated on 9 Dec 68. Results from 1 Nov - 9 Dec 68 are below:

4
6. (C) Dawson River: Task Force Hotel of the 3d Marine Division deployed the 9th Marine Regiment on 28 Nov 68 into the area previously encompassed by Scotland II and extended the southern boundary through BA 101 to the Quang Tri/Thua Thien Province Boundary. The 9th Marine Regiment conducted clear and search operations in the central portion of this AO; in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, Lang Vei and the Laotian Border in the west; and along the Ba Long Valley in the east. Several large amm/ supply caches were discovered. Ground contacts and attacks by fire decreased slightly during the report period. Operation Dawson River terminated on 27 Jan 69 with the following results:

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7. (C) The following operations remain in progress with the results for the report period listed in subparagraph g below:

a. Scotland II: Task Force Hotel of the 3d Marine Division deployed the 4th Marine Regiment into the area previously occupied by Lancaster II. This area is bounded by Camp Carroll, the Rock Pile and the Laotian Border on the south, with the DMZ from Laos to a point due north of Camp Carroll as a northern boundary. Extensive clear and search operations were conducted throughout the AO with the emphasis on the area along the DMZ and the Laotian Border. Several large amm/ supply caches were discovered in well constructed bunker complexes. Ground contacts and attacks by fire were light.

b. Kentucky: Elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) and the 3d Marine Regiment conducted clear and search/RIF/cordon operations in the area surrounding Cam Lo, Con Thien and north to the DMZ. On 10 Dec 68, the Army element redeployed leaving the 3d Marine Regiment in the AO. In mid-December 1968, 3d Marine Regimental Headquarters, and the first and third battalions, along with appropriate combat support and combat service support moved to SICTZ. Task Force Bravo, consisting of an infantry battalion, a tank battalion and the 1st Amtrack Battalion, assumed responsibility for the Kentucky AO, enlarged to include the Cua Viet River. The Cam Lo and Con Thien areas were primary targets for US/GVN efforts related to the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. Significant results were achieved. Ground contacts and attacks by fire decreased during the past quarter.

c. Marshall Mountain: On 10 Dec 68, the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) deployed to an area in the eastern portion of Quang Tri Province south of the Cua Viet River. Extensive clear and search/cordon operations were conducted throughout the area with US forces establishing cordons and GVN forces clearing and searching. Pacification efforts were highly successful in the many fishing villages located along the coastal plain. Light ground contacts and sporadic attacks by fire continued. The enemy's use of mines and booby traps increased significantly.
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3. Operation Dewey Canyon commenced on 22 Jan 69, with TF Hotel deploying elements of the 6th Marine Regiment southwest toward the Da Krong Valley to construct FSB's. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment and the 1st and 4th Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment executed combat assaults on 26 and 30 Jan 69, respectively. The operation continues with the entire 9th Marine Regiment participating along with the 1st and 4th Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment.

e. Nevada Eagles: Due to the departure of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), the 101st Airborne Division (AM) extended its northern boundary to the Thua Thien/Quang Tri Province Boundary. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) effectively used its air-mobile capabilities in conjunction with ARVN, RF/PF, NPPF and US and GVN naval forces to ferret out the VCL and destroy enemy combat forces. Continuous clear and search operations along the coastal area prevented the enemy from massing troops and equipment for future operations. A determined effort by US/GVN forces achieved remarkable results in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign during this report period. Ground contacts and attacks by fire decreased measurably since the last report. Extensive RIF operations in the southern portion of the AO frequently harassed the 4th and 6th NVA Regiments. Falling in this category, and summarized below, are named operations whose results are integrated with totals for Nevada Eagle.

1. Operation Rawlins Valley commenced on 17 Dec 69 with two US airborne and two ARVN battalions combat assaulting into BA 114 to clear and search for elements of the 6th NVA Regiment. The operation terminated on 23 Dec 69 without significant results.

2. Operation Todd Forest, employing one US airborne and two ARVN battalions, commenced with combat assaults into BA 101 on 31 Dec 69. Todd Forest terminated on 13 Jan 69 with the following results:

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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

3. Operation Platte Canyon commenced on 8 Jan 69 in the Ruong Valley southeast of Phu Loc. Inclement weather caused delay of combat assaults and an airborne battalion was moved overland into the AO. Platte Canyon continues at the end of the report period without significant results.

4. Operation Ohio Rapids is a clear and search operation being conducted by the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AM) and two 1st ARVN Division battalions south and east of BA 101 in Thua Thien Province. The operation commenced on 24 Jan 69 and continues with the following results:

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<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
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(5) Operation Sherman Peak commenced on 25 Jan 69 south of BA 114 along Route 547. It is a clear and search operation employing a battalion from the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AM) and a 1st ARVN Division battalion. The operation continues without significant results.

f. STATISTICAL DATA (1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69)

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<td>NEVADA EAGLE</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
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</table>

g. RICE CAPTURED:

(1) Quang Tri Province: 75½ tons

(2) Thua Thien Province: 171½ tons

8. (C) Task Force Clearwater.

a. During the report period, Task Force Clearwater detected 66,555 vessels on the inland waterways within the XXIV Corps AO. Sailors boarded and searched 31,234 vessels or approximately 48% of all vessels detected, and inspected 21,656 vessels without boarding or approximately 32%. Vessels were searched for weapons, unmanifested cargo, improper ID cards and draft dodgers. There were 535 individuals detained for the following violations: suspected VC-2, curfew violators-174, improper ID cards-140, restricted area violators-28, on Black List-93, draft dodgers-9, evading patrol-5, and 75 others for suspicious actions. There were 12 NVA/VC killed in action and 1 FW captured. The patrol craft of the River Security Groups also conducted an active PSYOP program. The best measure of the effectiveness of the PSYOP program is found in the results of the Voluntary Informant Program. From 26 Dec 68 to 31 Jan 69, a total of 123,780 $VN was paid to children along the Cua Viet River for weapons and munitions turned in.

b. The enemy has increased efforts to close the Cua Viet LOC during this period by mining. Losses have been one LCPL (patrol craft) destroyed with six men
killed in action, one PBR damaged, one YFU logistics craft sunk and two LCM-6 logistics craft damaged. Cargo loss has been three pallets of C-Rations lost, and one 6 x 6 truck damaged. The threat has been countered by an intensive training program to make all River Security Group personnel "mine conscious" and the employment of two new sweeps by mine countermeasures craft, a bottom drag and a catenary drag 1-2 feet below the surface by two minesweeping LCM-6's. In addition, it was determined that the concussion grenade, MK-3A2, is the most effective weapon against the mines being used, and they are used extensively for clearing the channel. A total of 23 mining incidents were initiated by the enemy of which 18 were countered without loss. The LOC's have not been blocked and the Cua Viet River has been closed only 10 hours due to enemy action.

c. The Patrol Boat River (PBR) and Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles (PACV) of the Blue River Security Group have shifted from a defensive to an offensive posture during this period, supporting various sweep/search and clear operations conducted by 101st Airborne Division (A/B) and 1st ARVN Division forces. The loss of the PACV's in December 1968 due to material casualties has seriously hindered the patrol effort of Dam Can HiiI which is now patrolled only on a random basis by PBR's, due to the extensive distance to that area and the requirements for the PBR's in the other estuaries of the AO (Dam Sam, Phu Tam Giang, and Thuy Thien).

D. LOGISTICS.

1. (C) During the period covered by this report, the logistics support capabilities in the XXIV Corps AO improved considerably. Added support units, realignment of support missions, new facilities and input of new types of equipment all added to the attainment of effective logistical support. Major support units new in the Corps AO are the 259th Quartermaster Bn and the 1002d Supply and Service Co, both of which became fully operational during the period. The transportation support in the Corps AO was realigned with one battalion headquarters and two companies moving from the AO and one company deactivated. Due to redistribution of truck assets very little actual transportation capability was lost. Construction, that provided additional logistics storage, included a new ASP at Camp Evans with a capacity of 1935 short tons, and new POL storage tanks which raised the storage capacity from 6.6 million gallons to 9.3 million gallons. Construction completed at Tan My improved cargo handling capability at that port. This construction included an ammunition revetment area, office space, covered storage space and facilities for repacking broken cargo. The items of new equipment introduced were AH-1G and CH-47C helicopters and M48A3 tanks. This equipment plus purification of PLL's and ASL's during the report period resulted in an improved maintenance posture.

2. (C) Significant Activities.

a. During the period 27 Oct - 13 Nov 68, the 1st Cavalry Division (A/B) moved from IVC to III CTZ during Operation Liberty Canyon. Aerial ports of departure were Quang Tri, Camp Evans and Phu Bai. Aerial ports of arrival were Bien Hoa, Phouc Vinh, Tan Minh, An Khe, Long Than North, Quam Loi, Vung Tau, Phu Cat and Dan Thien. A total of 185 sorties of C-130 aircraft were used, lifting 11,550 passengers and 3,396,4 short tons of cargo. Sealift required 31 LST's, 3 LSD's and 3 LPD's departing from Tan My to Newport; 2 LST's from Da Nang to Newport, and 1 LPH from Da Nang to Vung Tau. Truck assets of the 26th General Support Group were used to move personnel and equipment to departure airfields and to the port of Tan My. Major unit phase-out dates were: 3d Bde, 31 Oct 68; 1st Bde, 5 Nov 68; 2d Bde, 11 Nov 68; Division Command and Control and Fire Support Elements, 12 Nov 68 and Support Command, 12 Nov 68.
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b. Rapid departure of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) from base camps was facilitated by employing two principal methods of property transfer. The most expeditious method proved to be the direct turnover in place, of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) supplies and equipment to relieving units. The relieving unit inventoried the stocks and returned supplies excess to their requirements to the 26th General Support Group for redistribution. In other instances, when time permitted, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) supply assets not accompanying them on the move, were turned over to the 26th General Support Group by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

c. During the first week of November 1968, HQ 259th Quartermaster Battalion completed its move from Quang Tri Combat Base to Phu Bai Combat Base. The battalion's subordinate units completed the takeover of POL support responsibility from Force Logistics Support Group - Alpha. The 259th Quartermaster Battalion assumed responsibility for POL support to the southern half of the Corps AO, in addition to their previous mission of POL support in the Quang Tri area.

d. Significant developments in highway accessibility led to increased highway traffic during this report period. QL-1 from Long Co to Dong Ha, TL-4 (Highway 551) from Hue to Tan My, Route 547 from Hue to LZ Bayd and QL-9 from Dong Ha to the district capitol at Cam Lo are now rated GREEN during daylight hours. The Hai Van Pass was opened on 8 Nov 68 to both northbound and southbound military and civilian traffic, Monday through Saturday and to civilian traffic on Sunday. Military Vehicles not previously in an organized convoy are escorted through the Hai Van Pass by a cavalry platoon of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) which provides command, control, and security. Non-military convoy departs Nha 0 Bridge, #2278642, between 0630 and 1000 hours. A southbound convoy departs Lang Co Bridge, #2886935, between 1000 hours and 1700 hours.

e. On 6 Dec 68, the AGoC's, G4, assumed staff responsibility for T-Day planning. A series of meetings have been conducted to develop firm T-Day plans. Actions that lead to a better T-Day posture without inhibiting operational requirements have been initiated.

f. On 11 Dec 68, the NICTZ supply support for Class I was reorganized. The Marines' Force Logistics Support Group - Bravo, Class I Supply Point at Dong Ha Combat Base assumed responsibility for supplying Class I items to all US troops north of Camp Evans. The 1002d Supply and Service Company, Class I Supply Point at Phu Bai Combat Base, assumed responsibility for supplying Class I items to all US troops at Camp Evans and south. The Class I supply point previously located at Quang Tri Combat Base was eliminated.

g. During the period 9-14 Dec 68, elements of the 3d Marine Regiment moved from base areas in the vicinity of Dong Ha to SICTZ for Operation Taylor Combat. The air movement consisted of 49 sorties of C-130 aircraft, moving 2,453 passengers and 265.5 short tons of cargo. No significant problems were encountered.

h. The Tan My/Quang Tri Combat Base pipeline was completed for single product operation on 19 Dec 68. Operation and maintenance responsibility was accepted by the Army on 10 Jan 69. This line is expected to be completed for multi-product operation during Feb 69.

i. Reconstruction of the Da Nang-Hue railroad was completed on 3 Jan 69, and the railroad resumed operations on 15 Jan 69. The initial capacity of this line

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is 200 short tons per day; fifty percent of which may be devoted to US Forces, as required, and fifty percent devoted to ARVN/civilian needs. Security is provided by six companies of Regional Forces for the rail facilities and elements of a military security battalion provide on-train security. Although no US Forces' cargo was transported during this report period, plans are being made for future use of rail to move rock from Phu Loc to Phu Bai. The following is the published daily train schedule effective 15 Jan 69.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOUTH</th>
<th>NORTH</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hue</td>
<td>Ly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>Ar</td>
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j. A pre-booking system for passengers departing from Phu Bai Airport on official orders was instituted on 14 Jan 69. Pre-booking can be made up to seven days in advance for trips to An Khe, Saigon, Dong Ha and Da Nang.

k. The new Hue Ramp opened on 18 Jan 69. The rated capacity of this ramp is 865 short tons daily. Another ramp for retrograde cargo is still under construction. The old Hue Ramp returned to ARVN control.

1. In December 1968, USA RV announced a policy for disposition of excess material. Implementation has begun in both the 101st Airborne Division (AM) and the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH). A large amount of excess equipment was produced in the 101st Airborne Division (AM), as it reorganized to an airborne configuration. Over 60 excess trucks and 30 excess trailers were turned in. In addition, the 101st Airborne Division (AM) submitted requests for disposition of 50-50 line items of TA 50 material and tentage. Additional requests for disposition are being prepared on these large volume items. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) is currently studying several hundred line items in an attempt to identify and dispose of excesses.

E. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MOBILIZATION, DISCIPLINE AND MEDICAL

1. (U) Military Personnel Management. During the report period, there was an increase in personnel administrative activities to include processing of personnel actions, promotions, personnel requisitions, R&R allocations, awards and decorations, etc., with the assignment of the 2d Battalion, 38th Artillery. The responsibility for reviewing and processing recommendations for awards and decorations of all US Army personnel assigned to RVN advisory teams in the COTZ was also assumed by the Corps AG Section. The Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps is assisted by the Corps AG Section in the review of OERs of advisory officers located within the Corps AO.

2. (U) Civilian Personnel Management. The authorization for direct hire Vietnamese Nationals in the command remained at 52. The number of daily hire Vietnamese Nationals was increased in the 3d Quarter FY69 in order to provide assistance in area construction to the assigned artillery battalions. An increase in the assistance-in-kind funds was requested and approved for this purpose.

3. (U) Special Services. During the period special services activities increased considerably with the acquisition of a Butler building for use as a gymnasium, the establishment of an area field library, and the opening of a newly constructed handball court. A swimming pool is under construction and other outdoor athletic facilities are planned for construction in the near future. In addition.
two mobile libraries and a mobile photo lab have been requisitioned and are reported enroute to Phu Bai Combat Base. These units will greatly increase the recreational facilities available to personnel assigned to the area.

4. (U) Religious Activities. The comparative stability of units in the XXIV Corps AO facilitated adequate religious coverage. Continued cross service support between Army, Navy and Marine Corps chaplains was most effective in providing adequate religious coverage for all units. Individuals in units at rear echelons were able to observe the Sabbath in accordance with the dictates of the individual's faith. For units in forward areas and those directly involved in military operations, observance of the Sabbath generally coincided with the visit of the chaplain. The limited number of Catholic and Jewish chaplains during the period required thorough planning and coordination to insure religious coverage for personnel of these faiths.

5. (U) Discipline, Law and Order. The 504th Military Police Battalion, less Company B, moved to Northern I Corps Tactical Zone (NICTZ) during November 1968. The 504th Military Police Battalion (-) provides non-tactical, area military police support to include convoy escort, traffic enforcement and accident investigation on main supply routes; evacuation of prisoners of war from division collecting points to the Combined Division Interrogation Center in Hue City; discipline, law and order in the cities of Quang Tri and Hue; and investigation of criminal offenses involving non-divisional troops.

6. (U) Medical. During the report period excellent medical support was provided Army units in the XXIV Corps AO. The 1st Medical Laboratory (Mobile) arrived at Phu Bai Combat Base on 1 Nov 68 and became operational on 16 Dec 68. This unit provides all medical laboratory procedures and greatly adds to the medical support capabilities in NICTZ. The US Army Hospital Phu Bai (Provisional) was redesignated the 85th Evacuation Hospital on 5 Dec 68 with a planned capacity of 400 beds. Construction of a new facility to provide this capacity began on 21 Jan 69. Relocation of the 18th Surgical Hospital from Quang Tri Combat Base to Camp Evans took place during the period 23-26 Dec 68 and became operational in this location on 1 Jan 69. This move provides hospital facilities at three central locations which are readily accessible to all units within the Corps AO.

F. INSPECTOR GENERAL

None.

G. INFORMATION

1. (U) General. On 31 Dec 68, negotiations were completed for the establishment of a Stars and Stripes Book Store at Phu Bai Combat Base. The bookstore opened on 15 Jan 69. The method of delivery of free issue Stars and Stripes newspapers was amended. Papers for all units located in the vicinity of Phu Bai Combat Base are transhipped in bulk under the supervision of the Information Office. The Information Office is now on distribution of DOD Newsclips.

2. (U) Command Information. Official photo coverage was provided for VII visits to include the Christmas Service of Dr. Billy Graham at Phu Bai Combat Base.

3. (U) Public Information.
a. The Commanding General and key staff members granted interviews or conducted briefings for thirteen members of the press.

b. 528 news media representatives used the services of the Phu Bai Press Camp.

c. 11 feature stories were prepared and released by the Information Office.

H. COMMAND HISTORIAN

1. (U) Historical Study 4-68 was completed during the report period, and will be forwarded to the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

2. (U) A historic overview of military operations in Northern I Corps Tactical Zone during 1968 was prepared during the report period.

3. (U) A Department of the Army, Letter of Appreciation for Historical Study 5-68 Operation Vinh Loc was received by the 31st Military History Detachment.

I. AVIATION

None

J. SIGNAL

1. (U) Activation of Mode V AUTODIN Terminals at Camp Eagle and Camp Evans. During the first week of this report period, Mode V AUTODIN terminals were installed at Camp Eagle AACC (Army Area Communication Center) and Camp Evans AACC. These terminals and associated communications centers supported the 101st Airborne Division (AH) and the 1st Cavalry Division (AH), respectively. Each Mode V AUTODIN terminal, providing 100 word-per-minute full duplex service, was connected to the Nha Trang automatic Switching Center. Activation of these terminals was accomplished without difficulty.

2. (U) Army Area Communications System Upgrade. On 5 Nov 68 an upgrade program of the Army Area Communication System in XXIV Corps AO was completed. This upgrade consisted of several distinct phases, as indicated below:

   a. Installation of an AN/TRC-129 tropospheric-scatter system between Phu Bai Combat Base and Camp Eagle (101st Airborne Division). This system improved the quality of long distance telephone service, pending installation of the 400-pair tie cable between Phu Bai Combat Base, Gia Le Combat Base and Camp Eagle.

   b. A 12-channel VHF system was installed between Phu Bai Combat Base and Gia Le Combat Base to increase the trunking capability and to provide two XXIV Corps Artillery battalions with direct access to HQ, XXIV Corps. This system was installed pending completion of the 400-pair tie cable mentioned above.

   c. Installation of a 12-channel VHF system between Phu Bai Combat Base and Hue Citadel improved the service between XXIV Corps and 1st ARVN Division, and now provides direct communications between HQ, 1st ARVN Division, HQ, XXIV Corps and the
Hue Combined Division Interrogation Center.

d. A 12-channel VHF system between Phu Bai Combat Base and Tan My Army Post, YD815310, was installed to improve the quality and quantity of service provided previously by an AN/GRC-163, a 4-channel system.

3. (U) Operation Liberty Canyon.

a. During the first days of the report period, Operation Liberty Canyon, movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) to III CTZ, produced many communications actions. These included the immediate installation of voice and teletype circuits from Camp Evans to the new command post location in III CTZ. A voice circuit was installed from Camp Evans to the Tan My Army Post to facilitate the sea movement of division elements.

b. By mid-November 1968, the last elements of 1st Cavalry Division (AM) departed the Corps AO. The narrow band AUTOSEVOCOM terminal accompanied the 13th Signal Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), and the Mode V AUTODIN terminal was deactivated and returned to 1st Signal Brigade assets.

c. The communications aspects of Operation Liberty Canyon were accomplished without difficulty and contributed significantly to the overall smooth execution of such a large undertaking.

4. (C) Issue of TSEC/KY-38 Speech Security Equipment to 1st ARVN Division Advisors. As a result of pending MACV and XXIV Corps OPLANS, an urgent need arose for 1st ARWF Division advisors to obtain TSEC/KY-38 speech security equipment. Due to the nature of the equipment and associated cryptographic material, considerable difficulty was encountered in establishing the channels for issue, obtaining release of equipment and material, verifying security clearances and cryptographic access, and issuance of KY-38. After coordination and the promulgation of USARV Reg 380-21, "Military Security - Control and Accountability of COMSEC Material Issued to MACV Advisors" 38 KY-38 security devices were issued to 1st ARVN Division advisors on 4 Dec 68. As a result of this action, communications security within 1st ARVN Division has increased immeasurably.

5. (U) SEAWBS-ICS Overbuild Program in XXIV Corps AO.

a. During the report period, an extensive overbuild of the Southeast Asia Wideband System - Integrated Communications System (SEAWBS-ICS) was activated. Two objectives were met by this program.

(1) Replacement of the AN/TRC-66 Tropospheric-Scatter Systems, operated by 7th Air Force personnel on rotating 90-day TDY basis.

(2) Completion of Phase III of the overall SEAWBS-ICS program.

b. This overbuild program resulted in the extension of the SEAWBS to Quang Tri, and Dong Ha Combat Bases with technical control facilities located throughout XXIV Corps AO at Phu Bai Combat Base, Hue City, Quang Tri City, and Dong Ha Combat Base. In addition to a considerable expansion in quantity of circuits available for both long-haul and intra-corps AO use, the quality of service has improved as a result of the overbuild program.
6. (U) Activation of 400-Pair Tie Cable, Phu Bai Combat Base-Gia Le Combat Base-Camp Eagle. The completion of the 400-pair cable project on 21 Jan 69 culminated a long and continuing effort to provide telephone service to the Phu Bai Combat Base-Gia Le Combat Base-Camp Eagle military complex on other than multi-channel radio systems. This 1st Signal Brigade cable construction project provides 200-pairs between Phu Bai Combat Base and Gia Le Combat Base, 200-pairs between Gia Le Combat Base and Camp Eagle, and 200-through pairs between Phu Bai Combat Base and Camp Eagle. The entire project constitutes the most extensive long-distance cable installation in XXIV Corps.

7. (U) Switchboard AN/MTC-9 Installation at Camp Eagle. Concurrent with the completion of the above mentioned 400-pair cable project, was the activation of an AN/MTC-9 switchboard at Camp Eagle. This installation provides a 600-line capability to Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (AM) and other tenant units at Camp Eagle, in contrast to the previous 200-line switchboard capability.

K. ENGINEER

1. (C) During the report period the Corps Engineer Section, in coordination with the Quang Tri and Thua Thien Province Chiefs and Senior Advisors, developed a proposed secondary LOC upgrading program. This program, planned for accomplishment by ARVN Engineers supported by US Army Engineer units, will re-establish the road network emanating from the cultural and market centers of Quang Tri City and Hue City. A total of 186 miles of road in the two provinces are programmed for upgrading as the initial segment of the project.

2. (C) The following major construction projects were completed during the report period:
   a. Construction of 1,146 Seahuts and 44 messhalls throughout the Corps AOC.
   b. POL tank farm at Quang Tri Combat Base.
   c. Bridge 1-14, YD519348.
   d. Bridge 1-13, YD477377.
   e. Bridge 9-2, YD026561.
   f. South Hue LCU ramp, YD737322.
   g. ASP at Quang Tri Combat Base.
   h. Relocation of the 18th Surgical Hospital from Quang Tri Combat Base to Camp Evans.
   i. Repair of Phu Loc railroad bridge, ZD099008.
   j. Repair of railroad roadbed Hue-Da Nang.
   k. Repair of Camp Evans airfield.

3. (C) The following major construction projects were started during the report period:

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a. North Hue LCU ramp, YD760250
b. 85th Evac Hospital at Phu Bai Combat Base.
c. UH-1 hangars at Camp Eagle and Camp Evans.
d. Redecking of the Hue City highway/railroad bridge, YD751209-YD749213.

4. (C) Tactical bridging.
   a. 300 ft of M4T6, installed in October 1968 is still in service at Cam Lo, YD148604.
   b. 1,140 ft of M4T6/M4 float bridge was installed in the Perfume River at Hue City, YD766218. The bridge was opened to traffic on 22 Jan 69.
   c. 100 ft of M4T6 was installed at YD336549 on 25 Jan 69.

5. (C) Designs of the following major highway bridges were developed during the report period. Construction is currently scheduled on the dates indicated.
   a. Cam Lo YD148604 1 Feb 69
   b. Lang Co YD886957 1 Feb 69
   c. Dong Ha YD242611 1 Apr 69
   d. Quang Tri YD329519 1 May 69
   e. Hue Bypass YD773249 1 May 69

6. (C) Reconstruction of the following railroad bridges was tasked to the Seabees during the report period. Repairs should commence during the next report period.
   a. An Hoa YD773228
   b. Song Bo YD614278
   c. Pho Trach YD519368
   d. My Chanh YD461399
   e. Bau Vit YD325520

L. G5 ACTIVITIES

1. (U) Civic Action:
   a. Civic Action progress.
      (1) During the report period, civic action activities reached their highest tempo of the year. This is attributed to the intensity of major combat operations.
and an increased emphasis on military civic action activities in support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). A major shift in civic action areas of responsibility occurred in early November 1968 when the 1st Cavalry Division (AC) deployed to the III Corps Tactical Zone. 1st Cavalry Division (AC) projects were absorbed by the 3d Marine Division and the 101st Airborne Division (AM). Self-help was again the keynote to the civic action activities within XXIV Corps. XXIV Corps' units consistently reported that more than 50% of the work on projects was accomplished by self-help labor. During the quarter, units OPCON to XXIV Corps spent over 3,750 man-days (ten hour days) in civic action work. Over 1,600 MEDCAPS were held during the quarter with nearly 140,000 patients treated. These totals more than double the totals of any previous quarter. XXIV Corps units used and/or made available approximately 35 tons of commodities per week during the report period. The commodities included soap, food items, medical supplies, CARE kits, and construction materials such as sand, gravel, tiles, bricks, and both salvaged and qualified lumber. Civic action programs supported nearly 400 projects (to include schools, orphanages, hospitals and dispensaries) with funds and technical advice.

(2) XXIV Corps received additional civic action assets during the quarter. The 29th Civic Affairs Company, headquartered in Da Nang, provides four Civic Action Platoons to the XXIV Corps AO. The 53d and 54th Civic Affairs Platoons arrived from the 95th Civil Affairs Group in CONUS and support the Senior Advisors of Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces, with a primary mission of refugee support. The 11th Platoon of the 2d Civil Affairs Company, a new arrival from II Field Force Vietnam, and the 10th Platoon, created from personnel already on hand, were also designated as refugee support units at Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. This brings the total of civil affairs platoons in the XXIV Corps AO to nine.

(3) XXIV Corps civic action projects covered a broad spectrum.

(a) 3d Marine Division Area of Operations.

1. A program of instruction was instituted for assigned personnel which provides information concerning civil affairs and psychological operations. The instruction was held initially for all concerned personnel, and will be presented quarterly for newly arrived staff members and commanders. The instruction includes: political organization at province and district level and the US advisory effort; the status of pacification and the role of US/FRANP.

2. The division has been active in numerous county fairs and cordon and search operations. They have provided transportation, food, MEDCAPS, DENTCAPS, and entertainment.

3. The sawmill in Quang Tri City has reopened. The timbers are floated down rivers from the mountains in the western portion of the division's AO or airlifted by supply helicopters returning from various fire support bases and landing zones. The 3d Marine Division, when possible, provides security, transportation, supplies and equipment for the workers.

4. The 3d Marine Division G5 Section publishes a monthly newsletter to recognize successes, give direction to projects, and pass along ideas and comments.

5. The Dong Ha Children's Hospital continued its successful operation during the report period. Since the hospital opened in early September 1968, 5,000
outpatients have been treated and the hospital has well over 2,000 inpatient days. Since the hospital grows more and more successful, evidenced by the increasing patient load, a new wing is planned. A relatively new undertaking at the hospital is the Cleft Palate Program. Children with this malady, and other children who can be assisted through minor surgery, are being treated at hospital. The program is being advertised through PSYOP media and by 3d Marine Division MEDCAP and DI MEDCAP personnel. Treated children are the best advertisement for program.

(b) 101st Airborne Division (AM) Area of Operations.

1. In support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign the 101st Airborne Division (AM) conducted "soft" cordon operations, in which maximum emphasis is placed on CA/PSYOP effort. Aerial loudspeakers are used to broadcast information and instructions to the citizens. After the citizens are moved to a secure area, MEDCAPS are conducted, food provided, and games, toys, and recreation equipment were made available. An audio-visual team provides movies and television and the 101st Airborne Division Band often provides entertainment.

2. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) conducts forty-five minute discussions on the importance of Vietnamese-American relationships each week to companies returning to the Division headquarters for a stand-down. Each discussion is followed by an appropriate film, e.g. "The Unique War".

3. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) civil affairs personnel, working with district chiefs and district senior advisors, have developed their programs to complement and supplement other agencies. In January, the 101st Airborne Division (AM) was participating in 41 major projects, the largest number it has had since its arrival in Vietnam.

4. Lumber is in short supply throughout Thua Thien Province. The 101st Airborne Division (AM), from its scrap lumberyards at Camp Eagle and Phu Bai Combat Base, supplies the bulk of the lumber used in all civic action projects in Thua Thien Province, over 80,000 board feet per month. Projects are occasionally threatened with delays due to shortage of lumber and other building materials. To keep these projects moving, the 101st Airborne Division (AM) supplies cement, tin, and reinforcing bars from its resources on a "loan" basis. Once the province receives the supplies through government channels, the division is reimbursed.

5. Coordination between the 101st Airborne Division Surgeon and the Thua Thien Province Medical Chief established a regularly scheduled MEDCAP throughout the province. Villagers know exactly when a MEDCAP will be held in their area. This provides better medical assistance and prevents duplication of effort by different units within the province. Additionally, a program for maintaining health records was established. Each MEDCAP is accompanied by Vietnamese medical technician who posts these records and receives medical training.

(c) The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) reported during the quarter that a mobile clinic was used during MEDCAPS. This clinic covers the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) Area of Operations on a regularly scheduled basis, and provides the doctor with a small laboratory, a pharmacist, and a trained laboratory technician. Vietnamese health workers meet the mobile clinic at each of its stops for on-the-job training. Another feature of the clinic is a referral system. Each patient receives a card on which his medical history is recorded in both Vietnamese and English. This provides the MEDCAP doctor with an aid to his diagnosis and treat-
ment, and enables patients to be referred to the provincial hospital where more serious ailments can be treated. The hospital’s physicians then have a medical history and diagnosis to assist them.

(d) During the report period the Civil Affairs Division of the XXIV Corps G-5 Section assisted and coordinated a number of civic action activities. The following are representative of these activities:

(a) With the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) from the XXIV Corps to the XXIV Corps on 1 July Nov 68, the Corps Civil affairs Division convened a conference at Camp Evans to insure continuity of civic action activities in the 1st Cavalry Division's AO. Representatives from Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and from the 3d Marine Division, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) and 101st Airborne Division (AM) attended. Supplies, information, responsibilities and future plans were transferred and discussed. Additionally, over 300,000 $VN in the General Walt Scholarship Fund were transferred along with all of the scholarship records on each of over 200 students. As a result of this conference, and the diligent work of those in attendance, there was a smooth transfer of civic action activities.

(b) During Nov 68, XXIV Corps was allocated 100,000 $VN per month in CA/PSYWAR funds. These funds support the civic action activities of numerous non-divisional units within the Corps AO and relieve the divisions of the burden of supporting those activities which are of a corps-wide nature. Initial expenditures from the fund supported Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces and 1st ADIV Division Christmas celebrations, provided channel markers for the Gia Dang Fishing Villages in Quang Tri Province and supplied materials for well casing molds of selected PC barracks. The response to this fund has been so overwhelming that on 18 Jan 69, a request for an additional 400,000 $VN was submitted to MACV.

(c) The G-5 Section continued to serve as a clearing house for information and material for various civic action activities throughout the XXIV Corps AO. Examples include tentage and food commodities for CA Platoons in refugee assistance work, food commodities and administrative advice for cordon and search operations, transportation assistance for everything from 1,000 pallets of cement to 250 Boy Scouts, and quick reaction support for victims of a flash fire in Hue City. Additionally, the section provided coordination assistance for English class at the American Cultural Center in Hue City and the Hue University School of Pedagogy. Another major event in which the G5 Section took part was the resumption of tours through the Imperial City of Hue by U.S. servicemen. Civic action personnel provide liaison between Corps' units and the XXIV Corps Special Services Office for the City of Hue tours.

(d) The G5 Section helped coordinate the visits of over 1,000 Vietnamese to the Thu Bai Combat Base during late Dec 68 to visit graves of their ancestors and provided coordination and control for a visit at Christmas time by over 200 citizens of Hue City who wished to express their thanks and best wishes to XXIV Corps. The activities included a high school student chorus which sang carols in Vietnamese and English, a performance by the Imperial Ballet, and a presentation to the Corps Commander of a symbolic gift for the entire Corps expressing best wishes for the holiday period.

(e) During the Christmas Holidays, the G5 Section provided the Corps Commander with gifts for distribution and has prepared documents, cards, and suggestions for his activities during the Tet Holidays.
(f) The monthly G5 Conference and G5 Civil Affairs Information Papers continued during the report period.

b. Civic Action Effectiveness

(1) Intelligence of VC/NVA activities continues to be given to units throughout the XXIV Corps AO. The local populace reflects a more responsive attitude toward American soldiers and Vietnamese government representatives. Their will to rebuild, and the effort invested in constructing permanent buildings, indicate faith in the ability of the government to protect and lead them.

(2) In Nam Hoa District of Thua Thien Province the citizens are growing more self-confident and self-sufficient due to the work they perform to rebuild their homes with supplies provided by province and US/FNARF sources. Success in self-help projects is reflected throughout the XXIV Corps AO.

(3) MEDCAPS continue to be the most effective Civic Action projects, since they allow individuals to see immediate results in their state of health. MEDCAPS also bring Vietnamese and American medical personnel together and allow each to learn from the other.

2. (U) Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

a. The XXIV Corps, G5 PSYOP Officer continued to monitor and supervise PSYOP conducted by units OPCON to XXIV Corps, and to coordinate PSYOP activities with ARVN, Provincial, and III Marine Amphibious Force PSYOP agencies.

b. Throughout the report period, the PSYOP effort was directed primarily against two targets: NVA/VC units located within the XXIV Corps AO, and the Viet Cong Infrastructure. Primary means of PSYOP attack against the VCI has been the Denounce Viet Cong Infrastructure Campaign and the Third Party Chieu Hoi Rewards Program.

c. The number of Hoi Chanhns decreased during the report period to 234 from a high of 708 during the preceding quarter. The bombing halt, peace talks, possible withdrawal of main enemy forces and tightening of VC/NVA control of their troops are factors contributing to the downward trend. The total Hoi Chanhns for the year, however, remained well above that for 1967, with a total of 1718 as opposed to a 1967 total of 509.

d. During this quarter the XXIV Corps PSYOP section processed some 3,000 requests for leaflets and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts from units OPCON to XXIV Corps. In response to these requests, approximately 161,901,765 leaflets were disseminated and 969 hours of messages were broadcast over aerial and ground loudspeakers.

e. During the report period the XXIV Corps G5 PSYOP Section assumed responsibility for the PSYOP effort in the A Shau Valley. More than 2,956,170 leaflets were dropped on known or suspected NVA/VC infiltration and supply routes. The PSYOP Section developed and disseminated to units OPCON to XXIV Corps and related PSYOP agencies at province headquarters, texts for posters, leaflets, and radio announcements.
f. The Corps PSYOP section continues to assist the Thua Thien Province Armed Propaganda Teams by obtaining servicable field equipment (uniforms, helmets, web gear, etc) from field and evacuation hospitals. This headquarters continued to emphasize the importance of Armed Propaganda Teams, and the necessity of their being adequately equipped in order to improve their effectiveness and capabilities.
SECTION 2. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. COMMAND

None.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) ITEM: PW Unit Identification

a. OBSERVATION: Reports indicate that political officers of VC units have instructed their personnel to identify themselves as NVA soldiers if captured by allied forces. Guerrilla leaders believe the NVA main force PWs captured by allied forces receive better treatment.

b. EVALUATION: Several instances of deception have been reported involving Trieu Phong District guerrillas.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Although identification of NVA units is of high priority, interrogators should maintain caution in accepting unit identification from PWs.

2. (C) ITEM: Hand-Held Interpretation Reports.

a. OBSERVATION: Hand-held aerial photography taken from light observation aircraft has greatly improved the reaction time for engagement of transient targets. Information from hand-held photographs is available within 4-6 hours after completion of the mission as opposed to 48 hours for normal reconnaissance missions. However, hand-held photography can overtax available reproduction facilities and create a problem of disseminating intelligence from the photographs. To overcome the undesirable aspect of hand-held aerial photography, XXIV Corps required subordinate organizations to prepare hand-held aerial photo interpretation reports, which are disseminated to all XXIV Corps major commands. The reports contain necessary identifying data to include location of the negatives.

b. EVALUATION: Hand-held interpretation reports allow intelligence acquired by hand-held aerial photography to be made available to XXIV Corps major commands and expedite reproduction and dissemination of requested photographs. The reports also curtail indiscriminate use of hand-held cameras, which reduces photo production requirements.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That units extensively using hand-held aerial photography adopt the interpretation reports.

3. (C) ITEM: Allocation of O-1 Aircraft for Visual Reconnaissance.

a. OBSERVATION: Under the system of O-1 aircraft allocation in use prior to August 1968, a specific number of aircraft hours were allocated to support NCTZ units based upon stated requirements in accordance with established priorities. A study showed full, productive use of aircraft was not being made. Upon completion of a mission, aircraft capable of conducting additional missions would frequently engage in nonessential activities or return to base. A new system has been inaugurated wherein aircraft are held in general support, and supported units submit requirements to the Visual Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Area Coordination Center (VARSACC) on a daily basis. Under this system a single sortie often completes several missions, frequently in support...
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of more than one unit. Also, aircraft are allocated during the day to meet additional requirements caused by changing situations. Procedures are established for inflight diversions to cover higher priority missions that develop.

b. EVALUATION: The aircraft allocation system, instituted five months ago, has improved aerial reconnaissance support to NICTZ tactical units and has permitted regular surveillance over areas not covered under the old system.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That other corps-sized units in RVN consider using this system to provide more effective use of aircraft resources.

C. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

(U) ITEM: Publishing and Distributing MTOE's and General Orders

a. OBSERVATION: Delays between publishing general orders, reorganizing units under an M.OE, and receipt of the MTOE, result in the units concerned being unaware of equipment or personnel authorized.

b. EVALUATION: The four and one-half month delay between reorganization of HHC, XXIV Corps (15 Aug 68) and receipt of the MTOE (4 Jan 69) prevented normal personnel requisitioning procedures and actions to dispose of excess equipment or to requisition authorized equipment.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That MTOE's and general orders implementing MTOE's be published and distributed to reach the unit concerned at approximately the same time.

D. LOGISTICS

(U) ITEM: Maintenance of Supplies and Equipment.

a. OBSERVATION: Quarterly Material Readiness Reports, DA Form 2406, indicate a large number of major end items of equipment have been deadlined for maintenance or repair parts in excess of 30 days. In some instances, the equipment has been deadlined in excess of 90 days.

b. EVALUATION: Unit commanders are hesitant to return equipment due to the shortage of some major end items. They prefer to exercise their prerogative under USARV Reg 750-1 and await repair of the equipment. This headquarters has dispatched a message to all subordinate units requesting that commanders examine all equipment deadlined in excess of 30 days to ensure that all necessary measures have been taken to return the equipment to a serviceable condition, or, alternatively, turned in. Retention, rather than turn in, of equipment down for excessive maintenance or parts causes no demand to be placed on the supply system for additional end items.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Recommend the provisions of USARV Reg 750-1, dated 28 Jun 68, with change 1, dated 22 Dec 68, be reviewed to determine if the present latitude allowed the unit commander with regards to turn in of equipment hinders the USARV and MACV operationally ready standards.
E. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE DISCIPLINE AND MEDICAL

(U) ITEM: Establishment of an Area Communications Center/Courier Transfer Station

a. OBSERVATION: The local communications center performs the functions of a corps communications center and an area communications center. All traffic is processed through the XXIV Corps AG section and creates an excessive workload since the section is not staffed to perform both functions.

b. EVALUATION: Upon establishment of XXIV Corps, the AG section was staffed to provide message center mail and distribution service for the Corps Staff. Due to the lack of a separate area communications center courier transfer station, and the increasing number of units moving into the Phu Bai area, this service had to be expanded. The XXIV Corps AG Section presently provides message center service to units in the Phu Bai area and acts as a courier transfer station for NICTZ units without additional staffing.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Upon establishment of a corps headquarters such as XXIV Corps, a separate communications center providing communications support only for the headquarters should be established. The area communications center/courier transfer station would perform its normal mission of servicing all units in the area. This would provide a more efficient system for these services to area units and would relieve a corps headquarters staff section from a workload which is excessive for the number of personnel authorized.

F. INSPECTOR GENERAL

None.

G. INFORMATION

None.

H. COMMAND HISTORY

None.

I. AVIATION

None.

J. SIGNAL

1. (U) ITEM: Requirement for Qualified Cable Personnel in Signal Units.

a. OBSERVATION: Increased emphasis on use of distribution cables within base camps and combat support bases has shown a serious lack of qualified personnel in area signal units for cable installation, splicing and maintenance.

b. EVALUATION: Current TOE's provide personnel trained in tactical spiral-four and 26-pair cable. The distribution cables presently employed range from 50-pair to 600-pair, requiring permanent construction and advanced splicing and installation techniques. CONARC does not provide instruction in complex splicing.
and maintenance techniques. The 1st Signal Brigade, through the US Army Southeast Asia Signal Training Facility, provides this required instruction. However, a field school of this nature cannot completely meet all of the requirements in AV.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That CONARC initiate an MOS producing course advanced cable splicing for signal maintenance personnel, and that current TOE's of appropriate signal units be modified to include personnel in this MOS.

2. (U) ITEM: Requirement for Low Level Secure Voice System.

a. OBSERVATION: Limited secure voice capability from battalion to brigade and from brigade to division seriously hampers the ability of commands to pass classified "real-time" information.

b. EVALUATION: At present, secure FM radio is the only means available for rapid secure communications. The limitations of range, terrain and availability of secure stations prove that secure FM radio is not the complete answer to this problem. Use of low level operations and numerical codes over unsecure circuits is also insufficient due to slow and tedious preparation and transmission as well as the possibilities of inaccuracies that could be extremely costly in the combat environment.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a tactical secure voice system be developed which would operate on both conventional wire circuits and tactical multi-channel radio circuits. Such a narrow band secure voice system would enable commands at division level and lower to pass classified information promptly and accurately.

K. ENGINEER

None.

L. C5 ACTIVITIES

(U) ITEM: Use of Propaganda Shells.

a. OBSERVATION: During the report period the 3d Marine Division initiated use of 105mm propaganda shells. During the test phase, it was found that many rounds were erratic and ejected leaflets immediately after leaving the howitzer tube.

b. EVALUATION: Further testing revealed that the controlling factor was the size of the roll of leaflets placed within the body of the shell. If loosely packed, the leaflets would shift, causing the leaflet roll to shift suddenly to the rear, forcing out the backplate and premature ejection of the leaflets.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That all personnel responsible for handpacking 105mm propaganda shells be advised of the necessity for packing the shells in a manner which will not allow the leaflets to shift. This can be done by merely stuffing a few loose leaflets into the shell cavity around the roll of leaflets.
AVHGC-RST (4 Mar 69) Iat Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period
Ending 31 January 1969, ROS CONFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375. 4 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, XXIV Corps.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning Hand-Held Interpretation Reports, page 21, paragraph B1. Concur with XXIV Corps requirement that subordinate units produce photo interpretation reports on hand-held photography. This procedure appears to work well for XXIV Corps but implementation of this requirement by other headquarters is not recommended without further study of its operational impact. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   b. (U) Reference item concerning Publishing and Distributing MTOE’s and General Orders, page 22, paragraph C; concur. The delay between publication of General Orders and the publication of the implementing MTOE precludes the requisition of equipment necessary to realign the affected unit’s structure as directed. The delay in MTOE publication has occasionally exceeded six months. Action by DA to reduce this delay is recommended.

   c. (U) Reference item concerning Maintenance of Supplies and Equipment, page 22, paragraph D; nonconcur. USARV Regulation 750-1 W/C1 does not give any commander the prerogative of waiting for the equipment to be repaired. The time limit of 30 days (or the in-country order and ship time if greater than 30 days) may be doubled by agreement of the supported unit commander and the battalion commander of the supporting maintenance unit. Exceptions to this policy cannot be approved at any level lower than support command level. The unit is being so informed by separate correspondence.

   d. (U) Reference item concerning Establishment of an Area Communications Center/Courier Transfer Station, page 23, paragraph E. Concur in the recommendation that separate corps and area communications centers
be established upon activation of a corps headquarters. In the special case of the XXIV Corps Headquarters, no corps signal battalion was or is available to supply this support. Under the current situation, the existing arrangement is economical and has been agreed upon by the XXIV Corps Signal Officer.

e. (U) Reference item concerning Requirement for Qualified Cable Personnel in Signal Units, page 23, paragraph J1. Concur in recommendation that USCOMARC initiate an MOS producing course for cable splicing. Army personnel are presently trained at Shepard Air Force Base. Current TOE's of appropriate signal units include MOS 36E personnel. The 17th Heavy Signal Construction Platoon and elements of the 40th Signal Battalion in the XXIV Corps area provide this type of support.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
XXIV Corps
GPOP-DT (4 Mar 69) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, XXIV Corps for Period Ending
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 Apr 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ment and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
# Roster of Key Personnel

## Headquarters XXIV Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Grade</th>
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<tr>
<td>Commanding General</td>
<td>Richard G. Stilwell</td>
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<td>Clifford B. Drake (USMC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Alexander R. Bolling, Jr.</td>
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<td>Secretary, General Staff</td>
<td>Edward G. Gunning</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
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<td>Asst Chief of Staff, G1</td>
<td>John W. Armstrong</td>
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<td>Asst Chief of Staff, G2</td>
<td>Oliver Patton</td>
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<td>Asst Chief of Staff, G3</td>
<td>John L. Osteen, Jr.</td>
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<td>Asst Chief of Staff, G5</td>
<td>Leroy C. Land</td>
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<td>Staff Engineer</td>
<td>Carroll N. Letellier</td>
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<td>Arley C. Richter</td>
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<td>Provost Marshall</td>
<td>Oscar J. Weible</td>
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<td>Adjutant General</td>
<td>Webster Parker</td>
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<td>Headquarters Commandant</td>
<td>Joseph B. Sestito</td>
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<td>Aviation Officer</td>
<td>Robert L. Jones</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commanding General</th>
<th>101st Airborne Division (AM)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Melvin Zais</td>
<td>MG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allen M. Burdett</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry J. Muller, Jr.</td>
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<td>Lawrence L. Morey</td>
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<td>Lloyd J. Picou</td>
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<td>Richard A. Bresnahan</td>
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<td>John A. Hefling</td>
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<td>Joseph Connolly</td>
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<td>Myron H. Murley</td>
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<td>MG</td>
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<tr>
<td>F. E. Garretson</td>
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<td>R. B. Carney</td>
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<td>W. F. Goggin</td>
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<td>R. H. Barrow</td>
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<td>P. J. Muironey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frank W. Burfo</td>
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<td>William A. MacLeod</td>
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<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>William I. Gordon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commanding Officer 108th Artillery Group</td>
<td>Robert V. Lee, Jr.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>Sylvanus J. Williams III</td>
<td>LTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commanding Officer TF Clearwater</td>
<td>S. A. Swartztrauber</td>
<td>CPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>F. X. Colleton (USMC)</td>
<td>LTC</td>
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XXIV Corps

HHC, XXIV Corps
MI Det (Prov)
PI Det (Prov)
Provisional Trans Co, (Car)
33d Chemical Det
2d Plat, Co A, 504th MP Bn
31st Mil Hist Det
Provisional Corps Avn Co (CPCON, XXIV Corps)
220th Recon Acft Co (CPCON, XXIV Corps)
3d Sqdn, 5th Armd Cav (attached from 9th Div)
Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armor (Attached from 25th Div)

XXIV Corps Artillery

HHD, XXIV Corps Arty
1st Bn, 83d Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)
2d Bn, 138th Arty (155mm) (SP)

108th Arty Gp

HHD, 108th Arty Gp
8th Bn, 4th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)
(Btry B, CPCON 1st Mar Div)
6th Bn, 33d Arty (105mm) (T)
1st Bn, 40th Arty (105mm) (SP)
1st Bn, 44th Arty (Twin 40's)
Btry G, 65th Arty (.50 cal MG)
Btry G, 29th Arty (Searchlight)

Incl 2
2d Bn, 94th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)
Btry F, 26th Arty (Tgt Acq)
235th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
238th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
239th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
240th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
245th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
250th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
1st 8" How Btry (FMF Pacific-OCON XXIV Corps Arty)
5th 155 Gun Battery (155mm gun - 8" How) (FMF Pacific-OCON XXIV Corps Arty)
101st Airborne Division (AM)

HHC, 101st Abn Div

1st Brigade
HHC, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
1st Bn, 327th Inf
2d Bn, 327th Inf
2d Bn, 502th Inf

3d Brigade
HHC, 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div
1st Bn, 501st Inf
2d Bn, 501st Inf
1st Bn, 502d Inf

3d Brigade
HHC, 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div
3d Bn, 187th Inf
1st Bn, 506th Inf
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2d Bn, 506th Inf

Division Artillery

HHB, 101st Abn Div Arty
2d Bn, 319th Arty (105mm) (T)
2d Bn, 320th Arty (105mm) (T)
1st Bn, 321st Arty (105mm) (T)
2d Bn, 11th Arty (-) (155mm) (T)

3 Bty A (OPCON II FFGCEV)
F Btry, 16th Arty (155mm) (T)
4th Bn, 77th Arty (ARA) (-)

160th Avn Gp

HHC, 160th Avn Gp
101st Avn Bn, (Aslt Hel)

499th, 510th, 516th, 527th Trans Det
159th Avn Bn (-) (Aslt Spt Hel)
625th, 649th Trans Det
163d Avn Co (GS)

10th Trans Det

478th Avn Co (-) (Atch from 1st Cav Div)

Division Troops

3d Bn, 506th Inf (OPCON II FFGCEV)
2d Sqdn, 17th Cav (-)
Co F, 58th Inf (IRP)
Trp D, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (Atch from Americal Div)
326th Engr Bn
501st Sig Bn
101st MP Co

265th RRC

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42th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
47th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
58th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
557th Inf Plat (Combat Trackers)
Det 16, 1st ANGLICO (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)
10th Cml Plat
20th Cml Det
Det 5, 7th PSYOP Bn (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)
7th AA Plt, 29th Ga Co (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)
22d Mil Hist Det
25th PI Det
34th PI DET
45th PI Det
101st MI Det (Prov)
181st MI Det
TACF #19 (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)

Division Support Command

HHC & Band
5th Trans Bn
326th Med Bn
426th S&S Bn
801st Maint Bn

3rd Marine Division

HQ Bn, 3rd Marine Div

Hq Co (-)
Serv Co (-)
MP Co (-)
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Det, Comm Co

7th Intelligence Translation Team

15th Counterintelligence Team

7th Counterintelligence Team

1st AA Plt, 29th CA Co (DS) (OPCON, 3d Mar Div)

2d Det, 7th PSYOP Bn (DS) (OPCON, 3d Mar Div)

3d Marines

HQ Co, 3rd Marine Regt (OPCON to 1st Mar Div - 9 Dec 68)

1st Bn 3d Mar (OPCON to 1st Mar Div - 14 Dec 68)

2d Bn, 3d Mar

3d Bn, 3d Mar (OPCON to 1st Mar Div - 14 Dec 68)

1st AMTRAC Bn (FMF Pacific)

TF Hotel

HQ TF Hotel

4th Marines

HQ Co, 4th Marine Regt

1st Bn, 4th Mar

2d Bn, 4th Mar

3d Bn, 4th Mar

9th Marines

HQ Co, 9th Marine Regt

1st Bn, 9th Mar

2d Bn, 9th Mar

3d Bn, 9th Mar

12th Marines

HQ Btry, 12th Marine Regt

1st Sit Btry, (FMF Pacific)

1st Bn, 12th Mar (105mm) (T)
2d Bn, 12th Mar (105mm) (T)
3d Bn, 12th Mar (105mm) (T)
1st Bn, 12th Mar (155mm) (T)
1st Arm Amph (105mm LVTH)

3d Tank Bn
3d Recon Bn
3d Shore Party Bn
9th Motor Transport Bn
3d Motor Transport Bn
3d Med Bn
3d Dental Co (FMF Pacific)
3d Engr Bn
11th Engr Bn (FMF Pacific)
Force Recon Co (FMF Pacific)

1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (CP CON, 3d Mar Div)

HHC, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div
1st Bn, 11th Inf
1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)
1st Bn, 77th Armor (Tank)
5th Bn, 4th Arty (155mm) (SP)
Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav
Co A, 7th Engr Bn

75th CS Spt Bn

HHC, CS Spt Bn
Co A (Admin)
Co B (Med)
Co C (S&T)
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Co D (Maint)
48th PI Det
86th Cml Det
298th Sig Co
517th MI Det
407th RR Det

Task Force Clearwater
River Div 543
River Div 521
Coastal Div 17
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69

CG, XXIV Corps

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4 Mar 69

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