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SECTION 1 (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General.

   a. During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation MAC ARTHUR.

   b. Organizational Structure. Task organization for Operation BINH TAY-MAC ARTHUR for the period is contained at inclosure 1.

   c. Key personnel. Commanders as of the end of the reporting period are listed at inclosure 2.

   d. Mission.

      (1) The general mission of the division at the end of the reporting period was to conduct surveillance and offensive operations and to provide maximum support to the Government of VIETNAM's Refugee Resettlement Program and the Revolutionary Development Program.

      (2) The specific missions of the 4th Infantry Division are to:

         (a) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the CAMBODIAN Border and destroy enemy (NVA/VC) units within the assigned area of operations.

         (b) Block enemy infiltration routes from CAMBODIA/LAOS across the highlands into the coastal provinces.

         (c) Conduct spoiling attacks and ambush operations.

         (d) Destroy enemy base areas and supply installations.

         (e) Detect and eliminate VIET CONG infrastructure.

         (f) Clear, secure and assist in the development of the Tactical Area of Responsibility.
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(g) Support the Government of VIETNAM's EDAP ENLING Resettlement Program.

(h) Open, secure and maintain land lines of communication.

(i) Be prepared to deploy forces for the relief/reinforcement of Camp Strike Forces, Regional and Popular Forces, critical signal sites and sector/subsector headquarters within II Corps Tactical Zone.

(j) Provide to I Field Force, VIETNAM, a battalion size reserve on order.

2. (c) Intelligence.

a. General: At the beginning of the reporting period, the major enemy threat had shifted to DÄLAC as a result of the 1st NVA Division having withdrawn from KONTUM Province in June and moved into DÄLAC Province in July with the mission of taking BÀN MÈ THUỘT. By the middle of August, the enemy was conducting his final reconnaissance of the city, with the 66th Regt north of the city, the 320th Regt to the west, and the 95C Regt to the south. With the arrival of 4th Division units in the BÀN MÈ THUỘT area, however, the enemy was forced to switch his objective, and he redeployed the 320th and 95C Regts to DỨC LÀP. After unsuccessfully attempting to overrun DỨC LÀP Sub-sector Headquarters and SF Camp, the enemy withdrew into Base Area 7-40.

In the Tri-border area, the 101D Regiment in late August made an abortive ground attack on DÀK SEÁNG SF Camp and a number of attacks by fire on DÀK SEÁNG and FSB's in the area.

In early August the 24th Regt relocated from north of KONTUM City to the vicinity of the PLEIKU-KONTUM Province boundary, east of Highway 11N. They attempted three ambushes in late August. NVA elements inflicted heavy losses on the 24th Regt in August and September engagements east of Highway 11N between PLEIKU and KONTUM Cities.

The 18B and 95th Regts, which moved to Base Area 701 from the coast in July, did not return to the coast in September as anticipated, indicating that they may be assigned to the Highlands for a long offensive. The 95th Regt moved to the DỨC LÀP area in September, but was contacted only sporadically.

September and October saw a general withdrawal and reassignment of B-3 Front forces. The 101D Regt vacated the Tri-border area and moved south, probably to Base Area 701. The 24th Regt moved out of country and probably returned to its normal resupply area in Base Area 609. The 66th Regt moved from north of BÀN MÈ THUỘT to the area north of DỨC LÀP.

At the end of the reporting period, the main enemy force appeared to have concentrated in Base Area 701 opposite DỨC CO. Units believed to be in the area were the 18B and probably 101D Regts. The 18B Regt was identified in a contact southwest of THÀNH AN at the end of October, indicating that an enemy offensive might be in the offing in western PLEIKU. A diversionary effort around BÀN HẾT was also taking shape, with 40th Arty Regt units and possibly elements of the...
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24th Regt conducting attacks by fire on BEN HET and FSB's in the area. The 320th
and 950 Regts were not observed since early September, and were probably still
in Base Area 740. The 95th Regt was probably also there, while the 66th Regt
was located somewhere between Base Area 740 and Base Area 701:

(1) KONTUM: In marked contrast to past patterns of enemy operations in the
Highlands, KONTUM Province witnessed only limited enemy activity after early
August, and at the end of the reporting period was opposed by the smallest num-
ber of NVA forces since prior to the Battle for DAK TO during November 1967.

Activity during the month of August was centered in the DAK SEANG area. After
a feint at friendly firebases in the BEN HET area on the night of 14 Aug by
means of heavy weapons attacks by the 40th NVA arty Regt, the 101D NVA Regt
launched a savage attack on the DAK SEANG Special Forces Camp on 18 Aug. A
sweep of the area following the abortive assault netted 39 enemy bodies and 12
prisoners. This attack signaled the initiation of the Third General Offensive
in KONTUM Province. The lst Bde CP received a rocket attack on 22 Aug, and
KONTUM City was hit by rockets and mortars on 23 Aug. It is significant that
the attacks by fire were not followed by major ground contact as was the case
during the Tet and Second General Offensives. This would indicate that the VC
and NVA forces simply were not strong enough to carry out full-scale coordinated
attacks as they had previously. The attacks by fire continued on a daily basis
in the DAK SEANG area during the remainder of August, but dissipated to sniping
in the DAK TO area and mining activity and sporadic harassing attacks in the
KONTUM City area.

For the first three weeks of September, friendly installations in the DAK SEANG
area continued to experience almost daily attacks by fire, light contacts, and
probes. In late September, however, enemy activity rapidly decreased, and Red
Base, APD sensings, and visual reconnaissance detected the withdrawal of the
101D Regt from the DAK SEANG area into LAOS. Activity generally increased south
of DAK TO as a result of NVA efforts to reuse the old PLEI TRAP Road, specific-
ally its northern and the eastern extensions. The KONTUM City area remained
relatively active during September. Two rocket attacks, numerous light harass-
ing attacks, and several attacks by fire on friendly locations north of the city
were received.

The NVA units in KONTUM Province used the majority of the month of October to
recover and reposition; consequently, there was an almost complete halt of enemy
activity during this period. The DAK PEK area was the scene of increased ac-
tivity as a result of the enemy's resupply efforts; however, despite this ac-
tivity, no significant contacts were made in this area.

In late October there were indications of increased enemy activity in the BEN
HET area that culminated in several intense attacks by fire on FSB #29 just
south of the BEN HET Special Forces Camp and one 122MM rocket attack on BEN
HET itself. This was the first rocket attack on the Special Forces Camp since
16 Feb, and indicates continued enemy interest in this area. The enemy involved
were the 40th Arty Regt and possibly elements of the 24th Regt.

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On 27 and 28 Oct wheeled vehicle tracks were noted along the northern section of the PLEI TRAP Road, indicating the intention of the NVA to use this road once again. This is the first sign of vehicular use of the road since it was closed on 6 April.

(2) PLEIKU: In early August, the 24th NVA Regt moved from KONTUM Province and positioned itself along the PLEIKU-KONTUM boundary near Highway 14N. They were identified in a contact on 16 August when a two-company size ambush on Highway 14N resulted in 11 NVA killed. Documents captured in a sweep of the area identified the K-5 Bn, 24th Regt. Another two-company size ambush on 23 Aug, and subsequent platoon to company size contacts with CSF and RVN units, produced PVN who identified all three Bns of the 24th Regt. The mission of the 24th Regt at that time was the interdiction of Highway 14N. Contacts continued throughout September. On 22 Sep a HOI CHANH from the K-5 Bn, 24th Regt stated that 350 men from the K-4 Bn and 150 men from the K-5 Bn were killed by recent airstrikes. He also stated that the K-6 Bn was operating west of Highway 14N, north of PLEIKU MAGN. This was confirmed by contacts with US and CSF units north of PLEIKU MAGN in late September and early Oct. It now appears that the 24th Regt has withdrawn into CAMBODIA for resupply purposes.

A newly formed Local Force Bn, designated the X-45, was identified by documents on 19 Aug. The X-45 Bn is located north of EDAP ENVANG, between Highways 19W and 509, and has the mission of attacking the EDAP ENVANG and THIANG GUO Resettlement Villages, as well as harassment of Highway 19W. Another Local Force Bn, the H-15, was identified for the first time since TET. On 7 Oct, a HOI CHANH rallied along Highway 7B, near the PLEIKU-PHU BON border. He stated that the H-15 LF Bn had been recruiting new personnel since TET and their current strength is 50. Their mission is the harassment of Highway 7B.

Enemy local force, sapper and artillery units harassed allied installations in the PLEIKU City area in late August. On 23 August, elements of the 31st Bn, 4th Army Regt launched a total of 45 rounds of 122mm rocket fire from the west and north in conjunction with squad to platoon size sapper attacks against installations in the PLEIKU City area. On 12 Sep, Camp ENARI received approximately 25 rounds of 122mm rocket fire, all of which landed outside of the perimeter.

The infiltration and resupply route across southern PLEIKU Province remained active. Intermittent contacts have been made with transportation units providing supplies to the 95B Regt.

The 95B NVA Regt continued to operate on the eastern boundary of PLEIKU Province. The 5th Bn, 95B Regt continued its mission of harassment of vehicular traffic along Highway 19E. However, there was very little enemy activity along the highway, and recent indications are that the 95B Regt has moved east into BINH DINH Province and may in the future assume another mission.

In July, the 95th and 18B Regts moved from their areas of operation in PHU YEN and KHANH HOI Province into Base Area 701 in CAMBODIA. They remained in that location until approximately 1 Sep when the 95th Regt moved south to join the forces threatening DUC LAP. The 18B Regt as well as elements of the 101D Regt
posed a threat to DUC CO and other installations in western PLEIKU Province at the end of the reporting period. Indications were that the enemy plans a major offensive effort against DUC CO, possibly at the beginning of November. A contact with elements of the 18B Regt at the end of October southwest of THANH AN - OASIS confirmed the probability of impending enemy operations in western PLEIKU.

(3) DARLAC: An increase of contact with small enemy forces and a large number of agent reports during the first part of July provided the first indications that a buildup of enemy forces was taking place in DARLAC Province. On 21 July 68 a raller who returned to TRANG PHUC SF Camp revealed that the lst NVA Div was preparing for operations in DARLAC Province. He also said the 66th Regt was moving one day behind the Division's HQs. In the latter part of July, captured documents and an increased number of contacts with infiltrating forces confirmed the presence of the lst NVA Div and support elements in DARLAC. By the end of July the NVA forces were in position for the planned attack on B.N ME THUOT, the 95C Regt was located on the high ground approximately 15 Kms south of B.N ME THUOT, and the 320th Regt was located on the DARLAC/CAMBODIA border west of B.N ME THUOT.

A large scale ground attack was launched against DUC LAP SF Camp and DUC LAP Sub Sector on 23 August. The initial battle lasted until 26 August when the attacking forces withdrew to CAMBODIA to regroup. The 320th Regt and 95C Regt were identified as the attacking units by documents and PW's. PW's captured in the contact revealed that the 1st NVA Div was preparing for the attack on B.N ME THUOT when US and ARVN forces discovered their position. The objective was immediately changed to DUC LAP. The 66th Regt was left in the B.N ME THUOT area to maintain pressure there.

A PW who was captured by 2-35 Inf on 21 Sep in the DUC LAP area revealed that the 95th Regt of the 5th NVA Div had moved to the DUC LAP area to participate in the attacks there. Also, the 66th Regt moved from its location in Base Area 238, north of B.N ME THUOT, to the DUC LAP area.
The attacks became more sporadic, and ceased almost entirely by the latter part of October.

The total losses for the NVA/VC forces attacking in the DUC LAP area were well above 1,200.

Additionally, in the early part of August, captured documents revealed that the K-37 Engineer Bn AKA K-37 Sapper Bn and the K-25 Engineer Bn AKA K-25 Sapper Bn were working in the areas west and E-NE of BAN ME THUOT, respectively.

During the month of September contacts throughout DARLAC Province were usually limited to small local forces elements.

The decrease in enemy activity continued through the month of October. There has been no further identification or contact with the K-37, K-25, K-39 Bns, and the 66th, 320th, 95th, and 95th Regts during the month of October. The E-301 LF Bn was identified on 26 Oct by PWS as having two companies operating west of the MEDWL Plantation vic AQ 8221. The C-2 Co, E-301 LF Bn has been identified by documents as located south of BAN ME THUOT. The 401 LF Bn was reported by PWS to be operating east of the MEDWL Plantation. Also, the PWS stated that the H-5 District Headquarters is located in the MEDWL Plantation. On 18 Oct a PW captured east of BAN ME THUOT from the 316th Trans Bn stated that his unit was subordinate to the 55th Trans Gp.

b. Estimated Enemy Composition, Disposition and Strength on 31 Oct 68.

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<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>EST. STR</th>
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<td>B-3 Front Hq</td>
<td>CAMBODIA/KONTUM Border</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st NVA Inf Div (HQ &amp; SPT)</td>
<td>Base Area 740</td>
<td>1115</td>
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<tr>
<td>66th NVA Inf Regt</td>
<td>CAMBODIA/DARLAC Border</td>
<td>1800</td>
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<tr>
<td>320th NVA Inf Regt</td>
<td>Base Area 740</td>
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<tr>
<td>95th NVA Inf Regt</td>
<td>Base Area 740</td>
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<tr>
<td>18B NVA Inf Regt</td>
<td>Base Area 710</td>
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<tr>
<td>95th NVA Inf Regt</td>
<td>CAMBODIA/DARLAC Border</td>
<td>1800</td>
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<tr>
<td>24th NVA Inf Regt</td>
<td>CAMBODIA/KONTUM Border</td>
<td>900</td>
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<td>400th NVA Art Bn</td>
<td>Tri-border Area</td>
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<td>95th NVA Inf Regt</td>
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<td>304th VC LF Bn</td>
<td>North of KONTUM City</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>406th Sapper Bn</td>
<td>North of KONTUM City</td>
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<tr>
<td>X-45 VC LF Bn</td>
<td>W. PLEIKU Province</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>H-15 VC LF Bn</td>
<td>DAK AYUNH Valley</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>407th Sapper Bn</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
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<tr>
<td>408th Sapper Bn</td>
<td>Northeast of PLEIKU City</td>
<td>275</td>
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<tr>
<td>301st VC LF Bn</td>
<td>BAN ME THUOT Area</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>401st VC LF Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>K-37 NVA Inf Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>K-25 Sapper Bn</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-37 Sapper Bn</td>
<td>East of BAN ME THUOT</td>
<td>300</td>
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c. Significant Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Capabilities:

(1) General: With the exception of the attempts to overrun friendly installations at D.K. SEANG and DUC LAP in late August, the enemy generally concentrated on attacks by fire and small probes against friendly units. In September and October he reverted almost entirely to ambush and mining operations, sapper attacks and attacks by fire. This trend has not been evidenced long enough to determine if it is an actual change in tactics or simply a temporary measure due to logistic and personnel problems.

