**UNCLASSIFIED**

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**AUTHORITY**

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96570

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFEC-RE-H, APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(I)ST, APO 96375
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. (C) Introduction

   (1) During this reporting period 1 Aug 68 to 31 Oct 68, the 9th Infantry Division continued operations in support of missions and tasks either specified or implied by III Corps/II FFORC/COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLANS 1968, dated 15 Dec 67; the RVNAF, JGS/MACV Combined Campaign Plans 1968, AB 143, dated 1 Nov 67 and 1 Jun 68, and instructions for 4th Quarter CT 68. Division headquarters remained at Long Tan (AS4145) throughout the reporting period. Division headquarters rear was maintained at Camp Martin Cox (YS1799) until 9 September to facilitate the transfer of responsibility for Bien Hoa Province to the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force. As a result the 9th Infantry Division's present Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) consists of Long An, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces. (See inclosures 3).

   (2) The mission of the 9th Infantry Division is to conduct sustained, coordinated combined air and ground operations to destroy Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese (NVA) main and local force units, and their installations and infrastructure in the TAOI; in close cooperation and coordination with Task Force 117 to execute ground and riverine operations to interdict VC/NVA land and water lines of communication and deny the use of their base areas and to destroy targeted main and local force units; conduct consolidation and pacification operations to identify and destroy VC guerrilla units and infrastructure and secure population centers and LOCs in close coordination and cooperation with the government of Vietnam (GVN) forces; conduct support operations to further assist the GVN pacification program by enhancing the capability of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), Popular Forces (PF), and Regional Forces (RF), and by

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contributing to the health and welfare of the civilian population. The
9th Inf Div has successfully accomplished this mission by conducting the
above operations in Dinh Tuong, Long An, Go Cong, Kien Hoa, Kien Phuong,
Kien Tuong, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long, Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, Phong Dinh, Chuong
Thien, Kien Giang and Bien Hoa provinces.

(3) The 9th Inf Div was involved in combat during every day (92 days)
of this reporting period while conducting four major operations that commenced,
terminated or continued during the reporting period: TRUONG CONG LINH,
QUIET CHIEN, TOAN THANG II and KUDZU.

(4) An element of the 9th Inf Div, the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry (-),
participated in combat operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ).
The squadron conducted mounted and dismounted patrols in this zone. Troop
D remained at Camp Martin Cox and later at Dong Tam and participated in
missions as assigned by division headquarters.

(5) There were two major changes within the division during this
reporting period. The first change was the return of the Royal Thai Army
Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) to Thailand on 15 August 1968. The RTAVR had
been OPCON to the 9th Infantry Division since September 1967. The second
change involved a switch of Infantry battalions between the 9th Infantry
Division and the 1st Infantry Division. This change took place on 12 and
13 September and involved the 5th Bn (secl.) 60th Inf, 9th Inf Div and the
1st Bn 16th Inf, 1st Inf Div. These units switched unit designations on
21 October 1968 in order that the divisions could retain the traditional
lineage already established.

(6) On 26 Aug 68, Col Ira A. Hunt Jr. replaced Col Lenry Emerson as
1st Brigade commander due to injuries sustained when his helicopter was
brought down by hostile fire. At this time LTC John B. Tower became the
acting Chief of Staff and LTC Fred K. Mahaffey became the acting G-3. On
16 Oct, BG Frank L. Gunn replaced BG Elvy B. Roberts as assistant division
commander. On 15 August LTC John A. Hemphill replaced Col George C. Benson
as 3d Bde commander and on 6 September Col George E. Bland replaced Col
Robert W. Archer as 2d Bde commander. At 1st Bde on 10 October Col John P.
Geraci replaced Col Ira A. Hunt Jr., who returned to his former position as
Chief of Staff. LTC Tower then resumed his position as G-3.

(7) The 9th Signal Battalion was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commenda-
tion for outstanding service from 19 Dec 66 to 18 Dec 67, and the 709th
Maintenance Battalion received a Meritorious Unit Commendation for exception-
ally outstanding service during the period 1 Dec 66 to 31 Dec 67.
b. (C) Organization

(1) Under the provisions of USARPAC General Order No 354, the following units are reorganizing under the new Riverine MTOE. The riverine organization was designed to maximize an infantry battalion's effectiveness for operations in inundated areas by eliminating non-essential military occupational specialties (NOS) and equipment, and adding infantryman (11 series) and equipment made necessary by the riverine environment.

Strength authorizations are as follows:

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Reorganization of these units is scheduled to be completed by the end of November. The balance of the division reorganization has begun and indications are the full reorganization of the division will be completed by the first of the year.

(2) Under the provisions of USARV General Order No. 4182 the United States Special Security Detachment was attached to the 9th Infantry Division.

(3) Under the provisions of USARV General Order No. 4447 the 61st Medical Detachment was attached to the 9th Infantry Division.

(4) Organizational Structure - Incl 1

(5) Roster of Key Personnel - Incl 2

(6) Division TAOI - Incl 3

c. (C) Personnel and Administration

(1) General Data: See Inclosure four for information and statistics concerning the following:

(a) Maintenance of unit strength.

(b) Personnel Management.

(c) Development and maintenance of morale.

(d) Maintenance of discipline, law and order.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(2) Significant Activities:

(a) Adjutant General: During this period the AG section completed its move to Dong Tam and was fully operational at the new location by late August.

(b) Surgeon:

1 Operation Safestep: Operation Safestep was continued during this quarter. Its primary purpose is to investigate the causes, prevention and treatment of skin diseases affecting US personnel operating in the Mekong Delta. Selected volunteers tested various models of jungle and paddy boots, special socks and light weight tennis shoes in a test rice paddy and an old banana grove. The heavy Nomex boot proved to be the best of six boots tested for durability, ankle support, rapid drying and troop acceptance. Nylon socks were superior in durability and comfort. A calf-length vinyl wader was tested in a waterproof gear experiment, and was found to decrease the incidence of disease. Waterproof socks will be tested when available. Tennis shoes without socks proved useful for bivouac and base camp wear, not involving walking long distances.

2 Griseofulvin prophylaxis in fungal disease: Two experiments conducted last quarter resulted in a dramatic decrease in fungal disease of the skin. A field trial of prophylactic Griseofulvin, 0.5 grams daily, was conducted in one infantry battalion during September and October. There were 67 patients with fungal disease during this period. The predicted number of cases based on past experience during this period was 100-150. Of the 67 cases, all were adequately treated in the battalion aid station and no adverse side effects were reported. Conclusion: Griseofulvin is an effective means of preventing fungal disease in a high risk population. Further field trials will be conducted to establish the most effective safe dosage and to determine if prophylaxis is necessary during the dry season.

(c) Red Cross: During this period the Red Cross Clubmobile unit strength was reduced by one, this resulted in fewer visits to troop units. It is expected that one additional girl will be added to the unit next month, enabling this program to resume its former level.

(d) Tiger Scouts: The 9th Division Tiger Scout Program has made significant advances. At the end of this reporting period the Division was employing 234 Tiger Scouts. An increase in authorization was obtained from USARV to enable the Division to employ 330 Tiger Scouts. During this period an English language school for Tiger Scouts was begun. The purpose of the school is to teach basic military terms to Tiger Scouts. They will then be
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more effective in communication with US Troops. The school has a student load of ten who receive six hours of training each day for a two week period. Initial results indicate that the language training, although limited, has proven to be of value to the scouts, enabling them to more rapidly communicate with US soldiers.

(e) Finance: The majority of the Finance section moved from Camp Martin Cox to Dong Tam on 15 Sep 68. Uninterrupted cashier and Finance liaison service was provided at 4 different locations within the division area of responsibility during the period of displacement. At the present time only an in-processing team remains at Camp Martin Cox in support of Reliable Academy. It is anticipated that the remainder of the Finance section will move to Dong Tam in late November 1968.

d. (C) Intelligence

(1) Discussion and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Discussion

1 General: Since the abortive May offensive, the enemy's shattered and demoralized units lung to their base areas and attempted to rebuild their force for a much belated Third Offensive. In July, the enemy attempted to rebuild with local recruitment and began to reorganize his political structure. By August the enemy was organizing new village organizations without the stigma of the NLF name although the party members were to be carefully inserted to insure control. These new organs of local government were to have been "freely" elected. Directives concerning the manner of conducting the elections and progress within each district in Long An Province have been captured throughout the reporting period and indicate that by late August there had been unsatisfactory progress with the exception of one village in Can Giuoc District and one in Tan Tru District. In October, lists of candidates for villages began to be captured or reported by agents and indicated the enemy had applied pressure to complete the elections. In Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa however, the enemy evidently achieved some success. Agent reports have indicated there have been elections or lists of candidates drawn up for elections in an estimated 60% of the villages. Throughout the reporting period, the enemy was forced to rely on his local forces, sappers and guerrillas for his offensive actions. The enemy's plans for the Third Offensive attack with his major battalions were completely thwarted and the major forces were systematically chased and cut up by friendly forces. The VC/NVA has suffered such losses that, despite his reinforcement and recruiting efforts, the present total strength of his major forces is less than at the beginning of the period. At the end of the reporting period it appears that once again the enemy is attempting to build for an offensive in early November.
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2 Long An Province: In VC Long An Province several changes have been
made in the political structure. It appears that the old Long An Province
Committee has reorganized to fit the sub-region organization by forming a
Northern and Southern Long An Province with Hwy 4 dividing the two provinces
similar to Sub-region 2 and 3. The loss of the area south of Vam Co Tay from
the "Island" area to the mouth of the Vam Co to MR II for military operations
has caused a reorganization of the Long An Province rear service agencies.
The LOC south of the Vam Co Tay, while using the same units, must now support
both MR II and Sub-region 3 forces. The Vam Co Tay LOC is also the primary
supply route into the Tri-border area south of the "Mouse Ears" area which
supports VC Go Cong Province, eastern VC My Tho Province, and southern VC
Long An. During September and October, the intensity of activity along the
LOC indicated that sufficient supplies entered southern Long An to support
another major offensive. The cost the enemy has been forced to pay for these
supplies in September and October is over 60 sampans destroyed; and the
annihilation of the 36 man My Phuoc Tay Guerrilla Force (33 killed) which
handled supplies in the vicinity of the "Island" as well as an additional
40 VC killed along the supply line in scattered contacts.

3 SR-3: In early August, SR-3 was faced with the problem of mounting
another offensive on Saigon without sufficient replacements. The battalions
of SR-3 that had participated in the May Offensive (1st, 2d, Phu Loi II, 265,
Dong Nai, and 6th Bns) were unable to recruit a sufficient number of personnel
to recover from the losses of May. Additionally, continued small contacts with
the 1st Brigade had constantly whittled away what limited personnel gains that
had been made. The 294 NVA Bn had been sent to SR-3 to bolster the forces,
but was hit hard by the 1st Bde in June just after its arrival. Initially, the
SR-3 Commander, Tu Than, felt it better to keep the 294 Bn intact to preserve
its morale; but captured documents in August stated that morale had so deter-
riorated in the battalion, that there were only 10 men in the 2d Co that
would fight during a countersweep, and that the 2d and 3d Co leaders continually
stayed in the rear in order to be the first to run away. SR-3 then dis-
persed the 294 Bn to the 1st and 2d Bns. In preparation for the Third Offen-
sive, the SR-3 with its low priority on replacements from COSVN, received only
the 520 Bn from Kien Hoa and had to do the best with what they had available.
Therefore, the Phu Loi and Dong Nai Bns were combined to form the Dong Phu
Bn and the CO and XO of the Dong Nai took over the SR-3 operations and train-
ing section. The 265 and 6th Bns were combined to form an understrength 265
Bn, and the available replacements were sent to the 1st and 2d Bns. The
plan for the Third Offensive called for the 1st and 2d Bns to be the main
attacking force with the Dong Phu Bn in reserve; the 265 Bn to attack Nha Be and
keep the common routes open for the main battalions; and the 520 Bn was to
infiltrate Saigon. From the beginning, SR-3's part in the offensive was doomed
as the 1st Bde struck the 520 Bn in the area south of the "Mouse Ears" and they
reeled south into Dong Son. Then, in rapid succession, the 1st Bn was
captured and hurt southwest of Can Giovc, and the 2d Bn was spotted near Long An-
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Gia Dinh border. For two days and nights, the 2d Bn attempted unsuccessfully to evade contact. The 1st Bde then hit both the 1st and 2d Bns one more time southwest of Can Giuoc as they attempted to pull out. The ill-fated 265 Bn was encircled and lost 79 killed southeast of Can Giuoc onl; a week after it had lost 39 in brief, vicious encounters with the 1st Bde. The Dong Phu Bn moved continually during this time to avoid contact, but FNs reported they were struck by artillery and air frequently and never got into position for the offensive. After the failure of the offensive, SR-3 initially sent its battalions to the previously secure base areas where the 1st Bde pursued them, contacting the 1st, 2nd, 265, and 520 Bns in September. The enemy assessed the situation and found they were unable to even supply the battalions due to the 1st Bde's continual interdiction of the LOCs. They were losing too many battles due to what they called "Hawk tactics" (the 1st Bde's "piling on" tactics). SR-3 assigned each battalion to a district or districts for support and broke the battalions down into scattered squad-platoon sized elements. Captured SR-3 documents confirm only 4 districts (Tan Tru, Can Duc, Can Giuoc, and Nha Be) and 4 Saigon precincts (2, 4, 7, 8) under SR-3 control. In mid-October, new plans for an offensive were formulated by SR-3 and, according to the captured CO and XO of the Training Section SR-3, a training period commenced on 16 October to last for approximately 20 days. On 27-28 Oct, according to the FNs, the units were to commence platoon-sized movement in preparation for an attack on Saigon sometime between 3-10 Nov. On the evening of 26 Oct, radar detected a significant increase in movement in Can Giuoc, and on the 27th, the 265 Bn was hit in eastern Hiep Phuoc (V), Can Giuoc (D). Radar continued to show heavy enemy movement from the 26th of Oct until the end of the reporting period with continued activity along the infiltration routes into Saigon.

4 MR-2

Dinh Tuong Province: In August, the forces of MR-2 began to feel the pressure of allied operations as the heretofore relative security of BA 470 was dissolved in a series of continued operations by allied forces. On 13 Aug, the enemy's attack plan on Cai Lay was captured. Later, the 7th RVN Div captured the Chief of Staff of the E-1 Regt who confirmed that the loss of the plan canceled the attack. The E-1 Chief of Staff reported that the constant pressure of operations, air and artillery was taking its toll on the morale and strength of both the E-1 and E-2 regts of MR-2. Evidence of the reduced ability of these units came in early September when 4 battalions attacked Giao Duc, an isolated district town, and failed. Previously this would have been a one to two battalion attack; and from the amount of forces used should have been more successful. In early Oct, the 3d Bde

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found and destroyed the 261B Bn in a two day fight, killing 139. PW's and
documents captured in October indicate all the main battalions of MR-2
except the 267B had been hit during September and October. The 267B was
reported as moving to Ba Thu, Cambodia, in late September and may possibly
have been assigned to SR-2 as it was prior to the TET Offensive. On 18-19
Oct, the 3d Bde struck the 514C Bn in southern BA 470 and killed 40 VC by
body count. After mid-October, the MR-2 battalions were reported moving on
the periphery of BA 470 or passing rapidly thru central BA 470. On 26
October, the 7th ARVN Division hit elements of the 514C and 261A battalions
in the eastern fringes of BA 470. From this and other October contacts
it is apparent the enemy is no longer using the canals with his former
impunity, but is now hiding away from the canal lines and attempting to
stay in areas where the rules of engagement afford him an advantage. The
boundary change with MR-2 and SR-3 which gave MR-2 the area south of Van
Co Tay from the "Island" to the junction of the Van Co has placed an added
burden on MR-2, as Tan An, the capital of Long An Province, was included.
A PW reported that the 261A Bn tried to attack the Can Dot airstrip west of
Tan An in late August but failed. The attack by this battalion was reported
at the time as a small probing attack by local force elements—since the
attack was so poorly conducted.

