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AUTHORITY
30 Apr 1981, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A, ltr 29 Apr 1980

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GENE

DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH

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BY

Defense Documentation Center
Defense Supply Agency
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division (Airmobile) (U).  

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

MAY 19 1969

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified Inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
I. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.

A. There were no changes or additions to the unit mission.

B. Organization:

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<th>ASSIGNED UNITS</th>
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FOR GT UT

691178

Confidential

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals. Declassified after 12 years.
DOD DR 5220.10
C.  COMMAND:
The following are personnel occupying major command and staff positions:

(a) LTC George B. Crook: Squadron Commander
(b) Maj Harold L. Johnson: Squadron Executive Commander
(c) Capt Raymond A. Fields: Adjutant
(d) Capt Herbert K. White: 32
(e) Maj Norman N. Rissell: 33
(f) Maj William J. Arbogast: 34
(g) LTG Gary G. Cashion: Signal Officer
(h) Capt John F. Kuniishi: Flight Surgeon
(i) Capt Charles K. Hellman: Safety Officer
(j) Maj James H. Weaver: Maintenance Officer
(k) Capt Stanley S. Trucker III: CO, Headquarters Troop
(l) Maj Phillip G. Shaffer: CO, Troop A
(m) Maj David L. Thompson: CO, Troop B
(n) Maj David V. Lainas Jr.: CO, Troop C
(o) Capt Donald D. Grandal: CO, Troop D

D.  UNIT STRENGTH AS OF 31 JANUARY 1969:

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2. Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL
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E. AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZED/ON HAND

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### CONFIDENTIAL

**F. COMBAT: TOTAL:**

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**AIRCRAFT BY TYPE:**

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**CONFIDENTIAL**
1. During the reporting period emphasis was placed on the infusion program with officers, warrant officers and enlisted men. The current officer/warrant officer infusion continues through January and is scheduled to be completed during February 1969. This headquarters does not anticipate further serious rotation humps until January 1970, when presently assigned officer rotations will exceed 40%. Progressing is currently underway to correct this problem area.

2. On 5 November 1968, LTC George Crook assumed command from LTC Robert W. Mills. The change of command ceremony, conducted at Vung Long Airfield, was attended by the IV CTZ SI, Major General Lechardt and the 1st Aviation Brigade Commander, Major General Robert H. Williams.

3. During the 1st Week in December the Squadron prepared to receive Troop E, 7/1 ACR who returned to the Squadron from Dl. Aa. Republic of Vietnam where they had been attached to the 3rd Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry since May 1968. On 6 December, Troop H returned to the 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry. A great deal of co-ordination and liaison was conducted in order to prepare for their arrival. On 7 December 1968, a ceremony took place on the South Ramp for the arrival of Troop B with Major General Lechardt attending along with the 9th US Infantry Division Band.

4. With stabilization of the Squadron in permanent facilities, additional time has been available to establish and develop administrative operating procedures and management policies. Daily emphasis has been placed in this area to insure maximum and proper utilization of all Squadron personnel consistent with current directives and mission requirements.

5. This headquarters has experienced considerable difficulty during this reporting period in obtaining assignment instructions for lower grade enlisted personnel (grades 55 and below). This not only created an additional burden on administrative sections, but created a low morale factor for the affected individuals, since they were normally unaware of their OCONUS assignment until after arrival at their leave address.

6. The Squadron was administered its first USAF AGI during the period of 27-31 January 1969. The Squadron received a satisfactory exit briefing on 31 January 1969.

7. Military justice activities for the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969:

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8. The Squadron continues to utilise 100% of its allocations for Australia and Hawaii; approximately 80% of the allocations for other RAN centers are presently being filled.
During the reporting period, awards and decorations have been recommended and approved as follows:

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</table>

II. OPERATIONS:

1. During the reporting period, the Squadron continued OPERATION BLACKHAWK in the 44th SFZ to interdict and harass enemy movement across the Cambodian border into the Delta. Primarily, two troops were used in this role on a daily basis. On occasion, one troop would be diverted to work in general support of one of the Division operations to perform a visual reconnaissance of the operational area prior to insertions, bomb damage assessments, or to screen the flanks of the Division operational area.

2. During the first week in December 1968, Troop B joined the Squadron at Vinh Long after being attached to the 3rd Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry since May 1968. The necessary coordination and preparations to incorporate the additional Air Cavalry Troop in the Delta were conducted and completed in minimum time. Troop B closed Vinh Long on the 8th of December and commenced operations in IV CTZ on the 9th of December. In order that terrain familiarization and operational orientation were incorporated immediately, the Squadron infused key personnel for a temporary period to fly with Troop B to assist them in the new environment and operational characteristics of the Delta.

3. The arrival of Troop B enabled the Squadron to continue operating with two Air Cavalry Troops along the border and still continue operations in support of the Divisions.

4. During the month of December, great emphasis was placed on night operations to further interdict possible enemy movement across the Cambodian border. Various methods and concepts were employed by the Blackhawks during the night operations in the 44th SFZ. One Air Cavalry Troop conducted night operations while the other continued daylight operations giving the border zone 24 hour coverage.

