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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 40 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to ensure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. VICKFAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 incl

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
1. (C) **Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.**

   a. **Administration/Personnel.**

   (1) During this period there were three significant personnel changes in II FFORCEN Artillery. Captain Barry L. Ciders assumed command of Headquarters Battery, Major Robert M. Dunning assumed the position of SI, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, and Major Richard L. Miller assumed command of HKB, 25th Artillery.

   (2) Personnel rotation has been normal for the period covered by this report, and replacements have been received in adequate numbers in the majority of MCS positions. However, MCS shortages continue in 750 (Radio-Teletype Operator), 723 (Communications Center Specialist), 71720 (Maintenance Data Specialist), 16F10 and 16F40 (Light Air Defense Artillery Crewman and key NCO's), 76S20 (Automatic Repair Parts Specialist), and 13A10 and 13B40 (Field Artillery Basic Crewman), as well as 17320 (Counterbattery/Countermortar Radar Crewman).

   (3) The following awards were presented to assigned and attached personnel:

      (a) Silver Star - 2.

      (b) Soldier’s Medal - 1.

      (c) Bronze Star - 36.

      (d) Air Medal - 15.

      (e) Army Commendation Medal - 52.
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(1) Purple Heart - 8.

(2) This headquarters was engaged in normal operations during the reporting period. Emphasis was placed on the improvement of perimeter defenses and the performance of sentinels.

(3) On 6-7 November 1968, II FFORCEV Artillery achieved a satisfactory rating on a II FFORCEV AGI.

(4) There were no administrative or tactical moves by this headquarters during the reporting period.

(5) Current organisational structure of II FFORCEV Artillery is at Inclosure 1.

b. Operations

(1) General. This reporting period was characterized by the repositioning of Force Artillery units commensurate with the conduct of increased spoiling operations and the more aggressive efforts to seek out the enemy. A significant redistribution of Force Artillery assets was required to provide support for the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division. Force Artillery capabilities were taxed appreciably by not only the support required by this added division but also the support necessitated by increased activity on the part of maneuver units already in the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). Continuing emphasis was placed on seeking new ways to improve the effectiveness of ARVN Artillery, particularly in the area of mobilization of artillery assets.

(2) Tactical deployments and missions of II FFORCEV Artillery Units. Current deployments of II FFORCEV Artillery units are listed in Inclosure 2. Heavy artillery coverage for III CTZ is portrayed graphically in Inclosure 3. The current tactical missions of Force Artillery units are outlined in Inclosure 4; however, individual unit missions have varied frequently during the reporting period. Inclosure 10 provides the coordinates of fire support bases and other geographical locations cited in this report.

(a) While the heavy artillery coverage remained unchanged, there was considerable activity involving the heavy batteries during the reporting period. At the close of the period, all heavy batteries were in the configuration of two 8 inch howitzers and two 175mm guns, with the exception of Battery A, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, which has three 175mm guns and one 8 inch howitzer. This unit was reconfigured...
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from four 175mm guns to provide the 8 inch capability needed to counter
the rocket and mortar threat against the unit's Fire Support Base (FSB)
at St. Barbara. At the close of the last reporting period the config-
uration of Battery B, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery at Tay Ninh had been
three 175mm guns and one 8 inch howitzer, with the battery split into
one 175mm platoon and a platoon of one 8 inch howitzer and one 175mm
gun. This posture was assumed in readiness to deploy the 175mm platoon
east of the Anvil's Ling area in support of a 25th Infantry Division
contingency plan, while retaining the capability of both type weapons
at Tay Ninh. However, since the plan was not implemented, the battery
was reconfigured to two 8 inch howitzers and two 175mm guns on 18 November.

Several support missions were conducted by Force Artillery units requiring
the deployment of heavy platoons. With only one exception, one-half of
the battery deployed to support an operation, while one-half remained
in position to continue normal support of the base area. The moves
included: 8 inch platoon of Battery A, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery
from Quan Loi to Loc Ninh in support of the 1st Cavalry Division; 8
inch platoon of Battery A, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery from Bien Hoa
to FSB Julia in support of the first Australian Task Force; one 8 inch
platoon of Battery B, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery from Tay Ninh to FSB
Washington in support of the 25th Infantry Division; one 8 inch howitzer
of Battery B, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery from Ben Luc to Nha Be in
support of US Naval operations in the Sung Sat Special Zone.

(b) In November 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division was deployed from
the XXIV Corps to III CTZ and assumed responsibility for the northern
tier of the corps zone. The organic artillery which accompanied the
division consisted of three 105mm howitzer battalions, one AHA bat-
talion, and one 155mm howitzer battalion. The arrival of the division
artillery significantly augmented the available firepower in the
northern part of III CTZ. However, the increased support required of
Force Artillery necessitated a substantial redistribution of Force
Artillery Units. At the close of the last reporting period, the 6th
Battalion, 15th Artillery (105mm), less two platoons deployed in Northern
Tay Ninh province was supporting MAC. On arrival of the 1st
Cavalry Division, the remainder of the battalion was repositioned to
this division's Tactical Area of Responsibility. Battery C reconfigured,
deploying three tubes at Katu and three at Thian Ngon. Battery B was
positioned at Quan Loi and Battery A positioned three tubes at
Phuoc Vinh and three tubes at FSB Dot. Battery F, 16th Artillery (155mm)
deployed from Phuoc Vinh to Tong Le Chon to provide medium support for
division operations near the Cambodian border. Battery A, 3d Battalion,
197th Artillery relocated from FSB Thunder II to FSB Thunder III to
provide medium support to both the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st
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Cavalry Division. The 1st Cavalry Division immediately began operations in the northern areas and throughout the period, Force Artillery units were heavily engaged with the enemy in these areas.

(c) On 3 November 1968, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery deployed from Nui Dat to YS 615 816 to continue support of the Australian Task Force. The operation continued for three weeks, after which the battery returned to Nui Dat.

(d) On 3 November, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery deployed from FSB Concord to YT 545 060 to provide medium artillery support to the 18th ARVN Division. To replace the medium capability at FSB Concord, Battery C, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery was repositioned from Tay Ninh to FSB Concord. When the ARVN operation concluded on 10 November, the battery deployed further east to YT 737 022 to support an operation of the ARVN Marines. This operation lasted until 23 November, at which time the battery returned to FSB Concord. Battery C, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery then displaced from FSB Concord to FSB Mead and assumed the mission of general support, reinforcing 25th Infantry Division Artillery.

