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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (3 Mar 69)

FOR OT UT 684350

10 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

AD 500764

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

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 KENNETH G. WICKHAM
 Major General, USA
 The Adjutant General
 APR 14 1969


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US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

AVCA CRB-GO-0

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-0,
APO San Francisco 96384
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT,
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section I - Operations: Significant Activities.

a. ACofS, Personnel and Administration

(1) Personnel Management:

(a) Civilianization Program 6 was implemented during this period. In August all positions being civilianized were established with the Civilian Personnel Offices for recruitment action. By 31 October 1968, 826 employees had been hired which is 71% of the command objective of 1162 Local National employees. The overall average does not reflect the unfavorable hiring rate for semi-skilled (45%) and skilled (13%) positions.

(b) The Command's Local National direct hire authorization increased from 1214 spaces to 2360 spaces. The primary reason for this increase was the implementation of the TDA for US Army Depot, Cam Ranh and the authorization for additional Local Nationals in the proposed MTDA for the Depot. Direct hire spaces in the Depot were increased from 182 to 1328 by these actions.

(c) The US Army Depot, Cam Ranh was organized under a TDA on 1 August 1968 by USARPAC GO 369 dated 29 July 1968. On 1 September 1968, 19 TOE units which had formerly performed the Depot mission were inactivated.

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(d) The following unit status changes occurred between 1 August 1968 and 31 October 1968:

(1) Gains: US Army Depot, Cam Ranh (Implementation of TDA)
14th TC Det (BARC)
61st TC Co (-) (Med Trk)
172nd TC Co (Med Trk)
522nd TC Det (BARC)
554th TC Det (BARC)

(2) Losses: US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay
3rd CS Detachment (DFU)
14th TC Detachment (BARC)
31st CS Company (Hvy Matrl Supply)
53rd CS Company (Gen Sup)
96th CS Battalion (Sup & Ser)
96th CS Detachment (DFU)
194th QM Detachment (Reefer Rpr)
195th QM Detachment (Reefer Trk)
239th QM Company (Service)
273rd Engr Detachment (Supply)
278th CS Battalion (Sup & Ser)
423rd CS Company (Rpr Parts)
504th CS Field Depot
522nd TC Detachment (BARC)
532nd CS Battalion (Sup & Ser)
539th CS Company (Rpr Parts)
548th CS Company (Gen Sup)
554th TC Detachment (BARC)
561st QM Detachment (Reefer Trk)
563rd QM Detachment (Reefer Trk)
575th CS Company (Gen Supply)
588th TC Company (Depot Trans)
855th CS Detachment (Signal Depot)

(2) Personnel Services Division:

(a) The recent 1968 Joint Annual Campaign for Army Emergency Relief and the Army Relief Society has come to a successful conclusion. Of a USARV total of \$219,999.98, the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay contribution was \$20,809.70.

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(b) A program for review of morale indicators throughout the command has been instituted. This review will obtain data on each company size unit concerning the number of incidents occurring within that unit in order to identify units which have an actual or potential morale problem. The Morale Survey will obtain data pertaining to number of AWOL's, Courts-Martial, Article 15's, and accidents as well as clubs and messes, day room facilities, special services facilities and re-enlistments.

(c) The remains of 154 US Armed Forces personnel and Free World Military Assistant Forces personnel were processed through USASUPCOM-CRB collecting points during the period 1 August through 31 October 1968.

(d) As a result of Conversion Day, 21 October 1968, post exchanges, concessions and clubs were closed most of the day. There were PX facilities in Nha Trang which did not reopen until the afternoon of 22 October. Unit mess facilities remained operational in all areas with cash collections on a credit basis as required. There were no delays of personnel due to depart on R&R or PCS. While G-Day caused delays and interruptions to operation schedules, there were no permanent hardships on individuals or significant decline in the morale of the command.

(e) The US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay held its first Morale Council meeting on 29 October 1968 for the purpose of assessing the morale and welfare posture of the command and to make recommendations to improve the effectiveness and prestige of all enlisted personnel assigned or attached. The council reviewed the initial results of the Morale Survey and the minutes of the morale councils of each subordinate command. Of particular concern to the council was the expansion of recreational facilities, initiation of board proceedings against habitual military offenders who are causing morale problems within units, and the recognition and promotion of individuals within units who are performing in a superior manner.

(3) Civil Affairs:

(a) During the period 1 May through 31 October 1968, a total of 44 units of this command participated in 225 projects; 34 of these projects were completed with the majority of the remainder being of a continuous nature. The average number of monthly projects was 75.

(b) USASUPCOM-CRB contributed \$8,077.00 in supplies and equipment in direct support of the GVN Recovery Program. This included direct support to the victims of aggression and support to the GVN in their pacification and nation building effort.

(c) During a campaign to clean up Cam Ranh Village, it was noted that most of the people of the village needed plague shots. Representatives of the village suggested that they be allowed to organize and administer

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the inoculations, with serum furnished by the US Army. On 9 September 1968, the village, under its own supervision, administered 4,150 plague shots to the residents in a major effort to prevent an outbreak of plague.

(d) During this period an intensive inoculation program was instituted in Cam Ranh City, with the 176th Veterinary Detachment administering rabies inoculations to 1,907 animals. This was accomplished in a minimum time thus eliminating the possibility of a major outbreak of rabies in the Cam Ranh City area.

(e) As another means to increase the proficiency of the local Vietnamese employees within USASUPCOM-CRB, 10 English classes, with a total of 175 students, were conducted. As an adjunct to the English classes, OJT was provided in the following skill areas: Interpreters, cooks, carpenters, paramedical techniques, veterinary medicine, painters, nurses aides, etc.

(f) During the period USASUPCOM-CRB gave material assistance to the following number of institutions:

(1) Schools	31
(2) Hospitals/Dispensaries	30
(3) Orphanages	24

(g) Trung Thu or Mid-autumn Festival was held on 6 October 1968. Trung Thu is mainly a celebration for children. USASUPCOM-CRB contributed approximately \$700.00 for gifts for children of Cam Ranh City.

(h) Of significant importance for the population of Cam Ranh City area were the veterinary training programs conducted by the 176th Veterinary Detachment. Many of the hamlets were visited and on-the-spot training was given to the people in the care and treatment of cattle within the area.

(4) Adjutant General:

(a) Awards and decorations: During this quarters, the following awards were processed by this command and forwarded to 1st Logistical Command for approval, except Certificates of Achievement, which are approved at this headquarters.

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Legion of Merit	3	3	4	10
Bronze Star	70	27	43	140
Air Medal	0	0	0	0
Army Commendation Medal	78	35	34	147
Purple Heart	2	0	0	2
Certificate of Achievement	<u>113</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>143</u>
	266	84	92	442

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(b) Strength of Command:

(1) 1 Aug 68: 11,349 (OFF: 492 WO: 115 EM: 10,742)

(2) 31 Oct 68: 10,476 (OFF: 527 WO: 124 EM: 9,825)

(3) Gains and Losses: AUG SEP OCT

Gains:	420	1376	1262
Losses:	1474	1312	1145

(c) Reenlistments: See Inclosure 1.

(d) Testing Status: See Inclosure 2.

(e) Congressional Inquires received within the command by month:

	<u>Number Received</u>	<u>Interim Replies</u>	<u>Final Replies</u>
August	22	16	22
September	25	7	25
October	26	18	18

(f) Casualty Reports: See Inclosure 3.

(g) Promotions: See Inclosure 4.

(h) Distinguished Visitors: See Inclosure 5.

b. ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations:

(1) Security and Intelligence Division (S&I):

(a) Clearance Actions: During the reporting period, a total of 401 requests for personnel security actions were received and a total of 475 clearances granted. As of 31 October 1968, 67 clearance actions were pending. An annual review of command clearance actions is approximately 80% complete. A composite clearance roster for Cam Ranh Bay Support Command will be published by 1 January 1969.

(b) Document Security: During the quarter, USASUPCOM-CRB regulations 380-5 and 604-5 were published and disseminated to all subordinate elements. These revised regulations contain more specific guidance and direction in areas where security violations frequently occur. In mid-October, S&I Division initiated a command wide program to eliminate the most prevalent of security violations, improper paragraph and group markings. Commanders and Security Control Officers were required to insure that all correspondence contained proper classification and group markings.

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(c) Alerts: During the quarter, three practice alerts were conducted with emphasis given to improving notification procedures and reaction force deployment. The reassignment of the 191st Ordnance Battalion, 68th Maintenance Battalion, and 262nd Quartermaster Battalion to Support Command Headquarters required slight alterations in alert notification charts and procedures. Prior to the effective date of transfer, these units had been added to the CRBSAC alert net and plans formulated to place these units on the CRBSAC simultaneous alert notification telephone.

(2) Plans and Training Division (P&T)

(a) Replacement Training:

(1) Average monthly attendance at Replacement Training was 800. Decline in figures was due to lower input of Replacement Personnel. Continuous command interest is being stressed to insure that all untrained personnel are brought to the attention of this headquarters in order that additional classes may be scheduled for the assigned personnel not previously trained.

(2) The following courses of instruction were conducted during the past quarter: Course of Instruction Dates

Remedial DS Maintenance Tng	4 Aug 68 - 26 Aug 68
Project Counter IV PLL and ASL	1 Aug 68 - 29 Oct 68
Packing and Preservation Tng Course	9 Sep 68 - 27 Sep 68

(b) Force Development:

(1) During the reporting period, the following moves were made among troop units of USASUPCOM-CRB: 633rd C&S Company transferred from CRB to DMG at zero strength.

(2) During the reporting period, the following units were gained by this command:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Auth Str</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Assigned To</u>
14th TC Detachment (BARC)	46	CRB	10th TC Battalion
61st TC Company (Med Trk)	137	CRB	262nd QM Battalion
172nd TC Company (Med Trk)	183	CRB	36th TC Battalion
522nd TC Detachment (BARC)	47	CRB	10th TC Battalion
554th TC Detachment (BARC)	52	CRB	10th TC Battalion
US Army Depot, Cam Ranh (TDA)	2997	CRB	USASUPCOM-CRB

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(3) During the period the following units of this command were inactivated:

3rd CS Detachment (DFU)	504th CS Field Depot
14th TC Detachment (BARC)	522nd TC Detachment (BARC)
31st CS Company (Hvy Matrl Supply)	532nd CS Battalion (Sup & Ser)
53rd CS Company (Gen Sup)	539th CS Company (Rpr Parts)
96th CS Battalion (Sup & Ser)	548th CS Company (Gen Sup)
96th CS Detachment (DFU)	554th TC Detachment (BARC)
194th QM Detachment (Reefer Rpr)	561st QM Detachment (Reefer Trk)
195th QM Detachment (Reefer Trk)	563rd QM Detachment (Reefer Trk)
239th QM Company (Service)	575th CS Company (Gen Supply)
273rd Engr Detachment (Sup & Ser)	588th TC Company (Depot Trans)
278th CS Battalion (Sup & Ser)	855th CS Detachment (Signal Depot)
423rd CS Company (Rpr Parts)	

(4) During the period no units scheduled for USASUPCOM-CRB were diverted.

(3) Operations:

(a) The following tactical operations were supported by USASUPCOM-CRB during the period of this report:

(1) Operation McLean: A search and destroy operation which began 15 July 1968 and continues in the Southern Provinces of II CTZ, with Headquarters, Task Force South, located in Dalat, by the 3rd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Brigade; 173rd Airmobile Infantry Brigade; 101st Air Cavalry Division; and 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery. This operation was supported by the following logistical operations.

(a) FSA Phan Thiet - This Forward Support Area continues to provide supply point distribution of Class I, III, IV supplies; unit distribution of fast moving II and IV items; laundry, bath and graves registration services and direct support maintenance. During this reporting period, the size of this FSA was reduced from 104 to 87 persons.

(b) Bao Loc Forward Support Element (FSE) - Originally designated as Task Force Tomlinson, it continues to provide the same type of services as a Forward Support Area, except on a smaller scale. The operation at Bao Loc has expanded from 36 to 62 total personnel. They are almost at the same level of activity as a FSA. It is supplied by land and air LOC.

(2) Operation Bolling: A search and destroy operation began on 19 September 1968 and continues in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa Provinces by the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, 173rd Infantry Battalion (Abn). This operation is partially supported by limited unit distribution of all classes of supply, bath, and graves registration services and direct support maintenance from Tuy Hoa Subarea Command.

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(3) Operation MacArthur South - A search and destroy operation began on 13 July 1968 and continues in Darlac Province by the 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. This operation is supported by FSA Ban Me Thuot with supply point distribution of Class I, III, and V supplies, unit distribution of fast moving II and IV items, laundry, bath and graves registration services and limited direct support maintenance. To support the buildup and sustain the continuing operations around Ban Me Thuot, USASUPCOM-CRB scheduled resupply convoys at a frequency of three per week until operations were disrupted on 18 Oct 68 by Typhoon Hester. During the period of this report a total of 21 resupply convoys were completed to Ban Me Thuot, as compared to six convoys for the preceding reporting period.

(4) Americal Division - During the reporting period, this command continued to serve as the primary depot for Class V and bulk Class IV supplies in support of the Americal Division operating in Northern II Corps Tactical Zone while USASUPCOM-QHN supported other commodity requirements.

(5) Republic of Korea Army Operations in II Corps Tactical Zone (South) continues to be supported primarily by supply point distribution of Class I, III, and V supplies from PRLSA, NTSAC and CRBSAC; and unit distribution of Class II and IV items from US Army Depot CRB. During the period of the report, this command furnished Ninh Hoa with daily reefer van service and completed 44 convoys of Class I, II, IV and V to that location. With an increase in the operation of the rail system from Phan Rang to Ninh Hoa, these vitally needed truck assets will be returned for line haul commitments. The rail system was established during this period, first being utilized on 1 October 1968.

(6) Air Drop Operations: During the reporting period the 109th Aerial Delivery Company continued its mission in support of tactical units throughout RVN by air dropping a total of 1,325 short tons of critically needed supplies. Of that total, 319S/T were free dropped, impact igniting, 55 gallon drums of Diesel Fuel and JP-4, (Scatter and Bannish Beach Missions), 79 S/T were dropped by the Combat Delivery System and 507 S/T were dropped by the ARC LAPES System. During this period the 109th jointly rigged with the Air Force 220 S/T that were dropped using the experimental 1528 LAPES System, a new type of Air Force Aerial Delivery System that enables the aircraft to come in low over the drop zone to avoid enemy fire. The 623rd Aerial Equipment Repair and Depot Company continued its high rate of recovery, classification and repair of air items during the reporting period and completely rewarehoused Warehouses 63, 80, and an outside storage area in the Cam Ranh Bay Depot.

(c) Logistical Operations:

(1) USASUPCOM-CRB continued its assignment mission of back-up support of all classes of supply to the other Support Commands in 1st Logistical Command.

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(2) This command moved an unprecedented amount of cargo by line haul operations:

No. Convoys	Destination	S/T Dry Cargo	Gallons POL
21	Ban Me Thuot	6610	2,083,100
3	Bao Loc	609	247,600
6	Dalat	937	192,500
1	Phan Thiet	300	215,000

All convoy planning to include security, cargo priorities, monitoring of bookings and allocation of Transportation assets was controlled from the Logistical Operations Center (LOCC). Each convoy was personally inspected by a member of this headquarters prior to departure and copies of cargo manifests were forwarded to convoy destinations by air to insure smooth offloading and rapid turnaround.

(3) The logistical operations at Ban Me Thuot and Bao Loc attained full activity during this period. The 21 convoys to Ban Me Thuot virtually opened highway 21 to normal traffic and convoy operations became routine. The increased line haul commitment placed a severe strain on the transportation assets of this command. The availability of the 512th TC Co (Lt Trk) TDY from USASUPCOM-QHN from 10 Sep to 30 Oct 68, eased this strain and the assignment of the 172nd TC Co (Med Trk) (Program 6) will increase the command line haul capability substantially. In spite of the increased line haul requirements versus limited resources, customer requirements continue to be satisfied.

(4) Typhoon Hester disrupted the resupply activities of this command from 18 Oct to 1 Nov 68. Aerial resupply was disrupted only for the period of the storm itself. Resupply by land was completely eliminated due to bridge washouts, landslides and severe flooding. Line haul operations south to Phan Rang were suspended until 25 Oct 68 and north to Ban Me Thuot until 2 Nov 68. During this period critical shortages of Class I, III, and V at Ban Me Thuot were filled by air and convoy operations from Pleiku to Ban Me Thuot conducted by USASUPCOM-QHN. A contingency plan is presently under development by USASUPCOM-QHN for the emergency resupply of Ban Me Thuot should weather again preclude line haul resupply from Cam Ranh Bay.

(5) During the period of the report, the LOCC coordinated a total of 54 combat essential and emergency resupply missions. This represents a significant reduction in the number of missions from the previous quarter (104) caused primarily by the growth of the Ban Me Thuot and Bao Loc forward support operations and improved management of resources. The LOCC also coordinated all air drop missions, convoy security requirements, and deployment of supporting units.

(6) During the period this headquarters was tasked to provide necessary logistical support and to expedite the deployment of the 6th Battalion (HAWK), 71st Artillery from Cam Ranh Bay to CONUS. The

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support requirement was received from 1st Logistical Command on 27 August 1968, and on 8 October 1968 all deployable equipment of the unit was enroute to CONUS aboard the Sea Train Carolina.

(7) A functional facility for the receipt, storage, issue and maintenance of Duffle Bag equipment was activated on 1 Aug 68. This program consists of various sensors and readout devices to detect enemy activity. Personnel of this command were trained on Duffle Bag equipment in NKP, Thailand and on site by technical representatives from the manufacturers. The Operations Section of ACofS, SP&O has the responsibility to coordinate all Duffle Bag staff actions. During this period the original name Duck Blind was replaced by the name Duffle Bag. This project has wide scale command interest and during the period the site received over 100 taskings to ship Duffle Bag equipment to tactical units. The Duffle Bag Site has had 50 visitors during the period for briefings and tours of the facility.

c. ACofS, Comptroller

(1) During the periods 29-31 Jul 68 and 24-26 Sep 68, ACofS, Comptroller conducted courses in Introduction to Automatic Data Processing (ADP) for Support Command personnel. The purpose of these courses is to familiarize company grade officers and NCO's E-5 and above with basic operating fundamentals of ADP. The objective is to improve the quality of source documents as input for the Data Processing activities throughout the Command. Sixteen students attended the July course while 13 attended the September course.

(2) Review and Analysis: On 25 July 1968 the 4th Qtr FY 68 Review and Analysis was presented to the Commanding Officer by major subordinate commanders and staff section chiefs. Each participant briefed the commander on significant events that occurred and informed him as to what areas would require command emphasis or action.

(3) Management Improvement-Cost Reduction - USASUPCOM Regulation 11-1 was written by this office to implement the Management Improvement Cost Reduction programs initiated by 1st Log Comd. This regulation gives direction on requirements and responsibilities placed on Staff Sections and Subordinate Commanders of this headquarters.

(4) During the period 20-26 July 1968, ACofS, Comptroller Section conducted an inspection of those ordering officers under the jurisdiction of Cam Ranh Bay Support Command. The purpose of the inspection was to review all procedures and controls to insure that procurement actions and relations with contractor personnel reflected sound judgment, integrity and prosperity. The inspection revealed the following deficiencies which were forwarded to 1st Logistical Command for action:

(a) A specific regulation describing in detail the functions and duties of the ordering officer has not been published.

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(b) Ordering officers were not always able to find three bidders.

(c) There is no control over which bid the ordering officer accepts because he is not required to forward bids on contracts.

d. Director of Ammunition:

(1) Class V Stockage Objectives and quantities on hand at the beginning and end of period in short tons:

(a) General:

<u>Location</u>		<u>Beginning</u>	<u>End</u>
Phan Thiet FSA	Stockage Obj:	557	738
	O/H Balance	765	607
Ban Me Thuot FSA	Stockage Obj:	668	853
	O/H Balance	841	1044
Bao Loc FSE	Stockage Obj:	273	377
	O/H Balance	796	641
Tuy Hoa ASP	Stockage Obj:	6,064	2,258
	O/H Balance	5,560	5,284
Cam Ranh Bay ASD	Stockage Obj:	52,667	59,233
	O/H Balance	65,276	76,096

(b) Discussion: (1) The stockage objectives are based on weapon densities, required supply rates, issue experience, and storage capacity. The Cam Ranh Bay stockage objective includes 30 days of I Corps' 60 day requirement.

(2) The stockage objective at the Phan Thiet FSA was raised during August due to an increase in activity in the area and in weapons supported. The objective will decrease during the coming quarters due to the movement of 155mm howitzers from the Phan Thiet area.

(3) At the Ban Me Thuot FSA, the stockage objective was increased due to support requirements for 8-inch and 175mm weapons. It will be lowered during the coming quarter due to the redeployment of elements of the supported force.

(4) At the Bao Loc FSE, the stockage objective increased from a six to a ten day level due to the uncertainty of weather (for air resupply) and road conditions/openings. The objective will decrease during the coming quarter because the issue experience gained during the past quarter indicates that such a reduction is warranted.

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(5) The substantial decrease at the Tuy Hoa ASP reflects a change from a 60 to a 30 day level along with the elimination of certain slow-moving items from stockage. It is currently under study to reduce the stock level at the Tuy Hoa ASP to approximately 600 tons with the possibility of eliminating it as a 1st Logistical Command storage facility. Ammunition support would then come from Cam Ranh Bay and the storage facility would be used as a storage area for operational/contingency stocks.

(2) Total storage capacity at the beginning and the end of period in short tons:

(a) General:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Beginning of Period</u>	<u>End of Period</u>
Phan Thiet FSA	1,393	1,750
Ban Me Thuot FSA	0	1,960
Bao Loc FSE	986	2,318
Tuy Hoa ASP	13,928	13,928
Cam Ranh Bay ASD	64,871	76,127

(b) Discussion: Storage capability is based on the planning factor of 1 short ton per 14 square feet of storage space. This planning factor is used upon directive of 1st Logistical Command, and represents a change from the factor of 1 short ton per 11 square feet used in previous reports. Construction of three additional pads is currently under way at the Ban Me Thuot FSA which will increase the storage capability there by 536 tons. Planned construction in ASA "Charlie" at Cam Ranh Bay during this fiscal year will increase the storage capacity by approximately 19,000 S/T.

(3) Quantities of Class V received and issued in short tons:

	<u>August</u>		<u>September</u>		<u>October</u>	
	<u>REC</u>	<u>ISS</u>	<u>REC</u>	<u>ISS</u>	<u>REC</u>	<u>ISS</u>
Phan Thiet FSA	855	1,057	804	793	479	661
Ban Me Thuot FSA			1,863	2,446	2,084	1,538
Bao Loc FSE			197	247	319	182
Tuy Hoa ASP	2,162	2,711	2,501	1,721	1,529	2,220
Cam Ranh Bay ASD	27,010	20,107	20,107	14,589	15,378	12,342

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e. Director of General Supply

(1) Class II & VII Supply Point: A Class II and VII Supply Point was established for the Cam Ranh Bay area on 15 September 1968 under operational control of Cam Ranh Bay Subarea Command. This facility will serve retail customers formerly supported by the Cam Ranh Bay Depot. This was part of a series of actions that were required to enable the Depot to reduce its current support mission prior to implementation of the Standard Supply System, Vietnam (3SVN). Similar Supply Points were established previously in Nha Trang and Tuy Hoa to support retail customers in these area.

(a) The Cam Ranh Bay Supply Point will operate as an administrative office with the Cam Ranh Bay Depot making issues at the shipping area until permanent facilities are completed for the Supply Point. This MCA funded project will initially use data processing equipment excess to other 1st Logistical Command requirements.

(b) Data on customers transferring from depot retail support to CRBSAC support was checked for validity during the transfer. It was found that some units had been bypassing the local supply point and carrying their requests directly to the depot. These customers were directed to the supply point which serves the area. The Class II & VII Supply Points at Nha Trang and Tuy Hoa, the 129th Maint. Co., and the 136th Maint. Co. will receive a small increase in requests from their customers.

(c) Section V of the USASUPCOM-CRB Station list is being used to validate customer accounts. If the organization is not on this list, the establishment of an account at the CRB Supply Point is withheld until the unit furnishes data to the ACoFS, Security, Plans and Operations, USASUPCOM-CRB. A gain in official strength supported has been realized as a result of this procedure. If units are supported which are not on the station list, ~~favorable~~ consideration will not be received when personnel authorizations, construction requirements, storage space, maintenance floats and equipment requirements are being considered at higher headquarters. All of these actions are based on population supported for both DSU and Depot requirements.

(2) Central Issue Facility (CIF) Annex: A Central Issue Facility Annex operated by CRBSAC was established at the 22nd Replacement Battalion on 15 September in compliance with USARV Letter AVHGD-SM, Subj: "Establishment of Central Issue Facilities", dated 21 August 1968. This facility makes an initial issue of 22 items to replacements regardless of destination within RVN. Replacements who enter RVN through the 90th Replacement Battalion receive this initial issue from the CIF operated by the Saigon Support Command. By USARV direction, MACV, 5th Special Forces and 509th Radio Research Group personnel are excluded from this processing.

(a) Personnel processed daily have ranged from a low of 70 to a high of 559 for an average of 304 issues per day. The original estimate for number of personnel to be processed monthly has been reduced from 10,000 to 9,120.

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(b) Issues of jungle fatigues and boots are made at the main CIF to officers and E-9 personnel who do not have these items in their possession. Officers processed daily have ranged from a low of 8 to a high of 44 for an average of 29 issues per day. Officers processed to date are 9.9% of the total processed.

(c) The issue of these items to personnel in the replacement channel will reduce DX requirements of supported units in the Nha Trang and Tuy Hoa areas.

(3) Rapid Arrow II, Phase I: The concept of Phase I of Rapid Arrow II is to expedite supply actions for MACV Advisory Teams with a one-time fill of authorized shortages. PEMA items, Command Controlled items and Garrison Mess Equipment were not issued. There are eight Province Advisory Teams supported in the CRB Support Command Area. The requirements for the first five Advisory Teams's shortages were submitted to USAD-CRB on 20 October 1968 which were completed on 23 October 1968, except for some medical supplies which were airlifted to destination on 29 October 1968. The remainder of the Teams requirements were submitted to the Depot on 21 October 1968 which were airlifted to destination. Requirements for items on the shortage list that were out of stock in USAD-CRB were passed to the USAICCV.

(4) Closed Loop Support Program: The Closed Loop Support Program was expanded during the reporting period to include the 3/4 ton cargo truck M37B1 (OSR) and 5 ton tractor M52A2 (OSS)

(5) High Priority Requisitions: During the reporting period a 7.9% reduction in quantity of $\emptyset 2$ and $\emptyset 5$ priority requisitions was experienced. High priority requisitions submitted between January and June averaged 33.6% of the total received while the average for the report period was 25.7%. This reduction was a direct result of the restrictions placed on the use of $\emptyset 2$ and $\emptyset 5$ priorities when requisitioning items in selected Federal Supply Classes (FSC). These items can be broadly described as non-combat essential such as furniture and office supplies.

(6) Project Count: This project was initiated by the CG, 1st Logistical Command, in August 1968 and implemented on 1 September 1968 in this command with the mission to inventory all stocks on hand. Subsequent reconciliation is planned to insure that all command assets are recorded by quantity and location.

(a) Special training in inventory and stock locator procedures was conducted for personnel assigned to the project and a complete wall-to-wall location survey was conducted at the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay and all other Supply Points. At this date all reporting units have completed their location surveys. All Class I, III, and V stocks have been inventoried and adjustments have been made to the Availability Balance Files and Stock Records (ABF/SR). The inventory of all Class II, IV, VII and IX is in progress and was approximately 50% complete as of 31 October 1968. Target date for project completion is 15 Jan 69.

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(b) Inventory controls have been established by the units to insure the command desired objective of 95% accuracy. Statistical techniques have been developed to assist in obtaining the desired accuracy.

(c) The progress of the inventory in this command has exceeded the originally programmed weekly averages, particularly at the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh. It is anticipated that the inventory and adjustment phases of Project Count will be completed in mid-December, or at least two (2) weeks prior to the deadline established by 1st Logistical Command.

(7) Project STOP/SEE: A Project STOP/SEE Team became operational at Cam Ranh Bay on 28 September 1968. The mission of this team is to prevent items which are already in long-supply from arriving at USAD-CRB. By inspecting ship manifests and cargo, and determining excess stocks in Depot, action is taken by the Project SEE Team to divert, transship or retrograde selected items. The Project SEE Team is composed of a Liaison Officer from 1st Logistical Command, and members from Director of General Supply, Director of Transportation, Director of Retrograde and Disposal, USASUPCOM-CRB, Transportation Command and USAD-CRB.

f. Directorate of Maintenance

(1) The Director of Maintenance was tasked with the mission of staff supervision of the in-country Automation of Material Readiness Report DA Form 2406. The key punching is being accomplished by the 518th Personnel Service Company and the US Army Depot Cam Ranh Bay. The Depot is providing the data processing services.

(2) There have been intensive efforts made to establish a more effective preventive maintenance programs throughout the command. Effective preventive maintenance helps reduce the workload of higher categories of maintenance and increases equipment availability.

(3) There has been increased emphasis on maintenance management by the command and staff personnel and through the use of the Material Readiness Team. This emphasis is resulting in better maintenance management within units throughout the command.

g. Director of POL

(1) The initial movement of elements of the 4th Infantry Division into the Ban Me Thuot area required no change in Class III storage. The eventual troop strength buildup required the establishment of an additional helicopter refueling site, along with a MORGAS and Diesel storage area at Ban Me Thuot East Airfield. Bulk fuel storage capacity in the Ban Me Thuot area increased from 310,000 to 400,000 gallons on 9 September 1968. Monthly consumption increased from 537,400 gallons on 1 July 1968 to 1,510,700 gallons by 30 September 1968, a 200% increase.

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(2) In August 1968, under existing contracts, this headquarters requested Asiatic Petroleum (Shell) of Nha Trang to deliver bulk fuel to various Southern II Corps locations. The quantity requested to be delivered daily was 6,000 gallons of MOGAS and 9,000 gallons of Diesel. A token bulk delivery service was started on 30 September 1968 by Shell Nha Trang when 3,000 gallons each of MOGAS and Diesel were delivered to Phan Rang Airbase. It is anticipated that this daily service be expanded to include Esso and meet all bulk fuel requirements for Phan Rang and local deliveries for Nha Trang.

h. Directorate of Retrograde and Disposal

(1) Retrograde Division: During the period 1 August 1968 through 31 October 1968, the total short tons of retrograde materiel processed by USASUPCOM-CRB units were:

<u>MATERIEL</u>	<u>ON HAND BEGINNING OF QUARTER</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>SHIPPED</u>	<u>ON HAND END OF QUARTER</u>
Station Returns	0	0	0	0
Depot Excess	8,017	5,528	9,568	3,977
Repairables (Less Marine)	2,065	7,588	6,774	2,879
Unserviceable & Excess Ammo	773	1,323	642	1,454
Reusable Ammo Components	1,057	390	545	902
Marine Repairables	<u>196</u>	<u>623</u>	<u>520</u>	<u>289</u>
TOTAL (Short Tons)	12,108	15,452	18,057	9,501

(2) Property Disposal Division: During the period 1 August 1968 through 31 October 1968, the two (2) Property Disposal Yards within the command processed 152 short tons of usable property, and 7,160 short tons of scrap. Approximately 875.9 short tons of usable property was reissued to various units within the command, while remaining property was listed for sale. All scrap metals on hand at the disposal yard belong to Stainless Processing Company, Chicago, Illinois. Financial arrangements have been completed and Stainless Processing Company is removing scrap. During this period, 10,519 short tons of property has been removed from the disposal yard and sold with a net return of \$184,092.00 to the Government.

i. Director of Transportation

(1) Highway Operations:

(a) On 10 October 1968 the 172nd Transportation Company (Med Trk) arrived at Cam Ranh Bay and was assigned to the 16th Transportation Battalion. They became operational on 20 October 1968 and began line haul

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operations on 21 October 1968. At full task vehicle strength, the addition of the medium truck company relieved to some extent the command's critical shortage of M52 tractors for line haul operations.

(b) The concept of "Monster Trucks" was introduced during the past quarter. This consists of a M54 cargo truck connected to a 10 ton dolly and a M127 trailer. Cargo carrying capability is increased from 6S/T to 12 S/T which makes the "Monster" ideally suited to port and beach operations. Six 10-ton dollies with M127 trailers were received at Phan Rang and are expected to be transferred to Cam Ranh Bay during November 1968.

(2) Terminal Operations:

(a) During the month of October, two BARC 60's started a cargo shuttle between Vung Ro Bay and Tuy Hoa, releasing valuable truck assets operating at Vung Ro Bay. The shallow draft vessels average one (1) turnaround per day hauling a payload of between 60 and 100 S/T.

(b) Also during October, the Transportation Command resumed use of the BDL Page as a Roll on/Roll off shuttle vessel between Cam Ranh Bay and Vung Ro Bay. The Page operations facilitates the cargo hauling effort using trailer assets economically with a minimum turnaround time. The Page discharged and loaded a record 2,541 S/T of cargo on 1 November 1968.

(c) During the month of October, construction was finished on a LST Ramp South of Pier 5. The ramp presently handles one draft at a time and provides an alternate shallow draft discharge and outload location to South Beach.

(d) Project "Clean Sweep", the program to return excess and unidentifiable depot stocks to Okinawa, has cleared a total of 11,107 S/T through the 1st quarter of FY 1969.

(3) Rail Operations:

(a) The Vietnamese Railroad system, after coordination by the Director of Transportation, is hauling US Military cargo between Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang and Phan Rang. As the operations become routine, the command plans to transport 500 S/T of cargo per week, resulting in a more economical operation than either truck or water movement.

j. Engineer

(1) Construction Operations: Several major construction projects were initiated or completed during the reporting period. These projects include:

(a) The Depot ADPS Facility was completed.

(b) The Depot Reefer Hardstand was completed.

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- (c) Eleven miles of 6" and 8" POL pipeline was relocated by the 577th Engr Bn (Const) between Tuy Hoa and Vung Ro Bay.
- (d) Ammo LST Ramps at Pier #5 were completed except for one mooring dolphin, and LST operation was initiated without incident.
- (e) The 87th Engr Bn (Const) began reseeding operations on the CRB Peninsula in an effort to control wind and water erosion.
- (f) The anti-swimmer devices for security of the My Ca Bridge were installed.
- (g) The 116th Engr Bn (Combat) began stabilization of roads and construction of Minimum Essential Requirements at the Bao Loc FSE. The construction request was submitted to IFFV as Operational Support.
- (h) Construction of Camp McDermott, Nha Trang, commenced.
- (2) Construction Planning: This headquarters was notified by USARV of the approved projects for the FY 1969 Military Construction Army Program. Approved construction funds over twelve (12) million dollars for the following projects:
 - (a) 28 miles of narrow gauge railroad linking the Cam Ranh Complex with the Vietnamese Rail System.
 - (b) 41 miles of 8" pipeline from Cam Ranh Bay to Phan Rang.
 - (c) Consolidated Motor Pool for the US Army Trans Comd Cam Ranh.
 - (d) Ammunition Renovation Facility.
- (3) Laundry and Bath:
 - (a) Utilization of contract laundry service increased as additional pressing plants, driers, and a larger boiler plant were installed at the Modern Services plant in Nha Trang.
 - (b) Field laundry and bath operations continued at FSA's located at Ban Me Thuot, Bao Loc, and Phan Thiet. One-third of the command's laundry and bath assets are deployed at Forward Support Areas.

k. Staff Judge Advocate

- (1) Legal Assistance: Legal assistance to military and civilian personnel in the Cam Ranh Bay area decreased somewhat from the last report of 1,727 to 1,477 cases this quarter. Cases handled were in the following categories:
 - (a) Adoption and Change of Names: 26
 - (b) Citizenship, Immigration: 36

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- (c) Domestic Relations: 429
- (d) Non-Support: 25
- (e) Personal Finances: 252
- (f) Personal Property: 66
- (g) Taxation: 30
- (h) Torts: 40
- (i) Wills and Estates: 23
- (j) Miscellaneous: 430

(2) Military Justice: During the reporting period a total of 53 Special and 18 Summary Courts-Martial cases were advised, processed and reviewed by this office. 820 Article 15 punishments were checked for legal sufficiency and 52 appeals adjudicated.

(3) Legal Opinions: A total of 32 written opinions were rendered covering the legal gamut of procurement, military affairs, admiralty law, international law, and Military Justice.

(4) Claims: A total of 24 claims under the Military Claims Act were received by the office of which 17 have been paid. Dollar value of claims processed were as follows:

- (a) Claims received: \$3,711.84
- (b) Claims paid: \$2,891.69

(5) During the reporting period, 13 individuals were separated from the United States Army UP AR 635-212 for unsuitability or unfitness. Individuals who are repetitive violators of the Uniform Code of Military Justice can be rapidly eliminated by utilizing this method. Once an established pattern of unacceptable behavior is apparent from an individual's conduct, commanders are advised to consider the above courses of action. Persons convicted by more than one court-martial or convicted by one court-martial and also punished by a number of Article 15's should be considered for separation IAW AR 635-212.

1. Director of Food.

(1) This directorate has been concerned with the improvement of Class I requisitioning, receiving, recouping, transporting and storage activities at all end stations.

(2) During the reporting period, action was initiated to reconstruct the Class I Yard at Bao Loc. An additional 1,800 cubic foot reefer and three

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(3) GP medium tents were obtained for storage which has improved subsistence operations.

(3) A stepped-up program, emphasizing proper rotation of stocks, has been initiated by this directorate. Condemnation losses reports reflect negligence and abuse of the principles of stock rotation.

(4) A program is now in effect to insure that all Thanksgiving Holiday Meal items are properly segregated and promptly prepared for shipment to end stations. The "push" system will be utilized to insure that all end stations receive the proper proportion of rations. The overall program will be supervised by this directorate.

(5) The use of DOW insulated containers for shipment of perishable rations has greatly improved the food supply system. Although these units are not installed, the boxes have virtually eliminated intransit spoilage of perishable items.

m. Signal

(1) Two additional communications sites were established to support the Bao Loc FSE and Ban Me Thuot FSA. Each of these two sites were equipped with one AN/GRC-46 radio teletypewriter set and one AN/FRC-93 (Collins model KWM2-A) radio set. These radios supply both hard-copy messages and reliable voice communications capability.

(2) Additionally, two mobile radio trucks were outfitted to provide reliable long-haul communications for convoys operating in II Corps South. Each of two 3/4 ton trucks are equipped with 2 each AN/GRC-106 radios and 2 AN/VRC-53 radios. The two AN/GRC-106's provide mobile communications to this headquarters and to Headquarters, IFFV to gain assistance in accidents or enemy action and for convoy control. The AN/VRC-53's are utilized for intra-convoy, Visual Reconnaissance Aircraft, Sector, and convoy communication.

(3) Although the mobile configuration had been a necessity for quite some time, it was recently put into operation by this command. Several problem areas arose, but most notably was the inability of this command to acquire AN/GRC-106 radios for this function. Since the radio is a command-controlled item, initial attempts through 1st Logistical Command channels to have USARV release the AN/GRC-106 radio sets were unsuccessful. IFFV was then requested to go through their channels and 2 radio sets were hand-receipted to this headquarters for 60 days, and approximately 30 days later, 2 sets were approved for this headquarters.

(4) On 2 Sep 68, LTC Paul M. Johnson assumed duties as the Signal Officer.

n. Staff Chaplain:

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(1) When conducting Religious Services for units in the field, Protestant and Roman Catholic Chaplains will conduct concurrent services in order to reduce time for Religious Services from two hours a week to one hour.

(2) The days of Recollection for Chaplains have proven to be of great benefit by affording the Chaplains time for re-thinking important spiritual values.

c. Information Office

During the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68, the Information Section submitted 97 News Releases, 107 Photo Releases, 3176 Home Town News Releases, and 217 Home Town taped interviews. Of significant interest is the coverage of the 172nd Transportation Company, a reserve unit from Omaha, Nebraska called to active duty. Both still and motion picture coverage was used to cover the arrival of this unit.

2. (U) Section II - Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel.

(1) Local Superstitions:

(a) Observation: Local Vietnamese superstitions concerning the taking of blood from animals and the general ignorance of accepted animal health practices caused some delays in various animal husbandry projects. This problem has been eliminated by an intensive training program instituted and directed by the 176th Veterinary Detachment.

(b) Evaluation: Increased cooperation by the Vietnamese people has been noted by the several civic action teams. As the result of the confidence engendered by civic action programs, Vietnamese people are furnishing these teams with intelligence information, to include reports of VC sightings.

(c) Recommendations: That Civic Action personnel increase the number of hamlet and village visits for teachings in animal husbandry projects.

(2) Civilianization Program 6:

(a) Observation: The labor market in the Cam Ranh Bay area is extremely limited. Unskilled female labor was adequate to fill the majority of the jobs and the hiring rate among this category has been excellent. There are still 126 unskilled job vacancies in the ammunition storage areas which current security regulations prohibit local nationals from filling. The remaining vacancies either require males or skilled personnel. The hiring rate for these types of employees has been slow and the existing labor market has been exhausted.

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(b) Evaluation: The shortage of males and skilled workers necessitates an extensive training program in the Cam Ranh Bay area. The existing training programs offered by USARV Civilian Personnel Directorate through the Central Training Institute are currently inadequate to meet the needs of this command.

(c) Recommendation: That USARV Civilian Personnel Directorate expand the training programs for local nationals in this area. This command will also establish its own training program to supplement the program offered by the Civilian Personnel Directorate.

b. Security and Intelligence Division.

(1) Intelligence Files:

(a) Observation: Existing intelligence file formats did not allow for detailed analysis of trends or patterns of enemy activity and did not provide for the rapid extraction of required information.

(b) Evaluation: A file system was developed in which each incident was listed on a separate 3"x5" card. These cards were then color-coded to the area of the incident and filed within type of incident in chronological sequence. The completed file systems allow for searches according to (1) area, (2) type of incident, (3) chronological sequence, and (4) any combination of these categories. To supplement this more flexible file system, 1:25,000 scale maps of each area of interest have been prepared for display and annotated with plotted enemy incidents which have occurred during the past month. These systems provide rapid and detailed analysis of the enemy.

(c) Recommendations: None

(2) Ground Defense Files:

(a) Observation: Information concerning the status of ground defense activities for elements of this command not stationed at Cam Ranh Bay was contained in several files and was not readily retrievable. Frequent telephone calls were required to acquire basic elements of information from such commands.

(b) Evaluation: A comprehensive ground defense file was developed for each outlying subordinate element. This file contains Physical Security Plans, Ground Defense Plans, key personnel rosters, inspection data, major ground defense deficiencies, corrective action and detailed charts of ground defenses. Emphasis was placed upon uncorrected ground defense deficiencies or problem areas for use as a management tool.

(c) Recommendation: None

c. Plans and Training: None

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d. Operations:

(1) Operational Deficiency:

(a) Observation: This headquarters has no organic aircraft or aircraft dedicated solely for its own use.

(b) Evaluation: Continuous requirements arise for a means of rapid air transportation responsive solely to personnel of this command. These requirements include requisition pickup and delivery, delivery of repair parts and essential material (particularly small shipments), parts re-distributions, deployment of maintenance contact teams, command and control visits, isolated unit visits, convoy control and reconnaissance, road and ground reconnaissance and staff coordination. Many critical command and control problems and combat essential resupply missions delays could have been avoided or immediately corrected had a rapid and responsive means of organic air transportation been available.

(c) Recommendations: That this headquarters be authorized organic aircraft or aircraft dedicated solely for its own use to accomplish its overall mission.

(2) FSA Concept.

(a) Observation: A FSA is designed to support a brigade-sized unit with wholesale distribution only. It is essential that the supported unit deploy with its complete slice of the DISCOM.

(b) Evaluation: When the FSA was deployed to Ban Me Thuot in support of a brigade unit, the supported unit had an engineer company, maintenance company and medical support, but did not deploy with sufficient assets from the Division S&T Battalion. This caused an additional burden to be placed on the limited FSA assets.

(c) Recommendation: That when all future FSAs are established, the supported unit deploy with sufficient assets from their organic support elements. This action will keep the FSA in the wholesale distribution of supplies.

(3) Unit Move of 6/71st Arty.

(a) Observation: Required information for the support of a unit move was not received on a timely basis and it was frequently changed throughout the period of planning, preparation, processing and outloading.

(b) Evaluation: To properly expedite and support a unit move, it is imperative that both the deploying unit and its supporting element be accurately informed of the following information on a realistic time basis:

(1) Planned departure dates

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- (2) Equipment readiness dates
- (3) Equipment status (outload vs retained)
- (4) Special requirements for processing equipment for overseas movement

(5) Stowplan

(c) Recommendation: That information required for support of deploying units be disseminated accurately and on a timely basis to all major headquarters concerned with the move.

(4) Proper Steam Cleaners for Unit Moves:

(a) Observation: Three steam cleaners were used 24 hours per day for 6 days at the final equipment processing site. The type of steam cleaners being employed (Steam Unit, FSN 4940-865-4738) was unsuitable for continuous operation due to design limitations.

(b) Evaluation: To properly operate a steam cleaning area, it is imperative that a steaming device be employed that is designed for continuous operation and can sustain sufficient steam spray pressure and volume for extended periods.

(c) Recommendations: That future support elements that engage in steaming operations have adequate steaming devices capable of a continuous 24 hour operation such as the Malsbary Semi-Automatic, oiled fired, steam cleaner, series 300 to 500 (non standard military issue).

(5) Limited Assets of the Staging Area:

(a) Observation: The final processing area for equipment consisted of a hardstand area between Pier 1B and 2A at Cam Ranh Bay. At this site, processing consisted of steam cleaning, draining of fuel, engine preservation, and decontamination.

(b) Evaluation: Areas available to this command are not suited to the type of processing required. The use of this area by the unit being deployed severely restricted its use for other port operations. The area cannot accommodate heavy tracked vehicles due to surface weight limitations and an almost total lack of lighting equipment. Portable flood lighting sets with internal power systems were borrowed from the Air Force at Cam Ranh Bay. This headquarters has initiated steps to insure that a staging area for units deploying overseas be equipped with the following:

- (1) Permanent or mobile lighting equipment for night operations.
- (2) Adequate space for storage of those items required in the final processing of vehicles and equipment, i.e. lube oil, grease,

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decontamination materials.

(3) Vehicle racks for total cleaning, lubrication, and decontamination processing.

(4) Communication equipment to facilitate command and control of outloading operations.

(c) Recommendation: That other Support Commands establish staging areas fully equipped to outload tactical unit equipment.

g. Logistics

(1) Relocation of Pipeline:

(a) Observation: It was necessary to relocate eleven (11) miles of six-inch pipeline between Tuy Hoa and Vung Ro Bay.

(b) Evaluation: The Tuy Hoa-Vung Ro Bay pipeline was relocated to run parallel with the existing road between Tuy Hoa and Vung Ro Bay because of repeated breaks and punctures in the lines caused by sniper fire and demolition charges. The original route, although a much shorter distance, provided a lucrative target for enemy saboteurs and access roads to the pipeline were non-existent.

(c) Recommendation: That future pipelines be located to run parallel to main supply routes to afford execution of positive security measures and accessibility for line maintenance.

(2) Engineer Support:

(a) Observation: Numerous Forward Support Areas have been established without proper engineer support to provide Minimum Essential Requirements.

(b) Evaluation: The absence of Administrative Orders that provide for engineer support prior to a movement of personnel and equipment into Forward Support Areas has caused problems. Many FSA's are now operating without stabilized road nets, adequate drainage system, concrete slabs for mess facilities, and proper safety distances within POL and Ammunition storage areas.

(c) Recommendations: That future Forward Support Areas be established by Administrative Orders written IAW Log Comd Reg 525-1 with provisions made for engineer work to be accomplished by the nearest engineer troop unit. This work is requested as "Operational Support" and must be accomplished prior to movement of personnel and equipment into the FSA base.

(3) Non-Availability of Engineer Support:

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(a) Observation: Sufficient and timely engineer support is not available to Logistics Commanders.

(b) Evaluation: All engineer support and resources are found in organizations which parallel the 1st Logistical Command. The local Logistics Commander may request engineer support and materials from Engineer Construction Agency but has little influence as to how and when the support is rendered.

(c) Recommendation: That 1st Logistical Command be assigned organic engineer units to provide adequate and timely support under the operational control of the Support Command Commander.

(4) Use of Insulated Ice Cream Containers:

(a) Observation: Insulated ice cream containers should be hand receipted to all units supported by FSA's and FSE's for transporting ice cream from respective areas to final consumer.

(b) Evaluation: The previous method of transporting ice cream from FSA to FSE to supported units has been unsatisfactory due to the perishability of this commodity. With the use of the new insulated ice cream containers, the solidity of ice cream has improved immensely. These containers will hold six 3-gallon containers of ice cream in a solid state until arrival at final destination for consumption. As these containers are ENSURE (Expediting Non Standard Urgent Requirement for Equipment) items, they are not TOE equipment.

(c) Recommendation: That all units supported by FSA's or FSE's be hand receipted insulated ice cream containers for transporting this commodity.

(5) Double Handling of Bread, Milk and Ice Cream:

(a) Observation: Double handling of bread, milk and ice cream should be eliminated to maintain maximum freshness of these highly perishable items.

(b) Evaluation: Milk, bread and ice cream have been shipped from Cam Ranh Bay to Phan Rang and transshipped to Phan Thiet. Milk, ice cream and bread should be shipped directly to FSA or FSE from the producer to eliminate spoilage and maintain maximum freshness and palatability.

(c) Recommendation: Ship bread, milk and ice cream directly from origin to FSA or FSE to eliminate spoilage.

(6) Class I Support of New Units Moving into Forward Support Area

(a) Observation: New units moving into forward support areas must bring a basic load of Meal Combat Individual and promptly notify the forward support unit of perishable subsistence requirements.

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(b) Evaluation: Units arrived at the B' n Me Thuot FSA without the required basic load of Meal Combat Individual. This coupled with short notice for "R" rations, created an unnecessary burden on the FSA and supporting depot. Experience shows that 72 hours are required for supply of "R" rations.

(c) Recommendation: That units carry basic load of meal combat individual when moving to a new support area and give at least 72 hours prior notice for supply of perishable subsistence.

(7) Project SEE.

(a) Observation: The project SEE Team functions within existing organizational structure with representatives at each command level. Direct coordination between team members is authorized so that rapid action can be taken to prevent additional items from being placed in Depot stock. Responsibilities for each section involved are listed below.

(1) Director of General Supply, USASUPCOM-CRB: Overall Project Officer for USASUPCOM-CRB coordinates and lends support to the 1st Logistical Command (1LC) Liaison Officer and serves as Support Command Coordinator.

(2) Director of Transportation, USASUPCOM-CRB: Assists the Director of General Supply (DOGS) and the 1LC Liaison Officer by diverting ships, transshipping cargo and providing transportation support to retrograde frustrated cargo.

(3) Director of Retrograde and Disposal, USASUPCOM-CRB: Assists the Project SEE Team by supervising retrograde of excess stocks in Depot and insuring maximum efficiency of all excess programs requiring retrograde of supplies.

(4) US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay: Coordinates all excess programs; provides stockage information and assists in identification of items excess to the needs of USAD-CRB; coordinates Project SEE programs with other excess programs to insure maximum efficiency in stock management, storage and retrograde operations.

(5) Transportation Command: Provides one copy of ship manifests to the 1LC Liaison Officer and removes stores and transships or retrogrades items ordered frustrated by USAICC-V.

(b) Evaluation: To date, manifests have been available for ships approximately 1-5 days prior to the ship's arrival at Cam Ranh Bay. These manifests have proven accurate and the FSN of items can be obtained by submitting the Transportation Control Number (TCN) to USAICC-V. Coordinated action has resulted in the frustration of 197 S/Ts with an additional 4,000 S/Ts pending final disposition.

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(c) Recommendation: The emphasis on close coordination between USASUPCOM-CRB, Transportation Command and USAD-CRB should continue. Excess identification and diversion or frustration of items not needed should be incorporated in daily operations. Specific objectives should be established in order to improve stock control. These should include:

(1) Command action to reduce the time between receipt of an item and its appearance on the Availability Balance File (ABF)

(2) Use of acceptable substitute items IAW principle FSN's if not available.

(3) Establishment of a system of primary locations for each item with supplementary storage locations used when necessary for back-up which will allow for a reduction in the number of lines with multiple locations. Prepare flow charts to show each activity the flow of both documents and supplies within their activity. Example: Documentation: a chart showing what happens to the document from the time it is received into Central Receiving until the stock on that document is picked-up on the ABF; Stock: from the time it is received at Depot Central Receiving until it is picked up on the ABF after placement in storage.

(4) Establishment of Desk SOP's in each operational area.

(5) Additional Command Emphasis to insure retrograde material is expeditiously returned to CONUS and/or other points. This would expedite the return of items for rebuild, clear the retrograde intransit areas and create more storage space in Depot.

(6) Insure issues are made from Depot on the basis of "first in, first out", date or condition of pack as appropriate. This will eliminate backlog in the Care and Preservation Facility, will allow more time for the management of stocks in Depot and will institute a more aggressive Care and Preservation Program.

(8) Accounting for Forward Support Activity Equipment.

(a) Observation: The present procedure of units hand receipting TO&E equipment to Forward Support Activities (FSA) is unsatisfactory. There have also been times when assets from Depot stocks have been issued to the FSA's without accountability.

(b) Evaluation: Units are losing TO&E equipment when responsible FSA personnel are transferred or returned to their home duty station before hand receipts are updated. The unit that hand receipts TO&E equipment to an FSA does not have authority to request a replacement for loaned equipment.

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(c) Recommendation: That authority be granted for each FSA to establish a property book.

(9) Requisitioning Procedures for Forward Support Activities:

(a) Observation: The present procedures being utilized by the Forward Support Activities (FSA) to request/requisition supplies are unsatisfactory. The Director of General Supply prepares a Supply Directive which is forwarded to US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, instructing the Depot to release and ship items to FSA's.

(b) Evaluation: The FSA is not assigned a Unit Identification Code (UIC) or an activity address code. The FSA is precluded from requesting/requisitioning from a Direct Support Unit (DSU) or Depot. Special handling is required for all requests because there is no way to identify the FSA, which delays document flow and requisition fill.

(c) Recommendation: That headquarters be assigned several activity address codes to be used in support of FSA's. The activity address code will remain under control of this headquarters and would become inactive when the FSA is non-operational. The FSA would be limited to items not requiring tabular authority and all requests/requisitions for supplies will be cancelled as soon as the FSA is inactivated.

(10) Project Count.

(a) Observation: A degradation to the accuracy of the Project Count Inventory occurs after normal operations are resumed.

(b) Evaluation: The degradation is taking place from 4-10 days after normal operations are resumed. The most prevalent contributing factors are the failure to post the Availability Balance File (ABF) or Stock Records (SR) in a timely and accurate manner.

(c) Recommendation: Action must be taken to assure that normal operations are conducted in a timely and effective manner. Periodic samples of location accuracy must be taken by supervisory personnel. If the sample accuracy indicates less than a 95% location accuracy, a complete location survey is essential. An inventory will be conducted on all FSN's that are identified in other than the recorded location(s).

(11) Required Density List for Maintenance.

(a) Observation: The maintenance element deployed in support of the Ban Me Thuot FSA was initially improperly staffed and did not have a sufficient stockage of repair parts.

(b) Evaluation:

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(1) The size and composition of a maintenance element is dependent upon the type and density of equipment requiring support. This Headquarters did not receive an accurate density list until after the maintenance element was established.

(2) The problem of an insufficient stockage of repair parts by the maintenance element was further complicated by supported units deploying with insufficient PLL's. If the maintenance element had received copies of the supported units PLL's they could have assembled an adequate repair parts stockage.

(c) Recommendation: That higher headquarters require units to identify the type and density of equipment for which the support is required and furnish copies of their PLL's to the Support Commands.

(12) Nha Trang Commercial T-2 Tanker Discharge Facility.

(a) Observation: Nha Trang is limited to off-loading T-2 Tankers through the Esso-Shell commercially-owned submarine lines and connecting pipelines into US Military storage tanks. In March, June, August and September of this year, the commercial discharge facilities were damaged by tankers and inoperative for periods of up to three weeks. In March and June, Army Engineers repaired the lines while in September, Esso-Shell arranged for necessary repairs which took three weeks.

(b) Evaluation: The inability of the commercial owners of the submarine sea lines to complete repairs caused the bulk petroleum stocks at Nha Trang to reach a dangerously low level. Small coastal tankers had to be off-loaded on the Nha Trang commercial pier to supply bulk fuel to the Nha Trang Air Force Base which was very inefficient and required excessive manhours to accomplish the task. This action supplied only enough fuel to keep the Air Base operational on a day-to-day basis until the submarine sea lines were repaired. This headquarters has initiated a request for the construction of an Army-owned T-2 tanker discharge facility at Nha Trang. This request has been placed before the Nha Trang Engineer Base Planning Board and will be forwarded to CG, 1st Logistical Command at an early date.

(c) Recommendation: Approval of this request should be expedited and construction initiated as soon as possible.

(13) Quality Surveillance.

(a) Observation: Numerous reports of contaminated fuel were received by this headquarters from USASUPCOM-CRB supply points and supported aviation units.

(b) Evaluation: Two of the reports were erroneously initiated because of poor sampling techniques. The remaining reports were the result of incorrect handling procedures by untrained personnel. Both

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type of incidents required the suspension of Class III issues until laboratory analysis could be accomplished. A comprehensive Quality Surveillance Manual has been prepared for publication and distribution to all petroleum operating elements of the command and all customers in southern II Corps. Training programs concerning the proper techniques of handling petroleum products have been initiated for all personnel working at Class III Supply Points and terminal operations.

(c) Recommendation: That this command's experience be announced to all interested activities.

(14) Marginal Amount of Retrograde Cargo Shipped.

(a) Observation: The amount of Retrograde cargo shipped from Cam Ranh Bay has declined since last quarter.

(b) Evaluation: During the last quarter there has been a marginal amount of Retrograde cargo shipped which is directly proportional to available transportation. The only means to plan transportation requirements is to know the exact amount offered for shipment. Transportation can be planned using the amount shipped and the amount offered for shipment and these two figures, when combined, give the total requirement over a given period.

(c) Recommendation: That organizations handling retrograde cargo process and offer for shipment the highest possible tonnage.

(15) Removal of Property from Disposal Yards.

(a) Observation: Contractors are encountering problems in their efforts to remove property from the disposal yards.

(b) Evaluation: (1) During the last Quarter the Property Disposal Division has made meaningful advances in contractor purchase and removal of disposal property. Problems encountered with respect to contractor purchase and removal of property were:

- (a) Availability of a staging area
- (b) Availability of dockage space
- (c) Lack of equipment

These matters have been discussed with the contractors and measures are being taken to overcome these obstacles. The contractors will locate and establish a storage area which will provide a centralized location of operations. This area will be used as a processing, staging and planning area for the outloading of material and will also provide the contractors with a secure area to store their equipment. At the present time authorization has been obtained to relocate the Cam Ranh Bay disposal activity, adjacent to the present yard. The yard is being prepared and operations will commence on 1 December 1968. The old yard will be rented to the contractors to be used as a storage area.

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(2) Due to the amount of material arriving in Cam Ranh Bay, the contractors have been unable to utilize dock space for the removal of property. Consequently, the contractors have been forced to employ barges to move property to ships anchored in the harbor. One method used by contractors to move property out-of-country is utilization of LST's. The contractors could construct an LST dock facility without disrupting the military mission of the present harbor.

(3) The contractors have experienced difficulty removing property because of lack of equipment. Contractors are allowed to utilize Government property provided that the Government is reimbursed for the use of its equipment. Contractors have been encouraged to acquire the necessary organic equipment to remove purchased property. The capabilities of each bidding contractor is studied prior to the granting of a contract.

(c) Recommendation: That the contractor be authorized to construct an LST dock.

(16) Sixty Ton Truck Scales.

(a) Observation: Discrepancies have been noted in the recorded weights of property removed by the contractors.

(b) Evaluations: (1) Property sold from disposal facilities is measured by weight. Many systems of measuring the weights of disposal property have been employed in Vietnam with varying success. The most common methods employed are:

- (a) Estimated weights
- (b) Measuring Ship drafts
- (c) Truck scales

(2) The most reliable means of determining accurate weights is to employ truck scales, where vehicles are weighed upon entrance and departure. During the last Quarter the contractor installed axle scales which improved the weighing operation but discrepancies are still common. The cost of installing large sixty ton truck scales will be offset by the monetary return of the Government from property purchased by contractors. 1st Logistical Command has authorized the procurement of truck scales and a number of other items to be used in the disposal yard. The disposal facility has submitted requests for these items and 1st Logistical Command is in the process of procuring these items from CONUS.

(c) Recommendations: That action be expedited to procure required disposal facility items.

(17) Preparation for Emergency Shipments.

(a) Observation: In the past, valuable time has been lost in preparing ammunition for emergency air shipment. After notification

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that emergency resupply was necessary, ammunition had to be moved from the storage area to the air base where it was placed on Air Force pallets by Air Force personnel.

(b) Evaluation: Fast moving, critical items have been identified and pre-palletized on Air Force pallets. These items continue to be stored in the Army storage areas and are under Army control. This procedure eliminates double handling after notification of an emergency air resupply requirement, thereby significantly reducing reaction time.

(c) Recommendation: That other commands be made aware of this labor saving experience.

18. Observation: Stockage objectives for Forward Support Areas were being calculated based on a fixed number of days of supply for each item. This leaves very little flexibility in applying the principal of selective stockage.

(b) Evaluation: Ammunition items have been identified as to criticality and regularity of issue. Based on these factors, along with the anticipated frequency of resupply, the number of days of supply for each individual item is determined. For example, 5 days for slow-moving less critical items and 15 days for faster moving more critical items. This method of selective stockage reduces the risk of zero balance of critical items, but doesn't increase the total tonnage.

(c) Recommendation: That selective ammunition stockage be extended theater wide.

f. Other:

(1) Staffing of Central Accounting Offices:

(a) Observation: The accounting records of the Cam Ranh Bay and Tuy Hoa Subarea Command clubs and messes were unsatisfactory because of inadequate staffing of the respective central accounting offices.

(b) Evaluation: The staffing of the Central Accounting Offices with qualified personnel is the key to maintaining a sound accounting system. The shuffling of central accounting personnel must be held to a minimum if satisfactory performance is to be expected from such a function.

(c) Recommendation: That personnel sections exercise extreme caution in staffing central accounting offices and endeavor to assign only qualified accountants to these activities.

(2) Newspaper Coverage.

(a) Observation: This command is receiving more coverage in the 1st Logistical Command newspaper, The Observer, than it has in the past.

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(b) Evaluation: A more liberal release policy instituted by higher headquarters has resulted in a broader coverage of unit news.

(c) Recommendation: That this command continue to receive the amount of coverage next quarter as it has this quarter.

(3) AN/FRC-93 Versus AN/GRC-106 Radios:


(a) Observation: The preferred equipment to be used to provide fixed, non-mobile tactical single-side band voice communications between this headquarters and its end stations is the AN/GRC-106 radio. This set is designed for tactical SSB operations and can sustain rough handling. Because the set is command-controlled, it could not be obtained for this use. Consequently, the AN/FRC-93 (Collins type KWN-A) radio, using 110V AC current, was utilized. The radio shelter which houses the AN/GRC-46 radioteletype is equipped with an electrical rotary converter which provides 110V AC current from the 28V DC power source system. The Collins set was installed within the shelter utilizing the converter as its power supply.

(b) Evaluation: This arrangement has proved to be a satisfactory substitute in lieu of the AN/GRC-106 SSB radios.

(c) Recommendation: That consideration be given to using the AN/FRC-96 (Collins KWM2-A) radio set in other fixed, non-mobile tactical installations requiring reliable long-distance voice radio communications. The cost for an AN/GRC-106 is \$15,537 versus \$875 for the AN/FRC-93 (ref SB 700-20).

3. (U) Section III - Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey
Information: None.

5 Incl - all inclosures w/d, Hq, DA
es



ALBERT NEWTON
Colonel, TC
Commanding

AVCA GO-C (15 Nov 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh
Bay for Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

19 DEC 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 is forwarded.

2. (U) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference II, paragraph d(1). Concur. The requirement for responsive aircraft support is recognized. Action is being taken to secure support aircraft for each support command and this headquarters.

b. Reference Section II, paragraph d(4). Concur. Request that USAICCV be furnished the name of the manufacturer, contract, or other identification necessary to determine if malfunction is attributed to one manufacturer, or to the design characteristics. These cleaners have been in use by various units in Vietnam for over a year without adverse comment. There is insufficient information available to determine whether a different item should be supported.

c. Reference Section II, paragraph e(2). Concur. However, this recommendation can be realized only if this headquarters receives enough advance notification of the requirement for the establishment of an FSA.

d. Reference Section II, paragraph e(5). Concur. This should be done, but a tight control on the issues and issue documents handled by the FSA and FSE must be kept to insure that proper accountability and control for the items issued can be affected.

e. Reference Section II, paragraph e(8). Nonconcur. The very nature of the FSA precludes it from establishing a formal property book. However, an informal property book might serve to improve the present accounting procedure for FSA equipment. This headquarters is currently formulating a proposal for all FSA's to be organized under a TOE.

f. Reference Section II, paragraph e(9). Nonconcur. Activity address codes cannot be used in support of a unit not organized under a TOE.

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g. Reference Section II, paragraph e(10). Concur. In addition, emphasis must be placed on proper receipt and issue procedures to insure that the data base remains accurate. Personnel in charge of storage locations must know what is on hand by quantity, location, and condition. This information must be fed into the ABF on a continuing basis.

h. Reference Section II, paragraph e(11). Concur. This headquarters has disseminated appropriate instructions to all subordinate units.

i. Reference Section II, paragraph e(12). Concur. The DD 1391, Military Construction Line Item Data, has been approved by both the Nha Trang Engineer Planning Board and 1st Log Comd and has been forwarded to USARV for designation of an Engineer unit to accomplish the work.

j. Reference Section II, paragraph e(13). Concur. CRB Support Command made distribution of subject manual to each support command. No further action is required.

k. Reference Section II, paragraph e(15). Nonconcur. While movement of material is essential, it is felt that to permit a PDO contractor to construct a fixed facility, which would give him undue advantage over other bidders on the current or future sales, would be unwise. Additionally, numerous other questions would arise, to include dock ownership, right of use, action in the event the contractor is unsuccessful in later bids at the yard, claims in the event of death, injury or property loss in construction or use of the dock etc.. It is recommended that a survey be made to determine if the dock is necessary to support operational requirements in the Cam Ranh Bay area. If it can be justified, a request for construction should be submitted, ownership, and status of the dock would then be well defined, and the contractor would not be given either an unfair advantage over other competition or a possible lever for use in future dealings with the U.S. Government.

l. Reference Section II, paragraph e(16). Concur. Truck scales have been on requisition and re-requisition since October 1967. Current status is that these items are scheduled for shipment from CONUS within 60 days. Follow-up action to establish a more definite arrival date is in process through the U.S. Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam.

m. Reference Section II, paragraph e(17). Concur. This headquarters will take action to notify other commands of this labor saving experience.

n. Reference Section II, paragraph e(18). Concur. Selective stockage is being practiced theater wide as directed by this command on 7 Sep 68. No action required by higher headquarters. However, selective stock-

AVCA GO-0

19 DEC 1968


SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay for Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

age objective is based on issue experience. The concept of ammunition support is to place in an ASP/FSA a specific number of days of supply for the specific weapons density being supported which becomes the stockage objective. Replenishment of the stockage objective is based upon the actual issue experience and considers the time to resupply.

o. Reference Section II, paragraph f(1). Enlisted accounting personnel carry MOS 73D, a school trained MOS. Cam Ranh Bay is authorized two and has 9 assigned. Resources are available within the command to resolve the problem.

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


ROBERT W. MUNSON
1LT AGC
Asst AG

CF:

2 - DA, ACSFOR, Washington D.C. 20310

1 - USASUPCOM-CRB

AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 24 JAN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference items concerning Civilianization Program 6, page 22, paragraph 2a(2)(c). Concur with the recommendation that the Central Training Institute expand its facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. The following actions will be taken:

(1) Requests for the necessary facilities and equipment, adequate for a major expansion of Central Training Institute facilities, will be submitted to the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay.

(2) The Area Civilian Personnel Officer will consult with the CG, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay to obtain cooperation in supplying skilled instructors from the Support Command Staff.

(3) The Cam Ranh Bay Area Civilian Personnel Office will intensify the screening of applicants to determine the training potential for high skill positions. Improved testing procedures will be adopted.

(4) Nonconcur with the recommendation of paragraph 2a(2)(c), page 22, which states that the Support Command will set up its own training program. This action is contrary to Civilian Personnel Regulation 400 and USARV Regulation 690-10.

b. Reference item concerning non-availability of engineer support, page 25, paragraph g(3). Nonconcur. USARV confidential message, 80183, AVHFN-40, DTG 191106Z Nov 68, subject: Engineer Support (U) clearly defines the problems and policies of USARV concerning engineer support. Conditions have not changed appreciably since this message was dispatched.

c. Reference item concerning AN/FRC-93 versus AN/GRC-106 radio, page 34, paragraph f(3). Concur in the recommendation that the AN/FRC-93 radio to be used at installations where there are operational requirements for a fixed site over an extended period of time. The AN/FRC-93

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radio is widely used in RVN to satisfy an urgent requirement for fixed non-mobile radio installations until the standard military version, the AN/GRC-106, can be distributed to the field. Tactical units receive priority of issue of the AN/GRC-106.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
O/C AG CLASSIFIED

Cy furn:
HQ, US Army Spt Comd, Cam Ranh Bay
HQ, 1st Log Comd

GPOP-DT (15 Nov 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ US Army Spt Comd Cam Ranh Bay for
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

7 FEB 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
<i>(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)</i>		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL
		2b. GROUP
		4
3. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CO, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay		
3. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
15 Nov 68	43	
6a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	6a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
	684350	
b. PROJECT NO.		
c. N/A	6b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A	OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		

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DD FORM 1 NOV 68 1473

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification