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<tr>
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</tbody>
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The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November to 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R1)

1. Section 1 (C) Significant Organisation or Unit activities.

   a. General. During the reporting period, I FFORCENV Arty continued support of ARVN, RF/PF, ROK, US and USSSF/CIDG forces in II CTZ. The I FFORCENV Arty organisation remained unchanged from that reported 31 Oct 68. Two group headquarters each with four battalions attached, three separate battalions, three separate batteries and ten detachments supported operations conducted by allied maneuver units in areas of operations (AO) indicated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I FFORCENV Arty</th>
<th>Maneuver Unit</th>
<th>AO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41st Arty Op</td>
<td>22d ARVN Div</td>
<td>DAN SINH - COCHIEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24th ARVN STZ</td>
<td>Binh Tay - MacArthur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Arty Op</td>
<td>23d ARVN Div</td>
<td>DAN THANG - MCLAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 27th Arty</td>
<td>23d ARVN Div</td>
<td>GRID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry B, 6th Bn, 8th Arty</td>
<td>Task Force South</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry C, 5th Bn, 22d Arty</td>
<td>9th ROK Inf Div</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>22d ARVN Div</td>
<td>9th ROK Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry C, 6th Bn, 8th Arty</td>
<td>23d ARVN Div</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cap ROK Inf Div</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. See Inclosure 1
2. See Inclosure 2
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RCS CSFOR - 65 (R1)

The 1st Bn, 60th Arty (AWSF), with attached Btry B, 29th Arty (SLS) and Btry
1st Artillery (MD), and HHB, 5th Bn, 26th Arty (TAB) with ten attached counter-
mortar radar detachments continued operations in support of allied forces
throughout II CTZ.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Hostile artillery activity was concentrated in the three northern
Provinces of Kontum, Pleiku and Binh Dinh during Nov 68. Significant as-
pects of this activity were the enemy employment of 105mm artillery for
the first time on targets near Ben Het, Kontum, and his employment of the
100mm gun on targets near Duc Co, Pleiku. The enemy artillery capability
increased as two new battalions were categorized as "confirmed" and one
battalion as "possible" in OB holdings.

(2) Enemy artillery attacks and expenditures throughout II CTZ for
the reporting period are indicated below: Type weapons employed included
mortars, rockets and recoilless rifles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>ATTACKS/DAY</th>
<th>RDS/DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 68</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 68</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 69</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately 50% of the enemy attacks occurred in the Western Highlands
where 45% of the enemy's artillery capability is suspected to be located.

(3) The enemy attack on Phan Rang AFB on 26 Jan 69 is noteworthy in
that CMRC identified the rounds as 107mm rockets. This is the first re-
ported employment of this weapon in II CTZ.

(4) Countermortar Radar Operations.

(a) During the reporting period, countermortar radars (CMR) continued
to be deployed at those installations and fire bases where enemy artillery
has been active. Pattern analyses of attacks in the Duc Lap, Duc Co and
An Khe areas to include past enemy artillery firing positions, caliber of
weapon used, and time of attack were constructed to provide the CMR's a
primary sector of search. Pattern analyses of all areas where CMR's are
deployed are maintained by the S2, I FFORCE Arty and updated after each
attack.

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(b) Each month the degree of CMR operational effectiveness is measured by comparing the number of hostile firing positions located with the total number of attacks received. The average percentage of operational effectiveness during this reporting period was 57%. CMR’s deployed in areas that frequently receive enemy artillery attacks are the most effective. For example, 253d FA Det deployed at Duc Iap was 83% effective and the 77th FA Det located at Pleiku AFB was 73% effective during the reporting period. Communications to all major units that can supply the CMR with rapid notification of possible enemy firing positions has enhanced the CMR operations.

(c) Although the effectiveness of CMR’s are analyzed monthly the best measure of any target acquisition means is obtained when a ground sweep of the area is performed. Ground sweeps were conducted for 35% of the 265 enemy artillery attacks occurring in Dec 68 and Jan 69. This was a slight increase over previous months.

(d) During November 1968, a maintenance contact team modified all AN/MPQ-14 countermortar radars in RVN to enable them to detect low trajectory artillery weapons more accurately. This modification was installed in the 13 Q-4 CMR’s located in II CTZ by mid-November and has proved successful as indicated by increased detection of low trajectory weapon attacks.

(e) On 2 Nov 68, the 256th FA Det located at FSB 12 (16 km East of Dak To) was rendered a combat loss by enemy artillery. Within 36 hours a maintenance float Q-4, located with the 62d Maint Bn at Pleiku, was airlifted to the Dak To area as a replacement.

(f) To utilize more adequately countermortar radar assets, the AN/MPQ-10A deployed in the Cam Ranh Bay/Dong Ba Thin area was redeployed to Ban Me Thuot due to the lack of an enemy artillery threat in the CRB/DBT area. The Q-4 radar at Ban Me Thuot was redeployed at LZ Sherry in the Phan Thiet area, thereby giving Task Force South a Q-4 countermortar radar capability.

c. Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Operations.

(a) On 10 Nov 68, the Darlac Province Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC) began operations as the second ARVN/US CFSCC established in II CTZ. The first CFSCC was established in Binh Tman Province in mid-Aug 68. The Darlac CFSCC is collocated with the 23d ARVN Div TOC in Ban Me Thuot City and consists of an operations section, targeting section and liaison officers. The CFSCC has reduced by at least five minutes the time
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required for granting clearances to artillery, gunships and Tac Air. Prior to the establishment of CFSCC in these areas two major problems were encountered.

1. It was difficult to integrate the fire power of allied nations capable of firing in a given area. This frequently necessitated selection of a less suitable weapon for attacking a particular target or the loss of a lucrative target while attempting to coordinate the required fire support.

2. The obtaining of political clearance often required an excessive amount of time while an FSCC, working through a liaison officer, attempted to obtain clearances from political headquarters and several military headquarters. The CFSCC alleviates these problems by collocating in one integrated facility, representatives from every fire support organization and clearance agency operating in a given area. The advantages are that the maneuver elements receive quick responses to calls for fire because the final authorities for selecting the best available weapon to attack the target and for obtaining political and military clearance are located within the single facility.

(b) During the period 5–12 Dec 68, Btry B, 1st Bn, 92d Arty (155T) and Batteries B and C, 6th Bn, 114th Arty (8/175, SP) supported elements of the 1st Inf Div and ARVN in operation DEAD END. The operation was conducted against the enemy's road network in the northwestern area of Binh Tay - MacArthur AO. The batteries' expenditures during the operation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B/1/92</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/6/14</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/6/14</td>
<td>1,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,897</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) On 16 Dec, a provisional battery was formed consisting of two 105mm howitzers deployed at Duc Lap District Headquarters and two 105mm howitzers, located at the Duc Lap USSF/CIDG Camp. The two howitzers at the District Headquarters are manned by 52d Arty Op personnel. One howitzer crew and one officer of the 52d Arty Op are located at the USSF/CIDG Camp to provide the platoon with a FIRECRACKER capability. The howitzers are manned by CIDG personnel for normal missions. The mission of the provisional battery is to provide support for the Duc Lap area where the enemy continues to pose a major threat. On 31 Jan 69 the unit was officially designated Btry D (PROV), 5th Bn, 22d Arty (105T) by 52d Arty Op.

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(d) On 14 Jan 69, 1st Bn, 92d Arty assumed responsibility for fire support coordination in northern Kontum Province from the 6th Bn, 29th Arty, 14th Inf Div Arty. An ARVN/US Combined Fire Support Coordination Center was established at Kontum City, the third CFSCC to begin operations in the II CTZ. The CFSCC staffing and operational responsibilities are similar to those of the Dalac CFSCC.

(e) On 17 Jan 69, 5th Bn, 27th Arty relocated its tactical command post from Phan Rang to Dalat for purposes of expediting coordination activities with Hq, Task Force South. Commanding Officer, 5th Bn, 27th Arty, is the Fire Support Coordinator for the Task Force South area of operations.

(f) On 4 Jan 69 four howitzers of Btry C, 1st Bn, 92d Arty (155T) began support of 24th Special Tactical Zone Operation Binh Tay 48 and 49. The four ARVN battalion search and clear operation was conducted in the mountainous terrain west of Plei Mrong and east of Se San River. The 1st Bn, 92d Arty, 3d Bn, 6th Arty and 6th Bn, 14th Arty provided forward observer parties for each maneuver battalion and 6th Bn, 14th Arty provided a Liaison Officer to facilitate rapid clearance of artillery fire. As of 31 Jan 69 Btry C, 1st Bn, 92d Arty expended more than 6,000 rounds in support of the operation which continued through the end of the reporting period.

(g) Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE).

1. An average of two ships were on station in II CTZ coastal waters each day of the reporting period to provide naval gunfire support for the 173d Abn Bde, CRID, 9th ROK Inf Div and Task Force South. The USS New Jersey supported operations of the 9th ROK Inf Div and Task Force South during the period 5-7 Nov 68 and returned 26-28 Dec 68 to again support the 9th ROK Inf Div. The following are the total naval gunfire expenditures for the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>ROUNDS EXPENDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>370</td>
<td>17,075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The average of 1922 Immediate Reaction/Hangfire targets developed each month was comparatively the same as for the previous reporting period. The number of targets by month, increased as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TARGETS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2684</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Several hip-shoots/raids were conducted. The most notable was a ten-day interdiction program employing 175mm guns in an area of heavy enemy activity normally beyond the range of occupied fire bases. A total of 935 rounds (175mm) was expended on this operation.

3 FSCE issued an average of nine ARC Light suppressions of 175mm firing each day of the reporting period. Commanders were requested to report informally on the effects of these suppressions on their units' missions. The response indicated that the suppressions had not significantly affected operations.

4 Plans were made during January for a phased takeover to the Artillery FSCE of those ARC Light functions currently performed by G3 Air, I FFORCEV. The takeover will be completed 5 Feb 69. The elimination of this dual interest should prove to be administratively more efficient in addition to recognizing that the primary responsibility for such action belongs with a FSCE.

(2) Training.

(a) The I FFORCE Arty Forward Observer Training Course (FOTC) and the Fire Direction Officer Training Course (FDOTC) continued to train artillery Lieutenants and other US and RVNAF personnel.

1 Four different programs of instruction have been developed to accommodate the various personnel receiving forward observer training: a 5-day course conducted for artillery Lieutenants and ARVN personnel; a 4-hour course conducted for 1st Cav Div (AM) and 173d Abn Bde replacements; an 8-hour course conducted for RF/PF Ranger School; and a 16-hour course conducted for RF/PF and RD personnel. The total output for the period July - Dec 68, was 3108 personnel for the four courses. A total of 618 were ARVN personnel. During Jan 69, 50 US personnel attended the FOTC.

2 In the latter part of Dec 68, I FFORCE Arty initiated a FADAC assistance program. A team of two instructors from the FDOTC and technical representatives from the 1st LOG Cmd visited I FFORCE Arty units during the week 22-28 Dec 68. The team will continue to conduct visits to the subordinate units approximately every six weeks to improve operator proficiency and decrease FADAC non-operational time.

(b) US Artillery Assistance and Support to RVNAF.

1 The three assistance programs, USSF/CIDG, Associate Battery and RF/PF and RD, continued during the reporting period. Improvement in the proficiency
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of CIDG camp artillery in the II CTZ continues. More effective coordination between ARVN and US Artillery units in mutual support and increased proficiency in the ARVN artillery battery operations and maintenance procedures was noted.

2 In Nov 68, approximately 97% of the RF/PF units in the II CTZ were located within the range capabilities of allied artillery. Forward observer training for RF/PF continued to receive emphasis during the period. CG, II Corps (ARVN) directed that forward observer training schools be established by ARVN Artillery units in each province. US artillery units assist in the training as requested by ARVN.

3 In coordination with CORDS-RF/PF, I FFORCEV Arty developed a requirement for US Advisors to submit a report on the status of RF/PF capabilities to obtain artillery fire support. A series of questions pertaining to forward observers assigned, communications available, and the artillery support provided were distributed to the Advisors through CORDS channels. When responses have been received they will be used to isolate problem areas and initiate corrective action to improve the fire support for RF/PF.

3 Other

(a) Artillery Seminar. The Third Allied Artillery Seminar was hosted by CG, I FFORCEV Arty in Nha Trang on 29 Jan 69. Senior commanders selected staff officers and associate US artillery advisors of ARVN, ROK and US artillery organizations attended the one day conference. The seven topics included a progress report on RF/PF forward observer training and artillery survey and mapping problems presented by the ARVN Artillery; innovations in gunnery techniques by the ROK Artillery; and countermortar/defensive targets programs and an informational topic pertaining to the operations of the Darlac CFSCC presented by US Artillery. The day's program was concluded by a demonstration of the Radar Chronograph, M36.

(b) Ammunition Expenditure Analysis. The Ammunition Analysis Section, established in Sep 68, has enabled a more comprehensive analysis of I FFORCEV Arty ammunition expenditures in the II CTZ. Resulting from the weekly and monthly analyses, expenditure trends were emphasized or curtailed by command action and target analysis, target acquisition, fire planning and coordination continued to be more effective. For the six month period, Aug 68 - Jan 69, 15% of I FFORCEV Arty expenditures were in the interdiction category, while 32% and 20% were in the more profitable acquired and confirmed target categories, respectively.
Artillery Safety. The activities of the Artillery Safety Section, established in Oct 68, included publication of an Artillery Accident/Incident Investigating Officer's Checklist for uniform preparation of investigations; publication of nine lessons learned from analyses of artillery accidents; publication of two letters distributed by I FFORCEV regarding clearances; publications of five safety policy documents which were distributed to I FFORCEV Artillery units; and preparation of four changes to the I FFORCEV TAC SOP regarding safety precautions. Analyses of investigation reports revealed that approximately 20% of the accidents occurred as a result of improper clearances. Coordinated action is being taken by allied artillery organizations to improve clearance procedures.

During this reporting period, both 41st Arty Gp and 52d Arty Gp operated organic calibration teams using the Radar Chronograph, M36. In addition to calibrating the tubes of attached battalions, the 41st Arty Gp provided support to the 3d Bn, 319th Arty and the 52d Arty Gp provided support to 6th Bn, 32d Arty. The USARV Calibration Team provided support to the 5th Bn, 27th Arty and other artillery units located in the Task Force South area of operations.

The I FFORCEV Artillery Command Inspection program continued during the reporting period. Units inspected were: 1st Bn, 92d Arty (16 Nov 68); 7th Bn, 15th Arty (25 Nov 68); 5th Bn, 22d Arty (9 Dec 68); 7th Bn, 13th Arty (16 Dec 68); 3d Bn, 6th Arty (6 Jan 69); 6th Bn, 11th Arty (20 Jan 69); 6th Bn, 84th Arty (27 Jan 69). All battalions except one, received a satisfactory rating. The unsatisfactory battalion was deficient in personnel administration, motor maintenance, and property accountability.

CG, I FFORCEV Arty continued to perform duties as Sub-Zone V Coordinator for administrative and security matters for US major installations in Kham Hoa Province and Cam Ranh Special Sector. Responsibilities include publishing appropriate directives and conducting security inspections of the three installations in Sub-Zone V.

Meteorological Quality Control Team (MQCT).

To maintain the quality of ballistic meteorological data in II CTZ, the I FFORCEV Arty MQCT checked the following number of soundings during the reporting period with results as indicated.
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To insure that artillery units are provided with accurate wind data, the HQCT expanded its checking system on 16 Jan 69. Plotting equipment was acquired and one member of the HQCT now replots a sampling of 50% of wind data obtained each month.

(h) The total number of artillery pieces available in I FFCRCEV Arty assets was 160 tubes. The total number of rounds fired by all calibers, I FFCRCEV Arty was 300,717.

(4) Personnel of HHB, I FFCRCEV Arty were engaged in 92 days of missions oriented operations during this reporting period.

d. Personnel.

(1) Personnel strength of HQ & HQ Btry, I FFCRCEV Arty on 31 Jan 69 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auth</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assg</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) I FFCRCEV Arty units continued to be short Field Artillery Captains. In an attempt to offset this shortage, excess lieutenants (ADA and FA) have been assigned. Status of battery grade artillery officers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPT'S</th>
<th>FA</th>
<th>AT/A</th>
<th>LT'S</th>
<th>FA</th>
<th>ADA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auth</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Auth</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assg</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Assg</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-46</td>
<td>+29</td>
<td></td>
<td>+12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-See Inclosure 3
The shortage of Field Artillery captains has remained a problem for the last nine months. The lack of tube artillery firing battery experience of newly assigned captains compounds this problem. Of the 37 replacement FA or ADA captains assigned since 1 Nov 68, 76% have tube artillery experience. The percentage of lieutenants with tube artillery experience is 46%. Consequently, extensive in-country training is required before these officers can be considered effective in a firing battery.