(2) Significant Changes in Tactics: The enemy is increasing the utilization of sapper units. At DUC LAP, sapper elements were used extensively to breach the perimeter during the attacks of late August. Sappers were also used by the 101D Regt at DAK SEANG on 18 August. PWS revealed that the 120th Sapper Bn of the 325C Div had been broken down and four sappers were assigned to each company of the 101D and 95C Regts to provide the companies with organic sapper capability and to train additional members of each unit in sapper techniques. On 23 August, several installations in PLEIKU were hit by small sapper attacks simultaneously. A contact on 27 October southwest of THAN HIN identified the 408th Sapper Bn along with the 18B Regt, indicating that elements of the 408th Sapper Bn, which normally operate in or north of PLEIKU City, have probably been attached to the 18B Regt for support. In addition, at least two new sapper battalions have been formed. The K-25 and K-37 Sapper Bns have recently been identified near RA N ME THUOT.

(3) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses (1 Aug-31 Oct)

(a) Personnel: KIA (BC) 472
NVA CIA 8
VC/VN/CIA 23
TOTAL 503

(b) Weapons:
S/A 163
C/S 21
TOTAL 184

(c) Ammunition:
S/A rds 53,281
C/S rds 12,668
Grenades 352
Mines 106

(d) Miscellaneous captured items:
Explosives 427 lbs
Documents 56 inches
Rice 14.9 tons
Salt 5 lbs
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(e) Enemy facilities destroyed:

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<tr>
<td>Fortifications</td>
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d. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action.

(1) Enemy Capabilities:

(a) The B-3 Front, controlling the 18B and 101D Regts, is capable of conducting attacks by fire and multi-regimental attacks in western PLEIKU Province.

(b) The 40th Arty Regt and probably elements of the 24th Regt are capable of conducting large scale attacks by fire and multi-battalion attacks in the BEN HET-D.K SE:NG-D.K TO area.

(c) The 320th and 95C Regts are capable of conducting attacks by fire and multi-battalion attacks in the DUC LAP area.

(d) The 95th and 66th Regts can reinforce enemy forces at DUC LAP or DUC CO.

(e) The 304th LF Bn and 406th Sapper Bn can conduct ambush and mining operations on Hwy 14 north of KONTUM City. They are also capable of attacking friendly installations in the vicinity of KONTUM City.

(f) Elements of the 31st Bn, 40th Arty Regt are capable of conducting attacks by fire (122mm rocket) on PLEIKU City and Camp EARI.

(g) The 95B Regt can conduct ambush and mining operations, attacks by fire, and limited ground attacks in the vic of Hwy 19E.

(h) The X-45 LF Bn, H-15 LF Bn, 6th Bn/32d Regt, and 408th Sapper Bn are capable of conducting small attacks and harassment in PLEIKU Province.

(i) The 301st LF Bn, 401st LF Bn, K-39 NVN Bn, K-25 Sapper Bn and K-37 Sapper Bn are capable of conducting ambush and mining operations on Hwy 14 and 21, and attacks by fire and small ground attacks on friendly installations in the B.N NE THIET.

(j) The enemy is capable of introducing new forces without warning into the AO from CAMBODIA and LIOS.

(2) Enemy Vulnerabilities: The enemy is vulnerable to artillery and air strikes when he bivouacs or massed for a large attack.

(3) Enemy Probable Courses of Action:

(a) Attack in western PLEIKU Province in November with the 18B and 101D Regts, supported by the 408th Sapper Bn, 31st Bn/40th Arty Regt, and local forces. These units can be reinforced by the 95th and 66th Regts within 48 hours after the decision to do so has been made.
(b) Maintain pressure in the Tri-border area with the 40th Arty Regt and probably elements of the 24th Regt conducting attacks by fire and small ground attacks.

c) Conduct mining and ambush operations on LOC's, particularly around KONTUM City, PLEIKU City, and BAN ME THUOT, and on Hwy 19E between PLEIKU and AN KHE.

d) Conduct attacks by fire on friendly installations throughout the AO.

e) Counterintelligence.

(1) Activities of the Counterintelligence Section (CI) were characterized by a transition from individual agent operations to preplanned operations by the entire section. CI operations of all types accounted for 25 of the 94 division detainees during the reporting quarter. Of the 25 detainees, seven were classified prisoners of war, and nine were classified civil defendants, the remainder being released as innocent civilians. The CI Section was largely responsible for the conduct of indigenous civilian checkpoints in coordination with the 12th MID (ARVN). The check-points were conducted three times, two of which were during Operations CI&NSWEEP II and III. The total checkpoint operations resulted in proper identification checks of 1,963 civilians, of whom nine were temporarily detained for irregularities in their identification papers. One detainee of these nine was declared a civil defendant. The operations of individual US agents from the Special Operations Branch, CI Section, resulted in the production of 157 agent reports in addition to capturing the seven prisoners of war mentioned above.

(2) Special Security Branch, CI Section, identified and established a file on all permanent and personal hire indigenous employees on Camp ENARI, and conducted background investigations in conjunction with ARVN security agencies on these personnel. The conduct of these background investigations resulted in 17 indigenous personnel who worked on Camp ENARI being identified as having VC affiliations. Subsequently they were discharged and taken into custody by Military Security Service (NSS, ARVN). On 24 October, Special Security Branch conducted Operation GATEC&SH during which the identification papers of 1,110 indigenous civilian employees were jointly checked upon entering Camp ENARI by NSS and 4th MID personnel. A total of 122 minor deficiencies in identification papers were found and corrected on the spot. In addition, 18 individuals were apprehended by NSS for using forged or transferred ID cards. The Special Security Branch also initiated the Installation Research Program, designed to detect and identify, through the use of controlled sources, VIET CONG operating on Camp ENARI. The Security Branch, CI Section conducted a total of 233 counterintelligence inspections of Division units during the quarter. As a result of these inspections the security of classified information in the 4th Infantry Division improved.

f) Interrogation of Prisoners of War. During the reporting period the Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW) Section, 4th MID, interrogated 94 division detainees, and provided the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, supplementary reports on an additional 34 prisoners held by other allied units. Of the 94 detainees, eight were NVA Prisoners, 16 VC/VNA Prisoners, 20 civil defendants, one CHU HI, and 48
inocent civilians.

g. Imagery Interpretation Section: During the reporting period the Imagery Interpretation (II) Section, 4th MID produced 257 interpretation reports, including the identification of one storage area which, when attacked by fire, produced several significant secondary explosions. The II Section analyzed its production time schedule and determined that an ES-38 film developing facility would reduce the time lag between date of mission and date of photo readout received by Division G2 by as much as 72 hours. A request for this facility was processed through ACofS, G2 to USARV. The II Section also determined that the primary problem with the present Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility (TIIF), was that there was insufficient and unreliable electrical current to allow for efficient operation. Requisitions for suitable generators to power the TIIF were submitted during the month of October 1968.

h. Communications Security: During the reporting period there were a total of 282,345 radio and telephone transmissions monitored by the 374 RRU. There were a total of 119 transmission security violations during the reporting period for a total of 2.4 transmission security violations per 1,000 hours of transmission.

3. (C) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES
   
   a. The following OPLANS/OPORDS were either prepared or published:

   (1) OPLAN 19-68 (UNG THOI - SPOILER) dated 6 August 1968 (with 2 Changes) classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

   (2) OPLAN 20-68 (BLAZE) dated 17 August 1968 (with 1 change), provides for the organization, training and preparation for deployment of a reaction force composed of tactical unit rear detachment personnel within the Division TAOR.

   (3) OPLAN 21-68 (PATCH) dated 10 September 1968, provides for land clearing and road upgrade operations, and for security of engineer work parties, within the Division area of responsibility.

   (4) OPORD 22-68 (CLEANSWEEP II) dated 26 September 1968, directed Camp ENARI Base Camp Defense Forces to conduct sweep/cordon and search operations in the Division TAOR. This operation was terminated on 27 September 1968.

   (5) OPORD 23-68 (GOSSIP) provides villages within the TAOR the capability of notifying U.S. Forces of the presence of VC.

   (6) OPORD 25-68 (CLEANSWEEP III) dated 14 October 1968, directed Camp ENARI Base Camp Defense Forces to conduct sweep/cordon and search operations in a designated area of the Division TAOR. This operation was terminated on 19 October 1968.

   b. Operations.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, AGS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(1) The 4th Infantry Division continued Operation BIN 11-1, T,,Y ARTHUR which began on 12 October 1967. A chronological summary of significant activities for this quarter is at Inclosure 3.

(2) During the reporting period the 4th Infantry Division made widespread use of a new patrolling technique called the Short Range Patrol (SRP) Screen. The concept involves the saturation of an area with a series of four non-stationary teams equipped with radios and positioned for a 48 hour period astride likely enemy infiltration routes. The SRPs are located up to 3 kilometers from the patrol firebase. The mission of the SRP is to adjust artillery and mortar fire and to call in airstrikes and gunships on any enemy which it can observe or hear. The concept is designed generally to disrupt the enemy's activities and specifically to prevent the enemy from massing for an attack. During the month of October the division maintained an average of 150 SRPs in position per day. Frequent contacts made by SRPs in the BIN ME THUOT area proved the effectiveness of the technique and were largely responsible for thwarting the attack by the 66th NV, Regt on BIN ME THUOT. On several occasions SRPs were successful in adjusting timely air/artillery fires on NVN forces of company and battalion size.

c. Training.

(1) The second class in a Division-sponsored ARVN LRP training program began on 14 October. Forty students started the course. Because of poor screening procedures by the ARVN 24th STZ in selecting students to attend the course, 22 students dropped out for disciplinary and academic reasons. The course ended on 1 November. This is the last scheduled formal instruction phase in this program.

(2) Two additional increments of Kit Carson Scouts were trained during the period. The first class of three scouts was conducted from 16 thru 27 September 1968. All three graduated and were sent to Division units. The second class was conducted from 18-24 October 1968 with nine scouts. One was revealed to be an ARVN deserter during in-processing and was handed over to ARVN authorities. Three others were found to be incompatible with the Kit Carson program and were returned to the CHIEU HOI Center. At the completion of the reporting period, 83 Kit Carson Scouts were assigned to the Division.

(3) Aviation Training continued with one quota each to two PACAF Jungle Survival Schools on 15-19 Aug and 29 Aug - 2 Sep and one quota each to two Fleet Airborne Electronic Training Unit Pacific (FETUP) Jungle Environmental Survival classes on 19-23 Aug and 26-30 Aug. Div Circular 350-2, dated 14 Oct 68. Aviation training quotas are scheduled for all organic aircraft flown in the Division.

(4) An additional Division LRP course was added to the 4th Training Detachment curriculum to supplement Pre-Recondo and MACV Recondo quotas.

(5) Prescribed Load List Training in S.I.G.O.N, CBR NCO Classes, and various technical and nontechnical maintenance classes continued to be scheduled on a
need-to-have basis. In addition, a travelling Sling Rigging Class was conducted by the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion throughout the Division with a C-54 Sky Crane during the last two weeks of August. A Maintenance Management class was conducted at Camp ENRI to point out maintenance indicators to officer/NCO supervisors of all units from 27-30 Oct. Forward area classes will be conducted during the first two weeks in November. This class is conducted by the CO, DISCOM through the Division Material Office.

(6) 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment.

(a) The Replacement Training Committee trained 5574 enlisted and 278 officer replacements.

(b) The Combat NCO committee graduated 158 candidates.

(c) The Recondo Preparatory/TRP course had 42 enrolled of which 24 graduated.

(d) The MACV Recondo Course had 15 enrolled, of which 12 graduated.

(7) An RVN/ROK/US Officer Exchange Program was initiated on 2 September. Four US officers were sent to the 22d RVN Division and ROK Capitol Division (one artillery and one infantry officer, each). The 4th Infantry Division received two RVN officers (artillery) and four ROK officers (two infantry, two artillery). The exchange lasted two weeks. During this period the exchange officers (lieutenants or captains with 6 months field experience) observed operational techniques of the host units. An after action report was required of each participant. The exchanges are scheduled on a receiving basis to commence the first Monday of each month and will last for two weeks each.

(8) RF/PF Training. IFFORCEV directed that an RF/PF Leadership School be established by the 4th Infantry Division NLT 15 November 1968. To accomplish this training the 4th Training Detachment has been expanded from 5 officers and 15 EM to 6 officers and 29 EM. A new classroom has been approved for construction late November. Intensive preparations were undertaken during the period to develop POI's, write lesson plans, and train instructors in preparation for the first class.

(9) R&D: Several new items of equipment were evaluated during this quarter. Evaluations included:

(a) Mine Roller: Parts for the expendable bogey wheel roller were received in October. The system has been attached to a tank in the 4th Engr Bn and is presently being used daily to sweep the road from DUC CO to the OASIS. The system has not encountered any mines to date.

(b) Discreet Hamlet Signaling Device: The signaling device which had been rescheduled for delivery in September has been delayed until November 1968.

(c) ML13 APC Belly Armor: The modification consists of 3/4 inch steel plate which is affixed to the underside of the APC, an emergency quick release ramp.
and a driver's safety harness. 4th Inf Div evaluation was terminated in Oct 68 on receipt of a directive to ship all kits to 11th CR for further evaluation.

(d) SENSORS: The evaluation of sensors under the "Duffle Bag" program was concluded in September with favorable results. Sensors were used extensively in the DAK TO and DUC CO areas to detect enemy infiltration. As of the end of the reporting period, 19 sensors were emplaced and operational.

(10) Training Regulations.

(a) The following 4th Inf Div Training Regulations were rescinded on 8 September 1968:

350-1: MACV Recendo School, 23 Dec 66.
350-3: Replacement Training, 22 Jun 68.
350-4: The "CHIEU HOI" Program, 11 Nov 66.
350-6: Unit Training, 17 Jul 68.
350-9: Aerial Delivery Slings, 7 Sep 67.
350-14: Small Arms Range, 10 Oct 67.
350-16: Pre-Recondo Training, 10 Nov 67.
350-17: Antivehicular Countermine Warfare Training, 17 Nov 67.
350-18: Training to Improve Utilization of Southeast Asia airlift, 28 Nov 67.
350-21: Replacement Training Exercise, 3 Apr 68.
350-22: LRP Refresher Marksmanship, 18 Apr 68.
350-23: Long Range Patrol (LRP), 18 May 68.

(b) The following 4th Inf Div Training Regulations were published to consolidate, clarify, and update training and special operations policies reflected in the rescinded regulations.

350-1: Unit Training, 6 Sep 68.
350-3: Small Arms Range, 6 Sep 68.
350-4: Replacement Training, 6 Sep 68.
350-5: Division Pre-Recondo School and MACV Recendo School, 6 Sep 68.
350-6: The "CHIEU HOI" (Open Arms) Surrender Program, 6 Sep 68.
350-7: Special Operations: Kit Carson Scouts Program, 9 Sep 68.
350-9: Special Operations: War Dog Operations, 12 Sep 68.

(c) A Division Aviation Training Regulation, to be numbered 350-8, was drafted and staff coordination began on 26 Oct 68.

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(d) 4th Infantry Division LOI (S), SUBJ: Combined Operations with the Republic of VIETNAM Armed Forces (U), was published on 24 Oct 68 to replace Reg 350-19 (above) and reflect guidance contained in IPF Secret LOI 3-68, SUBJ: Combined operations with the 23rd ARVN Infantry Division and the 24th Special Tactical Zone (U), dated 29 Sep 68.

(e) Organization: TDA Augmentation 4th Infantry Division: On 3 October 1968, a Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) Augmentation to the division TOE was submitted to USARV. The purpose of the augmentation was to increase the capabilities of the division to perform base camp functions not envisaged in the TOE. Specific functional areas which required augmentation were base camp command, control, and defense, educational development, safety, non-appropriated fund administration, revolutionary development, special services and labor management. In addition to personnel spaces, the TDA augmentation will provide sufficient equipment to enable the division to accomplish base camp functions without excessive draw-down on its ability to accomplish its combat mission.

(f) Air Support:

(1) The following close air support missions were flown in support of Operation BINH TAY-MACARTHUR, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>RSND</th>
<th>FLOWN</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>AL</th>
<th>B57</th>
<th>F100</th>
<th>C130</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1163</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>137</td>
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<td>363</td>
<td>1460</td>
<td>3</td>
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(2) Bomb Damage Assessment:

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<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ESTR</th>
<th>KB</th>
<th>BNGS</th>
<th>SEC</th>
<th>SEC</th>
<th>ENS</th>
<th>EXPLOSIONS</th>
<th>OM</th>
<th>MTR</th>
<th>STRUC</th>
<th>FOX</th>
<th>ROAD</th>
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<tr>
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<td>305</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>595</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) B-52 Strikes

B-52's struck known base areas, infiltration routes, strong points and major NVA headquarters. Both primary and secondary strikes were delivered in support of Operation BINH TAY-MACARTHUR. The following figures show the number of B-52 strikes carried out during the period 1 Aug 31 Oct 68.
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SUBJ: JT 6 Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

A. PRIMARY MISSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIMARY MISSIONS</th>
<th>TOTAL MISSIONS</th>
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<td>4th Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>II Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tot.</td>
<td>368</td>
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B. SECONDARY MISSIONS

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<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
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</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Corps</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot.</td>
<td>187</td>
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</table>

C. TOTAL MISSIONS

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<th>TOTAL MISSIONS</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Div</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Corps</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot.</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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g. Psychological Operations:

(1) A total of 186,274,000 leaflets was dropped during the period, compared with 22,885,000 during the preceding period. Air and ground loudspeaker time amounted to 1,051\(\frac{1}{2}\) hours compared with 932 hours during the previous period. Themes were in support of the CHIEU HOI Program, the Volunteer Information Program and the Surrender Program.

(2) Personal appeals were made by Corporal Le Hung, a HOI CHANH from the 1st Bn, 101st Regiment, via tape messages and leaflet drops.

(3) On 25 September 1968, the 4th Infantry Division initiated a Psypops campaign directed against the 4th, 5th and 6th Battalions of 24th NVA Regiment, with the objective of inducing a mass surrender of the survivors of these battalions. The Psypops campaign was tied to air and ground operations and was conducted in three phases as follows:

(a) Phase I - The idea of surrender was planted utilizing general information themes, CHIEU HOI leaflets, and special messages on surrender.

(b) Phase II - The surrender plan was presented by surrender cadre and hard sell line messages. Using feedback from intelligence and POWs, the accent was shifted to direct action to include cadre in individual or group surrender plan.

(c) Phase III - The surrender plan was executed with an increased emphasis on surrender procedures.

The results of this program have not been fully evaluated at the present time, as the program was halted when the 24th NVA Regiment withdrew from contact with US and ARVN FORCES.

Inclosure 3
The bi-monthly NVA newspaper, BÍNH MINH, continued to draw favorable comments from the HOI CHÀNH. The newspaper was first printed in March 1968, after intelligence indicated a complete news blackout among NVA units in the division area of operations.

LOH's with loudspeakers exploiting HOI CHÀNH were deployed for psychological missions. The LOH was found to be extremely effective in these missions. It was found, however, that only 500 watt systems could be used because of limited aircraft space. Their limited space also reduced the volume of leaflets which could be dropped.

The NVA improved and defended a series of road networks originating in the area and extending into South VIETNAM. A plan was formulated in which these roads would be interdicted by aerial bombardment and artillery fire. Psychological Operations were undertaken to coincide with this three-phase plan. The plan is currently in Phase I which is a leaflet and loudspeaker operation. It is believed the continued use of the road is a sure way to death. Also, National Safe Conduct Pass leaflets are being dropped to reinforce the "Road to Death" message.

The Division Chemical Section and 43rd Chemical Detachment continued to support combat operations within the division during the reporting period by employing riot control agents (RCA), supervising the defoliation program, operating and maintaining the division's Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD), rendering emergency response on use of flame munitions, operating a chemical ASP, and importing unit CBR readiness equipment and supplies.

Defoliation operations were seriously hampered by weather, especially during the first half of the reporting period. Only two TRAILDUST missions were flown in August and one in September as compared to an average of nine per month before the monsoon rains. The rains did, however, increase crop destruction operations. Approximately 336 acres of enemy crops, including rice, beans and corn were destroyed. Perimeter defoliation and roadside defoliation also increased due to excessive growth and brush around friendly installations and areas previously cleared by the Rome Plow. See Inclosure 5 for a complete summary of defoliation operations.

The use of RCA within the division increased significantly during the reporting period. This was due primarily to a general increase in enemy activity, greater availability of RCA munitions, and greater reliance on RCA munitions in a combat support role. See Inclosure 5 for a complete summary of RCA operations.

Employment of bulk agent CS increased during the reporting period. CS was in 55 gallon drums and eight pound plastic jugs was used extensively in terrain denial and on concentrations of enemy weapons positions, bunkers, tunnels and assembly areas. Additionally, the Division Chemical Section dropped 20,000 pounds of bulk CS on suspected enemy assembly areas west of BAN MÓ THUCH.
(b) XM-15 CS Cannister Clusters. During the reporting period a total of 260 XM-15 clusters were dropped as compared to only eight during the previous period. These clusters have proven highly successful in preparing landing zones and for use on reconnaissance in force operations.

(c) E-8 Tactical CS Launchers. The use of the E-8 launcher decreased during the period with a total of 136 issued as compared to 741 issued during the previous period. This reduction indicates that issue during the last quarter was sufficient to meet nearly all unit requirements for ground-mounted non-persistent CS munition.

(d) 4.2" CS Mortar. The availability of the 4.2" CS mortar round is still critical. There have been no reports of the use of the 4.2" CS mortar round during the reporting period.

(e) Evaluation of New CS Munitions. The Division Chemical Section is participating in the evaluation of newly-developed persistent and non-persistent CS munitions. These munitions have been made available only in limited quantities pending final evaluation and production requirements.

(1) XM-27 CS Grenade Dispenser. A total of 10 XM-27 CS Grenade Dispensers and 102 Reload Kits were received for evaluation. The dispensers are mounted onto the rocket pods of UH-1C gunships and deliver 144 XM-54 CS grenades. The system has been employed on six occasions in a close combat support role and found to be an effective and responsive munition in temporarily incapacitating the enemy.

(2) XM-28 "Brown Bag" CS Dispenser. Of the 10 XM-28 systems received in September for evaluation all have been employed. Each system can deliver 750 pounds of CS-2 from either a CH-47 or UH-1 aircraft. The system has the advantage of shorter response time, accuracy and increased persistency when compared with the 55 gallon drum method of terrain contamination. The division expects to receive an additional 10 dispensers in early November which will be the last available until final evaluation and production is made.

(3) XM-629 105mm CS Cartridge. The division received 250 of the 105mm CS Cartridges in October. These munitions were subsequently distributed to the brigades. No reports have been received of their use in combat although they are expected to provide a long range incapacitating capability to supplement other fires.

(4) (U) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) Employment: With the expansion of the division south of BAN ME THUOT it was necessary to assign operators temporarily to the brigades. The positioning of an operator at both D.K TO and BAN ME THUOT provided an immediate capability to the northern and southern extremes of the AO. As a result, APD operations increased significantly during the reporting period. Utilization of the APD for the period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>1st Bde</th>
<th>2d Bde</th>
<th>3rd Bde</th>
<th>2-1 Cav</th>
<th>24th STZ</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. (C) Logistics
   a. General.

   (1) Action was completed on 213 Reports of Survey with 24 currently pending final action. Sixty-seven Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss were approved and 384 Combat Loss Reports were processed.

   (2) Primary emphasis continued on the use of LLOC throughout the area of operations for the resupply of all classes of supply. ALOC were used only as a backup resupply capability.

   (3) During the period a major effort was initiated to correct property accounting procedures and to bring property records in line with TO&Es and MTO&Es. A program was started in which all property book account holders are required to visit the office of the G4 on a weekly basis. When imbalances are discovered, items of a critical nature are redistributed.

   (4) A Commander's Critical Items List was initiated by the Commanding General 1st Log Command. This list is submitted in message form to Major Field Commands on a bi-monthly basis and indicates the shortage of critical items which influences the division mission. This method is designed to place critical logistical problems in the proper command channels at all levels.

   b. Supply and Services.

   The following figures represent cumulative support data for support activities of the 4th Supply and Transportation Battalion at all locations in the division area of operations.

   (1) Division Supply Office

   (a) Requisitions received 14,875
   (b) Requisitions passed 2,077
   (c) Requisitions filled 11,666
   (d) Total due out releases 5,910

   (2) Class I

   (a) Average headcount issues 15,481
   (b) Average number of units 44

   (3) Class III issues (Total)

   (a) JP-4 1,322,000
   (b) MOGAS 768,000
   (c) DIESEL 1,062,000
   (d) AVGAS 97,000
AVDD1-6C-KH
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division
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(4) Baths 2,673

(5) Graves Registration
(a) Human remains processed 118
(b) Personal property shipments processed 158

(6) Bulk supplies issued at forward support elements
(a) Class I
   A Rations 402,758
   C Rations 121,123
   Sundry Packs 4,236

(b) Class III
   JP-4 1,284,400
   AVGAS (gal) 21,100
   MOGAS (gal) 209,500
   DIESEL (gal) 267,000

(c) Class IV
   Sandbags 1,035,100
   Concertina (bales) 247
   Barbed wire (rolls) 698
   5' Pickets 11,331
   8' Pickets 21,269
   3' Pickets 8,866

C. Transportation Services
(1) During this period convoy operations consisted of 325 convoys with a
    total of 33,354 vehicles.

(2) Aircraft support
(a) Total tonnage moved by scheduled air 18.8
(b) Total tonnage moved by dedicated air 387.2
(c) Total tonnage moved by special mission air 396.4

(3) The hold baggage section of Camp ENARI processed 1,943 pieces consisting
    of 85.9 short tons.

(4) Emphasis was stressed on retrograde of unserviceable items during the
period, and as a result, 54 short tons were evacuated by the 4th S&T Bn.

d. Material Readiness

(1) The formal division command maintenance management inspection cycle for FY 69 commenced on 31 October with the inspection of one unit. The Division CMII Team also conducted courtesy and assistance visits throughout the period.

(2) Organic aircraft units of the division completed a USARV CMII inspection during the month of October.

(3) Because of the constant turnover of qualified personnel in the division and tactical situation, the TAERS Record System must receive constant supervision to insure accuracy and completeness. An eight-hour maintenance course was given in October to all officers and NCO's at Camp Enari involved in the field of maintenance. This course is further programmed for units of the forward areas during the month of November.

(4) Prescribed Load List (PLL) classes were conducted for divisional units during the period. A PLL assistance team was formed to visit all units to make on-the-spot corrections and render assistance as required, this included special instructions on policy and procedures. Issue priority designators were reviewed and follow-up action stressed. The lack of supply responsiveness to low priority requisitions continued to be a problem. Currently the division is at an approximate 40% zero balance on PLL's. As stocks are depleted, deadline requests are initiated. When additional parts are required, Red Ball requests appear in the system.

(5) Personnel of the division attended a special Supervisory Course on the NCR 500 Computer and related equipment during the period. This equipment is used extensively by the technical supply section of the 704th Maintenance Battalion for processing and maintaining supply records and for documenting repair parts. The course consisted of 16 hours of instruction and provided management personnel with an excellent insight on the capabilities of the NRC 500 system.

(6) The UNIVAC 1105 computer was used for the first time to process the division Quarterly Material Readiness Report. The revised system did not provide sufficient additional information at division level to justify the expenditure of time and effort required for preparation of the input data. Information contained in the Quarterly Material Readiness Report is considered adequate for use at division level.

(7) A Material Readiness Assistance Team (RAT) from USARV was requested for the month of November. It is anticipated that this team will assist divisional units in the review and correction of existing discrepancies in the maintenance and supply related areas, i.e., Property Book, TAERS Records and PLL Procedures.

(8) The tactical and combat vehicle deadline rate for the quarter has fluctuated between 10 and 18 percent with a current deadline rate for tactical vehicles of 12 percent and 10 percent for combat vehicles. The low rate of dead-
line can be attributed to an accurate initial analysis of the malfunction and immediate action on parts requisition. In addition, a weekly deadline report has proven to be a very effective management tool through the extraction of deadlining parts which are compiled and forwarded to the Material Readiness Expediting Teams at depot level. This list is immediately screened against the assets of the various cannibalization points.

(9) The Daily Roadside Spot Inspection Program was expanded to include IF-FORCEV vehicles operating within the division area of operations. The roadside spot check program continues to be a valuable asset for the division in the early detection of unit discrepancies in the preventive maintenance program.

e. Maintenance Support

(1) Maintenance support and supply of spare parts for all divisional and attached elements continued to be accomplished through three forward support companies, the base camp Maintenance Support Company and the Aircraft Maintenance Company of the 704th Maintenance Battalion. Provisional emergency support was provided to the 4-503 Abn Inf Bn, 173d Inf Brigade while OPCON to the 4th Infantry Division. Additional emergency support was provided for Special Forces units in the division area of operations.

(2) Emphasis was placed on "on site" repair by forward maintenance companies with a back up for contact teams provided by HQs and A Company, 704th Maintenance Company.

(3) Maintenance capabilities in the majority of the areas were satisfactory, with the exception of signal repair where approximately 25 percent of the job orders received were evacuated to support maintenance for repair. During this quarter, 1,116 items out of 5,761 signal items received for repair were evacuated to support maintenance.

(4) Job orders completed by division maintenance:

(a) Tanks 53
(b) Wheeled Vehicles 733
(c) Artillery 111
(d) Signal 4,645
(e) Aircraft Components 449
(f) APC 172
(g) Heavy Engr Equipment 733
(h) Small Arms 1,297
(i) VTR's 21
(j) Generators 278
(k) Instruments 913
(l) Aircraft 407

(5) To reflect a more responsive support to the forward units, the forward support companies are in the process of establishing ASLs to support unit PLLs.
in their respective areas of responsibility. Direct exchange facilities will also be established with the ASL's. This procedure will decrease the work load and the travel distance of supported units.

(6) Repair parts requisitions processed and level statistics:

(a) Total requisitions received 42,077
(b) Total ASL requisitions received 32,281
(c) Total ASL issued 14,345
(d) Total receipts 12,051
(e) Total due-out releases 6,987
(f) Total passing orders 7,472
(g) Total replenish requests 5,186
(h) Total warehouse denials 1,984
(i) Total transactions posted 56,472
(j) Total lines on ASL 53,945
(k) Total lines zero balance 24,065
(l) Zero balance percentage 44.7
(m) Demand accommodation 79%
(n) Demand satisfaction 43%

(7) Two contact teams are continuously provided 2-1 Cav on highway 19E and at Kontum.

f. Medical Service:

(1) Medical support was provided by the division medical battalion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HQ &amp; CO A</th>
<th>CO B</th>
<th>CO C</th>
<th>CO D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>Patients seen</td>
<td>6,027</td>
<td>3,890</td>
<td>4,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>Patients admitted</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>Patients returned</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Medical Supply

(a) Requisitions processed 185
(b) Average initial fill 94%
(c) Approximately 15 short tons of supplies per week were processed from depot to using unit.

g. Logistics - Operation MACARTHUR.

(1) Logistical support continued to be provided for forward elements of the division by Forward Support Elements (FSE) from the Division Support Command, by Forward Support Activity (FSA) facilities from the Pleiku Sub-Area Command, and by 1st Log Command units located at Cam Ranh Bay.

(2) During this period the 1st Brigade continued operations in northern Kontum Province and continued to be supplied by FSA 1st Log Command. FSA Dak To is established on a permanent basis and furnished Class I, III, V, barrier ma-
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material, graves registration, bath, and laundry services primarily to the 1st Brigade. Additionally, the FSA provides customer service on Class III A, AVGAS and JP-4.

(3) FSE KONTUM is operated by the division support command in support of 3d Brigade units operating in that area. FSE provides Class I, III, II & IV fast moving items and barrier material, plus limited Class III A facilities at MARY LOU. The primary Class III A point located at KONTUM City Airfield is operated jointly by PKS:NC and the 57th Aviation Company which includes both AVGAS and JP-4. Class V is provided by the 1st Log Command ASP located in KONTUM; however, the ASP is scheduled for relocation to LZ MARY LOU during the early part of November which will result in a reduction of security requirements. Current demands have been greatly reduced as a result of the deployment of the 3d Bde to PLEIKU on 19 July 68 which left only a light force in the KONTUM area requiring logistical support.

(4) The FSE in operation at the OASIS continued to provide support for 3d Brigade operations in the western PLEIKU Province area. This FSE provides Class I, bulk and packaged Class III, V, barrier material, graves registration, bath and laundry services. The bath and laundry units are attached from the 1st Log Command. FSE provides custom service and bulk storage on Class III A, AVGAS and JP-4. On 6 October 68, a build-up of forces in the DUC CO area necessitated the establishment of an aircraft refuel and rearm point to conserve aircraft operational time. Selected items are delivered direct to DUC CO from the Division Support Command to include JP-4 and barrier material. Normal logistical support requirements are accomplished from FSE OASIS.

(5) An FSA from 1st Log Command continues to provide support for 2d Brigade units located in the BAN ME THUOT area augmented by FSE elements from the Division Support Command. FSA provides Class I, III, III A and V plus fast moving Class II and IV items, barrier material, general supplies, and bath and laundry services. FSE personnel provide augmentation to FSA support consisting of a Class I breakdown point, graves registration personnel, and transportation personnel and equipment. Because of the extended lines of communication and supply demands in the DUC LAP area, a forward supply point was established consisting of Class I, III A, IV, a light medical clearing platoon and graves registration personnel. Bulk Class I, III A and IV items were shipped by fixed wing aircraft to DUC LAP. The JP-4 refuel point operated by the 4th Aviation Battalion provided customer service for aircraft operating in the area. FSA BAN ME THUOT is supported directly from 1st Log Command facilities located at CAM RANH Bay.

(6) During period 5-9 Sep 68, Highway 14N was closed because of a washed out bridge. This created no major problems, however, as the stockage level had been programmed to support such a contingency. Highway 21 from CAM RANH Bay was closed during the period 20-31 Oct 68 resulting in ALOC as a primary means of resupply for FSA BAN ME THUOT. Limited LLOC resupply operations were established between PLEIKU and BAN ME THUOT for critical demands, specifically, Class III, and V. Although Highway 19E was closed during the period 20-23 Oct, no major problems were created.

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In addition to the logistical support provided by US Army elements, the US Air Force expended the following quantities of Class III and V in support of operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Weight (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Class III</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>292,953 gals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52's</td>
<td>2,600,000 gals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Ordnance</td>
<td>Qty (each)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>6,622</td>
<td>2,121.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>150.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm</td>
<td>2,246</td>
<td>835.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Delivered by fighters and AC-47 (Spooky)</td>
<td>Qty (each)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance</td>
<td>20mm</td>
<td>183,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.62mm</td>
<td>420,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Delivered by B-52</td>
<td>Qty (each)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance</td>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (C) Military Civic Action Program.

a. TAOR: The Good Neighbor Program continued to be effective within the Division TAOR. The number of hamlets was reduced from the 60 shown last reporting period to 58. PLEI ILAN (AR833346) was relocated to the consolidated village of PLEI CHI TEH (AR840377). The Division is no longer responsible for PLEI NGOL (AR772418) because it is now designated as an AP DOI MOI (New Life Hamlet Program) and has a resident Revolutionary Development Cadre Team. The consolidated village of PLEI GAO (ZA235375) was attacked by the VC on 16 September 1968. The VC entered the village and captured 5 PF soldiers without a shot being fired. The first indication the civic action team had of the attack was when the VC fired on the civic action team compound located in the center of the village. Civic action team members suffered minor injuries and one VC was killed. A set of SANDIA discreet signalling devices arrived on 18 October. An ACTIV system has been requested and will be used as a hamlet alarm system for the villages in the TAOR. The present SANDIA device was tested during the latter part of October to facilitate the employment of the requested set. A decrease in the number of kidnappings was once again noted. Five PF soldiers, one interpreter, and three villagers, were kidnapped this quarter. During the last week of October, the civic action effort was directed toward the security of the rice harvest. The addition of a second Audio/Visual Team on 1 October gave the division the capability of employing one team within the TAOR and one team in a forward area.
b. PLEIKU Province:

(1) The 3d Brigade continued civic action responsibility along route 15W and in the PLEI IRONG area.

(2) The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, continued civic action along Highway 15W from PLEIKU City to the MANG YANG Pass.

(3) The allocation of funds for the new PLEIKU Province refugee village on the eastern periphery of the CATECKI Tea Plantation has been approved. If funds are received, actual construction will begin when the rice harvest ends in late November.

c. KONTUM Province: The 1st Brigade continued civic action in the DAK TO and DAK SUT Districts and in the vicinity of KONTUM City.

d. D LEIAC Province: 2d Brigade continued civic action in the area around BAN ME THUOT. The deployment of a G5 representative to the area in early September assisted in the supervision of the program.

e. Nation Building Program:

(1) Psychological Development.

(a) Government:

1 The Division "Good Neighbor Council House" was used for four meetings during the quarter. At one meeting in September, it was discovered that there was a possible hierarchy of leadership within a group of hamlets that has not been noticed in the past. Attempts are being made to substantiate the presence of a leadership structure for groups of hamlets. The "Good Neighbor Council House" meetings have been postponed until the completion of the rice harvest.

2 As a result of 4th Infantry Division plans for protection of the rice harvest and for hamlet consolidation, it has been noted that there has been an improvement in the degree of organization of the hamlets within the TAOR. This organization involves an increased number of meetings between hamlet and village chiefs and similar meetings between hamlet chiefs and the District Chief and Sub-Chief.

3 The VIETNAMESE Supply/Logistics System: Division personnel have discussed with PLEIKU Province officials the projects that the Division wishes to be included in the 1969 PLEIKU Province Revolutionary Development Plan. The Government officials have tentatively agreed to support the projects discussed. Division civic action personnel experienced difficulty in obtaining fish from LE TRUNG District during September. On two occasions the hamlet chiefs concerned were assembled and transported to LE TRUNG where they could request the fish from the District Chief. Although they obtained no fish, the hamlet chiefs gained experience in dealing with district officials. The LE TRUNG District Chief authorized
building supplies for an administration building in PLEI GAO (ZA235375) and for a dispensary in PLEI KONG BRECH (AR866418) during the quarter.

(b) Education:

1. During August, the villagers of PLEI CHI TEH (AR846377) and PLEI KONG BRECH (AR866418) constructed two schools. The civic action teams provided canvas and the villagers contributed bamboo. Because of the intense interest the MONTAGNARDS show in educating their children, both schools were completed in less than a month.

2. In September, the villagers of PLEI KLAN NGOL (AR762265) constructed a school using all native material. The interpreter for the civic action team living there is currently doing the instructing. A request has been made to LE TRUNG District for the assignment of a teacher.

3. Two groups, totaling 14 women, attended the sewing school at the PLEIKU MONTAGNARD Training Center. Upon completion of the training course, the Training Center Advisor presented a sewing machine to the village from which the women came. The division G5 bought cloth from the US/FWMAF Civic Action Imprest Fund for the women to begin a cottage seamstress industry.

4. Twenty-five MONTAGNARD men attended agriculture classes at the MONTAGRDARD Training Center during September. The Training Center Advisor stated that this group was the best that had ever attended the school.

5. The Commanding Officer of the 1st Brigade gave 101,875 $VN to the HEI VAN CHU School in the village of TAN CANH, KONTUM Province. This money was donated by the officers and men of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

(2) Development of the Standard of Living:

(a) Water Supply: A windmill was obtained from IFFORCEV on 30 August 1968. An inspection revealed that the windmill could not be used due to lack of essential parts. Because these parts are not available in country, replacement parts will be obtained from the manufacturer in Australia. Twenty additional windmills were requested on 31 August 1968. The reply received on 18 October stated that windmills are not available through USAID sources or commercial channels and that a request for out-of-country procurement had been initiated.

(b) Animal Husbandry:

1. A horse was purchased and a pack saddle constructed in order to perform a series of demonstrations to encourage the MONTAGNARDS to use their horses as beasts of burden. On 7 and 9 October, initial demonstrations were held in PLEI NIVLO YUT (AR767405).

2. An artificial insemination kit for swine was ordered from a retail firm in CONUS on 8 August 1968 and received on 26 September 1968. The 4th Infantry Division Veterinarian, the G5 Veterinary Technicians, and a representative from IFFORCEV-CORDS Agriculture Office met from 9 October 1968 through 13 October 1968.
to modify the insemination equipment, to conduct training, to construct a boar milking dummy, and to survey village locations for insemination activities. It is expected that this program will increase both the quantity and the quality of local swine.

(c) Local Business. During the month of September, the MONTAGNARDS from PLEI HO LANG (AR777430) constructed a store on Highway 14 at coordinates LjR776432. This store is an excellent example of the people organizing in their own behalf in cooperation with GVN and US/FWMAF. The MONTAGNARDS have worked together and constructed this store to sell artifacts and other small items. They have chosen one of the villagers to run the store and account for the money. Other MONTAGNARDS in the village are constructing artifacts for sale in the store.

(d) Health Program.

1. During the month of September, a new dental program was initiated for the villagers in the Division Base Camp TAOR. On Wednesdays, dental teams from the 39th Medical Detachment (Dental Service) go to the consolidated villages and work with the resident civic action team to improve the dental health of the villagers. On Sundays, dentists who are not busy are teamed up with civic action teams and go to the other villages in the TAOR. Initially, the response to the program was not good; however, at the end of October, the dentists were treating the maximum number of patients possible during each visit.

2. The MEDCAP II Program continued to be the major effort in the Division's plan for improving the health in the TAOR. During the quarter, 37 MEDCAP huts were constructed. These huts are where the civic action team medics hold sick call for the 57 villages in the TAOR. During the quarter, 95,000 patients were treated under this program.

(3) Development of Security:

(a) The RF platoon from the DIVARTY consolidated village completed training at the RF/PF Training Center on 28 October 1968.

(b) On 1 October 1968 the PLEIKU Province Chief agreed to give the 4th Infantry Division operational control of the four PF platoons located at the four consolidated villages.

(c) During August 1968, the villagers at PLEI CHI TEH (AR840377) and PLEI KONG BREC (AR866418) organized a rotating force of home guards to supplement the RF platoons already stationed there. In addition to increasing the security of the village, the formation of the home guards indicates the development of an anti-VC sentiment.
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AVDDH-GC-MH:

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(4) Statistical Summary of Civic Action:

(a) Construction:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Built</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dwellings</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>7 km</td>
<td>27 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispensaries</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Places</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latrines</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spillways</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle Pens and Chutes</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fences</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig Pens</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulletin Boards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Bunkers</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archways</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Perimeter</td>
<td>0.9 km</td>
<td>16.5 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP Shelters</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing Set</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sump</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Health:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAPS</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Health Program</td>
<td>88,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VETCAP</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Services:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Distribution</td>
<td>24,249 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>2,732 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>40,079 bd ft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Intelligence Results: Villages served by division civic action teams have provided the following assistance:

1. 13 August 1968 - One road mine was pointed out by a child from LE TŠUNG District, PLEIKU Province.

2. 27 August 1968 - One road mine was pointed out by a child from LE TRUNG District, PLEIKU Province.

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3. September 1968 - People from one hamlet pointed out eight mines to SVN and US Forces on Highway 14N, LE TRUNG District, PLEIKU Province.

4. 27 October 1968 - A road mine was pointed out by a villager from LE TRUNG District, PLEIKU Province.

5. 28 October 1968 - A road mine was pointed out by a villager from LE TRUNG District, PLEIKU Province.

6. (C) PERSONNEL.

a. Strength: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Beginning of Reporting Period (1 Aug 68)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>16,363</td>
<td>17,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized - organic units</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>1,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized - attached units</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>17,379</td>
<td>18,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1072</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>17,640</td>
<td>18,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>16,461</td>
<td>17,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned - organic units</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>1,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned - attached units</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>17,379</td>
<td>18,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>17,379</td>
<td>18,719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) End of Reporting Period (31 October 1968)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>16,402</td>
<td>17,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized - organic units</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>1,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized - attached units</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>17,344</td>
<td>18,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>17,578</td>
<td>18,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>16,859</td>
<td>18,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned - organic units</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned - attached units</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>17,706</td>
<td>19,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>17,706</td>
<td>19,075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Replacements: A total of 592 officer and 6,278 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period, division losses were 389 officers and 4,894 enlisted personnel. Emergency leaves processed during the reporting period totalled 237.

c. Promotions: A total of 4,759 enlisted promotions were effected during the reporting period.

d. Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>HOSTILE</th>
<th>NON-HOSTILE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEATH</td>
<td>MISSING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVARTY</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCOM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2-1 Cav 3 0 12 0 0 12
1-10 Cav 1 0 41 0 0 12
1-69 Armor 5 0 50 0 0 4
4th Engr 3 0 7 0 0 17
4th Avn 1 0 9 0 0 1
124th Sig En 0 0 0 0 0 0
HHC, 4th Inf Div 0 0 0 0 0 0
4th MP Co 0 0 0 1 0 3
4th Admin Co 1 0 2 0 0 2
Scout Dog 0 0 0 0 0 5
E, 20th Inf 0 0 9 0 0 3
E, 58th Inf 0 0 3 0 0 2
4th MI 0 0 0 1 0 0
Total 154 3 607 11 0 195

e. Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) Decorations Awarded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decorations Awarded</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Valor)</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation (Valor)</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Service)</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Commendation (Service)</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>593</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Service)</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,188</td>
<td>2,330</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Badges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Badges</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Infantryman Badge</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>1,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Medical Badge</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Crewman Badge</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Badge</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>1,447</td>
<td>1,228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Reenlistments: 145 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown was as follows: First term RA reenlistments - 42; AUS enlistments - 24; RA extensions - 13; AUS extensions - 0.
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4. Postal:

(1) Money Order Sales: $4,417,606.63.
(2) Parcel Post and Postal Fees: $58,364.86.
(3) Incoming Mail: Sacks - 11,518; Pouches - 2,397; Daily Average - 125 Sacks and 26 Pouches.
(4) Outgoing Mail: Sacks - 4,367; Pouches - 1,007; Daily Average - 47 Sacks and 11 Pouches.
(5) Number of mail days: 92.

h. Special Services:

(1) The 4th Infantry Division was visited by the following six USO shows.
   (a) Lonnie B. and Vickie G.
   (b) Earl Nickels.
   (c) Jimmy Hawkins.
   (d) Gary Crosby and Bob Dorman.
   (e) All-Time Racing Greats.
   (f) All-Time Boxing Greats.
(2) R&R quotas received were 4,008 out-of-country and 788 in-country.
(3) A total of 78 movies circulated within the Division.

i. Chaplain Activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DENOMINATION</th>
<th>NO. OF SERVICES</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>20,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1,601</td>
<td>38,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorial Services</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>7,948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

   General Courts - Martial: 6
   Special Courts - Martial: 84
   Summary Courts - Martial: 40

k. Health.

   (1) The general health of the division during the quarter remained at a satisfactory level.
   (2) The most significant medical problem in the division continues to be malaria. In October malaria rates reached the highest level since December 1967. There were 231 cases of malaria in October 1968, including 74 cases of vivax malaria. The malaria rate was still considerably below that reported for the corresponding period of 1967. The third quarter of the year is generally the period of highest incidence of malaria, primarily because of weather conditions most suitable for mosquitoes. Continued enforcement of malaria discipline should result in lower malaria rates during the next quarter.

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7. (C) ENGINEER.

a. General. During the reporting period, the 4th Engineer Battalion (Combat) engaged in combat support of the 4th Infantry Division. A, B, and D Companies worked in direct support of the 1st, 2d and 3d Brigades respectively. Company C, though committed to base camp projects, often was called upon to support a forward unit. Company E (Bridge) supported the division with tactical bridging, transportation, and assisted in base camp development projects. Headquarters and Headquarters Company continued in general support by providing the line companies with heavy equipment, water purification units, tank and flame APC security, and by assisting in base camp projects.

b. Operations.

(1) During the period, the battalion used the D6B dozer, D-5A dozer, and the Case 450 dozer frequently. All have operated satisfactorily. The Case 450 in particular was used extensively in the BAN ME THUOT-DUC LAP area of operations. Though damaged by mortar fire and moved frequently, it was still able to accomplish much of the light clearing work.

(2) Company A continued in direct support of the 1st Brigade at DAK TO. Combat operations were light during the reporting period. However, there were 50 mining incidents reported during this reporting period which called for continuous minesweeps. Three new firebases were prepared during the period.

(3) Company B continued in direct support of the 2d Brigade at BAN ME THUOT and DUC LAP. Combat operations were heavy in this area for the entire reporting period; at one time Company B provided engineer support to six infantry battalions, two Special Forces camps and a MACV outpost. The company cleared in excess of 20 firebases during the reporting period.

(4) Company C continued its primary mission of general support to the division. Company C provided one platoon for DS of the 1-14th Infantry Battalion for a portion of the reporting period. This platoon worked on the construction and improvement of seven firebases. Base camp construction consisted of helicopter and fixed wing revetments, installation and maintenance of culverts and headwalls, and vertical and horizontal construction for the division.

(5) Company D continued its primary mission of direct support of the 3d Brigade with one platoon supporting a battalion of the 2d Brigade for a period of two months. Company D cleared 23 firebases and conducted 24 minesweeps during the reporting period. The Rappelling Platoon has been deployed on several occasions to clear landing zones and to assist in extracting casualties. This platoon is presently preparing a lesson plan and program for training a squad size element from each of the engineer line companies. Once completed, all the line companies in the battalion will have a rappelling capability.
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6. Throughout the reporting period Company E (Bridge) has provided tactical bridging, done limited construction work, and provided transportation support. Tactical bridging consisted of the installation of a 1931 M4T6 bridge at QL 512-3 on 23 September, assisting the 553rd Float Bridge Company in constructing a 1701 M4T6 bridge at QL 14-39, and installing mine booms at QL 512-3 and QL 19-30, as well as Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge support. Construction support consisted primarily of pouring concrete pads for base camp building foundations and now includes construction of a helicopter maintenance building. Transportation support consisted of trucking sand from the Kontum area to base camp, moving troops and equipment as required for various tactical moves in the division, and the moving of several Montagnard villages.

c. Mining incidents. A total of 115 vehicular mining incidents occurred during the period. Eleven mines were plastic and 21 were homemade (82mm mortar rounds, 105mm shells, and wooden box type). Only two command detonated mines were found. The total of anti-personnel mine incidents was five.

8. (C) Army Aviation Operations.

a. The total number of airmobile operations conducted by the 4th Aviation Battalion during the reporting period was in excess of any other period for the past 12 months. A total of 885 airmobile operations were conducted during the quarter.

b. Other operational totals are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>6,742</td>
<td>7,252</td>
<td>8,665</td>
<td>22,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>1,872</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>5,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>1,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>1,583</td>
<td>3,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops Lifted</td>
<td>7,286</td>
<td>7,001</td>
<td>7,329</td>
<td>21,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons of Cargo Trans</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>998</td>
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Ammo Expended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm</td>
<td>92,500</td>
<td>251,550</td>
<td>213,220</td>
<td>557,270</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.75 Rockets</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>1,344</td>
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<tr>
<td>40mm</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>985</td>
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Results

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Avn Pers KIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avn Pers WIA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Damage</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Destroyed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL.

a. The FY 69 USARV Annual General Inspection was conducted during the period 9-16 September 1968. An overall rating of satisfactory was achieved by the division. (Only ratings of satisfactory and unsatisfactory are given).

b. On 23 September 1968 the FY 69 Annual General Inspection Program was initiated for divisional units.

c. No complaints were received by the office of the Inspector General during the reporting period. A total of 266 requests for assistance were received and acted upon during the period.

10. (U) SIGNAL.

a. There were three major changes in the division area communications system.

b. The first major alteration occurred when a 4th Infantry Division TOC (TASK FORCE SPOILER) was located in BAN ME THUOT. In support of this command post the following equipment was sent:

   a. 2 AN/MRC-69’s (12 channel VHF)
   b. 2 AN/MRC-112’s (4 channel VHF)
   c. 1 SB-611 (patch panel)
   d. 3 SB-22’s (switchboard)
   e. 1 AN/MT-C-7 (switchboard)
   f. 1 AN/GRC-O.42 (RATT)
   g. 1 AN/VRC-49 (FM radio)
   h. 1 AN/MSC-31 (operations van)
   i. 1 MSC-17 (commo center)
   j. 1 wire team

b. The second major alteration occurred when elements of the division were deployed to the DUC LAP area. A four channel VHF system utilizing the AN/MRC-112 radio set was installed in mid-September between DUC LAP and the 2d Bde, 4th Infantry Division CP at BAN ME THUOT East. With the continued tactical buildup at DUC LAP a 12 channel VHF system was installed. An additional 12 channel system will be installed on 1 Nov 68.


(1) A special purpose (secure) RATT net for use by G2/G3 operations was established utilizing one AN/GRC-142 remote to the division TOC.

(2) The existing general purpose RATT net was closed and was combined into the special purpose net.

(3) The division station in IFFV was changed from an AN/GRC-26D RATT set to an AN/GRC-142. All battalion AN/GRC-26D’s are being turned in as AN/GRC-142’s become available.
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(a) The division RATT capability was increased when four AN/GRC-142s were
installed at Camp ENARI.

e. A Radio Wire Integration (RWI) facility was established to provide RWI
service to all base camp elements.

f. Coordination between the Division Communication Center and the brigade
communication centers was improved when all teletype circuits to the brigades
were rewired as speech-plus circuits.

g. A top secret teletype circuit has been established from the Division
Communications Center to the IFFV Communications Center to provide more rapid
handling of classified defense information.

h. The following new signal equipment was received and employed as follows:

(1) Two AN/GRC-163 radio sets (with 4 channel multiplex equipment) received.
A long range system from Dragon Mountain and VHF Hill at Camp ENARI was attempted
but in both cases proved unsuccessful due to the characteristics of FM propagation.
Stronger FM signals generated by other radio sets in the same frequency range
blocked out the receive side of both sides.

(2) Five AN/MTC-10 switchboards which replaced the AN/MTC-7's were received.
The AN/MTC's were placed in operation in the division TOC and in each of the three
brigades.

(3) Four AN/GRC-34 commo centers were received. One was put into operation at
the 1st Bde command post at D.I.K TO. Two others will be put into operation in the
near future at the other brigade locations.

11. (U) INFORMATION ACTIVITIES:

a. During the quarter 27 correspondents visited the division. They investi-
gated subjects ranging from home-town material to 4th Infantry Division policies.
Among the visitors were representatives of Time-Life, the New York Times, the
Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post, AP, UPI, Reuters, ADC, and NDC. The Com-
manding General personally briefed 8 of the 27 correspondents.

b. The Division Chapter of the 4th Infantry Division Association added 913
new members. Contributions to the 4th Infantry Division Scholarship Fund were
$62,112.56, which brought total contributions of $91,933.45.

c. The capabilities of the photo lab and Radio-Television Section increased
with the addition of new equipment, including eleven cameras, a photo dryer, four
tape recorders and a stereo receiver-amplifier system.

d. The Radio-Television Section expanded its activities as follows:

(1) Radio. A weekly news wrap-up, summarizing activity in the 4th Division,
now goes to AFVN, SAIGON, for country-wide broadcast. Material for the Army Hour and Pacific Report also goes to SAIGON.

(2) Television. The weekly command information program, FOCUS, has grown more professional with increased use of film and human interest interviews.

(3) Home Town Interviews. During the last quarter the section produced 370 interviews for distribution to hometown radio stations.

c. During the 1st Quarter, FY 69, the 4th Infantry Division led all USARV units in total Hometown News Releases submitted. The rejection rate was 2.3%.

d. During the reporting period the Information Office published a brochure on the history of the 4th Infantry Division, The Three Wars. The 4th Replacement Detachment furnishes a copy to each replacement during his in-processing.

f. The IVY LEAF improved liaison with other military publications. Pacific Stars and Stripes, the Observer (Hq, MACV) and the Army Reporter (Hq, USARV) are incorporating 4th Infantry Division news material to a much greater extent.
SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. (U) Personnel - None

2. (C) Operations.

   a. REPEATING ARTILLERY FIRE ON SUSPECTED ENEMY LOCATIONS:

      OBSERVATION: Artillery fire on suspected enemy locations is often not followed up by additional fire later.

      EVALUATION: Several PW's have stated that on many occasions they have remained in a location after it has been hit by artillery because they knew that the Americans were not likely to fire into the same area again.

      RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to followup artillery fire on intelligence targets after a period of time has elapsed following the original TOT.

   b. TUNNEL DESTRUCTION:

      OBSERVATION: Several personnel have been wounded by secondary explosions from tunnels and bunkers.

      EVALUATION: Soldiers have been wounded by throwing a hand grenade in a bunker and rushing up to inspect the results after the grenade has exploded. They are often met with a delayed secondary explosion.

      RECOMMENDATION: That personnel clearing bunkers or tunnels with grenades wait 3-5 minutes before entering to avoid being injured by secondary explosion.

   c. USE OF AIR CAVALRY DURING CORDON AND SEARCH (C&S) OPERATIONS:

      OBSERVATION: Cordon and Search Operations are frequently not completely successful because the element of surprise is lost before the village is sealed by ground elements.

      EVALUATION: An effective method of insuring that no one leaves a village before it can be searched is to employ air cavalry over the village. A loudspeaker can then instruct the villagers that anyone leaving the village will be fired upon. This tactic permits ground elements to have more time getting into position and thus insures a tight cordon around the village.

      RECOMMENDATION: That air cavalry be employed on Cordon and Search Operations to prevent anyone leaving a village prior to the completion of a cordon by ground elements.
d. CS OPERATIONS IN PERIMETER DEFENSE:

OBSERVATION: Dependence upon wind direction often limits the capability of directional fire CS munitions. As a result, perimeter probes often cannot be engaged with CS munitions without risking complete saturation of friendly positions.

EVALUATION: The E-8 Tactical CS Launcher now used on base camp and fire support base perimeters has a maximum range of 250 meters and is highly dependent upon winds. Indirect fire CS munitions cannot engage targets in the critical range of 250 to 400 meters. The XM-27 CS Grenade Dispenser mounted on a UH-1C gunship has been found to be a responsive and accurate system for engaging targets that otherwise cannot be effectively reached.

RECOMMENDATION: That UH-1C gunships equipped with the XM-27 Grenade Dispenser be utilized wherever possible against enemy troops probing friendly installations.

e. NON-PERSISTENT CS AND ARTILLERY OPERATIONS:

OBSERVATION: Failure to exploit the effects of CS on enemy troops negates the tactical advantage created. Follow-up fires must be placed on enemy positions immediately to capitalize on the temporary incapacitation.

EVALUATION: Non-persistent CS delivered on enemy positions followed immediately by artillery proved to be a most effective method of exploiting targets in KONTUM Province. Detailed coordination between artillery, chemical and aviation personnel insures timely and responsive engagement.

RECOMMENDATION: That plans be developed to exploit targets with the use of non-persistent CS and artillery fires.

f. EMPLACING DEFENSIVE DEVICES:

OBSERVATION: Often, after emplacing defensive devices in certain types of vegetation, a phosphorescent trail faintly recognizable at night is produced between the device and the friendly perimeter.

EVALUATION: A peculiar feature of some of the vegetation in the Central Highlands is that when bruised or disturbed it emits a faint glow visible at night. Personnel who emplace defensive devices such as claymores, trip flares, or booby traps must be careful to avoid leaving a visible trail which could lead to the location of the defensive devices or to the friendly perimeter.

RECOMMENDATION: That if phosphorescent trails leading to defensive devices are noticeable at night, that these trails be disguised within a network of other trails.
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...g. USE OF NATIONAL POLICE ON CORDON & SEARCH OPERATIONS:

OBSERVATION: Three to four days normally elapse before National Police respond to a U.S. request for Assistance on Cordon and Search Operations.

EVALUATION: The delay in response to the request for assistance prevents timely reaction to the demands of the immediate tactical situation. To preclude this delay, arrangements were made in one brigade AO to have several National Police assigned to battalion level units for short periods of time. These individuals were rotated as required by the chief of police. The arrangement was accepted favorably by the National Police and has increased the ability to meet immediate tactical requirements.

RECOMMENDATION: That wherever possible representatives of the National Police be encouraged to remain with U.S. units during periods when cordon and search operations are imminent.

...h. EMPLOYMENT OF SHORT RANGE PATROLS (SRP):

(1) OBSERVATION: SRPs should not engage the enemy except to adjust indirect fire or air strikes.

EVALUATION: A recent violation of this principle resulted in the death of all four members of a SRP. A later sweep of the contact area revealed that the SRP had engaged a small NVA force which had withdrawn to a nearby heavily vegetated draw. The SRP pursued the enemy and was subsequently ambushed.

RECOMMENDATION: That, in order to preclude the possibility of an ambush by a larger force, SRPs or any other small patrols with a similar mission should not intentionally engage any NVA force with small arms.

(2) OBSERVATION: SRPs must move into position quietly and without being observed.

EVALUATION: Two SRPs in the vicinity of KONTUM were attacked shortly after they had been observed moving into position by MONTAGNARDS in the area.

RECOMMENDATION: That SRPs move into position at dusk or later to minimize the possibility of compromise.

(3) OBSERVATION: SRPs should not leave their position except to return to the patrol/firebase or when the close proximity of air/artillery fire may necessitate relocation.

EVALUATION: Because of their small number, SRPs should make every effort to avoid unnecessary risks. On one occasion a SRP conducted a sweep after having adjusted artillery on an enemy element. The SRP was engaged by another enemy force and suffered several KIA.

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RECOMMENDATION: That SRPs remain stationary to reduce the possibility of being detected.

(4) OBSERVATION: SRPs should not smoke, use scented soap, or wear shaving lotion prior to going into position.

EVALUATION: A HOI CHINH commented recently that the NVA were usually able to locate U.S. positions because of the odors emanating from burning cigarettes or lotion/soap recently used.

RECOMMENDATION: That SRPs refrain from smoking or from using scented soaps/lotions.

(5) OBSERVATION: Only one member of a SRP should be permitted to sleep at any one time.

EVALUATION: The primary function of the SRP is to detect without being detected. This also serves as the patrol's best defense. When only one SRP member is awake, the enemy has a better opportunity to approach the SRP position undetected. In one case, a tiger killed the only SRP member awake and dragged the body away undetected.

RECOMMENDATION: That only one member of a SRP be permitted to sleep at any one time.

i. USE OF CS GAS TO BREAK CONTACT:

OBSERVATION: Employment of CS gas is a very effective means for a small unit to break contact with a superior force.

EVALUATION: A favorite NVA tactic is to engage a numerically inferior U.S. element. To counter this tactic small U.S. forces are instructed to deliver a heavy volume of fire and then attempt to break contact as quickly as possible. Often a small unit has difficulty in breaking the contact. The use of CS grenades can be effective in breaking contact in such a situation. In addition to disorganizing and confusing the enemy, the gas also provides a partial smoke screen which can mask the withdrawal of the U.S. element.

RECOMMENDATION: That small units use CS grenades to break contact with a larger enemy force.

j. REMOVING OBSTACLES WITH EXPLOSIVES:

OBSERVATION: When used properly, explosives are useful in removing obstacles in the path of an armored column.

EVALUATION: Because of insufficient traction, armored vehicles frequently become mired in rice paddies adjacent to dikes. Additionally, steep stream.
banks are an obstacle which may require the column to lose time in attempting to find a bypass. Explosives, when properly used, can easily clear many of these obstacles.

RECOMMENDATION: That wherever practicable armored units use explosives to remove obstacles which otherwise would require a bypass.

k. OBSERVATION: With proper precautions, tracked vehicles are capable of crossing rice paddies with little difficulty.

EVALUATION: Experience has shown that tracked vehicles are able to negotiate inundated areas if they maintain a slow, constant speed, steer only when necessary, and do not follow the track of preceding vehicles. If an armored vehicle does become mired, the use of an extra-long tow cable by the recovery vehicle will lessen the chance of the recovery vehicle also becoming mired.

RECOMMENDATION: That armored elements follow the above procedure when crossing rice paddies and that recovery vehicles be provided with extra long tow cable.

3. (c) Training.

USE OF CONTOUR SKETCHES TO TEACH MAP READING:

OBSERVATION: It has been found that depicting a terrain model with a contour sketch is a fast and effective method of teaching the individual to interpret terrain features on a map.

EVALUATION: The extensive use of small patrols in RVN has emphasized the individual soldier's need to become proficient in map reading and land navigation. In learning how to reconstruct a given terrain feature reflected on a map by sketching a small terrain model, the soldier can more easily learn to distinguish contour lines. This ability will increase his proficiency in land navigation and map reading.

RECOMMENDATION: That maximum use be made of sketching terrain models to teach map reading.

4. (c) Intelligence.

NVA USE OF A REVERSE SLOPE DURING A WITHDRAWAL.

OBSERVATION: The enemy often takes advantage of a reverse slope in a withdrawal to reduce the effects of direct fire weapons.

EVALUATION: During a recent attack in DâRLAC Province the enemy assaulted a perimeter from the forward slope. In their assault, the enemy moved across the perimeter to the reverse slope on the other side which served then to mask their withdrawal.
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RECOMMENDATION: That in planning the defense of a perimeter consideration be given to covering any reverse slopes with indirect fire weapons.

5. (U) Logistics - None.

6. (U) Organization - None.

7. (U) Tactical Cover and Deception - None.

8. (C) Civil Affairs.

a. RELOCATION OF MONTAGNARDS:

OBSERVATION: It has been discovered that when MONTAGNARDS agree to relocate their village, one way to ensure that they do not change their minds is to have them move their rice huts first.

EVALUATION: The MONTAGNARDS place a great deal of importance on their rice huts. A rice hut contains the year's supply of rice for a MONTAGNARD village. Once the rice huts are relocated, the families quickly follow. They are concerned about the security of their rice. They also like their rice huts nearby where they will not have to walk very far to obtain each meal.

RECOMMENDATION: That when planning a village relocation, the civic action personnel attempt to move the rice huts first.

b. INSPIRING MONTAGNARDS WITH A COMPLETED PROJECT:

OBSERVATION: It is sometimes better for Americans to complete a civic action project themselves in order that the MONTAGNARDS may develop an interest by seeing the results.

EVALUATION: 4th Infantry Division personnel purchased a horse and constructed a pack saddle with the objective of convincing the MONTAGNARDS to use their horses as beasts of burden. After the horse was trained and the pack saddle perfected, G5 personnel took the horse to selected villages and put on a demonstration. The villagers were visibly impressed and requested that the G5 personnel return to their village and help them train their own horses.

RECOMMENDATION: That civic action personnel be aware that certain projects are best accepted by the MONTAGNARDS by showing them the results.

c. CHIEU HOI PROGRAM:

OBSERVATION: Because of the nature of the CHIEU HOI Program some enemy soldiers who desire to give themselves up are reluctant to do so.
EVALUATION: It was learned from a HOI CHAMH that some NVA soldiers are afraid to give themselves up under the CHIEU HOI Program because they would then be considered collaborators for the GVN. The stigma of becoming a traitor coupled with the fear of never being able to return to their homes necessitates another alternative to offer the enemy. This alternative should be the opportunity for the NVA to surrender and become a POW. Such an opportunity would remove the stigma of being a traitor and would not preclude their eventual return to their homes.

RECOMMENDATION: That, under appropriate circumstances, PSYWAR campaigns be selectively conducted to encourage the enemy to surrender and obtain POW status.

d. CONTINUED SUPERVISION OF COMPLETED CA PROJECTS:

OBSERVATION: Civic action projects should continue to be supervised after their completion to insure motivation on the part of indigenous personnel.

EVALUATION: A project which involved breeding swine, constructing pens and providing food for the animals was completed in July. After completion of the project the civic action team did not follow up on the progress the indigenous personnel were achieving. Over a period of several months the project had nearly failed. An unknown disease had killed most of the animals while the remainder were suffering from malnutrition.

RECOMMENDATION: That civic action teams make follow-up inspections of completed projects to insure progress is being maintained.

9. (c) Signal

KY-38/TSEC ZEROIZE SWITCH

OBSERVATION: The KY-38/TSEC may become inoperable in the cipher mode if the zeroize switch is not held securely in position.

EVALUATION: If the Phillips screw that holds the zeroize switch becomes loose, the KY-38 will not function in the cipher mode, but will operate in the plain mode.

RECOMMENDATION: That the zeroize switch on the KY-38 be inspected frequently to insure that it is securely in place.
Section 3 (C) Department of the Army Survey Information - Escape and Evasion.

1. (C) SGT E-5 Buddy Wright

SGT E-5 Buddy Wright, Rl. 15677945, squad leader, Company D, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, was the rear security man for his squad on a company sweep in the vicinity of YU 791681 on 22 September 1968. Sometime between 1400H and 1430H, the squad took a break. Wright remained to the rear of the squad during the break. After approximately ten minutes Wright moved forward and discovered that his squad had moved out without notifying him. Wright tried to follow his unit's trail, but encountered a group of 25 to 30 NVA who captured him. The NVA took his weapon and ammunition, wallet, maps and squad leader's notebook. They then tied Wright's elbows behind his back and moved west toward Cambodia, using Wright as their point man. An NVA soldier with a rifle walked immediately behind Wright.

The platoon moved until approximately 1900H, when they arrived at a small camp just inside Cambodia at approximate coordinates YU 763700. There the soldiers fed Wright three bowls of rice and a bowl of hot water. After Wright had eaten, the NVA used commo wire to bind his wrists and ankles and tie his elbows together behind his back. They placed Wright in a two-man underground bunker where he stayed until the next morning. The bunker was approximately four feet under ground and the opening was covered with logs and leaves. Wright did not see any other bunkers in the area but guessed that many others were located there. The NVA in the camp camouflaged themselves with leaves. They hid close to the ground each time they heard airplanes.

At sunrise on 23 September the NVA woke Wright and fed him three bowls of rice and a bowl of hot water. After Wright had eaten, the NVA tied a leash to him and tied his elbows behind his back with commo wire. During their stay at the small camp the NVA did not mistreat or question Wright.

One or two hours after sunrise, the platoon headed north-northwest. An unidentified English-speaking member of the platoon approached Wright and asked him his name, rank, service number and unit. Wright gave his name, rank and service number. The NVA already knew the answers to these questions. In Wright's wallet they had found a pay voucher and other papers. The English-speaking soldier told Wright that he was being taken to a prisoner compound. Wright guessed that this individual was either an officer or senior NCO because the only weapon he carried was a pistol.

Sometime around 1200H the platoon took a 45 to 60 minute break for lunch. Wright ate three bowls of rice and a bowl of brown, sweet-tasting crystals that he thought to be sugar. After Wright had eaten, the NVA again bound his elbows with commo wire. Again the platoon moved north-northwest. SGT Wright judged that he was in Cambodia; there were no bomb craters and discipline was easy.

At about 1530H the platoon passed through a training area. Classes, apparently dealing with rifle grenades, were in progress. Wright observed bulletin boards and weapon-identification charts. The camp was about the size of a city.
block. It had no perimeter. Sometime between 1500H and 1600H, the platoon stopped for a five minute break. A soldier offered Wright a cigarette which he smoked and found to be marijuana.

At approximately 1900H the platoon arrived at a compound situated on the east side of a mountain at YU 754829. Wright saw four huts, seven feet by seven feet, with roofs made of bamboo and ponchos. The huts had bamboo floors but no walls. He saw two other huts with straw walls and straw roofs. Although NVA were carrying large rolls of commo wire, SGT Wright saw no power or communication facilities while he was in the compound. There was a double canopy of tall trees overhead; the camp is probably invisible from the air. Wright heard no aircraft fly over the camp. He judged, however, that helicopters might be capable of landing in an area southeast of the mountain. Wright could not estimate the number of troops guarding the compound or determine what security arrangements the camp had. There was no fence or perimeter.

Two English-speaking NVA interrogated Wright as soon as he arrived at the compound. One, about 18 to 20 years old, asked questions. The other, between 45 and 50 years old, took notes. The first interrogation lasted 10 to 15 minutes. The young interrogator said, "You are now a prisoner of the National Liberation Front. You will be treated humanely and will not be shot as long as you answer our questions." He asked Wright his name, rank, service number, unit, and size of unit. Wright gave only his name, rank and service number.

The NVA took Wright to one of the open-sided bamboo huts. There they fed him three bowls of rice, a bowl of the brown, sweet, sugarlike substance, and a bowl of hot water. When Wright had finished eating, the NVA bound his elbows, ankles and wrists with commo wire and took his boots. Two guards were stationed at the hut, one at Wright's head, the other at his feet. Both were armed with AK-47's. The guards changed at 0800 hours and served 24-hour shifts. None of the guards fell asleep while on duty. That night Wright managed to get six hours sleep.

The following morning, 24 September 1968, the guards woke Wright approximately one or two hours after sunrise and fed him three bowls of rice with a meat that tasted like pork. The guards then took Wright to the two interrogators. Wright sat on the ground in front of a table. One guard was on each side of the table and two guards were behind Wright. Throughout the interrogation, the guards kept their AK-47's pointed at him. The young interrogator asked Wright what unit he was from, the strength of his unit, his division, the location of his division, his brigade, the number of brigades in the division, his battalion and his battalion commander's name. He asked about the weapons, radio equipment and frequencies of US units. SGT Wright gave only his name, rank and service number. The interrogator answered many of his own questions. Because SGT Wright kept refusing to answer questions, the interrogator called him a "stupid NCO." The interrogator asked about the morale of US units. SGT Wright told him that it was high.
The interrogator replied that SGT Wright was a liar. He then asked about casualties and contacts. He asked Wright if he had heard about the American artillery battery that had been overrun. (Apparently he was referring to the sapper attack on TASK FORCE LANCE, 7 September 1968). He asked Wright if he had heard about DAK SAK (apparently the A239 Special Forces Camp at DUC LAP). SGT Wright refused to answer. The interrogator asked Wright if his parents were living. Wright lied; he said they were both dead. Wright then asked the interrogator how long he would be a prisoner. The interrogator answered, "For the Duration." This ended the session. The young interrogator wanted Wright to bow as a sign of military courtesy. Wright saluted instead.

The guards took Wright back to his hut and fed him three bowls of rice, a bowl of greens and a bowl of hot water. The guards did not bother Wright again until one or two hours after sunrise on 25 September. During the night Wright slept without any cover. On the morning of the 25th the NVA fed Wright the usual three bowls of rice and one bowl of hot water plus a white-colored vegetable and a meat that tasted like pork. They then brought him before the two interrogators. The young one repeated the same questions that he had asked the day before. Wright again gave only his name, rank and service number. The session ended at approximately 1200H. Wright ate another meal of three bowls of rice, a white-colored vegetable and a bowl of hot water. He remained in the hut until approximately 2000H, when the guards took him back to the interrogators. The NVA held the session by torchlight, apparently with the intention of scaring Wright. The young interrogator asked the same questions as he had before. Wright again refused to answer. At approximately 260100, the guards returned SGT Wright to his hut. As usual, they tied his elbows, wrists and ankles with commo wire and took away his boots.

Wright's breakfast on 26 September again consisted of three bowls of rice, a white-colored vegetable, a meat that tasted like pork and a bowl of hot water. The guards who came on duty at 0800H seemed to feel sympathy for Wright. Rather than tie him with commo wire, they used a rope about 1/4 of an inch thick. Wright spent the day in the hut and smoked marijuana cigarettes given to him by the guards. At 1200H and 1730 the guards fed him rice, hot water and pork-flavored meat. After the evening meal the guards bound Wright loosely with the rope and gave him a blanket to cover himself.

Shortly after dark, Wright began to unlace himself under the cover of the blanket. At approximately 30 minute intervals, or whenever there was a noise, the guards shined a flashlight on him. After untying himself, Wright remained quiet for approximately two hours, hoping that the guards might fall asleep. This did not occur. Wright therefore waited for the periodic flashlight check and then crawled off of the bamboo floor. He had moved about three feet away from one of the guards when he snapped a twig. The other guard shined his light into Wright's sleeping position. Instantly, Wright dashed away from the hut and into the brush. He was without boots. The guards fired at him but their shots were all high. Wright headed toward a river approximately 200 to 250 meters east of the hut. He crossed the river, approximately 20 feet wide, by jumping from rock to rock.

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Wright had the impression that three of four NVA soldiers were chasing him. He headed over a mountain and ran through brush for approximately two hours. He then stopped to rest. The NVA were no longer pursuing him. During the morning of September 27 SGT Wright continued moving east. While crossing an open field he spotted NVA soldiers moving along a trail. Thinking that he had been seen, Wright hid in the brush; NVA guards were stationed along the trail. Wright was afraid that if he moved he would be heard. After four to six hours it began to rain. Knowing that the rain would muffle sounds, Wright crawled approximately 250 meters away from the trail. He then walked another 500 to 600 meters, stopped and slept until sunrise on 28 September.

Wright returned to the trail and found it still guarded. Many NVA were moving along the trail. Wright low-crawled up to the edge of the trail and waited. Finally, at 1400 or 1500 he jumped up, ran across the trail and continued running for about ten minutes. He then continued eastward. At sunset Wright passed through an abandoned NVA camp. He continued on until he came to a river about 50 meters wide. There he spent the night.

Wright awoke at sunrise, 29 September, crossed the river and continued east. He made no more contact with humans until 5 October. Although water was abundant, SGT Wright had nothing to eat except some fruit that he found growing on trees.

On 5 October Wright heard artillery and helicopters to the southwest of his location. He headed southwestward and found a trail with US-type boot marks. Wright followed the trail until sunset. Rain fell during the night. Wright feared that the trail would be erased. Instead, on the morning of 6 October he found fresh boot marks. As Wright continued along the trail he smelled smoke and heard voices. Wright moved up to where he could observe individuals in the open ahead of him. He thought they were NVA. While Wright was moving away from them, jets flew over the area. Wright wondered why the jets did not bomb the supposed NVA. He returned to observe the strangers more closely. He saw that they were wearing US-style helmets and fatigues and carrying M-16 rifles. SGT Wright approached them yelling "chop chop," and pointing at his stomach. The VIETNAMESE were members of the 4th Battalion, 45th Regiment, 23d ARVN Division. They took SGT Wright to their patrol base, YU 887793. There an ARVN medic cleaned and treated Wright's cuts. A dustoff helicopter flew SGT Wright to the 2d Brigade Forward OP at LZ MACE.

Wright saw no other US prisoners during his captivity, nor did he see any other prisoner of war camps. At no time during Wright's captivity did the NVA pressure, mistreat or torture him. Wright stated that he asked numerous questions about the NVA, American prisoners, and his location, but received no answers.

Wright does not believe that smoking marijuana on the day of 26 September influenced his decision to escape. He stated that while a captive the thought of escape was always with him. He added, though, that the marijuana was helpful because it dulled the pain from the cuts in his legs and feet.
2. (C) CPT David M. Foye

Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry moved out of the 1-22 Infantry FSB on 28 April 1968 at 1551H. Traveling in single file because of the thickness of the vegetation, Company A followed the general trace YA 868888, YA 870886, YA 871885, YA 871882, YA 870880. The company commander, CPT David M. Foye, 0532-0940, told his lead element to push forward; they had a long way to go. While checking his map, CPT Foye noticed that a soldier to his front had become entangled in brush. He spoke to the soldier and told him to move out. CPT Foye approached the brush and began pushing branches aside with his CAR-15. Suddenly he looked up and saw someone pointing an AK-47 in his face. He screamed and dropped his map and weapon. While the armed man held his weapon pointed at CPT Foye, a second man pinned the captain's arms behind his back. The two men moved CPT Foye off the trail about ten feet to the right. There they lay still for approximately 30 minutes. During this time CPT Foye heard no one pass by their location. He believes that just beyond the heavy brush there was a fork in the trail and that his unit had moved to the left, away from the kidnapping site. CPT Foye could not explain why his RTO, who was ten feet to his rear, did not see the kidnapping of hear his scream. CPT Foye estimated the time of his capture at 1600 and the place as YA 870880.

The two enemy soldiers wore green fatigues and carried packs. One had a radio resembling an AN/PRC-25 in his pack. At no time did CPT Foye see this man use the radio. The man with the AK-47 was the only one who was armed. The soldiers were apparently inexperienced; they failed to search CPT Foye or take his ammunition. The two enemy soldiers took CPT Foye along the general trace YA 870880, YA 875883, YA 878875. The first part of the journey was a backtrack of his company's direction of movement. About 1000 meters from the kidnapping site a third individual joined the first two. He had no weapon or pack. At about 2000H the group stopped in the vicinity of YA 878875 and ate supper. The enemy soldiers offered CPT Foye some of their rice, but he ate "C" rations instead.

After the meal one of the enemy soldiers gave CPT Foye a white capsule to swallow. Fifteen minutes after taking the capsule, CPT Foye fell asleep. He woke up at about 0300H. Artillery was impacting in the area. The incoming fire wounded CPT Foye and two of the enemy. As the third individual, who was standing guard, approached, CPT Foye hit him in the head with a "C" ration can. CPT Foye grabbed the man's weapon and hit him again.

CPT Foye grabbed his pack and ran out of the area. He heard someone chasing him. He ran about 300 meters, until he had avoided his pursuer. Then he stopped and rested. He moved a little farther that night, then stopped and waited for dawn. On the morning of 29 April CPT Foye moved west until he reached a river at YA 859873. Then he moved north toward the 1-22 Infantry FSB. He reached the FSB at approximately 291600H.
3. (C) SGT E-5 John D. Liberman and PFC Stanley Ziarko

On 23 October, while in position about three kilometers from their patrol base, two SRP teams from Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an enemy force. Not knowing the enemy's strength, the teams attempted to withdraw. Two members of one SRP team were wounded and had to remain in place. The others broke into groups of two and moved to a rallying point. There they planned the rescue of the two wounded men. While one team supported from covered positions, the other returned to the point of contact. They found that the enemy had departed. The team recovered the two wounded men and destroyed equipment that they had abandoned during the contact and could no longer carry while transporting the wounded. The two teams then set out for their company's patrol base. En route, SGT E-5 John D. Liberman, US 51830161, and PFC Stanley Ziarko, US 519-67870 became separated from their team. The rest came upon a clearing. They radioed for a dustoff helicopter to evacuate the wounded and another helicopter to lift the remainder of the men back to the patrol base. Liberman and Ziarko had no map or compass, yet found their way back to the patrol base by remembering the terrain and using the setting of the sun to determine direction.

4. (C) WO1 David H. Reid.

WO1 David H. Reid, W315632, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade Aviation Section, was flying a critical resupply mission late in the day of 12 August 1968. He became disoriented in the heavy fog and darkness, expended all his fuel and made an emergency landing. Because of the darkness and fog other helicopters could not come to his assistance, WO Reid moved out of the area of the downed helicopter and spent the night hiding in the best concealment he could find. In the morning, when search craft found his helicopter, WO Reid came out of hiding. With the resupply of fuel brought by the rescue party, WO Reid was able to fly his helicopter back to LZ Oasis.

5. (C) 124th Signal Battalion Personnel.

During CLEANSWEEP III, three men from the 124th Signal Battalion became separated from the maneuver forces. They spent the night in the jungle and were found the next day unharmed.

SP4 Randolf Sweet and SP4 Timothy G. Mowdy were separated soon after their units left the assigned jump-off point. They spent the night in a well-hidden location from where they could observe the trail leading back to the jump-off point. In the morning they followed the trail back through a village to a highway where they were picked up by Military Police patrolling the road.

A third man, SP4 Ronnie E. Wood, became separated about half-way through the operation. Because the terrain was unfamiliar, he could not find his way to any rallying point. When he attempted to attract the attention of a helicopter
by firing his M-16, the helicopter returned fire with its M-60 machine guns. Sp4 Wood then found a secluded area near a field and spent the night. The next morning he waited until a search helicopter came near his location. He tied his white T-shirt on the end of a pole and waved it. The helicopter spotted him immediately and picked him up.

5 Incl CHARLES P. STONE
1. Organizational Structure
2. Key Personnel
3. Abbreviations
4. Chr. Gny of Sig. Activties
5. Chemical Operations
Incl 2 - 5 wd Hq, DA
AVFA-GC-OT (15 Nov 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division for Period
        Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (RL)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHC-DST, APO 96375

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and makes the follow-
ing comment: Reference Inclosure 1, Organizational Structure. Artillery
units attached to the 52d Artillery Group and 41st Artillery Group,
I FFORCEV Artillery, are not organic to nor have they been attached to
the 4th Infantry Division. The mission of these units is general support
or general support reinforcing of units of the 4th Infantry Division
Artillery and ARVN forces. Therefore the units listed below should appear
under I FFORCEV Artillery with appropriate mission indicated and not under
Brigade or Division Troops task organization.

a. 52d Artillery Group
   (1) Battery A and B, 3d Bn, 6th Arty
   (2) Battery A, B, C and D (Prov), 6th Bn, 14th Arty
   (3) Battery A and B, 5th Bn, 22d Arty
   (4) Battery A, B and C, 1st Bn, 92d Arty

b. 41st Artillery Group
   (1) Battery C, 7th Bn, 15th Arty

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT CRISWELL
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL
AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 68) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 15 DEC 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division and concurs with the report as modified by the preceding indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

W. C. ARNTZ
GFP, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (15 Nov 68)  3d Ind (b)
SUBJECT:  Operational Report of HQ, 4th Inf Div for period ending
   31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  13 JAN 1969

TO:  Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
     Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
A&I AG
1. (C) Task Organization as of 31 July 1968 was:

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<th>1st Bde., 4th Inf Div</th>
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<tr>
<td>1-8 Inf</td>
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<tr>
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<table>
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<th>2d Bde., 4th Inf Div</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>B/1-10 Cav</td>
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<td>A/7-17 Cav</td>
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<td>D/7-17 Cav</td>
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<td>B/4 Engr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 79-37-67 eff 1 Aug:

DELETE: 1-35 Inf
ADD: 1-35 Inf (-)

3. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 80-37-67:

DELETE: 7-17 Cav (-) eff 10 Aug.
ADD: A/1-14 Inf eff 10 Aug

Inclosure 1
4. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 81-37-67 eff 15 Aug:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
ADD: C/1-14 Inf

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
ADD: 1-10 Cav (-)
ADD: A/4-42 Arty

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
DELETE: 1-10 Cav (-)
DELETE: C/1-14 Inf

Also, effective 15 Aug:

Division Troops
DELETE: A/2-1 Cav
ADD: B/2-1 Cav

5. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 82-37-67 eff 19 Aug:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
ADD: Hqs/1-14 and B/1-14 Inf
DELETE: Hqs/1-14 and B/1-14 Inf

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
ADD: C/7-15 Arty

Also, effective 19 Aug:

6. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 83-37-67 eff 24 Aug:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
ADD: 4-503 Abn Inf
ADD: D/3-319 Abn Arty

7. (C) TASK FORCE SPOILER became operational 25 Aug 68. For task organization within SPOILER, see paragraph 20.

TASK FORCE SPOILER

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
1-12 Inf
B/2-9 Arty

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<td>4-503 Abn Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-10 Cav</td>
<td>B/5-22 Art</td>
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<td>7-17 Cav (-)</td>
<td>B/4 Engr</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-42 Arty</td>
<td>TACP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division

#### 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

| 1-8 Inf | 2-8 Inf |
| 3-8 Inf | 1-35 Inf |
| 3-12 Inf | D/1-14 Inf |
| 1-14 Inf (-) | 2-9 Arty (-) |
| A/2-1 Cav | A/5-16 Arty |
| 6-29 Arty | A/3-6 Arty |
| C/5-16 Arty | B/3-6 Arty |
| D/5-16 Arty | B/1-92 Arty |
| A/1-92 Arty | A/6-14 Arty |
| B/6-14 Arty | C/6-14 Arty |
| A/4 Engr | D/6-14 Arty (Prov) |
| TACP | C/7-15 Arty |

#### Division Troops

| 2-1 Cav (-) | B/5-22 Arty |
| 4th Engr (-) | 4th Engr |

8. (C) Effective 28 Aug:

**1st Bde, 4th Inf Div**

**ADD:** D/1-14 Inf

**DELETE:** D/1-14 Inf

9. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 84-37-67:

**Division Troops**

**DELETE:** D/2-1 Cav eff 9 Sep

**ADD:** 3-8 Inf eff 11 Sep

**DELETE:** 3-8 Inf eff 15 Sep

**1st Bde, 4th Inf Div**

**ADD:** 3-8 Inf

**3d Bde, 4th Inf Div**

**DELETE:** 3-8 Inf

**ADD:** 3-8 Inf

CONFIDENTIAL
10. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 85-37-67 eff 26 Sep:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
ADD: B/2-8 Inf

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
DELETE: B/2-8 Inf

11. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 86-37-67 eff 30 Sep:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
DELETE: B/1-14 Inf
ADD: B/1-14 Inf

12. (C) Effective 4 Oct:

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE (disbanded): D/6-14 Arty (Prov)

13. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 87-37-67 eff 12 Oct:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
DELETE: D/1-14 Inf
ADD: D/1-14 Inf

14. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 88-37-67:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
DELETE: 4-503 Abn Inf eff 15 Oct
ADD: 4-503 Abn Inf

D/3-319 Abn Arty eff 15 Oct
DELETE: 1-69 Armor (-) eff 20 Oct
ADD: 1-69 Armor (-) eff 20 Oct

Division Troops
ADD: 1-69 Armor (-) eff 22 Oct
DELETE: 1-69 Armor (-) eff 28 Oct
(B/1-69 rmn w/Div Troops)

Also, effective 15 Oct:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
DELETE: 1-14 Inf (-)
ADD: 1-14 Inf (-)
DELETE: C/6-29 Arty
ADD: C/6-29 Arty

15. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 89-37-67:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
DELETE: B/2-8 Inf eff 25 Oct
ADD: B/2-8 Inf

A/1-10 Cav eff 25 Oct
ADD: A/1-10 Cav

7-17 Cav (-) eff 25 Oct
DELETE: C/2-8 Inf eff 24 Oct

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Division Troops

ADD: 7-17 Cav (-)
ADD: C/2-8 Inf

16. (C) Effective 25 Oct 68, TASK FORCE SPOILER was dissolved.

17. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 90-37-67:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
DELETE: D/1-8 Inf eff 27 Oct
3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
ADD: D/1-8 Inf

Division Troops
ADD: C/1-10 Cav

Also, effective 28 Oct:

Division Troops
DELETE: C/2-1 Cav
ADD: A/2-1 Cav

18. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 91-37-67 eff 30 Oct:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
ADD: D/1-8 Inf

Division Troops
DELETE: 1-22 Inf

19. (C) Task Organization as of 31 October with supporting artillery units:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
1-8 Inf
3-12 Inf
C/2-1 Cav
6-29 Arty (-)
C/5-16 Arty
D/5-16 Arty
A/1-92 Arty
B/6-14 Arty
A/4 Engr
TAGP

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
2-8 Inf (-)
3-8 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-22 Inf
1-35 Inf
1-69 Armor (-)
A/1-10 Cav
C/1-10 Cav
2-9 Arty (-)
C/4-42 Arty
C/6-29 Arty

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2d Bde., 4th Inf Div.

1-12 Inf
2-35 Inf
1-10 Cav (-)
4-42 Arty (-)
B/2-9 Arty
B/5-16 Arty
C/1-92 Arty
B/5-22 Arty
B/4 Engr
TACP

3d Bde., 4th Inf Div. (Cont'd)

A/5-16 Arty
A/3-6 Arty
B/3-6 Arty
B/1-92 Arty
A/6-14 Arty
C/6-14 Arty
C/7-15 Arty
D/4 Engr
TACP

Division Troops

C/2-8 Inf
2-1 Cav (-)
7-17 Cav (-)
✓ A/5-22 Arty
4 Engr (-)

20. (C) Task forces subordinate to 2d Brigade and TASK FORCE SPOILER.

a. TASK FORCE LANCE

(1) Eff 24 Aug:

1/3 and 3/C, 2-35 Inf
ARP/A/7-17 Cav
3 tubes, A/4-42 Arty

(2) Eff 25 Aug:

ADD: C/4-503d Abn Inf

(3) Eff 26 Aug:

ADD: 2 tubes, A/4-42 Arty

(4) Eff 29 Aug:

DELETE: ARP/A/7-17 Cav

(5) Eff 30 Aug:

DELETE: 1/B and 3/C, 2-35 Inf
ADD: A/5-503 Abn Inf
DELETE: C/4-503 Abn Inf

(6) Eff 6 Sep:

ADD: A/7-17 Cav

(7) Eff 7 Sep:

ADD: B/2-35 Inf

(8) Eff 10 Sep:

DELETE: B/2-35 Inf

b. TASK FORCE BRIGHT

(1) Eff 10 Sep:

4-503 Abn Inf
B, C and Recon Plt, 2-35 Inf
Recon Plt, 1-22 Inf
A/7-17 Cav

(2) Eff 11 Sep:

ADD: B/2-9 Arty
ADD: 1/D and 3/C, 2-35

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(1) **Eff 10 Sep:** (continued)

D/1-10 Cav
A/4-42 Arty
D/3-319 Abn Arty
C/1-92 Arty

(3) **Eff 12 Sep:**

ADD: A and C, 1-22 Inf

(4) **Eff 13 Sep:**

ADD: 2-35 Inf (-)

(5) **Eff 17 Sep:**

ADD: 1-22 Inf (-)

(6) **Eff 29 Sep:**

ADD: C/4-42 Arty
DELETE: A/4-42 Arty

(7) **Eff 30 Sep:**

ADD: A and D, 1-12 Inf

(8) **Eff 1 Oct:**

ADD: 1-12 Inf (-)

(9) **TASK FORCE BRIGHT at maximum strength consisted of:**

1-12 Inf (-)
1-22 Inf
2-25 Inf
4-503 Abn Inf
A/7-17 Cav
D/1-10 Cav
C/4-42 Arty
B/2-9 Arty
D/3-319 Abn Arty
C/1-92 Arty

(10) **Effective 7 Sep TF BRIGHT was absorbed by 2d Brigade.**
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 4th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 Oct 68

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68.

CG, 4th Infantry Division
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