5. During these operations, the Air Cavalry Troops employed various lighting devices to pick up targets and movement along the canals and heavily traveled infiltration routes. The use of flares, deployed at timed intervals to illuminate large areas, proved valuable enabling the Air Cavalry Troop to conduct a visual reconnaissance.
with organic assets. The use of a M60 light or the C-403 searchlight cluster in the door of the lead aircraft proved very successful when conducting a VR of a canal line or specific target. This enabled the scout or gun ship to fly just outside the base and engage designated targets.

6. Troop D conducted operations in the vicinity of Nui Cau (45W0550) providing security for a fire support base during the month of November. While providing security, B-52G crews were deployed on armed personnel carriers and air boats to maneuver over terrain, impossible to wheels vehicles, to a position where the B-52G crews could successfully fire directly into the north of VC caves on the mountain. (See Incl 1)

7. During December and January, Troop D remained in the vicinity of Gia Lam, (45W0300), providing perimeter security for the airfield. One platoon remained with a fire support base for security in the vicinity of Tri Ooc, (45W0350). All resupply of ammunition, rations and water was provided by Squadron aircraft on a daily basis.

8. On 31 December 1967, Troop B brought a memorable new year to the Squadron when they found and repatriated Major Joseph H. Rose from the 75th Street, (45W550) after he had been held captive by the VC for 5 years. (See Incl 2).

9. During an operation with the 21st ARVN Division on 4 January 1968, Troop D proved the capability of the L-10A for use as a medevac aircraft during an operation SV of VN Thanh, (45W3050). While conducting a VR, 2 Scout aircraft received heavy fire forcing both aircraft to go down, one crashing and burning intact. The two L-10A gun ships supporting the VR immediately jettisoned rocket pods and landed in the two separate locations of the crashed aircraft. The wounded crews of the Scout aircraft were picked up on the same day from and flown for 30 minutes to the medical evacuation hospital at Binh Thuy on the two gunships. (See Incl 3).

10. During OPERATION XI ASSUMED on 14 January 1968, Troop A and Troop B simultaneously made contact with 2 VC Battalions infiltrating down through the 44th STZ from Cambodia. Both troops made contact at approximately the same time in areas about 30 kilometers apart. Troop A discovered numerous weapons and personnel in the vicinity of coordinates (45W3650) resulting in a large ammunition and equipment capture as well as the first 107mm rockets found in the IV CTZ. Troop B, working to the east, vicinity (45W3550), made contact while inserting ground troops into a possible VC camp. The contact lasted throughout the afternoon resulting in 75 VC KIA and 10 possible VC KIA. The total results for the Squadron on that day were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Equipment Captured:**

- 45 - AK 47
- 170 - RPD Automatics
- 5 - B40 Rocket Launchers
- 3 - Huey Machine Guns
- 20 - Cases of B40 Rockets
- 3 - Cases of Rocket Launchers
- 1 - 107mm Rocket Launcher
- 56 - 107mm Rockets

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11. A chart of cumulative results for the reporting period is attached as

12. The breakdown of days the units were engaged by type activity during
the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Activity</th>
<th>Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training Days</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Movement</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Days</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. TRAINING:

1. Due to the great increase of new personnel to the Squadron during this
reporting period, a great deal of emphasis and co-ordination went into in-country
training at Squadron level.

2. All new pilots received a Squadron briefing conducted by the S-3 section
on policies, safety, incalculable firing, rules of engagement and border re-
strictions prior to commencing their flight training in the respective troops.
Classes were conducted weekly.

3. All other personnel arriving in the Squadron were given a 5 day in-
country orientation by Troop D personnel conducted at Vinh Long Chest. 
Personnel were taught all the basic and required subjects listed in US/ARV 350-1,
concluding with a combat ambush patrol in Vinh Long Province. Classes were con-
ducted bi-monthly during the period to insure that all new personnel received the
training.

4. INTELLIGENCE:

1. During the past reporting period, maximum emphasis was placed on the
understanding of effective and timely intelligence data. Liaison visits with the
various American and Vietnamese units around Vinh Long has helped improve the
S-2 collection of intelligence data, thus enhancing Air Cavalry operations.

2. The continued use of the National Police Force has proven effective in
gathering intelligence data during sweeps around the perimeter of the airfield.
It has also contributed appreciably to the improvement of Vietnamese and American
relationships.

3. During the period 1 November 1968 thru 31 January 1969, all ambush
activity was curtailed. This was due to the departure of Troop D, the ground
Cav Troop, on an extended operation at Chi Lang (W1205520). It was also due
to the emphasis put on the pacification program underway in the towns and
hamlets in the Vinh Long Province.

4. The S-2 section, in conjunction with the S-3 section, also undertook the
project of constructing a Squadron Training Museum. The museum was built in
replica of a VC hut and contains various items of equipment and weapons often
used by the VC. This has proven most effective in the orientation and in-country
training given all new scout pilots. It gives the GMS a first hand look
at some of the equipment and weapons he will see in the operational area.

5. In January 1969, the Squadron was given the overall responsibility for
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the defense of the circle, perimeter. The 3-2 section, working in conjunction with the 33 section, took over the responsibility and completely reorganized the defense system. Valley Defense Force 6-3 (D) assigned perimeter areas of responsibility to various tower units on the airfield. Construction of new bunker/tower complexes was completed and units are presently improving their barriers and communications. All activities pertaining to the airfield defense such as Fire Fly, Hero Rocket and Red-Bees are now centrally located and controlled by the Squadron. Defoliation of the area just outside the perimeter surrounding the airfield has been completed to improve observation and fields of fire.

X. SAFETY:

1. During the reporting period there were three accidents involving Squadron aircraft. A brief account of these accidents follows:

a. Troop L, OSH, 1 Dec 66. This aircraft had tail rotor failure and possible partial power loss. The aircraft was autorotated and touched down hard and tail low. The main rotor severed the tail boom.

b. Troop A, ANG, 13 Jan 69. While engaged in a training flight autorotation, the aircraft touched down on a left wing. The pilot overcorrected after touchdown and the aircraft veered to the right, skidding off the blacktop. The left side collapsed, and the main rotor struck the ground breaking the last six inches below the main rotor head.

c. Troop L, OSH, 27 Jan 69. During a training flight the pilot was executing an autorotation. The aircraft hit tail low and the main rotor flopped cutting off the tail boom.

2. Safety Record (Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOTAL HOURS FLOWN</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RAGC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HRT</td>
<td>1324</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Troop</td>
<td>5072</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Troop</td>
<td>5346</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Troop</td>
<td>5346</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1 LOS</td>
<td>19430</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Command emphasis continues to be placed on the possibility of FOD. The ramp and movement areas are maintained in a high state of police and a class has been held on the cause and prevention of FOD for all pilots and crew members. The Squadron Maintenance Officer and Factory Technical Representative conducted the class.

4. There has been a very large turnover of personnel within the Squadron during the month of January and the majority of our pilots are now new and inexperienced. However, due to command emphasis and the individual attitudes displayed in the Squadron it is expected that our accident rate will remain at a low level.

I. COMMUNICATIONS:

1. In November, the 7/1 LOS Communications Center installed a land line

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secure telegraph system. This system replaced the radio telegraph system that was set up originally. This system, along with the TX-7, gives the communications center a secure and more efficient message releasing and receiving capability. The circuit output has improved tremendously since this system was installed. The TX-76 and TX-96 were hand-received from the area communications center.

2. The 52nd Sig, Dat, began installing a 200 pair cable during the last part of November. This cable will replace all commercial phone lines that are on the original 100 pair cable. The telephonic system in the 71 ACS has been a constant problem with the deterioration of the old 100 pair cable. This new heavy duty cable will greatly improve the telephonic communications in the 71 ACS.

3. When the Last CRDL was written, it was stated that Squadron secure communications had been improved and expanded by the receipt of additional TSZ-28/28-28's. Additional TX-29's had been issued to the Squadron and more will be issued in the future. Our goal, of each aircraft having a voice-secure capability, should be fulfilled in the next quarter. The TSZ-28/28-28's which the Troops have in their present aircraft and the TX-29's in their 100's are keyed daily by the Troop communications personnel. The keying equipment TX-12 and TX-29 has been hand-received to the troops along with daily extracts of the keylists. This alleviates the Squadron communications section from keying all the aircraft that have TX-28's installed.

4. During the third week of January, Squadron communications closed their accounts with the 51st Maint. Co (Com) in Can Tho. Evacuation of signal repair items is now being handled by the 238th Maint Co. The 238th will evacuate the items to Phan Duc for repair. This helps the Squadron in that previously the items had to wait until transportation became available to Can Tho. Some equipment is still being sent to the 23d Maint Co. This outstanding support has kept the ratio of deadline equipment down.

5. On the 20th of January, the Squadron end Troop communications were monitored by the 101st Racial Research Co (LSD) by request of the Squadron Communications Officer. The tactical radio and telephonic systems were closely monitored for a period of two weeks. The team found very few security violations during this period. Random frequencies were checked every day and all phone calls through the switchboard were monitored. The team did recommend more use of the K5 numerical codes, which is being implemented at this time.

II. LOGISTIC:

1. During the reporting period, the S4 continued to render logistical support to the 71 ACS. In the beginning of November, plans were made to move Troop B from Div to our location in Vinh Long. The S4 was responsible for construction of billets, latrines, chow, and office facilities prior to their arrival. Construction was also started on aircraft revetments and paving of the south ramp to handle the increased aircraft. On 5 December 1968, Week To buildings for Troop B were completed.

2. On 11 December 1968, Troop D commenced an operation for the 44th STZ in the vicinity of Ch Long (56026650) lasting throughout the reporting period. The Squadron was responsible for daily resupply of all rations, ammunition and water during the period. This necessitated 3 sorties a day to fulfill the new commitments.
During the month of December, several liaison trips were conducted by the Sq to our direct and general support units to hand carry requisitions for combat essential items and to maintain a harmonious relationship with these units.

