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AGAM-P (H) (12 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684210 26 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH ARMORED SQUADRON, 1ST AIR CALVALRY
APO San Francisco 96357

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: (U) Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, (RC3 CSPDR-55) (R1)
(UIC: WGZ6AA)

I. (C) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. There were no changes or additions to the unit mission.

B. Organization:

- **ASSIGNED UNITS**
  - 7th Sqdn, 1st Air Cav WGI6 AA Vinh Long 96357
  - Headquarters Troop WGI6 TO Vinh Long 96357
  - A Troop (Air) WGI6 AO Vinh Long 96357
  - C Troop (Air) WGI6 CO Vinh Long 96357
  - D Troop (Ground) WGI6 DO Vinh Long 96357

- **ATTACHED UNITS**
  - B Troop (Air) (Atch 3/17) WGI6 BO Di An 95299

- **ATTACHED UNITS/SECTIONS**
  - Personnel Section (Atch by 1RTC)
    - 3d Signal Detachment WGO9 AA Vinh Long 96357
    - 819th Signal Detachment WXGJ AA Vinh Long 96357
    - 370th TC Detachment WE43 TO Vinh Long 96357
    - 371st TC Detachment WE44 AA Vinh Long 96357

C. Command:

1. During the reporting period the following major changes in
   command and staff positions occurred:

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a. Major Harold L. Johnson, 091368, assumed duties of Squadron Executive Officer on 1 August 1968, replacing Major Herschel E. Stephens, 0229631.

b. Major John W. White Jr., 02300795, assumed command of A Troop on 1 August 1968, replacing Major James R. Hill, 072403.

c. Major Robert E. Stengle Jr., 05001127, assumed command of D Troop on 1 August 1968, replacing Major Richard A. Thompson, 091402.

d. Captain Stanley S. Fracker III, 0F101442, assumed command of HHT on 13 September 1968, replacing Major John F. Glenn, 02292576.

e. Captain John P. Lyon, 05235352, assumed duties of Squadron S-1 on 15 September 1968, replacing Captain Stanley S. Fracker III, 0F101442.

f. Captain Charles C. Wren, 05707672, assumed duties of Squadron Safety Officer on 15 September 1968, replacing Major John H. Bostdorf, 093127.

g. Major Norman W. Bissell, 094364, assumed duties as Squadron S-3 on 30 September 1968, replacing Major Arthur L. Finch Jr., 087515.

h. Captain James F. Lupton, 02331748, assumed duties of Squadron Chaplain on 10 October 1968, replacing Captain Gene Hantsinger, 02325300.

i. Major James B. Weaver, 090588, assumed duties as Squadron Maintenance Officer on 15 October 1968.


2. The following are personnel occupying major command and staff positions:

a. LTC ROBERT W. MILLS  
   Squadron Commander

b. MAJ HAROLD L. JOHNSON  
   Squadron Executive Officer

c. CPT JOHN P. LYON  
   Adjutant

d. MAJ ROCY D. WINSTOW JR.  
   S-2

e. MAJ ROBERT H. BISSELL  
   S-3

f. MAJ WILLIAM J. AMBERGER  
   S-4

g. CPT JAMES F. LUPTON  
   Chaplain
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h. CPT RICHARD L. BELLER Signal Officer
i. CPT JOHN F. KUNISHI Flight Surgeon
j. CPT CHARLES C. WUZH Safety Officer
k. MAJ JAMES H. WEINER Maintenance Officer
l. CPT STANLEY S. FRAGNER III CO, Headquarters Troop
m. MAJ JOHN H. WHITE JR. CO, A Troop
n. MAJ ALBERT F. RODRIGUEZ CO, C Troop
o. MAJ ROBERT E. STEIGELE JR. CO, D Troop

d. Unit Strength as of 30 October 1963:

1. Military:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>Auth O/H</th>
<th>Auth O/H</th>
<th>Auth O/H</th>
<th>Auth O/H</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>13+1</td>
<td>15+1</td>
<td>30+2</td>
<td>26+2</td>
<td>112+59</td>
<td>160+62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>13+1</td>
<td>14+1</td>
<td>30+2</td>
<td>23+2</td>
<td>112+59</td>
<td>160+62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7/1 ACS 64+2 62+2 69+4 60+4 632+116 420+116 653+124 542+122

2. Civilians:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Units</th>
<th>Tech Reps</th>
<th>U.S. Civ</th>
<th>V.I. Civ</th>
<th>3d Nat</th>
<th>Cont</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7/1 ACS 0 2 0 23 13 0 0 0 0

-3-

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3. Overall assigned/attached strength during the reporting period as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Warrant Officer</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 68</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sep 68</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 68</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. Aircraft Authorized/On Hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBORD</th>
<th>SUBORD</th>
<th>AUTH O/H</th>
<th>AUTH O/H</th>
<th>AUTH O/H</th>
<th>AUTH O/H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1 ACS</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. Cumulative Totals:

1. Results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>TRPS LIFT</th>
<th>CARGO TNS</th>
<th>EN KIA</th>
<th>STRUCTURES</th>
<th>SAMPLNS</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>1,921</td>
<td>67 tns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>7,742</td>
<td>10,695</td>
<td>86 tns</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>6,369</td>
<td>5,128</td>
<td>15 tns</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Troop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1 ACS</td>
<td>14,937</td>
<td>17,804</td>
<td>153 tns</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Aircraft by Type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH6A</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH1N</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH1G</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH1C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Losses (1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>Returned to Duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11610</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11620</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11630</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11640</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11650</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11660</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67620</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51204</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G. Personnel:

1. During the reporting period command emphasis was placed on the infusion program to insure a smooth, orderly transition within the Squadron. Numerous trips were conducted by the Squadron Adjutant to Long Binh and Bien Hoa to coordinate infusion of Squadron personnel with other units. Careful attention and screening was necessary to insure infusion was not conducted with personnel who were with other units or had approximately the same rotation date. The Squadron completed the enlisted infusion program two months prior to the anticipated date. All replacements assigned to the Squadron were personnel newly arrived from CONUS, straight out of basic training. The emphasis on infusion coupled with the newly assigned personnel placed the Squadron in an inexperienced state on trained personnel. Although the Squadron greatly reduced the rotational adjustment period, the number of officers due to rotate during the month of January slightly exceeds the 25% limitation.

2. During the month of August 1968, the Squadron's new KD teams were preparing to take over the maintenance duties and responsibilities for the Air Cavalry Troops which were formerly performed by "F" Troop. On 23 August 1968, "F" Troop was released from attachment to the Squadron and returned to the 765th Transportation Battalion, APO 96291. Advantage was taken of "F" Troop's personnel in that they were infused on a one for one basis with the KD cells with concurrence of the 34th General Support Group.

3. The Squadron completed their move from temporary to permanent facilities at Vinh Long and commenced to organize and establish administrative procedures and facilities to operate on a permanent basis. Since arrival in-country the Squadron had been in the process of relocation or alerted for relocation. A considerable amount of effort had been made by administrative personnel to maintain efficient and functioning administrative sections. On 26 August 1968, a courtesy personnel management inspection was conducted by the 154th Combat Aviation Group. All areas were found to be satisfactory.
4. The months of September and October 1968 were marked by considerable emphasis on legal activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scheduled</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212 Elimination Actions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadron Level Article 15's</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The Squadron consolidated mess became operational despite the numerous problems involved with the shortages of personnel (cooks), power, water and rations. The status of the mess personnel were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty Title</th>
<th>DMS</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mess Sergeant</td>
<td>94B40</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Cook (E6)</td>
<td>94B20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Cook (E5)</td>
<td>94B20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks</td>
<td>94B20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8 (2 volunteer 11B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks Helpers</td>
<td>94A10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 (3 volunteer 11B)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the first part of the reporting period there were no lights, gas, running water or drainage facilities. These problems were gradually improved upon as the period progressed. However, drainage and resulting sanitation problems still are prevalent. The improvement of the consolidated mess and the resulting improvement in messing conditions and meals have greatly increased the morale of the Squadron.

5. A serious problem occurred in the employment of Vietnamese personnel to work as KP's in the Consolidated mess hall. Due to the excessive amount of time required to process and approve the necessary paperwork for the authorization of these personnel, the Squadron was forced to employ some personnel to improve the conditions in the mess hall. The paperwork submitted was misplaced at the CPO and had to be completely resubmitted and, consequently, delayed necessary processing. None of the employed personnel were not paid from 7 June to 31 August 1968. When the submitted paperwork was approved the approval was not retroactive, consequently, all back pay for the employed Vietnamese personnel was paid through the donations of Squadron personnel.

7. The Squadron continues to fill 100% of its R&R allocations with a standing waiting list.

8. During the reporting period, awards and decorations have been recommended and approved as follows:

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H. Operations:

1. The Squadron (-) started the month of August in the process of completing a move from its temporary location on Vinh Long to a permanent location on the north side of Vinh Long Army Airfield.

2. The Blackhawk conducted three primary types of missions with the Air Cavalry Troops during the period to include OPERATION BLACKHAWK, general support of the divisions and special operations with Provincial Reconnaissance Units.

3. OPERATION BLACKHAWK continued in the 44th STZ with both Air Cavalry Troops being employed to interdict and harass enemy movement across the Cambodian Border. Various deviations were established to insure a set pattern was not established such as last and first light reconnaissance missions, Mohawk-Cobra "hunter killer" teams, "people sniffer" missions, night observation device tactics and listening posts.

4. Night visual reconnaissance missions were attempted by Troop C with the same mission objective as daylight operations. Weather proved to be a detrimental factor due to the monsoon season, resulting in heavy cloud decks during the night. Other problem areas encountered were the amount of artificial lighting needed to contain the targets until they could be destroyed or exploited. Target marking devices are being experimented with now which will enable the marker to remain afloat. Navigation along the border is particularly difficult at night. Coordination with Paddy Control Radar has been especially helpful in preventing border violations and in relocating specific targets. Each night mission conducted established contact with the enemy within two hours. The conduct
of this type mission seems to be highly favorable. Tactics and training are being developed at this time to improve the night capabilities so that operations of this nature can be conducted when the dry season commences.

5. Approximately 35% of the missions conducted by the Squadron were in general support of the divisions. On many occasions, the use of the Air Cavalry Troop by the division was outstanding. Operations would be planned and scheduled around the reconnaissance and findings of the Troop supporting the division. Assets and Troops would be held until the concentrations of the enemy were fixed and exploited by the Air Cavalry Troop. The division operation would then react to the confirmed intelligence data and place the ground troops in position to best seize the objectives. Operations of this nature employed the Air Cavalry Troop to the maximum effective utilization at the same time conserving airmobile assets and wear and tear on ground troops by inserting them in locations where the enemy situation is known and not likely to be what is referred to as a "Dry Hole".

6. Troop D has been limited on operations this period due to the monsoon season, resulting in poor trafficability of the wheeled vehicles. Their missions have been limited to road reconnaissance and security missions for convoy movements throughout the Delta. During the month of September the Troop moved to Chi Leng (WS 020650) for an operation with the 44th STZ in the mountain area. Results were significant, however, the mission of screening the northern flank of Dui Giao was again somewhat limited due to the fact the wheeled vehicles could not travel on the terrain and road network available. The majority of the period was spent in the vicinity of Vinh Long conducting night ambushes, reconnaissance patrols and Troop screening missions under the coordination of Vinh Long Province in the local area. Much credit is attributed to Troop D for the few and limited mortar and ground attacks. Results were significant, however, the mission of screening the northern flank of Dui Giao was again somewhat limited due to the fact the wheeled vehicles could not travel on the terrain and road network available. The majority of the period was spent in the vicinity of Vinh Long conducting night ambushes, reconnaissance patrols and Troop screening missions under the coordination of Vinh Long Province in the local area. Much credit is attributed to Troop D for the few and limited mortar and ground attacks in the Province due to the increased activity of Troop D in this area for the past three months. Extensive airmobile training was conducted in October to cross-train the influx of new personnel assigned to the Troop. Troop D personnel augmented the Air Cavalry Troop infantry platoons on daily missions reinforcing the platoons as well as enhancing training proficiency of newly arrived personnel.

7. During the month of October, Troop A was involved in numerous Special Operations conducted with Provincial Reconnaissance Units at Rach Gia (WS 108040), Tra Vinh (XR 106975), and Can Tho (WS 843110). These operations proved very successful and interesting because of their nature and consistent success. The PRU missions were backed with reliable, detailed information and, consequently, had to be reacted on immediately. The flexibility of the Air Cavalry Troop worked hand in hand with this concept. Accumulative results for the PRU (Special Operations) are as follows:

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Also to be included in the above mentioned results were 25 tons of rice captured, 22 individual weapons, 4 Mauser rifles, a punji stake factory destroyed and 10 kilos of medicine captured.

8. A chart of cumulative results for the reporting period is attached as Inclosure #1.

9. The breakdown of days the units were engaged by type activity during the reporting period are as follows:

Training Days: 0
Troop Movement: 0
Operations: 92

Total Days: 92

I. Intelligence:

1. Liaison: Squadron liaison visits to the various ARVN division headquarters and the 44th Special Tactical Zone headquarters continue to improve the Squadron collection of intelligence. Throughout the reporting period, the Squadron 3-2 personnel made continuous liaison visits with each headquarters that the Air Cavalry Squadron supported. A close working relationship with the Vietnamese intelligence agencies and U.S. advisors has developed through these liaison visits. Improvement of local intelligence gathering in conjunction with responsive reaction has enhanced Air Cavalry operations during the past three months. Presently, enemy sightings are being called directly to the Squadron TDC for rapid reaction.

2. National Police Assistance: Since early September, the Squadron has been greatly assisted by the deployment of Vietnamese police of Vinh Long in conjunction with dismounted sweeps around the installation base camp. The sweeps are conducted based on enemy intelligence and required reconnaissance of the surrounding area outside the perimeter. Usually, the Air Cavalry Troops' caro-rifle platoon conducts this mission. The attachment of a squad of policemen to the unit conducting the sweep aides the U.S. infantryman in a rapid on the spot interrogation of suspicious personnel. These policemen eliminate the language barrier and assure all information is obtained. They aid in the immediate collection of required intelligence information of the surrounding area. The continued use of these policemen has contributed to improve Vietnamese-American relationships within the surrounding civilian communities, and has definitely
increased the combat effectiveness of the unit. The police personnel are still employed with all mounted sweeps within the local area.

3. Ambush: In August, the Squadron's Cavalry Troop increased its night ambush requirements to enhance the perimeter security of the Squadron's base camp. Throughout the reporting period, the troop has conducted at least one ambush nightly. Based on enemy activity within the Vinh Long Sensitive Zone, as many as ten different sites have been used. The ambush sites have been established along suspected enemy movement routes and are incorporated into the Squadron's installation defensive plan. Most sites used have been established within 600-1800 meters of the perimeter wire. The sites are normally manned by 15 personnel employing claymore mines as a defensive weapon. Throughout the reporting period, these sites have denied the enemy close access to the perimeter for small arms attack or perimeter penetration within the Squadron's area of responsibility. An added feature is that the ambush sites provide the Squadron with a listening device consisting entirely of Squadron personnel.

4. Security Control Inspection: The Squadron received a security control inspection by the 1st Aviation Brigade G-2 on 24 October 1968. The overall rating was "Excellent" with a 94% achieved throughout the Squadron.

J. Safety:

1. During the periods of August, September, and October only one accident occurred involving a Squadron aircraft. A brief account of this accident follows:

   A Troop; OH-6A, 8 October 1968. The 164th Combat Aviation Group SIP was demonstrating a straight-in autorotation to the ground. On touchdown, cyclic was inadvertently moved aft causing the main rotor blade to strike the tail boom resulting in major component damage.

2. Safety record (during the reporting period):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Total Hours flown</th>
<th>Accidents</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>5334</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>12156</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1 ACS</td>
<td>10406</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cumulative rate has been decreasing steadily since the last ORLL.

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3. The possibility of engine FOD remains a major item of concern in this unit. Command emphasis continues to be placed on maintaining a high state of police on the ramp area. However, the area in and around the revetments is continuously deteriorating. Loose sand and penspries are constantly being blown about by rotor wash.

4. The monsoon season has created a minor problem in certain revetment areas. Water up to six (6) inches deep backs up inside the revetment areas making it difficult to work on the aircraft. In addition, heavy rains have washed part of the ramp away, but it is anticipated that this will be corrected.

5. The miniport facilities have been a constant hazard to the squadron since arriving at Vinh Long. The pumps are located too close to the active runway and to the adjacent revetments. The line is under constant repair for leaks. On one occasion, while a coupling was being repaired, JP-4 flooded the revetment area. It is anticipated that the facilities will be removed in the near future.

6. Continual command emphasis at all levels of command has been the key to reducing our accident rate. In addition, close supervision, education, and training of all personnel has allowed for a sound accident prevention program. It is anticipated that the present trend will continue to improve as the squadron matures with experience.

X. Communications

1. In the early part of August, plans were finalized for the squadron to relocate its permanent location on Vinh Long Airfield. Although only a small part of the construction and preparation had been completed, the "sand pile" had to be evacuated EMT 15 August to permit construction of a new parking ramp. Through self-help, the TOC/Signal complex was initiated the first week of August with the hope of initial occupancy by 12 August.

2. The communications complex was left intact until the last possible moment and then moved into the new TOC resulting in minimum down time. This was only accomplished through the priority given the communications center by the S-3. Immediate action was taken to improve the new TOC and establish a tactical communications center. Some difficulties were experienced in obtaining material, but the major improvements have been accomplished at this time.

3. The final equipment configuration for the communications center includes a radio-teletype position, switchboard position, high frequency radio and a tactical FM radio position. The teletype position was installed to accommodate an LR/TOC 19 when a circuit is allocated from higher headquarters. The switchboard is maintained as stacked SE22's.
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for maximum circuitry at all times.

4. During this quarter, the squadron has established a secure net with the utilization of TSEC/K36's and TSEC/KY28's. This equipment allows secure transmission throughout the squadron area of operations and higher headquarters. Presently, the limiting factor is the shortage of TSEC/KY28 sets for the aircraft. Only the CC aircraft in each troop, the S-3 aircraft, and the squadron C2C have this equipment installed. Plans have been formulated to have all aircraft, except the OH-6D equipped with speech secure equipment. The squadron's organic infantry, by utilizing the TSEC/KY38 will be able to enter the secure net as soon as the equipment is available.

5. Classes were conducted by the squadron communications officer for key personnel in the operation and security requirements prior to the installation of the equipment. Some problems were encountered initially with keying procedures. Training has eliminated these difficulties, but unexplained equipment failures deprecate from the effectiveness and reliability of the overall program.

6. Since the squadron's arrival at Vinh Long Installation, we have continued to experience unsatisfactory signal equipment support. The direct support for the squadron and all US units in IV Corps is the 51st Maintenance Company (Ord) located in Can Tho, Vietnam. They only have three repairmen available and cannot support the density of equipment in this area. Some relief has been obtained through direct liaison with the 2nd Maintenance Battalion (DS) located in Vung Tau, and with the 147th Light Equipment Maintenance Battalion (GS) located in Long Biên. Normal evacuation channels will not provide adequate operational equipment on hand for accomplishment of our mission.

7. Throughout the quarter, a continuous effort has been made to maintain a maximum number of telephones in operation in order to accomplish our tactical and administrative mission. The telephone requirements were kept to the bare essentials because of the number of lines available. Under these conditions, an outage creates a serious problem. A 100-pair cable was installed at the approximate time of the squadron's arrival at Vinh Long (May 68). Primary users of this cable are the 69th Engineer Battalion and the 7/1 ACS. This cable should have provided adequate phones for these units. By the end of the first month, the cable had deteriorated to less than 30 lines due to water leaking into the cable and resulting in a ground short. Corrective action was taken and repairs have been made to restore adequate telephones on Vinh Long Airfield. The lines available for calls outside of Vinh Long are inadequate to meet the requirements of this installation.

8. In October, the 101st Radio Research (LSI) unit conducted the first annual inspection of the squadron crypto account. The inspection revealed no discrepancies in the account and only two minor discrepancies in physical security.
9. During October, the 1st Aviation Brigade inspected two troops of the squadron on maintenance management. Each troop received an average material rating of 97.5, and the average management rating was 92.

10. The successful results of these inspections added to a quarter that has seen much overall improvement throughout the squadron.

L Logistics and Transportation

1. During the reporting period 1 August through 31 October, the S-4 continued to render logistical support to the 7/1 LCS. During the first two weeks of August, plans were completed for moving the squadron from its "Tent City" location to the north side of Vinh Long Army Airfield. This move had to be completed not later than the 15th of August. The S-4 section was required to obtain construction materials and assist the various sections and troops in construction of billets, latrines, showers and office facilities. As a result of this relocation, the squadron's living environment improved by moving into buildings of a more permanent nature.

2. During the remaining two weeks of August, the S-4 section concentrated on obtaining additional construction materials needed for completion of the buildings and general area beautification. Priority was placed on the completion of troop billeting areas and the consolidated mess hall.

3. New bunkers were constructed during this period in both the billet areas and on the perimeter. This work has been completed during the quarter to include intermediate firing positions within the squadron's sector of the perimeter.

4. During the month of September, construction on the various areas continued. The normal convoys were dispatched to Gen Tho and Binh Thuy for various supplies. As things became more stabilized with continued progress, the S-4 section concentrated its efforts toward conducting inventories and evacuation of unserviceable equipment through proper supply channels. Throughout the month, liaisons were established with our various support units. This proved to be beneficial to the squadron, in that it identified us to our support units and promoted a harmonious working relationship with other units.

5. One problem area experienced in September was with electrical power. For a period of two weeks, the squadron was without lights and power during the hours of darkness. This was caused primarily by the lack of personnel to properly maintain the few generators available on a 24-hour basis. In late September, all our sources of electrical power were turned over to P&Z. This solved our problem because they had the trained personnel and facilities to properly carry out this operation.

6. The month of October was routine in the S-4 section. Construction continued on improving all bunker sites and improving the mess hall.
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Construction was started on a walk-in freezer for the mess hall. This will help to eliminate a storage and spoilage problem.

7. Throughout the month, the S-4 became quite involved in drafting the new MTO&E for the squadron. The MTO&E was completed in draft on the 16th of October and the new proposed changes were submitted on the 22nd. With the approval and implementation of this new MTO&E, provisions will be made to provide additional personnel for the consolidated mess hall and ammunition storage area.

8. During the period 22-25 October, C and D Troops received an unannounced CNU by 1st Aviation Brigade. Each troop received satisfactory ratings, experiencing little difficulty on wheeled vehicle maintenance.

9. During this period, construction was started on a new "CO BBQ and permanent shower and latrine facilities. Water lines are programmed to be laid which will provide the squadron with a 24-hour water supply. Installation of this project is due to be completed by mid-November.
II. (C) Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

A. Personnel

1. Direct Support Maintenance Team

(a) Observation: The 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry received its TC Maintenance Detachments five months after arrival in country.

(b) Evaluation: The TC Detachments required a period of four weeks to become operational and were not able to assume maintenance support responsibility immediately upon arrival. Additionally, the personnel were not as qualified to perform their mission as were the personnel of the attached direct support maintenance team (E Troop). In order to assure no depreciable effect with regards to aircraft maintenance, a transitional overlap period of approximately four weeks planned between the arrival of the KD cells and the release of E Troop.

(c) Recommendations: That the TC Detachments train and deploy with the unit to which attached, which will facilitate both to become operational concurrently. When this is not possible, implement a transition period of approximately three months between the arrival of the KD cells and the release of the direct support maintenance team to include infusion between the teams.

2. Finance Detachment

(a) Observation: In accordance with the Military Modified Pay Voucher System, one individual from the Squadron's Finance Section was attached to the 10th Finance Section at Phu Loi to support 6 Troop, 7/1 ACS and three were attached to the 292nd Finance Section at Can Tho.

(b) Evaluation: This attachment has caused many administrative problems. It has required duplicate work in many instances where correspondence was lost in transmittal to the finance office. It requires the S-1 section to arrange for transportation to finance for personnel who have pay problems that cannot be resolved by the personnel section. It requires individuals departing on emergency leave and PCS to go to Can Tho to clear prior to departure. In some cases, individuals are required to go to the finance section two and three times to complete simple actions such as application for allowances and allotments.

(c) Recommendations: Recommend that the Squadron's finance section be attached to the personnel section for operational control to alleviate correspondence and administrative separation as well as
limit transportation problems incurred by separation of personnel from the unit.

B. Operations

1. Use of Paddy Control on Night Missions

(a) Observations: Air Cavalry Troops use Paddy Control when conducting night observation along the border in the 44th STZ to assist in navigation as well as target locations.

(b) Evaluation: The cooperation and assistance rendered by Paddy Control has been outstanding during Squadron operations at night in the 44th STZ. Troops contact Paddy when a target is located and request location be marked so that the Troop can return later on station for a strike or VR. The navigational assistance along the border is invaluable for the Troops on night operations especially when the rainy season completely voids night navigation by terrain familiarization.

(c) Recommendations: Recommend Air Cavalry Troops scheduled for night missions use Paddy Control on all missions working in areas where terrain navigation is difficult and hazardous. The Squadron is presently incorporating this procedure as SOP.

2. Night Missions on OPERATION BLACKHAWK

(a) Observations: A night OPERATION BLACKHAWK mission has been conducted on several occasions by employing the Troop from 1800H until 0500H the following day for border interdiction in the 44th STZ.

(b) Evaluation: During the conduct of these missions, contact is frequently made during the first two hours of the VR. The presence of the Air Cavalry Troop in the VR capability at night compiled with the unexpected change of the pattern established by daylight operations has proven to be a valuable detriment to VC movement. The present weather has limited the number of night operations scheduled.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that 30% of the Blackhawk Operations be staggered to include night VR missions by the Air Cavalry Troop. A further evaluation of tactics used for employment of the night mission would have to be conducted as experience developed. The Squadron plans to incorporate this percentage of night missions pending favorable weather conditions.

3. Medevac Aircraft

(a) Observations: Medevac aircraft should be available on standby at 44th STZ when OPERATION BLACKHAWK is conducted.

(b) Evaluation: The Squadron has two Air Cavalry Troops operating in the 44th STZ on a daily basis. The requirement for medevac
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exists daily in both operational areas for US and ARVN personnel. Each time a medevac takes place, the Troop must dispatch one of its four lift aircraft for this purpose. When a medevac is required, the Troop has ground troops in contact or an aircraft down by enemy fire. The necessity for all four lift aircraft is critical at this time. Normally, the evacuation is of an immediate nature and cannot wait for a normal medevac aircraft to respond to the far northern extremities of the 44th STZ where the Squadron usually operates. There is a need for this requirement when the Squadron has two Troops in the STZ with approximately twenty to thirty aircraft in the operational areas.

(c) Recommendations: Recommend a medevac aircraft be available at Cao Lãnh when OPERATION BLACKHAWK is conducted to react to either AO as required. Squadron has requested to 44th STZ that two medevac aircraft be available during OPERATION BLACKHAWK.

4. Deployment of An Air Cavalry Troop

(a) Observation: The majority of the missions assigned to the Air Cavalry Troop in general support do not achieve the maximum effectiveness from the capabilities.

(b) Evaluation: The primary mission of the Air Cavalry Troop is to find, fix and destroy the enemy. It is primarily a reconnaissance unit to pin point and exploit enemy locations. To achieve maximum utilization and success from operations, the Troop should be used by divisions to visually recon depicted operational areas while OPCON aircraft assets and troops standby to react to findings. In normal operations in the Delta the Air Cavalry Troop could locate an enemy target of value in two to three hours in a given area of responsibility for a division operation. Division elements could then react immediately if maintained on a standby basis until a target is fixed by the Troop. On numerous operations, units will plan an operation and use the Troop in a screening mission in a separate AC with only organic infantry for RP. Regardless of what is found or fixed by the Air Cavalry Troop, the division cannot react because assets and troops have been committed already on the pre-planned mission. Numerous wasted hours flown on aircraft could be alleviated and effective utilization of ground troops and success on division operations could be achieved by allowing the Cavalry capability to locate and fix the concentration of enemy in a given AO before Division Troops are committed.

(c) Recommendations: Division elements using an Air Cavalry Troop in the Delta allow the Troop to VR the designated AO prior to committing assets in order to fix and ascertain the latest enemy concentrations. This could normally be accomplished by having the airborne assets and ground troops standby for two to three hours during the beginning of the operation.
5. Mohawk Operations

(a) Observations: The Mohawks have the ability to find targets but are unable to mark the target for the Huey Cobra.

(b) Evaluation: When the Mohawk provides a flare ship, the IR ship leads and the flare ship follows. The lead ship calls "Mark" when he gets a hot reading on his equipment. The flare ship then drops a flare. The lead ship must then adjust from the flare drop to put the gunships and helicopter flare ship on target. Adjustment from a moving aerial flare is very difficult.

(c) Recommendations: Flares dropped from the Mohawk aircraft be set at maximum ejection and ignition delay, allowing the flare to strike and burn on the ground as long as possible. This provides an excellent stationary point from which to adjust the helicopter flare ship and gunships.

6. Night Strike Missions

(a) Observation: The enemy conducts the greatest majority of their operations and meetings during the hours of darkness.

(b) Evaluation: Acting on immediate and reliable intelligence information pin pointing the location and time of a Viet Cong meeting, gunships were employed on night missions to attack targets of this nature. One gunship team and flare helicopter was utilized. The flare ship was employed primarily to confirm the target and provide continuous illumination while the gunships strike. Surprise and rapid action are the determining factors for success of the mission. The gunships expend their load of ordnance as rapidly as possible, in a minimum number of passes. After expending their ammunition, all aircraft immediately return to the staging area.

(c) Recommendation: The strike mission has been conducted with excellent results. Targets of this nature should have a very high priority and intelligence rating. Normally, intelligence of this nature is short fused and must be reacted upon on short notification.

7. Units Attached

(a) Observation: Units placed OPOCM to the Air Cavalry Troop on operational missions.

(b) Evaluation: The CIDG, ARVN and PRU units under the operational control of the individual troops are aggressive and well disciplined fighters. These units augment the organic infantry platoons to increase the RRF capability. They are familiar with the real estate on which they operate. They know the customs of the people and the habits of the Viet Cong. The greatest problems we have
encountered while operating with these units is ascertaining exactly what enemy equipment is being captured or destroyed during the operation. Also, there is a communications problem between the C&C aircraft and the ground units because of the limited number of US advisory personnel assigned to the units on operations. To combat these problem areas we have employed additional personnel from the infantry platoon of the Air Cavalry Troop with the ground element attached for the operation. This greatly increases the control and movement of the troops, alleviates the communications problem and also helps in assessing enemy losses and other intelligence data.

8. Employment of Scout Aircraft for First Light Reconnaissance Missions in the Delta

   (a) Observation: Scout aircraft limits the flexibility and speed of the AH-1G on first light reconnaissance missions.

   (b) Evaluation: The primary missions of the Air-Cavalry on a first light mission is to detect any unauthorized traffic early in the morning. The scout helicopter's greatest asset is its ability to operate lower and slower than Huey Cobras to acquire targets that are difficult to see. The targets that are searched for on such missions are readily identified and must be engaged quickly. The aircraft must be able to cover a wide area in a short time.

   (c) Recommendations: The scout aircraft, as a rule, should not be used for first light reconnaissance missions. This allows the AH-1G to use its speed to cover a much larger area and come up on the enemy before he has an opportunity to hide.

9. Final Surveillance of an Area After Extraction of Ground Units

   (a) Observation: After an extraction of ground elements, the Viet Cong will normally have several people assess the damages of an attack or strike.

   (b) Evaluation: Several times the number of Viet Cong killed on an operation has been increased by sending a gunship team back into the area of operation approximately thirty minutes after the final extraction of the ground unit. By making a fast sweep, the gunships have been able to catch several Viet Cong returning to the area.

   (c) Recommendations: Whenever possible a final reconnaissance of an operational area will be made by a gunship team.

10. The Use of the Same Area for Landing Zones and Pickup Zones

   (a) Observation: The enemy has learned to evaluate choices for landing zones and pickup zones for small scale operations and use them to their advantage.

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(b) Evaluation: When a unit is forced to use the same area for a landing zone and pickup zone, several precautionary measures must be taken. It has been found that the enemy will withdraw in front of an advancing ground element, then follow him back to the intended pickup zone. He can only do this if the canopy coverage is so thick that his withdrawal will not be detected by the aerial scout element. Another concept that the Viet Cong will use is allowing the ground element to sweep past their position along the landing zone when they know that the same area will also have to be used as a pickup zone.

(c) Recommendation: The landing zone and pickup zone should not be the same area. If the situation is such that no other choice is possible, extreme caution should be taken and maximum security should be employed. Extremely close air coverage should be used on the extraction of the final elements.

11. C&C Aircraft

(a) Observation: The C&C aircraft requires the ability to extend the time available on station during operations up to approximately four hours.

(b) Evaluation: The Air Cavalry Troop mission commander must remain in the area of ground operations for direction and control of ground elements. It is imperative that the mission commander be able to maintain contact and control with ground elements during the time of contact which normally lasts from two to three hours of Air Cavalry Troop operations. The present method of coping with the problem is that control is turned over to the weapons platoon leader or weapons section leader on station during the time the C&C aircraft is refueling.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that an auxiliary fuel tank be installed in the C&C aircraft to extend time on station to cover the entire time that the ground elements are inserted.

12. Enemy Booby-traps Encountered by Scout Aircraft

(a) Observation: On 25 October 1968, Troop elements came across a swamps in an open area covered with weeds and water. It was seemingly abandoned with an ammo box plainly displayed. On closer examination, a claymore mine on tripods was spotted. The scouts were advised to abandon the area. As the aircraft were clearing, two mines detonated. On further examination of the general area, four more mines of the same type were found on each corner of the swampl at an approximate distance of 25 to 30 meters. An attempt to determine if the mines were command detonated was unsuccessful due to the terrain and the area. No personnel were observed in the vicinity. See Inclosure 52.
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(b) Evaluation: Enemy forces have become wise to the troops' efforts to garner information and intelligence by inspecting and picking up packs, ammo boxes, etc. on isolated and seemingly abandoned sampans on plains and paddies in chiefly enemy infested area.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that a closer observation and longer period of visual reconnaissance of an area be required before any attempts are made to pick up any suspicious equipment to prevent such enemy traps from being successful. If sightings do not appear to have military value or significance for intelligence value, it should be destroyed without endangering lives by attempting to secure the item(s). This has been incorporated into the Squadron SOP.

13. Training: None

14. Intelligence: Enemy Information and Equipment Collected when on OPERATION BLACKHAWK

(b) Observation: US intelligence channels do not appear to parallel the Vietnamese channels when equipment and documents are procured on OPERATION BLACKHAWK.

(b) Evaluation: During OPERATION BLACKHAWK, Camp Strike Forces are used to augment and support the Air Cavalry Troop. When material or documents are picked up during operations by these troops, the Squadron is unable to receive or obtain any information concerning intelligence gained by the material. Attempts have been made through channels to obtain a feeder report or other type report as to what information was picked up by the ground forces. Procurement of collected items from the CSF is impossible for these personnel are paid by what they pick up in the AO.

(c) Recommendations: All information received through documents or other captured materials be obtained and reported by the CSF advisors prior to the material going through Vietnamese channels. This information could be very valuable to future targeting of the Air Cavalry Troop in that area. The Squadron has requested that 44th 3TZ assist in this area of importance.

15. Logistics:

(a) Overheating of Radios

(1) Observation: The continuous operation of radios in the TOC causes them to overheat.

(2) Evaluation: Radios operating continuously in a confined area such as a TOC have a tendency to overheat and malfunction if continuous circulation of cool air is not available. By the installation of air conditioning units in the TOC's, the life of the radios is greatly increased. The KY-8 unit requires a cool environment to function properly.
The keying unit of the KY-G continuously overheat and has to be taken from the radio and cooled.

(3) Recommendation: A request has been made to acquire a 16,000 BTU air conditioning unit to sufficiently keep the TOG at an optimum temperature for cooling radio equipment.

(b) Rations for Consolidated Mess Hall

(1) Observation: There has been a continuous problem of receiving the proper rations for the consolidated mess hall.

(2) Evaluation: The Squadron rations breakdown point is located at Can Tho. Rations for Soc Trang, Vinh Long, Can Tho, and the outlying posts are transported to Can Tho from Saigon. The Squadron has, on numerous occasions, been short of rations due to the fact that rations were short upon arrival at Can Tho. Additionally, large quantities of milk, eggs, and meat are being lost through rough handling, delay in route, and lack of refrigeration.

(3) Recommendation: That a rations breakdown point be established at Vinh Long for all units at Vinh Long. That rations be transported by water or air directly to Vinh Long from Saigon.


17. Other

(a) Effects of Rainy Season in Selection of LZ and PZ

(1) Observation: During the rainy season, the paddies and plains of the 44th STZ are covered with water ranging from 3 to 10 feet in depth.

(2) Evaluation: When contact is made with enemy elements by the Air Cavalry Troop, careful attention must be emphasized to select an LZ as well as route to the objective that will enable the ground troops to maneuver in little or no water.

(3) Recommendation: Mission Commanders should check the depth of the water in an LZ to insure troops dropped are not restricted or trapped in water too deep to maneuver to their objective.

(b) Use of Air Boats During the Rainy Season

(1) Observation: The Air Cavalry Troop has used the air boat on numerous occasions to assist in exploiting targets and reconnaissance missions.

(2) Evaluation: The air boat has been used to exploit areas covered by water during the rainy season to assist the Air Cavalry Troop on OPERATION BLACKHAWK. Certain restrictions are imposed when using these
boats as follows: Control is very difficult primarily because the operators cannot communicate clearly when boats are operating at high speeds. Only three personnel can ride on the air boat preventing the ability to carry troops to further exploitation. The boats can only be used on a reconnaissance mission due to the limited ability to carry troops and exposure of personnel crewing the air boat.

(3) Recommendation: The use of air boats should be employed to further assist Air Cavalry Troop operations in the 44th STZ, however, limitations should be stressed and considered in employment by the mission commander.

(c) Conduct of Night Missions During the Rainy Season

(1) Observation: The Air Cavalry Troops have attempted to conduct various types of night missions in the 44th STZ during the rainy season.

(2) Evaluation: During the reporting period, numerous night missions were scheduled to include VR as well as "Cobra" "Hunter" comet missions. The weather normally between the hours of 2200H and 0100H caused missions to be cancelled due to the storms and low cloud decks in the operational area.

(3) Recommendation: Recommend careful scheduling of night missions during this season to insure trained pilots are scheduled who know the weather and aircraft limitations as well as navigational aids and radar facilities. Missions should be kept to a minimum during this period due to the frequency of these conditions.

(d) Wet Season Operations in the Delta

(1) Observation: The use of pontoons on lift aircraft during the wet season could prove to an an enhancement to wet season operations in the 44th STZ.

(2) Evaluation: Presently, aircraft are hovered above the surface of the water or with skids just on the surface of the water while troops and equipment from caches discovered are picked up. On numerous occasions, the ability to place the aircraft down on the water for loading of equipment and prisoners would greatly enhance the troop operations and minimize the dangers to pilots and crews.

(3) Recommendation: It is recommended that a study be made and experiments run to determine feasibility, accessibility, and practicality of the use of the pontoon in swampy terrain such as in the 44th STZ in the wet season.
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(e) AM/PRC 25 Radio Set

(1) Observation: The AM/PRC 25 radio set is less efficient in the Delta due to the problems incurred by the over abundance of water and moisture.

(2) Evaluation: Since May 1968 this unit has operated in the Delta. Experience has shown that the planning range over water has been diminished to about half that normally expected. Various antennas have been tried, but in each instance less than half the distance reached during the dry season has been reached in this location. Although the unit is waterproof, a certain amount of seepage and condensation causes corrosion and electrical shorting which, in turn, leads to equipment failures. Another difficulty is water seepage in handsets and microphones. At times, the seepage intermittently keys the radio transmitter.

(3) Recommendation: Maximum utilization should be stressed with portable AM single side band radios for patrols, ambushes, and other small unit operations. A better sealed AM receiver-transmitter and handset could alleviate some of the transmission and maintenance problems incurred with the distance and reliability of the AM/PRC 25 during the rainy season.

(f) MX 6707/VRC Antenna Matching Unit

(1) Observation: The MX 6707 Matching Unit is a sealed, waterproof unit, however, condensation during the wet season in the Delta has caused the internal mechanism to corrode.

(2) Evaluation: During the dry season in the III CTZ the organization experienced no failure of the MX 6707 Matching Unit. After operating in the Hokong Delta during the wet season for approximately three months, the Squadron has had a dozen or more matching units fail. The equipment is designed to allow manual tuning and loading of the antenna. The corrosion caused by condensation within the waterproof unit eventually destroys that capability. The matching unit cannot be repaired in Vietnam. Consequently, some method of prolonging the life of a matching unit must be discovered.

(3) Recommendation: Modifications should be sent to the field allowing a hole to be drilled in the bottom plate. The hole will allow the moisture to evaporate from the internal mechanism. A study should also be conducted to evaluate the effect of hermetically sealing the matching unit.

(g) Interior of Aircraft Damaged by Rats

(1) Observation: As a result of high water during the wet season, there has been a problem in the Troop of rats getting into aircraft and damaging wires in the interior by chewing them.
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(2) Evaluation: The presence of C Rations, packages of cigarettes kept in the aircraft appear to have been a major factor, as well as the "HELL HOLE" being uncovered for entrance.

(3) Recommendation: It is recommended that no food, C Rations, or other material be left in the aircraft. It is further recommended that when the cargo hook is not needed on aircraft, it be removed so the "HELL HOLE" can be covered to prevent rodents from gaining access to the aircraft.

(h) Survival, Escape and Evasion: None

2 Incl
1. Enemy Equipment Captured or Destroyed
2. Diagram of Enemy Booby Trap
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AVON (13 Nov 68) 1st Inf (c)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (Hi) (U)

DA, HQ, 164TH AVIATION GROUP, APO 96215, 30 November 1968

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) The attached 7/1 ACS ORLL for the period ending 31 October 1968
has been evaluated by this headquarters as required by USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (U) The authorized strength for 7/1 ACS units is as listed below.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Trp</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Trp</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Trp</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (C) Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations,
and Recommendations:

a. Direct Support Maintenance Team: Concur with that portion of the
recommendation which states that TC Detachments should train with and
deploy with the unit they are programmed to support. Four weeks is not
considered excessive time for a unit to become fully operational after
arriving in country. Experienced personnel were infused into these
detachments upon arrival. Support by two TC Detachments for a three
month transition period is not required.

b. Finance Detachment: The move of a finance section to Vinh Long
is under consideration by this Headquarters.

c. Use of Paddy Control on Night Missions: Concur with the
recommendation. Units of the 164th CAG are presently using the radar
facilities of Paddy Control for a positive fix on location when operating
in the vicinity of the Cambodian Border. Due to the reduced air traffic
during the hours of darkness, the use of Paddy facilities along
the border does not degrade its capability to flight-follow other aircraft.

d. Night Missions on Operation Blackhawk: Concur with the recommenda-
tion. Operation Blackhawk is conducted to prevent enemy infiltration
into IV CTZ from Cambodia. Daily 24 hour operations are essential to
successful accomplishment of the assigned mission.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
for Period Ending 31 October, 1968, RVN CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

e. Medevac Aircraft: Concur with the recommendation. Only six medevac aircraft are presently employed in the IV Corps area, none of which is usually in maintenance. Medevac aircraft are not available to stand by in each operational area, when organic transport helicopters are available for medevac missions. Primary medevac responsibility for ARVN soldiers remains with VNAF. An additional medevac detachment is programmed for employment in the Delta region; upon arrival medevac aircraft will be available to stand by at each operational area.

f. Employment of an Air Cavalry Troop: Concur with the recommendation. Commencing on 8 December 1968 an air cavalry troop will be employed with each of three ARVN Divisions in the IV CTZ. The squadron will conduct a reorientation program for each division to explain capabilities and concepts of employment of the air cavalry troop.

g. Mohawk Operations: Non concur with the recommendation. The damage to friendly property caused by flares burning on the ground, particularly during the dry season, prohibit their use in this manner to mark targets.

h. Night Strike Missions: Each target is evaluated to determine its threat to friendly forces and its influence on overall tactical operations prior to engagement.

i. Units attached: Group concurs with the cross-reinforcing and training of US and ARVN units.

j. Employment of Scout Aircraft (OH-6A) for first light reconnaissance mission in the Delta: Techniques of employing scout and gun teams will vary depending upon the mission. However, the AH-1G gunships should not operate at the lower, more vulnerable altitudes as a replacement for the scout helicopters.

k. Final Surveillance of an Area after Extraction of Ground Troops: Concur with the recommendation. This technique has been employed with success by 164th CAG units.

l. Use of the Same Landing Zones and Pick up Zones: Concur with the recommendation. Consistent use of the same LZ's and PZ's is avoided whenever possible. The Senior Advisor, IV CTZ has informed all ARVN units of the hazards associated with the habitual use of the same PZ's and LZ's.

m. C&C Aircraft: The decision to install an auxiliary fuel tank in the air cavalry troop command and control aircraft should remain with the Squadron Commander.
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AVNH-(13 Nov 68) last with November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
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n. Enemy Booby Traps Encountered by Scout Aircraft: Concur with
   the recommendation. Every effort should be made to prevent injury to
   friendly forces.

o. Enemy Information and Equipment Collection when on Operation
   Blackhawk: Coordination is being affected with MACV Advisors to determine
   a method of processing captured enemy material that will satisfy the
   intelligence needs of both US and ARVN forces.

p. Overheating of Radios: An electric fan properly positioned can
   effectively reduce the heat generated by radios and associated equipment.

q. Rations for Consolidated Mess Hall: Concur with recommendation.
   With the progressive increase in personnel at Vinh Long, the need for a
   local Class I supply point becomes acute. The establishment of a Class I
   supply point at Vinh Long is under serious consideration at this time.
   Improved packing methods have been employed to reduce damage to vegetables
   and bread during shipment.

r. Effects of the Rainy Season on Selection of L/7s and P7s: Concur with
   recommendation. The depth of the water must be known before troops leave the aircraft to insure that troops will be able to
   maneuver on the ground and to prevent unnecessary loss of life.

e. Use of Air Boats: Concur with the recommendation. Airboats
   are presently being used on select missions during the wet season.

t. Conduct of Night Missions During the Rainy Season: Concur with
   the recommendation. Night missions are being performed by the best
   qualified pilots assigned to each unit of the 161st CAG.

u. Wet Season Operations in the Delta: Concur with the recommendation.
   Helicopters search and find caches in many areas that airboats and other
   vehicles do not have access.

v. AN/PRC 25 Radio Set: The effects of water on ground radio
   handsets and microphones have been persistent. EIR is being submitted.

w. MX 6707/1RC Antenna Matching Unit: An EIR is being submitted
   by the 7/1 ACS.

x. Interior of Aircraft damaged by Rats: Concur with recommendation.
   Crew members must insure that exposed food is not left in an aircraft and
   the "hell hole" should be covered by a screen or other material to keep
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RGS CS FOR 65 (RI) (U)

4. (U) The 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry has accomplished all assigned missions during this reporting period.

Leo C. Hansen
LTC, CE
Acting Commander

DISTRIBUTION:
2 DA, ATTN: ACSFOR
1 CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVEA-C
5 CO, 7/1 AFS
2 S3, 164th CAG
a. Paragraph II A2, page 15. Nonconcur. The Modified Military Pay Voucher System has been accepted in USARV as the most efficient method to render finance support considering available facilities and personnel resources. It is the prerogative of the Army commander, based on guidance in paragraph 1-5d, DA Circular 37-22, to determine whether finance support will be centralized or fragmented. Admittedly, transportation does cause problems in this command. However, the system is more effective when centralized, pay errors (i.e., over and under payments) are less, and correspondence has fewer channels through which to flow, which decreases the number of documents which are lost. Centralized finance support requires fewer personnel, and facilitates cross training of those assigned to pay functions. The number of administrative problems noted in evaluation would probably decrease only slightly if finance records were decentralized, e.g., transportation problems would be less, however individuals would still have to go to finance when departing RVN (casual and partial pays, advance pays, travel pay, etc). One of the real problems that would be encountered if finance were placed at squadron level would be lack of competent supervisory personnel. The average unit personnel technician and personnel sergeant haven't been associated with pay records maintenance and pay procedures for over two years. Since supervisory level personnel would not be competent to administer the pay system, many additional administrative problems would develop that now exist in minimal numbers.

b. Paragraph II B11, page 20. Nonconcur. Provisions are made for the installation of ferry tanks in aircraft for specific purposes. Installation of unprotected fuel cells in the cargo compartment of an aircraft during combat operations increases the hazard of a mid-air explosion and also occupies valuable cargo space.
Subject: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSPCM-65) (KL) (UIC: WCZ6AA) (U)

2. (c) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph II B7(f), page 24. Nonconcur. No drain holes should be drilled in any sealed electronic units. The problem and cause lies with the deterioration of the seals and these should be replaced or repaired with a silicon rubber compound.

b. Paragraph II B15, page 21. USAF Regulation 420-54 does not authorize air conditioning for command and control centers (TOC) below separate brigade level. Air conditioning is authorized if this area is classed as a security room without windows or mechanical ventilation.

c. Paragraph II B15, page 22. Problem has been relayed to Director of Foods, Saigon Support Command. The food advisor from the 164th CAG was instructed to devote attention to the rations being shipped from the Can Tho Class I point to Vinh Long. Brigade food supervisor will personally visit Saigon Support Command, 53d General Support Group, and Can Tho LSA, as necessary, to determine why items are being short issued. The recommendation that a ration breakdown point be established at Vinh Long cannot even be considered by the Saigon Support Command until a thorough investigation has been completed.

d. Paragraph II B17(e), page 24. The general support facility (185th Bn-LEM) is aware of the watertight seal problems with the AN/PRC-25. As an interim fix they recommend and are using a silicon rubber compound to repair the seals.

For the Commander:

Lee S. Peterson
1LT. AGC
ASST ADJ GEN
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 27 Dec 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry.

2. Comments follow:


   b. Reference item concerning wet season operations in the Delta, page 23, Section II, paragraph B17(d). Nonconcur. Flotation kits would decrease useful payload of the helicopter by 226 pounds. The kit would also replace the normal skid gear.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn: HQ 1st Arm Bde
HQ 7/1 AGS
GPOP-DT (13 Nov 68) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Armored Sqdn, 1st Air Cav
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORIT
CPT, AGC
Asst AGC
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Ingeclosure #1 (Enemy Equipment Captured or Destroyed) to Operational Report
Lessons Learned for the Reporting Period Ending 31 October
1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

I. ENEMY CASUALTIES:

79 VC KIA (Possible)
5 VC WIA

II. CAPTURED:

312 POW's
1 scale (500 lbs)
2 cauldrons (500 lbs)
1 quarter-moon-shaped cauldrons for iron ingots
3 grinding wheels (metal use)
1 6'x6'x2' wagon, rubber wheels (East German)
1 cauldron track, 12' long by 3' wide to haul cauldron
10 nylon straps (2000 lbs stress)
1 60" latho, metal
390 lbs tools, hand chisels, screw drivers, hack saws, planes, cross-cut saws, drill bits, 3 regular drill bits
80 lbs iron and steel forge tools, tong, pokers, dips, etc.
1 24" drill press
1 transistor radio (3 band)
1 ammunotor motor (Briggs & Stratton), shaft and propeller
2 40mm flares
20 bolt action rifles
1 5 hp motor, diesel for lathe (Kubota name)
1 52mm mortar sight
8 rifle stocks
30 rounds 60mm mortar ammo
2 14-3 sub-machineguns
4 shotguns (12 guage)
18 AK47 rifles
4 Chicon rifles
4 Chicon pistols
4 Russian carbines
9 automatic rifles
90 cylindrical mines
300 hand grenades
110 rifle grenades
1 sewing machine
1 typewriter
400 feet thin gauge wire
2 vises
1 arc welder
22 carbines
2 pistols (caliber .45)
16 tractor engines (scrap)
26 truck engines (scrap)
20 50' lengths 1" diameter concrete reinforced rods
9 main drive shafts

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60 lbs documents (supply records, instructions on how to run new Anti-aircraft guns of unknown type, orders and photos with rewards for people who had turned Chou Hoi

III. DESTROYED:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 forges (50 lbs each)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 empty grenade casings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 warheads 75mm molds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 truck jack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 rounds AK47 ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 lbs charcoal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 VC uniforms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750 lbs TNT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 vials vitamin pills (consumed on spot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 welding rods (24&quot;x1/4&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600 fish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 aluminum grenade molds for sand casts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140 sand casts for grenades (4 molds per cast)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 woodworking benches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 sampans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 rifle grenades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 bluster bomb units (C.B.U.'s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1.5 KW generator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 cylindrical mines (10 KG ea)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 16&quot; metal lathe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 vehicle mines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 booby traps (2 lbs ea)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 engine with drive shaft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 15-26 grenades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3283 home made grenades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 pieces of 4'x6' sheet metal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 pieces of 1&quot; steel rod 24' long</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 barrel of potassium chloride</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 barrel of black powder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 barrels of unknown type acid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 pressure fuses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 springs for grenades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 cans of cosmoline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 chemical scales</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 melting stove</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 gallons of crystallized powder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 anvils</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Chicom mines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 steel stakes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80 blasting caps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 lbs of M-1 propellant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15000 lbs of rice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many ammo magazines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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35
DESTROYED: (Cont)

3 ammo factories
1 melting shop
1 chemical installation
1 sheet metal shop
1 booby trap plant
1 blacksmith shop
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Diagram of Enemy Booby Trap to Operational Report Lessons
Learned for the Reporting Period Ending 31 October 1968
(RCS G3FOR-65) (N1)
IWOASSJ UK J)

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R&D

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