(e) On 7 November, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from Tay Ninh to FSB Crocket II to provide artillery coverage for the Phu Cuong Bridge.

(f) At the close of the last reporting period, Battery C, 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery was positioned at Di An in the 1st Infantry Division Tactical Area of Responsibility. On 13 November, the unit deployed to FSB Copperhead in the CMAC area. This repositioning was made possible when the 1st Cavalry Division assumed responsibility for the northern portion of the III CTZ, releasing a medium battery of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery for deployment to Di An.

(g) Battery B, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from FSB Patton II to Dau Tieng on 13 November with no change in mission. The battery remained in this location for over three weeks before deploying to FSB Bragg II on 10 December. While at this location in a general support reinforcing role to the 25th Infantry Division Artillery, the unit received several stand-off attacks by rockets and mortars. On 19 January at this location, the battery received a major attack in which one howitzer was a combat loss and two personnel were killed in action.
On 20 November a three gun platoon from Battery A, 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery was deployed from Chu vn to FSB Cot near the Fishhook area and remained at that location throughout the reporting period. The proximity to the Cambodian border resulted in frequent enemy mortar and rocket attacks, with the intensity of enemy action requiring frequent rotation of personnel at this site.

A combined operation in the eastern III CTZ was conducted in December 1968. Participating units included elements from the Australian Task Force, RVN, RVN Marines, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. To support this operation II FFORCEV Artillery provided a medium battery and one 8 inch platoon. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery displaced from Nui Dat to FSB Chestnut, while a platoon of Battery C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery moved from Bien Hoa to FSB Chestnut on 3 December.

At the conclusion of the combined operation a sizable enemy threat to the Bearcat area materialized. The 8 inch platoon of Battery C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery was therefore displaced from FSB Chestnut to the Bearcat area, and Battery F, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery was repositioned from FSB Chestnut to the southeastern edge of Long Binh Post. The latter position provided medium artillery coverage to both the Bearcat and the Bien Hoa/Long Binh areas. Additionally, three searchlights, four Vulcins and two additional M42 Dusters were deployed to the Bearcat area.

An 8 inch platoon of Battery C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery returned to the vicinity of FSB Chestnut to provide heavy artillery coverage for a two week Australian operation on 21 December.

On 5 January Battery C, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery displaced from Bien Hoa to FSB Julia with the mission of general support reinforcing the Australian Task Force. The unit remained in this area throughout the remainder of the reporting period.

Artillery in support of the Capital Military Assistance Command. Due to the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division and the increased enemy threat in the northern III CTZ, it was necessary to reduce the fire support provided CMAC by force artillery by deploying the 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery to the 1st Cavalry Division TACOM. The units remaining in support of CMAC include: Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm) at Nha Be; Battery C, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery (155mm) and Battery C, 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery (155mm) at...
FSB Copperhead. In addition, a light battery from the 1st Infantry Division Artillery assumed the mission of the Force Artillery battery removed from Cat Lai. Battery R, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, although not within CMAC, provides general support reinforcing fires to unit OPCON CMAC.

(4) Artillery Support for the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC). BHTAC, a parallel ARVN/US command formed to coordinate the defense of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex, became operational in early November. Force Artillery normally provides one heavy battery, one light battery and one medium battery immediately responsive to BHTAC. These units presently include Battery C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery at Bien Hoa; Battery C, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery at FSB Concord; and Battery C, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery at FSB Concord. At the close of the period, BHTAC artillery assets had been augmented by the positioning of Battery A, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery at Long Binh Post. Additionally, Force Artillery maintains one medium artillery unit at Bearcat, currently Battery A, 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery, which can provide medium coverage for the southeastern BHTAC area.

(5) Artillery Support for SF/CIDG.

(a) On 3 November a platoon (2 tubes) of Battery P, 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery was air-lifted to the Punard Special Forces/CIDG camp to support a Mobile Strike Force operation. The unit remained at this location for more than a month and then returned to Bearcat.

(b) In response to a request for medium artillery support for a Mobile Strike Force operation in northwestern Tay Ninh province, Battery C, 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery on 30 November deployed one platoon (2 tubes) from FSB Copperhead in the CMAC area to Thien Ngon for a seven day period.

(c) Centurion III, a Mobile Strike Force operation, was initiated on 19 December. Due to the large area covered by the operation, the artillery support provided by II Field Force Vietnam Artillery was implemented in two phases. Battery C, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery was positioned at FSB Farrel from FSB Concord and continued support from that location until the maneuver unit was out of range. At this time the unit was returned to Concord and another unit was positioned at FSB Betty to continue support of the Mobile Strike Force. This unit was a provisional battery, Battery D, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery, composed of three 105mm tubes from
battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery and three 155mm tubes from Battery F, 3d Battalion, 107th Artillery. The provisional battery supported this operation until 14 January 1969, at which time its two platoons returned to their parent batteries at Phu Loi.

(d) In 17 January 1969, Battery D, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery (provisional battery) was reconstituted and deployed from Phu Loi to TSB Batical to support operation Centurion IV, another Mobile Strike Force operation northeast of Centurion III and well into War Zone D. The unit remained in this area during the remainder of the reporting period.

(6) Split Batteries. Although the artillery has the capability of splitting batteries, this technique creates serious command, control and logistical problems, and its extensive use is therefore avoided if possible. During the reporting period, however, Force Artillery units were required to split batteries at an unprecedented rate in order to provide support for the many simultaneous operations being conducted in III CTZ. The total battery-days of split battery operations for the three months reached the exceptionally high figure of 1337 for artillery with II FFCEV.