4. In late December, the Sq made arrangements with the 304th Depot in Long Binh to exchange all of our M-16 rifles for new weapons with chrome chambers. On 30 December, 225 of the new weapons were picked up and issued to the troops. This required extensive coordination within the Squadron in that many of the troops were in field locations and aircraft were required to make deliveries. As the new weapons were picked up from Long Binh they were issued to the Troops. On 23 January 1969, the weapons exchange was completed for the entire Squadron.

5. In January, this Squadron assumed the responsibility for the entire defense of the airfield perimeter. Coordination and plans were made with the 164th O&G to increase the amount of weapons and ammunition allocated for the perimeter. The primary problem was the fact that many of the units at Vinh Long did not have the weapons and equipment required assigned as TOE. Requirements have been submitted to the 164th O&G for the necessary equipment. Barrier nets (concertina wire, sandbags and lumber) have been obtained or placed on requisition to strengthen the perimeter.

6. During the month of January, coordination was made with the 53rd Gp in Vung Tau to receive assistance and recommendations for the Vinh Long Ammunition Supply Point. Representatives from the 143th Ordnance Co. made several visits to the supply point and provided additional personnel to supervise procedures in the issue, handling, and storage of ammunition. As a result of their assistance the ammunition storage area is under construction and is expected to be complete by the end of February. This will enable the Ammunition Supply Point to maintain a larger stock of ammunition within a more secure environment, and will ensure more efficient support to the Squadron as well as the installation.
II (C) Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

A. Personnel: None

B. Operations:

1. Joint Operations with ARVN Units:

(a) Observation: Indigenous units are not always able to provide a reserve or back up force for Air Cavalry Operations.

(b) Evaluation: Without adequate reserves it is highly undesirable to deploy the Infantry platoon organic to the Air Cavalry Troop. It is also undesirable to conduct normal cavalry operations with insufficient reserves to provide security for downed aircraft and crews.

(c) Recommendations: That commanders effect coordination with units having operational control of their Air Cavalry Troop to insure that reserves are available and that a thorough mutual understanding is reached as to conduct of missions. This co-ordination should be made through ARVN channels as well as U.S. Advisory channels and a clear understanding reached prior to launching the mission. When the supported unit is not able to provide reserves, the tactical employment of the aircraft should be modified to minimize the risk of losing an aircraft to hostile fire.

(d) Command Action: The Troop Commander or his representative, prior to each mission, co-ordinates with the Senior Advisor and Counterpart to establish use of reserve forces. Prior to departing for the AO, the mission commander physically checks the presence and combat readiness of the reaction force at the staging area.

2. Aircraft Recovery:

(a) Observation: When an aircraft is forced down in the area of operations, the need for immediate recovery is imperative, if the primary mission is not to be detracted from.

(b) Evaluation: On many occasions it has taken the recovery aircraft as much as 1.5 to 5.0 hours to extract a downed aircraft. Air and ground troop assets are tied up for extended periods of time.

(c) Recommendations: That recovery aircraft (CH-47) with rigging crews be staged at Soc Trang and Vinh Long on a daily basis for immediate recovery of aircraft stationed at those locations.

(d) Command Action: The feasibility of decentralization of recovery aircraft in the Delta is presently being analyzed. The recovery officer
from the 611th Maintenance Company has been consulted concerning this problem.

3. Night Operations:

   (a) Observation: The use of xenon searchlights for illumination during night missions has proven ineffective.

   (b) Evaluation: The xenon searchlight is excellent for illumination of targets at great distances. When used on an aircraft, even on wide beams, the light beam is too narrow for use while in the air.

   (c) Recommendation: That the illumination aircraft discontinue the use of the xenon searchlight and utilize a C-123 searchlight cluster. This system has been used effectively within the Squadron, however a more effective wider coverage system is still needed.

   (d) Command Action: The xenon searchlights in the Squadron have been replaced with the C-123 searchlight clusters and reinforced with aircraft flares.

C. Trainings:

1. In-country Trainings:

   (a) Observation: New in-country personnel assigned to the 7/1 AGS are not completing the in-country training within 7 days after arrival in country, as required by USARV 350-1 regulation.

   (b) Evaluation: Personnel assigned to the unit normally complete their in-processing to include personal records, finance records, signing for equipment and troop orientation approximately 3 to 4 days after being assigned to the Squadron. The average reporting time to the Squadron from arrival date in country has been 4 to 6 days. Training cannot be conducted or scheduled often enough to meet all requirements. Additionally, Squadron does not have readily available range facilities or personnel to conduct in-country training as frequently as required.

   (c) Recommendation: An in-country school be established and conducted for personnel assigned to non-divisional units arriving in-country at or near the replacement center, where personnel can receive the required training prior to assignment. This would enable the personnel to meet the training requirements, receive good training at facilities that are adequate and allow, in some cases, a closer screening of records and personnel for assignment to units while training is under conduct.

   (d) Command Action: The Squadron is conducting in-country training with facilities at Vinh Long. Training is being conducted bi-monthly and as required as soon as possible after replacements arrive in the Squadron.

D. Intellignence:

1. POW Intellignence:
(a) Observation: Information acquired from POWs by immediate interrogation enhances the successful completion or exploitation of the Cavalry mission when operating with AINV Divisions.

(b) Evaluation: When the Cavalry troops bring POWs or documents to the Division headquarters or senior unit which they are supporting, it is difficult to get information passed back to the troop commander on the results of POW interrogation. In almost all cases, the troop is returning to work in the same area and such information would greatly enhance mission results.

(c) Recommendation: All units requesting Air Cavalry troops should immediately attempt to pass on any information gained through POWs or documents. Emphasis should be placed on interrogating POWs upon their capture and relaying this information to the mission commander by the most expeditious means.

(d) Command Action: Squadron has sent personnel to respective Division Headquarters for informal briefings where this point has been stressed. Additionally, mission leaders are making the specific point of requesting any information when a POW or document is turned into the Division TOC.

E. Logistics:
1. Shortage of Propane Gas:

(a) Observation: Recent increases in containment mess hall equipment has increased the requirement for bottled propane resupply to a daily basis.

(b) Evaluation: During the reporting period many new items of garrison type equipment such as coffee urns, hot and cold serving lines and mixing machines have been issued and installed requiring more propane than is presently available at Vinh Long.

(c) Recommendations: That the Squadron have bulk propane tanks installed near the mess hall and that resupply of propane be on a regularly scheduled basis.

(d) Command Action: The Squadron 3-4 has coordinated with the USAV POL Officer concerning this problem. The USAV POL Officer is assisting in obtaining the tanks and is arranging for scheduled delivery of propane gas.

2. Turn-in of Unservicable Equipment:

(a) Observation: Property disposal facilities are not in close proximity to Vinh Long.

(b) Evaluation: Equipment technically inspected by the 238th Maintenance Company and declared unserviceable must be turned in to a property disposal facility. The nearest facility of this type is located in Vung Tau. Disposal of unserviceable equipment requires aircraft to be utilized for other than operational missions. At present the 238th Maintenance Company has no facility for accepting or storage of those items pending availability.
of cheaper transportation, i.e. water craft. There is no adequate road network from Vinh Long to Vung Tau.

(c) Recommendations: That a property disposal facility be centrally located at Can Tho which would be easily accessible by road to units located at Soc Trang and Vinh Long. Also recommend that the 236th Maintenance Contact Team at Vinh Long accept unserviceable material required to go to the property disposal facility at Vung Tau and that they be given the responsibility to evacuate this equipment.

(c) Command Action: Arrangements have been made with the 236th Maintenance Contact Team at Vinh Long to accept unserviceable equipment and to evacuate this equipment to Vung Tau.

4. Command and Control Console, AN/ASC-11:

(a) Observation: The 7/1 ACS is authorized three command and control consoles, AN/ASC-11, according to HDOE 17-952, dated August 1960. The Squadron has one AN/ASC-10 in the Squadron Commander's aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: The Squadron Commander's aircraft is used as the command control aircraft in the area of operation. Because the Squadron operates in three different AD's on any given day, one console equipped aircraft is inadequate.

(c) Recommendation: Request the 7/1 ACS be issued the three AN/ASC-11's authorized by the HDOE to ensure that the Squadron command and control aircraft are equipped with the console.

(d) Command Action: The three AN/ASC-11's have been on requisition since the 7/1 ACS was authorized the AN/ASC-11's, follow up action has been initiated with negative results.

5. Support Maintenance for the MX707 Antenna Matching Unit:

(a) Observation: MX707 units are turned in to the 2nd Maintenance Battalion in Vung Tau for repair. The antenna matching unit cannot be repaired in-country and is therefore sent to Sacramento Army Depot for repair.

(b) Evaluation: The MX707 antenna matching units have not been returned since the first one went in several months ago. However, six antenna matching units were salvaged at the support maintenance unit and these items were dropped from our inventory. These matching units were put on requisition and received the latter part of this quarter. The new items were depleted immediately to replace inoperable units on vehicles. The supply is at a critical state and none have been salvaged recently.

(c) Recommendation: That a support unit be established in the Delta to repair antenna matching units. If the antenna matching unit does have to go to Sacramento Army Depot more units should be salvaged, allowing new units to be placed on requisition.
(c) Command Action: The /1 ACS communications section is presently utilizing the 236th Maintenance Company in Barksdale for repair. If this unit can repair the 162707 unit, the item will not have to be sent to Sacramento Army Depot.

F. Other:

1. ARC-54 Radios:

   (a) Observation: Avionic difficulties have been found in the ARC-54 radios.

   (b) Evaluation: Continuous operation of the FM radio had caused overheating and eventual malfunction in the transmitter. By limiting the transmission time and also any surge of power to the radio itself, the life of the radio could be extended.

   (c) Recommendation: Transmissions be limited to 30 seconds with a cooling interval prior to the next transmission. Prior to turning on the radio, inverter checks should be made and the aircraft load meter should stabilize on 5 or less.

   (d) Command Action: All pilots are thoroughly briefed on the radio operation and limits on radio transmissions. The load meter check prior to turning on aircraft radios has been included in the ramp SOP.

2. AH-1G FM Antenna:

   (a) Observation: The FM antenna on the AH-1G is positioned in the pylon enclosure behind the engine oil reservoir. An oil film and accompanying dust and dirt decreases the range and effectiveness of the FM radio.