(2) Enlisted personnel status indicates improvement, with the overall input offsetting the losses during this period. As of 31 Jan 69, enlisted strength for the command is 100%; however, there are shortages in critical MOS as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE MOS</th>
<th>SHORTAGE</th>
<th>60 DAY PROJECTED LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery NCO - 13B40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery Operations and Intelligence NCO - 13B40</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery Crewman - 13A10</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Weapons NCO - 13D40</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) During the reporting period, 32 graduates of the NCO Academy, Fort Sill were assigned to I FFORCEV Arty. As of 31 Jan 69, the total number of assigned graduates, by MOS, are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13B40</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E40</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13B20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93F20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17B40</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31G40</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) The following accidents were recorded during this period for I FFORCEV Arty Units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicular</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-fatal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November-31 January 1969, FORCS CSFOR (R1)

(6) The following awards and decorations were processed for II FFORCEV arty units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF AWARD</th>
<th>NOVEMBER</th>
<th>DECEMBER</th>
<th>JANUARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSM &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSM &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCOM &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCOM &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCOM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Morale and discipline continued to be excellent throughout the period.

e. Other

(1) II FFORCEV Arty Aviation.

(a) Hq, USARV announced a program for distribution of OH-6A and OH-23G aircraft by letter, AVHAV-LOQ, dated 29 Nov 68. Subsequent to the receipt of the implementing instructions for aircraft issue to II FFORCEV Arty (Hq, USARV Msg, 821-38, dated 4 Dec 68), several conferences were conducted with this headquarters SU, IG, II FFORCEV and Direct Support Unit representatives attending to establish the ASL responsibilities for the aircraft. No problems were foreseen for OH-6A aircraft because of the number of OH-6A on hand in command and the adequate number of DSU in II CTZ. Since there are only seven OH-23G aircraft being stationed in II CTZ, only one ASL could be provided.

(b) Two officers were provided by Hq, USARV, to II FFORCEV Arty to assist in coordinating the issue of aircraft and organisational tools. The tools were "tagged" at the Saigon Depot to expedite requisitioning. Aircraft were forecasted for issue during the period Jan - Mar 69.

(c) Aircraft Allocations and DSU Designations.
AVFA-AT-D  

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November-31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR (R1)

UNIT | OH-6A | OH-230 | DSU/LOCATION
--- | --- | --- | ---
HBB, I FFORCEV Arty | 1 | 0 | 608 DSC/Dong Ba Thin
1st Arty Gp** | 6 | 3* | 79 DSC/Qu Nhon
52d Arty Gp | 5 | 2* | 60th DSC/Flein
5th Bn, 27th Arty | 2 | 0 | 60th DSC/Dong Ba Thin
6th Bn, 32d Arty | 2 | 0 | 79 DSC/Qu Nhon
TOTAL | 16 | 5 |

*OH-230 aircraft will be supported by 79th DSC, Qu Nhon.
**Two of these aircraft to be utilized by 4th Bn, 60th Arty and HBB, 26th Arty.

(c) I FFORCEV Arty S2 Section was augmented with an Aviation Officer to assist in the command's aviation program to include personnel, training and maintenance.

(2) The 5-millionth artillery round expended by I FFORCEV Arty units was fired on 19 Nov 68 at Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Province. CO, I FFORCEV and CO, 9th ROK Inf Div joined in pulling the lanyard of 175mm gun in Btry B, 6th Bn, 32d Arty.

(3) The I FFORCEV Arty Information office, comprised of one officer and two enlisted men, was established in Nov 68. The purpose of the office is to assist subordinate units with public information activities. Additional duties include publication of the "Afternoon News Sheet", a daily, concise summary of current events; and "The Artillery Review", a bi-monthly publication containing news of awards, decorations and other news worthy items about I FFORCEV Arty men and units.

2. Section 2 (C) Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.

b. Operations.

(1) Clearances for Artillery Fire.

(a) OBSERVATION. Clearance agencies do not specify the limits of the target area cleared for artillery fires.

(b) EVALUATION. Failure to specify the boundaries of a cleared target area is a hazard to friendly elements which may be operating in the vicinity as well as to friendly residents living nearby. This is
particularly significant in an adjust mission where deviation from the original grid can be expected. If the clearing agency is requested to clear a grid and a specified area around the grid, the possibility of an artillery accident could be reduced.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That clearance agencies be requested to clear a grid and a specified area around the grid into which artillery fire may be directed.

(2) Coordination for Registration Using Aerial Observers (AO)

(a) OBSERVATION. Valuable aircraft time is lost and firing battery registrations are delayed when proper coordination for an aerial registration has not been affected.

(b) EVALUATION. In some instances, aircraft time has not been efficiently utilised and registrations have been delayed because the firing battery did not receive advance notice that an aircraft and an AO were available. Consequently, the battery was not prepared and appropriate grids were not cleared when the aircraft arrived over the target area. Advanced coordination between the aircraft controlling agency and the firing battery will preclude delays in registrations and assure full utilisation of aircraft "on station" time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the aircraft controlling agency notify the firing battery one day in advance that aircraft will be available for registration and that the battery initiate grid clearance requests several hours prior to the planned registration.

(3) Employment of Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM)

(a) OBSERVATION. Current rules of engagement do not permit artillery to attack targets detected by electric devices (AD, IR, SCAR) with ICM.

(b) EVALUATION. Currently, ICM can be employed only against counter-battery targets and observed targets, which represent a small percentage of the total targets engaged by artillery. Targets acquired by electronic detection and verified by targeting agencies are lucrative candidates for engagement with ICM because of the munitions large radius of effect.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That rules of engagement be revised to permit the use of ICM for attacking targets acquired by electronic detection means.

c. Training. None
d. Intelligence.

Employment of Night Observation Device, Medium Range.
12 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery I Field
Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November to 31 January 1969,
RCS CSFOR (R1)

(1) OBSERVATION. The Night Observation Device, Medium Range, a port-
able battery-powered, electro-optical instrument, can accurately detect
personnel to ranges in excess of 4,000 meters during the hours of darkness.
The device, when exposed to bright light or flashes, such as impacting
artillery projectiles, will blank our (white out) for a 20-second period
thereby precluding continuous observation.

(2) EVALUATION. Due to the fact that the Night Observation Device
blanks out when observing impacting artillery projectiles, it should be
used solely for target acquisition, and not for adjustment of fire. After
a target has been acquired with the device, artillery can be adjusted
using standard optical instruments such as the BC scope or binoculars.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That artillery units use Night Observation
Device, Medium Range, in conjunction with BC scopes or binoculars to
acquire and place fire on targets detected during hours of darkness.

e. Logistics.
Requisitioning of Supplies and Equipment.

(1) OBSERVATION. Many requisitions for supplies and equipment are
lost or misplaced in the logistics chain between the unit, depot and US
Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam.

(2) EVALUATION. In response to subordinate units' requests, the
SU, 1 FFORCENV Artillery contacts the appropriate depot to follow-up on
numerous requisitions. Experience has shown that approximately half of
the requisitions checked are invalid due to no record at depot or USAICCV.
It is apparent that requisition processing procedures in the logistic
chain require review in order to correct this deficiency.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That direct support units and depots review
procedures for processing supply requests and take positive action to
ensure that valid requisitions remain in the system.

f. Other. None.

RICHARD A. EDWARDS, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

12 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November to 31 January 1969, NCS GSWOR (B1)

DISTRIBUTION:
2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
3-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHAG-C-DEST
4-CG, I FFORCEV, ATTN: AVFA-GG-D
5-IIForceV
5-XXIV Corps
5-USAAMS
5-USAADS
2aa-1st Arty Op
   52d Arty Op
   5th Bn, 27th Arty
   6th Bn, 32d Arty
   1st Bn, 60th Arty
1-HHB, 8th Bn, 26th Arty
1-File
AVFA-GC-OT (12 Feb 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for period 1 November to
31 January 1969, ROS CJSFOR-65 (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 27 FEB 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-D3T,
APO 96375

(U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with its content.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

S A Crawford
S A CRAWFORD
1LT, ASC
ASST. AR

Cy furn:
2 - ACSFOR, DA
1 - I FFORCEV Arty
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOT-6T, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Improved Conventional Munitions (ICH), page 13, paragraph 2b(3); concur. Unit is referred to CQUSMACV Secret Message, Cite 9239, DTG 140150Z February 1969, and CQUSMACV Secret Message Cite 10336, DTG 190050Z February 1969, both of which were furnished as information to CG, I Field Force.

b. Reference item concerning requisitioning of supplies and equipment, page 14, paragraph 2e(1); nonconcur. 1st Logistical Command Regulation 700-16 "Reconciliation of Backorders" and 1st Logistical Command Regulation 700-40 "General Supply Instructions" apply to all requests/requisitions for items of supply processed through USARV supply channels or supplies from 1st Logistical Command. 1st Logistical Command Regulation 700-16 contains procedures for a reconciliation of backorders between the DSU and the using unit at least every 60 days. Reconciliation of backorders on a continuous basis will assist in ensuring requisitions are valid. Follow-up action by the originator of the request/requisition in accordance with Appendix A, 1st Logistical Command Regulation 700-40 will ensure requisitions are kept current in the logistic chain. Through the proper utilization of follow-up procedures and reconciliation of backorders, DSUs and Depots can more effectively supervise and monitor the requisition processing procedures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. O. WILSON
LIT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy: furn:
I FFV Arty
I FFV
GPOF-DT (12 Feb 69) 3d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for  
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)  
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 20 MAR 1969  

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310  

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding  
endorsements and concurs in the report as endorsed.  

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:  

[Signature]  
JOHN F. DUNN  
Colonel, AGC  
Deputy Adjutant General
I Field Force Vietnam Artillery

5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm, T)
6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175/8 inch, SP)
4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AWSF)
Battery B, 29th Artillery (SIX)
Battery E, 41st Artillery (MI)
Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery (TAB)
77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
253d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
254th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
255th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
256th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

41st Artillery Group

7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm, T)
2d Battalion, 15th Artillery (105mm/155mm, T)
7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175mm/8 inch, SP)
6th Battalion, 81st Artillery (155mm, T)

52d Artillery Group

3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm, SP)
6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (175/8 inch, SP)
5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm/8 inch, SP)
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm, T)
AREA OF OPERATION II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. Binh Tay - Mac Arthur
2. Walker
3. Dan Sinh - Cehidoe
4. GRID
5. Dan Hoe - Belling
6. 9th ROK Inf Div
7. Dan Thang - No Lain

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 2

CONFIDENTIAL
1. (C) Artillery strength as of 31 Jan 69 included 72 - 105mm Howitzers, 40 - 155mm Howitzers, 26 - 175mm Guns and 22 - 8 inch Howitzers for a total of 160 tubes.

2. (C) Ammunition expenditures by target category:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>NOVEMBER</th>
<th>DECEMBER</th>
<th>JANUARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONFIRMED</td>
<td>19,335</td>
<td>15,457</td>
<td>18,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACQUIRED</td>
<td>28,581</td>
<td>36,616</td>
<td>46,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTERBATTERY</td>
<td>3,097</td>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPARATION</td>
<td>14,053</td>
<td>9,875</td>
<td>9,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERDICTION</td>
<td>11,993</td>
<td>15,973</td>
<td>23,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL PURPOSE</td>
<td>12,041</td>
<td>12,623</td>
<td>15,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>1,399</td>
<td>2,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>90,437</td>
<td>103,357</td>
<td>116,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (C) Ammunition expenditures by caliber:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>NOVEMBER</th>
<th>DECEMBER</th>
<th>JANUARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>105mm</td>
<td>46,186</td>
<td>41,279</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>18,614</td>
<td>19,850</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>13,256</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 in</td>
<td>12,679</td>
<td>11,694</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>90,435</td>
<td>94,132</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECEMBER</td>
<td>105mm</td>
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<td>41,279</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>13,256</td>
<td>18,309</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8 in</td>
<td>12,679</td>
<td>11,694</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
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<td>94,132</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>18,609</td>
<td>18,609</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 in</td>
<td>12,917</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>115,150</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

**Grand Total**

300,717

*Pro-rated Average

Inclosure 3
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69

CG, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery

12 February 1969

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

Security Classification