Go Cong Province: The enemy activity in Go Cong continued at a
low level as allied forces made inroads within the local guerrilla structure.
The 514B Battalion was hit twice in August by 7th ARVN Division forces and
was never an effective force during the reporting period. In early August,
the VC were recruiting 14-16 year-olds for their forces; but they generally
desereted as rapidly as opportunities presented themselves. Then on 14 Oct,
the 2d Bde struck a hospital complex and the 206 LF Company in the south-
eastern portion of Go Cong Island, killing 22 and detaining 26. This action,
coupled with an intensive RD effort in the southeastern part of Go Cong,
which has produced over 160 Hoi Chanhs, has shaken the local VC structure.

Kien Hoa Province. The 2d Bde moved to Kien Hoa in late August
after the 550 and 516 Battalions had attempted an attack on Ben Tre on the
21st. The 2d Brigade continued operations in September and October that
have taken a toll of the forces in Kien Hoa. Initially, the Brigade invaded
the Binh Dai and Thanh Phu base areas. It was determined that neither
was an active base area and had been relegated to a secondary status
as storage area. In October, the enemy began reacting to the 2d Brigade by
reverting to Phase I and early Phase II-type guerrilla activity. On 13
October, the Bde struck a fortified village in northeastern Kien Hoa Province,
killing 24 guerrillas. On 22 October, 6 km's southwest of Tien Lieu, 17 VC
were killed. On the 23d the 2d Brigade killed 70 VC of the 516 Bn. Continuing
the pressure with small actions daily, the Bde pinned a local force in
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AVDE-KH

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Ant Long, killing 19 on 27 October. These actions have caused the enemy to disperse and evade contact in contrast with early August when all enemy elements would willingly engage allied forces entering their areas. At the end of the reporting period the enemy is apparently shifting his emphasis to Mo Cay, as supplies have been captured along the LOC's into that area with greater frequency.

(b) Recapitulation.

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During the reporting period, the enemy responded to the "piling on" tactic by dispersing his battalions in platoon-sized groups so that the entire battalion could not be encircled and destroyed. The use of CS by friendly forces has caused the enemy to increase the amount of gas masks in the TA0I. On two occasions in Long An, the enemy attempted to use captured CS on RF/PF elements. On both occasions, the enemy failed to check the wind and the CS was not effective. Captured documents have ordered enemy forces to use the wooded edges of the hamlets rather than the 1st rice paddy dike out from the wood line as done previously. It is also significant that the VC directives spoke only of the use of hamlets rather than deserted areas, an indication of a shift of local enemy bases into populated areas.

There have been an increased number of VC directives captured relating to booby trapping and mining, confirming the increase in incidents noted during the reporting period. Special 5 man teams have been formed in Kien Hoa to ambush the boats of the Mobile Riverine Force. These teams normally have one RPG-2 or 7 rocket launcher as the main ambush weapon.
(2) Enemy Losses:

KIA-2596
DETAINEES-1239
Fws-304
CHIEU HOI-45
CREW-SERVED WEAPONS (C/S)-171
SMALL ARMS (SA)-729
MMD-159,650 (rdL)
MINES-6,735
GRAIN (TONS)-44.15
SAMPANS-409
STRUCTURES-696
BUNKERS-5090

(3) Intelligence Sources and Agencies

(a) Counter Intelligence.

1 Progress continued during the reporting period in the identification of the Viet Cong Infrastructure operating within the Division TA01. A total of 1,540 personalities were added to the Counterintelligence Section's black-list. This represents an increase of 703 names over the previous quarter. Of the 780 VCI identified in Long An Province, 129 were province level cadre, 105 were district level cadre and 546 were village and hamlet level cadre. Of the 661 VCI identified in Dinh Tuong Province, 3 were province level cadre, 27 were district level cadre, and 631 were village and hamlet level cadre. Of the 99 VCI identified in Kien Hoa Province, 2 were province level cadre, 12 were district level cadre, and 85 were village and hamlet level cadre. The following is a breakdown of the 1,262 hamlet and village level cadre: 257 Chapter Committee; 106 Military Affairs Committee; 159 Finance and Economy Section; 99 Security Committee; 19 Political committee; 83 Commu-liaison Agents; 163 Farmers Association; 57 Women's Liberation Association; 43 Youth Liberation Association; 66 Proselyting Cadre; 64
Propaganda Cadre; 5 Medical Cadre; 2 Rear Service Cadre; 25 Hamlet Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs; and 114 VCI identified only as village level cadre.

During this period, several reports have been received of Viet Cong village elections establishing People's Liberation Committees to enhance VC control of an area in the event that a negotiated peace settlement would call for a withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam. Documents captured by the 1st Brigade on 10 September 68 included an undated directive providing guidance for the establishment of a Viet Cong governmental structure. As outlined in the directive, the base of this organization would be the elected Village People's Liberation Council and the Village People's Liberation Committees, of which nine to seven members nominated by that council. The village committees would appoint Hamlet Committees, and District and Province Committees would in turn be appointed from a congress of delegates of these lower bodies. The purported function of these People's Liberation Committees is to publicize and implement party resolutions and policy. Reports indicate that village elections were held in VC Ben Tre Province in early September: 6 in VC Chan Thanh District, 4 in Bin Dai District, 11 in Gian Trom District, 15 in Mo Cay District, 4 in Thanh Phu District, and 5 in Cho Lach District. As of 13 October, village elections in Dinh Tuong Province were also reported to have been held in the following districts: 5 in Giao Duc, 1 in Cai Be, 8 in Cai Lay, 4 in Lon Dinh, 2 in Chau Thanh, and 3 in Cha Gao.

Viet Cong propagandists have continued their efforts to persuade 9th Infantry Division personnel to defect. They are now directing their propaganda specifically toward Negro soldiers. During the month of August, two possible SAEDA cases were reported. Both reports indicated there are unknown persons and/or organizations in Saigon and Bien Hoa City who are attempting to exploit US Negro soldiers. In the first case, a 9th Infantry Division Negro soldier was asked to renounce US involvement in Vietnam. In the second case, an AWOL 9th Infantry Division Negro soldier was told by a Negro known as "Smokey" in Bien Hoa City, that there was an underground black power movement in Bien Hoa. For 15,000$VN this organization can transport a US Negro soldier to Cambodia. If the Negro did not have the required money, he could still be transported to Cambodia. However, he would have to work for the Cambodian government until the equivalent of 15,000$VN had been paid. "Smokey" also stated that the Cambodian government would provide Negroes with riot training to prepare them for participation in disorders when they return to the United States.

(b) The Division Interrogation Section processed a total of 1038 detainees. The following classifications were made: 306 innocent civilians, 393 civil defendants, 301 prisoners of war, and 36 Hoi Chanhs. In addition, the section processed 226 batches of captured documents, 198 of which were of tactical
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value. The section also processed approximately 2,108 pounds of captured material, consisting primarily of medical supplies and Viet Cong clothing and equipment.

(4) Long Range Patrol (LRP) Activities.

During the reporting period, Company E, 50th Infantry (LRP), continued to perform its mission of harassing and interdicting the Viet Cong deep within the Mekong Delta. While the Company (-) continued to employ two 8-man patrols by River Patrol Boats along the Song Nha Be and one 8-man patrol with the Mobile Riverine Force, the bulk of the patrol assets were employed at Dong Tam. Reconnaissance and Bushmaster Patrols attached to the 1st Brigade have had above average success in the accomplishment of their mission. 202 patrols have been conducted during this period. Contact was developed 71 times, and 56 reactions by artillery, air or ground forces were made to exploit LRP contact. Results were as follows: 47 VC KIA (X); 26 KF/LF PWS; 58 cases of grenades, 12 cases of TNT, 30 75mm RR rounds, 5 60mm M1R rounds, and an 18 inch bench lathe captured.

(5) Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance

(a) During the reporting period, with increased friendly activity in the IV Corps area resulting from the movement of the Division from Bearcat to Dong Tam, a marked increase resulted in all phases of the aerial surveillance and reconnaissance program. Aerial photography missions increased from 101 to 239 received and processed. Personnel Detector (people sniffer) missions increased from 62 to 483. Night infra-red and SLAR missions flown at the request of the 9th Division increased from an average of 10 targets/night to an average of 20 targets/night and were successfully employed to locate VC locations in the base areas of Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, and Kien Hoa Provinces. Infra-red and SLAR data were also instrumental in selecting B-52 targets during the period. In order to reduce the time delay from the detection of a SLAR or Infra-red target in flight to the reaction taken against the target, the FSE of Division Artillery was selected as the sole recipient of all SLAR-RED HAZE reports in the Division TAOI. Because of the adverse effects of weather, particularly during September and October, sufficient data has not yet been accumulated to report statistical increases in reaction times as of the end of this period.

(b) During the reporting period, the Imagery Interpretation Section, consistent with its basic mission, received and processed 239 aerial photographic missions; and prepared and disseminated a total of 99 Imagery Interpretation Reports. In response to specific requests, 54 photo mosaics, 30 defense overlays, 3 aerial hand-held photographic missions and 3 special
studies were also prepared. Prior to this reporting period, photography requesting procedures were not standardized and complete coverage of the Division TAOI was not available. A new, simple and effective system has been implemented for requesting aerial photography from supporting commands. This consists of subdividing the Division TAOI into 10 by 10 kilometer areas utilizing a breakdown formulated by the Order of Battle Section. This not only provides a convenient cross-referencing of intelligence and better graphic representation of the photographic status for the division, but also facilitates systematical requesting for aerial photographic coverage of the TAOI.

(c) The Chemical Section flew 483 personnel detector missions (a total of 629 hours in the air) for the reporting period. During this period, the Chemical Section, coordinating with the air cavalry troop, developed a tactical technique which provides instant reaction to significant detector readings. The "sniffer" team is carried in a UH1D helicopter followed immediately by two LOH 6 "scout" helicopters flying cover with AH1G "cobras" orbiting overhead. Significant readings are passed to the scout ships which visually recon the area. When the "scouts" discover the enemy, they call in the AH1G "cobras" for fire support. The Aero Rifle Platoon is on call as a reaction force with which to further develop the situation and provide intelligence to the brigade commander. This technique has proven its value and provided the personnel detector team with an immediate effective reaction to significant detector readings.

(6) Weather and Terrain: During the reporting period, the weather had little adverse effect on Division operations. Rainfall, especially in the Delta, was well below the average annual rainfall. The most adverse effects were the result of "buffeting" from strong gusts of winds (as high as 30 knots) on aircraft and air cushioned vehicles. Some limitations were also imposed by early morning fog; however, these were generally negligible since the fog was normally dispersed by 0800 hours.

(7) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action.

(a) The enemy has the capability to:

1. Conduct multi-battalion attacks on province and district seats, major cities and military installations.

2. Conduct attacks by fire and harassment on towns, villages, hamlets, outposts and other installations.

3. Conduct sniffer and terrorist attacks at key bridges, roads, RD projects, and population centers.
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4. Defend base areas and positions with local security forces and reinforce with forces within a 4 km radius.

5. Move multi-battalion forces to attack positions at a maximum rate of 14 kms per night.

6. Disperse major units into company and platoon sized elements.

7. Withdraw and disperse his units at any time.

8. Wage political and psychological warfare, tax the populace and hold control of any area where there is no friendly security at night.

(b) The enemy is vulnerable to:

1. Loss of control/support of the population.

2. Friendly superior artillery and air power.

3. Interdiction of his LOC's.

4. Disclosure or capture of attack plans.

5. Detection by friendly surveillance devices.

(c) Probable enemy courses of action:

1. Intensify population control efforts by establishment of new local governments.

2. Continue interdiction efforts on the LOC's with emphasis on Hwy #4.

3. Continue to attempt offensive action against the Saigon complex.

4. Attempt to evade decisive engagement with US forces.

5. Conduct multi-battalion or lesser force attacks on targets for propaganda purposes.

6. Harass and attack primary targets by fire.

7. Continue efforts to secure base area and LOC's.

(e) (C) Operations:

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(1) There were a total of four major operations either initiated, terminated or in progress by the 9th Inf Div during the period 1 Aug 68 to 31 Oct 68. The division again experienced heavy combat during the reporting period. To conduct offensive operations, the division refined and established new combat techniques and riverine operations. The enemy's offensive activity prior to the expected initiation of the "Third Offensive" was characterized by harassment of outposts, mining of roads and extensive use of sapper units. The VC acts of terrorism, directed at both civilian and military personnel, gradually increased throughout the reporting period. The enemy has also been devoting much of his time to recruiting, reorganizing, resupply and training. Toward the end of the reporting period there were indications that the enemy attack would in fact attempt to be timed to influence the conference in Paris and the upcoming US elections. The enemy has made a deliberate effort to fragment his unit into squad size elements and disperse them over a large area.

(2) The following new techniques were established this reporting period:

(a) Division Support Command with one maneuver battalion attached and charged with the responsibility of securing Dong Tam Base has had success in utilizing platoon size base camps in its area of operations (KUDZU). This permits the troops to become thoroughly familiar with the terrain in which they are operating, and with the people living in the vicinity of their patrol areas. (In the past, the units rotated from Dong Tam Base every three or four days). This technique has significantly contributed to the reduction of attacks by fire on Dong Tam base during this period.

(b) To assist Dinh Tuong Provincial forces in their responsibility for the security of Highway QL4, special devices and techniques designed to provide improved protection to this important LOC were used. Because interdiction of the highway normally occurs during hours of darkness or reduced visibility, emphasis was placed on night security measures to include: sniper teams equipped with starlight scopes, pink searchlights, surveillance radar, and scout dog teams to complement extensive small unit patrols and ambushes. These new techniques were extremely successful in keeping the highway open to traffic.

(c) Another technique that emerged through experience was the use of the E53 Manpack Personnel Detector. Finding and fixing the enemy continued to be the most difficult problem in defeating him in the field. To solve this problem division units employed the E53 Manpack Personnel Detector from a helicopter operating with the Air Cav. Once VC forces were located by means of this device, immediate response by Air Cav troop gunships was used to restrict enemy movement. Friendly reaction forces were then rapidly deployed by helicopter to seal off and exploit the contact.
Other new techniques adopted this period were initiated by the unique Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). Although the following techniques were adopted by the MRF, other units may find them adaptable to their operations:

1. **Re-entry**: This tactic was devised to counter the VC practice of moving to an area just vacated by Free World Military Forces. In practice, an operation is conducted in a known enemy base or refuge area. After extensive search for caches, bunker destruction, and the elimination of any VC within the area, the friendly unit leaves. When the delay period expires, usually 24 hours, the unit, or another friendly unit, executes a rapid re-entry into the area and conducts offensive operations against VC who have infiltrated back into the area.

2. **Multiple watermobile insertions**: This tactic is a variation of Eagle Float operations. It is conducted over a larger area with the beachings more widely spaced and with greater inland penetration. The landing force searches and clears the banks, then backloads to continue operations. Detailed planning is required to insure that the navigational restrictions associated with low tide do not prevent deep penetration on inland waterways.

3. **Cart Wheel**: The cart wheel tactic is based on recent intelligence. A base or hub is established in a fire support-patrol base near the center of the target area. An airmobile force reacts to the intelligence by making insertions on the perimeter, or rim of the wheel. This force maneuvers inward toward the hub. The base element force reacts when the outer force makes a contact, maneuvering toward the rim.

4. **Selected area screening**: Selected screening utilizes the principles of cordon and search. The target area is kept small and is placed under intensive surveillance for an extended period of time. When the intelligence input indicates a lucrative target, the area is sealed off and personnel within the cordon are detained. A large group of National Police (100 is the optimum number) conduct the search and screen the population to identify all individuals not loyal to the GVN. Ideally, the operation should last two or three days to allow the National Police adequate time to conduct intensive and very detailed screening and searching activities.

**Combat Operations:**

1. **TOAN THANG II**: The 1st Brigade continued operation TOAN THANG II in Long An Province initially with three infantry battalions (2-39, 2-60 and 6-31) and one mechanized battalion (5-60). The 6-31 Inf primarily performed security missions in the vicinity of Nha Be and the southern Saigon rocket belt. The 5-60 Inf (Mech) performed the mission of road, bridge and
Convoy security along highway QL4. On 14 August 1968, the 6-31st Inf was released from OPCON of the 1st Brigade and placed under the operational control of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade in the southern Capital Military Area Command (CMAC). On 12 September, the 5-60th Inf (Mech) was transferred to the 1st Infantry Division. The 1st Brigade assumed OPCON of the 2-47th Inf (Mech) which had been in direct support of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) at Bearcat(XS1600). The 1st Brigade then continued operation TOAN THANG II with three infantry battalions (2-39, 3-39, and 2-60) and one mechanized battalion (2-47). The 1st Brigade participated in a substantial number of ground contacts since 1 August. Most of these were characterized by "pile on" techniques employed to seal off an enemy force detected by Air Cav using helicopter-mounted people sniffer. To achieve a rapid and tight seal, maximum use was made of helicopter eagle flight techniques while continuous pressure was maintained by artillery and air support. The first major engagement for the 1st Brigade came on 7 August 68 when two companies of the 6-31 made contact with an estimated VC battalion at XS905605 (8 Km SE of Can Giouc). Seven additional companies were inserted into the contact area resulting in a complete encirclement of the enemy force. Artillery was concentrated in the area throughout the night and the avenues of escape were cut off by the maneuver elements aided by continuous illumination of the area by C47 flare ships. A sweep of the contact area on the morning of 8 August yielded 46 VC KIA, 11 POW's, 14 individual weapons and 1 62mm mortar captured.

On 6 August, the 3d Brigade with two maneuver battalions (3-39 and 4-39), commenced operations in the thon Trach area under Operation TOAN THANG II. On 12 August, 4-39th Inf relocated to Ana Be b, beat and later conducted operations in the Long Song area. During this time, Task Force Starlight, a combined naval/ground force, was formed from elements of the 3d Brigade and Navy TG 117.2. Although there was no significant contact, the 3d Brigade did play a significant role in blocking the southern approaches to Saigon.

The 1st Brigade again made heavy contact on 12 August. Elements of 2-39th Inf made contact with an estimated VC battalion at vic XS705547 (9 Km SW of Can Duc). In this engagement ten companies were employed to complete the encirclement of the VC unit. Air strikes and artillery were directed into the objective area while the maneuver elements closed the area of the encirclement. Action resulted in 104 VC KIA, 8 POW's, 2 Chieu Hoi's, 21 individual weapons and 5 machine guns captured. On 19 August, a company from 2-39th made contact with two VC companies vicinity XSB25650 (7 Km NE of Can Duc), this company was supported by the air cavalry. Air and artillery fixed the enemy in position, while eight additional companies were rapidly inserted to support the contact. The result of this contact was 93 VC KIA, 15 POW's, 6 Chieu Hoi's and 45 captured weapons.
During the period 4 to 6 September, elements of the 2-39, 2-60 and 5-60 engaged a VC battalion which was fragmented into small units in an area three miles west of Can Giuoc. A total of six companies were employed continuously in different areas to destroy the enemy force. This engagement produced 131 VC KIA, 12 POW's, 1 Chieu Hoi, 25 individual weapons and 7 crew served weapons captured. On 10 and 11 September, 9 Km N of Rach Kien, elements of 2-39 and 2-60, in two separate recon-in-force operations, accounted for 78 VC KIA, 10 POW's and 146 weapons captured; 96 weapons were found in a cache by a company of the 2-60th Infantry. On 24 September in the vic of XS667386 (7 Km NW of Rach Kien), one company of 2-60th Inf made contact with a VC force. Three additional companies of the 2-60th and one company of the 3-39th maneuvered to encircle the enemy force while air strikes and artillery were placed on the enemy positions. Sporadic contact continued through the late afternoon and during the night. At first light on 25 September, a sweep of the area was conducted which yielded a two-day total of 42 VC KIA, 9 POW's, 1 Chieu Hoi and 14 weapons captured. On 11 October the 1st Brigade's 2-39th Inf with A Troop, 3d Sqd, 17 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force vic of XS7676, approximately 5 km SSW of Can Giuoc. Again, the enemy could not withstand the firepower of the 1st Brigade and sustained 52 VC KIA. In addition to the major contact with company size or larger VC units, the 1st Brigade conducted numerous recon-in-force missions in which contact was made with small elements of local force or fragmented main force units. These contacts were made throughout Long An and Gia Dinh Provinces and served to keep the enemy off balance and making it extremely difficult for him to mass any large units within these provinces. The following are the cumulative results for TOAN THANG II.

FRIENDLY LOSSES: 164 US KIA, 806 US WHA, 6 helicopters damaged, 7 APC damaged.

ENEMY LOSSES: 1940 VC KIA, 95 POW's, 651 detainees, 15 Hoi Chanh, 552 small arms, 74 crew served weapons, 310 mortar rounds, 258 grenades, 1,866 Tons rice, 900,000 piasters, 16,650 rounds small arms ammunition, .5 tons salt, 181 lbs documents, 306 lbs medical supplies, 37 mines, 440 lbs CS agent, 313 sampans, 1,778 bunkers and 156 structures.

(b) TRUONG CONG DINH and QUYET CHIEN: The 2nd and 3d Brigades terminated Operation TRUONG CONG DINH on 3 August 68. It was followed by Operation QUYET CHIEN on 4 August which is still continuing. On 8 August the 3d Brigade (with 3-39 and 4-39) terminated Operation QUYET CHIEN and displaced to III CTZ. The Brigade returned to IV CTZ and resumed QUYET CHIEN on 12 September 68 with two new battalions; 6-31st Inf and 1-16th Inf (later redesignated 5-60th Inf). Though the 3d Brigade had no major rotations in August and September, their combat operations were successful and...
significant in the overall results obtained. The 2d Brigade began the period by operating in various provinces, but in early September under Operation HOMETEAD, a part of QUET CHIEN, it confined operations to Kien Hoa Province. The 2d Brigade began the period by conducting VI THANH Campaign from 30 July to 8 August 1968. The operation began as part of Operation TRUONG CONG DINH but became part of Operation QUET CHIEN. The operation was conducted in Chua Thien Province. It was significant from several standpoints: it was a combined force operation with the 5th Vietnamese Marine Battalion operating in cooperation and coordination with the 2d Brigade; the operation was the first penetration by an American ground force into the U Minh Forest region, and the deepest penetration into the Delta. The 2d Brigade established a land base and forward logistic support area with lines of communication extending 50 miles to the MBA located near Can Tho.

The results of the U Minh operation were seen in the enemy losses of 249 VC KIA, 18 POWs, 276 small arms, 24 machine guns, one 120mm mortar, one 75mm howitzer, one 106mm recoilless rifle, 832 grenades and 19 land mines.

Operation HOMETEAD, as mentioned above, was the next significant operation conducted by the Mobile Riverine Force. This operation marked the 2d Brigade's assumption of a continuing type mission in Kien Hoa Province with the intention of keeping one battalion land based at all times. The land based battalion was to conduct operations in Kien Hoa Province near Ben Tre while the remainder of the Brigade conducted strike operations against hard intelligence targets throughout the entire province. Results of the operation during the reporting period were 367 VC KIA.

As mentioned above, the 3d Brigade did not have a major contact in August and September; but this was not the case for October. On 4 October, Co B, 5-66th Inf (then designated 1-16th Inf) was inserted into a landing zone at 1030 hours approximately 20 Kms west of My Phuoc Tay (WS93567), and was immediately engaged by an unknown size force. Contact was so heavy that the other companies of the battalion and the 6-31st Inf battalion were also inserted to seal the enemy in and pile on all available fire power. D Troop, 3d Sqd, 5th Cav, also supported the 3d Brigade. A sweep of the area was made on 5 October. The results of that engagement accounted for 138 VC KIA with D Troop, 3-5th Cav killing 65 of the VC. 85 small arms and 78 crew served weapons were captured. 11 Ho Chi Minh and 25 prisoners were also taken. The enemy battalion was annihilated with the 26th. The 3d Brigade sustained 1 KIA and 8 WIA.

The 2d Brigade made significant contact with the enemy on 25 October 68. At 1040 hours approximately 11 Kms east of No Cay (XS576213) elements of the
3-60th Inf were inserted in a landing zone and immediately began receiving heavy automatic weapons fire. Fire was returned with organic weapons and A Troop 3-17th Cav, artillery and US Air Force supported. The other companies of the 3-60th Inf were inserted to support the contact. At 1735 hours the contact was broken. The results of that contact were 70 VC KIA while the US sustained 2 KHA and 11 WHA. The following is the cumulative results for TRUONG CONG DINH, and QUYET CHIEN. TRUONG CONG DINH: (Figures in parenthesis are results for Operation PEOPLE'S ROAD) FRIENDLY LOSSES: US KHA 197 (28), US WHA 1,094 (205). ENEMY LOSSES: VC KIA 2,246 (239), 134 (43) POW's, 1,874 (76) detainees, 393 (85) small arms, 34 (6) crew served weapons, 35,675 small arms rounds, 248 (126), grenades, 97 (67) RPG rounds, 252 (250) bangalore torpedoes, 112 (68) RPG rockets, 174 (37) mines, 362,700 (1,000) Piasters, 322 (65) lbs medical supplies, 7,201 (720) lbs explosives, 200 entrenching tools, 14.25 tons rice, 277 artillery rounds, 400 ft time fuse, 6,477 blasting caps, 5,663 (607) bunkers, 388 structures. QUYET CHIEN: FRIENDLY LOSSES: US KHA 59, US WHA 552, 2 MHA, 25 Armored Troop Carriers damaged, 2 trucks destroyed, 1 Armored Personnel Carrier destroyed, 26 helicopters damaged, 1 barge damaged. ENEMY LOSSES: 949 KIA, 14 Hoi Chanhs, 8 POW's, 195 small arms, 97 crew served weapons, 15 radios, 4,445 grenades, 148 mines, 50 lbs commo wire, 180 tons rice, 2 cameras, 102,740 rounds SA ammunition, 609 lbs medical supplies, 3061 lbs documents, 360 lbs TNT, 4 cases CS ammunition, 21 sampans motors, 17 sampans, 1087 gas masks and 217 structures. (c) KUDZU: The Division Support Command with one maneuver battalion has the mission of securing the Division Base Camp at Dong Tam. This was accomplished during the reporting period through the employment of one OPCON infantry battalion in AO KUDZU. As mentioned before, the number of mortar/rocket attacks on Dong Tam decreased from the previous reporting period. There was also a significant decrease in the number of mining incidents and sniper attacks along Highway 22 between Highway 25 and Highway 4 and also along Highway 25 from Dong Tam to My Tho. Countermortar radar sets continued to be used in locating enemy movement and active mortar locations. With the establishment of platoon-size bases in the AO, and the employment of six patrols in the western AO, the enemy's ability to move into mortar attack positions undetected has been significantly reduced. The following are the cumulative results for KUDZU: FRIENDLY LOSSES: 16 US KHA, 255 US WHA, 2 helicopters damaged, 1 Armored Personnel Carrier damaged. ENEMY LOSSES: 120 KIA, 26 POW, 503 detainees, 18 small arms, 65 lbs medical supplies, 202 lbs documents, 2,861 small arms rounds, 5.5 tons rice, 9,000 can of fish, 2.5 tons sugar, 600 gals gasoline, 6 land mines, 77 artillery and mortar rounds, 28 sampans, 210 bunkers and 26 structures destroyed.
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(4) Combat Support Activities

(a) Artillery Support:

1 For the first time, this period found all elements of Division Artillery working in the vast expanse of Long An, Go Cong, Kien Hoa, and Dinh Tuong Provinces. Timely and continuous fire support was provided to the division elements, Army of the Republic of Vietnam units, Civilian Irregular Defense Group, and Regional Forces/Popular Forces outposts. The TPS-25 radar was employed as an integral part of the overall division plan to search and detect enemy movement along the major infiltration routes to Saigon and deep in enemy base camp areas. Radar surveillance was increased by extensive use of the TPS-33 and the FPS-5 surveillance radars in the fully integrated division surveillance plan. Illumination, time on target (TOT) fires in coordination with gunships, or in coordination with aerial observers, were used to effectively interdict the major water infiltration routes in the area. On numerous occasions, artillery raids were conducted against carefully selected intelligence targets. Paddy platforms were used by the 3d Bn, 34th Arty in Kien Hoa Province to provide a suitable firing position for a 105 howitzer battery supporting 2d Brigade operations in the Gion Trom District of Kien Hoa Province. Three firing batteries from II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, operating primarily in Long An Province, were used to supplement the fires of the 9th Infantry Division Artillery.

2 Artillery with 9th Infantry Division fired a total of 258,274-105 howitzer rounds, 51,748-155 rounds and 6,696-8 inch howitzer rounds. These figures do not reflect support from adjacent firing elements as figures were not obtainable for these fires. A chart reflecting a breakdown of rounds fired by artillery is attached as Inclosure 6.

(b) Helicopter Gunship Support:

1 The 9th Aviation Battalion flew 2,074 gunship sorties. Missions included escort for VIP flights, aerial displacement of supplies, personnel and equipment by cargo helicopters, medical evacuation, people sniffer, convoy covers, insertions and extractions. The gunships provided support for units in contact and countermortar reaction at Bearcat, Tan An and Dong Tam. The gunships accounted for 49 VC KBA (BC). They destroyed 73 structures and 40 sampans, and damaged 39 structures and 4 sampans.

2 D Troop, 3/5th Cavalry supported all division elements during this period, providing an average of 6 armed helicopters daily. Missions included reconnaissance, screening and blocking operations. The troop accounted for 253 VC KBA, 306 structures and 187 sampans destroyed, with 2 structures and 2 sampans damaged.
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(c) Tactical Air Support: The number of air sorties decreased slightly during this reporting period. The most significant contact with close air support was the 3rd Brigade contact on 4 and 5 October in Base Area 470. The USAF was credited with 31 confirmed VC KIA. Spectre, a C-130 with a starlight scope, organic mini-guns and 20mm cannons was initiated on an experimental basis. Spectre was used extensively in Long An Province along the Bo Bo Canal and the Van Go Tay River. Nighthawk, a new concept utilizing a Mohawk aircraft with infra-red surveillance capability, a flareship and a Cobra LFT was initiated on 25 October 68.

(d) Strategic Air Support: There was a total of 17 B-52 strikes conducted with the 9th Division TACO. Fourteen of these were in Base Area 470 in combined operations with the 7th ARVN Division. Prisoners of War have reported that many of the VC battalion size units which normally operate in this area were hit by the strikes.

(e) Naval Fire Support: Naval gunfire was effectively integrated with artillery fire in support of 2d Brigade operation in Base Area 473.

f. (U) Training

(1) During the reporting period, division training consisted of the following:

(a) Replacement training

(b) NCO Leadership training

(c) Battalion refresher training

(2) Replacement training consists of five and one-half days of intensive orientation designed to prepare the individual for combat in Vietnam. The Reliable Academy, a provisional organization formed by the 9th Infantry Division, conducted all replacement training. The following table shows the number of personnel trained during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TRAINED</th>
<th>CASUALTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>1,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPT</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1,850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Company grade officers and non-commissioned officers receive a six-day orientation keyed specifically to the situation in Vietnam. The latest equipment in use in Vietnam is demonstrated when practical, and the capabilities and limitations of support elements are discussed.

The 14 day NCO Leadership Course is designed to raise the proficiency level of small unit leaders within the division by presenting instruction in the principles of leadership and instruction as well as practical exercises in the skills required of junior leaders. The course is aimed at the specialist and junior NCO who have not had the benefit of prior leadership positions during combat. During the past three months, two hundred and thirty-seven personnel have completed the NCL Leadership Course.

Battalion refresher training is conducted by maneuver battalions on a schedule of one day per company per week. This flexible schedule allows timely instruction and also permits each maneuver battalion to complete its refresher training each month.

The 9th Infantry Division continues to qualify personnel in specific MOS’s by sending them to courses being conducted for this purpose by support units.

g. (C) Logistics: Logistical support was provided for all units assigned or attached to the 9th Infantry Division throughout the reporting period. A portion of this support has to be dispensed to division elements scattered throughout Kien Hoa Province, Long An Province, Dinh Tuong Province and Bearcat due to the vast area of operation for 9th Infantry Division elements. This support has varied from routine resupply of subsistence items to sizeable amounts of barrier and bunker materials that were required to support operations in areas that American troops had not previously operated and remained in for long periods of time.

Supply:

Providing an adequate supply of bunker, barrier and tactical construction materials has proven to be difficult. This has been primarily due to expanded efforts by the division to assist the local civilian population with this type of material. In some instances General Support activities did not have adequate quantities of materials on hand to fulfill all requirements. To assist in the orderly flow of material a consolidated forecast for a six month period was computed and submitted to 53d General Support Group.

Repair Parts for Outboard Motors: 85 Horsepower Johnson outboard
motors are used to power "Boston Whalers" within the division. These boats are used extensively for administrative and tactical purposes in connection with riverine operations. During August and early September parts requisitions for these engines were not being filled. Investigations revealed that there was a shortage of parts for these engines throughout SVN. First Logistical Command had the AMC representative check the status of parts through channels which resulted in a sizeable increase of filled requisitions during late September.

(2) Services:

(a) Quartermaster Laundry: First Logistical Command provides laundry service for the 9th Infantry Division at Dong Tam. Currently there are only four machines of World War II vintage in use. Several breakdowns have been experienced due to age and work load. In addition to personnel of the division requiring service, there are the 5A Surgical Hospital and the 9th Medical Battalion. Constant efforts are being made to improve laundry service; including the building of a new facility which was completed on 29 October.

(b) Generators: Difficulty was experienced in obtaining repair parts for generators during August and September. However, central power is being installed throughout the division area which has lessened the generator requirements and now makes power available to some areas that had previously been given a lower priority. At one point there were insufficient generators to maintain operations and provide power for special service activities such as the Service Club, Library and the Craft Shop.

(3) Support:

(a) Forward Area Refuel Equipment (FARE): 9th Infantry Division has used the forward area refuel systems extensively as the main fuel source where there was no fixed facility, or as back up where there was an existing facility. This equipment has paid large dividends in keeping air assets immediately available in the tactical area with minimum time lost for refueling.

(b) Because the FARE is an experimental piece of equipment, no repairs can be made to the pump engine if it does not work. Experience has shown that with adapters the standard issue 100 GPM pump can be used to replace the pump that comes with the system.

(4) Transportation:
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(a) Most areas where FARE systems have been set up to support operations have been inaccessible by road. Aircraft have been the means of transporting the systems and fuel into these areas.

(b) Without the support of CH-47 and CH-54 helicopters, it would have been impossible to provide fuel in sufficient quantities to most forward areas.

(c) There have been no major problems associated with land or water transportation that have not been commented on in previous reports.

(5) See inclosure 15 for additional comments in depth on most areas mentioned.

h. (c) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

(1) Psychological Operations.

(a) Themes being emphasized during this period. Psychological operations continued to be directed against military and non-military targets. During the month of August, emphasis was placed primarily upon military targets due to the number of contacts established with local, main force, and NVA units. As the quarter progressed, enemy forces apparently fragmented into small groups and attempted to avoid contact. Recently, enemy morale has been low, due primarily to the many defeats he has suffered and a general disillusionment with the VC cause. Themes directed against the enemy have emphasized his defeats, the overwhelming power of GVN and FWMAF Forces, the hopelessness of continuing to fight, and the lies of the VC/NVA cadre. Virtually every mission has contained an appeal to rally under the GVN's Chieu Hoi program. Themes utilized with the civilian populace have pointed out that the GVN builds and the VC destroy; and have appealed to the people to support the GVN and reject the VC. Appeals have been made to report mines, boobytraps, and VC activities. Again an underlying theme of VC lies has pervaded virtually every message.

(b) Coordination measures. It became apparent in August that closer coordination was required between Division PSYOP personnel and the many other PSYOP agencies operating in the Division TAOI. Weekly meetings were established with Division PSYOP personnel and representatives of each Province CORDS/PSYOP agency, and ARVN Division PSYOP advisors. Information concerning PSYOP activities for the preceding week and plans for the coming week were exchanged among the various representatives. The purpose was to provide a better coordinated PSYOP effort with emphasis on data.
accumulated concerning targeting of specific enemy units. These data are readily available and can be transferred within the PSYOP community when a known enemy unit moves outside its normal area of operation. The system permits determining what PSYOP has been directed against a specific unit, the media used and the results. In addition, intelligence reports have received closer scrutiny, interrogation reports have been studied more closely to determine PSYOP vulnerabilities, and EEl were requested to provide the additional information needed to conduct an effective campaign. A coordination element composed of plans and operations personnel of the G5 section was established and is operating on a 24 hour basis in the Division Tactical Operations Center. This element has provided the required coordination, decreased response time in meeting the requirements of subordinate commands, and has efficiently controlled the allocation of Division assets. All of these measures have contributed markedly to the successful PSYOP program conducted during this three month period.

(c) Chieu Hoi program. During the reporting period, 1057 Hoi Chanhs rallied to the GVN under the Chieu Hoi program within the four provinces of the Division TA01. This represents a sharp upturn from the previous five quarterly reporting periods, and an even greater upward trend seems to be indicated. This figure is more than double the total number of ralliers received during the comparable quarter of 1967. It marks the highest number of ralliers since the February through April reporting period of 1967. Of equal significance to Division personnel is the number of Hoi Chanhs rallying to 9th Division units. Until July of 1968 this figure was too low to warrant keeping records, and frequently the monthly total was nil. This condition was broken in July when 5 ralliers were received by Division units. In August the figure rose to nine; in September, 12; and in October the total was 25. Although tactical success has certainly influenced these figures, it is felt that the new and improved PSYOP methods directed toward the Chieu Hoi program have significantly effected classification of detainees. It was found that some detainees had been deprived of the benefits of the Chieu Hoi program due to the methods of interrogation. Now all detainees are asked two specific questions. Does the individual understand the Chieu Hoi program; and if so, why does he not wish to rally? The individual who does not understand the program has it explained to him in detail. If he can be classified as a potential rallier, he is then afforded the opportunity to rally. In addition, more emphasis has been placed on PSYOP intelligence in interrogating detainees. This has resulted in more complete readout of the effectiveness of PSYOP.

(d) PSYOP activity statistics 1 August through 31 October.
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1 Total Leaflet Missions: 415
2 Total Loudspeaker Missions: 366
3 Leaflets:
   Total Dropped: 136,616,610
   Total Hand Distributed: 168,546
   Total Rapid Reactions Produced by Other Agencies: 24
4 Total Loudspeaker Hours: 615.4
5 Number of Movies Shown: 156
6 Rapid Reaction Leaflets Produced by 9th Division:
   Total Leaflets produced: 45
   Total Disseminated: 279,000

(2) Civil Affairs.

(a) Civic Action, General. Significant progress has been made during this quarter in developing the Division Civic Action Program. The 1st Brigade is participating in the Long An Province Civic Action Plan. The CO, 1st Brigade, the Province Chief, and the Senior Province Advisor have developed a coordinated civic action plan to integrate all 1st Brigade elements into the overall Province plan. Among other features, the plan directs the establishment of civic action committees in each district composed of GVN officials, advisory personnel, and US battalion and ARVN regimental commanders. These committees will coordinate all military civic action conducted within the districts. Initial effects of this plan are encouraging; and it should lead to an exceptionally active, efficient program. The 2d Brigade has undertaken the responsibility for several civic action projects in Kien Hoa Province. The establishment of a fire support base in the Province, described later in this report, should assist in the development of a well coordinated civic action effort. The 3d Brigade’s civic action efforts are being directed in large measure to western Dinh Tuong Province. Close coordination has been affected with District officials and advisors, and many construction projects have been undertaken. Virtually all of these are self-help projects greatly desired by the local populace. The 3d Brigade civic action personnel are providing materials and technical
assistance only, in most cases. A change in the limitations imposed on assistance-in-kind funds for civic action has greatly assisted the entire Division civic action program. Before September 1968, the Division was limited to 200,000 piasters (approximately $1695 US) per month. The Division requested and received authorization for an increase to 500,000 piasters per month (approximately $4237 US). This increased authorization is permitting the Division's units to accept many projects formerly denied due to lack of funds.

(b) Intelligence Civic Action Program. A civic action program designed to integrate civic action, psychological operations and intelligence activities was developed and initiated by the Division early in this reporting period. The Intelligence Civic Action Program (ICAP) is a coordinated, combined activity composed of civic action, intelligence, PSYOP, and security personnel, each performing their customary roles in a contested or insecure area. In addition to obtaining humanitarian benefits, objectives of the ICAP include obtaining information of intelligence value, particularly that which regards the VC infrastructure; determining the status of security and pacification in contested and insecure areas; assisting the unit S5 in conducting civic action surveys and establishing liaison with local leaders and officials in contested areas; and to improve the image and relieve any fear or tension created by the presence of US Forces operating in the RVN. In addition, ICAPs provide the opportunity for combined small unit operations with RF/PF personnel. This program has produced remarkably successful results from its inception, and it is felt that all of the objectives of the program have been achieved. Virtually every battalion has experienced the acquisition of significant intelligence information, and numerous instances of ICAPs successfully obtaining information where more customary intelligence methods have proved to be unsuccessful have been recorded. Units have also reported the easing of hostile or apprehensive attitudes on the part of villagers in VC controlled areas. The presence of ICAP teams has increased unit rapport with local leaders and officials, and combined operations with Regional Force/Popular Force troops has had a marked influence upon their morale and their image in the eyes of their countrymen. Vietnamese civilians are actively participating also, by assisting with security, notifying medical personnel of the location of those needing medical treatment, providing the team with the locations of boobytrapped areas, and in some cases even walking the point for security. Counter-intelligence personnel from the 9th Military Intelligence Detachment, the OPCON infantry battalion, and Division Support Command have formed a team known as "HouseCAP". This interesting application of the ICAP procedure has been developed by the Division Support Command. RF or PF troops are added to the team prior to entering a hamlet. The team, accompanied by the village chief and the hamlet chief of each hamlet visited, walks from house to house offering medical treatment. The houses are approached by the hamlet chief, and if an invitation is extended by the occupants, the team enters and treats those who need medical care. Although this method of conducting an ICAP is arduous and time consuming, it has several distinct advantages. Civic action personnel are able to enter
areas where only infantry had operation have moved before, providing face to face friendly contact with the indigenous personnel. The use of local officials and R/PP troops presents a unified display for those people who have had very little contact with US forces. Persons who have never been near a doctor or medic in the past are able to receive medical attention. Individual homes offer privacy for medical treatment and for intelligence personnel. This application of basic ICAP concepts has produced great success. It is anticipated that additional applications will be developed and further refinements made of existing procedures to produce additional benefits.

(c) Cai Rang Incident. On 8 August 1968, the Mobile Riverine Force composed of US Navy personnel and elements of the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was returning to its anchorage near Can Tho, Phong Dinh Province, when it was ambushed by the Viet Cong at three separate locations in Thuan Phuoc and Cai Rang Districts. The boats in the convoy were subjected to intense small arms, automatic weapons, and rocket fire from the banks of the Xa No Canal and the Can Tho River. The Mobile Riverine Force responded with organic weapons and helicopter gunships in order to defend the convoy from the enemy attack. Most of the ambush force was located in populated areas and suppressive fires were required on these positions. In some cases, rounds were fired unintentionally high and went beyond their intended targets into the district town of Cai Rang. Unfortunately, as a result of these ambushes, many friendly Vietnamese were killed or wounded, and many homes were damaged or destroyed. On 9 August 1968, the Commanding General dispatched a special team composed of officers of his general, special and personal staffs to assist the local GVN officials in every way and to stay as long as needed. This team, under the supervision of the Division ACofS, was, conducted an extensive PSYOP and Civic Action operation to assist the Province and District officials. In cooperation with the District Chiefs, a total of 924,700$VN in solatium gifts was presented to the next of kin of those killed and to the individuals who suffered injury as an expression of sympathy and condolence. The Division Civic Action Officer surveyed the devastated areas to determine total requirements and to offer assistance from Division assets if these requirements could not be met by local GVN officials. More than 25,000 pounds of foodstuffs were flown from the Dong Tam Base Camp to Can Tho and turned over to Province officials for use in the relief effort. The Division PSYOP Officer assisted the IV Corps and Phong Dinh Province PSYOP personnel in developing a coordinated PSYOP campaign in the area. The Division Surgeon examined the wounded, assisted local medical personnel, and provided several hundred pounds of medical supplies from Division resources to meet the initial hospital requirements. Two weeks later a second shipment of critical supplies including plasma, body fluid, and intravenous fluids was made to the hospital. As a result of the team's well coordinated...
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(d) Effect of displacements on civic action. The displacement of the 9th Division Headquarters from Bearcat to Dong Tam base camp affected the civic action program during the past quarter. Projects conducted in the Bearcat area were completed, or in some cases turned over to other units, e.g., orphanages. The heavy work schedule in becoming administratively and logistically established at the Dong Tam base camp limited the personnel and materials available for civic action during the early portion of this reporting period. Many assets frequently utilized in civic action projects were restricted to construction projects at the base camp. The return of the Royal Thai Volunteer Regiment to Thailand has further lowered certain portions of the statistical data. During the four preceding quarterly reports, statistics for civic action and psychological operations conducted by the RTAVR have been included in the 9th Division report. The frequent response of major subordinate commands to enemy activities has also had an effect on certain portions of the statistical data. Major commands have displaced repeatedly to meet anticipated enemy concentrations, forcing them to leave projected activities temporarily and participate in very short range projects only. There have been beneficial aspects to some of these displacements however. For example, the 2d Brigade has established a permanent fire support base in Kien Hoa Province during this reporting period. The establishment of this base camp and the movement to occupy it disrupted the normal routine for approximately three weeks. The location and permanency of the base offers lucrative opportunities for civic action, and plans to exploit these opportunities have been developed and instituted. Since the 2d Brigade normally travels throughout the Mekong Delta as a strike force, this base will permit them to engage in activities formerly denied to them.

(e) Gunship incident. A structure housing two families in Northern Cai Be District, Dinh Tuong Province, was set on fire during a fire fight in that area during the month of August. A gunship from the 191st Assault Helicopter Company, which was supporting 9th Division troops in the area, responded to the fire by landing nearby. The crew fought and extinguished the blaze, however, they were unable to save the structure. The sixteen occupants were noted to have received very minor injuries. Not wishing to leave the families homeless and in need of medical attention, the crew transported all sixteen persons (one elderly man, two adult women, and thirteen children) to the Dong Tam Base Camp. They were examined by the medical personnel of the 3d Surgical Hospital and then turned over to the Division G5 section at the Innocent Civilian Center. This facility is normally used to process detainees who are later classified as innocent civilians prior to their release, but it is suitable as a guest house for
any Vietnamese emergencies. The families were made to feel at home in the center and were given the opportunity to bathe in the showers and rest after their frightening and tiring experience. Their clothing, which had been scorcherd and soiled, was replaced by new outfits and solatium gifts were presented. They requested and received instructions on the processing of a claim for the loss of their home. All of these people expressed great appreciation for the treatment they had received and were thankful that the Americans displayed so much interest in their misfortune. The elderly gentlemen credited the gunship crew with saving their lives. After two days and nights of rest, they were returned by helicopter to the District Chief so that they might file their claim.

(f) Civic Action Statistics.

1 MEDCAPS:

- Operations: 918
- Patients: 85,175

2 Efforts to Improve LOC:

- Bridges Constructed: 37
- Bridges Repaired: 10
- Roads Constructed: 1 Km
- Roads Repaired: 167 Km

3 Repair and Construction

- Schools: 16
- Dispensaries: 5
- Dwellings: 36
- Other Major: 12
- Other Minor: 14
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4 Commodities Distributed:

- Cement 258,140 lbs
- Lumber 35,316 bd ft
- Clothing 1,475 lbs
- Health Items 4,378 lbs
- Tin Sheets 2,693
- Foodstuffs 96,167 lbs
- Paint 164 gals

1. (U) Regional Force/Popular Force Upgrading and ARVN Training.

(1) The Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) infantry re-training program was not active during this reporting period. Training of the first unit (2-50th ARVN Infantry) is scheduled to start in December. During this interim period the 9th Division 1st Brigade has initiated action to train the 50th Regiment (ARVN) in airborne techniques. This is a phased program. Phase one, the preparation phase, is the planning, coordination, demonstration and orientation flights with the ARVN commanders and staff. In phase two, the development phase, the 50th Regiment (ARVN) practices airborne operation under the supervision of the 1st Brigade. During phase three, the application phase, the 50th Regt (ARVN) conducts airborne operations while the 1st Brigade monitors the operations. Once this technique is mastered by the battalions of the 50th ARVN Regiment, they will be able to combine the best capabilities of infantry and air mobility to locate, fix, and destroy an enemy target.

(2) Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) upgrading program continued to be supported throughout the division TAOI. Specific teams employed to support the various programs were the Improvement Action Teams (IMPACT) and Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP). The 9th Division Mobile Advisory Teams (MATS) were transferred to MACV on 1 August 1968.

(a) The IMPACT teams continued their barrier material support to the RF/PF outposts. The locations of the teams at the termination of this reporting period are as follows:
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1st Brigade

Raoh Kien

Long An

2d Brigade

Mo Cay

Kien Hoa

Huong My

Kien Hoa

Giong Trom

Kien Hoa

3d Brigade

Go Cong

Go Cong

These two-man teams continued their high impact, short term visits and have given a boost to the province's RF/PF outpost supply system. The amount of RF/PF IMPACT support provided is shown in Inclosure 9.

(b) The CRIP's continued their employment in Long Thanh, Bien Hoa Province and in Tan An, Long An Province. The CRIP at Long Thanh was reassigned to the 3d Brigade on 15 Aug 68 and moved to Dong Tam for reorganization and preparation for re-deployment to their new area of operation in Long Dinh District, Dinh Tuong Province. During September 68, the CRIP moved to its new location and began building its operational base. During October 68 personnel initiated their training program and local operations. This CRIP is working closely with the District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) to target on VC Infrastructure.

(c) The Reciprocal Mobile Training Team (RMTT) began the presentation of instruction to battalions of the 7th ARVN Division on 27 September 68. During the period 27 September to 30 October this three man team has presented an eleven hour POI to 570 members of the division. The POI was developed in consideration of the state of unit training, area of operations and mission.

The POI hours are:

- M-79 Grenade Launcher 1 hour
- 81mm Mortar 2 hours
- Map Reading 2 hours
- Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination 3 hours
- First Aid 2 hours
Radio Maintenance (PRC 25)

TOTAL 11 hours

The 7th ARVN Division Reciprocal portion of the team will join the 9th Division Reliable Academy when it displaces from Baroat to Dong Tam.

j. (U) Engineer Support.

(1) Support rendered to 1st Brigade included road repair work, installations of 2 Bailey Brigades (one of which was a 150 Triple-Double at Rach Kien), installation and maintenance of anti-floating mine booms at the Tan-an and Ben Luc bridges, daily minesweep of portions of Highway QL4 and selected routes in the 1st Brigade TACL, and engineer support committed to Reconnaissance in Force Operations. A recurring problem in this area has been the maintenance of the Ben Luc mine boom. Almost daily repair and/or replacement of this boom has been necessary due to its repeated sinking by the ARVN guards on the bridge and its destruction due to the traffic of heavy sampans passing over it.

(2) In the 2d Brigade area, combat support was concentrated on the movement of elements of the Brigade into Kien Hoa Province. Engineer support included the completion of two major fire support bases, land clearing operations, demolition and mine detection, and construction of a ferry loading site near the destroyed bridge at XS5531. A four float M476 raft was airlifted to this site and is presently utilized as the primary ferry transportation in the area. Most noteworthy of the support of the 2d Brigade was the extensive use of airlift to emplace bunkers and construction materials on site. A large number of fighting and protective bunkers were prefabricated at Dong Tam Base, then lifted by CH-47 helicopters directly into their area of employment in Kien Hoa Province. This extensive use of air resources has greatly increased the battalions' capability to conduct livable and protected fire support bases in a matter of days. Also included in 2d Brigade operational support were several missions by the airboat platoon. This element added highly mobile reconnaissance and fire support to operations along rivers and canals.

(3) Operations in support of 3d Brigade elements have included fire support base construction and improvement, upgrading and maintenance of lines of communication within the area and numerous minesweep and demolition missions.

(4) Working with elements of the Division Support Command, the Engineer battalion conducted a daily minesweep along Highway 25 to the Highway 22 intersection and north on 22 to its intersection with QL4. The cutting
of four cleared traces (100 meters wide) through the woodline to the east of Dong Tam Base was also initiated. Two traces have been completed while the third is in progress at this report date. The battalion also airlifted a 45 ft M476 fixed span bridge into a location south of Vinh Kim to improve the road net within the DISCOM TAOI. Numerous demolition team and mine detection elements were provided in support of DISCOM combat operations.

(5) The battalion Security Platoon, consisting of four flame tracks and two 3/4 ton trucks armed with .50 caliber machine guns, has provided security for engineer work parties, daily minesweeps and convoy operations. With the proposed addition to the platoon of M151 1/4 ton trucks equipped with vehicle mounted mine detectors, it is planned during the next quarter to shift full responsibility for the daily minesweep to the Security Platoon.

k. (U) Signal Support

(1) During this reporting period the areas served by the Division Communication System were as follows: Bearcat, Dong Tam, Tan An, Binh Phuoc, Tan Tru, Rach Kien, Nha Be, My Phuoc Tay, Tiger II, Vung Tau, Can Tho, Cao Lanh, Can Giuoc, Ben Tre, Go Ai Duc, Ben Luc, and Vientiane.

(2) From 1 August until 7 August, the 9th Signal Battalion supported the southernmost combat operation ever undertaken by U.S. Infantrymen in Vietnam. The operation culminated in a two week operation in the U Minh Forest approximately 95 miles southwest of Dong Tam. Continuous VHF communications were installed and maintained with the 2d Brigade during this entire period. The 3d Brigade displaced to the vicinity of Can Giuoc on 12 August, and two VHF systems were provided; one relayed through Vung Tau to Dong Tam and the other terminated at Tan An. On 14 August the 2d Brigade established a land-based CP at Ben Tre supported by VHF provided by the 9th Signal Battalion. The 9th Signal Battalion provided a radio-teletype system, AN/VSC-2, to support the 2d Brigade Forward CP at My Phuoc Tay on 25 August. On 29 August the Goodyear helium-filled communications balloon operated by the 9th Signal Battalion broke its tether line and disappeared in the direction of Vung Tau. Both Army and Air Force Aviation elements were alerted, however the balloon was not recovered.

(3) In early September the 2d Brigade established a land based CP at My Phuoc Tay with telephone and teletype circuits provided by the 9th Signal Battalion using VHF equipment airlifted into the site to support the operation. At Bearcat, on 8 and 9 September, the Reliable Rear switchboard as well as the Division Operations Net (FM), and the Division Secure Net were discontinued. During this month numerous VHF test systems were installed at the Vung Tau relay in an effort to train new personnel and improve equipment readiness. The signal battalion was issued two radio sets (AN/GRC-163's)
for installation, testing and demonstration prior to additional sets being issued to the brigades. On 25 September FSB David was relocated and named Tiger II; the VHF van from David was airlifted into the new position. After the extensive delay due to unfavorable terrain, the system to Dong Tam was reestablished. The 3d Brigade established a Brigade Forward at My Phuoc Tay and the 9th Signal Battalion airlifted an AN/MRC-69 into this area to support the Brigade.

(4) The 3d Brigade continued to maintain a Brigade Forward CP at My Phuoc Tay during the first week in October. In addition, a Brigade TOC was established at FSB Moore with VHF support being provided by the 9th Signal Battalion. An extensive VHF and HF training program was undertaken by the 9th Signal Battalion personnel with its primary purpose of checking operational and equipment readiness. A four channel AN/MRC-69 system was established at Ben Luc to support a company of the 709th Maintenance Battalion. Additionally, 12 channel AN/MRC-69 VHF systems to battalion level base camps at Tan Tru and Tiger II were replaced by 4 channel AN/MRC-112 systems. In mid-October, the 2d Brigade established a land-based forward CP at Ben Tre. An AN/MRC-69 VHF van was moved by road to Ben Tre and installed to provide telephone communications. Also in mid-October, the 3d Brigade established a tactical CP at Giao Duc. Another VHF van accompanied the 3d Brigade during the road march and was used to provide telephone communications support. During October, the Photographic Facility instituted a quality control program which resulted in improved quality of photos by the 9th Signal Battalion's Photographic Laboratory.

(1) (C) Army Aviation: Army Aviation supported the division on a daily basis. Operations TOAN THONG II, TRUONG CONG DINH, QUYET CHIEN and KUDZU were characterized by employment of multiple assault helicopter companies and air cavalry troops. Medium and heavy cargo helicopters provided lift for artillery, supplies, equipment, and troop movement. The 9th Aviation Battalion provided general support to the division. II FFORCEV supported the division by providing a daily average of 1.9 assault helicopter companies, one air cavalry troop and 2.3 cargo helicopters.

(a) (C) Chemical Support.

(1) Personnel Detection: During this quarter, the Division Chemical Section flew 518 missions for a total of 664 hours. Compared to the previous quarter, the missions increased 600% and hours flown increased by 200%. This quarter the Section has flown many more missions which were of less time duration than the previous quarter. In conducting these missions, the Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) XM3, which was received by the Division in late July, and the E63 Manpack Personnel Detector (XM2) were utilized. Results of these missions were reported to G-2 or to Brigade and/or Air Cavalry units for
immediate reactions to significant readings. It is noted that most of the significant contacts during this quarter were initiated by "People Sniffer" missions.

(2) Riot Control Agents (RCA): Due to the new base of operation of the 9th Inf Div and to the monsoon season which decreases the effectiveness of CS, the employment of bulk CS decreased 75%. However, the employment of E150 Canister Cluster Tactical CS increased 150% over last quarter. The 1st Brigade continued to use the greatest amount, although there was a marked increase in use by 2nd and 3d Brigades and D Troop, 3/5th Cav.

(3) Defoliation: During this quarter, a new defoliation program was designed to meet the particular requirements of IV Corps. The term "selective defoliation" came into being and represents highly selective and relatively small defoliation targets, usually those of single tree lines and canals or river lines known to be VC base camps, resupply and ambush areas. Eighteen separate target areas were submitted for approval. The approval for requests submitted this quarter should be received, approved and completed during the next quarter.

(4) New Concept this Quarter: The Air Cav concept in employment of the personnel detector was perfected during this quarter. This concept involves the use of the LOH-6 "Scout" ships, the AH 16 Cobra and the Aero Rifle Platoons (ARP) of the Air Cav units. Previously the "Sniffer Teams" consisted of a UH-1D with two gunships for security only. The "Sniffer-Team" in use by an Air Cav unit consists of the UH-1D "slick", two LOH-6 "Scouts" and one or two AH 16 Cobras. The "slick" flies the "Sniffers" at tree top level in the area of interest. The "Scouts" fly immediately behind the "slick" for security and as an instant reaction visual reconnaissance capability to recon high "Sniffer" readings. The Cobras fly in a high orbit over the "Sniffer" AO and provide security for the "slick" and "Scouts." When the "Sniffer" ship obtains high readings or receives ground fire, it ascends to an altitude of approximately 1500 feet while the "Scouts" recon the area. The "Scouts" recon the area and if enemy contact is made, the enemy is engaged with the mini-guns. The Cobras then make their pass and drop their ordnance. Should the situation warrant further development, the ARP's are inserted and further tactical decisions are made based on their findings. This concept has proven highly effective in obtaining the maximum results from the employment of Personnel Detectors.

(5) Ensure Items: The 9th Infantry Division Chemical Section had one officer on TDY to the 4th Infantry Division to participate in the initial stage of the evaluation of the XM-28 Brown Bag CS-2 Dispenser. He participated in two separate drops of the XM-28 in the tri-Border area northwest
of Dak To. The evaluations will be shared by the 4th, 9th and 25th Divisions. This Division will complete its evaluation in the next quarter.

(6) Training of 1st Australian Task Force (ATF): During this quarter, an NCO of the Chemical Section was sent to the 1st ATF with three B63 Manpack Personnel Detectors (MPD) XM2. He conducted training on employment techniques and maintenance procedures for selected Australian personnel. USARV directed two MPD's be assigned to the 1st ATF. The 9th Division was therefore relieved of the requirement to support the 1st ATF with personnel and "sniffers."
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2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

   a. (C) Personnel

      1. (U) Personnel Information Roster (PIR) Procedures

         OBSERVATION. Information received on copies of the PIR returned from units was out of date by time of receipt. Personnel management needs accurate up-to-date information at all times in order to effect proper assignments.

         EVALUATION. The PIR's as maintained through September 1968 were of questionable value as a management tool. The system used was in accordance with current regulations but was not adequate for the job that had to be done.

         RECOMMENDATION. That the reports and statistics within FM be continued since the PIR's are now being posted on a daily basis from the most current information available. Units still receive copies of the PIR and return a posted copy monthly to FM which enables this headquarters to rectify any discrepancies.

      2. (U) Hospital Mail

         OBSERVATION. Battalion and separate company mail clerks are not always aware of the hospitalized status of their unit members.

         EVALUATION. In order for the hospital mail to be timely and effective, mail clerks must "pull out" mail for members of their unit who are hospitalized prior to forwarding the mail to lower echelons. When mail is not screened prior to forwarding to lower echelons a day or two is lost in transit time thus delaying eventual delivery to a patient in the hospital.

         RECOMMENDATION. A copy of the unit morning report should be provided to each battalion and separate company mail clerk as a means to insure he knows by name each member of the unit who is hospitalized.

   3. (C) Inadequacy of Organizational Maintenance Personnel ---- MRF

      Land Based Operations

         OBSERVATION. During this report there was a marked increase of prolonged land based operations by MRF Battalions. Vehicles and other equipment were furnished the MRF units by tasking divisional units, however, no organizational maintenance capability was provided. Because the using unit had no mechanics, there was no preventive maintenance program and equipment was frequently inoperable.
EVALUATION. In preparation for land-based operations, other divisional units were tasked to provide TOE equipment such as vehicles on a loan basis. Without exception, organizational maintenance personnel requirements were ignored by all concerned in spite of frequent requests by the maintenance battalion and the tactical unit. In no known instance were any organizational maintenance personnel attached or assigned to land-based MRF units to maintain the equipment provided for such an operation. On several occasions, elements of the 15th Engineer Battalion and the 3/34th Arty Battalion voluntarily performed organizational maintenance for MRF land-based Battalions simply because the Engineers and Arty were co-located with the MRF Battalions and observed the deplorable condition of equipment and the observed lack of Preventive Maintenance being conducted. This was stop-gap emergency work and offered no long range effective maintenance program. Countless numbers of minor maintenance problems, especially with vehicles, which could and should have been solved by the using unit (e.g. lubrication and tightening of nuts and bolts) were ignored until equipment became deadlined and required extensive field maintenance repairs by the Maintenance Battalion. These problems continue to exist as of this writing despite the emphasis and advice given by the Maintenance Battalion to unit commanders and personnel, MRF Bde S-4 and G-4. The Maintenance Battalion has, of necessity, responded to emergency requests by the MRF units and repeatedly used highly skilled personnel for countless man-hours to perform on-site operator and organizational maintenance. Each time this was done, the DS Maintenance mission of the Maintenance Battalion was neglected in part, and suffered or was delayed an amount of time equal to the work and time spent performing organizational maintenance. The Maintenance Battalion has neither the mission nor capability to perform both organizational and DS Maintenance. It is extremely uneconomical to continue to detract from the division’s DS Maintenance capability and use highly skilled and trained personnel to perform basic low level maintenance.

RECOMMENDATION. Organizational maintenance must be considered when equipment is provided to MRF units or land based operation. Every item of military equipment has been allocated its share of maintenance personnel. For example, mechanics should be assigned at least in ratio of one per each 5 vehicles. Units levied for equipment should also provide operators and mechanics.

(b) (C) Operations

(c) VC/NVA Evasion Techniques

OBSERVATION. VC/NVA will attempt to use canals, streams or rivers in an attempt to escape from a US force which is sweeping toward or has encircled an enemy unit. The enemy will fragment and either swim the water obstacles or try to hide in the vegetation along the banks of the waterways.
EVALUATION. During the periods of darkness, it is extremely difficult to stop the enemy from escaping by use of waterways. Several methods have been employed to deny these escape routes to the enemy. The most successful means employed has been the periodic grenading of the waterway with concussion grenades. Some success has been obtained by employing concertina wire submerged across the streams, but the weight and bulkiness of the wire has presented problems in its employment. Flame expedients have been employed with varying results; one method is to pour gasoline or napalm upstream from the VC position and after a time lapse to allow dispersing of the gasoline, light the mixture. This method has driven the VC out of streams, but is less effective in fast flowing waterways.

RECOMMENDATION. Continue to develop tactics and techniques to deny the enemy use of waterways as escape routes.

(2) (C) Checkerboard Operation

OBSERVATION. The checkerboard operation is an effective means to engage enemy elements moving at night and to disrupt the enemy lines of communication.

EVALUATION. The checkerboard operation consists of inserting a company into an area of operation for 36 to 72 hours. It should be inserted in a method designed to conceal the company location. One means of accomplishing this is to insert two companies in an area of operation and later extract only one company with the same number of aircraft used to insert two. Radio transmissions necessary for the two company extraction should be made to increase the deception. The company fragments into several ambush patrols, their size depending on terrain and enemy activity. These ambushes deploy to predetermined locations within the area of operation to block the infiltration routes. Caution should be exercised in not placing units out of supporting distance of one another. During daylight the company should rendezvous at a well concealed defensive location and observe daylight activity. The following night the unit moves into a new position in the area of operation and again fragments into ambush positions.

RECOMMENDATION. That the techniques of using Checkerboard ambushes be further developed and refined in order to deny the enemy the use of vital terrain at night as well as during the day.
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(3) (C) USE OF PATHFINDERS: 2nd Brigade

OBSERVATION. When coordinating for airmobile operations, problems are often encountered. Use of multiple airmobile companies for night insertions can become confusing if proper coordination is not effected. Close coordination must be made between pathfinders, the commanders making the insertion, the airmobile company commanders and the air mission commander.

EVALUATION. Airmobile company commanders must be thoroughly briefed by the S3 Air of the battalion conducting the airmobile operation. If pathfinders are used, the battalion S3 Air must insure that close coordination with them is made.

RECOMMENDATION. Pathfinders should be used to set up the PZ prior to the battalion’s arrival. The pathfinder unit must be in charge of controlling aircraft in the PZ. The airmobile commanders report on station using the pathfinder’s control frequency. The battalion PZ control officer or S3 Air will be in charge of coordination between the pathfinders and the infantry company commanders. The S3 Air should be responsible for selecting the assembly areas for the infantry companies, and for assuring that the companies are properly prepared for loading. The S3 Air must give the command to load the aircraft after coordination with pathfinders.

(4) (C) USE OF TACTICAL SMOKE: 2nd Brigade

OBSERVATION. During airmobile operations, landing zones frequently come under fire from enemy forces concealed in adjacent wood or trench lines. Smoke delivered by helicopters is normally more accurate than that delivered by artillery fire. Smoke pots provide a heavier screen than do grenades.

RECOMMENDATION. That airmobile companies carry smoke devices to cover insertions and that tactical planning always consider the possible use of smoke to conceal airmobile insertions.

(5) (C) OPERATIONS ALONG CANALS AND STREAMS: 2nd Brigade

OBSERVATION. When encountering wide streams and canals on combat operations, attempts must be made to employ troops on both banks while moving parallel to these natural water barriers. On a recent operation, the VC took advantage of such a barrier by detonating a claymore mine from the opposite bank, then escaping without pursuit because of the barrier.
EVALUATION. Waterways that are 10 to 15 meters wide are ideal sites for ambushes. The waterway itself is difficult to cross, yet the far bank is close enough for the enemy's effective use of command detonated mines and small arms fire.

RECOMMENDATION. To prevent the enemy using waterways to his advantage, maneuver on both sides of waterways at the same time.

(6) (C) Airmobile Raids

EVALUATION. Surprise is essential in executing successful airmobile raids.

EVALUATION. Surprise may be lost if artillery or gunships are used in the objective area prior to assault by airmobile troops. All unusual activity must be prohibited in the objective area prior to actual assault. Total surprise in such an operation more than compensates for the loss of fire support.

RECOMMENDATION. Artillery, gunships and FAC aircraft should not be allowed in an area where airmobile raids are being planned until immediately after initial assault.

(7) (C) Anti-Ambush Procedures.

OBSERVATION. The unique nature of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) and its watermobile deployment requires that special emphasis be placed on preventing ambushes against a riverine convoy and on reactions once enemy ambush is initiated.

DISCUSSION. Measures taken to discourage ambushes include air escort by tactical air and armed helicopters, airstrikes on suspected ambush sites, artillery fires on call, scheduled fires on call, scheduled fires along the water route, and reconnaissance by fire from the armament of the escort boats.

(1) Three general courses of action are available to riverine columns ambushed on a wide river; however, variations of each, and combinations of two or more techniques may be used by the commander as his analysis of the situation dictates. One course of action is to neutralize the enemy fire using all available friendly fires; to include Naval gunfire, artillery fire, helicopter fire teams and airstrikes. Then, once the enemy fire is suppressed, the infantry executes an assault landing to close with remaining enemy forces. Another course is to immediately conduct a beach
landing on a flank of the ambush and roll up the flank using all available supporting fires. The major disadvantage to this method is the warning the enemy receives by the long move to the beaching site. Further, if the ambush is merely for harassment, valuable time is lost without making significant contact. For harassment ambushes another alternative is to steam through the ambush while turning heavy suppressive fire; the troops are not landed. In all cases the observation and firepower afforded by a command and control helicopter and a helicopter light fire team greatly enhance the flexibility of the commander's decision.

(2) If the boat column is ambushed on a narrow river or canal, the best course of action open to any element in the kill-zone is to rapidly push through the ambush. Elements not in the kill-zone remain in position and must assist by placing fire into the ambush position. A Zippo (flame thrower) boat should be employed, if possible. Its flame capability is very effective in reducing the ambush and the flame also serves as an excellent marker for airstrikes. After the boats clear the kill-zone, infantry elements are beached to execute a double envelopment, using Naval gunfire to prevent reinforcement of or escape by the enemy force. Should an ambush be sprung as a result of reconnaissance in force operation, eagle float operations may be used to develop the situation or an airmobile assault may be used to complete an encirclement.

RECOMMENDATION. When air support is available, movements along waterways should be covered by an aerial observer and/or a light helicopter fire team, provided such support does not compromise the mission. When air support is not available, on call and scheduled artillery fires should be planned along the route of advance; reconnaissance by fire should be used in specified strike zone areas.

(C) Locating VC Dispersed Over Large Base Areas.

OBSERVATION. In operations aimed at hitting the enemy in his own base area, the area must be thoroughly reconnoitered to locate the dispersed enemy and his positions so that troops can be more gainfully employed.

EVALUATION. The most rapid means available for reconnoitering wide areas is to use air-cavalry combined with people sniffers. The number of contacts made and body count is much greater when this method is utilized.
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AVIJE-MH
15 November 1968

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RECOMMENDATION. That brigades have combinations of Air Cavalry and sniffer units under their operational control throughout operations aimed at finding, fixing and destroying VC units in large base areas.

(9) (C) Maintaining the Fighting Capability of Troops Over Long Periods of Action.

OBSERVATION. The need to keep constant pressure on the VC requires that troops be in the field for long periods. Frequently, unit effectiveness is cut down due to injuries resulting from exposure to the wet, muddy environment of the delta.

EVALUATION. When operating with only two battalions, usually four companies are in the field and the remainder maintained as a ready-reaction force and/or distributed among certain sites which require a continual static defense. If large contact is made, almost 100% of all troop strength must be committed. There remains no ready-reaction force and no replacements for units who suffer large losses due to exposure as well as to casualties. The addition of, as a minimum, a third battalion to the brigade structure now allows for more frequent rotation of troops in the field, thus reducing exposure casualties. It further provides a larger ready reaction force in the event of a major contact.

RECOMMENDATION. That the minimum structure for brigade operations consist of three maneuver battalions.

(10) (C) Security for Small Vessel Movement.

OBSERVATION: Employment and tactics of two or three unescorted vessels.

EVALUATION. a. Frequently it has become necessary to run two or three vessels down canals and rivers in support of an operation. When this has to be done, the policy is that two vessels are the minimum to any one location. This insures mutual fire support in case of ambush and in the event of heavy damage, the damaged vessel can be supported and towed by the second vessel. If Navy escort is provided, a single boat is dispatched, but generally at least two go; however, as Navy vessels are LCM-6's, they are too small to support a damaged vessel as large as an LCM-8.

b. Navy escort vessels are desirable for all small vessel movement. These LCM-6's are armored, have 40mm, 20mm, and .50 caliber weapons and have additional flotation material along the freeboard. The LCM-6 vessels of the 1097th have only shrapnel protective steel plate and...
two .50 caliber machine guns. However, Navy assets are difficult to obtain, and of necessity unescorted moves must be made. If the move is entirely on a wide river, i.e., My Tho, Binh Luong, Co Chien, or Bassac, threat of ambush is minimized.

**RECOMMENDATION.** The smaller rivers and canals are, however, very dangerous and require the following procedures:

1. Full protective clothing on all personnel.
2. Defensive positions behind steel plate.
3. Flank speed if the wake will not destroy adjacent civilian small craft.
4. Varied schedules of movement.
5. Suppressive fire if the area has been properly cleared by US, ARVN and RVN authorities.

Two or three LCM-6's moving alone have generally been unmolested. The enemy will usually not fire on resupply type vessels even if they are carrying Class V items. There have been exceptions, but as a rule, small convoys are not attacked. If the tactical situation permits, the company Command & Control vessel escorts the cargo vessels as it has better communication and firepower.

11 (C) **Minesweep.**

**OBSERVATION.** The major problem in minesweep is the electronic detector, both in its reliability and operator's lack of familiarity with the equipment. The head/stem coupling frequently fails and the knowledge of replacement personnel is severly lacking.

**EVALUATION.** Failures of the new style of head/stem coupling in addition to the fact that replacements from CONUS are not adequately trained in the maintenance, repair, and employment of the detector all combine to make minesweep activities far more time-consuming than necessary.

**RECOMMENDATION.** The old type head/stem coupling reliability is superior to the new model and should be utilized whenever available. Personnel scheduled for RVN duty with Engineer battalions should have indoctrination in all basic equipment prior to arrival. Present mine detectors should be replaced with lighter-weight, more reliable units used by the Marines.
(12) (C)  **Destruction of Sites Used by the Enemy.**

**OBSERVATION.** Many sites used for enemy activity are left standing or inadequately destroyed.

**EVALUATION.** Bunkers, buildings and woodlines have offered the enemy havens from detection and destruction on many occasions. Quite frequently, a particular building or particular section of woodline has been the site of a command detonation device for mines or the site of an ambush force. Repeated attempts to secure permission to destroy these sites have proved futile. Frequently an inadequate job of bunker destruction is accomplished and the enemy returns to the same positions.

**RECOMMENDATION.** Sites used for command detonation of mines and for ambushes should be immediately destroyed when encountered. Enough time should be taken for bunker destruction to insure denial of the bunkers to the enemy in the future. The use of trained engineers for this purpose will insure denial without unduly delaying the tactical operation.

(13) (C)  **Use of Non-Metallic Mines Against Vehicles.**

**OBSERVATION.** The use of non-metallic command detonated mines against vehicles has become a more serious problem as enemy methods become more sophisticated.

**EVALUATION.** The VC have developed sophisticated methods to prevent detection of non-metallic mines. The mines are buried in the road and the wire is buried in the embankment at the edge of the road where it is somehow marked for future use. Instead of laying additional wire to the command site, the VC leave no trace of any wire until the day and time they decide to blow the mine. Then they lay the wire through the rice paddy, during the day, just before they plan to use it, and connect it to the wire hidden in the embankment at the side of the road.

**RECOMMENDATION.** Design a more reliable non-metallic mine detector.

(14) (C)  **Earthwork During the Rainy Season.**

**OBSERVATION.** Earth moving projects in the Mekong Delta during the rainy season are practically impossible.

**EVALUATION.** The use of earthmoving equipment to accomplish major tasks during the rainy season has proven to be extremely difficult. The ground conditions at the time are such that all earthmoving equipment
bears no equipment to recover the mired vehicles. This often results in a series of vehicles becoming stuck as they attempt to recover others. Various solutions to this problem have been attempted but none have met with any degree of success.

RECOMMENDATION. Face the fact that earth-moving projects in the Mekong Delta during rainy season are not generally feasible. What is needed is planning which allows the scheduling of heavy equipment jobs during the dry season, or a new class of engineer vehicles possessing a vastly higher bearing area-to-weight ratio than those presently available.

(15) (C) Surveying Stakes in Enemy Areas.

OBSERVATION. The enemy uses surveying stakes laid out by our survey parties as anchors for booby traps placed during the night.

EVALUATION. The use of surveying stakes in areas of enemy activity provides a ready-made anchor for booby traps. This problem was encountered several times during clearing operations around Dong Tam Base.

RECOMMENDATION. Every morning before work starts, all surveying stakes should be checked for booby traps. When work in an area is finished, all stakes should be removed to prevent further enemy use.

(16) (U) Drainage Ditch Support.

OBSERVATION. Hand driving of U-shaped pickets for drainage ditches is too time consuming.

EVALUATION. When using tin roofing material for lateral support, the common practice is to use U-shaped pickets driven into the earth to support the tin. The standard method of driving the pickets by hand was found to be time consuming and inefficient. The use of a clay tamper and air compressor increased efficiency and reduced manhours by 20%.

RECOMMENDATION. A method similar to the one mentioned above should be used whenever possible to drive U-shaped pickets.
Use of Four Channel Systems in Battalion Level Base Camps

OBSERVATION. Battalion level base camps at Tan Tru and Tiger II have been provided communications support with 12 channel AN/ARC-69 VHF systems. In each case about one third of the AN/ARC-69's capability was being used for essential channels. Additionally, the need for 12 channel systems in other areas increased and the amount of equipment available to the 9th Signal Battalion to support combat operations fell below the required level.

EVALUATION. In each case the feasibility of replacing the 12 channel systems with four channel AN/ARC-112 systems was studied. It was determined that four telephone channels were satisfactory for communications out of the battalion level base camps. The range, reliability, and availability of frequencies in each case was studied. It was determined that the AN/ARC-112 would provide satisfactory communication and the only expected problem would be in frequency interference. Since AN/ARC-112 operating frequencies are compatible to those in the VRC-12 series FM radios, interference between the two types of radios could be a problem. The Radio Officer of the Division Staff was given overall responsibility for allocation of AN/ARC-112 frequencies. The AN/ARC-112 systems were installed and the results have been completely satisfactory.

RECOMMENDATIONS. It is recommended that the four channel AN/ARC-112 telephone systems be installed to Battalion level base camps instead of the 12 channel AN/ARC-69 systems whenever possible. It is further recommended that management of AN/ARC-112 frequencies be included in the frequency management responsibilities of the Division Radio Officer. When AN/GRC-163 radios become available they should be considered for this type employment.

Inadequacy of Maintenance Consideration in Tactical Planning.

OBSERVATION. Tactical commanders and their staffs fail to give adequate prior notification of movements and operations to maintenance support units.

EVALUATION. Movement of artillery, radars, and other equipment to areas where contact DS Maintenance Support must be provided, have caused considerable difficulty in identification of problems, finding units, arranging transportation and have consequently delayed repair by the Maintenance Battalion.
RECOMMENDATION. That tactical commanders (including artillery units) maintain close liaison with their supporting Maintenance DSU and advise as soon as possible of moves, operations and changes which affect maintenance considerations.

(19) (U) Employment of the Battalion Surgeon.

OBSERVATION. The function and location of the Battalion Surgeon varies widely throughout Vietnam.

EVALUATION. Experience in the 9th Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta indicates that the Battalion Surgeon is the key figure in Division level medical service. He normally locates with the field OP and routinely visits all company base camps for sick call, field preventive medicine advice and the training of company aidmen. On occasion, he follows behind an assault company if heavy casualties are anticipated. Being thoroughly familiar with the environment in which the soldier operates, he can offer both excellent field medical care and valuable advice to his unit commander.

RECOMMENDATION. To continue the policy of locating the Battalion Surgeon in the field with the troops he serves.

(20) (U) Inadequacy of Medical Considerations in Tactical Planning.

OBSERVATION. Tactical commanders fail to give adequate prior notification of pending combat operations to medical support elements.

EVALUATION. During recent months, combat operations were conducted in the 9th Infantry Division Area of Operations without prior consideration to medical evacuation and treatment support. This fact makes medical resupply and prompt evacuations extremely difficult for short duration operations.

RECOMMENDATION. The tactical commanders include their medical staff and medical support personnel in all preliminary planning phases of combat operations.

a. (C) Training.

(1) (U) Conversion of Military Payment Certificates.
OBSERVATION. Many collection officers and troops were not properly instructed as to C-Day (21 Oct) procedures and certain prescribed procedures were difficult to keep under close control.

EVALUATION. Each company sized unit is required to indicate conversion readiness by reporting the following semianually.

(a) Date on which an orientation on conversion procedures was last given.

(b) That sufficient blank forms are on hand to convert the MPC for the unit.

(c) The name and appointing authority of the unit collection officer. Notwithstanding the fact that such reports had been submitted as of 1 Sept 68, there were numerous errors and oversights in documentation turned in. It was apparent that in several cases, the most readily available officer was put on orders to be collection officer and was not aware of provisions of the division regulation. Procedurally it was impossible to exercise control over multiple conversions by requiring that the MACV ration cards be signed. There were hundreds within the division at the time of the conversion who were not in possession of a ration card because it was lost or at some other location. There were also numerous cases of personnel out of country on leave, or hospitalized, who had MPC stored in unit field safes. Current provisions indicating that conversion will be documented on Application for Special Conversion upon return of the member are adequate, as many personnel do not return from out of country hospitalization or emergency leave. Also, prolonged tactical operations of a single unit in certain cases precluded timely conversion of all members.

RECOMMENDATION. Personnel should receive an orientation on conversion procedures not less frequently than quarterly. Conversion officers should be required to familiarize themselves with pertinent regulations immediately upon being placed on orders as collection officer. Recently assigned personnel who have not had time to familiarize themselves with procedures should not be given duties as collection officers. Finally, when possible, stand downs should be scheduled to permit timely and complete conversion of all MPC of all personnel within the authorized conversion period.

(2) (U) Team Training.

OBSERVATION. During this period it became evident that VHF and HF teams were not establishing communication systems as rapidly as desired. This was primarily due to lack of team-training.
EVALUATION. On several occasions a lack of team proficiency delayed the establishment of critical VHF and HF systems. In an attempt to improve technical proficiency and responsiveness, two VHF teams moved to the perimeter of Dong Tam base and established a VHF system with the 9th Signal Battalion relay located at Vung Tau. Two complete antennas were erected by each van and both organic stocks of equipment operationally checked. The next day the two teams installed the system using different frequencies and antenna polarization. Several of the HF teams also underwent similar training and established communications with the Radio Teletypewriter Van operating in the Division Administration-Logistics Net located at Vung Tau. Not only was valuable practical experience obtained by this training program but all equipment was checked and faulty components identified and turned in for maintenance.

RECOMMENDATIONS. Prior to committing any signal material a complete operational check must be conducted to insure the readiness of both equipment and personnel.

(3) Training of Newly Arrived Medical Officers

OBSERVATION. Newly arrived medical officers are inexperienced in diagnosis and treatment of tropical skin diseases.

EVALUATION. Since skin disease is the most important cause of non-effectiveness in the 9th Infantry Division, this deficiency in medical care has serious consequences. The physicians are unable to provide effective care, to train their corpsmen or to advise their commanders in preventive measures. The three important skin diseases are ring worm, infections and immersion foot. Since early August, the Division Surgeons Office reinforced by COL W.A. Akers, Chief Dermatology Division AMED, and Professor David Taplin, Assistant Professor of Dermatology, University of Miami Medical School, have conducted an extensive four day course in diagnosis and treatment of the common skin diseases. The results of improved treatment are already apparent.

RECOMMENDATION. That the above mentioned procedures be followed for other special problem areas.

(4) Determining Rate of March on Rivers

OBSERVATION. A requirement exists to accurately predict arrival times at destinations for river movements.
EVALUATION. Starting in early August, arrival times were scheduled much more accurately than before. A number of variables must be known before an arrival time can be accurately determined. The most difficult problem to solve is the determination of the speed at which the gun barges can be pushed. The rate of march determines departure time. Affecting rate of march are the following variables:

(a) Vessel engine status.
(b) Tide direction.
(c) Current strength.
(d) Time of year (high water months compared to low water months).
(e) Drainage direction of small canals emptying into two or more rivers.

RECOMMENDATION. To compute an accurate march and arrival time, the system described below is most efficient. For example, to determine a departure time and rate of march from Dong Tam to Sa Dec, the following computations must be made:

(a) Tide direction during move: Outgoing
(b) Time of year: High water month (Oct).
(c) Current strength.
(d) Speed: This is based on experience for the given variables in the Evaluation. In this instance, it would be 7250 meters per hour.
(e) Suitable Engine RPM: 1100.
(f) Distance to Travel: 62,500 meters.
(g) Travel Time: 6 hours 40 minutes.

(c) Anchor Configuration.

OBSERVATION. A requirement exists for better anchorage.

EVALUATION. a. Anchor configuration and layout has been changed to meet a different Fire Support Base configuration. The Helicopter
Barge has been relocated between the starboard and port quarters of the Battalion CP and Brigade Commo vessels. This configuration, although harder to lash up, keeps the helicopter Barge from turning around on an outgoing tide. (See Diagram #1) The bows of the boats, only drawing two and a half feet of water, are easily extracted during outgoing tides. The Helicopter Barge anchored over 40 feet from shore, never touches bottom unless tactical considerations require that the entire CP complex "dry out."

b. Anchor layout is as shown in Diagram #2. Additional anchors have been requested to implement a layout as shown in Diagram #3. Under present anchor availability, lone boats have to tie up together. The currents are extremely fast in portions of the delta and the boats are torn away from shore frequently, particularly when backing down from shore on an outgoing tide. The anchor layout shown in Diagram #3 would minimize the instances of the anchor dragging.

c. Specific places in the Delta have river currents approaching six knots. Currents of this velocity against an LCM-8, cannot be consistently handled by one lightweight 75 pound anchor. Usually anchorages do not cause too much difficulty. However, to insure a capability to handle all situations the following is recommended.

RECOMMENDATION. Each boat should have two 75 pound lightweight Danworth Anchors. Heavier anchors would prove too difficult to handle in the waist-deep rice paddys.

d. Intelligence

(1) (C) TO Gas Mask

OBSERVATION. Recent capture and further testing of the newer type VC issue gas mask indicates the capability to sustain normal breathing for a mean period of 15 minutes following contact with CS.

EVALUATION. Enemy discovered by "People Sniffer" missions are able to remain undetected within their bunkers despite the employment of CS on their positions. Therefore, the tactical employment of CS following a significant "People Sniffer" reading does not sufficiently recon a treeline, or determine the presence or absence of an enemy so equipped with this mask.

RECOMMENDATION. That Infantry elements are physically needed on the ground to make a cautious, complete check of the suspected enemy location. However, the use of CS should continue in the event that the enemy forces engaged do not have gas masks.
Diagram #1

- BN FDC
- BN CP
- Helicopter Barge
- BDE Commo
- BDE POW
DIAGRAM #3

CP COMPLEX

BATTERY COMPLEX

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(2) (C) Interdiction of Routes

OBSERVATION. Interdiction of supply and commo liaison routes is quite difficult without using a system of checkpoints. The enemy has frequently conducted convoys during the day, as well as at night, without being observed.

EVALUATION. None.

RECOMMENDATION. That a series of checkpoints be developed along heavily traveled rivers and canals, using PBR's or similar small boats, to prevent such unchallenged freedom of movement.

(3) (C) VC Tactics Against the Encirclement.

OBSERVATION. In late August and early September, the enemy continued to maintain company and battalion size locations, spread over a one or two kilometer area. Engaging the enemy in large groups, the 1st Brigade’s encirclement/pile-on tactics proved highly effective. However, once the enemy deployed his elements over a four to six kilometer area, the same tactics became significantly less effective. Also, once the enemy dispersed his elements over large areas, 1st Brigade encirclement forces were sometimes subjected to fire and mortar attack from outside the sealing circle.

EVALUATION. Enemy forces using this tactic have met with considerable success in preventing encirclement of units larger than a platoon.

RECOMMENDATION. That friendly forces employing an encirclement against an enemy force exercise caution in the disposition of their forces so as to prevent enemy breakout through thinly-held positions. Further, that a reaction force be readily available to counter any thrust from within and without the sealing circle.

e. Logistics

(1) (C) Reducing refueling, rearming time for Helicopters during Brigade operations.

OBSERVATION. A continual problem during brigade operations is the time required for helicopters to return from forward areas to fixed installations for refueling and rearming.

EVALUATION. Use of portable refuel systems and temporary rearm points
at forward locations to support brigade operations can cut from 15 to 30 minutes from the normal time required for refueling/rearming. However, to conserve fuel during lulls in the tactical situation, aircraft should return to fixed installations for refueling.

RECOMMENDATION. That maximum use be made of portable helicopter refuel systems and temporary rearm points at forward locations to support brigade operations.

(2) (U) Transfer of Electrical Accounting Machines.

OBSERVATION. During the movement of the Personnel Services Division from Bearcat to Dong Tam, IBM and UNIVAC equipment experienced internal damage to their operational components.

EVALUATION. Electrical Accounting Machines are intricate and complicated pieces of equipment. It is felt that over-exposure to dust and dirt, bumpy roads and excessive movement of this equipment, as experienced through transfer from one site to another, causes major internal difficulties which require the assistance of professional repair personnel from the Saigon or Long Binh areas.

RECOMMENDATION. The movement of EAM Equipment should be held to a bare minimum to prevent loss of costly machine and man hours.

(3) (C) Airmobile Water Points.

OBSERVATION. The Airmobile 600 GPH Water Purification Unit is being deployed without filters.

EVALUATION. The 600 GPH Water Purification Unit is being sent to the units from depot without the filter unit being included in the shipment. This filter is required for operation of the unit.

RECOMMENDATION. To take steps to insure that the purification units are inspected at depot to insure that all component parts are present before shipment and allow the stockage of spare parts at the using unit level.

(4) (C) Case 450 Airmobile Dozer.

OBSERVATION. Case 450 dozer is constantly deadlined for a broken ring gear.
EVALUATION. The ring gear in the Case 450 tractor is constantly breaking down because it is incapable of handling the torque transfer from engine to drive shaft. To this date, it has not been determined whether this situation occurs only when shifting from forward to reverse and vice versa or, as operators and supervisors contend, during normal operation.

RECOMMENDATION. Conduct further inquiries as to reason for breakdown. If it is a result of operator error, to take steps to inform operators of proper operating techniques. If in fact the ring gear is defective, to make studies for new design or material to make the gear more durable.

(5) (U) Chain Saw Parts.

OBSERVATION. The Remington Chain Saw is continually becoming inoperable because of starter rewind breaks.

EVALUATION. This situation has limited rapid completion of many jobs because repair parts are difficult to obtain.

RECOMMENDATION. The DS maintenance activity should keep a large stock of these repair parts on hand, or develop the capability of repairing the starter rewind.

(6) (U) Consolidated Signal Maintenance.

OBSERVATION. Each of three line companies of the 9th Signal Battalion are authorized a communications and electronics (C&E) maintenance section to perform organizational maintenance. The MOS structure of each section is basically the same and in reality provides more of a team capability rather than a full section capability. In addition, MOS’s in the Signal Battalion are the same as in the Direct Support Unit (DSU). Due to various administrative commitments, i.e., KP, guard, Latrine detail, etc, personnel would be drawn from the company C&E maintenance shop rendering the facility almost inoperative.

EVALUATION. The mission of the C&E maintenance shop is to support the organic communications equipment of the Signal Battalion. To accomplish the mission, efficient use of the personnel assigned electronic maintenance MOS’s is of prime importance. In addition, when a replacement with an MOS of 31L40, 31L20, 31E20, 36G20, or 31J20 arrives at the Division, he can be assigned either to the
Signal Battalion or at DSU, depending upon the personnel vacancies of the organisation. The Signal Battalion in fact receives personnel with equivalent training and experience to that of the personnel assigned to the DSU. This gives the Signal Battalion the level of proficiency to perform a higher level of maintenance. However, by TO&E, the Signal Battalion can requisition only organizational maintenance parts.

In order to obtain maximum use of the C&E personnel, the Signal Battalion has taken the following action.

(a) The C&E maintenance personnel from each company were consolidated into one C&E maintenance facility. The consolidation enables the shop to operate more uniformly, effectively, and efficiently. The personnel are still being used on details as mentioned above, however, their absence from duty does not affect the operation of the shop as it had in the past.

(b) The Signal Battalion requested authorization to requisition Direct Support (DS) level repair parts. The request was approved by Division and at present the Signal Battalion C&E maintenance shop is providing the Signal Battalion with a DS level maintenance capability on AN/TSC-24, AN/TCC-7, and other selected items.

The action taken in (a) above has enabled the Signal Battalion to greatly reduce the handling time and down time of deadline equipment in the Battalion.

RECOMMENDATION. No doubt the problems encountered by the 9th Signal Battalion have been experienced by other Signal Battalions. The maintenance problems of C&E equipment could be greatly reduced if the Signal Battalions were given the DS or 3d echelon maintenance capability on organic equipment.

(? C) Inadequacy of Organisational Maintenance Considerations in MEF Land-Based Operations.

OBSERVATION. When MEF units are deployed for land based operation and are provided equipment on loan such as vehicles, no provision has been made to provide a corresponding organizational maintenance capability.
EVALUATION. Organisational mechanics, manuals, tools and PLL or repair parts must accompany equipment issued to MRF land based units. Repeated, high nonavailability rates for wheel vehicles, cooking stoves and other equipment were directly attributed to lack of organisational maintenance capability. There were no repair parts on hand prior to operations and almost none were requested during operations. There were no manuals available and no tools, making it virtually impossible to provide even a semblance of an organisational maintenance program. Operations were hindered because of deadlined equipment. In addition, the mission of the 709th Maintenance Battalion was impaired because, in order to provide operable equipment to meet MRF unit mission requirements personnel and equipment from the maintenance battalion were used on site on numerous occasions to perform organisational maintenance and DS repairs of failures which could have been prevented.

RECOMMENDATION. When vehicles and other non-TOE equipment is taken from other units to provide capability for MRF land based operations, appropriate organisational maintenance capability must accompany the equipment, to include, mechanics, manuals, tools and repair parts. Commanders of using units must thereafter be responsible for organisational maintenance to include PLL supervision and timely submission of proper requirements to 709th Maintenance Battalion for DS repair. Using units should designate maintenance supervisors including a maintenance officer. Preventive maintenance programs such as motor stables should also be initiated and emphasised by Commanders of using units.

f. (U) Organization

OBSERVATION. Divisional company/troop size aviation units "an improve mission accomplishment by adding an organic direct support capability.

EVALUATION. An increase in maintenance personnel coupled with the addition of a direct support capability at the unit level provides a very responsive maintenance program. It allows the unit commander to establish maintenance priority in consonance with mission requirements. More parts are maintained at the unit level allowing a wider latitude of repair parts immediately available to the commander. The delays normally associated with evacuating an aircraft to the direct support unit are not encountered.

RECOMMENDATION. That the decentralised maintenance structure be adopted to provide direct support maintenance capability at the unit level.
SU&JECT:  Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

g.  (C) Other

1)  (C) Signal: Use of a PRC-25 Radio from a Helicopter.

OBSERVATION. Complex operations frequently require simultaneous use of more radio nets than are normally available on a command and control helicopter. Often utility or light observation helicopters are used as command and control aircraft.

EVALUATION. An antenna which will allow a PRC-25 to operate effectively from a helicopter may be constructed using a nine foot length of RG-8 cable, six feet of UG-58 coaxial cable and insulator.

(a) Strip the length of RG-8 cable of its insulation and copper mesh. Cut the cable in half and attach both halves of the RG-8 cable to the insulator.

(b) Attach one end of the length of UG-58 cable to the insulator and the other to the radio.

(c) Place the length of RG-8 cable between the skids of the helicopter.

(d) The effective range of the radio is increased by using this type of antenna in place of the three foot whip antenna.

RECOMMENDATION. That the above mentioned antenna be studied for possible installation on all utility and light observation helicopters.

2)  (U) Testing the AN/GRC-163.

OBSERVATION. The Radio Terminal Set AN/GRC-163 which is due to be issued to the 9th Infantry Division, contains a significant defect which will adversely affect the operation of these sets when issued.

EVALUATION. The AN/GRC-163 is a radio telephone-teletype terminal system which provides four channels of voice communication and two channels of teletype communication to a distant terminal. This system can either be vehicular, trailer, or ground mounted and communications between stations is possible at ranges up to 35 miles. Approximately forty of these sets will be issued to the 9th Division in the near future.
On 20 September 1968, the 9th Signal Battalion was issued two Radio Terminal Sets AN/GRC-163's for installation in appropriate configurations and field testing. One radio was installed in a 1/2 ton vehicle and the other in a 1/4 ton trailer. Subsequent testing revealed that operations from a whip and counterpoise antenna were satisfactory. When erection of the Log-Periodic Antenna was attempted, mast sections were bent almost double. It was determined that the log-periodic antenna was too heavy thus causing the bending of the mast sections. Testing revealed that communications were excellent when employing these antennas at reduced height.

RECOMMENDATION. When using the log-periodic antennas with the AN/GRC-163 extreme care must be taken not to raise the antennas over a height of thirty feet.

(3) (U) Quality Control in the Photo Laboratory.

OBSERVATION. The photographic prints released from the 9th Signal Battalion Photo Laboratory have not been of the highest quality. In the past, prints have been released showing scratches, dust spots, excessive grain, or improper focus.

EVALUATION. A majority of the imperfections on photo productions can be eliminated by more careful handling of all prints by processing personnel. Scratches can be controlled by extremely careful handling and storage of negatives and proper preparation of developing solutions. Some scratches which occur as a result of dust in the camera cannot be completely controlled but can be minimized by proper operator's maintenance procedures in keeping cameras clean. Dust spots on final prints can be controlled by maintaining dust-free dryers and overall dust control within the laboratory processing area. Excessive grain imperfections are caused by enlarging 35mm film. This has been controlled by minimizing the amount of cropping of 35mm photos thereby reducing the negative to final print ratio in the enlarging process. Focusing imperfections have primarily resulted from improper focusing procedures used by photographers and faulty range finders on cameras. This has been controlled by emphasizing training of photographers and frequent checking of range finder performance. Overall improvement in quality output of photographs has been achieved by the implementation of a quality control program within the Photo Laboratory. This program prevents release of photographs with imperfections that can be corrected. Specific causes of imperfections are pinpointed and responsible photographers or laboratory personnel corrected on-the-spot.
RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that all photo facilities institute a quality control program within the laboratory. This program should direct efforts toward determining specific causes of photo imperfections and taking necessary actions for preventing these imperfections.
3. (C) Section 3, Lessons Learned from Employment of Tactical Cover, Decoy, and Evasion.

a. (C) False Extractions.

OBSERVATION. The use of false extractions has been a successful means of placing ambush units into their area of operation.

EVALUATION. In order to be effective it is necessary for ambush patrols to be inserted into an area of operation (AO) without their presence being disclosed to the enemy. One of the most effective means employed to produce the desired deception is to insert the ambush unit with another force and later, during the extraction phase, to conduct a false extraction of the ambush force. To produce the desired effect, it is imperative that the number of aircraft employed be the same as used for the insertion of both elements. Dummy radio transmissions to cover a second extraction should be used along with the usual smoke markings. This method is most effective during periods of reduced visibility. The stay behind ambush force must remain in a concealed position during the extraction phase in order not to disclose their presence and move to the ambush location after dark or by a covered route during daylight hours.

RECOMMENDATION. That deception techniques used to produce a false extraction be further refined to allow the insertion of elements without the enemy having knowledge of the stay-behind force.

b. (C) General Deceptive Measures.

OBSERVATION. Passive deception measures can easily be used during normal operational planning and during the conduct of the operation.

EVALUATION. Tactical surprise is rarely achieved when early coordination is effected for AOs and specified strike zones. Early coordination and dissemination of operation plans provide the enemy with increased opportunity to obtain advance knowledge of the intended target or AO. Once an operation is initiated, movement of the river assault craft to and within the AO must be deceptive. The MRF employs a variety of deceptive measures to deny the enemy advance knowledge of its operations. New techniques employed are:

(1) Varying the pattern of operations by changing the times of attacks. Predawn landings as well as midday landings are initiated to alter the pattern of attacks.

(2) Requesting several AOs or an extremely large AO for each operation planned.

(3) Relocating the MRB several kilometers from the immediate AO during tactical operations.
(4) Deceptive movement of river assault craft to and throughout waterways not within the actual AO.

(5) Deploying maneuver battalions into the AO prior to the establishment of a fire support base. This requires coordination for employment of ARVN or US artillery fire support for the maneuver battalions until the Brigade direct support artillery has established its fire support base.

(6) Collaborating with sector and district advisors to disseminate deceptive information.

(7) Submitting an AG through ARVN channels under one name and referring to it by another name during the conduct of the operation.

c. (C) Publication of a False Operations Order:

OBSERVATION: Analysis of certain operations seems to indicate that specific information concerning the tactical plan was known by the VC force.

EVALUATION: It is rarely possible to determine at exactly what point in planning, coordination and publication cycles a compromise occurs. Therefore it is considered a valuable practice to publish and distribute a completely false operation order, and at the same time plan an operation to be executed in the same time frame but in a different area. However, the total deception value of such a practice has thus far been unevaluated.

RECOMMENDATION. That this method of deception be considered during operations.

FRANK L. GUNN
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Commander

19 Incl. - wd, Hq, DA
1. 9th Inf Div Organization
   1.1 Week Organization and Unit
   1.2 Locations
2. Roster of Key Personnel
3. Tactical Area of Interest (TAO/ I)
4. Personnel and Administration Data
5. Enemy Unit Locations
6. Artillery Support
7. G-F Air Operational Support Chart
8. G-F Tabulated Operations Data
9. IMPACT Support to RF/FR

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15 November 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

10. Base Operations
11. 1st Bde Operation Report—Lessons Learned (ORIL)
12. 24 Bde ORIL
13. 34 Bde ORIL
14. 3-5 Cav ORIL
15. DISCOM ORIL
16. 15th Engn En ORIL
17. 9th Sig En ORIL
18. 9th Inf En ORIL
19. 9th MP Co ORIL
AVFC-RE-H (15 Nov 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ II FORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266 16 DEC 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 9th Infantry Division for the period ending 31 October 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

O. B. FONY
ILT, AGC
Asst AG
1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report–Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division.

2. Comments follow:


   (1) The electronic detector referred to is the AN/P153 metallic detector. ACTIV conducted tests of this detector, the results of which were published in Study and Evaluation of Counter–Mine Activities (SECMA) (U) in Volume 3, Mine Detection, dated 26 September 1968. ACTIV findings isolated the problem of structural weaknesses in the handle, search head and the connecting bolt between the two. Recommendations were made that the appropriate R&D agency should correct this structural weakness in the P153.

   (2) Reference item concerning training of CONUS replacements in mine detection equipment. Army Subject Schedule 5-12A10 provides for a 22 hour block of instruction in Land Mine Warfare. This headquarters will correspond with the Engineer School and Fort Leonard Wood to determine actual lesson time being devoted to training on the P153 detector.

   (3) Reference the lightweight mine detector used by the marines (Ordnance Locator Mark 15). This detector was tested by the III MAF in Vietnam, and the test results were included in Volume 3 of SECMA. The Mark 15 was recommended for adoption as a standard item and this headquarters will continue to monitor its development and standardization.

b. Reference item concerning use of a PRC-25 radio from a helicopter, page 64, paragraph 2g(1): Nonconcur. Any cable placed between the skids of a helicopter creates a hazardous condition during landing and takeoff operations. A configuration under development
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

for test and evaluation by a USAECOM field team is being designed to provide sufficient facilities for rapid installation of portable tactical radios for use while temporarily operating from a helicopter.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ II FFV
HQ 9th Inf Div
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 9th Inf Div for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. I. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
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