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<td>AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
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AGAM-P (H) (1 May 69) FOR OT UT 691179

7 May 1969


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Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 307TH COMBAT AVIATION (Phantom) BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96215

AW-P 15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS, G3P0R-65 (RI)

1. (C) SECTION I OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:

a. (U) MISSION: There has been no change in the battalion mission since the last reporting period.

b. (U) ORGANIZATION: The flexibility of the battalion was augmented by the addition of the 271st Aviation Company (Wm Hel), which provides medium lift capabilities to include missions of transporting personnel and cargo for combat service support and combat support within the IV CTZ. The battalion lost the 221st Reconnaissance Airplane Company to the 13th CAB. The 235th Armed Helicopter Company was redesignated the 235th Aerial Weapons Company. The battalion was also affected by a new TOE, which provided for the merging of companies with detachments that were in their support.

(See Organization and Station Chart, Incl 1)

c. COMMAND GROUP PERSONNEL:

(1) (U) Twenty-five percent of the battalions principal staff positions were affected by personnel changes. The addition of an S2 officer was the only change not resulting from normal replacement. The duties of the S3 were previously handled by the S3 section and intelligence sergeant.

(2) (C) Composition of the Battalion Command Group:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>AGM</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>RELEASED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Charles H. Allrood</td>
<td>061105</td>
<td>11 July 69</td>
<td>3 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Rolly E. Rutherford</td>
<td>0710921</td>
<td>3 Jan 69</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Off</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Robbie Berry</td>
<td>0710202</td>
<td>1 Nov 69</td>
<td>26 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Off</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Robert S. Roder</td>
<td>071526</td>
<td>24 Jan 69</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>James O. Starkis</td>
<td>0710956</td>
<td>28 Oct 69</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Thomas E. Murray</td>
<td>091607</td>
<td>6 Feb 69</td>
<td>26 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Franklin W. Berry</td>
<td>071062</td>
<td>26 Jan 69</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Leonard L. Rossell</td>
<td>0710727</td>
<td>12 July 69</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Rex E. Seidman</td>
<td>0710012</td>
<td>2 Nov 69</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>James R. Will</td>
<td>0712483</td>
<td>8 Aug 69</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Karl A. Brauget</td>
<td>082345</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C Maint</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Donald A. Covillio</td>
<td>093640</td>
<td>24 Aug 69</td>
<td>2 Dec 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C Maint</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Jerry A. Ross</td>
<td>07104255</td>
<td>24 Jan 69</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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POSITION  RANK  NAME  ASN  ASSIGNED  RELEASED

Safety       CPT   John Grilli  05260176  1 Nov 68  N/A
Signal       CPT   Joseph Smith  05537569  13 Nov 68  N/A
Medical Off MAJ  Larry B. Robinet  05512041  6 Nov 68  15 Jan 69
Supply Tech CW2 Walter C. Conron  W843092A  11 Dec 68  N/A
Motor Maint Tech  CW2  Elgene Hamilton  W2200442  26 Nov 68  N/A
Personnel CW2  Everett E. Koth  W218073  26 Nov 68  25 Nov 69
Personnel CWI  Stephen T. walston  W154008  28 Nov 68  N/A

(3) (c) Subordinate Unit Commanders: (Changes)

(a) Commanding Officer, 199th Reconnaissance Airplane Company, 307th Combat Aviation Battalion; MAJ Robert V. Borer, 091556, commanded from 1 July 68, to 31 Dec 68; MAJ Gary L. Kline, 086377, assumed command on 1 Jan 69.

(b) Commanding Officer, 235th Aerial Weapons Company, MAJ William R. Landerman, 079596, commanded from 27 Julv 68, to 26 Jan 69; MAJ Charles A. Teague, 0102281, assumed command on 27 Jan 69.

(c) Commanding Officer, 224th Surveillance Airplane Company, MAJ Joe E. Neely, 084097, commanded from 20 Aug 68, to 27 Jan 69; MAJ Edward J. Horton, 0102287, assumed command on 28 Jan 69.

(d) Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company 307th Combat Aviation Battalion; CPT Walter C. Hicks, 0517127, commanded from 3 Sep 68, to 19 Jan 69; CPT James C. Wilson, 0105305, assumed command on 20 Jan 69.

d. Unit strength as of 31 Jan 69:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>199th MAC</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235th SGC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244th SGC</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st Avn Co</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 307th</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 307th CAB                   | 101     | 92  | 58  | 251   |

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Inclusion

2.
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(2) (C) Civilians

SUBORDINATE
UNIT

DAC VII 3rd NAVY CONTRACTOR

AUTH 0/H AUTH 0/H AUTH 0/H AUTH 0/H

199th RAC 235th SVC 214th SAC 271st Avn Co VHCC
1 2 1 3 4

307th CAB 3 5 4 4

e. (V) AWARDS PRESENTED 1 NOVEMBER 1968 TO 31 JANUARY 1969:

AWARD

199th 235th 214th 271st VHCC 307th

Silver Star
Distinguished Flying Cross 1 2 1 10 1
Soldier's Medal 1
Bronze Star 11 14 10 13 11 59
Army Commendation Medal 15 15 17 21 10 79

f. (C) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF 31 JANUARY 1969:

SUBORDINATE
UNIT

EH-1 CH-47 AH-1C O-1 OV-1U U-6 A-6A

AUTH 0/H AUTH 0/H AUTH 0/H AUTH 0/H AUTH 0/H AUTH 0/H AUTH 0/H

199th RAC 235th SVC 214th SAC 271st Avn Co VHCC, 307th CAB
1 2 16 15 24 24 1 1 10

307th CAB 3 3 16 15 21 17 24 24 18 18 2

3 3 10

g. (V) BAR ALLOCATIONS: 1 NOVEMBER 1968 TO 31 JANUARY 1969:

CITY

NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY

Bangkok 8 8 9
Hawaii 21 21 21
Hong Kong 9 6 11
Kuala Lumpur 2 2 1
Manila 4 3 3
Penang 3 1 3

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15 February 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS, CH chính (77)

9. (U) BAR ALLOCATIONS: 1 NOVEMBER 1968 to 31 JANUARY 1969: (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>NOVEMBER</th>
<th>DECEMBER</th>
<th>JANUARY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 71    73    73

h. (C) OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND EVENTS:

(1) (C) Hunter Killer missions, employing two OH-1s and two AH-1C aircraft, were flown on request from IV GTZ. Reportable results of these missions were continuously limited because the total effect on enemy infiltration and night operations could not be evaluated by sector intelligence agencies. Hunter Killer operations were exclusively conducted at night to interdict enemy movement. Many operations were cancelled because of bad weather, which is the reason only seven (7) missions were flown during the reporting period. Of the seven missions flown, only the mission of 21 December 1968, produced significant results, causing six secondary explosions. Hunter Killer Operations have not been flown since 21 December 1968.

(2) (C) The Phantom III Operation, the Battalion’s own offensive effort, was conducted on an average of sixteen days per month during the reporting period. In mid December, Phantom III Operation moved into Kien Giang Province on an experimental basis. Starting out of the Rach Gia airfields, Phantom III successfully engaged numerous enemy targets. The results of operations in Kien Giang were so impressive, the province was added to the Phantom III schedule. On 13 January 1969, however, the enemy attacked the Can Tho Airfield damaging seven (7) AH-1C Cobras. Scheduling of Phantom III was reduced in order to meet the aircraft commitments of other support missions. This reporting period, Phantom III resulted in the following toll of enemy personnel and equipment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KBA</th>
<th>STRUCTURES</th>
<th>SAMPAENS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>321/0</td>
<td>1135/1145</td>
<td>222/222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) (U) The 271st Aviation Company (Night) supported IV GTZ by participating in napalm drops, recoveries of downed aircraft, C-5, C-4 drops, insertion and extraction of ground forces and equipment, numerous recoveries of enemy caches, and the delivery of C-4 cargo. The company was also involved in the 44th Special Zone operations at Dal Coto and operations with the 21st ARVN Division in the U Minh Forest, both operations resulted in the recovery
of enemy caches. The success of the 235th is best illustrated by the high number of requests for their support and their ability to continuously provide a sufficient number of mission ready aircraft despite the taxation of many flying hours.

(4) (U) The 25th Surveillance Airplane Company continues to provide intelligence information by flying missions over the coast and mainland using Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), infrared (IR) and photographic equipment. Side Looking Airborne Radar missions were flown over the coastal territories and border areas to detect waterborne targets and enemy infiltration activities. SLAR missions over the interior, covered ninety-five percent of the primary water routes. Infrared missions were flown daily to provide surveillance of areas of interest. Day and night photo missions were flown on request. A total of two SLAR and four IR missions were flown in support of the U.S. Air Force. Thirteen missions were flown for the Navy in support of operation "SEALORD" for the purpose of detecting and interdicting enemy infiltration and efforts to ambush PFs.

(5) (U) The 235th Armed Helicopter Company was redesignated the 235th Aerial Weapons Company on 1 November 1968. The company underwent its first CMI on 17 December 1968, and AGI on 7 January 1969, receiving satisfactory ratings. During January the TO of the 235th was changed from 1-770 to 1-111T, resulting in the merging of the 608th and 190th detachments with the 235th. The combining of the 235th and its detachments is expected to simplify both operation and administration procedures. The company has supported the IV CTZ by providing an average of twenty (20) mission ready aircraft per day for the reporting period.

(6) (U) The 199th Reconnaissance Airplane Company was reorganized under NTO 1-25F on 20 January 1969. This reorganization brought about the addition of a communication section and additional personnel for motor maintenance. The acquisition of these personnel will be of significant value in maintaining communications and vehicular equipment. NTO 1-25F, however imposes a significant reduction in aircraft maintenance personnel by cutting nine (9) mechanics slots from the previous authorized strength. With an average of one aircraft in PC each day, this reduction in personnel could increase aircraft down time and will impose a greater workload on the assigned aircraft maintenance personnel.

(7) (U) The aviation safety program within the battalion has resulted in a low accident rate. During the reporting period only two accidents resulted in the loss of aircraft. The first accident occurred during a night force landing of AH-1G Cobra. The pilots emergency procedures were near perfect, however, the aircraft hit a dike that could not be seen until the aircraft had touched down. The second accident occurred during a night landing approach to a ship. A one hundred feet altimeter error resulted in the aircraft being flown into the sea. The crews of both aircraft escaped unharmed.
The excellent safety record of the battalion is the result of command emphasis on safety at battalion and company level.

SAFETY STATISTICS 1 NOVEMBER 1968 TO 31 JANUARY 1969:

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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FORCEn</th>
<th>PREVENTION</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATES</th>
<th>INCIDENTS</th>
<th>DAMAGE</th>
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</thead>
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<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>235th</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307th CAB</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (c) SECTION II LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. PERSONNEL:

1. (U) Incentive pay for the AH-1G Crewchief:

   (a) Observation: The AH-1G crewchief has greater responsibilities, is required to possess a higher skill level, and is required to regularly fly to forward area starfields for the purpose of maintaining aircraft and weapons systems embarked in combat support activity. For accomplishing this task he receives less compensation than does the UH-1 crewchief. This situation has a decidedly adverse effect upon the morale of the AH-1G crewchief.

   (b) Evaluation: Due to the complexity of the aircraft and its armament system, the AH-1G requires more time and a higher skill level to maintain, than many other helicopters. During the day the crewchief is often required to fly to outlying starfields to service the aircraft and maintain its armament system. He then returns and works into the night troubleshooting the aircraft for the following day. This means work load and proficiency level is necessarily higher than most other helicopter crewchiefs. The AH-1G crewchief is expected to carry this load and maintain his proficiency level without the benefit of incentive pay that is awarded to other helicopter crewchiefs.

   (c) Recommendation: That incentive pay commensurate with their skill level, be awarded the AH-1G crewchief. Surveys should be initiated in other commands to determine the percent of crewchiefs receiving pay as compared to how many AH-1G crewchiefs receive the pay.
15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom)
Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1969, Page 65

b. OPERATIONS:

(1) (U) More efficient use of the CH-47 Chinook:

(a) Observation: Misutilization of the CH-47 Chinook has been evidenced in many instances where the aircraft has been required to wait for the load of the supported unit. The reporting times of the chinook are determined by the requesting organization through higher headquarters, however, higher headquarters has no means to monitor the preparation of cargo that is to be lifted. Thus many aircraft hours are wasted due to lack of coordination of lower organizations with supporting aviation units. Instances of wasted CH-47 time could be avoided with better prior planning on behalf of the requesting unit.

(b) Recommendation: That requesting agencies receive verification of mission requests and advise 164th CHC TOC of any change in the starting time if load cannot be ready at assigned time. This procedure would eliminate wasted time and provide maximum aircraft availability on later dates.

(c) Command Action: This headquarters is closely monitoring times aircraft have to report to pickup points and how much time is spent waiting for the supported unit. Requests for aircraft divertions to more profitable missions are sent directly to next higher headquarters.

(2) (U) Use of certain major airfields as staging areas for CH-47 Tactical Operations:

(a) Observation: The use of major airfields as tactical staging areas is impractical and results in considerable delay in the accomplishment of the tactical mission.

(b) Evaluation: There are four major airfields in the TV CTZ where traffic density precludes the efficient use of the CH-47 as helicopter staging areas. These airfields are Dong Tam, Vinh Tuy, Soc Trang, and Binh Thuy. The daily volume of air traffic at each of these airfields is such that it is not practical to use them as medium lift helicopter staging areas. Delays as long as thirty (30) minutes have been experienced by a single aircraft attempting to enter or depart from the airport traffic area. When a tactical artillery move is in progress, involving several CH-47 aircraft, the problem is further compounded. An area, large enough for a CH-47 to pick up and land a slingload, is often unavailable, due to the proximity of parked aircraft on or near the active runway. This results in entries and departures being dependent on gaps of inbound and outbound traffic. The extremely heavy volume of traffic precludes efficient insertion or extraction from these areas. The cumulative delays experienced by several CH-47 aircraft supporting a tactical move have amounted to several hours in some cases.

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(c) Recommendation: That tactical units whose base camp area is located in proximity to those major airfields, refrain from using the major airfields as a staging area for tactical moves. A cleared area sufficiently removed from the major airfield traffic pattern area should be selected and prepared. In the event that it is not practical to prepare such an area, an alternate area such as a road should be utilized. If these steps are taken, the tactical unit commander would realize a time savings that would result in quicker mission completion.

(d) Command Action: Higher headquarters has been advised of the problems relating to staging from major airfields. Whenever possible, staging from these staging fields is avoided. There are tactical situations which currently require the use of these airfields regardless of existing conditions. When operations from major airfields cannot be avoided, this headquarters or the subordinate CH-47 unit contacts the control agency at the airfield in order to predict the density of air traffic and the length of time necessary to extract or insert men and equipment.

(3) (c) Use of Aircraft Revetment Guards:

(a) Observation: Prior to the 13 January 1969 attack on the Can Tho Army Airfield, it has been airfield policy to station guards in individual aircraft revetments when the alert status was YELLOW or RED.

(b) Evaluation: The enemy penetrated the airfield perimeter while the airfield was on a CRAY alert and the guards were not in the revetments. The enemy moved through the aircraft revetment areas and destroyed numerous aircraft. Had guards been placed in each revetment or had a walking guard been placed so as to cover several revetments, the damage to the aircraft might have been less or even prevented.

(c) Recommendation: That revetment guards be placed near the aircraft, regardless of the airfield's alert status.

(d) Command Action: This Battalion has instituted seven guard posts within the Battalion's revetment area. All seven are manned regardless of alert condition. Guards are checked by the duty officer every night to insure they know their duties.

(4) (II) Inconsistencies of the Modified TOEs:

(a) Observation: All five companies in the Battalion are in the process of being reorganized under the applicable MTOE as specified in USARPAC General Order 771, dated 22 November 1968. The most significant changes resulting from the reorganization is the deactivation of three TC Detachments and two SC Detachments. Generally the personnel and equipment along with the mission of the deactivated detachments were absorbed by the aviation companies which the detachments had previously been supporting.
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(b) Evaluation:

1/ Section I, paragraph 3 (Capabilities) of the modified TOE fails to add the direct support level capabilities for aircraft, aviation maintenance and repair parts, thus having the newly reorganized aviation company with authority for organizational maintenance only. The General Orders made no mention of the increased capabilities either.

2/ The majority of the shop sets, both organizational and direct support level, have been replaced by new sets on the MTO's. The organizational sets are to arrive in RVN during February or March. The direct support shop sets (LHD T 17090) for the 235th BMC and (LHN T 17011) for the 271st Avn Co are not yet identified in S 700-20. No supply catalogs are available for the sets and a determination as to their adequacy, or that they are in fact DS level shop sets, can not be made at this time.

(c) Recommendation: That the MTOE be clarified to include description of the direct support level capabilities for aircraft, aviation maintenance and repair parts. Catalogs should be made available for the shop sets (LHD T 17090) and (LHN T 17011) in order to determine if these sets belong to DS level shops.

(d) Command Action: MTOE will be instituted to add the DS level capability and to add items of equipment which were deleted but are needed to accomplish the mission. Request for temporary loan will be submitted IAW UH/HW BAG 700-20 for all tool and shop sets until the new equipment is issued.

(5) (i) Engine Change Down Time:

(a) Observation: Aircraft often down excessive periods of time for an engine change.

(b) Evaluation: On occasion, aircraft have been down in excess of ten (10) days awaiting engines, due to normal time changes, or changes resulting from malfunctions. An additional 72-96 man hours is normally required to transfer accessories from the old engine to the new engine and complete the installation. If a spare engine was available, it could be prepared as a Quick Change Assembly (QCA) prior to the time of actual need, and an engine change could be completed in one working day or less.

(c) Recommendation: That units be permitted to stock a minimum of one engine (QCA), or that engines be shipped to the units assembled as QCA's.

(d) Command Action: This battalion has considered the possibility of relocating one replacement engine at company level. The
relocation of an engine at company level is feasible, if the control of the employment of the engine remains with a central control facility. The companies would then have a spare engine on hand, but would be required to requisition the use of the engine from the central control agency. Shipping time is saved since the engine is already located at the company.

f. ORGANIZATION: None

8. OTHER: None

3. SECTION III DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY PERSONNEL: ESCAPE AND EVASION AND SURVIVAL: None

2 Incl

as

FILLY E. RUTHERFORD
LTC, INF
Commanding

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Section II Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

1. Personnel:
   a. Incentive pay for the AH-10 Crewchief: This headquarters concurs with recommendation.

2. Operations:
   a. More efficient use of the CH-47 Chinook: This recommendation is already in practice. Aircraft are diverted to missions which are more profitable.
   b. Use of certain major airfields as staging areas for CH-47 Tactical Operations: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and action taken.
   c. Use of aircraft avionics guards: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and action taken.
   d. Inadmissibility of the individual flight. This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and action taken.
   e. Engine Change Down Time: This headquarters concurs aircraft engines should be an item of unit inventory carried on the authorised Stockage List (ASL). With a minimum of one engine on hand within the unit, preparatory work can be accomplished by the maintenance engine shop to prepare the item as a quick change assembly. This would save many man hours that are normally required for an engine change.

JACK Y. MACKULL
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as endorsed, except as noted below:

a. Paragraph 2a(1), Page 6: Crew chiefs for the AH-1U aircraft perform no in-flight duties, consequently, there is no basis for award of flight pay. This condition has a serious impact on morale and is more dramatically pointed up when personnel on flight status as crew chiefs of other rotary wing aircraft absent because of shortages in H-1 UH-1B are diverted to in-flight duty with AH-1U aircraft. This headquarters previously recommended that crew chiefs for AH-1U aircraft be authorized a higher level of proficiency pay or a higher grade in recognition of their advanced skill and level of responsibility.

b. Paragraph 2b(4), Page 9: Concur with command action taken. This headquarters realizes that there are errors and deficiencies in the new standardized MTOEs. Action is currently being taken to obtain recommendations for possible changes to MTOEs.

c. Paragraph 2b(5), Page 9 and paragraph 1b(5), 1st Indorsement: Non-concur. Aircraft engines in RVN are AIKL items. Stockage of engines as QCA items is not authorized U.S. Army Reg 711-1, dated Aug 66. Para 3c quote, "Units not authorized AIKL stockage may request these items only to satisfy a valid KIF requirement or forecasted for specific aircraft requiring the AIKL within 30 days," end quote.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DAVID L. ANDERSON
C.S. AGC
Asst AG

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 8 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning Incentive pay for the AH-1G Crewchief, page 6, paragraph 2d(1) and 2d Indorsement, paragraph a; nonconcur. Flight pay is intended to compensate for the increased hazards encountered in flight operations. To grant a higher grade for one select group of personnel would establish a precedent which is in conflict with the purpose of the promotion system. Concur in the recommendation for a higher level of proficiency pay.

   b. Reference item concerning Inconsistencies of the Modified TOEs, page 8, paragraph 2b(4). Concur in the recommendation, however, action is already being taken. The airmobile shop sets listed in the new ATOEs have only recently been developed; consequently, the line numbers and federal stock numbers are not listed in SB700-20 dated October 1968. These numbers will appear in the next issue of SB700-20. The 34th General Support Group recently received copies of the new shop set catalogs and is currently distributing them.

   c. Reference item concerning Engine Change Down Time, page 9, paragraph 2b(5); nonconcur. Engines are a critical item managed under the Closed Loop Support (CIS) concept. Sufficient engines are not available to permit the use of the pre-positioned Quick Change Assembly (QCA) concept. Time required to build up an engine is not considered prohibitive.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
307th Combat Avn Bn
1st Avn Bde

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 23 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

[Signature]

C. L. Shortt
Cpt, AGC
Adj AG
307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion

Headquarters, 307th
Can Tho
APO 96215

199th RAC
Vinh Long
APO 96357

235th APC
Can Tho
APO 96215

266th SAC
Can Tho
APO 96215

271st Air Co.
Can Tho
APO 96215

RHC
Can Tho
APO 96215

190th Sig

502nd TC

361st TC

PATHFINDER

60th TC

537th Sis

As of 28 January all detachments were infused into their parent unit.

Incl 1 - ORGANIZATION AND STATION CHART
### 307th COMBAT AVIATION (Phantom) BATTALION

**OPERATIONAL STATISTICS**

**1 NOVEMBER 1968 - 31 JANUARY 1969**

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**Incl 2 - OPERATIONAL STATISTICS**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68-31 Jan 69

CO, 307th Combat Aviation Battalion

**DD Form 1473**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Security Classification

**DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D**

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