(7) ARVN Artillery. The preparation of ARVN units ultimately to assume the conduct of all military operations against VC/PAVN forces has become a matter of increasing concern at this headquarters. Over the past three months close liaison has been maintained with CO, III Corps Artillery and with the US Artillery advisors. Frequent visits to ARVN artillery sites have been made by CO, II FFCEV Artillery and members of his staff. The status of all aspects of ARVN's operations has been thoroughly analyzed, and ways to assist in the elimination of problem areas have been sought at every opportunity. In most areas, the artillery has significantly less problem than do the other elements of ARVN; however, in the most critical area of tactical mobility, the artillery has been severely limited. In fact, until five months ago all of the batteries in III CTZ were fragmented into widely dispersed two-gun platoons, immobilized in fixed sites, with the primary mission of GVN territorial defense. There was little unit integrity. Artillery headquarters, lacking flexibility and aggressiveness, exercised little or no control or coordination over the fires of these dispersed, immobile elements. As a result, the artillery could not and did not respond to the needs of the forces on the ground. Infantry maneuver units and Revolutionary Development (RD) forces were restricted to operating within areas where there was adequate artillery support. In August 1968, the first steps were taken to mobilize the ARVN artillery when ten platoons were released from their territorial defense...
mission for employment on tactical maneuvers. For the first time ARVN maneuver elements could be supported with reconnoiter organic artillery. This first critical step was accomplished with the preparation of the territorial defense coverage; however, in order to release additional platoons, gaps would be left in the coverage. Therefore, in November 1968, upon the request of CG, III CTZ, a plan was formulated by this headquarters calling for the assumption of the responsibility for territorial defense in these areas by US artillery units in II FFORCEV. In this second phase, ten additional platoons were mobilized. These, together with the first battery of a newly organized corps artillery 155mm howitzer battalion, brought the number of mobile artillery platoons in III CTZ ready to respond to the needs of the ground gaining and pacification units. Emphasis will now turn to monitoring the operations of these mobile elements, and providing assistance where required in the areas of tactical employment and training.

(e) Employment of Improved Conventional Munitions.

(a) The expenditure rate of improved conventional munitions has increased considerably since the last reporting period, with over 1200 rounds being expended in the III CTZ during this period, as compared to 558 for the previous three months. This increase can be attributed to additional command interest, the increase in areas authorized for the expenditure of these munitions, and publication of a more detailed and less restrictive letter of instructions. The additional areas were derived from CG, II FFORCEV’s granting authorization for OPCOM units to employ improved conventional munitions in all areas previously authorized by CINCPAC. The letter of instructions permitted the division, separate brigade and group commanders to delegate the authority to expend these munitions to the supported or supporting battalion level.

(b) A system was established to maintain accurate data regarding the expenditure of ICM. This reporting system was necessary to provide the maneuver unit commanders information regarding areas that have been targeted with ICM and to provide CINCPAC detailed information on ICM effectiveness.

(c) A request was submitted to MACV to relax the rules of engagement for improved conventional munitions to provide for engagement of a wider variety of targets.

(9) Artillery Accidents and Incidents. Every round that leaves a tube in Vietnam is headed toward, by or over friendly troop positions
and areas occupied by friendly civilians. There is simply no margin for error, yet errors are made and friendly personnel are killed and injured. These accidents and incidents continue to be a matter of grave concern for all artillerymen, and there is a need to reduce the possibility of human errors are continually being studied. In November a new regulation governing the conduct of investigations of accidents and incidents was published. It provides for more thorough and analytical evaluation of the causes of these errors. It has enabled the subordinate headquarters to take more thorough and timely action on areas requiring command emphasis and corrective action. The primary problem areas determined by these studies in the present quarter and corrective actions include:

(a) Coordination and control errors by controlling artillery. Shortcomings in the system for controlling and coordinating fires were isolated early in this reporting period. A thorough evaluation of the operations of the FDC's and TCC's of battalion and higher headquarters resulted in significant improvements which have materially reduced errors by these agencies. In addition, the rules of engagement and TAC SCI's were revised in an effort to clarify and simplify all procedures for clearing fires.

(b) Firing battery errors. Firing battery errors continue to result from the lack of experience of battery personnel and a failure to adhere to prescribed double check procedures. In order to provide commanders with an accurate and effective means of evaluating the professional competence and state of training of their personnel, a comprehensive Artillery Combat Readiness Evaluation Program was recently established. The results of these evaluations will be used to determine the need for personnel changes and areas in which battery personnel require additional training. In addition, increased command emphasis has been placed on adherence to double check procedures.

(c) Forward Observer errors. The letter at Indiscretion 5, written by a young officer serving as a forward observer in the 1st Infantry Division and recently distributed to all FO's and LIO's in this command, serves to point out the complexity of the job which the young officer is called upon to perform as an FO in Vietnam. In an effort to insure that he is as thoroughly prepared and qualified as possible before being sent to fulfill these responsibilities, every major headquarters has been encouraged to review and improve their procedures for selecting and training FO's.

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(a) Civilians in a properly cleared area. In an effort to reduce the number of accidents resulting from friendly civilians being in areas for which clearances had been properly obtained from GVN agencies, the following actions have been taken:

1. The problem has been brought to the attention of the office of OFFCROS. Upon request of CCDC personnel, sufficient copies of the II FPCRCEV regulation governing rules of engagement, which had been translated into Vietnamese, were provided for distribution to all sector and subsector headquarters.

2. US artillery units have been instructed to establish liaison with local GVN clearance agencies for the purpose of obtaining friendly population overlays and insuring that these are continually updated. The units are required before firing to check target grids against these overlays in order to assure the validity of GVN clearances.

(b) Artillery Actions. During this reporting period, II FPCRCEV Artillery conducted a thorough evaluation of the TTP's of all corps artillery batteries and prepared appropriate TTP's. Many of the changes, such as providing the batteries with a second FDC and duplicate sets of equipment in the firing battery headquarters, were necessitated by the increasing frequency of splitting batteries. Other changes, such as providing the batteries with an ORC 142 long range radio and increasing the skill level of the artillery mechanics at battery level, were necessitated by the great distance over which the batteries and their service and support elements must operate. Changes were also submitted for the automatic weapons battalion and for the target acquisition battery, tailoring these units for the unique missions they must accomplish in Vietnam.

(c) Aviation Support. At the end of the previous reporting period, the aviation assets available to this headquarters and its assigned, attached, and CFCCH units included 2 HU-1H, 5 H-6A, 3 CH-11, 4 I-H, and 6 O-1D aircraft (a total of 17 aircraft, all part of the aviation section of the 23d Artillery Group) and daily mission allocations of 3 HU-1D and 6 O-1D aircraft from II FPCRCEV assets. These assets were determined to be inadequate to meet the requirements for command and control (C and C), emergency organizational repair, and target reconnaissance (VR) for the many, widely dispersed units of this command. Through close liaison with the USARV aircraft allocation office, a program was developed which will provide II FPCRCEV artillery units with additional aircraft on the following schedule:

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Jan 69 - 3 OH-6A helicopters have been delivered to the newly formed 54th Artillery Group Aviation Section.

Feb 69 - 3 additional OH-6A aircraft will be drawn by the 54th Group.

Mar-Sep - 8 OH-23's are scheduled for issue to the 23d Group and 6 to the 54th Group, as they become available through a retrofit program developed by the USARV Aviation Section.

With these additional assets, the commanders and their staffs will be able to exercise more effective control over the operations of their units.

12. **Programs to Increase the Accuracy of Artillery.**

1. **Metro.**

   During the reporting period the following metro stations were relocated in order to provide increased coverage and more frequent broadcasts in the areas of greatest artillery density. (At Inclosure 6 is a map depicting the metro coverage in III CTZ and a list of broadcast times for all stations):

   1st Cav Div Arty - from I CTZ to III CTZ, assumed operations at Quan Loi.

   8th TAB, 25th Arty - from Phuoc Vinh to Can Tho.

2. A recommended AGL has been submitted to the direct and general support activities to assist them in requisitioning and stocking repair parts necessary for support of the Naviscout systems. Obtaining critically needed expendable items, particularly radiosondes and calcium hydride charges, continues to be a problem. Close liaison with direct and general support agencies has resulted in the elimination of a number of errors in supply records which were contributing to this problem. The continued attention of this headquarters will be devoted to this area until a normal flow of these items is attained.

3. Because the parameters employed in evaluating the quality of the output of the various MET stations were revised in November, a statistical comparison of the quality of the output for this reporting period cannot be provided. It is the considered opinion of the MET...
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Quality Control Team, however, that the validity of the MET output has improved during the past three months.

(b) Artillery calibration. With the issue in mid-October of the M36 Radar Chronograph on a basis of one to each division artillery and two to each artillery armor, the requirement for the coordination of the calibration support by the 177th Ordnance Detachment was significantly reduced; however, it was by no means eliminated. With the general support unit released from the primary responsibility of servicing the division and corps units, attention was turned to the 3d brigade fire commands, AHVN and other Free world Military Assistance Forces, for which significantly improved service can now be offered. In addition, it has been found that because the very delicate M36 chronograph is difficult to maintain, continued support for division and corps artillery units is still necessary on a reduced scale. With the combined assets of the organic M36 radars and the continuing support of the 177th Ordnance Detachment, the calibration requirements of all artillery batteries in III CTZ can now be satisfied on a regularly scheduled, timely basis.

(c) Survey. The majority of the survey effort has been devoted to establishing survey control for AHVN and Free world Military Assistance Forces and surveying DEPTAKi and perimeter defensive positions within the Long Binh/Plantation area. A total of 17 survey control points were established, the majority in the Long Binh/Bearcat area, and 13 stations in III CTZ were recovered. (At Inclosure 7 is map depicting 3d and 4th order Survey Control in III CTZ).

(c) Intel. (1) Assumption of Intelligence Responsibilities by HHTAC. The formation of the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (HHTAC) (see para 1b (a)) also had a significant effect on the intelligence program in the area of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex.

(a) On 5 November, immediately after it became operational, HHTAC relieved H4, II FFORCEn Artillery of the responsibility for coordinating the operations of the flash base towers and plotting central for Long Binh Post. While the tower locations and units responsible for manning them remained unchanged, the plotting central was relocated to the HHTAC FSCC on Bien Hoa Air Base. In December, coverage to the west was increased by the addition to the flash base of a tenth tower.

(b) On 1 December 1968, HHTAC also assumed control of Operation Checkmate Charlie, a program which had been instituted by II FFORCEn
Artillery on 1 February 1968 to provide aerial observation as well as command and control of supporting physical and artillery during night attacks on the Long Binh/Dien Hoa complex. (3) In addition BHTAC, on 1 February 1969, resumed responsibility for security via missions which had been flown over this area by personnel of Headquarters, II Field Force Artillery since 2 February 1968.

(2) Deactivation of the 67th Infantry Detachment. On 27 August 1968, 1st Force Artillery submitted a request for deactivation of the 67th Infantry Detachment (OAC) and lateral transfer of the nineteen spaces to Hq, 8th TAF, 25th Artillery. These spaces were required to replace the personnel on 180 days TUI from Hq, 30th Artillery, who were manning two AN/TPS-25A radar sections in support of Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC). The request was approved and on 4 January 1969, the 67th Infantry Detachment was released from its mission of supporting BHTAC and turned in its equipment (four AN/TPS-4 and two AN/TPS-3 radars). By 22 January, the personnel of the former detachment completed training on the AN/TPS-25A radars and relieved the TUI personnel at the two CMAC sites. Action is currently being taken by this headquarters to assist BHTAC in obtaining three AN/TPS-5 radars to replace the ground surveillance radars which they lost in this transaction.

(3) Identification of the 75-cm recoilless Rifle Projectile. During November 1968 the enemy began making greater use of the Chicoa 75mm recoilless rifle as an indirect fire weapon. Due to the higher trajectory in this mode, the projectile is easily mistaken for that of the US 75mm pack howitzer. Furthermore, many characteristics of the two projectiles are similar and both weapons are available to the enemy. Since correct identification is essential to an accurate evaluation of the enemy's artillery employment, II Field Force Artillery made distribution to all units of pictures of these projectiles and their fragments. (See photos at Inclosure 8).

(4) Surveillance of Intelligence Targets. On 6 December 1968, II Field Force Artillery instituted a program to thoroughly analyze the validity of intelligence information and to improve the effectiveness of artillery fires on intelligence targets. The 23rd and 54th Artillery Groups were directed by this headquarters to conduct, whenever possible, aerial surveillance of missions conducted on intelligence targets, with emphasis on conducting this surveillance as early in the morning and late in the evening as practicable. Results to date have not been conclusive because the majority of these targets are located under a thick jungle canopy, making accurate surveillance difficult. However, some reports of secondary explosions and damage assessments have been received and the program will be continued until conclusive results can be obtained.
(5) Acquisition of Additional AN/PSC-14A Radars. With the arrival in November 1968 of the 1st Cavalry Division, four AN/PSC-14A radars were added to the countermortar surveillance assets in this area, bringing to thirty the number of sets in operation in III CTZ. Three of the four radars have been operating at Phuoc Vinh, Long Be, and Tong Le Chon; the fourth, which has occupied five different sites since its arrival, is presently located at fire support base WAC, northeast of An Ba Ba Mountain. During the months of December and January, these four radars experienced over 30% of the rocket/mortar attacks which occurred within range of countermortar sites in III CTZ. Of those occurring within range of these four sets, pickup were made on 25%. They have, therefore, provided a valuable addition to the countermortar coverage in III CTZ.

(6) Deception Techniques in the Employment of AN/PSC-14A Radars.

(a) It was noted that with considerable consistency, mortar and rocket attacks were initiated while an AN/PSC-14A radar was oriented in a direction other than that of the attack, suggesting that the enemy is aware of the limited sector of scan of the radar and plans his attacks from locations outside of this narrow sector. In order to deny him the knowledge of which direction the radars are scanning, a field expedient cover was designed to completely enclose the sets. This cover, which consists of a parachute draped over four uprights which extend above the top of the antenna, completely conceals the radar from view without any degradation of the radar's capability.

(b) Field experience has revealed that the presence of an AN/PSC-14A radar acts as a deterrent to mortar attacks. A program has, therefore, been developed to establish a series of decoy and dummy sites. The decoy simply consists of the field expedient enclosure described in the previous paragraph. To date three dummy sets have been constructed at sites in Nha Be, Di An, and Long Binh Post. To insure the credibility of these deception devices, a program of rotation of dummy and actual sets has been initiated; in addition, most of the decoys are placed in positions which are occasionally occupied by radars.

(7) Analysis of Countermortar Radar (CMR) Effectiveness. In December 1968, a program to evaluate CMR effectiveness was initiated. The basic parameters considered were rocket/mortar attacks within range of radars, the status of the sets (operational or not), and radar pickups of these attacks. (NOTE: A separate program evaluates the effectiveness of the disposition of the radars by comparing the total number of rocket/mortar attacks to those which fall within range of AN/PSC-14A's). The analysis provides a measure of the radar's capability to cover an
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area (the capability varying by the number of potential targets to be protected and the number of potential launch sites within the range fan), the operational capability of the individual sets, and operator efficiency. In December the effectiveness against the 172 attacks within radar range was 20.46, with the effectiveness of individual radars ranging from 0-100 (See Inclosure 9).

2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel. None.

   b. Operations.

      (1) Computation of Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM) Fire Missions.

         (a) Observation. Double checks to insure the accuracy of fires cannot be performed on data for 105mm and 155mm ICM fire missions computed by FADAC.

         (b) Evaluation. Due to a change in the planned height of burst of ICM, programmed into the FADAC tapes but not yet changed in the tabular Firing Tables (TFT's), these two sources of firing data produce different solutions. The Gunnery Department of the US Army Field Artillery School has informed this headquarters that the data provided by FADAC will produce optimum effect on the target, and that revised TFT's are in the process of preparation. While manual computations can be verified by a second independent computation using the same tables, those of FADAC, to be truly independent, must be checked either by manual computation or a second FADAC. Since few batteries have access to a second FADAC and data computation by and transmission from another FAC is too time consuming, the double check of FADAC data must be performed manually. Until the revised TFT's become available, this manual check cannot be accomplished for ICM missions, requiring that batteries employ the less effective TFT data.

         (c) Recommendation. That publication and distribution of FT 105 ADD-B-2, FT 105 ADD-F-1, and FT 155 ADD-L-1 C6 to units in Vietnam be expedited.

      (2) Erratic Debris Fallout Pattern of Illumination Rounds.

         (a) Observation. The fallout pattern of debris from artillery illumination munitions is so widespread and erratic that it has been
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necessary to restrict the use of this source of vitally needed illumination in this combat theater.

(b) Evaluation. Debris from these rounds has landed in every direction around both the point of ejection and the predicted point of impact, with the carrier landing as far away as 600 meters beyond the predicted impact point. This seemingly innocuous munition is far from harmless as evidenced by the nine deaths and eleven injuries which have resulted from the impact of the debris of five illumination rounds over the past two months. As a result it has become necessary to restrict the use of these munitions.

(c) Recommendation. That an R&D program be initiated immediately to develop an artillery illumination round which either destroys its carrier and other impedimenta or deposits them in a small, predictable pattern.

(3) Precautions in the Use of Artillery Fuzes.

(a) Observation. There is no guidance available upon which to base a determination as to which PD, SQ, or MTSQ artillery fuzes should be employed when firing during a heavy rain.

(b) Evaluation. For all PD, SQ, and MTSQ fuses, TM 9-1300-203 includes the precaution that premature functioning may occur during heavy rainfall; however, no guidance is provided in this or any other document stating which fuse or fuses are least sensitive to rain.

(c) Recommendation. That a study be conducted to determine the relative sensitivity of PD, SQ, and MTSQ artillery fuzes to heavy rainfall.

c. Training Infantrymen in the Adjustment of Artillery Fire.

(1) Observation. Too often in the past, inexperienced infantrymen operating without an artillery observer have failed to call for needed artillery, have not been able to adjust fire, or worse, have brought fire in on their own troops.

(2) Evaluation. The infantryman, particularly the NCO and the junior officer, will often find himself operating without an artillery observer by his side, for in this environment of the widespread, small unit operation, there are simply not enough FO's to go around. These non-artillerymen must therefore be ready and able to call for and adjust their own artillery fire.

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(3) Recommendation. That the amount of training on the adjustment of artillery provided in the infantry schools be significantly increased.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Expedient Survey Technique.

(a) Observation. When the tactical situation and dense jungle vegetation preclude the use of normal survey methods, an acceptably accurate survey can be accomplished by simultaneously observing from three control points a helicopter hovering over a fire support base.

(b) Evaluation. Using this procedure, the following problems may be encountered: It is extremely difficult to observe a helicopter at ranges exceeding 12 kilometers; the maximum range for this type of survey, is approximately 15 to 18 kilometers; and if the position at one control point is at ground level, it becomes necessary for the helicopter to fly at an altitude of from 1500 to 2000 feet to obtain a line of sight, with the pilot's ability to fly precisely over the desired ground location decreasing as the altitude of the helicopter increases. The accuracy of this survey procedure depends primarily on the pilot's ability to remain on station over the proper point and on weather conditions, which can adversely affect aircraft stability and observation of the helicopter. Using the best three of five sightlines from each position, an accuracy of 1:500 can be obtained by an experienced crew.

(c) Recommendation. That this method be used only when the tactical situation and/or the terrain preclude the use of normal methods of survey.

(2) Relative VR Capabilities of O-10 and OH-6A aircraft.

(a) Observation. The O-10 (Birddog) fixed wing, light observation aircraft is more effective for visual reconnaissance (VR) missions than is the OH-6A (Cayuse) light observation helicopter.

(b) Evaluation. While the OH-6A is a more versatile aircraft than is the O-10, the latter is far superior for this one specialized, yet very critical mission. The flying time of the O-10 is approximately four hours as compared to two hours, twenty-five minutes for the OH-6A. This permits the Birddog to range farther and remain on station longer, two highly desirable qualities in the VR aircraft. The O-10 has a wider field of vision, permitting both the pilot and observer to observe on either side of the aircraft. The O-10 provides a very steady observation platform, while the OH-6A vibrates to such an extent as to interfere with the observation process.

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with detailed observation of small or camouflaged targets. Finally, the case of control of the O-1U permits the pilot to assist in observation, while the pilot of the OH-6A must devote his entire attention to the business of flying.

(c) Recommendation. That the current program of phasing out the O-1U as these aircraft are lost or become unrepairable be reevaluated.

e. Logistics.

(1) Use of Radar-repair Contact Teams.

(a) Observation. During several displacements of AN/KPS-4A radar units, excessive non-operational time has resulted upon arrival at the new site.

(b) Evaluation. During displacements, AN/KPS-4A radars are often subjected to excessive shock and vibrations, which can cause non-operational time. A radar-repair contact team standing by at the new site can render valuable assistance to the radar unit in attaining an operational status, in spite of equipment malfunctions sustained enroute. Experience during several displacements has shown that the radar-repair contact team, with experienced maintenance personnel, can assist in performing the necessary checks on the equipment to insure that the radar is rapidly returned to peak performance operation.

(c) Recommendation. That AN/KPS-4A radar units request assistance of a radar-repair contact team when displacing to a new location.

(2) Reliability of Artillery Sights.

(a) Observation. Artillery sights are not sufficiently durable to stand up under the extreme climatic conditions in Vietnam.

(b) Evaluation. In the past four months, four artillery accidents resulting in the death of five friendly personnel and injury to twenty-six others were caused by defective sights. Of the four type sights used by artillery weapons in this theater, three, the H12A7H, H113 and M115, have each been involved in one or more accidents. In each case the cause of the malfunction was deterioration of the sight mechanism as a result of exposure to extreme climatic conditions. EIR's have been submitted on defective sights and all sights in this command now receive a monthly technical inspection by Ordnance personnel.
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(c) Recommendation. That action on LMK's for artillery sights be expedited and methods for testing the durability of newly developed optical mechanisms be improved.

f. Organization. None.

g. Other. None.

10 Incl
1. Organization of II FFORCEV Artillery
2. Positioning of II FFORCEV Artillery
3. Heavy Artillery Coverage as of 31 January 1969
4. Missions of II FFORCEV Artillery Units
5. The Forward Observer of the 1st Red One
6. Metro Coverage
7. Survey Control
8. Photos of 75mm Rounds
9. Counter-mortar Effectiveness Study
10. Alphabetical Listing of Sites

B.E. HOFFMAN, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

DA, Hq II FFORCENV, APO San Francisco 96266 2 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVPEC(IN), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

(U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery for the period ending 31 January 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

[Name]

FOR O. R. FOBY

ILS, AGC

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AVORD-DT (15 Feb 69) 2d Ind.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1969, II FFGV-65 (C)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375-13 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOPT-DT, APO 96375

1. (C) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning Computation of Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM) Fire Missions, page 15, paragraph 2b(1); concur. Through the Pin Point Distribution System this type publication will be automatically distributed. To expedite distribution an emergency requisition must be submitted by the unit and the publication will be air mailed to the unit.

b. (C) Reference item concerning erratic debris fallout pattern of illumination rounds, page 15, paragraph 2b(2); concur. Illumination fires must frequently be prohibited in populated areas or in vicinity of friendly troops. Malfunction Reports (AD: 700-1300-8) submitted by using units are acted upon by appropriate DA agencies.

c. (C) Reference item concerning artillery fuses, page 16, paragraph 2b(3); concur. Premature bursts, because of fuse sensitivity to heavy rain, are hazardous to firing crews, aircraft, and friendly personnel in the target area. Recommend action be taken by appropriate DA agencies when malfunction reports (AD: 700-1300-8) are submitted by using units.

d. (C) Reference item concerning relative VFR capabilities of C-12 and CH-6A Aircraft, page 17, paragraph 2d(2). Concur in recommendation that phase out of C-1 ("Bird Dog") aircraft be reevaluated. The C-1 is capable of providing a more effective platform for visual reconnaissance artillery missions than the CH-6 (Cayuse). In addition to inherent stability, greater on station times, wider field of vision for crew members, and less pilot fatigue during sustained operations, the C-1 aircraft is better adapted for night operations during periods of minimal lighting and visual references than the CH-6. The C-1 has the disadvantage of not being capable of landing anywhere a rotary wing aircraft can land.

e. (C) Reference item concerning Reliability of Artillery Sights, page 19, paragraph 2e(2); concur. The primary reasons for defective sights are: The recoil shock associated with constant firing at maximum charge,
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AVICCI-CCT (15 Feb 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
Army Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1969, IIFFV-

extreme climatic conditions, and repeated displacement and emplacement re-
quired for slinging and hoisting. These problems are peculiar to the con-
lict in I RVN, and WFOCOM has been notified. The status of new sight develop-
ment is unknown at this time. Prompt submission of IFI's will be continued
as appropriate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furr:
II FFV Arty
II FFV
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Short
CPT. AGC
Asst AG

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ORGANIZATION OF II FIERCE ARTILLERY

1. The following units are assigned to II FIERCE Artillery: Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 4th Target Acquisition Battalion, 25th Artillery.

   a. The following units are attached to III, 4th TAB, 25th Artillery and further attached or placed OPCON as indicated:

      (1) 6th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
      (2) 9th *
      (3) 75th *
      (4) 70th *
      (5) 231st *
      (6) 234th *
      (7) 246th *
      (8) 247th *
      (9) 248th *
      (10) 249th *
      (11) 257th *
      (12) 258th *
      (13) 259th *
      (14) 260th *

   b. The following units are assigned to 8th TAB, 25th Artillery:

      (1) 1st Field Artillery Section (Surveillance Radar)
      (2) 2d Field Artillery Section (Surveillance Radar)

Inclosure 1

ORGANIZATION

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2. Headquarters, II FFCRCEV Artillery has operational control of two artillery groups. The artillery battalions listed below are assigned to the artillery groups indicated and are under operational control of II FFCRCEV Artillery except as specified.

a. 23d Artillery Group.

(1) 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery (105T)
(2) 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery (105T)
(3) Battery F, 16th Artillery (155T)
(4) 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery (155T)
(5) 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery (155SP)
(6) 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (8"/175SP)
(7) 2d Battalion, 12d Artillery (8"/175 SP)

b. 54th Artillery Group

(1) 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (105T)
(2) 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery (105T)  
   (Attached 9th Inf Div, OPCON SA IV CTZ)
(3) 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery (155SP)
(4) 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155T)
(5) 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (8"/175 SP)

3. Headquarters, II FFCRCEV Artillery has one attached automatic weapons battalion, 5th Battalion (AW) (SP), 2d Artillery. This battalion has two additional batteries and one platoon attached as indicated below.

   Battery D (MG), 71st Artillery
   Battery I (SLT), 29th Artillery
   Combat Evaluation Team (Vulcan)
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Appendix 1 to Inclosure 2
CONFIDENTIAL

LOCATION OF II FPDORCE ARTILLERY UNITS  T 2400, 31 JANUARY 1969 (Cont)

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CAMBODIA

Artillery Coverage

The range capability circles shown are those of the 175mm Gun.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLUSION 3
MISCELLANEOUS II FFORCEV ARTILLERY UNITS

1. 23d Artillery Group - General Support II FFORCEV and III ARVN Corps.

   a. 2d Bn, 13th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
      (1) Btry A - 3 tubes GS-Reinf 1st Infantry Division Artillery
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery
      (3) Btry C - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery

   b. Btry F, 16th Arty - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery

   c. 1st Bn, 27th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
      (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 25th Infantry Division Artillery
      (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV

   d. 6th Bn, 27th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
      (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery
      (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV

   e. 2d Bn, 32d Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
      (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV
      (2) Btry B - General Support II FFORCEV
      (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV

   f. 6th Bn, 15th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
      (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 1st Cavalry Division Artillery
      (3) Btry C - 3 tubes Direct Support 5th Special Forces
      3 tubes GS II FFORCEV, POP to 5th Special Forces

   g. 3d Bn, 197th Arty - General Support II FFORCEV
      (1) Btry A - General Support II FFORCEV
      (2) Btry B - 3 tubes GS-Reinf 1st Infantry Division Artillery
      3 tubes Direct Support Co A, 5th Special Forces
      (3) Btry C - General Support II FFORCEV, ORCON Capital Military
      Assistance Command, less positioning authority.

Inclosure 4
2. 54th Artillery Group - General Support II FPCRGLV and III ARVN Corps.

   a. 7th Bn, 3rd Arty - General Support II FPCRGLV.
      (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 12th ARVN Division Artillery.
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 2d Bn, 40th Arty.
      (3) Btry C - General Support II FPCRGLV.

   b. 7th Bn, 8th Arty - General Support II FPCRGLV.
      (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 18th ARVN Division Artillery.
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 2d Bn, 40th Arty.
      (3) Btry C - General Support II FPCRGLV.

   c. 2d Bn, 35th Arty - General Support II FPCRGLV.
      (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf 7th Bn, 8th Arty.
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 12th Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery.
      (3) Btry C - GS-Reinf 2d Bn, 40th Arty.

   d. 5th Bn, 42d Arty - General Support II FPCRGLV.
      (1) Btry A - GS-Reinf Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force Artillery.
      (2) Btry B - GS-Reinf 9th Infantry Division Artillery.
      (3) Btry C - GS-Reinf 9th Infantry Division Artillery.

   e. 6th Bn, 77th Arty - OPCON Senior Advisor IV CTZ.
THE FORWARD OBSERVER OF THE 114TH RCT ONE

1. The duty of the artillery forward observer is to provide artillery support for the maneuver unit to which he is assigned. This is a 24 hour a day responsibility, and it requires initiative, common sense, and the ability to keep a cool head when contact with the enemy is taking place.

2. We’ll start with calling in the fire mission. Prior to calling in any artillery, the FO must know his own location. Two reasons, you can’t give coordinates to the target if you don’t know where you are, and you can’t expect the artillery to fire for you if you can’t give them your location. You have your tools to help you, a map, a compass, the pace count kept by the point element, and marching rounds, which will be discussed later. None of these are 100% accurate, but when used together, you can always figure your location within at least 200 meters if you maintain a constant check on all four. Suggestion: When you’re in hilly terrain, Song Be for example, use a 1/50,000 map which shows up contour features well. When in flat terrain, such as Thu Duc, the 1/25,000 picto map can be very helpful in that it shows many more streams and small roads, Carry both maps and check one against the other.

3. Your own location, a distance and direction to the target, a quick polar plot, and you can read the grid of the target. The call for fire can be made using that grid and direction or by using a shift from one of your pre-planned targets or marching rounds. If you are not using marching rounds, the first round fired in contact will not be in the target area. Reason: 95% or more of the targets you engage will be within 200 meters of your position. For safety reasons, contact fire missions should start a minimum of 500 meters from friendly troops. If you slipped up and aren’t sure of where you are, start it further out and be ready to make a bold shift.

4. The best place to put the initial round is over line of the target so that you can simply drop the rounds in on the target. The only time you should do otherwise is when the initial round over line will put your element on the gun target line. In this case, place the round over left or over right of the target. Most erratic rounds come from cold tubes on the first round. Once that initial round has fallen safely you can start to work it in. If you are on the G.T. line one thing you must be cautious of is large trees. A tree burst can injure your own troops and will probably be short of the enemy.

5. How close to bring in the artillery? If the target is 50 meters from you, and the nearest rounds 100 meters from you, and the enemy has any kind of cover, the rounds aren’t going to do you much good. You must
know where your most forward element is if you are not in it. In many
cases the artillery is shut off prematurely by the infantry because of
fragmentation falling out of the sky. It is your job to educate these people
as to the risk involved in close artillery support, but also to the fact that
falling fragments may hurt, but will not kill. Make sure they know to
keep low. Depending on cover available, berms, rice paddy dykes, etc.,
105 artillery rounds can be brought to within 50 meters of friendly troops
with limited risk. The FO must remain cool headed, and he must know
what he is doing.

6. What shell or fuse should be used? The situation will dictate what to
use. Shell HE, Fuse Quick is used most often, but many of your contacts
will be with Viet Cong in bunkers. A heavy volume of medium or heavy
artillery with fuse delay is best for this situation. In the rare case that
you catch the enemy in the open, at a safe distance, use fuse VT. VT is
also good for sampans on a river. You will have many occasions to use
the illumination round. Several things to keep in mind: one, wind, use
a starting grid that will cause the light to float over the area to be illu-
minated; two, don’t make shifts smaller than 300 meters, if you do the
light will not appear to have moved at all; three, the light should burn
out just before it touches the ground, the more wind the longer it will
stay up. Keep in mind what the artillerymen has to offer and educate
the infantry so that they will want to use artillery.

7. How much artillery to request? As a guide line, you don’t have to
have rounds on the target to increase the method of fire. Sniper fire
from 3 AK-47’s does not mean that there are only three VC or that they
will remain in the same place. Air observers, for example, expend
many rounds working over areas that are suspect VC locations. You can
decrease the interval between impacts by upping the number of rounds
fired at each correction. i.e., platoon three, four, or five. When contact
is made, turn it on quickly, move it around, and vary rates of fire.
When contact is broken move it out, reduce rate of fire and go to march-
ning or blocking fires. Use it when you need it but don’t waste it. Arti-
lery ammo is expensive.

8. Within minutes after initial contact is made, an Air Observer will
normally be on station. The AO can be of great help to the infantry.
However, his effectiveness is greatly influenced by the FO’s ability to
explain the tactical situation on the ground. First, where are the friendly
elements; second, where is the enemy, what is their estimated size, and
how are they deployed i.e., in bunkers, trees, cane fields, in the open,
etc. Locations are given with reference to smoke popped on the ground.
Smoke on the flanks and in front of the friendlyies is necessary. When
smoke is out, the FO gives locations using directions and distances from
the smoke. Example: "Forward-most friendly signs north of green smoke.
Yellow smoke marks our east and west flanks. VC in north-south tree
line 100 meters off east flank. Receiving heavy automatic weapons fire
from large house with orange roof at junction of tree line and stream."
Mark your position constantly with smoke and inform the AO of any changes
in location or tactical situation. Never give your location by saying
"friendlies in back of yellow smoke" or receiving fire from left flank.
The AO does not know which way you are facing. One thing to keep in mind,
what happens on the ground is a responsibility of the infantry unit com-
mander; therefore, even if the AO makes all of the corrections, it is still
your fire mission, your responsibility.

9. Providing "timely and accurate" artillery fire can be greatly facilitated
by a good prearranged fire plan whether in the night defensive position, in
an ambush site, or on a sweep.

10. In the NDP defensive targets should be planned and fired in if permis-
sible. When planning DEFTARS keep several things in mind. One, the gun
target line, keep off of it; two, the likely avenues of approach to your NDP;
three, "Charlie" doesn't always use likely avenues of approach, keep 1.400
mile coverage; and four, that you are well oriented as to where the DEFTARS
are on the ground and that you know how they are numbered. A ground
attack at night can be so sudden that you will never have time to look at
your map or compass. The best way to number them is clockwise from the
north.

11. DEFTARS for the ambush patrol should be placed so that they will func-
tion immediately as a blocking force and rear security. "Charlie" is well
aware of what a DEFTAR is, and when fired in, it can easily be distinguished
from H and I fire. Have sufficient (3 to 5) on-call HF DEFTARS 500 meters
from your position; also, have on-call illumination targets. It is a good
policy to fire in one or two DEFTARS to verify your location and to determine
how the battery is shooting. Bring these in to 400 meters. When firing in
DEFTARS for the ambush patrol try not to use more than 3 rounds and fire
the rounds at varying intervals more than 15 minutes apart. You will usually
not go on platoon or squad size ambush patrols. Send your recon sergeant or
RTO, or, at a minimum, make sure the element leader is capable of relaying
through you what he needs in the way of artillery support.

12. On a sweep, the use of marching rounds will provide you with the fast-
est artillery support in the event of contact, and also provide you with
constant marking rounds to help you determine your location. Suggestions:
one, fire one round every 05 or 10 minutes "At my command"; two, adjust
the rounds along a cardinal direction so that you can follow the replot data. Be cautious of your rate of march and the distance between you and your lead element. As always, keep the GT line in mind. Pre-planned targets should be set up for all sweeps whether in no-fire zones or specified strike zones. Targets should be planned so that at no time will you be more than 1,000 meters from targets that will provide you with adequate coverage. Tubes should be laid on these targets on a do not load basis if your marching fires are check-fired or if you are in a no-fire zone.

13. You have an additional responsibility in the NDP. When you are under a mortar or rocket attack, you will be expected to get the counter fires started. A polar plot given to the artillery is usually sufficient since they have your location. You should be familiar enough with your position that you don't need a compass to give a direction, but never lie without a compass. Once you get the initial fire mission called in, try to get an analysis on a crater. The chances are against your seeing the flash or hearing the thud from "Charlie's" mortar tube. The crater analysis may be your only means of getting a good direction. You can easily tell from which direction the rockets are coming.

14. The big point to remember is, always be ready to go. Get your fire plan in as soon as you can get the sweep route from the infantry S3 or your Battalion LNO. Don't wait until the company commander gives the route to the platoon leaders. Double check to make sure all the necessary information gets down to the firing battery. One important thing is your radio, without a radio you are just another IIIB. Keep it dry, always have an extra battery, try to get an extra hand-set and use your long whip antenna. Keep one jump ahead at all times.

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<th>UNIT</th>
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Computer Metro broadcast times are 15 minutes prior to ATR broadcast times.
U.S. 75mm Pack Howitzer Projectile
75mm RECOILESS RIFLE, HE
CHICOM
# Alphabetical Listing of Sites

**MENTIONED IN II FFORCEY ARTILLERY UNITS**

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**FSB** = Fire Support Base  
**SFC** = Special Forces Camp  

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Inclosure 10

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOB BBR 5/20/10
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq. II Field Force Vietnam Artillery

The following report documents the lessons learned by the II Field Force Vietnam Artillery during their operations from 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.

#### Distribution Statement

N/A OASFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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**DD. 69-1473**

**UNCATEGORIZED**

- Second Classification