   (b) Evaluation: Because of the close proximity of the antenna to the reservoir this problem must be checked after every flight.

   (c) Recommendation: That a sheet metal shield be placed between the reservoir and antenna or the antenna should be relocated.

   (d) Command Action: All pilots on their preflight and postflight inspections check the antenna for cleanliness. An AIR is being submitted on this problem.

3. Switch, Pressure Sensing (OHSA):

   (a) Observation: After sitting for several hours an OHSA lost the prime to the engine fuel pump. This aircraft could easily be primed by removing the fuel line from the fuel spray nozzle (FSN 2046-535-2949) and starting the engine with the starter. Otherwise, operation was normal.

   (b) Evaluation: The entire fuel system was checked for leaks where air could enter the system causing contamination. Finally the engine fuel pump was replaced along with a differential pressure switch (FSN 229-379-9187). This immediately solved the problem. Other instances have shown that this differential pressure switch has caused fuel pump cavitation. After
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considerable consultation between maintenance personnel and engine technical representatives it is felt that loss of prime can be attributed to a faulty diaphragm in the pressure switch.

(c) Recommendations: When fuel pump cavitation or loss of prime occurs, which cannot be attributed to leaking fuel lines or fuel stoppage, the pressure switch (FSN 5930-979-9137) be replaced as the next step in trouble shooting.

(d) Command Action: The direct support TC Detachments for each troop have been thoroughly briefed on this problem. The pressure switch (FSN 5930-979-9137) is presently being stocked to meet replacement requirements.

4. OH6A Main Rotor Blade Dampers (FSN 1615-922-3200)

(a) Observation: After two to three hundred hours on the OH6A, lateral vibrations were experienced. These could be worked out by exercising the main rotor dampers; however, the lateral vibrations continued to reoccur and a new damper did not always solve the problem.

(b) Evaluation: After considerable experimentation, it was found that by keeping a supply of dampers (FSN 1615-922-3200) the break torque on each damper could be varied in inch/pounds. Normally, when a damper problem arises, one or two of the dampers are near the maximum or minimum torque limits. By matching the four dampers which have a range spread of 20 inch/pounds or less, the lateral vibration is eliminated. Rough handling of blades when phasing also causes damage to the dampers.

(c) Recommendations: When lateral vibrations are experienced on the OH6A, a set of 4 dampers should be matched with a range spread of less than 20 inch/pounds differential, with the average break torque between 255-295 inch/pounds. Only 2 dampers are authorized for stockage by IM 55-1580-214-35P; they should be declared a combat essential item with at least 4 each on hand at unit level. Also, if dampers which are removed are still within the range of 255-295 inch/pounds, they should be marked with torque values and restocked. Pilots and crew members should use caution when phasing blades.

(d) Command Action: All aviators and crew chiefs have been instructed to phase the blades with caution. The direct support TC Detachments and all maintenance officers have been furnished the above information. The Squadron has requested authority for additional stockage.

5. OH6A Recovery:

(a) Observation: During several OH6A recoveries, characteristics of instability have been found in different aircraft configurations.

(b) Evaluation: Experience has revealed that the OH6A is very unstable while being evacuated when the crew and cargo doors are installed and the tail boom is missing.
(c) Recommendations: If the tail boom is missing, the crew and cargo doors should be removed and carried inside the recovery aircraft.

(d) Command Action: All recovery teams in the Squadron have been instructed to comply with the above recommendations.

4 Inc1
1. After Action Report Mounted 106mm RR
2. After Action Report 31 December 1968
4. Report—Equipment Captured or Destroyed

GEORGE R. CROOK
LTC, Armor
Commanding
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AVBACE (14 Feb 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 January 1969 (JSO 356/01-65) (11) (O)

Da, U.S. 164TH AVIATION GROUP, AID 98215, 22 February 1969

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.
   a. Personnel: None
   b. Operations:
      (1) Joint Operations with I.VI Units: This Headquarters concurs with the recommendations and action taken.
      (2) Aircraft Recovery: There is not a shortage of recovery ships (Gi-47) but rather a shortage of rigging material and rigging ships (UH-1D). During the month of December, the 611th maintenance Company inventory of UH-1D aircraft was reduced to one aircraft that was available for rigging. Prior to this, the 611th had two rigging ships, one at 3rd Trang and one at Vinh Long. If this ship goes down for any reason, the immediate rigging capability for IV Corps is drastically curtailed. 132nd Group then has to provide a ship to pick up the rigging crew. This is time consuming. When Group is informed that the 611th ship is down, a ship is sent to the 611th for rigging assistance. To help alleviate this problem, the Group aviation companies are training their maintenance platoon personnel to rig. Rigging gear is being collected so if a need arises, those companies can rig their own aircraft. At this time the 611th rigging capability is barely adequate. Group has asked that the 611th provide one more ship to the rigging section. Due to lack of float aircraft that normally are available for use as rigging ships, the 611th has not been able to provide an extra ship.
      (3) Night Operations: This Headquarters concurs with the recommendations and action taken.
   c. Training:
      (1) In-country Training: This Headquarters concurs with the recommendation and action taken.
d. Intelligence:

POW Intelligence: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and action taken.

e. Logistics:

(1) Shortage of Propane Gas: Propane is supplied by commercial contractors. Coordination with Ban Tho 134 has revealed an anticipated completion date for installation of commercial bulk storage and replenishment facilities at Ban Tho o/a 1 March 1969. Once this is completed, the problem of transportation of propane should be minimized. In the event the commercial contractor cannot meet the requirements, the 7/1st ACS has full authorization of field mess equipment on hand.

(2) Turn-in of Unserviceable Equipment: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and the action taken.

(3) Command and Control Console, AII/ASC-11: A review of requisitions submitted by 7/1st ACS revealed that the three AII/ASC-11's were only recently placed on valid requisition. Appropriate follow-up action will be taken in current regulations.

(4) Support maintenance for the I-XC77 Antenna Matching Unit: This headquarters is incapable of determining if density of subject equipment is sufficient to justify a local maintenance capability; or an in-country maintenance capability. Recommend a direct exchange system on items in need of repair be evaluated to determine feasibility.

f. Others:

(1) 380-5A Radios: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and action taken.

(2) AII-1G M. Antenne: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and action taken.

(3) Switch, Pressure sensing (A/NIK): This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and action taken.

(4) 216A Mainotor Blade Dampers (584 1615-222-8200) - This headquarters concurs with the recommendation and action taken.
AVRAGE (14 Feb 69) 1st Ind 22 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for
Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS ORC-65) (i2)

(5) OFFICIAL DISCRETION: This Headquarters concurs with the recommendation
and action taken.

JACK V. HAGDMILL
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
2 DA, ATT: ACSPOA
1 CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATT: AVB-6
Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for
Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RG 5OFOD-0) (RL) (UIC: WZDAA)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVIC-DST
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: UPOF-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate
and concurs with the contents, except as noted below.

a. Section I, paragraph 45, page 5: USAV Reg 614-220, Reporting and
Assignment of Enlisted Personnel Returning from Overseas, dated 8 Jan 69,
prescribes procedures which, if properly complied with, should substantially
reduce if not eliminate the problem of non-receipt of assignment instruc-
tions for junior enlisted personnel. Normally, EM will receive assignment
instructions approximately 45 days prior to DEROS. Nonreceipt of assignment
instruction rosters are provided by USARV 45 days prior to DEROS month for
EL-Bb personnel for updating. Personnel within 10 days of normal DEROS
who are still pending assignment instructions are reidentified to USARV.
USARV Reg 55-2 provides guidance to permit individuals to ship household
goods prior to receipt of assignment instructions. Approximately 99% of 1st
Avn Bde Junior enlisted personnel receive assignments prior to ten days
before DEROS. The month of December 68 unaccountably showed a slightly lower
rate of approximately 96.2%.

b. Section II, paragraph Cl, page 13: All Brigade units have been di-
rected to coordinate with division replacement training facilities located
near them to obtain assistance in replacement training. These training units
have facilities available to accomplish all replacement training require-
ments and have given excellent cooperation to 1st Aviation Brigade units.
The 9th Infantry Division is nearest to the 7/1st ACS Base Camp and can
assist them in their replacement training.

c. Section II, paragraph 24, page 15: Reference USARV confidential
message, 86623, dated 31 December 1968 which outlines the basis of issue of
ASC 10, 11, and 15's. Command consoles are issued to aviation groups or
separate battalions only. They are command-controlled items and will only
be received through a ROL. The 7/1st ACS must coordinate their mission re-
quirements with the 164th Group for an increase in allocation of 164th
Group's resources.
d. Section II, paragraph E5, page 15: Units which have MX 6707 matching units which have been in the repair and return to user program over six weeks should receive a turn-in and requisition new ones on a one-for-one basis. Coordination is being made with 1st Log to have the MX 6707 placed into a repair and return to stock program. Antenna matching unit MX 2799/VRC, the predecessor to the MX 6707, is a good substitute item and is in the supply system.

e. Section II, paragraph F1, page 16: The problem existing in AH-1G aircraft with ARC-54 radios is a heat problem. The location of the radio allows very little air circulation and receives heat from the engine exhaust. Tests are being conducted to measure heat in the vicinity of the ARC-54 in the AH-1G. Different modifications have been performed locally, one of which appears to relieve the heat problem. Avionics Labs and ECM personnel, in conjunction with the Avionics officer of 1st Aviation Brigade and 3/17th ACS, are conducting these tests to achieve an NMO which will eliminate the transmission problems of the ARC-54 in the AH-1G aircraft.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

DAVID L. ANDERSON
Ct. AGC
Ant. AG
AVHGC-DST (14 Feb 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RG-OFPD-65) (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 24 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry and concurs with report and the endorsements of intermediate headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
7/1st ACS
1st Avn Bde
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as endorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. E. HOOFFIELD
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
In November 1968, Troop D provided security for a fire support base in the vicinity (VS89358) while OPCON to the 44th STZ. During this operation the VC held fortified positions along the SW portion of Nui Coto (VS900562). Troop D planned their 106RR on air boats supplied by the 44th STZ to enable the weapons to move down into the open swamp land where direct fire could be placed in the VC caves. The air boat was very effective as a maneuver element, however, the air boat could not maintain its normal speed. Due to the weight of the 106RR only 4 rounds could be carried in the same boat. This caused a problem in that the additional air boats carried the ammunition for the weapons, and rounds had to be transferred from one air boat to the other. When fired, the 106RR had very little effect on the boat, however, a great deal of water and spray covered the area. The stability and accuracy of the 106RR were not affected. This adaptation allowed the 106RR to be carried over terrain where normally a heavy crew served weapon could not be used (See Incl 1 to Incl 1). During the same operation the 106RR was placed on top of an armored personnel carrier to accomplish the same mission. This adaptation also proved to be very satisfactory in that the APC could traverse the open swampland and rice paddies with little or no problem. The APC with the 106RR was able to carry the basic load of ammunition required (See Incl 2 to Incl 1). Both of these concepts have proven very valuable and have been used frequently by Troop D, 7/1 AOS on operations in the IV CTZ.
CONFIDENTIAL

INCLUSION 1 TO INCLUSION 2 (AFTER ACTION REPORT) to Operational Report
Lessons learned for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1969

Blade & Cage

Driver

Extra Rounds

106RR

Motor

Directional Flaps

Mount for 50 cal or 30 cal MG

106RR Mounted on Air Boat

AIR CAT

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

ECLOSURE 2 TO ECLOSURE 1 (AFTER ACTION REPORT) to Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

106ER Mounted on APC

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

INCLUSION 2 (AFTER ACTION REPORT) to Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

On 31 December 1968, B Troop, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry received a mission to VR an operations area NW of Ca Mau (VR953490) in support of the 21st AFWN Division Operations.

While conducting a visual reconnaissance of the area, B Troop located numerous sampans traveling SW along a network of canals, loaded with equipment and ammunition. The sampans were not camouflaged or hidden but were left along the canals as if the personnel traveling in them had departed in a hurry as the aircraft approached. B Troop inserted troops on the various clusters of sampans.

As the teams and C&C aircraft orbited overhead, the Troop Commander observed what appeared to be a VC several hundred meters away. He was in tall grass and reeds waving a white cloth. It was surmised that this individual was possibly bait for a trap, however, the possibility of a defection or surrender could not be overlooked. The Troop Commander requested that his scout aircraft cover him while he approached the man to attempt a pick up. On landing in the area, he noticed that the man had a fair complexion and long beard, definitely not a Vietnamese. As the Troop Commander departed the area he notified the 21st AFWN Div., that he had just picked up James N. Rowe, an American officer who had been held prisoner by the VC for 5 years. The expression and relief displayed on Rowe's face after being picked up was enough to convince the men of B Troop that their year in Vietnam would be a memorable one and that 31 December 1968, would be a New Year's Eve never forgotten. The Troop dropped Maj. Rowe off at Ca Mau to a reception committee of numerous personnel for examination and questioning and returned to the operational area. An insertion was made in the same vicinity where numerous caches of ammunition and equipment were secured. In one back pack, several pictures were found showing numerous Americans being examined by VC doctors. Maj. Rowe was included in some of these pictures. The contents, along with caches were turned over to the 21st AFWN Division.
On 4 January 1969, Troop B, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry received a mission to VR an operational area SW of VT Thanh (WR190680) in support of a 21st ARVN Division operation.

While conducting a visual reconnaissance of their assigned area, 4 armed men were observed running toward a tree line. After receiving clearance to fire, the gun team rolled in to suppress the area with rockets and mini guns. Upon completion of the firing runs, the scout aircraft returned to check the damage. As they approached the area, they received heavy automatic weapons fire. The lead OH-6A crashed out of control against a tree line and burst into flames on impact. The observer was dead inside the flaming wreckage, however, the pilot managed to crawl clear. The scout wingman attempted to land by the burning helicopter but the enemy's automatic weapons fire severely wounded him. He was shot in the leg, had one finger shot off and was temporarily blinded by shattering plexiglasses. His scout observer took control and landed the aircraft approximately 1000 meters away from the action.

The weapons platoon leader in the lead Cobra spotted the pilot of the first LOH crawling away from the fire. He immediately led his Cobra to pick him up. The pilot of the Cobra dismounted and went to the LOH pilot's aid, as his wingman began making gun runs on the closing VC. With this covering fire, the Weapons Platoon Leader and his pilot were able to get the scout pilot onto the ammo bay door and fly clear of the contested area. As soon as this rescue was completed, the Cobra wingman located the second LOH and landed to evacuate the crew. In this case, the Cobra pilot got out of his helicopter to help the scout observer carry the seriously wounded scout pilot to the Cobra. Once they had placed the wounded pilot on the ammo bay door, the second scout observer got in the front seat of the Cobra and the Cobra pilot used his own body as a shield to hold the wounded officer on the ammo bay door during the evacuation flight to base. This operation proved the value of the Cobra in roles other than that of a weapons platform, while also exemplifying the initiative and ingenuity of the Dutchmaster Team.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69

CO, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry