<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
<th>AD501007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>confidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 22 NOV 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
<td>AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (6 Mar 69) FOR OT UT 684306 11 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 101st Airborn Division, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

Kenneth C. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Adjutant General School
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chaplain School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Missile and Munitions School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
OSD(SA)Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
CINCE, US Strike Command
Commanding Generals
US Army Materiel Command
US Army Weapons Command
US Army Flight Training Center
101st Airborne Division
Commander, US Army Forces Southern Command
National Aeronautics & Space Administration
USAF Air Ground Operations School
The Air University Library
Joint Action Control Office
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Defense Documentation Center
Research Analysis Corporation
Security Officer, Hudson Institute
Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Aviation Test Activity
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 101st Airborne Division
APO San Francisco 96383

AVDO-3C 22 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSROR-65 (RL)

DISTRIBUTION

The enclosed Operational Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with XXIV Corps Regulation 525-2 and USARV Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. P. TALON, JR.
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

INCLUSION

1 Inc1

as

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - CENGCUSARVAC (ATTN: GTOP-DT, APO 96558)
3 - CO, USARV (ATTN: AVHOC-DST, APO 96375)
4 - CO, XXIV Corps (ATTN: AVII-GCT, APO 96308)
3 - CS, 101st Airborne Division
1 - CO, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
1 - CO, 2nd Bde, 101st Abn Div
1 - CO, 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div
1 - CO, 3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div
1 - CO, 160th Avn Sq, 101st Abn Div
1 - CO, 101st Abn Div Arty
1 - ACOFS, G1, 101st Abn Div
1 - ACOFS, G2, 101st Abn Div
1 - ACOFS, G3, 101st Abn Div
1 - ACOFS, G5, 101st Abn Div

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DD/MAR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
A. REDENSIATION AND REORGANIZATION

1. (U) Redesignation - USARFAC General Order 457, Section II, paragraph TC 010, redesignated the 101st Air Cavalry Division as the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) effective 15 September 1968.

2. (9) Reorganization.

a. During the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct, the division accomplished the majority of its planned Phase I (July - December) reorganization. Reorganization began officially on 20 July with the activation and organization of the 160th Aviation Group. This Group, which will eventually contain the majority of the Division's aviation assets, was initially organized as follows: Group HHC (organized at a cadre strength of 57 personnel), 101st AHB (3 lift companies and 1 gun company), 159th ASHB (minus one company) and the 163rd Avn Co (GS) (minus the ASTA platoon). During the reporting period this organization remained unchanged with the exception of the Group HHC, which is presently at full TOE strength (223 personnel).

b. In order to support the increased aviation assets, the Division Support Command also began reorganizing according to the airmobile TOE on 20 July. The major reorganization occurred within the 801st Maintenance Battalion. Co B, 801st was redesignated as Co A, 5th Trans Bn, and became the nucleus of the Division's aviation maintenance. Simultaneously, a Bn Hqs & Hqs Co was activated (at cadre strength), in order to direct the aviation maintenance activities. On 23 October the 122nd Trans Co (DS) closed in the Division from CONUS. This unit will become Co B, 5th Trans Bn on/about 10 November, thus completing the organization of the 5th Trans Bn. Other changes, which occurred within the Support Command included the assignment of a helicopter ambulance section to the 326th Med Bn, and the activation of the 126th S&S Bn, formerly a provisional unit. This activation included the redesignation of the 501st Supply Co and the 101st CM (AE) Co as Companies A and B, respectively, of the 126th S&S Bn. In addition to the major changes, the following Divisional units were also reorganized during the period: 326th Engr Bn, 101st MP Co, 101st Admin Co, HHC, 101st Abn Div, and Brigade HHC's (with the exception of the 1st Brigade).

c. Reorganization has been conducted in a smooth manner except for several areas of confusion created by errors in the USARFAC OD constituting reorganization authority. The OD (USARFAC 325, dtd 28 June) omitted 1st Bde HHC and organized the Division's aviation maintenance in a large TAM concept, rather than to the programmed cellular maintenance concept. These errors were brought to the attention of USAPV and USARFAC and a subsequent OD
is expected in November to correct the problem. At this time the Division has completed the majority of its internal reorganization and the remaining reorganization is primarily dependent upon the arrival of incoming aviation assets. (These assets include: Co C, 159th ASHB, 158th AHB, Batteries A, B and C, 4-77th FA (AIA) Bn and Troops A, B and C, 2-17th Cav Sqdn. All of these assets should arrive by the end of March 1969, at which time the Division will be combatantly air mobile.

B. OPERATIONS

1. (C) During the period 1 August to 31 October 1968, the 101st Airborne Division conducted operations in coordination with the 1st ARVN Division to provide for the external defense of Hue City; interdict Hwy 547 and Hwy 547A; implement rice denial measures; destroy NVA/VC forces, VC infrastructure, caches and installations; and assist in the pacification program of Thua Thien Province. The operations conducted during the reporting period included Operation SOMERSET PLAIN (4 Aug – 20 Aug) and continuation of Operation NEVADA EAGLE (17 May – continuing).

2. (C) Operation SOMERSET PLAIN consisted of a combined US/ARVN airborne thrust into the A Shau Valley to destroy enemy forces, installations and caches and to interdict the enemy’s main line of communication into I CTZ, the A Shau Valley. A Task Force composed of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and the 2nd and 3rd Bns, 1st ARVN Regt, conducted combat assaults into the valley on 4 Aug and 5 Aug, respectively. The Task Force operated under the direction of CO 101st Abn Div.

3. (C) During Operation NEVADA EAGLE, the 2nd Bde, 101st Abn Div, conducted a series of cordon operations near the populated areas on the coastal plains east of Hue to attack the VC infrastructure; the 3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div, under the operational control of the 101st Abn Div until 4 Oct, conducted static security missions and reconnaissance in force operations to provide security for Hue; and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, following the completion of Operation SOMERSET PLAIN, conducted RIF operations in the Nui Ke mountains south and east of Hue. The 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div, which moved from III CTZ and returned to the operational control of the 101st Abn Div on 3 Oct 68, assumed control of the area of operations vacated by the 3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div, and began RIF operations in its assigned AO.

4. (C) The 101st Airborne Division combat operations during the period 1 Aug – 31 Oct were characterized by extensive reconnaissance in force (RIF), airborne and soft cordon operations. Enemy activity, with few exceptions, was characterized by squad-size or smaller operations, boobytrap incidents and harassing ground actions. The chronological sequence of significant combat operations during the reporting period is as follows:

a. 4 Aug – 20 Aug Operation SOMERSET PLAIN.

3

CONFIDENTIAL
During the latter part of July, the Division finalized its plans, marshalled forces and constructed fire bases for a two brigade US-ARVN combined airmobile operation into the A Shau Valley. During the period 15 Jul - 3 Aug, Fire Bases Son (YD 472011), Berchtesgaden (YD 435011), Eagle's Nest (YD 405036) and Georgia (YD 418012) were constructed adjacent to the valley to facilitate continuous surveillance, both visual and radar, and comprehensive artillery fire support throughout the valley. Fire Bases Birmingham (YD 706102) and Bastogne (YD 620095) were expanded to shorten helicopter turn around time and to improve medical and resupply support. Fire Base Birmingham was expanded to include refuel and rearm pads capable of handling 15 helicopters at one time. In addition, space and facilities were provided for storing a five day reserve of Classes I, II, IV, IV-A and V and two days of Class III. The expanded supply facilities enabled combat units in and near the valley to be resupplied quickly, reduced helicopter turn around time for resupply and combat missions, and reduced the impact of inclement weather. At FB Bastogne, an expanded medical clearing station facility proved to be particularly valuable in providing timely medical treatment to the casualties resulting from an errant air strike on 10 Aug, which resulted in 7 US KNHA and 54 US WNHA.

The original date for the commencement of the operation, 1 August, was delayed until 4 August because of inclement weather. On 4 Aug, units of the 1st Bde, 2-502 Inf and 2-327 Inf, conducted combat assaults into the A Shau Valley in the vicinity of A Luoi and Ta Bat, respectively. As the two battalions conducted the combat assault, 1-327 Inf maintained blocking positions astride Hwy 547A, east of Ta Bat, to assist in providing a safe air cordon for the combat assault. Prior to 4 Aug, 1-327 Inf conducted extensive sweep operations along Hwy 547A to clear enemy forces from the area and along the flight path of the combat assault forces. On 5 Aug, a two battalion task force (2nd and 3rd Bn's) from the 1st ARVN Regt, 1st ARVN Div conducted a combat assault into the valley in the vicinity of Ta Bat. The 2-327 Inf secured the LZ as the ARVN forces were lifted into the valley. During the period 5 Aug - 17 Aug, both the 1st Bde and 1st ARVN Regt forces encountered squad to company size enemy forces. The enemy employed delaying and harassing tactics as the US/ARVN forces conducted reconnaissance in force operations in the valley. The enemy forces encountered were considerably smaller in size than those anticipated by the intelligence sources and no major enemy caches or installations were found. On the nights of 16-17 and 17-18 August, elements of the 326 Engr Bn and two six-man teams from the Division Long Range Patrol Company emplaced minefields and sensors at three choke points in the valley. Each mine was booby trapped and fitted with a delay fuse to destroy the mine after a set period of time. The sensors were monitored by a station, which was positioned on FB Eagle's Nest and had a direct telephone line to the artillery unit located there. An immediate response by artillery fire was
CONFIDENTIAL

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

provided when sensor devices detected enemy movement in the vicinity of the minefields. Aerial reconnaissance indicated that this procedure denied the enemy the use of this principal LOC for over two weeks after the maneuver units were extracted. The maneuver elements were extracted on 18 and 19 Aug, and the operation was ended on 20 Aug.

(3) The results of the combat operations in the valley by the US/ARVN forces were:

(a) US Totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Friendly Losses</th>
<th>Enemy Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 US KIA</td>
<td>93 NVA KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 US WIA</td>
<td>1 NVA PW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 US MIA</td>
<td>23 Indiv Wpn Capt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 Crew Serv Wpn Capt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) ARVN Totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARVN KHA</th>
<th>NVA KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57 ARVN WIA</td>
<td>3 NVA PW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ARVN MIA</td>
<td>22 Indiv Wpn Capt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Crew Serv Wpn Capt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Equipment captured and destroyed by US/ARVN forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 ea</td>
<td>2 ton trucks destroyed</td>
<td>54 ea</td>
<td>Mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 tons</td>
<td>Rice captured</td>
<td>51 lbs</td>
<td>Medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 rds</td>
<td>122mm rocket ammunition</td>
<td>4 ea</td>
<td>Medical kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.2 rds</td>
<td>Crew served weapon ammunition</td>
<td>11 km</td>
<td>Communications wire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 cases</td>
<td>12.7 MMG ammunition</td>
<td>1 ea</td>
<td>Switchboard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 cases</td>
<td>Small arms ammunition</td>
<td>2 ea</td>
<td>Field telephones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>215 ea</td>
<td>Huts destroyed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) US Aircraft damaged or destroyed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damage</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Gunships</td>
<td>4 Gunships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Troopships</td>
<td>1 LOH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Troopship</td>
<td>1 USAF F-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Non hostile action)</td>
<td>3 Troopships (Non hostile action)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
b. 8 - 9 August: On 8 - 9 August the 1-501st Inf, National Police Field Forces (61 personnel), a Popular Force squad, a Psyops broadcast team, elements of the Provincial Reconnaissance Units and Police Special Branch Teams conducted a cordon operation in the hamlets of An Truyen (YD 8126) and Ap Trieu Son (YD 8027). Numerous agent reports had indicated the presence of at least one VC platoon in the area. In addition, information from agents also described the methods which the VC used to elude the previous allied sweeps through the same area. If the US/RF/PF forces swept overland, VC observers in observation posts located in pagodas fired warning shots, and the VC hid in the nearby rice paddies and marshy areas. If the allied forces came by helicopter, the VC observers would warn the VC to hide in the bunker complexes in the vicinity of the hamlets.

To preclude similar occurrences, the 1-501st Inf coordinated with the local RF/PF, NPFF and US Navy elements to conduct a combined operation. On the morning of 8 Aug, A, B, and C/1-501st Inf, with NPFF forces, swept overland and established a cordon around the two hamlets. Simultaneously, US Navy Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles (PACV), not previously used in the area, waited approximately 5 km away for the word to move to the scene of the cordon. After the cordon was established, the PACV swept toward the cordoned hamlets. Following the arrival of the PACV's, observation of the VC movement and their suspected locations was maintained by helicopters, which flew to the scene only after the VC had committed themselves to hiding in the water. The ability of the PACV's to enter the shallow marshy areas, combined with concussion grenades thrown into the rice paddies and the noise of the PACV's, caused the hiding VC to vacate their watery hiding places. Following interrogation of the 106 detainees, 23 were classified as PW's and 40 were classified as Civil Defendants (law violators).

