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SECURITY
MARKING

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AGAM-P (M) (28 Apr 69) FOR OT UT 691331  5 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

1. Subject reports are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

Regarded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operation. Report of 25th Inf Div Arty for Period ending 31 Jan 69
RCS CSPOR-65 (RL)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities
   a. Summary
      The 25th Infantry Division Artillery was actively engaged in combat
      operations in support of Operation Toan Tang (Complete Victory) II which
      continued from the previous quarter. The major activity continued to occur
      in the Tay Ninh-Dau Tieng area. Because the enemy chose to avoid major contact,
      artillery operations consisted primarily of landing zone preparations
      for maneuver element air assault search operations and the attack of intelli-
      gence and acquired targets. Only on three occasions did the enemy choose
      to engage in significant combat, two attacks against convoys and one against
      a patrol base, and each time Div Arty provided the fire superiority to
      defeat him. Reinforcement training of replacements, on-the-job, and pro-
      ficiency training continued as noted in the 31 October 1968 report.
   b. Specific Activities
      The progress of the "Colors Up" (Accelerated Pacification) Program,
      the enemy's evasive tactics, and the judicious location of Fire Support
      Bases (FSB) and Patrol Bases resulted in more stable operations with fewer
      battery moves. Throughout November Div Arty supported Operation Toan Thang
      (Complete Victory) II. Concurrently Div Arty supported the Colors Up Program
      and Operation Piedmont Swift from 23-30 November. The 7th Battalion, 11th
      Artillery, was in direct support of the 1st Brigade; the 1st Battalion, 8th
      Artillery, in direct support of the 2d Brigade; and the 2d Battalion 77th
      Artillery, in direct support of the 3d Brigade. The 3rd Battalion, 13th
      Artillery, provided general support to the Division.

      (1) In support of Operation Complete Victory II and the Colors
      Up Program the 7/11th Arty maintained organic batteries and planned the fires
      of General Support Reinforcing batteries at Fire Support Bases (FSB's)
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AVDCDA-OP 15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operations Report of 25th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending 31 Jan 69 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Randels III (XT 2948), Buell III (XT 2153), Bragg II (XT 3958), and Tay Minh Base Camp (XT 1651). To support a 1st Brigade thrust into northwestern War Zone C, 7/11th Arty moved B/7/11(-) by road from Tay Minh to FSB Sherman (XT 1170) and back to Tay Minh on 12 November to cover the march of A/7/11 from Buell III (XT 2153) to FSB Ord (XT 1881). The remaining platoon of B/7/11 replaced A/7/11 at Buell III. Alpha battery remained in the area of FSB Ord until 15 November when B/7/11(-) again road marched from Tay Minh to FSB Sherman to cover the return of the artillery and infantry from FSB Ord to Tay Minh. Bravo battery then closed into Buell III.

(2) The 1/8 Arty provided support for Operation Complete Victory and Colors Up by controlling the fires of organic and CSR batteries located at FSBs Crockett II (XT 7416), Patton (XT 5921), Pershing (XT 5025), Stuart III (XT 4919), Meade (XT 6011), Reed II (XT 4712) and Yeene III (XT 6001). Operation Piedmont Swift was mounted by the 2d Brigade in the Duc Hue area (vic XT 3209) between 23 and 30 November. To support this operation, 1/8 Arty moved A/1/8 from FSB Reed II to FSB Cutler (XT 3209) and C/3/13 from FSB Meade to FSB Houston (XT 4307). One eight inch howitzer from B/3/13 at FSB Stuart III was attached to C/3/13 at FSB Houston. The 23d Arty Group placed C/1/27 (155mm SP) at FSB Meade to replace C/3/13. C/1/27 remained at FSB Meade until 18 December when it departed the Division Tactical Area of Responsibility to support other II Field Force operations. At the completion of the operation on 30 November A/1/8 returned to FSB Reed II and C/3/13 plus the single 8 inch Howitzer moved to Cu Chi. The following day, 1 Dec, the 8 inch Howitzer rejoined B/3/13 at FSB Stuart III (XT 4919) and C/3/13 moved to Tay Minh.

(3) Artillery support provided by 2/77 Arty during November's operations came from organic and CSR batteries located at FSBs Mahone (XT 5437), McNair (XT 4526), and Dau Tien Base Camp (XT 4927). FSB McNair was closed out on 18 November with B/2/77 moving to FSB Wood (XT 4307). The Div Arty Headquarters, Headquarters 1/8 Arty, and Headquarters 3/13 Arty remained at Cu Chi Base Camp (XT 6516).

(4) In early December intelligence indicators pointed to a build-up of bunkers and fighting positions with suspected build-up of enemy troop activity in the Bii Leu Woods (vic XT 4935). On 5 Dec a complex of suspected locations in this area was attacked by artillery fire, initiated by a seven battery Time on Target artillery concentration. Six targets were hit with 731 rounds of mixed caliber, resulting in seven bunkers destroyed and 3 bunkers damaged. The following day an additional 1,517 rounds were placed in the area, plus 9 airstrikes. The results were 5 tunnels, 47 bunkers and 250 meters.

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AVDCDA-OP

19 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operations Report of 25th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending 31 Jan 69

RC 054-565 (Ml)

of trench destroyed; 18 bunkers uncoved; 5 secondary explosions; and 3 enemy killed (by body count).

(5) On 10 December the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery moved its "C" Battery from FSB Bragg II (XT 3358) to FSB Grant II (XT 3682) to support a 1st Brigade probe into south central War Zone C. In order to maintain artillery support along the MSR from Tay Ninh to FSB Grant, B/2/13 (105mm towed) was moved from Dau Tieng to FSB Bragg II. The battery mission remained general support-reinforcing to the 25th Infantry Division Artillery. B/2/77 moved from FSB Wood II (XT 4637) to replace B/2/13 at Dau Tieng Base Camp and was replaced at Wood II by A/2/77 from FSB Austin (XT 3731). FSB Austin continued to be occupied by B/3/13.

(6) By 12 December intelligence indicated the enemy would launch another offensive against Tay Ninh. Defenses were tightened by moving A/7/11 from FSB Washington III (XT 1059) to FSB Washington (XT 1156) and C/7/11 from Grant II to FSB Mitchell (XT 1645). These moves brought artillery fire nearer to the city of Tay Ninh and placed C/7/11 in a blocking position on the likely enemy approach from the southwest.

(7) At 2000 hours on 15 December an Air Force Forward Air Controller (FAC) received ground fire near the Mushroom (XT 6029) and observed numerous lights in the Filhol, Hobe and Boi Lei Woods. The Commanding General interpreted these lights as possible enemy troop movements and directed the Division Artillery to provide continuous air observation over the suspected area throughout the hours of darkness and to adjust artillery fires on the lights. During the operation, referred to by Division Artillery as Operation Lights Out, as many as five aerial observers were employed simultaneously from 152030 to 160330 and 2157 artillery rounds expended.

(8) During the afternoon, 17 December, the Dau Tieng Convoy was ambushed in the Ben Cu Rubber Plantation (vic XT 4345). Div Arty elements fired 2285 rounds in support of the convoy and counter-ambush operations which netted 52 VC bodies.

(9) During the predawn hours of 22 December two companies of 4/9 Infantry with heavy support from Div Arty and ARVN artillery beat off an NVA regiment which attacked their "Mole City" Patrol Base (XT 2630). Close-in time and VT fire and ICM artillery support were crucial to the defense of the position. The enemy left behind 106 dead. To provide additional artillery coverage for the patrol base, B/2/77 moved into FSB Hull (XT 2638) and

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and was attached to the 7/11 Artillery.

(10) During the last nine days of December, C/2/77 made several moves from FSB Mahone to Dau Tieng in order to support 1st Brigade operations in the Michelin Rubber Plantation.

(11) Two new FSB's were opened in early January to support, more adequately, 1st Brigade operations. B/3/13 moved from FSB Austin (XT 3731) to FSB Stoneman (XT 3037) on 6 January. FSB Sedgwick consolidated the 4/9th Infantry from nearby "Mole City" with its artillery support, B/2/77.

(12) The enemy conducted a major ambush of the logistical convoy along the Tay Ninh-Dau Tieng MSR on 14 January. Over 2500 rounds of artillery pounded enemy positions near XT 3345 and XT 4143. The artillery was credited with 38 of the total 122 enemy bodies counted.

(13) Early on the morning of 25 January ARVN elements made contact with an enemy force seven kilometers southwest of Go Dau Ha. While Division ground elements were being dispatched to reinforce the ARVN forces, 3/13 artillery laid B and D batteries to provide fires. Although the support of these batteries was offered several times during the day, the ARVN's withheld necessary clearances to prevent damage to the village. An estimated NVA battalion was believed surrounded in Ap Binh Hoa (XT 3418). Late in the afternoon a 105mm howitzer platoon from A/1/8 Artillery was employed by air in the night laager position of B/3/4 Cavalry just west of the village. The remainder of A/1/8 then moved from FSB Reed II (XT 4712) to FSB Jackson (XT 4216). At approximately 0200 hours the following morning, one of the 3/4 Cavalry positions was attacked with mortars, small arms and automatic weapons. The Div Arty counter mortar observer adjusted artillery onto the enemy positions. A daylight sweep credited the observer and D/3/13 Artillery with 10 VC body count and three mortars destroyed. The operation was concluded about noon, 27 January, and all elements of A/1/8 returned to FSB Reed II.

(14) On 28 January a well emplaced enemy platoon (vic XT 3539) caused a delay of Rome Plow operations. A total of 1085 medium and light artillery high explosive rounds dislodged the enemy.

(15) The last three days of the quarter saw very light scattered activity. On 31 January C/2/77 moved from FSB Mahone (XT 3437) to open FSB Mahone II (XT 3241), as the battery continued to support 1/27th Infantry.
During the quarter ending 31 January Div Arty elements made fewer moves (113) than in any quarter of the past year. The total rounds fired for the quarter, 327,709, far surpassed the totals of the three previous quarters. Of the total rounds fired, 258,900 were 105mm; 60,278 were 155mm; and 8,531 were 8".

c. Personnel and Logistics

(1) Personnel status steadily improved. The command reached 99\% of its assigned strength by the close of the quarter. The critical shortage of captains was alleviated, although many of those recently assigned were inexperienced in field artillery. Shortages exist in the middle noncommissioned officer ranks in MOS 63C, 13B, 94B, 76Y, and lower enlisted ranks in MOS 76S. During the quarter 136 valor (including one Distinguished Service Cross), 16 achievement and 472 service awards were earned by members of Division Artillery.

(2) During the past quarter logistics operations consisted of coordinating resupply activities in support of the firing units. High ammunition expenditures during December made resupply of fire support bases a critical problem. This problem was solved by increasing the ammunition stockage objective at the Fire Support Bases. As a result requests for Combat Essential resupply have been minimized.

d. Intelligence Operations

(1) Throughout the period the frequent enemy mortar/rocket attacks resulted in increased emphasis on effective employment of counter mortar radars. In December the 257th FA Detachment (Radar), an AN/MFO-4 Radar detachment, was detached from the 25th Infantry Division and redeployed to the Bien Hoa area. The three Div Arty organic AN/MPQ-4 sections and the 258th FA Detachment (Radar), an attached AN/MFO-4 Radar section, continued to operate against the mortar/rocket threat and identified 32 hostile mortar/rocket locations during the period.

(2) The surveillance radar program continued. However the mission of the AN/TS-25 radar, located at Co Dau Ha, assumed new importance in guarding the Angel's Wing (vicinity XT 2822, Cambodia) approach to the Division area.

RCS CSMP-65 (R1)

(3) Survey operations during the period were continuous, with 33 survey control points established throughout the Division area. By the end of the period all artillery batteries were located on common control, and an expansion program was underway. The Survey Information Center was completely remodeled, and a new records system established. With the installation of the PADC computer system, survey data can now be transmitted from the field to SIC, the survey computed, and computed coordinates sent back to the user in a very short period of time. A long range survey project to establish surveyed registration points throughout the Division area was begun and three points (2 APC's and 1 tank) were established by the end of the period.

(4) Division Artillery observers continued their mission of support for artillery units. Over half of the inflight time was in support of night operations, to include engagement of radar and observation tower targets, unit contacts, ground sensor targets, an countermortar and counterrocket operations.

(5) Meteorological operations during the period were hampered by considerable deadline time on the Rainin set. During the period the set was deadlined (19 Nov 1968 to 20 Jan 1969) the section maintained its schedule through the use of visual flight methods. The accuracy of data remained high, as typified by the IR Field Force Quality Control Team's evaluation of 100% validity on metrc messages evaluated during January 1969.

c. Civil Affairs

(1) The Civil Affairs Section continued to provide technical and material assistance to Government of Vietnam (GVN) agencies in Trang Bang district (XT 4920). This assistance was in support of GVN revolutionary development in public health and welfare, agriculture, education, and construction. GVN projects supported by Div Arty during the quarter included:

(a) Providing food and clothing to local civilians whose homes had been destroyed by Viet Cong terrorists.

(b) Constructing wells in An Phu, Gia Bien and An Duc hamlets, Trang Bang District.
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AIDCIA-OP

15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operations Report of 25th Div Arty for period ending 31 Jan 69
RCS CSFO-65 (R1)

(c) Repairing district government offices.

(d) Providing materials for construction and improvement
of RF/PF outposts.

(2) Plans have been made to help district school children enjoy
a happy Lunar New Year with appropriate TET holiday celebrations.

2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and
Recommendations

a. Personnel. None

b. Operations. None

c. Training. None

d. Intelligence. None

e. Logistics

Bag, Cargo, A-22

(a) Observation: The Bag, Cargo, A-22 has two major
disadvantages when used to transport 105mm howitzer ammunition in meeting
the frequent ammunition resupply requirements of a direct support
105mm How Hz.

(b) Evaluation: 1) The Bag, Cargo, A-22 is capable of
transporting 80 rounds of 105mm howitzer ammunition (40 rounds is recommended).
However, to transport these rounds in the A-22 bag, the 105mm howitzer round
in its fiber container must be unpacked from its original wooden shipping
container and stacked in the bag in a prescribed manner.

(2) Tactical considerations require that a certain
amount of ammunition be prepared and immediately available for aerial resupply.
Therefore, certain quantities of 105mm ammunition must be unpacked and stacked
in their fiber containers in the A-22 bags for varying periods of time,
readily accessible to helicopter pickup.
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

3) Exposing ammunition in fibre containers for any significant period of time increases the possibility of damage to the ammunition due to weather and handling.

4) Unpacking ammunition from its original wooden container and stacking the rounds (in fibre containers) in the prescribed fashion for the A-22 bag requires an excessive amount of time when heavy aerial resupply is required.

5) The 14' x 14' rope net, FSM 3940-542-4698, is capable of transporting 120, 105mm Howitzer rounds in the original wooden shipping container, eliminating unpacking and special stacking and providing increased protection of the round before, during, and after transporting.

C. Recommendation: That direct support 105mm Howitzer Battalions be authorized a minimum of thirty (30) 14' x 14' rope cargo nets, FSM 3940-542-4698.

f. Organization. None

g. Other. None

1 Incl
Listing of Units

DISTRIBUTION:
6 CG, 25th Inf Div
3 CG, USARV
2 CINC, USARPAC
5 AVDCDA-HQ
1 ea CO, XO, Staff Section, BN

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AVDCNH (15 Feb 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending 31 Jan 69, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 96225, 15 March 1969

TO: CG, II FORCEN, ATTN: G-3 (D&T), APO San Francisco 96266

Forwarded with concurrence.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. W. DUNGAN
MAJ, AGC
SAST ADJUTANT GENERAL
A VFBC-RE-H (15 Feb 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operations Report of 25th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending 31 Jan 69
RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

DA, HQ II FFORCENV, APO San Francisco 96266     8 1 MAR 1969

T.HU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
       Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
   Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

(U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-
Lessons Learned of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for the period ending
31 January 1969, with the following comments:

a. Reference paragraph 2e(b). Chapter 10, TM 55-450-11, Helicopter
External Loads Rigged with Air Delivery Equipment, specifies that 40 rounds
of 105mm howitzer ammunition is the maximum permissible A-22 bag load. HQ
USARV has directed that the handbook on CH-47 (Chinook) supersede all other
directives and SOP's in the command. This handbook, in turn, refers to
chapter 10, TM 55-450-11 as the authority on authorized load limits for air
delivery equipment.

b. Reference paragraph 2e(c). Each direct support 105mm howitzer battal-
ion is presently authorized 27 of the 14'x14' rope nets ILC 80 A22 bags. The
authority for this is USARV Regulation 725-7, dated 15 December 1968. The
25th Division Artillery has been notified of this.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

B. G. MACDONALD
ILT, AGC
Assl AG
AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1969 ROC CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 7 APR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division Artillery and concurs with the report as indorsed by the intermediate headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy fmr:
25th Inf Div Arty
II FFV

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
LISTING OF UNITS

Organic Units

1/8 Artillery (105 How, Towed)
7/11 Artillery (105 How, Towed)
2/77 Artillery (105 How, Towed)
3/13 Artillery (155/8", SP)

Attached Units

B/5/2 Artillery (AW battery and attached Machine Gun and Searchlight platoon)

General Support Reinforcing

2/13 Artillery (105 How, Towed) (-)
1/27 Artillery (155 How, SP) (-)
2/32 Artillery (175/8", SP) (-)

Incl 1
**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

**HEADQUARTERS, ARMY**

**OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310**

**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 25th Infantry Division Artillery**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.**

**CO, 25th Infantry Division Artillery**

**5. AUTHORISATION (First name, middle initial, last name)**

**CO, 25th Infantry Division Artillery**

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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N/A