The An Truyen Operation was based on reliable intelligence which led to the conception of a plan which combined Airborne-Naval-Vietnamese forces to exploit this intelligence. The plan provided inherent flexibility and made maximum use of the advantages of the air cushion vehicles. The professional manner in which the operation was executed is evident as 43 VC were killed and 23 VC and 11 individual weapons captured without a single friendly casualty. It also points out the advantages of changing tactics, and using new techniques and equipment. The key elements of this successful operation were the quick reaction to good intelligence, maximum use of available resources, detailed planning and coordination, a tactical concept different from the norm, and surprise.

c. 23 Aug - 3 Sep: On 13 August CPL Duong Caoc of the 43d Observer Co, 5th Regt, rallied to a CAP team. He revealed knowledge of the location of the base camp and cache sites of the 5th NVA Regiment west of the Nui Ke mountains. An offensive sweep into this region by 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div units in July met with sporadic resistance indicating the enemy's presence.
The operation was terminated before full results could be realized due to the start of Operation SOMERSET PLAIN. On 23 August, following the conclusion of Operation SOMERSET PLAIN and the increased availability of helicopters, 1-508 Inf conducted a combat assault into landing zones vicinity PB Brick (TD 634997). Led by the rifle, the 1-508 Inf moved toward the base camps of the 5th NVA Regiment vicinity YD 7999. After 11 days of heavy fighting, the 1-508 Inf had killed 109 enemy and captured 3 enemy, 685 individual weapons and 46 crew-served weapons. Searches of the base camps in the vicinity of YD 7999, 7999, 8099, 8199, 7998, 7998, 8098, and 8198 resulted in the capture of the following additional enemy materiel: 5624 rds 60/82mm mortar am; 306,050 rds small arms ammo; 129 AP/AT mines; 990 lbs of TNT; 21 radios; 352 gas masks; 761 grenades; and 15.5 tons of rice.

d. 3 Sep - 6 Sep: Combat operations were halted during Typhoon Beas, which brought heavy rains and gusts of wind up to 40-60 knots. During the period 002000 Sep - 051000 Sep, a total of 19.02 inches of rain fell at Camp Eagle (TD 808162), the Division Base Camp. All combat aviation missions were cancelled during this period. After the heavy rains stopped, the RP/FF forces and 1-501 Inf conducted several Eagle Flights over the flooded coastal lowlands to locate enemy forces. Civil Affairs teams were very active as they distributed tons of needed food, clothing and construction materials to the local Vietnamese who had suffered economic and physical damage to their property.

e. 10 Sep - 31 Oct: As a result of the decreasing number of contacts during July and August with the NVA main force and VC local force units on the coastal lowlands surrounding Hue, a series of operations was planned to destroy the VC Infrastructure. During these operations, emphasis was placed on coordination with and use of GVN forces, surprise, isolation of the battlefield, minimum destruction of civilian property and population control. (See Section II: Lessons Learned, Operations, for a description of the methods of conducting soft cordon operations.) Preparatory fires were placed only on barren areas near the LZ's. Fires on other targets, such as known or suspected enemy locations, were planned but not fired unless necessary for the prevention of friendly casualties. The soft cordon took place in populated areas where enemy resistance was expected to be light. The combined results of the soft cordon operations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allied Losses</th>
<th>Enemy Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 US KHA</td>
<td>313 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 ARVN/GVN KHA</td>
<td>651 Pw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 US WHA</td>
<td>395 Indiv Wpns Capt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 ARVN/GVN WHA</td>
<td>11 Crew Served Wpns Capt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120 Hoi Chanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77 Civil Defendants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(252 of the Pw were classified and identified as members of the VC infrastructure.)
AVDG-GC

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSPR-65 (R)

(See Inclosure 3 (Letter of TRNG) for a Viet Cong's description of the
effectiveness of the 101st Abn Div soft cordon operations.)

The significant soft cordons are individually described in chronological
order as follows:

(1) 10 Sep - 20 Sep: The first of the soft cordon operations
was conducted on the peninsula of Vinh Loc, a long time VC stronghold. (See

(a) The task organization of forces in the operation was
as follows:

TF 1-501 Inf
A/1-501 Abn Inf
B/1-501 Abn Inf
D/1-501 Abn Inf

51st ARVN Regt
7th ARVN Cav Sqdn
3/7th ARVN Cav Trp
1-54th ARVN Bn
2-54th ARVN Bn
3-54th ARVN Bn

VINH LOC Regional Forces
922 RF Co
955 RF Co

GVN Forces
National Police
Police Field Force
Police Special Branch
Census Grievance Committee
Revolutionary Development Cadre
12th and 13th Coastal Groups
Provincial Reconnaissance Unit

Support Forces
Hua River Sect Group
US Navy Swift Boats

(b) The operation began with the 2-54 and 3-54 ARVN Bn's
occupying blocking positions west of Vinh Loc Island from TD 940244 to 2D
C26110 on 10 Sep to drive the enemy across the water into Vinh Loc (D). Sim-
ultaneously, D/1-501 Inf conducted RIF operations near TD 942/4 to force the
enemy towards the southwest and into Vinh Loc (D). At first light on 11 Sep,
3/7 ARVN Cav Trp moved from Col Co Beach (TD 863/2) southeast and occupied a
blocking position to block the escape routes to the northwest from the is-
land. At 0700 hrs 1-501 Inf and 1-54 ARVN Bn's combat assaulted into seven
separate LZ's. As the combat assault was in progress, the 3/7 Cav Trp swept
down from its blocking position and linked up with the 1-54 ARVN Bn. As the
1-501 Inf moved off their LZ's, PF platoons were lifted from the Vinh Loc (D)
headquarters and joined the US infantry companies. All units then attacked
rapidly to the south in their zones, using the Special Branch Forces and NFPF
teams for search, interrogation and identification of the suspects detained.
Intelligence gained from these teams was immediately exploited as the operation progressed. The results of the operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Friendly Losses</th>
<th>Enemy Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 US WHA</td>
<td>154 KTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ARVN KHA</td>
<td>370 PW (of the PW's, 126 were classified as members of the VC infrastructure.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 ARVN WHA</td>
<td>176 Individual Wpns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Crew Served Wpns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56 Ho Chi Manhs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50 Civil Defendants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) 27 Sep - 10 Oct: The 1-501 Inf, 2-17 Cav, and Vietnamese forces from Phu Vang (D) and Huong Thuy (D) conducted a soft cordon operation to attack and destroy the VC infrastructure in Phu Vang District. During the period June - August, elements of 1-501 had frequent contact with small groups of VC, and encountered numerous boobytraps in the Phu Vang area, but had not been able to close with and defeat large VC forces. The VC had intimidated the local population so effectively, that allied forces had not been able to locate the VC. As a result of this situation and an increasing number of aircraft receiving ground fire in the area, 1-501 coordinated and planned a series of cordon operations in Phu Vang District. On the morning of 27 Sep, 1 and C Co's, 1-501 Inf moved overland to establish cordons and searched around the hamlets vic YD 815265 and YD 807272. US Navy Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles (PACV) patrolled the waterways adjacent to the cordoned hamlets. 1-501 Inf in the north (YD8322-YD8319), 2-17 Cav on the south (YD8319-YD7920), established a cordon prior to darkness on 27 Sep 68. The 2-54 ARVN Bn swept across the island on 28 Sep on three axes, fragmenting the enemy elements. During the ensuing searches conducted by the 1-54 ARVN and by blocking forces, the allies killed 96 VC, and captured 174 VC, 153 individual weapons and 8 crew served weapons. In addition, PSYOPS missions conducted during the operation resulted in 46 Hoi Chanhs returning to the GVN. Of the 174 PW captured, 98 PW were classified as members of the VC infrastructure. Friendly losses during the operation were 9 US WHA, 1 ARVN KHA, 8 ARVN WHA, 2 PF WHA.

(3) 19 Oct - 23 Oct: 1-501 Inf, 1-54 ARVN, 3-54 ARVN, Huong Thuy FPI's and US and ARVN Naval elements established a soft cordon vic YD 9126, YD 9226, and YD 8828, which resulted in the following enemy losses: 3 enemy killed, 16 VC and 6 individual weapons captured and 18 Hoi Chanhs returning to the GVN. There were no allied casualties.

(4) 20 Oct - 25 Oct: 2-502 Inf, 3/7 ARVN Cav Trp, National Police Field Forces and Huong Thuy FPI's captured 24 VC in a soft cordon vic YD 9010, 9009, 8910 and 8911. Friendly losses were 1 US KHA and 5 US WHA.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(5) 26 Oct - 31 Oct: 1-501 Inf, VN, D/1-502 Inf and RP/FF elements conducted a soft cordon operation in the vicinity of YD 8322, the same area as the cordon conducted during 21 - 10 Oct. Following the establishment of the cordon on 26 Oct, the ARVN, RP/FF and NPFF forces swept through the cordoned area engaging the VC elements in the hamlets and capturing several. The operation ended on 6 Nov and the final results were:

Friendly Losses

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 US KHA</td>
<td>6 US WHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 ARVN KHA</td>
<td>12 ARVN WHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 RP/FF KHA</td>
<td>7 RP/FF WHA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enemy Losses

<p>| |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56 VC KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 VC/POW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 NVA/POW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 Individual Wpn Captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Hoi Chanhs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Civil Defendants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. 15 Sep - 16 Oct: On Sep 15, 1-327 Inf and 2-502 Inf conducted an airborne combat assault into the Dong Truoi Mountains south of Hue. For the next 32 days, the two battalions conducted extensive company-size RIF operations to locate and destroy the enemy forces indicated to be in the area. The combat assault of the two battalions was conducted in response to an increasing number of agent and sniffer reports, which indicated the enemy's presence in the Dong Truoi Mountains (YC 8097). In addition, interrogation of the large number of FWs and Hoi Chanhs gathered by the 2nd Bde during its cordon operation in Vinh Loc, confirmed the presence of five infantry battalions of the 4th and 5th NVA Regt's in the Truoi Mountains area. During the period 15 Sep - 16 Oct, the two battalions maintained continuous pressure on the enemy forces and, during the frequent contacts with squad to platoon size enemy forces, killed 78 NVA and captured 11 Fw, 32 individual weapons and 3 crew-served weapons. This operation served to keep at least five enemy battalions off balance and caused them to displace towards the southwest, thus relieving pressure on Da Nang, on 15 Sep from Phu Bai to Hai Van Pass, and on Phu Loc District. The operation also prevented enemy reinforcement and recovery from his losses in Phu Vang, Phu Thu, and Vinh Loc Districts.

g. 15 Sep - 19 Oct: During this period, the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div moved from I CTZ to III CTZ. The 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div was released from the operational control of the 101st Abn Div on 1 Oct 68, by authority of USARV CO L665, para TC 023, dtd 8 Oct 68. Simultaneously, the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div moved from III CTZ to I CTZ, and returned to the operational control of the 101st Abn Div, effective 3 Oct 68.

h. AO Boundary Extensions: Due to relocation of allied forces, principally the 1st Marine Division, in I CTZ, the 101st Abn Div eastern
AVDG-GC

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, AGCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

AC boundary was extended on 14 Oct to the east to include Phu Loc District and all of southern Thua Thien Province, with the exception of the Hai Van Pass. On 28 Oct, the Division AC was extended to the northern Thua Thien Province boundary, as the 1st Cav Div (ANGEL) was alerted to move to III CTZ. The 101st Abn Div TAR now encompasses all of Thua Thien Province, with the exception of Hai Van Pass located north of Da Nang.

5. (C) The results of the Division's combat operations during the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Friendly Losses</th>
<th>Enemy Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68 KIA</td>
<td>1249 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>567 WHA</td>
<td>406 VC/FW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 MIA</td>
<td>9 NVA/FW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1299 Individual Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92 Crew Served Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>545 Ho Chi Minh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84 Tons of Rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3½ lbs of Documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(These figures reflect only the 101st Abn Div casualties and those losses inflicted on the enemy by 101st Abn Div units. The figures do not include the casualties sustained by ARVN or GVN forces or losses inflicted on the enemy by ARVN and GVN forces during the numerous combined operations with the 101st Abn Div.)*

C. TRAINING

(U) Increased emphasis was placed on training during the period 1 August to 31 October 1968. Training inspections/visits in July-August indicated that units were deficient in maintaining records of training completed. In part, this resulted from units misinterpreting Div Reg 350-1. In order to standardize training records, and to establish a system that was relatively simple, yet complete, Div Reg 350-2 was published. This new regulation requires that Quarterly Training Reports be submitted containing a list of those mandatory training requirements accomplished during each quarter. In this manner ACoS, G3 is able to monitor the units' training progress, while the unit is able to maintain a readily available record of training accomplished. Several training areas which received special emphasis are as follows:

1. The Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS) at Bien Hoa was reorganized to increase the cadre strength to 140 personnel. The School's POI was also adjusted to conform to new USARV training requirements.
and to satisfy training requirements from the field.

2. The Division established an airmobile operations school, sponsored by the 160th Avn Op, to standardize airmobile procedures, and to familiarize brigade and battalion commanders and S3 and S5 Air officers with the capabilities and limitations of the Division's aircraft. This school was found to be particularly effective, and will be repeated periodically for incoming field grade officers and all aviators.

3. The Division organized a mobile training team in response to the demonstrated need for additional training in detecting and detonating mines and boobytraps. The team was sent to both the 25th Inf Div and 1st Marine Div "Mines and Boobytrap" schools. The team is now developing a suitable program of instruction for training Division units.

4. The Division continued to use the reciprocal mobile training program with the 1st ARVN Div. The 101st Abn Div conducted instruction on weapons, to include care and cleaning, employment and techniques of fire. The 1st ARVN Div presented very informative classes on VC/Sapper tactics and techniques and VC mines and boobytraps. Throughout the reporting period, the Division followed a procedure of rotating infantry battalions to Camp Eagle or LZ Sally for a 3-7 day stand-down. This procedure has enabled the battalions to conduct meaningful and highly successful training in a short period of time.

D. CHEMICAL

1. (U) During the reporting period the Division Chemical Section continued a diversified program employing munitions in support of Division tactical operations. With the 20th and 36th Chemical Detachments and 10th Chemical Platoon (OS) attached, the Chemical Section conducted incendiary, tactical CS drop, tunnel contamination, defoliant, airborne personnel detection, insecticide, maintenance, and training missions.

2. (C) Riot control agents were used both in tactical support and bulk dispersal operations. Eleven tactical drops of non-persistent CS munitions were made during the reporting period; six from UH-1 aircraft and five from CH-47 aircraft.

a. The most impressive action in which CS was used, was in support of a cordon operation on a peninsula, vic AU 8307, during the period 23-30 Oct 68. The cordon conducted by 2-327 Inf sealed off the peninsula, where 200 enemy were reported to be located. Tactical CS drops were conducted in
conjunction with naval gunfire, artillery and fires from gunships. One
hundred sixty E-158 Tactical CS Canister Clusters and 1792 M7A3 CS grenades
were dropped in five missions from a CH-47 aircraft, and 10 E-158 and 192
M7A3's in one mission from UH-1 aircraft in support of the operation during
a five day period. During the operation five enemy personnel were killed
as a direct result of CS being used in conjunction with aerial fire power.
In addition, two Ho Chi Minh rallied saying that they could not take the CS.
This was the first time in this Division that CH-47 aircraft were used for
tactical non-persistent CS drops. The success of the drops indicates that
this is a practical method for placing an incapacitating concentration of
CS over a large area.

b. Another example of the use of CS to complement conventional
fire power occurred on 21 Sep 68 when E-8 tactical CS launchers were em-
ployed successfully in support of offensive operations by the Black Panther
Company of the 1st ARVN Division (SFCON to 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div). While
moving along the axis of advance, the rear element of the company was en-
gaged on a trail at YD 965949 with automatic weapons and RPG fire. Organic
weapons and artillery were employed, but the enemy held their positions. For
three days the company continued to probe the enemy's bunkered positions on
Hill 790 (YD 965950). Artillery was continuously employed, until the lead
element attacked the enemy positions, but the company could not overrun the
positions. A light fire team was employed twice, but the friendly element
still could not advance an appreciable distance. The 101st Abn Div Art
Chemical Officer, who was attached to the Black Panther Company as the
Artillery LO, recommended the use of CS in order to dislodge the enemy.
The Bde delivered eight E-61 CS launchers to the unit. Five E-8 launchers
were fired point blank into the bunkers, and artillery was simultaneously
employed. The lead element then moved forward and took the hill, while
receiving only sporadic small arms fire. Upon reaching the hilltop, one
dead VC was found. Two days later the company found fresh graves contain-
ing five bodies, believed to have been killed during the fight for Hill
790.

3. (C) In support of the 2-501 Inf, which conducted a RIF operation
during the period 22-24 Oct, the Chemical Section conducted six incendiary
drum drop "Fireball" missions from CH-47 aircraft. A total of 170 55-gal-
on drums of fuel mix (50% diesel - 50% JP-4) was dropped using a special
sling loading technique. The burning fuel sustained fires that lasted
approximately thirty minutes. The fires burned out the underbrush ex-
posing boobytrap trip wires and causing several secondary explosions.
Although not originally designed for use in support of troops in contact, the fireball missions were a highly successful addition to combat firepower for close support. The success of the mission can be attributed to the skill of the OH-47 pilots, who responded to the ground commander's call and dropped the drums of fuel mix within 200 meters of friendly units.

4. (C) The Division Chemical Section also conducted 85 airborne personnel detection missions. Results from these missions were used extensively in targeting H&I fires and air strikes.

B. INTELLIGENCE:

1. (C) At the beginning of the reporting period there were three NVA regiments (14th, 5th, 803d), one NVA battalion (9-90th), and six local force companies operating in the Division AO. All of the units, with the exception of the two battalions of the 803d Regt, were considered combat effective. The K1 and K3 Bn's, 803d Regt were considered combat ineffective due to the heavy losses inflicted by allied forces during April, May and June. The enemy forces were attempting to avoid contact, and were trying to replenish manpower losses sustained during and after the first and second offensives. They were also conducting reconnaissance, and attempting to rebuild equipment, ammunition and food caches in preparation for future offensive operations.

2. (C) Prior to the beginning of the reporting period, intelligence reports indicated that enemy elements were actively building defensive positions in the A Shau Valley. In addition, they were clearing and improving both Route 546 and 547A, while moving large amounts of supplies and replacements into Thua Thien Province and northern ICTZ. To deny the enemy this major infiltration route, the 101st Abn Div initiated Operation SOMERSET FLAND into the A Shau Valley. This operation successfully forced the enemy out of the valley and into Laos. Prior to withdrawing from the valley on 19 Aug, the 101st Abn Div interdicted Routes 546 and 547A at several locations, and implanted three minefields at choke points in the valley. After the Division's units departed from the valley, the enemy began immediately to move back into the valley. His movement was significantly hampered, however, by the minefields and barriers in the valley, and by artillery units firing in response to sensor detections.

3. (C) In late August, elements of the 5th NVA Regt were forced to withdraw to the south of their normal base areas in response to the 101st Abn Div operations into the Nui Ke Mountains (YD 7605). The NVA units avoided contact with the Division units, and in mid-October reentered their base camps when the Division withdrew from the area.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

4. (C) Due to highly successful rice denial operations conducted in the coastal lowlands by the 101st Abn Div and other allied forces during May, June and July, the 803d NVA Regt was unable to obtain enough food to supply its units and was forced to withdraw into Laos to refurbish and re-supply its units.

5. (C) The six local force companies which operated throughout the lowlands of Thua Thien (P) were fully combat ready at the beginning of the reporting period; however, after a series of coordinated, extremely successful cordon operations conducted by allied forces, the local force units were virtually eliminated, and the VC infrastructure was severely crippled. All of the LF Co's are now carried as combat ineffective, with most having strengths of less than 30 men. The loss of the VCI and a major portion of all the LF Co's has deprived the major NVA units of their primary source of guides into and through the lowlands and of their source of supplies.

Friendly operations and aerial bombardment have kept the enemy on the move and have held his offensive operations to a minimum. Highly trained, efficient sapper forces have remained in the AO and have conducted extensive reconnaissance of ARVN and US installations for future operations.

6. (C) At the close of the reporting period, the enemy is continuing to avoid contact with the allied forces, and continues to employ harassing sniper fire, boobytraps and mines, while regrouping and refitting his forces for future offensive operations.

F. PERSONNEL

1. (U) During the reporting period, the G1 Section was concerned with the conversion of the Division to an airmobile configuration and the repositioning of additional personnel to fill newly created positions.

2. (U) Of primary importance to the G1 Section during this period was the preparations for the rotation of 5,700 officers and enlisted men to CONUS during November and December. Planning also included consideration for the in-processing of 5,700 replacement personnel. Rosters were prepared indicating the operational requirements of each unit, and the manpower needed to bring units up to TOE strength. Upon receipt of confirmed aircraft seat reservations, adjusted DROs rosters were distributed to all units and staff agencies. The Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School was enlarged to allow the simultaneous processing of rottees and replacements. Personal services have been increased to provide appropriate military awards and decorations for rottees, and to improve facilities to handle the expected increase in financial matters.
A. LOGISTICS

1. (U) General: During the reporting period, 101st Airborne Division Support Command and units of the 26th General Support Group provided the essential combat service support to assist in the accomplishment of the Division's missions. The basic concept for support, less aviation maintenance support, was centered around the Forward Service Support Element in support of each of the Division's brigades. Logistical support continued despite reorganization of battalion size elements to the airborne configuration. As part of the reorganization, the aircraft maintenance capability was increased by the arrival in-country of the 142d Transportation Company which was redesignated Company A, 5th Transportation Bn (AMCS). The disposition of logistical support units changed slightly with the phased move of the 3d Brigade and the 3d FSSE from Phuoc Vinh to the Division AO in I CTZ. Throughout the remainder of the period the 1st and 3d FSSE's operated from Camp Eagle, while the 2d FSSE provided support from LZ Sally. On 15 October, a centralized system of supply distribution using organic CH-47 helicopters was implemented within the Division. This system centralized the control of CH-47 sorties at Division Support Command as part of the airborne division concept. Significant changes under this new concept were:

a. The supported units no longer had to supply themselves using organic transportation.

b. The FSSE's, backed up by the 426th SSS Bn, provided all required supplies to the requesting units.

c. CH-47 missions at Camp Eagle all originated from a single facility.

d. Increased responsiveness was obtained by centralized control of sorties.

e. Air safety at Camp Eagle was improved by eliminating multiple CH-47 pads and air traffic patterns.

2. (U) Maintenance

a. The 801st Maint Bn reorganized under the airborne configuration on 6 August. The major change involved the disbanding of B Company (Aviation Maintenance). The company's personnel and equipment were re-organized into A Company, 5th Transportation Battalion, and had essentially
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RG 65 (K)

the same mission as the disbanded B Company.

b. The 801st Maint Bn deployed Forward Support Companies with each brigade. HQ & A Company provided maintenance support for Division Headquarters and Division Troops, and back-up maintenance support for the Forward Support Companies. The battalion also had a rear support detachment which supported the Division Rear and Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School at Bien Hoa with a limited supply facility and armament maintenance. All other items of equipment for repair at Division Rear were evacuated to the 79th Maint Bn at Long Binh. General support maintenance was provided by units of the 26th General Support Group, including the 67th Maint Co at Camp Eagle, and the 576th Light Maint Co at Phu Bai. Aircraft general support maintenance was provided by the 610th Transportation Company located in Da Nang.

c. HQ & A Companies, 801st Maint Bn increased their authorized stockage list (ASL) of technical supply repair parts to 10,500 lines. Each Forward Support Company established a technical supply activity with a standardized 1,500 line ASL. During this quarter, the technical supply posture was the best since arriving in country, with a demand satisfaction of 65 percent, and a demand accommodation of over 72 percent.

3. (U) Supply

a. Logistical supply support for the 101st Airborne Division was provided by the 426th Supply and Service Battalion, except for medical, chemical, avionics, crypto, and repair parts. Ninety percent of all supplies for the Division were transported by surface means. The main supply sources for this Division are Da Nang Support Command and the 26th General Support Group (Phu Bai). Transportation truck support was received from the 39th Transportation Group, on request of DISCOM Movements Control.

b. Supply Tonnages used in support of the Division (short tons):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>1407</td>
<td>2150</td>
<td>2773</td>
<td>7330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II &amp; IV</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>3551</td>
<td>5313</td>
<td>11364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>1676</td>
<td>2592</td>
<td>5400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>3978</td>
<td>2580</td>
<td>5463</td>
<td>12021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>9602</td>
<td>12311</td>
<td>16133</td>
<td>38046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (U) Transportation

a. The DISCOM Movements Control Section controlled all convoys passing through the Division AO. There was an average of three convoys a day (Monday through Saturday) within the Division area of responsibility. In addition, the Movements Control Section monitored the nightly Huế-Rámp and Tan My Beach clearance operations conducted by the 26th General Support Group.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

b. Aircraft sorties flown in support of the Division were required
to transport DEROS, RPR, and leave personnel from Phu Bai to the Division
Rear located at Bien Hoa. During the reporting period, the sorties flown
and passengers and cargo carried were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>DORTIES</th>
<th>PAS</th>
<th>CARGO WT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>8660</td>
<td>1320 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>8912</td>
<td>1722 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>9716</td>
<td>673 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>3527</strong></td>
<td><strong>33107</strong></td>
<td><strong>9238 S/T</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Operation GOLDEN SWORD - the operation of moving 3/101 from III CTZ to I
CTZ, and moving 3/B2 from I CTZ to III CTZ during the period 15 Sep - 19
Oct.)*

H. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS. During the reporting period, numerous civic action
programs were completed by the Division units for the Vietnamese in Thua
Thien Province. The following projects were completed:

1. On 2 Aug, HHC/159th ASHB completed its 3 day project of providing
kitchen facilities for the Dai-Hoc Hue University. Materials were provided
through the unit's voluntary contributions.

2. On 15 Aug, HHB/101st Abn Div Arty, completed rebuilding the Bao
Anh Orphanage in Hue. The project took 3 months to complete. Materials
were provided by CORDS, Thua Thien Province and Div G5.

3. On 27 Aug, 2-17 Cav Sqdn provided 400 large roof tiles to repair
the Nam Hoa High School. The Nam Hoa District Chief provided the laborers
to repair the roof.

4. On 27 Aug the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div completed its well-casing pro-
ject in Huong Thuy District. The Brigade provided the cement for 15 wells
in the District and the Vietnamese provided the labor.

5. During the period 11 Sep - 29 Sep, several projects sponsored by,
the Div G5 were completed in the Districts throughout the Province. The
Div G5 furnished lumber, cement, tin, roofing tiles and transportation to
the local Districts, which provided the required work force. In addition,
the G5 provided clothing, food, and medical aid during the period after
Typhoon Bess (4-6 Oct) and during the 2d Bde's cordon operations (10 Sep,
31 Oct). In October each Brigade G5 conducted a survey among the District
15 November 1968

S U B J E C T: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R)

Chiefs and US advisors to determine the priorities for completing future projects. The District Chiefs submitted requisitions for the needed building and repair material, and the projects will be started in November 68. The priority projects selected by the Districts are as follows:

a. Nam Hie District - Repair of roads and bridges and continuation of the MEDCAP activities.

b. Hoang Thuy District - Repair of war torn buildings and schools, construction of additional school facilities and distribution of school kits to students. (The school kits contain pencils, pens, ink, ruler, chalk, scissors and 2x10 blackboards.)

c. Vinh Loc District - Construction of the District Market Place, repair of medical dispensary and provision of medical supplies for the dispensary.

d. Phu Loc District - Repair of school and medical facilities.

e. Hoang Tra District - Repair of schools and distribution of school kits to students.

f. Quang Dien District - Repair of District schools.

g. Phu Tu District - Provision of medical supplies and continuation of MEDCAP activities.

h. Phu Vang District - Repair of roads and rebuilding the District Market Place.

I. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

(U) During this period a total of 545 Ho Chi Minh Chieuhs rallied to the GVN and allied forces in the Division AO. The increase in the number of Ho Chi Minh Chieuhs over the last reporting period is attributed to the continuous pressure brought to bear on the enemy units and the amplification of the Chieu Hoi PSMOP Campaign. The Division’s PSMOP Campaign included the dissemination of over 84 million leaflets, 611 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts, 161 hours of movies and 10 TV programs. In addition to the Division’s campaign, GVN and military agencies initiated the Migen Trai Campaign. This campaign was designed to persuade all GVN military and civilian organizations to support the Chieu Hoi Program. During the soft cordon operations on the coastal lowlands east of Hue, the PSMOP teams made broadcasts continually throughout each operation. These broadcasts, both from helicopters and ground
teams, had an immediate impact on the numerous Hoi Chahns who rallied during the cordons. The broadcasts also influenced many additional enemy to rally to the GVN after the cordon operations were completed.

J. (0) MEDICAL

1. Base camp medical operations and statistics: Base camp operations continued with little change from the last reporting period. The 326th Medical Battalion and the aid stations of the separate battalions continued to provide base camp medical support. Outpatient medical visits dropped monthly during the period. Outpatient visits during August were 16,527, September 12,916 and October 12,415. The drop is attributed to increased sanitation measures which resulted in a reduction of visits for diarrhea and digestive tract infections.

2. Significant diseases during the reported period were malaria, psychiatric disorders, and immersion foot syndrome.

   a. Malaria: The Division malaria rate remained stable through the month of September, averaging approximately 51 cases/1000/annum. But during the month of October the rate fell to 21.1 cases/1000/annum. This decrease in rate may be attributed to the following factors:

      (1) Units of the 1st Bde which have had the highest rate of malaria moved to the coastal lowlands. In this area there is a reduced incidence of malaria as evidenced by the 2d Brigade's persistently low rate.

      (2) Increase in heavy precipitation with an accompanying decrease in environmental temperatures reduced the rate of mosquito development and breeding.

   These two factors, combined with an increase in command awareness, lowered the rate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate (cases/1000/annum)</th>
<th>% Vivax</th>
<th>% Mixed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   The apparent rise in percent of Vivax infection was due to a decrease in overall falciparum infection with a stable, absolute number of Vivax
cases. The 51.3 cases/1000/annum rate of August was the peak seasonal rate of malaria infection for 1968. This rate was significantly lower than other units operating in the same area during this period of time. The stable absolute number of Vivax infection during this peak period indicated a high level of command emphasis in this area by the 101st. The high level of falciparum infection during this peak period demonstrated that chemoprophylaxis (Dapsone) will not afford 100% protection against Falciparum Malaria, but will afford considerable protection when combined with personal protective measures. This is clearly evidenced when we compare the percent of infected individuals of combat units in the field (92%), who because of conditions cannot use mosquito nets, to infected individuals in combat support and combat service support units (10%), who have the advantages of a higher level of personal protective measures. When comparing the figures of malaria infections, absolute numbers or rate (cases/1000/annum) with other units in the area, it is clearly evident that considerable command attention was directed to this area.

b. Psychiatric Disorders: Psychiatric disorders for the forward area reported by the 326th Medical Battalion continued to rise during the reporting period. Psychiatric patients shown in rate/1000 average strength were, 60/1000 in August, 67.5/1000 in September and 43/1000 in October. However, the patients hospitalized for psychiatric disorder declined slightly in October. Rates were 1.6/1000 for August, 5.2/1000 in September and 4.6/1000 in October. This drop can be attributed to a more aggressive Division psychiatric program which returned a majority of all psychiatric disorders to duty. The cause of the increase in the total number of psychiatric patients is the classic "short timer syndrome." Modified forms of stress reactions to combat were seen, and it appeared that the increase was related to chronic stress or that the incidence rate increased for those men with nine or ten months in combat. Most of these patients can be returned to duty in 48-72 hours with the help of sedation, rest, recreation and supportive psychotherapy.

c. Immersion Foot Syndrome: The problem of immersion foot syndrome increased in the last 2 months due to an increase in precipitation in the Division AO and the deployment of units in the coastal lowlands where marshes and rice paddies abound. The clinical syndrome ran the gamut from swelling and "waterlogging" of the feet to abrasions, fissuring and secondary infection of denuded areas. In this Division, the typical case was an individual with a 2-3 day history of standing or wading in rice paddies or marshes with little or no chance to dry the feet and change socks. The skin of the feet became wrinkled, convoluted and white, and abraded at points of pressure within the boots. Many had a intersurrent time pedis infection of varying severity. These men were evacuated from the field because they could not
walk or stand for prolonged periods of time due to pain in the distal lower extremity. The majority of these individuals were held at battalion rear areas or medical clearing companies and treated as follows:

1. Rest and elevation of the feet.
2. Exposure of the affected feet to the air and sunlight.
3. Shower clogs for walking.
4. Systemic and local antibiotics for any secondary infections.
5. Treatment of any intercurrent tinea infection when the edema of the foot disappeared.

Most cases responded to this therapy and were returned to duty within 3-5 days.

K. (U) SIGNAL

During the reporting period the 501st Signal Battalion participated in Operations NEVADA EAGLE, SOMERSET PLAIN, and GOLDEN SWORD by providing command and control communications for the 101st Airborne Division Headquarters and its major subordinate elements. Communications provided included very high frequency (VHF) multichannel telephone communications down to battalion level; high frequency (HF) radio teletypewriter service; communications center facilities; messenger service; telephone switching centers, including a non-TOE AN/MTC-1, single side band radio wire integration (SSB RWI) service; and frequency modulated (FM) secure and non-secure radio communications. The Signal Battalion provided public address (PA) systems on 39 occasions, which included the arrival ceremony for BG Burdett. The Signal Battalion began reorganization under the airmobile signal battalion TOE 11-205T, which will result in a loss of 203 officers and men, along with associated equipment. An MTOE, designed to correct deficiencies in the airmobile TOE of a signal battalion, was completed on 31 October and submitted through channels.

L. ENGINEER

1. (U) During the reporting period the 326th Engr Bn provided combat support for Operation SOMERSET PLAIN and NEVADA EAGLE. A/326 Engr, in direct support of 1st Bde, assisted in construction and improvement of fire bases used during Operation SOMERSET PLAIN. B/326 Engr had two companies at
CONFIDENTIAL

AVI-OC, 15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSOR-65 (R1)

Ou Chi in direct support of the 3d Bde, and the remaining platoon and
company headquarters at Phuoc Vinh. On 15 Sep, the company headquarters
and 1st and 2d Platoons closed into Camp Eagle, as an element of the 3d Bde,
101st Abn Div. The 3d Platoon remained at Ou Chi in support of the 3-187
Inf Bn, and moved with them from III CTZ to I CTZ, closing into Camp Eagle
on 6 Oct. C/326, normally in direct support of 2d Bde, assisted and em-
placed three barrier minefields in the A Shau Valley on the nights of 16, 17
and 18 August to obstruct and harass enemy movement in the valley. Fol-
lowing Operation SOMERSET PLAIN, which terminated on 20 Aug, the company
returned to direct support of the 3d Bde. On 11 Sep, following Typhoon Bass,
the company constructed FB Sandy (TD 878499), and the CP of the 1-501 Inf.
Later the company constructed a road east from the fire base to the beach,
repaired a culvert (TD 683221) on the Quang Dien Road and redeployed the
Quang Dien Bridge (TD 689341).

2. (U) In addition to supporting combat operations, the engineers
invested hundreds of man hours in preparing Camp Eagle and LZ Sally, Division
and 2d Bde base camps, respectively, for the monsoon season. Construction
of roads, drainage ditches, quarters, office space and perimeter defense
bunkers characterized the engineer efforts in the base camps.

3. (U) Equipment support provided for line companies and Division
Headquarters was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-5A Bulldozer</td>
<td>2,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-450 Bulldozer</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cat 112 F, Grader</td>
<td>1,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Yard Front Loader</td>
<td>1,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell Backhoe</td>
<td>771</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

K. ARMY AVIATION

1. (U) At the close of the last reporting period, 160th Aviation
Group was supporting the preparations for Operation SOMERSET PLAIN. During
the buildup of the fire bases and the actual operation, the Group accomplis-

a. Carried a total of 2675 combat troops during seven major combat
assaults and carried 2605 combat troops during six major extractions.

b. Carried a total of 6221 passengers and 595 tons of supplies
by CH-47.

c. Flew a total of 2604 hours (UH-1C 367 hrs, UH-1H 1285 hrs,
CH-47 952 hrs).

2. (C) During the reporting period in support of Operation NEVADA
EAGLE, 160th Avn Op executed 152 combat assaults, transported 25,420 tons

CONFIDENTIAL
of cargo and 81,147 passengers, conducted 29 artillery battery size moves and flew 20,510 hours. These actions were accomplished with only an average of 120 aircraft assigned to the Group (Group is authorized 234 aircraft).

3. (U) The following statistical data is provided for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Hrs flown</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Pax Trans</th>
<th>Trans</th>
<th>Recoveries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101st AHB</td>
<td>17,705 hrs</td>
<td>61,145</td>
<td>40,251</td>
<td>2,921</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159th ASHB</td>
<td>4,587</td>
<td>17,131</td>
<td>54,279</td>
<td>28,453</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163rd Avn Co (GS)</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>2,424</td>
<td>1,387</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avn Op Totals</td>
<td>27,114</td>
<td>81,103</td>
<td>95,747</td>
<td>31,474</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N. (U) INFORMATION. During the reporting period the Division Information Office distributed several publications to the Division and provided numerous new releases to the news agencies in Vietnam. A description of the publications distributed by the Division Information Office is as follows:

1. The DREAMING EAGLE - The Division's bi-weekly eight page, offset paper published in Japan. The paper describes the Division's accomplishments and serves as a Command Information vehicle.

2. RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY - The Division's magazine, published quarterly. The magazine describes the Division's activities and accomplishments. The fall edition, published during this reporting period, consists of 32 pages of articles and pictures.

3. AIRBORNE DAILY - The Division's daily mimeographed newspaper covering the latest world and Division news. Special editions of the paper were published during the Presidential Election.

4. Command Information Fact Sheets - During the period the following articles were distributed to the Division's units on the dates indicated:
   a. Your Reserve Obligation....................16 Aug
   b. Driving Safety............................2 Sep
   c. Marihuana Abuse............................18 Sep
   d. Getting Along in Vietnam...............1 Oct
   e. Religions of Vietnam - Buddhism........20 Oct
   f. Religions of Vietnam - Taoism...........25 Oct

The Information Office also sent 203 news releases and 140 pictures to Vietnam and Stateside news channels and prepared daily summaries for the US ARV and Da Nang Press Centers and AFVN radio in Da Nang.
II. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

A. Personnel.

(U) Infusion.

1. OBSERVATION: During the months of November and December, approximately 5,700 officers and enlisted men will rotate out of the Division and return to CONUS.

2. EVALUATION: This rotation will cause a temporary loss of over 20% of the experienced commanders, staff officers, and combat troops in the Division. The "rotational hump" can be attributed both to the fact that all of the Divisional elements crossed into Vietnam in late 1967 and to the fact that commanders were reluctant to infuse personnel of known combat ability and to receive men of unknown quality. Casualties within the combat elements have been such that the "rotational hump" has a somewhat lesser impact on them. However, the combat support and combat service support elements have not had a significant attrition rate, and are the units most affected by the rotation.

3. RECOMMENDATION: That commanders of units arriving in-country should forcefully require their staffs and subordinates to execute promptly a vigorous and effective infusion program to prevent such a "rotational hump." It is important that infusion selection be impartial and that no stigmas be attached to being "infused out."

B. Operations.


a. OBSERVATION: The soft cordon operation is an effective means to defeat the VC and VC infrastructure, while minimizing damage to civilian property and reducing civilian casualties.

b. EVALUATION: The soft cordon, as used by the 101st ABN Div, was characterized by minimum use of artillery and firepower, surprise, speed of execution, detailed searches, minimized damage to civilian property, population control and integration of all available US, ARVN, GVN and police forces. The soft cordon operation was conducted in populated areas in which the VC were suspected to be widely dispersed throughout the civilian population, and where they were expected to try to escape, rather than establish organized resistance. Prior to initiating the soft cordon,
extensive coordination was conducted with selected and trusted Vietnamese agencies. Through practical experience, the Division's units learned that plans of an impending operation must be confined to only selected personnel. Widespread knowledge of the operation inevitably enabled the VC to escape from the intended cordon area. The characteristics of the soft cordon are as follows:

1. **Surprise** - To maintain secrecy, the planning group of the operation coordinated with a selected number of trusted personnel. Units in the operation were notified at the latest possible moment to prevent disclosure of the impending operation. In addition, reconnaissance was limited, and CP's and supporting artillery were moved into position only after the ground force had cordoned the objective.

2. **Speed of Execution** - The units established the cordon quickly, and then sent forces attacking across the cordoned area to defeat enemy organized resistance. The swiftness in establishing the cordon and in attacking across the cordoned area fragmented the enemy forces and disrupted their normal avenues of escape.

3. **Detailed Search** - Following the sweep of the cordoned area, and the defeat of any organized resistance, squad size or smaller elements were placed throughout the area to conduct a meter by meter search of the area. The searchers used shovels, entrenching tools and metal rods to dig and probe into hedgerows, rice paddy dikes and open areas in an attempt to locate the bunkers and caches of the VC. At night, these same search elements established ambushes throughout the cordoned area along suspected enemy escape routes. The detailed searching of the area was continued for several days, rather than the usual US forces "sweep" tactic of remaining in and searching an area for a day or less. The extended occupation of the area resulted in the VC becoming impatient and eventually disclosing or compromising their positions.

4. **Minimized Destruction** - No artillery fires were placed in the cordoned area, unless the enemy's organized resistance necessitated its use. This tactic reduced the destruction of civilian property, and significantly reduced the number of civilian casualties and civilian refugees.

5. **Population Control** - Every US and ARVN unit in the combined cordon operation had ARVN or GVN special police personnel attached to question and control the population. Orders were issued to the maneuver forces to detain everyone, even women and children, regardless of the credentials which they held. All of the people were then taken to a common well guarded collection point, where US/ARVN and GVN special police and
intelligence personnel were formed into combined interrogation or released, Civic Action Teams showed movies and TV programs and distributed candy, food and clothing. MEDCAPs were also conducted at the collection point and provided medical aid to those who needed it.

(6) Integration of Forces - In tailoring the force to conduct a soft cordon operation, all available forces from US and GVN units were integrated into the task organization. As a result, a Popular Force platoon worked with each US company; the National Police Field Forces were split among all combat units; and members of the Armed Propaganda Teams, Census Grievance Committee and Special Branch Police were spread to units when and where they were needed. This procedure ensured that the force sweeping the area included RF/PF/GVN forces who were familiar with the area and provided all US forces Vietnamese interpreters to converse with the Vietnamese people. Misunderstandings concerning the purpose of the operation were greatly decreased and more effective initial screenings of the population were conducted.

(7) PSYOPS Broadcasts - During the soft cordon operations on the coastal lowlands east of Hue, the PSYOP teams made broadcasts continually throughout each operation. These broadcasts, both from helicopters and ground teams, had an immediate impact on the numerous Ho Chi Chans who rallied during the cordons. The broadcasts also influenced many additional enemy to rally to the GVN after the cordon operations were completed.

(8) Collocated US/ARVN/GVN Command Group - The command headquarters and staff of the US, ARVN and GVN forces/agencies were collocated in a combined operations center. The collocation made possible frequent and close coordination, immediate exchange and sharing of intelligence gained from the interrogation of detainees, and quick reaction to the intelligence by ready reaction forces. The collocation of the key personnel of all forces was a significant factor in the success of the operation.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That combat units conduct soft cordon operations in the manner described as a means of effectively destroying the VC infrastructure and defeating VC units, while minimizing damage to civilian property and reducing civilian casualties.

2. (U) Setting Patterns during Combat Operations.

a. OBSERVATION: Interrogation of enemy prisoners and Ho Chi Chans has revealed that enemy units conduct operations in response to U.S. units' "pattern-setting" combat actions.
b. EVALUATION: During extensive interrogation of NVA and VC PW and Hoi Chams, the Division learned that U.S. units were setting patterns in their combat operations. One prisoner stated that, since U.S. H&I fires were normally fired on the high ground, NVA units moved on the low ground in the valleys and streams. Another prisoner stated that his unit SOP was to walk on roads and well used trails on clear bright nights and to move under the concealment of brush and woods on nights of poor visibility. This SOP was used, the PW stated, because it was opposite to the practice of U.S. units in the area. The U.S. units pattern of ambushing roads and trails during periods of restricted observation and moving into woodlines and brush areas on clear, moonlit nights, in effect, enabled enemy units to move freely at night.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That U.S. units be advised to review continuously their modes of combat operations to preclude setting patterns.

3. (U) Landings at Improperly Prepared or Poorly Policed Landing Zones.

a. OBSERVATION: The preparation of LZ's both in the jungle and at fire bases requires that units provide safe LZ's.

b. EVALUATION: The LZ in a jungle must be large enough and have sufficient aircraft approach routes to allow an aircraft to approach, land on and depart an LZ without striking a blade or tail rotor on surrounding trees. In addition, police of an area is absolutely necessary. The presence of pouch liners, air mattresses, items of clothing, sheets of plywood and other similar lightweight objects on an LZ or fire base frequently results in the unpolicing items being whirled into the air. These unpolicing items result in damage to blades and injury to personnel in the vicinity of the landing aircraft. An unpolicing area is a major threat of damage to the aircraft and injury to aircraft crew members and personnel on the ground.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That units be advised of, made to comply with, and enforce safety in constructing and policing LZ's and fire bases.


a. OBSERVATION: Aircraft employed in VR missions at altitudes less than 1500 ft should have a gunship as an escort.

b. EVALUATION: All aircraft operating over hostile territory when flying below 1500 ft should have a gunship escort in the event enemy fire is received. If a VR or artillery adjusting mission is to be flown, it should be done at an altitude high enough to avoid enemy ground fire and to enable the pilot to make a radio transmission in the event he is
hit by enemy ground fire. Aircraft should be flown at low airspeeds and at tree top level only when the tactical situation demands accepting the high probability of loss of aircraft and crews.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That units be advised of the proper methods of employing aircraft on visual reconnaissance missions, and that, if the aircraft is to fly below 1500 ft, an escort gunship be provided to protect the aircraft conducting the VR mission.

C. Training.

1. (U) Airmobile Training.

a. OBSERVATION: With the increased number and type aviation assets available as a result of the reorganization of the Division, it was apparent that a large number of personnel were insufficiently trained in airmobile operations.

b. EVALUATION: The large increase in number and type of aviation assets available for tactical employment necessitated an airmobile training program. A program was established to standardize airmobile procedures within the Division and ensure that all personnel engaged in the planning and conduct of airmobile operations were thoroughly familiar with the capabilities and limitations of Division aviation and aviation support units. The program conducted by the Division consisted of 12 hours of instruction presented by aviation personnel. All aspects of airmobile operations were stressed, particularly, the various roles of the helicopter, i.e., gunship, troop carrier, logistics resupply. Also stressed was the planning and execution of a combat assault to include the use of all supporting fires. All commanders, S3 and S3 air officers were required to attend this training program.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That units programmed to receive additional aviation assets conduct an airmobile training program similar to that of the 101st Airborne Division.

2. (U) Mines and Boobytrap Training.

a. OBSERVATION: During combat operations, Division units sustained numerous casualties from mines and boobytraps because of the density of the boobytraps and lack of familiarity with detecting and detonating them.

b. EVALUATION: In order to decrease the casualty rate resulting from mines and boobytraps, the Division selected one officer and
four enlisted men to form a traveling "Mines and Boobytraps" Instructor Team. The selected personnel were sent to special mines and boobytrap classes conducted by the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division. The team is presently writing a program of instruction in mines and boobytraps which will be presented to Division units in December. The purpose of the team is to introduce to newly assigned personnel the types of mines and boobytraps commonly found in the Division AO. In addition, the team will instruct on the methods of detecting and detonating the mines and boobytraps. The team will present these classes during unit stand-downs and will be available for refresher training classes following their initial classes to each unit.

C. RECOMMENDATION: That brigade or larger size units form instructor teams to present classes and refresher training to newly assigned personnel and requesting units on combat operations subjects such as mines and boobytraps. The classes should be designed to improve a deficiency noted during combat operations, to train newly assigned personnel and to provide refresher training to company size units.

3. (U) Reciprocal Mobile Training.

a. OBSERVATION: Reciprocal training conducted by the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st ARVN Division has increased the tactical proficiency of both units and has strengthened the close cooperation and coordination which exists between the Divisions.

b. EVALUATION: The exchange of reciprocal mobile training teams between the 101st Abn Div and the 1st ARVN Div has been highly successful. ARVN personnel have benefited from instruction in weapons employment and maintenance, while U.S. personnel have gained new insight into VC tactics and techniques. This program has served to increase the tactical proficiency of both Divisions and has had a positive effect on increasing the cooperation and coordination of the Divisions.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That reciprocal mobile training with ARVN units receive increased emphasis.

D. Intelligence.

1. (U) SLAR Moving Target Indicators (MTI).

a. OBSERVATION: Insufficient information is provided with moving target indicators to permit full analysis.

b. EVALUATION: The Division never receives sufficient information to compute speed and direction of SLAR MTI. To do so, it would
be necessary to have two fixes on a given MTI separated by time and dis-
tance factors. Such information can be obtained only if the SIAR aircraft
makes a second pass in the target area and provides a fairly precise time
of detection for each MTI.

c. RECOMMENDATION: SIAR aircraft must make a minimum of two
successive passes in all target areas to permit determination of speed
and direction of MTIs.

2. (U) Voluntary Informant Program (VIP).

a. OBSERVATION: In order for the VIP, which provides money-
tary inducement for Vietnamese to voluntarily provide information, to pro-
duce tangible results, it must be combined with a strong local security pro-
gram.

b. EVALUATION: During the Vinh Loc and Phu Vang Combined
Operations, XXIV Corps contributed heavy psychological operations support
to the Chieu Hoi and Volunteer Informant (VIP) Program. The results of the
Chieu Hoi portion were quite gratifying, as several hundred VC/NVA troops
rallied to friendly forces. The results of the VIP were disappointing.
Not one person in these areas volunteered any information. After inter-
viewing IP’s personnel and the 32’s of the units involved, the following
conclusions were formulated: psychological operations were a determining
factor in the large number of Hoi Chanhs, but had little or no effect on
the VIP; the Viet Cong Security elements were so strong in these semi-
rural areas that an informant enjoyed absolutely no security once
the operation was terminated, this in itself was enough to defeat the VIP; a
Hoi Chanh was quite willing to volunteer information since he would be
leaving the area and would be under constant protection for some months;
in addition, once having finished the Chieu Hoi training program, he would
be resettled in a different area.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Aggressive anti-VCI operations and con-
stant patrolling by small units in each hamlet is necessary for the VIP
to be successful. These operations should also include constant liaison by
company commanders and platoon leaders with hamlet and village officials in
their areas of operation to publicize the program. It would also be help-
ful to organize the program. It would also be helpful to organize a de-
liberate plant, which will result in a public payment ceremony to emphasise
the advantages of reporting information and handing over equipment. All
of these operations should be run so as to convince the potential informant that he will be safe after providing information.

3. (U) Combined Interrogation.

   a. OBSERVATION: Joint US/Vietnamese interrogation is more effective in exposing Viet Cong Infrastructure.

   b. EVALUATION: Prior to the Vinh Loc cordon operation, screening and processing of detainees was done exclusively by US Interrogation Teams. This proved both time consuming and often ineffective in exposing Viet Cong Infrastructure. Had coordination been made with GVN agencies, specifically the National Police Field Force, Police Special Branch, and Province/District S2 personnel, their assistance in screening and processing detainees would have resulted in a more efficient operation and faster, more timely dissemination of information. During the recent operations at Vinh Loc and Phu Yen, this system of more detailed coordination with Province/District S2 personnel and the above mentioned GVN agencies resulted in a very effective operation.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: That US units attempt actively to include Vietnamese intelligence personnel/agencies in combat operations designed to attack the VC infrastructure.

E. Logistics.

1. (U) Re-supply by Air Drop.

   a. OBSERVATION: Re-supply by helicopter during inclement weather is not always possible.

   b. EVALUATION: Prior to Operation HAMSET FLAND, weather predictions indicated that periods of inclement weather lasting three or four days could be expected in the A Shau Valley. Since all re-supply of units during the operation would be by helicopter, an alternate means of re-supply had to be developed in the event the helicopters could not fly during the inclement weather. Emergency re-supply by air drop into the valley from USAF fixed wing aircraft appeared to be the best alternate means for re-supply. A request was submitted to the Air Force for assistance in the selection of Drop Zones. Air Force controller teams arrived on station four days prior to the start of the operation, and were attached to the combat battalions. Dive were selected, and complete information was sent to the Air Force ALCE and TMA. A request was also submitted to 1st Log Command to pre-rig three days of supply, for two battalions, in A-22 containers. These supplies were rigged prior to
AVDO-GC

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-85 (R)

the start of the operation and stored at Cam danh Bay. While the air drop
was not used, the planning would have permitted resupply of two battalions
within a two hour time limit.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That, when resupply by helicopter is not
possible, units make arrangements to resupply units by air dropped, pre-
rigged A-22 containers delivered by USAF aircraft.

2. (U) Forward Supply Point.

a. OBSERVATION: Existing helicopter assets can be utilized
to greater advantage by establishing forward supply points, which serve to
reduce the flight time between the supply source and the supported units.

b. EVALUATION: Since roads into the A Shau Valley were not
in an adequate state of repair to permit vehicle traffic, it was necessary
to resupply units operating in the A Shau Valley by helicopter. Upon com-
puting tonnage requirements and flight times, it became readily apparent
that sufficient helicopter assets were not available, unless the flight
time from the supply source to the units were reduced. Therefore,
a forward supply point was established by DISCOM between Camp Eagle and the
A Shau Valley, along Route 547. Resupply of the FSP was by road from Camp
Eagle. A five day level of supplies was stocked prior to insertion of
the combat troops into the A Shau Valley. The five day level of prestocked
supplies enabled the operation to be logistically supported smoothly during
periods of peak supply usage.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That forward supply points be established
as far forward as permitted by road conditions and that resupply be made
to the forward supply point by vehicles, thus reducing helicopter flight
time between the supply point and the combat units.

3. (U) Preparation for Airlift Movement.

a. OBSERVATION: Preparation of unit equipment and personnel
for airlift was not always in accordance with OPLAN's and SOP's.

b. EVALUATION: Equipment and personnel sometimes arrived at
the airfield not adequately prepared for movement. Examples of improper
preparations were as follows: vehicles topped-off (fuel tanks cannot be
full due to fuel expansion when airborne), no shoe tags prepared for in-
dividual manifest, grenades attached to individual LBE, weapons not cleared,
pallets improperly packed and marked, CONEX's improperly marked or not
marked at all, and cargo not secured on vehicles. None of these items was major, but each took considerable time to correct. The problem existed in that one or more of these items arose with each Task Force and required action by the Brigade Movement Officer on each occasion. Guidance on proper procedures had been published, but did not seem to filter down to or was not implemented by all units in all cases.

c. RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That units prepare detailed checklists or SOPs outlining the actions to be taken to prepare properly all equipment and personnel for movement by airlift.

(2) That units preparing for airlift movement insure that the guidelines and instructions from higher headquarters are implemented and thoroughly supervised.

4. (U) Use of Transportation Assets and Material Handling Equipment during Air Movements.

a. OBSERVATION: The use of transportation assets and material handling equipment during the movement of unit equipment from the unit staging area to the airfield was not properly coordinated.

b. EVALUATION: The use of transportation assets and material handling equipment (MHE) was not coordinated during the move of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div because the moving units failed to anticipate their requirements for transportation/MHE augmentation. On several occasions the units did not notify Division Movement Control of their requirements until one or two hours prior to movement time. The delay in notifying Division Movement Control necessitated extreme "scrambling" of assets to move units, and could have resulted in insufficient cargo being available for movement at the airfield.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That units notify Division Movement Control of the unit's requirements for additional transportation assets and MRE no later than 1800 hours on the day prior to the unit's movement date.

5. (U) Coordination between the Control Group and the Unit Staging Area.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

a. OBSERVATION: The coordination between the control group at the departure airfield and the unit staging area was excellent.

b. EVALUATION: The coordination between the control group at the departure airfield and the unit staging area is absolutely essential. The 3d Bde, 82nd Abn Div ensured excellent coordination between the airfield and the staging area by assigning a knowledgeable officer with sufficient authority to cause immediate correction of any loading, packing or SOP deficiencies. This officer worked closely with the control group, but moved freely among the units in the staging area to ensure a smooth flow of PAX/cargo to the airfield.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That units preparing for an air move provide a knowledgeable liaison officer to coordinate with the airfield control group and to assist in the movement of PAX/cargo from the staging area to the airfield.

6. (U) DACG/AACG Operations.

a. OBSERVATION: Departure Airfield Control Group (DACG)/Arrival Airfield Control Group (AACG), if not well rehearsed and closely supervised, can be a major source of problem areas.

b. EVALUATION: The normal Division DACG/AACG facility cannot handle the expanded requirements of a major unit move without considerable personnel/equipment augmentation. Tasking for this augmentation should be coordinated with the unit responsible for the DACG/AACG (DISCOM if the unit is passing through an DACG/AACG operating at a "Division Airfield"). The augmentation also must be coordinated with the USAF so that the specific capabilities of the aerial port are utilized. A smooth running DACG requires extremely close integration of USAF, Division DACG/AACG and moving unit effort. The organization must be assembled well in advance, briefings held, walk-thru's conducted and reporting channels exercised. There must be one supervisor who is free to move from activity to activity without being required to actually operate any facility. Some specific areas which required considerable expenditure of effort prior to the start of "GOLDEN SWORD" before being resolved were:

1. Maintaining exact and up-to-date records of which chalks were in port, checked and ready for loading.

2. Maintaining exact and up-to-date records of which chalks had departed and which were loading. The same was true of inbound chalks - what had arrived and what had been moved out to the inbound unit area.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(3) Responding rapidly to requests from the ramp controllers to move chalks to plane side.

(4) Insuring that such details as preparation and positioning of weight sheets and use of troop "shoe tags" for final manifests were accomplished per established SOP's.

c. RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That particular attention be given early in the planning phase to establishment of a complete DACG/AACG facility.

(2) That detailed and complete SOP's be established, briefed and rehearsed.

(3) That close supervision be given to adherence to SOP's.

7. (U) Control of Cargo.

a. OBSERVATION: During brigade size moves considerable cargo can be lost, if stringent controls are not enforced.

b. EVALUATION: The loss of cargo or the loss of control of cargo, rarely occurs between the unit staging area and the DACG. On short moves, such as moves between Phuoc Vinh and Cu Chi or Bien Hoa and Song Be, control of cargo is not a serious problem. However, on long moves, such as Operation GOLDEN SWORD which involved the movement of the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div from I CTZ to III CTZ and of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div from III CTZ to I CTZ, control of cargo does become a problem. During Operation GOLDEN SWORD, several plane loads were shipped through Cam Ranh Bay due to the end of a crew duty day or a maintenance halt. Although the majority of loads shipped to Cam Ranh Bay were delayed only a few hours, there were a few loads which were delayed for a considerable length of time. The delays in shipping cargo were caused in part by the lack of an escort for the cargo and the lack of proper marking indicating to whom the property belonged and the final destination of the cargo. As a result of these deficiencies, several units involved in the move misplaced or lost several loads of cargo.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all cargo chalks be escorted by a competent individual who has been briefed on to whom to call if he and the cargo appear to be stranded.
(2) That all cargo be clearly marked to indicate the cargo's unit, destination and transportation movement release (TMR) number.

(3) That coordination be made with all USAF agencies/facilities, which are or might be involved in the movement of the cargo, prior to the start of the movement of units and cargo.

(4) That units compile and retain detailed loading/packing lists for each CONEX and pallet.

F. Organization.

1. (U) Reorganization to Airmobile.

   a. OBSERVATION: The Division accomplished its initial re-organizational process in a smooth, efficient manner as a result of careful adherence to a time-phased plan.

   b. EVALUATION: USARPAC OOO 325 authorized reorganization or activation of the majority of the Division base elements. Effective date of the reorganization authority was 1 July. Rather than attempt to simultaneously reorganize all of the units, the Division established a time-phased plan that would extend throughout the period 1 July - 1 December. This period had been specified by USARV as Phase I of the 101st Abn Div's reorganization and was geared to the arrival of aviation assets. By carefully time-phasing the reorganization of assigned Division base units, the receipt of incoming aviation assets was accomplished in a smooth, professional manner. The time-phased plan also eased personnel and equipment turbulence that would have been created by simultaneous reorganization of all the units listed in the General Order. The schedule followed by the Division is as follows:

   1 Jul  - Begin reorganization of DISCOM
   20 Jul - Activate 150th Avn Op
   1 Aug  - Reorganize: 325th Engt Bn
            2nd and 3rd Bde, HHC
   1 Sep  - Reorganize: 101st Admin Co
            101st MP Co
            101st Div HHC
   1 Dec  - Reorganize: 501st Sig Bn
            Div Arty HHC

   c. RECOMMENDATION: That units scheduled to undergo a major reorganization establish and follow a time-phased plan rather than attempt a simultaneous conversion.
2. (U) USARPAC 00 325.

a. OBSERVATION: Several errors in USARPAC 00 325, dated 28 June 1968 have hampered the Division's conversion to an airmobile TOE.

b. EVALUATION: USARPAC 00 325 contained several errors. Included among these was the activation of a four company aircraft maintenance battalion which would have established a centralized aviation maintenance system for the Division rather than the planned cellular maintenance system. In addition to this major error, both 1st Bde HHC and 2-320 Arty Bn, although included on the USARV force structure requested, were omitted from the reorganization (D). A subsequent USARPAC 00 607 eliminated the four company aircraft maintenance battalion and established the required cellular maintenance system. However, the status of 1st Bde HHC and 2-320 Arty Bn has not yet been resolved.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That USARV recommend to USARPAC that a reorganization General Order be published to convert the 1st Bde HHC and 2-320 Arty Bn to the appropriate "T" series MTOE.

3. (U) Airmobile Signal Battalion.

a. OBSERVATION: Conversion from the Airborne Signal Battalion TOE 11-210T to the Airmobile Signal Battalion TOE 11-205T in December 1968 will result in major changes in the concept of operations with respect to communications within the Division.

b. EVALUATION: Under the current TOE 11-210T the Signal Battalion is capable of providing multichannel voice communications to the major and subordinate units of the Division to include fire support bases and isolated infantry battalions. Army Area Communications System (AACS) support is used to establish backbone multichannel communications within the Division and to higher headquarters. The communications established by this Battalion in support of combat operations are considered essential to the successful conduct of these operations. Upon conversion to TOE 11-205T, a significant amount of critical equipment and a large number of personnel will be lost, thus tremendously reducing the command and control communications which can be provided the Division. In an effort to avert the major difficulties associated with the reduction of personnel and equipment under TOE 11-205T, an MTOE has been prepared by this headquarters in coordination with 1st Cavalry Division (AM) which submitted an identical MTOE. This MTOE corrects the concept in its organization and equipment.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the MTOE submitted by this headquarters to USARV on 12 Nov 68 be adopted to insure required command and control communications are provided this Division.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSOR-65 (RL)

4. (U) **Base Camp TDA.**

   a. **OBSERVATION:** A suggested base camp TDA prepared by USARV was reviewed by the 101st Airborne Division.

   b. **EVALUATION:** USARV requested comments on equipment densities included in the TDA. No comments were required for personal organization. The TDA was reviewed and equipment densities were adjusted to reflect the minimum essential requirements to accomplish the missions and capabilities as outlined in the TDA. The TDA submitted to USARV, if approved, will alleviate equipment shortages and eliminate SD personnel positions which presently exist as a result of base camp defense requirements.

   c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That the TDA submitted by the 101st Abn Div to USARV on 10 November be approved.

G. Other.

1. Signal.

   a. (U) **Radio Set AN/PRC-77/KY-38.**

      (1) **OBSERVATION:** Despite obvious disadvantages in weight, the AN/PRC-77/KY-38 provides excellent capability at Infantry company level.

      (2) **EVALUATION:** Secure voice at company level provides for rapid, safe and detailed discussion of plans and operations without fear of enemy detection. To offset the weight disadvantage of the AN/PRC-77/KY-38 package, two solutions have been used: first, utilize the "two-man" carry, where one man carries the radio, the other the KY-38; and second, move the unit into positions as normal, and fly-in the secure voice equipment by supporting aircraft for use in static or night defensive positions.

      (3) **RECOMMENDATION:** That continued command emphasis at all levels be placed on full time use of the AN/PRC-77/KY-38 at Infantry company level and that tests be conducted to reduce the weight of the radio.

   b. (U) **Power Supply for the AN/PRC-77/KY-38.**

      (1) **OBSERVATION:** The battery life on the AN/PRC-77/KY-38 is considerably less than that of the AN/PRC-25.
(2) EVALUATION: Initial use of the AN/PRC-77/KY-38 gave indications of a battery life of only 12 hours. However, closer investigation revealed that, although the battery life of the AN/PRC-77/KY-38 was indeed 12 hours in normal use with the KY-38, the battery life of the KY-38 itself was approximately 24 hours.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That batteries in the AN/PRC-77 be changed every 12 hours in normal use of the zinc type battery, and that batteries in the KY-38 be changed every 24 hours. This should be widely publicized to avoid discarding good batteries.

c. (U) Aerial Radio Relay Set AN/ARC-121.

(1) OBSERVATION: Use of the new blade type antenna with aerial FM radio automatic retransmission permits full use of the AN/ARC-121 in the Army UH-A aircraft.

(2) EVALUATION: Supporting Army UH-A aircraft were unable to provide for more than one aerial FM radio retransmission system using whip-type antennas because of the drag caused by the antennas. When more than one pair of whips was used, the aircraft became unstable and unsafe to fly. When equipped with the new blade type antenna (similar to that used on aircraft VHF radios), three complete retransmission systems can be operated from one AN/ARC-121 mounted in the aircraft.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That all Army UH-A's used for aerial FM radio retransmission be equipped with blade-type antennas to permit use of 3 retransmission units in one AN/ARC-121 from one aircraft.

d. (U) Manual Telephone Central Office AN/MTC-1.

(1) OBSERVATION: The transmitter in the headsets for the switchboard AN/TTC-7 and AN/TTC-7A overheat causing failure of the headset due to excess voltage in the "talk" circuit of the switchboard.

(2) EVALUATION: Several different type headset-microphones have been tested on the AN/TTC-7A switchboard including H-91/AU, H-114/U and H-210/G headsets. All of these work only for a short time (approximately one hour) before they overheat, break down, introduce excessive static and lose transmitting power. Electronic maintenance personnel have isolated the problem to the "talk" circuit which presently places 48 volts across the transmitter (pins c and d). The headsets are designed to operate at 3 to 6 volts. To help eliminate this problem, a one-watt, 100 ohm resistor was placed in the "talk" circuit of the switchboard between terminals A and D of the OB relay. Tests indicate that this
modification has reduced the rate of failure, but has not eliminated the problem. Until a better solution is found, the switchboard operators are required to use handsets from telephone sets TA-236, which have been modified for connection to the switchboard.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That action be taken to assign a qualified ECOM technical representative the task of thoroughly investigating this problem to determine the best solution, and that all AN/MRC-1 switchboards be modified accordingly.

e. (U) Radio Relay Terminal Set, AN/GRC-163.

(1) OBSERVATION: The AN/GRC-163 provides a rapid means of installing reliable multichannel communications over paths which are not line of sight.

(2) EVALUATION: Since receipt of the AN/GRC-163, it has been tested extensively in various types of terrain. These tests have clearly proven that a line of sight path is not required for effective communications. Thirty kilometer systems have been installed over terrain with a 60-meter block in the path without noticeable degradation. Two different systems have been installed since 15 September and both provide high quality communications with no outage in 47 days of continuous operations.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the AN/GRC-163 be employed in areas which do not allow installation of line of sight equipment or space for larger equipment.

2. Engineer.


(1) OBSERVATION: In large tunnels where total destruction is impractical due to the quantities of explosives involved or the difficulty in reaching the work site, residual CS Crystals can be effectively employed to deny use of the tunnel for up to 6 months.

(2) EVALUATION: The problem encountered is the determination of the correct amount of explosives to distribute the CS in the tunnel, and to embed a portion of the crystals in the wall of the tunnel. Using the 10 lb bag of CS crystals, two wraps of det cord were found to be adequate to disperse the CS. One bag of crystals per 120 cubic feet of tunnel space produces the desired concentration.
(3) RECOMMENDATION: That combat units be informed of this method of contaminating tunnels with CS crystals.

b. (U) Fire Base Construction.

(1) OBSERVATION: Rapid construction of hill top fire bases in a jungle environment requires considerable planning to insure efficient construction, sufficient space for all units on the fire base, and a defensible position.

(2) EVALUATION:

(a) Considerations during the layout phase are optimizing the use of available land and minimizing the perimeter while insuring it is defensible. Sites with adjacent hills which overlook the base at short range should be avoided. A basic layout should be agreed upon by all occupants at the start, and a single fire base development officer should be appointed to authorize (and minimize) changes to the layout, and to establish construction priorities. If possible, a road should be cut the entire length of the base to facilitate the movement of engineer equipment. This also aids the movement of supplies, and affords flexibility in the utilization of helicopter pads during operations. Insertion of heavy bulldozers (D-5A) at the earliest moment is the key to rapid completion. Clearing should be done from the perimeter trace inward, so that an immovable barrier of downed trees is not created. Demolitions are useful, but must be strictly controlled to insure safety in a confined fire base.

(b) Initial site selection and layout should be accomplished by an Artillery-Infantry-Engineer party. Overall construction sequence for the fire base should be as follows:

1. Prep the site with Daisy Cutters.

2. Secure the site and bring in an engineer team to clear a one-ship LZ.

3. Lift in additional engineers, demolitions and chainsaws to clear an LZ large enough to accommodate a CH-54, a M-490 bulldozer. Expand the LZ to accommodate a CH-54, a D-5A bulldozer.

4. Bring in 3414 backhoes only after sufficient clearing as been accomplished to fully utilize them.
15 November 1968

SUBJECT:  Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSR-65 (R1)

6 At altitudes too great to allow lift of D-5A bulldozer, a TD-6 (12,300 lbs) may be obtained from naval construction units.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That units constructing fire bases consider the construction methods described, and direct a quartermaster party to ensure that the fire base is both defensible and large enough to accommodate adequately all of the programmed occupants.

c. (q) Rapid Destruction of Bunker Complexes.

(1) OBSERVATION: A 40 pound cratering charge provides a fast and efficient means of destroying a large number of bunkers.

(2) EVALUATION: The standard method of priming C-4 with det cord to destroy bunkers was found to be too slow when a large number of bunkers had to be destroyed quickly. To destroy bunkers quickly, a 40 pound cratering charge was found to be the most effective and fastest means of accomplishing the mission. Although the 40 pound cratering charge produces an "overkill" in some cases, the cratering charge is easy to prime and easy to transport over short distances. In addition, one charge is sufficient to destroy a 15' x 20' bunker with 5 feet of overhead cover. The cratering charge can also be dropped from a helicopter hovering at an altitude up to 100 feet, thereby providing on-site delivery of demolitions and reducing the load of the combat troops assigned the mission of destroying bunkers.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That units be advised of the advantages of using 40 pound cratering charges for destroying bunker complexes quickly.

d. (u) Chainsaws.

(1) OBSERVATION: The currently authorized Remington Chainsaw is inadequate to meet the requirements for fire base construction.

(2) EVALUATION: This is a lightweight saw to allow carrying it over great distances. In actual practice the saws are seldom carried for any great distance, but rather are lifted directly to the work site. The lightweight saws fail structurally, in that the cases split easily, and often fail mechanically. The carburetor and oil pump are not rugged enough to survive rough handling. Since saws do not have to be carried far during fire base construction, the trade-off of weight for added ruggedness could well be tolerated.
AVG-OC 15 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R)

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That a more rugged chainsaw preferably a two man saw, with carbide tips, capable of considerable rough handling, be developed for and issued to combat units in the field.

3. Civil Affairs.

a. (U) Stockage of Building Materials.

(1) OBSERVATION: Since the tactical situation permits increased emphasis on Civil Affairs activities in outlying areas, battalion sized units require small amounts of immediately available supplies in order to provide prompt Civil Affairs assistance.

(2) EVALUATION: Isolated rain storms, erosion, wind, track vehicles, etc., occasionally damage a single house or crush a rice paddy dike. The greatest civil affairs benefit is gained in these and similar situations, if immediate repairs can be made. In order to effect immediate reaction to these projects, the battalion/squadron must have its own resources on hand particularly, those items which are tightly controlled, and must be normally obtained from the local economy. Battalion/squadron level units should maintain, on hand, a limited supply of hard to get civil affairs/civic action material. Recommended items are:

- 500 " of cement.
- 50 lbs of cloth.
- 50 lbs of toothpaste, toothbrushes, sewing kits, health and welfare items, etc.
- 15 sheets corrugated aluminum roofing.
- 50 lbs of sack cloth (burlap) for blankets, comforters, etc.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That battalion size units be permitted to stock a limited amount of cement, clothing, metal roofing material, health and welfare items.

b. (U) Treatment of Large Numbers of Personnel.

(1) OBSERVATION: Treating a large number of people during a relatively short period of time presents several problems. One of the problems is how much medicine to dispense to each person, and how to best dispense the drugs.

(2) EVALUATION: Various methods of dispensing drugs have been tried by MEDCAP teams in an effort to treat patients effectively without dispensing an excessive amount of the drug. The spot...
packaging of medicine in small paper boxes was found to be time consuming, but effective. Packaged boxes of medicine were much faster; however, it was observed that the civilian reaction to this form of drug distribution was not good. Often the people would skeptically examine the contents of the box before moving on down the line. The Vietnamese people appreciate very much the personal touch of having their prescriptions filled on the spot, rather than receiving a prepacked box. Package medicine in clear plastic boxes was also issued to enable the people to see what they were getting. The only problem with the plastic containers was that the only size container available for use was too large. Having a few tablets in a large container made the people feel cheated. Occasionally, the MEDCAP team gave an elderly person with arthritis a full bottle of commercial aspirin, because he needed prolonged treatment. Intelligence reports indicated that dispensing partially filled containers or full containers of commercial drugs made the medicine easy prey for the black market. Vietnamese medical workers, after hearing of the problem of proper size boxes and proper number of pills to be issued, stated that the people were just as happy with a small number of tablets wrapped in a 4" X 4" gauze or Kleenex. In the limited time since then, the MEDCAP teams have found this to be true. This method should also make it more difficult for the medicine to reach the black market. After trial and error, the MEDCAP teams found that the most effective methods of dispensing drugs is to issue a small number of tablets in a 4" X 4" gauze or Kleenex. Any condition which requires a full course of drug therapy to be cured is treated by an appropriate issue of medicine. Fortunately, most complaints are minor, and satisfied easily with a small quantity of medicine.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That in-country S-5's and medical service personnel be informed of this method of dispensing drugs to their Vietnamese patients during MEDCAPs.
III. Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information

A. Listed below is an intelligence debriefing of two pilots shot down on the morning of 4 Oct 68. They evaded the enemy until 061700H Oct when they were returned to US control.

On the morning of 4 Oct 68 WO ERNEST O. THIBAULT, HHC, 1st Bde Avn Sec, 101st Abn Div, and CPT RONALD GOODMAN, HHB, 2/321 Arty, 82d Abn Div, were flying a visual reconnaissance mission southeast of Phu Loc (D), Thoa Thien (P), in response to a 1st Bde S-2 visual reconnaissance mission, which had drawn fire from the enemy on the previous day. WO Thibault was the pilot and CPT Goodman was the observer in an OH-6A. They were following a ridgeline running NW to SE, vicinity 2C 105965, and had spotted approximately 4 groups of hooches, with 25 to 50 hooches in each, located near the top of the ridgeline. They also saw well-fortified bunkers with over-head cover, located further down the slope of the ridgeline. Connecting these areas were several well-used trails, appearing capable of accommodating foot traffic. The trails ran NW to SE from vicinity 2C 102973, N to S from vicinity 2C 127-6S, and N to S from vicinity 2C 130972. The trails appeared to converge somewhere under the thick foliage vicinity 2C 118948.

While turning to fly back over the area to adjust artillery on the hooch complexes, the aircraft was hit by 4 to 5 rounds of what was believed to be AK-47. All hits were in the aircraft's engine compartment. It crashed upside down on a hillside vicinity 2C 103973 at 0835H.

WO Thibault was dazed from the crash and wedged in the helicopter's cockpit. CPT Goodman pulled him out of the wreckage. When WO Thibault regained consciousness, the two men crawled away from the aircraft. CPT Goodman had sustained a fractured left leg and burns on his right leg from hot JP, which had spilled from a ruptured fuel tank or fuel line. WO Thibault had a fractured right leg. Each man was armed with only a .45 caliber pistol. They crawled approximately 200 meters to the west, and hid under a log in a heavy wooded area until dark. They cut banana stalks there for what moisture they could soak out. Both men credited the close artillery and air strikes with keeping the enemy out of their area in the hours immediately following the crash.

After dark they crawled to a nearby stream. From then until their rescue, their only nourishment was water from the stream. Both men slept that night on the bank of the stream. At various intervals throughout the night, they could hear a hand-cranked generator being used to power a radio operating in CW Mode.
The morning of 5 Oct 68, CPT Goodman and WD Thibault crawled about 50 meters further downstream and hid in a hollow area under the stream bank. Later in the morning they spotted a helicopter flying back and forth over the area. WD Thibault crawled to a nearby open space and waved his handkerchief and map to attract attention. Then he went back and helped CPT Goodman out to the open area so that the aircraft pilot could see both men.

That afternoon they stayed hidden under the stream bank while US Forces engaged nearby enemy in a firefight. Enemy positions appeared to be near the top of the ridgeline, vicinity L.C. 102976. Both men agreed that the enemy sounded as though they were fighting a squad-size delaying action. They heard SA, AW, 2 or 3 mortars, and possibly a heavy MG or AA weapon.

After dark the two men moved to a flat area about 10 meters away and slept there. Again, at intervals throughout the night, they heard the sounds of a hand-cranked generator and a radio using Morse code.

At approximately 0900H, 6 Oct 68, the men heard 3 or 4 enemy voices. At approximately 0930 they waved again at a passing helicopter, then moved back to their position under the stream bank. In the afternoon they again heard firefight toward the top of the ridgeline and downstream from their position. At about 1700H C2-505, following instructions from a helicopter which had again spotted the men, reached them and called a MEDVAC. Both men were immediately evacuated to the 22nd Surgical Hospital, Phu Bai.
TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) The 101st Airborne Division (A2) Operational Report—Lessons Learned has been reviewed by this headquarters and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Regulation 525-15.

2. (C) Except as noted below, VI, XXIV Corps, concurs without further comment on commander's observations, evaluations and recommendations listed in Section 2 of the report. Comments follow:

   a. Item: Characteristics of soft cordon operations, page 24, para E1. Concur. The listed characteristics of a soft cordon operation are extremely effective innovations of the cordon described in the 101st Airborne Division ORLL for the previous quarter. The characteristics listed were employed during the very successful cordon of Vinh Loc, described in the after action report attached at Inclosure 4 to Section 4 of this report.

   b. Item: SLAR moving target indicators (MTI), page 29, para D1. Non-concur. Recommend use of the ground data link station which reproduces imagery transmitted from the SLAR aircraft with a three to four minute delay when radio contact with the aircraft is maintained. If a moving target is believed present, the aircraft may be instructed to "turn 180" and sweep the area again to determine speed and direction of movement. This procedure, dictated by limited aircraft assets, allows SLAR aircraft to accomplish scheduled missions with minimum delays to reacquire moving objects believed to be targets.

   c. Item: Voluntary Informant Program (VIP), page 30, para D2. Concur. MACV Directive 381-2, dated 19 Mar 68, authorizes resettlement of an informer and his family if necessary to guarantee safety. This fact should be stressed to potential informers.

   d. Item: Combined interrogation, page 31, para D3. Concur. The recommendation should be expanded to include using ARVN interrogators, when available, in combined screening interrogation efforts.


   f. Item: Airmobile signal battalion, page 37, para F3. VI, USARV, in coordination with the 101st Airborne Division (A2) and 1st Cavalry Division, is working to develop final MTOE recommendations.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-ICT (22 Nov 68) 3 JAN 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division (AA) for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RGO CSFR-65 (41) (U)


(1) Although the battery life experienced by 101st Abn Div (AA) was
12 hours for the AN/FRC-77 and 24 hours for the KY-38, other units testing
the AN/FRC-77/KY-38 sets reported varying battery lives. 199th Lt Inf Bde
experienced 4 - 6 hours life for AN/FRC-77 batteries, however, all units
determined the KY-38 battery does not deteriorate as rapidly as the battery
for the radio. In this regard, referenced recommendation should be qualified
to state that KY-38 battery life far exceeds that of the AN/FRC-77 battery.

(2) HQ, USARV Report, dated 5 November 1968, subj: Operational Evaluation of the
TSOC/KY-38 and AN/FRC-77 (C), concurs with 101st Airborne Division's
recommendations. The final BOI provides these sets at infantry company
level. The report also recommends to USAECOM further miniaturization of the
radio and voice security device.
k. Item: Radio relay terminal set, AN/GRC-163, page 40, para G1e. Non-concur. The lower operating frequency of the AN/GRC-163 in relation to other multichannel equipment would naturally ease the restriction of line of sight path. However, to plan for quality communications, the LOS considerations must be paramount to system engineering. On many occasions VHF systems have operated effectively when LOS did not exist, but the LOS requirement still remains valid. It would not be conducive to good communications to consider the AN/GRC-163 as a non-LOS radio, either in usage or US Army doctrine.

l. Item: Stockage of building materials, page 43, para G3a. Concur. Implementation of this requirement would facilitate assistance to the civilian populace in emergencies, when prompt response is required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

H.R. TAYLOR
CPT, AGC
ASST AG

50
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHOC-DST (22 Nov 68) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 i JAN 69

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Ambt).

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning SLAR Moving Target Indicators (MTI), page 29, paragraph D1 and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b. Nonconcur with the recommendation to fly two consecutive passes on each leg of SLAR missions. This procedure would probably be acceptable in areas of high density enemy vehicular traffic, however, this is not the case in RVN. Concur with 1st Indorsement recommending that the second pass be requested as necessary only after moving targets have been observed on the Division’s ground sensor terminal. This method provides for effective utilization of limited aircraft assets.

   b. (U) Reference item concerning USARPAC GC325, page 37, paragraph F2. Nonconcur with the recommendation. Concur with 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2e. USARPAC will publish reorganization General Orders as directed by DA without further comment from HQ USARV. No further action by higher quarters is required.

   c. (U) Reference item concerning Base Camp TDA, page 38, paragraph F4. Nonconcur with the recommendation. A standard minimum essential TDA has been developed for division base camps, approved by HQ, USARV, and tentative approval has been received from DA. The TDA augmentation will supplement but not completely equip a given installation as desired by the Divisions. The cost of the equipment involved in the desired division TDA averaged approximately $4.6 million dollars per division and was considered prohibitive. The equipment cost of the standard minimum essential TDA is approximately $760 thousand dollars per division. The standard TDA is currently being processed for submission during the time frame August - September 1969.

51

CONFIDENTIAL
d. (U) Reference item concerning Manual Telephone Central Office AN/MTC-1, page 39, paragraph Gld and lst Indorsement, paragraph 2j. Concur in the recommendation. An ECOM representative will investigate the problem at the 501st Signal Battalion.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. J. W. [Handwritten]

CLASSIFIED
GPOP-DT (22 Nov 68) 3d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Airborne Div for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. (C) Reference item concerning Voluntary Informant Program (VIP), page 30, paragraph D2 and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2c. Concur with comments in 1st Indorsement. Personal experience has reflected that an informant's identity can be protected by interviewing a large number of people, particularly children who often have valuable information, and insuring that each interview is private. During these interviews, information can possibly be obtained by assuring each interviewee that if immediate exploitation of his information would jeopardize his safety, he will be relocated or the information will be exploited in a manner that will not reveal the identity of the source. Often, an apprehended suspect may be discredited by attributing the source of the information to this individual.

3. (U) Reference paragraph 2e, 1st Indorsement and 2b, 2d Indorsement. This headquarters has published General Orders reorganizing HHC, 1st Brigade and the 2d Battalion 320th Artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL
Confidential

AVOC-OC

15 November 1968

Inclusion 1 (Task Organisation) to Operational Report of 101st Airborne
Division for the Period Ending 31 October 1968, AGS 05C04-05 (M)

1. Task Organisation - Operation NEVADA EAGLE

1st Bde, 101st Abn Div

HHC, 1/101
1-507 Inf
2-507 Inf
3-507 Inf
8-502 Inf
2-320 Arty (DS)
557th Engr (-)(DS)
FSSE (Med Serv Spt Elms)
A/326 Med
B/301 Maint
2/A/126 SRs
2/265 RRC
1/101 MP Co
2d Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
557th Inf Plat (Combat Tracker)
TM 101 MI Det
FASC/P/501 Sig
TACP 19 TASS (Tac Air Spt Sqd)

2nd Bde, 101st Abn Div

HHC, 2/101
1-501 Inf
2-501 Inf
3-502 Inf
1-321 Arty (DS)
C/326 Engr (DS)
FSSE
B/326 Med
C/303 Maint
2/A/126 SRs
2/265 RRC
2/101 MP Co
17th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
TM 101 MI Det
FASC/P/501 Sig
TACP 19 TASS
3b FT Det

3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div

HHC, 3/101
1-506 Inf
2-506 Inf
3-507 Inf
2-319 Arty (DS)
B/326 Engr (-)(DS)
FSSE
C/326 Med
D/301 Maint
2/A/126 SRs
3/265 RRC
3/101 MP Co
556th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
TM 101 MI Det
FASC/P/501 Sig
TACP 19 TASS
3b FT Det
20 Cal Det

3b FT Det, 82nd Abn Div

HHC, 3/82
1-505 Inf
2-505 Inf
1-506 Inf
B/1-17 Cav (OPCON 2-17 Cav 25 Jul-20
Sep, Depart 1 CTZ)
C/307 Engr
2-321 Arty (DS)
3/82 MP Co
3 FASC 82 Sig
3b FT Det
3b FT Det
3b FT Det
3b FT Det
3b FT Det
3b FT Det

*During the period 15 Sep-21 Oct, the 3/101 moved from 111 CTZ to 1 CTZ, and
3/82 from 1 CTZ to 111 CTZ. On 3 Oct, the 101st Abn Div assumed OPCON of
3/101 and on 4 Oct terminated OPCON of 3/82.

54
Inclusion 1 (Task Organisation) to Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for the Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSEON-65 (II)

1. Task Organisation - Operation NEVADA EAGLE (Cont'd)

101st Abn Div Troops

160th Avn Op

HHC, 101st Abn Div
2-17 Cav
D/1-1 Air Cav (Atch)
F/58 Inf (LRP) (Atch)
326 Engr Bn (-)
501 Sig Bn (-)
101 MP Co
265 HHC (-)
10 Cml Plt
36 Cml Det
22 Mil Hist Det
Det 16, 1st ANGLICO
Det 32, 5th Weather Sqdn
101 ML Det (Prov)
C/2-34 Arm (OPCON)
Det 5/7 Psyop Bn (DS)
7 AA Plt 29 CA Co (DS)
A/4-12 Arm Cav (OPCON 13-29 Oct)

HHC, 160th Avn Op
101 AHB
159 ASHB
163 Avn Co (GS)

Div Spt Cnd

HHC & Band
801 Maint Bn (-)
67 Maint Co
426 SES Bn
9005 501 Sig Bn
326 Med Bn (-)
5 Trans Bn

101st Abn Div Arty

HMB, 101st Abn Div Arty
2-11 Arty (-)
1-83 Arty (GS-R)
F/16 Arty (Was C/6-16 Arty - redesignated F/16 auth USARFAC CO
 B 21 Aug)
A/6-33 Arty (GS-R) (eff 21 Oct 68)
B/6-33 Arty (GS-R) (eff 21 Aug 68)
HMB/4-77 Arty (arr 101st 17 Oct 68)
Inclormrs 1 (Task Organization) to Operational Report of 101st Airborne Division for the Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (Pl)

2. Task Organization - Operation ZOMBAH PLAN

**TASK FORCE I**

**HHC, 1/101**

1-327 Inf (-)

D/1-502 Inf (OPORD 27 Jul-6 Aug)

C/1-505 Inf (OPORD 9 Aug-19 Aug)

2/C/1-502 Inf (OPORD 29 Jul-6 Aug)

2/D/1-501 Inf (OPORD 31 Jul-6 Aug)

2-327 Inf

B/1-327 Inf (OPORD 4 Aug-20 Aug)

2-502 Inf

2-320 Arty (DS 1/101)

B/1-9 Air Cav (OPORD 1/101 30 Jul-19 Aug)

A/326 Engr (DS)

1st FASOP 501 Sig

1/101 MP Co

1/265 RRC

D/326 Med

1/2/801 Maint

TM 101 MT Det

4/2 Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

557 Inf Plat (Cock Tracker)

TACP

**101st Abn Div Troops**

326 Engr Bn (-)

501 Sig Bn (-)

F/58 Inf (IMP)

101 Admin Co

265 RRC

58 Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

10 Ctl Plat

36 Ctl Det

20 Ctl Det

22 M11 Ctl Det

25 PI Det

101 MI Det

181 MI Det

**101st Abn Div Arty**

HHB, 101st Abn Div Arty

C/1-321 Arty (Reinf 2-320)

2-11 Arty (-) (OS 101 Div Arty)

B/2-11 Arty (GS-R 2-321)

C/2-11 Arty (OS-R 2-320)

C/6-16 Arty (OS-R 2-320, o/o Reinf 2-321)

C/6-33 Arty (OS-R 2-321)

B/2-140 Arty (OS-R) (2-21 Aug)

160th Avn Op

HHC, 160th Avn Op

101 AB

159 ASHB

163 Avn Co (OS)

Div Spt Qmd

HHC & Band

5 Trans Bn

126 SkS

501 Maint Bn (-)

326 Med Bn (-)

**TASK FORCE - 1st ARVN Regiment**

1st ARVN Regiment

2d Bn, 1st Regt

3d Bn, 1st Regt

HAC EMO (Black Panther Co)

A Btry, 11th Arty (105mm) (towed)

Plat, A Btry, 34th Arty (155mm)

Plat, 1st Engr Bn

CONFIDENTIAL
Inclosure 3 (Letter of TRUNG) to Operational Report for 101st Airborne Division for the Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSK08-65 (FL)

The following letter is an evaluation of the situation as of 5 September 1968 in QUANG DIEN as seen by a Viet Cong. The author was one of four VC killed in an ambush by D/1-502 on 12 October 1968. He was identified as Hoang Dan Trung of K300B believed to be a unit in K300, the Political Section of THUA THEN HUE Military Region. Trung is carried in OB files as Major Nguyen Van Phu, Troop Prose1ytin, Unit Leader, Political Section, THMR. Subject was armed with a 9mm CHICOM pistol.

Several reports have been sent to you for your consideration and action but to no avail. We haven't received any suggestion or instruction from you at all on our technical mission, while we are facing many difficulties on both enemy situation and technical mission.

Today I send this report again for your consideration and suggestion. Truly speaking, you do not understand the real problem and difficulty of our area, and perhaps even Mr. NAM could not give you the real situation of this area when he came to your meeting, because he does not stay in this area.

The enemy is using the "Sweep AND OCCUPY" tactic, concentrating US and Vietnamese troops to operate from one village to another. Within each village, they will concentrate to operate in each hamlet such as PHONG NHIEU village. Meanwhile, they are operating in the entire village, they concentrate their main effort only in some hamlets. It will be the same when they move to another village, searching from one hamlet to another; and when they get through, the PF's are sent in to continue the search. They may also have the US troops operating long time in one area, then the PF's are sent operating in another area. When they spot something strange or some guerrillas they fire artillery and use helicopter to lift US troops or even PF's, which now also become CAVALRY troops to search and run.

We used to say that they go sweeping; it is not sweeping now, but we must say they go looking for underground bunkers. It has never been like this that the US troops are very patient in searching underground bunkers. First of all, they fire a lot of artillery so that we have no way of escaping, we have to hide in secret bunkers. Then they will spread out, each group with shovel will keep searching in each garden, and they will move only to another garden when they get through with this one. They do not leave any area unsearched, and they continue the search day after day.

So doing, they cause a lot of casualties to us, of which most were killed and Chieu Hoi. Most of military action cadres were killed.

At NINH DAI (village) no village military action cadres are left, all of them were killed or captured long time ago. You might ask why we did not recruit
Inclusion 3 (Letter of TRiNG) to Operational Report for 101st Airborne Division for the Period Ending 31 October 1968, ACS CSFOR-65 (R1)

to fill in, but actually we no longer have the real force, there are only the Secretary General and about 3 fellow comrades left.

At BAC THUAN (vill.) from village cadre down to the hamlet, no more cadres are left, the village military action chief got killed. At NAM THUAN only the District Secretary General is left, the village chief and village cadres were killed including the village military action cadre. At QUANG HOA (vill.) the secretary was captured, village and hamlet cadres were killed, one of two village military action cadres was killed, the other was captured. At Đ瓮NG HUNG and TAY HƯNG, one was killed, one captured and one rallied (Chieu Hoi). Especially comrade KY, District General Secretary in charge of this area, also rallied. At PHONG NHIEU, there is only one military action cadre left; we don't have any information on the other two. At QUANG THAI, we haven't heard from that village since a long time.

Of the district military action cadres, there are only myself and two other fellows left (BPO and MIH); the rest include Mr. XVAN who already rallied and 5 other fellows killed. So now there are only 3 district military action cadres left living separately in 3 different areas. It is very hard to communicate with each other. I, myself, have also some difficulties communicating with comrade NOĐ. I haven't received any information or mail from NOĐ or NAM since one month ago. (NOĐ is the district chief, and NAM is his deputy.)

In using the "Sweep and Occupy" tactics, the enemy has attempted to:
- Intentionally round up and annihilate all our cadres and local guerrillas in order to create a secure area of their own,
- Maintain a permanent pressure on the local population (living in our controlled area) so that the people have to move into their area. This intention has been realized successfully. There are no more people left living in QUANG THAI, PHONG NHIEU, all the people already moved to the enemy area. It is the same in NHỊ NHAI long time ago, the same in BAC THUAN. In NAM THUAN there are only 10 out of 320 families left in HẠLAND Hamlet; only 1 family left in QUANG HOA, the rest already moved to the enemy areas, or resettled by the enemy in strategic hamlets were the People Self Defense force has been set up. In HẠN THUAN, the HẠNCANO Hamlet, which used to be the strongest liberation hamlet, is now their strongest strategic hamlet with 2 or 3 fences around in which there are 2 PF platoons defending; besides that, at da, time they have People Self Defense force on duty which include men and women from 15 years old to 65 years old; XVAN, TUY, NGHIA XO, LAI TRUNG, LAI XA hamlets in QUANG HÀA village, or THÀNH CAN, NAM Đ瓮NG hamlets in BAC TRUAN also become their strategic hamlets.

After that, they push forward the communist denunciation movement, keep pressure and watch closely our infrastructures, some of them already defected,
Inclosure 3 (Letter of TRUNG) to Operational Report for 101st Airborne Division for the Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RA)

or were detected by rallies. This caused much trouble among the people; the people now lose confidence in the final victory of the people revolution. The confidence in the cadre also is diminished because many cadres rallied, some of them just joined the revolution recently, some have just been coming back from North such as NAM, district military action cadre, and KI, district secretary. In addition to that many guerrillas and local main force troops have been killed causing much influence and trouble among the people. We may say that this is the most critical, bitter, and difficult stage we ever had in QUANG DIEN. Recently, they used dozers to plow NINH DAI, and now QUANG THAI, PHONG NHIEU. They almost got through with PHONG NHIEU now including LA VAN Hamlet located near Highway 1 from which the people have moved away. They also burned and destroyed everything left behind by the people in the liberation areas, including houses, temples and even trees and bushes, and they forced the people to go back to the area to cut or defoliate by hand what they could not burn. They started cutting trees and bushes in QUANG HAI day before yesterday, then the typhoon came they had to stop it. Besides that they suffered 1 KIA and 2 WIA by grenade booby trap while chopping down trees, that made them slow down a little. These are something on the enemy activities and people situation I want to bring up to you so that you can easily understand the difficulties of this area on the technical mission of ours.

On the technical mission, first of all I want to report to you that I have received a message on the military action meeting that would be held at Sub Region HQs on the 8 of September, but I could not make it, because it was too late when I received that message on the 3 of September. I would meet many difficulties on the way; the road to PHONG NHIEU - QUANG THAI is very dangerous and so I could make to QUANG THAI, there would be no place to stay. The situation now is very different from before; you might wonder why NAM could make it - that is because he already stayed in QUANG THAI.

Since the enemy use that tactics, the military action program faced many difficulties. Our infrastructures have been detected or do not have confidence in us. Even our secret agents surrendered to the enemy, it is very difficult to build up new agents or infrastructures now. We could not go into the hamlet to get in touch with our men because the enemy has a very effective control and checking system. If we ask our men to go out of the hamlet to a certain location to meet us, they would be afraid and scared to come out; if they do come out, they would be interrogated and bothered afterward and they would never come out again. Most of the village military action cadres were killed and no one left to carry out the military action program, and even if there are some left, it would do no good now.

There are only 3 district military action cadres left, about 16 or 17 are prisoners. We don't know where the three are now, they were supposed to move
Incl.ure 3 (letter of TRUNG) to Operational Report for 101st Airborne Division for the Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

to QUANG THAI at that time under the surveillance of DUNG, but when DUNG was wounded, no one took his place. PHAN and TRUYEN were supposed to take over but no word from them until now.

That is about the local situation. Next I would like to extend my regards to all of you. As to me, I have no problem with my health but I am very thin and tense every moment now. It would be very nice if I could go to the meeting to talk to you.

In the end of this letter, I wish you and our men good health and many victories to come.”

5 September

TRUNG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 101st Airborne Division, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

CG, 101st Airborne Division

22 Nov 68

N/A

684306

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

DD FORM 1473

UNCLASSIFIED