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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

RCS CSFOR-5 (K1)

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Significant Activities

1. (C) INTRODUCTION: This Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers the period 1 August through 31 October 1968. During this period, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation TOAN THANG (Phase II), conducting operations within the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). The Regiment (-) was under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. The Regiment conducted operations within its Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI), and elements of the Regiment conducted operations in the provinces of Binh Long, Gia Dinh, Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, and Bien Dong.

Squadrons were OPCON to the Capitol Military Assistance Command (CMAC) and DS to 18th ARVN Division at varying times throughout the reporting period. Squadrons and troop size units also conducted operations with the 1st Australian Task Force, 18th ARVN Division, and 5th ARVN Division. During portions of the reporting period, elements of the following 1st Infantry Division battalions were OPCON: 1/16 Infantry, 2/16 Infantry, 1/26 Infantry, 2/28 Infantry, 1/26 Infantry, 5/60 Mechanized Infantry, 1/2 Infantry, and 2/2 Mechanized Infantry. The 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) and 51st Ranger Battalion (ARVN) were DS to the Regiment. The Regimental HQ was located at LAI KHE (XT759375) and Bien Hoa (TT027145) during this quarter.

Operation TOAN THANG (Phase II) was generally characterized by cordon and search operations in selected villages and reconnaissance in force missions. The Blackhorse Regiment uncovered and destroyed numerous base camps and caches. Significant actions in the campaign were the cordon and search of CHANH LUU (XT827321) on 8 Aug by the 3d Squadron, the cordon and search of THIEN TAN (TT80187) on 13 Sep by 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) and the location of a large arms and equipment cache by the 1/28 Infantry on 15 Oct. The Blackhorse Regiment was responsible for Blackhorse Base Camp security, ground, rocket
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

and mortar defense of LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Area, the security of Rome Plow operations in the CATCHERS MITT and the prevention of enemy exfiltration from the CATCHERS MITT toward SAIGON. As usual, destruction of the enemy was a prime requirement.

2. (C) **ORGANIZATION:** The basic structure of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment remained the same throughout the reporting period. (See INCL I).

3. (C) **INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:**

   a. **GENERAL:** During the reporting period, the Regiment operated primarily in SR-5, MR-10, U-1, SR-1, and VC BA BIEN Province.

   b. **ORDER OF BATTLE:**

      (1) **LAM SON and CATCHERS MITT Area:** The 11th ACR and its OPCON units encountered units from VC Sub-Region 5 and VC U-1 Region in the LAM SON and CATCHERS MITT Area. The principal main force unit encountered was the DONG NAI Regiment of Sub-Region 5. During the period, the DONG NAI Regiment carefully moved from secure base areas to forward staging positions and, after failing to achieve offensive momentum, remained in those areas through mid-September and October. Local force units in Sub-Region 5 and VC U-1 Region remained in their normal areas of operation and conducted harassing actions and performed normal supply/transport functions throughout the period.

      (2) **VC Sub-Region 5:**

         (a) **DONG NAI Regiment:** During the quarter, the DONG NAI Regiment infiltrated south as it had during the TET and May Offensives. In mid-July, the DONG NAI Regiment was located in a base area in the CATCHERS MITT (vic YT0231, YT0238, YT0731, YT0738). During the period 8-10 August, elements of the 11th ACR sealed and searched CHANH LUU Village (XTB332); among the captives from this operation were members of the K2, K3, and K4 Battalions of the DONG NAI Regiment. From 2-16 August, agent reports revealed that large scale enemy movements occurred between BINH MY (YT0033) and BINH NHAM (XTB307); several reports identified battalions of the DONG NAI Regiment. A PW identified an infiltration route running from XT922330 to XT855103. On 22 August, friendly elements reported movement along this route at XT860263, XT857246, XT912283, and XT920265. On 22 August, a PW, captured at XT885144, stated that he was a member of the K3 Battalion and that his unit had passed through the area at 2200 hours with a strength of 100 men. The PW stated that the other three battalions of the regiment would follow the route of the K3 Battalion.

         By mid-September, the K1, K2, and K3 Battalions were located in the PHU CUONG/
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

LAI THIEU Area. KI Battalion remained in the vicinity of CHANH LUU, where contact was made with elements of the 11th ACR on 5 Sep and 24 Sep. On 22 Sep, a raider identified two "caretaker" elements of the DONG NAI Regiment in the CATCHERS MITT. These units are designated C16 and C19; each has a strength of 200 men and were formed by merging elements of the DONG NAI Regiment before its exfiltration from the CATCHERS MITT.

Current intelligence indicates that the DONG NAI Regiment left the CATCHERS MITT with orders to carry out offensive operations and to maintain the infiltration route into the Capitol Military District (CMD). By late October, it became evident that VC/NVA commanders did not possess sufficient force to fulfill intended missions. It is now considered possible that the K1, K2, and K3 Battalions will pull back into their traditional base areas in the CATCHERS MITT.

(b) Local Force Units of Sub-Region 5: Units of the 11th ACR made contact with local force units operating in BEN CAT, PHU GIAO, and TAN UTEN Districts during the reporting period. C-65 Local Force Company, operating between PHU CUONG and BEN CAT, was contacted on 19 Sep at XT802307 and on 6 Oct at XT817322. In both encounters, C-65 was conducting resupply missions in the CHANH LUU/BINH MY Area. On 5 Oct at XT050307, C-301 Local Force Company was identified when an occupied base camp was entered by the 1/26 Inf. Sub-Region 5. Headquarters was identified at YT001375 on 5 Oct, when captured documents identified the finance section of Sub-Region 5; two agent reports verified this location.

The most significant development in local force operations was the merger of C-61 and C-62 Local Force Companies. PW's and documents obtained August and September revealed that C-61/C-62 operated with a strength of 240 between BEN CAT and BINH MY. On 24 September, a PW stated that C-61/C-62 was joining operations with the K4 Battalion of the DONG NAI Regiment.

Currently, local force units are avoiding contact; ground encounters with and attacks on the VC infrastructure have seriously depleted their reserves.

(3) VC U-1 Region:

(a) D1 and D2 Battalions: On 13 Sep at THIEN TAN Village, vic YT0719, two PW's from the D1 Battalion, captured by the 36th Ranger BN (ARVN, DS to 11th ACR), revealed that the D1 Battalion, with a strength of 160 men, operated in a base area in the vicinity of YT1524. During the quarter, D1 has received large numbers of NVA replacements and has conducted reconnaissance in the BRIEN HOA Area (8-13 Sep). The D1 Battalion, which operates south of TRANG BOM with a strength of 170 men, was identified on 16 Sep and 11 Oct in attacks on TRANG BOM.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

(b) Local force units: The operation at THIEN TAN provided further information on U-1 Region. C-238 Local Force was identified by PW's and documents as a special mission unit for U-1 Headquarters. A series of "L" designated cells was identified through documents; these cells are formed from cadre residing in villages along the DONG NAI River.

(4) The rocket threat to BIEN HOA/LONG BINH: As VC/NVA activity peaked in late August and early September, BIEN HOA Airbase received four rocket attacks between 22 Aug and 8 Sep. Several significant developments in VC/NVA rocket deployment were detected at this time. It was found that the firing positions in the BIEN HOA/LONG BINH Rocket Belt along the north bank of the DONG NAI, which were used in the TET and May Offensives, were abandoned in August and September. The rockets were fired from the TAN UTEN Area and from less secure positions south of the SONG DONG NAI. Allied operations and reconnaissance activities had forced this change in position selection. Rockets are moved from HAR ZONE D through the Central CATCHERS MITT and brought to firing positions north and east of TAN UTEN; they are also transported along the SONG DONG NAI by sampans at night.

(5) Rear Service Activities: In the northern section of the CAT-CHERS MITT and the southwestern section of WAR ZONE D, trail and base camp activity was consistently detected by visual reconnaissance. A vigorous program of artillery harassment and B-52 airstrikes was directed at these areas, resulting in the destruction of many fortified zones and the uncovering of significant caches. It was felt that these sections of the AO are occupied by elements of Rear Service Group 81 and by transient infiltration groups.

(6) Blackhorse TAOI: During the initial stages of the reporting period, the 274th VC Regiment remained in the southern DINH QUAN Area. Their activity was limited. With the partial destruction of the IA NGA Bridge on Route 20 and small attacks on DINH QUAN itself, the 274th shifted to the southern portion of their AO near Highway 1. During the period 27 Jul - 4 Aug, the majority (2nd and 3rd Battalions) of the Regiment moved across Highway 1 and proceeded to the southern LONG KHANH/PHUOC TUY Border Area. The 2nd Battalion did not make the entire trip, stopping halfway and establishing a temporary base camp. The 3rd Battalion proceeded into Northern PHUOC TUY with the mission of selecting base areas for the remaining Battalions. Meanwhile, the 1140 had shifted its forces north of Highway 1 to aid in the screening of the regimental movement.

On the morning of 15 August, the 1140 and elements of the 1st Battalion attacked GIA RAY and placed a stand-off attack on XUAN LOC. The 8AA Rocket Regiment, possibly in coordination with the 1140 and the 1st Battalion, also placed a stand-off attack on the Blackhorse Base Camp. Further to the south, small attacks were placed on ARVN outposts bordering on Highway 2 in Northern
PHUOC TUY Province. These actions were probably initiated to partially screen the movements of the major portions of the 1st Battalion across Highway 1, to draw elements of the 18th ARVN to GTA RAY, and to screen the movement of portions of the 3rd Battalion across Highway 2 south of CAN MI. On 16 Aug, the 1st Battalion completed their deployment and ambushed elements of the 18th ARVN Division along Highway 1.

With the initiation of an ARVN/11th ACR operation south of Highway 1 in the latter part of August the 1st and 3rd Battalions settled in the northern portions of PHUOC TUY Province, while the 2nd Battalion remained in their temporary base area halfway between Highway 1 and the LONG KI THANH/PHUOC TUY Border Area. From this location, they could guard the northern, northeastern, and northwestern approaches into the border areas. During the ARVN/11th ACR operation, contact was made with the 2nd Battalion who suffered small losses while the ARVN elements sustained medium casualties. After breaking contact with the ARVN forces, the 2nd Battalion moved into the area vacated by the ARVN during the first phase of their operation and moved south to join the 1st and 3rd Battalions.

Simultaneously, the majority of the 3rd Battalion had crossed Highway 2 near the QUAN KHANH Plantation and moved westward into the HAT DICH vicinity of the BIEN HOA/LONG KHANH/PHUOC TUY Borders. From this position, it launched attacks against LONG THANH and FSB GRAY in mid-September. By early October, all elements of the 274th VC Regiment were identified in the vicinity of the BINH SON Rubber Plantation. Allied operations in October put increased pressure on the Regiment, however, leading to a pullback into the HAT DICH. As the quarter ends, the 274th VC Regiment is returning to base areas in VC BA BIEN Province. D440 and D445 Local Force Battalions continue small-scale harassing actions in the Blackhorse TAOI.

(7) VC Military Region 10: During August and through mid-September, elements of the 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR, operated in VC MR-10 in the vicinity of AN LOC and LOC NINH. During this period, elements of the 7th NVA Division executed various phases of a general offensive. Elements of the 7th NVA Division attacked in the LOC NINH Area with the intention of drawing Allied units from defensive positions around the CMD. The most significant action of the period was an encounter on 12 September between E/2/11th ACR and the 322nd NVA Regiment in a rubber plantation northeast of LOC NINH. The 7th NVA Division continued these diversionary attacks in MR-10 until the end of September. By mid-October, a lull in enemy activity was detected as the Regiments of the 7th NVA Division pulled into base areas in PHUOC LONG Province and Northern BINH LONG Province. It is apparent that as the quarter ends, VC/NVA leadership is reassessing plans and positions in MR-10.

c. MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS: There were 21 significant actions involving
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68 RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

elements of the Regiment or OPCON units.

(1) 082300H-101600H Aug, XT825322: CHANH LUU Village was cordoned by 1/3/11, K/3/11, B/2/16, and D/2/16. A search of the village was made by elements of the 1st and 4th Bn's, 8th Regt, 5th ARVN Division. This highly successful seal was preceded by a cover and deception plan employing a decoy map drop, diversionary VR's, and a series of fake radio transmissions. The seal resulted in 22 VC/NVA KIA, including a NVA general officer, 12 VC/NVA PW's from assorted units, 28 VCI, and 21 individual weapons, 2 crew-served weapons, and 4 tons of foodstuffs captured.

(2) 130044H-141600H Aug, XT820265: K/3/11, I/3/11, and 5th Recon Co (ARVN) cordoned and searched CAO DAT. The results were 1 VC KIA (BC), 10 VC PW's, 16 Detainees, 309 rds of 82mm mortar, 96 rds of 75mm RR, 42 rds of RPG-7, 1 122mm rocket, and 3 individual weapons captured.

(3) 130044H-131730H Aug, XT820265: 3/1 in conjunction with 1st Bn, 8th Regt, 5th Div (ARVN) cordoned and searched HOA LOI (1). The enemy losses in this seal were 8 VC KIA (BC), 15 VC PW's, 18 Detainees, and 3 individual weapons.

(4) 270710H Aug, XT974245: C/1-26 Inf (OPCON to 11th ACR) located 3 122mm rockets armed with a timing device set to fire the rockets at 0715H.

(5) 280731-281630H Aug, XT895232: K/3/11, I/3/11, and 1/5 Cav (ARVN) cordoned CHANH LONG Village. A search conducted by the 4th Bn, 8th Regt, 5th Div (ARVN) resulted in 63 civil offenders and 34 VC/NVA PW's.


(7) 051500H Sep, XT8332: Elements of 5th ARVN evacuated the XO, 4th Bn, DONG NAI Regiment, and his wife from CHANH LUU after the man indicated a desire to CHIEO HOI. From his information, the Aero Rifle Platoon, Air Cav Trp, were inserted XT803009 and engaged an estimated reinforced enemy platoon. The Aero Rifle Platoon was supported by light fire teams (LFT's). At 1745, K/3/11 moved to reinforce the ARP's. Contact broke at 1725H. Results: 1 US WIA, 11 VC KIA (BC), 3 PW's, and 1 crew-served weapon captured. The PW's were from 3rd Co, 4th Bn, DONG NAI Regiment.

(8) 130355H-130930H Sep, XT080187: Elements of the 36th Rangers, moving to seal THIEN TAN Village, engaged an unidentified unit moving from the village. Contact broke at 0405H and resumed again at 0500H. Task Force Privette reinforced and the enemy withdrew. The village was then sealed and

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searched. The results of the contact and seal were: 10 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 10 VC/NVA KIA (POSS), 7 PW's, 4 individual weapons, 1 crew-served weapon, 6 107mm rockets, and assorted ammunition captured. The PW's included a member of the U-1 Intelligence Section; other PW's were able to establish the organization of the D-1 Sapper Bn subordinate to U-1. ARVN losses were 8 WIA.

(c) 271130H Sep, XT865232: C/1/11 and 7th Intelligence and Reconnaisance Co located a well with a tunnel leading to an ammunition and weapons cache. One RPG-2 AT rocket launcher, 2 45-cal pistols, 351 82mm mortar rds, 59 60mm mortar rds and assorted other explosives were extracted.

(10) 061000H Oct, YT050299: B/1-26 Inf located an extensive base camp consisting of over 150 bunkers. Extracted from the complex were 34 individual weapons, a quantity of ammunition, and 1 PV.

(11) 061335H-062400H Oct, XT826323: Elements of 1/11, 36th Ranger Bn (ARVN), 1-26 Inf, ARF, and 7th Recon/5th ARVN Div cordoned and searched CHANH LUU, resulting in 1 VC KIA (POSS), 10 VC/NVA PW's, and 2 individual weapons captured.

(12) 151203H Oct, YT052298: A/1-26th Inf (OPCON to 11th ACR) located a small base camp with 5 bunkers. In the camp under metal sheeting, a weapons cache consisting of 130 individual weapons and 3 crew-served weapons was located.

(13) 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR (OPCON to 1st Inf Div):

(a) 181532H-18154H Aug: G/2/11 (OPCON to 1st Bn, 1st Inf Div) received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force 3km south of LOC NINH. During the 8 minute battle, the enemy lost 17 VC KIA (BC), 4 crew-served weapons, and 10 individual weapons. Friendly casualties were 3 US KIA.

(b) 19134H Aug, XU725078: F/2/11 and G/2/11 engaged an unknown size force 1km southeast of LOC NINH. The contact resulted in 5 US KIA, 17 US WIA, 18 VC KIA (BC), 20 VC KIA (POSS), and 3 individual weapons captured.

(c) 201711H Aug, XU710075: F/2/11 and G/2/11 were engaged in a 45 minute battle with an unknown size force. Results: 5 US WIA, 14 VC KIA (POSS), and 7 individual weapons and 2 crew-served weapons captured. One ACAV was heavily damaged by RPG fire during the contact.

(d) 211010H-211800H Aug, XU743099: G/2/11 maintained sporadic contact with an unknown size enemy force. LFT's, TAC Air, and Artillery
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

supported G Troop. Results: 2 US WIA, 4 VC KIA (BC), 2 crew-served weapons and 2 individual weapons captured.

(e) 221030H Aug, XU725100: F/2/11 received small arms and RPG fire from an estimated reinforced squad. Sporadic contact was maintained for over 8 hours. Results: 2 US WIA, 15 VC KIA (BC), 3 individual and 2 crew-served weapons captured.

(f) 241100H Aug, XU781150: G/2/11 received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from an estimated VC company at 1145H. Elements of E/2/11 reinforced. G/2/11 was supported by LFT's, TAC Air, and Artillery. Results: 3 US KIA, 13 US WIA, and 13 VC KIA (BC).

(g) 121725H Sep, Vic XU765120: E/2/11 (OPCON to 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div), while on a mission to reinforce A/1-28 Inf, made contact with an unknown size NVA force of the 32nd NVA Regt, attempting to block the linkup of the two units. The troop returned maximum volume of fire and continued its move. All three attempts to prevent linkup over a distance of 2 km failed, resulting in 31 NVA KIA. Radio contact was established with A/1-28 Inf at 1740H. E/2/11 hit the south flank of the attacking enemy force and broke up the NVA assault. A sweep the next morning revealed an additional 16 NVA KIA (BC).

(h) 131355H Sep, Vic XU7413: E/2/11 observed NVA soldiers and engaged them, killing one. Further sightings revealed a NVA Co. Gun-ships and airstrikes were called in. E/2/11 received a change in mission prior to exploiting the area.

(i) 152030H Sep, XU73078: E/2/11 NDP received a mortar attack, followed by a ground attack by an estimated platoon. Fire was returned, halting the attack. A sweep was made by the infantry the following morning with unknown results.

d. B-52 Strikes: The heavy use of B-52 strikes during the quarter has produced some highly desirable results. Successful strikes of occupied base camps was evident on four occasions. Evidence included pieces of bodies, blood stained bunkers, and signs of rapid evacuation. Agent reports also verified the damage. One report placed casualties at 130 killed in the same area where A/1-28 Inf located a weapon cache of 133 weapons on 15 Oct. Document readout revealed that the Headquarters, Ki En, DONG XAI Regt, had been struck on four different occasions, suffering the loss of 60% of their food and clothing supplies.

e. Intelligence Sources:

(1) Air Activity: The Regiment continues extensive use of SLAR,
Red Haze, aerial photography, and airborne detectors (Sniffer's). The Regiment has dramatically improved its response to readings by these detection devices. In-flight readout, especially from the Sniffer and SLAR, are transmitted through the Regimental TOC to the FSE. Artillery fire is on the target within minutes. The Regiment also has begun extensive use of aerial night photography in the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Rocket Belt.

(2) Agent Reports: The number of agent reports remains at a comparatively steady level. The Battlefield Intelligence Center (BIC) through direct coordination with the 525th Military Intelligence Detachment is consistently improving the quality of the intelligence available to the Regiment.

(3) Air Cav Trp: The greatest intelligence collecting agency of the Regiment lies in our Air Cav Troop. They provide us and our higher headquarters with a greater quantity of reliable intelligence than any other source. VR's combined with Sniffer missions give us invaluable data on trails, movement, base areas, and bomb damage assessment.

f. Enemy losses:

(1) The following enemy losses were credited to all units while operating under Regimental control during the reporting period:

- VC/NVA KIA (BC) 135
- VC/NVA KIA (POSS) 113
- VC/NVA PW's 68
- HOI CHANH 3
- Detainees 157
- Individual weapons 273
- Crew-served weapons 26
- Small arms ammunition 20,698 rds
- Crew-served weapons ammunition 1,199 rds
- Mines 68
- Structures 32
- Fortifications 722
- Documents 96.5 lbs
- Grain 27.25 tons
- Sampans 2

(2) The following enemy losses were credited to the Regimental units while under the operational control of other US units or in direct support of ARVN units:
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

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4. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analysis and Evaluation:

(1) The 11th ACR applied heavy pressure on the enemy during the reporting period. The Regiment conducted reconnaissance in force and cordon and search operations which uncovered base camps and numerous supply and munitions caches. Combat elements of the Regiment operated in conjunction with 5th ARVN Div, 1st Inf Div, 18th ARVN Div, 1st Australian Task Force and CMAC. Troop size elements were OPCON to II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV) for RRF missions.

(2) The enemy has avoided large contacts with the Regiment in the Blackhorse TaOR. Enemy contact was characterised by light encounters of small VC forces. The enemy has continued to utilise mines and harassing mortar fire effectively. Due to his heavy losses in supplies and personnel, he is actively trying to resupply and rebuild his forces.

b. Area of Operation: Operations this quarter were conducted within the II CTZ and covered five provinces (Binh Long, Gia Dinh, Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, and Binh Duong).

c. Operations: At the beginning of the reporting period, the Regimental CP was located at Lai Khe (X1755975). The 1st Squadron, OPCON to 1st Br, 1st Inf Div, conducted reconnaissance in force (RIF) operations in the vicinity of Loc Ninh (X177719). 2nd Squadron (-) was conducting RIF and NAP operations in the Lam Son Area. 5/2/11 ACR was OPCON to II FFV. 3rd Squadron (-) continued to secure Blackhorse Base Camp (TS40960) and provide engineer work parties to Gia Ray Rock Quarry (Hill 837); one troop (-) provided RRF
for XUAN LOC. K/3/11 ACR was OPCON to II FFV with RRF mission for the III Corps POW Compound and WIDOWS VILLAGE and security of DONG NAI River Bridge during hours of darkness.

On 6 Aug, the 1st Squadron conducted a tactical road march from LOC NINH (XUY772119) to Blackhorse Base Camp (Y5440960). The Squadron was released from 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div and returned to the control of the Regiment. The 2nd Squadron (-) conducted a tactical road march from the LAM SON Area to the vicinity of LOC NINH and became OPCON to 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div. The 3rd Squadron made a tactical road march from Blackhorse Base Camp to the LAM SON Area to conduct RIF and NAP operations. On 6 Aug, the 1st Squadron placed G/2/11 ACR OPCON to II FFV. From 8-14 Aug, the 3rd Squadron conducted cordon and search operations in the LAM SON Area. On 11 Aug, L/3/11 ACR became OPCON to 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div, to secure Rome Plow operations. 1/26 Inf was placed OPCON to the Regiment to conduct RIF and NAP operations in the southern portion of the CATCHERS MITT. The 36th ARVN Ranger Rm was placed DS to the Regiment to conduct RIF and NAP operations in the northeast portion of BIEN HOA Province. On 13 Aug, the Regimental CP moved from LAI KHE (XT759375) to the BIEN HOA Area (YT021427).

Task Force Privette was formed on 14 Aug as the controlling HQ for the two troops OPCON to II FFV. Task Force Privette assumed the responsibility of RRF for HQ Commandant, II FFV, and RRF for LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Complex. C/1/11 was released from OPCON Task Force Privette and returned to control of the 2nd Squadron. On 17 Aug, G/2/11 ACR made significant contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of LOC NINH. The engagement was a result of RIF operations conducted by the 2nd Squadron. On 19 Aug, B/1/11 ACR moved from Blackhorse Base Camp to LONG BINH/BIEN HOA and became OPCON to Task Force Privette. On 21 Aug, E/2/11 ACR was released by the 3rd Squadron to move to the vicinity of LOC NINH under the control of the 2nd Squadron. On 22 Aug, L/3/11 returned to the control of the 3rd Squadron. On 23 Aug, F/2/11 ACR was placed OPCON to 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div, to conduct RIF operations. On 25 Aug, A/1/11 ACR moved from Base Camp to LONG BINH/BIEN HOA to relieve B/1/11 ACR and become OPCON to Task Force Privette. During the period 19-27 Aug, the Regiment conducted RIF, NAP, and cordon and search operations with sporadic contact with the enemy. On 30 Aug, 2/28 Inf was released from the Regimental OPCON and 1/16 Inf was placed OPCON to the Regiment to conduct RIF and NAP operations in the LAM SON Area. On 5 Sep, B/1/11 ACR relieved C/1/11 and became OPCON to Task Force Privette.

On 7 Sep, the 2nd Squadron (-) was released from OPCON to 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, back to Regimental control. E/2/11 remained under control of the 1st Bde. On 8 Sep, F/2/11 was relieved from 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div, and returned to the control of the 2nd Squadron. 1/16 Inf was relieved from Regimental OPCON and returned to 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div. From 8-12 Sep, A/1/2 Inf was placed

CONFIDENTIAL
OPCON to the Regiment to conduct RIF operations in an AO east of BIEN HOA. Task Force Privette deactivated on 14 Sep. I/3/11 ACR assumed RRF mission of LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Complex.

On 13 Sep, the 1st Squadron moved from base camp to the LAM SON Area and relieved 2nd Squadron. The 2nd Squadron moved to Blackhorse and assumed the security mission. On 15 Sep, the 3rd Squadron(-) conducted a tactical road march from the LAM SON Area to SAIGON and became OPCON to CMAC. On 18 Sep, E/2/11 ACR was released from OPCON 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, and returned to Base Camp. The 3rd Squadron remained OPCON to CMAC. On 9 Oct, 1/16 was released from Regimental OPCON to 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div. 1/28 Inf was placed OPCON to the Regiment to conduct RIF and NAP operations east of TAN UTEN (TN965225). On 11 Oct, 5/60 Mech Inf Bn(-) was replaced by the 2/2 Mech Inf Bn(-) to continue securing Rome Plow operations in the CATCHERS MITT. B/1/11 ACR relieved I/3/11 and assumed the RRF mission of LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Complex. I/3/11 became OPCON to the 1st Squadron and moved to the LAM SON Area. On 12 Oct, A/1/11 moved to LAI KHE to become OPCON to 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div. On 14 Oct, the 36th ARVN Ranger Bn was released from DS and the 51st ARVN Ranger Bn was placed DS to the Regiment.

On 18 Oct, the 1st Squadron relieved the 3rd Squadron and was placed OPCON to CMAC. The 3rd Squadron(-) conducted a tactical road march from SAIGON to the LAM SON Area and sealed the village of HOA LOI I. The 1st Squadron(-) conducted a tactical road march to SAIGON and became OPCON to CMAC. A/1/11 was released OPCON from 3rd Bde, 1st Inf Div, and placed OPCON to the 3rd Squadron. On 22 Oct, A/1/11 ACR was released from the 3rd Squadron and relieved B/1/11 of the RRF mission in LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Area. B/1/11 moved to the LAM SON Area and became OPCON to the 3rd Squadron. During this period 18-31 Oct, the 1st Squadron(-) was OPCON to CMAC. The 2nd Squadron conducted RIF and NAP operations in the Blackhorse TAOR. The 3rd Squadron conducted RIF, NAP, and cordon and search operations in the LAM SON Area under the control of the Regiment. On 25 Oct, K/3/11 moved to the IRON TRIANGLE and became DS to the 5th ARVN Div. On 26 Oct, B/1/11 moved to the vicinity of LOC NINH and became OPCON to 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div.

d. Training:

(1) Replacement training was accomplished throughout the quarter to prepare new replacements to assume their duties as cavalry troopers. The Training School's seven day cycle was revised and reduced during the quarter to a 5 day cycle to provide the training considered most essential in the minimum amount of time. Monthly attendance during the quarter was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Attendees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12

CONFIDENTIAL
10 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

October 322

(2) A pilot training program for Kit Carson Scouts was initiated during the quarter to familiarize them with weapons, equipment, and tactics used by the 11th ACR. The principal objective of the training was to enhance their value and engender a strong sense of belonging to the Regiment. The course was 3 days in length. Following completion, students were assigned to units for duty.

(3) The 11th ACR Replacement Training School conducted CBR training for the 7th Surgical Hospital personnel. Approximately 120 people, divided into two classes, participated in the training.

(4) Duck Blind School: A 4-hour class on anti-intrusion devices was given during the quarter by a USARV Training Team. 27 Personnel from the Regiment attended.

(5) A separate class was given by the Regimental S-3 Office on the functioning, servicing, and maintenance of the M-60 machinegun to the unit armorer of the 1st Squadron.

(6) Specialized Training:

(a) Recondo School: 10 members of the Regiment attended the MACV Recondo School during the quarter.

(b) NCO Academy: The 9th Infantry Division NCO Academy is available to selected NCO's and potential NCO's of the Regiment. During the quarter, 21 Blackhorse troopers attended the Academy.

(c) Jungle Environment Survival Training School: A three-day survival course is conducted at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands, for aviation personnel. During the quarter, 3 aviators from the Regiment attended the course.

(d) Jungle Survival School: A 4 1/2 day course is conducted at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands. One aviator from the Regiment attended this course.

(e) Aircraft Maintenance: The Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS), 765th Transportation Group, VUNG TAU, trained 12 mechanics from the Regiment and attached units during the quarter.

(f) Cobra School: Six personnel from the Regiment attended the Pilot Qualification, Avionics, Engine, Crewchief, and Armament Schools operated by a NET Team at BIEN HOA Air Force Base on the AH-1G helicopter.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

(g) Signal Maintenance: AN/GRC-106 maintenance courses were conducted by the 1st Signal Bde, LONG BINH. Five personnel from the Regiment attended.

(h) AN/GRC-163 NET: An AN/GRC-163 New Equipment Training School at the US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Bde, LONG BINH, trained 7 personnel from the Regiment during the quarter.

(i) Transition Training: An OH-6A Pilot Transition Training School operated by the 765th Transportation Bn, VIENING TAU, qualified 5 aviators from the Regiment.


(k) Audio-Visual Training: An Audio-Visual Training School was started at USATF, 1st Signal Bde, LONG BINH. One man attended this course.

(l) G-2 Air: One man from the Regiment attended the G-2 Air Orientation Course, which provides G2/S2 air personnel with an orientation on mechanics and procedures of the aerial reconnaissance in Vietnam. School is conducted by the 1st Military Intelligence Bn (ARS).

(m) Narcotic Identification and Effects: A one-hour class was presented to units located in the Blackhorse Base Camp by a criminal investigator from the 18th MP Bde. The subject concerned the identification and effects of narcotics and other dangerous drugs available in RVN. 124 officers and senior NCO's attended.

(n) The 919th Armored Engineer Company was issued two M728 Combat Engineer Vehicles (CEV) at the beginning of the quarter. Two crews and a maintenance team from the company, as well as a maintenance team from the 551st Light Maintenance Company, received 2 1/2 weeks of training on the maintenance and gunnery techniques for this vehicle. The instruction was provided by a training team from CONUS.

5. (C) COMBAT SUPPORT:

a. Artillery:

(1) During this quarter the mission of the Regiment was to conduct RIF and screening operations vicinity of LAI KHE to block VC/NVA infiltration into the CMD/SOUTH Area, and from the second week in August, to assume res-
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

The organic howitzer batteries of the participating squadrons comprised the artillery forces supporting Operation TOAN THANG (Phase II).

Initially, the 2nd Squadron replaced the 1st Squadron in the LOC NINH Area, where artillery support was provided by the organic howitzer batteries. Meanwhile, the 3rd Squadron organic howitzer battery supported operations in the Regimental AO until 13 September when the 1st Squadron took over. The 3rd Squadron then moved to the SAIGON Area, remaining until 18 October when the 1st Squadron replaced them, releasing the 3rd Squadron once again to Regimental control.

Also providing artillery support in the Regimental AO this quarter were A Battery 2/33 (105mm), B Battery 2/33 (105mm), C Battery 2/33 (105mm), and B Battery 1/7 (105mm), all units from 1st Inf Div artillery. In addition, A Battery 7/8 (175mm), B Battery 2/35 (155mm), C Battery 2/35 (155mm), and C Battery 2/13 (105mm), from 54th Artillery Group, supported ground elements in the Regimental AO.

The types of missions fired by supporting artillery during Operation TOAN THANG (Phase II) were:

(a) Defensive concentrations.
(b) Observer adjusted missions.
(c) Intelligence missions.
(d) Navigational (marking) rounds.
(e) Preparations.
(f) Preplanned fires on call.
(g) ARVN support missions.
(h) Illumination missions.
(i) Harassing and interdicting missions.

The Blackhorse Base Camp was secured by 1st Squadron until the middle of September when they were replaced by 2nd Squadron in the base camp security mission. During base camp defense and operations in the Blackhorse TAOR, artillery support was provided by the organic howitzer battery with reinfor-
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-WE 10 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 31 Oct 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(3) Artillery provided timely and effective support during Operation TOAN THANG (Phase II) as each RIF operation was within range of at least one supporting artillery unit. Each convoy move made by the squadrons and the Regiment was covered by local ARVN and US artillery batteries along the route. The fire support bases utilized by the Regiment and OPCON units were positioned to not only insure maximum fire support to the maneuver units but also to provide mutual support to each other. In addition, liaison teams furnished to the Regimental Artillery; PSCC and all OPCON units operating in the Regimental AO contributed to the overall effectiveness of the artillery support. These liaison teams furnished by the 1st Inf Div and 54th Artillery Group were tremendous assets to the coordination of artillery support. Artillery air observers and aircraft were also readily available from 1st Inf Div and 54th Artillery Group as well as the Regiment's own O-1 "Birddog" aircraft and air observer. This aircraft was allocated to two squadrons a day for one-half day each. In this way, the Regiment received maximum utilization from the aircraft; a squadron with a critical mission, however, could obtain the aircraft for the entire day.

(4) Ammunition expended during the quarter by month:

(a) August
   HE 8,540
   ILL 703
   WP 78
   Smk 12

(b) September
   HE 6,733
   ILL 607
   WP 239
   Smk 19

(c) October
   HE 4,594
   ILL 306
   WP 27
   Smk 2

(5) New Techniques: During the quarter, maximum effort was concentrated on the "followup" of B-52 strike areas by artillery when a BDA could not be made immediately after the strike. It is felt that twenty minutes following the termination of a B52 strike is the ideal time for the artillery to be employed. At this time, occupants of the strike area should be in the process of evacuating dead and wounded as well as salvageable equipment from the base camp, and thus present an excellent target for artillery. "Time on Target" type missions with all available artillery should be used at the
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-WE 11 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

 twenty minute mark, and then intermittent fires should continue to impact in the area until a BDA can be made. This technique not only increases the probability of kills, but also prevents the enemy from policing up the strike area before friendly elements can secure it.

Another new technique adopted by the artillery this quarter is the firing of "Breakfast Interdiction" and "Supper Interdiction" targets. "Breakfast Interdiction" targets are fired between 0600 and 0800 hours because it is felt that the enemy will be above ground preparing food or in the open returning to a base camp area. Another reason for these fires is the fact that the enemy knows that normally the US artillery stops firing its HAI type fires at 0600 hours. He feels relatively safe being above ground as long as there are no aircraft in the area.

"Supper Interdiction" fires follow the same reasoning as the "Breakfast Interdiction" fires. These targets are fired between 1700 and 1900 hours, because the enemy again knows that there is very little chance that US artillery will be firing. At this time, the artillery FSC's are extremely busy receiving all friendly locations and planning all fires for the night. Again, it is felt that the enemy will be above ground eating, having meetings, or perhaps preparing for the night's activities. Both the "Breakfast Interdiction" and "Supper Interdiction" targets should be based on the most recent and most accurate intelligence of active base camp areas. It is recommended that "Time on Target" type missions be fired with all available artillery.

(6) Problem Areas: The lack of personnel for the Fire Support Element (FSE) at the Regimental TOC continues. The operation of the FSE was unaffected this reporting period because FSE personnel were provided on a direct support basis by HQ Battery, 8/6 Artillery, located at LAI KHE. As long as the Regimental FSE can be supplemented with personnel from higher commands, there is no immediate problem. If the Regimental FSE were forced to control the Regimental AO with its own assets, however, it would be severely limited; at present, there are only two personnel (one officer and one EM) to maintain round-the-clock operations. There should be an officer available at all times.

b. Army Aviation:

(1) Organisation and Employment:

(a) Aviation Platoon, HHT, 11th ACR:

1. Organisation: The platoon consists of a command and control section comprised of two OH-6A and two UH-1D aircraft and a trans-
port section comprised of four UH-1D and two UH-1C aircraft.

2 Employment: The platoon operates from a location near the Regimental CP and performs command and control, liaison, resupply, and limited troop transport for the Regimental Headquarters and subordinate, organic and OPCON units.

(b) Aviation Sections:

1 Organization: Each of the three squadrons has an organic aviation section consisting of two OH-6A aircraft and two UH-1C aircraft.

2 Employment: The aviation section operates from a location near the Squadron CP and performs command and control, liaison, observation and reconnaissance, limited troop transport, resupply, and emergency evacuation missions for the Squadron.

(c) Air Cavalry Troop:

1 Organization: The Air Cavalry Troop consists of a troop headquarters with one UH-1D, an Aero-Scout Platoon with nine OH-6A aircraft, an anti-tank/rocket platoon with nine AH-1G aircraft, and a service platoon with two UH-1C aircraft.

2 Employment: The Troop operates from a forward base area in or near the Regimental A0. It performs combat operations in an assigned A0 or near the Regimental A0, or operations in support of the subordinate, organic, or OPCON units of the Regiment. When operating in an assigned A0, the troop uses the "pile on" concept. First, the Aero-Scouts perform visual reconnaissance. When a target is located, the Aero-Rifle Platoon and anti-tank/rocket elements are employed. A ready reaction force (RRF) of one rifle platoon drawn from one of the OPCON infantry battalions is available for immediate commitment. This force "piles on" while direction and control are transferred to the Regimental level until necessary forces are built up to accomplish the mission. (See INCL IX, Commander's Notes 27).

When the Air Cavalry Troop supports a Squadron or OPCON unit is given mission-type orders. This allows the troop commander flexibility in selecting the size and type elements of his unit required to accomplish the mission.

The Air Cavalry Troop is employed throughout the Regimental A0 on missions developed through close coordination between the S-2, S-3, and the troop commander. The Troop is the primary intelligence gathering element for the S-2, using aerial visual reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, sensor mis-
SUBJECT: Operational report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 October 68 RCS CSFC &-65 (R1)

sions (Sniffer), night observation devices, and firefly missions. It is an ideal force for immediate follow-up in Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA). The basis of employment is the gathering of intelligence information, making direct contact with the enemy or supporting one of the Squadrons or OPCON units in contact. The Air Cavalry Troop serves to fight and destroy enemy forces as well as to develop the situation or gather intelligence information.

(2) Training: Intensive training was conducted during August and September in the following areas:

(a) Aero-Rifle Platoon: Training in the Air Cavalry Troop included reconstitution of the Aero-Rifle Platoon from the LRRP concept to an aero-rifle platoon concept. The platoon conducted basic unit training, advanced unit training, and became operational on 22 August.

(b) Anti-tank/Rocket Platoon: Nine AH-1G aircraft were received in the Troop to replace nine UH-1C. Pilot and crew training was conducted both in employment and aerial gunnery. Armament system training was accomplished for enlisted crewmen and pilots.

(c) Transition Training: Eight additional OH-6A aircraft were received to replace eight OH-23G aircraft in the Squadrons and Regimental Aviation Platoon. Unit transition training was conducted and school quotas were authorised at VUNG TAU to qualify pilots. Crew chiefs were cross-trained by the attached direct support maintenance detachment.

(3) Construction: Construction of a maintenance hangar is still in progress at Blackhorse Base Camp. Estimated completion date is 30 Nov 68. Concrete pads are being constructed at the refueling points. This will provide safer operating conditions for aircraft by alleviating the dust problem. It is the highest priority construction project in the Regiment.

(4) Safety: An active safety program has been initiated in the Regiment. Safety officers have been appointed in each aviation element. Emphasis is on training (both pilot and crew), preparation of landing sites at field locations, safety officer inspections of aviation activities, safety briefings, and publishing of a monthly aviation safety bulletin.

Positive control for airfield traffic was improved with the attachment to the Regiment of the 325th Airfield Service Detachment. This unit is responsible for all activities on and around the airfield at Blackhorse. This has greatly improved conditions for safer operations. In addition, it has relieved the Air Cavalry Troop of the burden of running the administration of an airfield, allowing it to orient itself toward its combat missions.
c. Chemical:

(1) General: The chemical section, consisting of one officer and 4 EM, provided defoliation, personnel detection, CS, and chemical staff support to the Regiment during the reporting period.

(2) Personnel Detection: The AX-2 personnel detector was used for all missions. 72 "Sniffer Missions" were flown in support of 11th ACR, 11 FFORCEV, 1st Inf Div, 18th ARVN Div, RTAVF, and 1st ATF operations. Verified "hot spots" were often engaged immediately with Air Cavalry gunships and artillery fire and all results were forwarded through S-7/G-2 channels for complete analysis and target planning.

(3) Defoliation Operations:

(a) One hundred hectares of the base camp perimeter were defoliated, using M9 PDDA and/or hand sprayer. Two miles of LT2 from Blackhorse to XUAN LOC were also defoliated to 10 meters either side of the road. During the latter part of the reporting period, a defoliation team from 18th ARVN Division defoliated an additional 10 hectares of the base camp perimeter using a buffalo turbine.

(b) Thirty-two Ranch Hand (USAF) defoliation sorties were flown in the CATCHERS MITT.

(4) CS Operations: Twenty-four CS missions were flown in support of 11th ACR operations. The E-158 cluster was utilized for all drops with 145 E-158's expended. CS has been used effectively in conjunction with Air Cavalry Troop "pile em" operations, followed immediately by gunships, artillery, and/or airstrikes.

(5) Inspections: During portions of this period, the Chemical Staff NCO functioned as a member of the IG inspection team, inspecting protective masks and defensive procedures.

d. Engineer:

(1) Introduction: During the reporting period, elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) participated in Operation TOAN THANg (Phase II), while providing direct combat engineer support to elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(2) Operations:

(a) 1st Platoon: The 1st Platoon provided direct support
for the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. On 1 August, the 1st Platoon was located east of LOC NINH, where it conducted reconnaissance in force and mine sweeping operations. On 7 August, the Platoon moved back to Base Camp with the 1st Squadron. While at Base Camp, the Platoon was responsible for minesweeping operations from Base Camp to XUAN LOC on Route 2. During this period, they detected 7 mines, recovering 1 and blowing 6 in place. From 16 to 20 August, the 1st Platoon provided one squad for engineer support to A Troop on an operation south of GIA RAY Mountain (Hill 837). During the operation, landing zones were cleared out of dense jungle and heavy forest. One fording site was prepared with explosives.

On 13 September, the 1st Platoon left Base Camp and moved to PHTJ LOI with the 1st Squadron, where they remained until October. While at PHTJ LOI, the 1st Platoon performed various missions for the 1st Squadron. They provided a tunnel rat team and demolitions to destroy enemy fortifications and supported operations at NDP HOLIDAY INN where with the use of D72 dozer tanks they leveled 1,000 meters of berm and an old French fortress. At BINH CO Village, they constructed a school house and two homes for the villagers. Before returning to PHTJ LOI, the 1st Platoon rebuilt the Bailey bridge south of BINH CO, which had been blown earlier by the VC.

On 18 October, 1st Platoon moved to C'MAC. During the reporting period, 1st Platoon swept 270km of road and used 700 lbs of demolitions in destroying enemy fortifications and preparing landing zones and fording sites.

(b) 2nd Platoon: The 2nd Platoon provided direct support for the 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR. From 1-4 August, the 2nd Platoon was located at Base Camp and was responsible for sweeping Route 2 from Base Camp to the junction of Route 1. There were negative results during this period.

On 4 August, the 2nd Platoon moved to the vicinity of FSB NOR'IANDY I, east of BEN CAT, and operated from night defensive positions along Route ZINC and PHU LOI. During the period 4 August to 14 September, the 2nd Platoon swept 175km of road, finding one mine. They destroyed six enemy bunkers and provided tunnel rat teams for the 3rd Squadron.

On 14 September, the 2nd Platoon moved to TAN SON NHUT Airbase where they provided support until 18 October. During this period, they obtained a Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV) to replace their tank dozer. After initial training and familiarization, the CEV was placed OFCON to the 1st Squadron where it was used in the vicinity of BARREN HEIGHTS with D Company.

The 2nd Platoon moved to Blackhorse to work on 3rd Squadron Base Camp construction, while leaving one squad at TAN SON NHUT Airbase for support.
18 October, the 2nd Platoon moved back to PHU LOJ for continued support to the 3rd Squadron.

(c) 3rd Platoon: 3rd Platoon provided direct support for the 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR. From 1-3 August, the 3rd Platoon was in the vicinity of NORMANDY I. They moved to LOC NINH on 3 August and supported Base Camp operations and cleared 500 meters of rubber trees on the west side of the airstrip between the ARVN and Special Forces Compound.

On 8 August, they moved to Eagle Base Camp southwest of LOC where they conducted minesweeping operations and destroyed VC ordinance, consisting of three 20-lbs 8-inch claymores, three 40-lbs AT mines, and eight grenades. The 2nd Platoon also installed one row of standard concertinas around Eagle Base Camp.

2nd Squadron, 11th ACR, then moved to QUAN LOI where the 3rd Platoon was placed OPCON to 1st Bde Engineers, 1st Inf Div. They constructed a culvert site by removing the old 50' French-built bridge and replacing it with 10' culvert and laterite fill and constructed 11 50'x20' U-shaped revetments. The GEV was used to dig five sumps and bunker positions. The D7E dozer, attached to the platoon from Company Headquarters, worked at a laterite pit.

On 6 September, they moved to LOC NINH where they cleared a 150m x 200m area of rubber trees and removed an ARVN minefield. The minefield was removed by burning it with a track mounted flame thrower, blowing the obvious mines in place, scraping the top 3" of surface, and blowing all uncovered anti-personnel mines in the area.

From 12-15 September, the 2nd Platoon was enroute to Base Camp. While at Base Camp, the Platoon conducted daily sweeps of Route 2 from Base Camp to the junction of Route 1 and 2. They also made four sweeps to CAM "ST. During this period, they found 14 mines, blowing 6 and recovering 8. The 2nd Platoon also installed 5,600 meters of triple standard concertinas along Route 2, emplaced trip flares around the fence, and built an observation bunker on Banana Hill (Yty12012).

(3) Regional Force/Popular Force Upgrading and ARVN Training: The 919th Engineers continued their upgrading support in LONG KHANH Province by releasing 300' corrugated steel culvert, 300 rolls of barbed wire, 200 rolls of concertina wire, 1,500 steel pickets, and 200,000 sandbags. They also gave technical advice and assistance in the placement of these materials.

(4) Base Camp Development: Elements from the 2nd Platoon built 10 barracks (20'x60') and an office for the Regimental XO and S-1. 3rd Platoon rebuilt the bunker complex at the Regimental TOC.

22
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68 RCS GSPF-65 (R1)

6. **COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

   a. General: The 20th General Support Group continued to provide logistical support to the Regiment during this quarter. The 185th Maintenance Battalion and the 266th Supply and Services Battalion provided classes I through IV. Class V was supplied by the 3rd Ordnance Battalion.

   b. Supply and Maintenance:

      (1) Class I: There were no problems with the issue of Class I. Milk, ice cream, ice, and perishable meats and vegetables were issued in proper quantities and in good condition.

      (2) Class II and IV:

         (a) Barrier material and supplies were drawn from the 208th yard. Supplies were adequate, but an administrative system was instituted which required 24 to 72 hours from submission of request to pickup. The Regimental S-4 arranged for this procedure to be bypassed in emergency situations.

         (b) The Squadron's PLL's averaged 1,300 line items during the reporting period. Approximately 49% of the lines were at zero balance, because of fast turnover and non-availability. Fuel, air and oil filters, large batteries, and M548 transfers were in short supply during the quarter.

         (c) The Regiment suffered the following combat losses during the quarter: 33 ACAV's, 4 tanks, 2 self-propelled mortars, 1 M32A1, and 2 M60A1 AVLB's. Eight ACAV's were turned in for rebuild under the closed loop program.

         (d) Field Maintenance Support:

            1. During the reporting period, field maintenance support was provided by the 551st LEMCO at Blackhorse and by a 15-20 man 551st contact team with forward units. The contact team had capabilities for auto-
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

motive, small arms, and limited turret and instrument repair repair. Backup support was provided by the 185th Maintenance Battalion, LONG BINH.

2. Units operating in the BIEN HOA/LONG BINH Area received maintenance support from the 140th HEMCO.

(4) Class V and Ammunition Storage:

(a) The Regiment utilized the 3rd Ordnance Battalion ammunition dump at LONG BINH to resupply the squadrons operating in the Blackhorse, BIEN HOA, and SAIGON Areas. Squadrons operating north of LAI KHE used the 1st Inf Div ASP. Their withdrawals were charged against the Regimental ASR at 3rd Ordnance Battalion.

(b) A five day time lag between submission of ammunition requests and transportation to Blackhorse caused the Regiment to overdraw its ASR on one item in September. This problem has been eliminated by requiring the squadron at Blackhorse to provide its own transportation for ammunition requested after the 18th of the month.

(c) A shortage of personnel at the 3rd Ordnance ammunition dump has resulted in a turn around time for ammunition trucks of from three to six hours. Units have resorted to maintaining a stockpile of howitzer and other critical ammunition items at the pickup zone in order to ensure a smooth flow of ammunition to the field. This has resulted in the additional benefit of having ammunition readily available for "combat essential" resupply.

(d) A low ASR for 4.2mm illumination rounds and hand held flares coupled with the frequent non-availability of 40mm illumination has denied the small unit commander prompt illumination. The Regiment was able to alleviate this situation in October by obtaining additional hand flares and 4.2mm illumination rounds from II FFV.

(e) Two additional ammunition pads were constructed on the west side of the Regimental ammunition dump by the 31st Engineers.

(5) Aerial and Convoy Resupply:

(a) During this quarter, the Regiment depended heavily on aerial resupply to units operating in the area north of BIEN HOA and to a lesser extent out of Blackhorse. An average of 35 CH-47 sorties a day were flown from Eagle Pad, BIEN HOA Post, to the forward areas.

(b) OPCON units employed in the southern sector of the TAOR
co-located their trains with the Regiment at BIEN HOA and were supplied from Eagle Pad. There were problems of coordination and excessive flying time with one OPCON unit whose trains were located in LAI KHE. It was determined that units operating in the northern sector of the TAOR with their trains located in LAI KHE could better be supplied using 1st Inf Div assets from LAI KHE.

(c) Aerial resupply was adequate until 19 October when a II FFV directive limited the CH-47 to six hours of flying time a day. The Regiment was reduced from 1 1/2 aircraft per day to nine hours of flying time per day. Given the employment and number of units supported at that time, nine hours was inadequate to supply the Regiment. Forward units were forced to conserve water, eat C-rations, and deplete basic load ammunition stocks. After one week of operating at this level, nine hours was recognized as being insufficient to support the Regiment and the allocation was raised to twelve hours, dropping to nine hours only when forced by insufficient aircraft assets. Organic slick assets were utilized efficiently during this critical period for emergency resupply.

(d) Blackhorse Base Camp was supplied by wheeled convoys from LONG BINH five days a week. Truck resupply was used to move supplies from trains located in the BIEN HOA/LONG BINH Area to units employed in SAIGON.

(e) Maintenance:

(a) Maintenance support was generally adequate during the quarter except for shortages of some repair parts.

(b) Non-availability of ACAV engines became serious during September but a large shipment of engines in early October alleviated the situation.

c. Medical:

(1) The physical condition of the troops during the reporting period has been excellent. Sanitary standards and discipline are the highest since the Regiment arrived in Vietnam and continue to be upgraded. Due to a concentrated effort by medical personnel throughout the chain of command, medical weaknesses and deficiencies are being observed and corrected in their early stages.

(2) Reportable injuries sustained in the Regiment range from insignificant abrasions and lacerations to serious injuries requiring hospitalization and evacuation from the Republic of Vietnam. Although the number of injuries requiring hospitalization has decreased 8% or an average of 2% per
month, non-battle injury statistics increased during the quarter to an average of 308 per month. Man-day loss statistics decreased 31% or an average of 155 man-days per month. This decrease represents significant progress in this problem area.

(3) Diseases diagnosed during the period are as follows:

- Infectious Hepatitis: 6 Cases
- Malaria: 18 Cases
- Diarrhea: 365 Cases
- Respiratory: 636 Cases
- Venereal: 238 Cases
- Viral Hepatitis: 1 Case

(4) The medical care facilities used during the reporting period have been as follows:

- 7th Surgical Hospital, LONG GIAO
- 24th Evacuation Hospital, LONG BINH
- 36th Evacuation Hospital, VUNG TAU
- 93rd Evacuation Hospital, LONG BINH
- 3rd Field Hospital, SAIGON
- 6th Convalescent Hospital, CAM RANH BAY
- 12th Evacuation Hospital, CU CHI

(5) A concentrated program with full time supervision has been initiated to facilitate preventive medicine procedures and policies. A preventive medicine officer, a medical doctor, MOS 3100, who completed on-the-job training with the 20th Preventive Medicine Unit in BIEN HOA, has been assigned to the Regiment. Initial efforts are directed toward upgrading the preventive medicine teams. Classes of instruction were offered during the reporting period and are scheduled to continue.

(6) Due to the volume of administrative responsibilities in the Regimental Surgeon's Office, a request for an administrative assistant was submitted to USAVE Headquarters. In response to this request, a captain, MSC, MOS 3506, will be assigned to the office. His responsibilities will include coordination between the Regimental Surgeons Office and all other 11th ACR medical facilities, collection, computation, and preparation of all medical data used for required statistical reports, coordination of enlisted medic replacements and intra-Regimental transfers, computation of the daily totals for patients admitted, transferred or discharged, and supervision of the Regimental Base Camp medical facility and personnel while the Surgeon is forward.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

(7) The need for a casualty mail system has been recognized and adopted during the period. A daily telephonic patient status report is received from hospitals treating 11th ACR personnel and is used by the Regimental Surgeons Office to initiate postal locator cards for each patient. In addition, postal locator cards are also made for all transfers between hospitals and upon discharge from medical facilities back to parent units.

(8) After an extensive investigation of past medical personnel replacement policies, the Regimental Surgeons Office has adopted a new concept of personnel administration, enhancing the training and employment of medics throughout the Regiment. Presently, all personnel with either 91A10 or 91B20 MOS's enroute to Regimental units are assigned to the 37th Medical Clearing Company. Here, each medic will receive on-the-job training in outpatient, clinic, ward, and surgery procedures and will be briefed and instructed by surgeons and senior medical assistants. Upon receiving a two to six week review of medical procedures, depending on previous training and background, each medic will be assigned to a Squadron for a minimum of four months field duty.

This plan will also be incorporated into an intra-Regimental infusion program which will minimize the effects of excessive monthly DEROS's and the loss of medics who are hospitalized for long periods of time, lost because of out-of-country evacuation or killed during hostile action, and replace medics who have been in line assignments for a period of ten months or more.

(9) Closer coordination between the Medical Service Corps officers and the unit medical personnel has enabled the Regimental Surgeons Office to present a more realistic medical picture of the Regiment. The new reporting system provides accurate data which will be used to pinpoint areas needing special attention.

(10) Two months ago, a Preventive Dentistry Program was initiated in the Regiment and strong emphasis was placed on fluoride treatment. Since fluoride paste is much more effective and practical than liquid fluoride, dental personnel have started fluoride paste treatment in all squadrons. In addition, the Replacement Training School presented classes on proper dental care, including use of the fluoride paste, to all incoming personnel. At this time, approximately 80-90% of all replacement personnel have received the new fluoride treatment.

(11) It has been observed that a Profile Board is of value when '03's are required to be changed. USAFV has given authority for a board, headed by the Regimental Surgeon, to convene when such changes are necessary.

(12) A prompt payment system on payday for hospital patients has been established. At the end of the month, a list is prepared of all patients
and is submitted to the finance officer, who completes the pay vouchers. A medical officer then travels to each hospital and pays each patient. Patients admitted after the original list in prepared are paid by their respective unit pay agents.

7. (FOUO) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

   a. General: During the quarter, the Regiment maintained assigned strength above authorized levels. Present for duty strength was maintained above 96% throughout the quarter, varying from 106.5% in early August to 96.6% at the close of the quarter.

   One Squadron in contact with hostile forces during September experienced an unusual shortage of enlisted personnel in 30G 11D (Armor Reconnaissance Specialist) as a result of casualties and normal rotation. These shortages were overcome in late September from within the Regiment and by receipt of replacements.

   Officer strength, including aviators, was maintained above authorized levels throughout the quarter. In addition, strength in the senior enlisted grades (E-7 to E-9) and lower enlisted grades (E-1 to E-4) exceeded authorized levels. Strength in the middle-level leadership and specialist grades, however, was far below authorized levels throughout the quarter. The Regiment is authorized 1,122 personnel in grades E-5 and E-6 and closed the quarter with only 819 assigned.

   b. Strength:

      (1) Strength at end of each month:

      |         | AUTHORIZE D | ASSIGNED | PRESENT |
      |---------|-------------|----------|---------|
      |         | OFF WO ENL | TOTAL    | OFF WO ENL | TOTAL |
      |         | AUG 206  60 | 3856  4122 | 236  54 | 3778  4068 | 235  52 | 3721  4008 |
      |         | SEP 206  60 | 3856  4122 | 237  61 | 4025  4323 | 226  57 | 3870  4123 |
      |         | OCT  207  61 | 3937  4205 | 232  60 | 3958  4250 | 220  58 | 3781  4059 |

      (2) Hospital returnees: During the quarter, 44 personnel were returned to duty after being hospitalized. This figure does not include those personnel who were treated and released immediately.

      (3) Casualties:

28
c. MOS Shortages: During the quarter, certain MOS shortages in critical skills continued to exist despite the level of assigned strength. The following is a list of critical MOS shortages for which on-the-job training of excess personnel is not feasible:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>SHORTAGE</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05B20</td>
<td>Radio Operator</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>E-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11B40</td>
<td>Light Weapons Infantryman</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11B40</td>
<td>Light Weapons Infantryman</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11C40</td>
<td>Indirect Fire Crewman</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>E-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11D40</td>
<td>Armor Reconnaissance Specialist</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>E-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12E40</td>
<td>Combat Engineer Vehicle Crewman</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>E-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12F40</td>
<td>Combat Engineer Vehicle Crewman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E40</td>
<td>Field Artillery Crewman</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>E-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E40</td>
<td>Field Artillery Crewman</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E40</td>
<td>Field Artillery Operations and Intelligence Assistant</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>E-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17K20</td>
<td>Ground Surveillance Radar Crewman</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17K40</td>
<td>Ground Surveillance Radar Crewman</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>E-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54D20</td>
<td>Chemical Equipment Repairman</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54E20</td>
<td>Chemical Staff Specialist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67V</td>
<td>OH-6 Helicopter Repairman</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69Y</td>
<td>AH-1G Helicopter Repairman</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76L40</td>
<td>Unit Supply Sergeant</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94E20</td>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Reorganization: The 919th Engineer Company was reorganized on 17 September per General Order 548, Headquarters, USARPAC, dated 17 Sep 68. Authorized strength was changed from 5 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 161 enlisted men to 6 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 2/2 enlisted men.

1An AH-1G helicopter disappeared enroute from VUNG TAU to Blackhorse Base Camp. The pilot and one enlisted crew member are missing. The aircraft has not been found.

2An Air Force FAC aircraft disappeared in the CATCHERS MITT and has not been found. One Regimental officer, who was acting as observer, is missing.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

The quality of replacements remained at an acceptable level. The Regiment received 33 enlisted personnel during the quarter who were trained under the Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Program. These replacements held grade E-5 and assisted in alleviating the shortage of Noncommissioned Officers.

All replacements were required to attend an orientation course at Base Camp upon arrival. The Replacement Training School assists in acclimating personnel to their new environment and conditioning their initial apprehensions of being in a combat zone. The course is designed to provide refresher training in basic skills and orientation emphasizing troop leading procedures, tactics, and safety procedures.

f. Services:

(1) Religious: During the quarter, a total of 348 religious services was conducted with a total attendance of 11,736. In addition, 225 confessions, 222 communions, and 10 memorials were conducted. The 348 services were divided as follows: 202 Catholic services and 146 Protestant services. Jewish services were centered around trips to LONG BIHN. The seven chaplains made 148 hospital visits, 794 interviews and counseling sessions, 276 visits to mens quarters, and 585 visits to the troop training and duty areas. The Chaplains Fund (Protestant, Catholic, Memorial) total receipts for the quarter were $2,924.95. Total expenditures were $1,620.78 and total expenditures for Vietnamese religious/charitable causes were $1,050.60. The individual chaplains assigned to the 11th ACR have continued to uphold the high standards of the Army Chaplaincy in providing spiritual service and moral guidance to all Blackhorse Troopers.

(2) Red Cross: For the three month period ending October 31, the Red Cross Field Unit at Blackhorse handled a total of 1205 cases. The Red Cross reporting and communication service handled a total of 31 birth and death notifications, health and welfare reports, and verification of emergencies for leave consideration. The Red Cross Office is presently preparing to distribute Christmas gifts to every serviceman assigned to the 11th ACR and Blackhorse Base Camp.

(3) Special Services: During the last quarter, Special Services had three USC shows consisting of Lonnie B. and Vicki G. (variety show), an Australian variety show, and a Vietnamese culture show. In addition, Willie Shoemaker and Bill Winfred appeared on a handshake tour. There were five movies every week shown at the Amphitheater; in addition, eleven of the units on Base Camp showed five movies a week. Whenever possible, movies were sent to the troops in the forward area. The new special services club is expected to open any time between 25 November and 25 December. It will be completely furnished with an arts and crafts shop, stage for shows, lounge
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-ME


area, and recreation room. In addition, it will be completely air-conditioned. The evening special service activities include Martha Raye and George Jewel and the Starlets (handshake tour).

Postal: The 7th Army Postal Unit (APU) is operating over TOE strength. Authorized strength is 1 officer and 15 enlisted men. Present strength is 1 officer and 18 enlisted men. The total value of money orders sold, including fees, totaled $2,428,341.70 for the quarter. The number of money orders sold was 31,284, while 1,364 money orders were cashed for a value of $86,912.30. The total stamp sales for the same period was $18,000.00. The following is a breakdown of incoming and outgoing mail:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOMING AND OUTGOING MAIL</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>DISPATCHED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pouches (letter mail)</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>1,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacks (Parcel Post, etc.)</td>
<td>4,784</td>
<td>1,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Pieces</td>
<td>1,846</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Mail</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>1,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured Mail</td>
<td>1,473</td>
<td>1,056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the period of August through October, airmail was received at the 7th APU 35 days, and surface mail received 3 days. The average transmission time of airmail was 5 days; surface mail received 3 days. The parcel post, money order, and locator windows are now open from 0800-1630 and 1800-2100 seven days a week. The post office is working two twelve hour shifts to accommodate the Christmas mail. Two money order personnel were sent to the field approximately five days a month to service 11th ACR personnel forward.

(5) Red Cross Clubmobile: The clubmobile made a total of 405 mobile visits, 420 regularly scheduled visits and 63 specially scheduled visits during the period.

An average of 100 birthday cards were sent out each month to the troops from information supplied by the 1st Sergeants of all units. Hospital books were distributed to hospital wards. Weekly visits were made to the wards at 7th Surgical Hospital, 37th Medical Company, 24th Evacuation Hospital, and 93rd Evacuation Hospital.

In addition to the clubmobile and hospital programs, the clubmobile had a series of athletic field days which were enthusiastically received by the troops which had just returned from the field. The events included basketball, volleyball, horseshoes, the 220-yard dash, and the 100-yard dash.

Programs during the period have covered diversified topics such as history, music, books, travel, women, food, color, and Vietnamese culture. Varied topics and methods of presentation have made the programs more interesting.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-WE

10 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(6) Post Exchange: During the quarter, the Blackhorse Post Exchange experienced many changes. On 21 September, the Post Exchange had a 50% turnover in Vietnamese Personnel as a result of a landmine explosion on the road between XUAN LOC and Base Camp. Mr. Royce Wright arrived on 30 September and is well qualified as a PACEX manager. The priority on the new 4,000 square feet warehouse has steadily risen and the ground has been surveyed by the 31st Engineers. The rainy season resulted in a fair amount of dollar value loss of merchandise. The merchandise was either marked off to zero balance or if saleable was marked down. Under the new warehouse management, this problem should be completely resolved.

g. Morale: A high level of morale continued throughout the quarter. The PX, Snack Bar, and Special Services activities directly contributed to the men's morale.

h. Awards and Decorations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Approved</th>
<th>Pending (This Qtr)</th>
<th>Pending (Last Qtr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MGH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOM</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 671 Purple Hearts were awarded.

i. Prisoners of War: The Blackhorse Detachment of the 720th Military Police Battalion processed 11 detainees during the quarter; none of these was deemed a POW.

j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order:

(1) Courts-Martial: During the quarter, the following courts-martial were processed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tried</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

(2) Serious Incidents: There were 4 serious incidents reported.

(3) During the last quarter, the use and possession of marijuana in the Base Camp increased alarmingly. In addition, a Vietnamese drug called Immenoctal or Binoctal was being bought and used by the troops. They are classified as barbiturates and are illegal. An orientation concerning the recognition, use, and effects of marijuana and other narcotics was presented by a representative of the 8th CI Group. A course of instruction is presently being integrated into the Regimental Training School for newly assigned officers and enlisted men to the 11th ACR.

k. Problems: There were no significant problems noted during this quarter.

9. (FOUO) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. General: The PSIOP program continued to support Regimental combat operations. Support was in the form of leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. These broadcasts were of a quick reaction nature designed to capitalize on the situation at hand.

b. Data: Aerial missions over the reporting period dropped 14,968,000 leaflets. They consisted of rally appeals (CHIEU HOI), safe conduct passes, regard leaflets, and propaganda describing the programs of the government of Vietnam. Loudspeaker broadcast appeals were made for a total of 55 hours of aerial broadcast time.

c. There were four rallies this quarter. The success of the PSIOP effort is based on the fact that the majority of the population in the LONG KHANH and BIEN HOA Provinces have been generally favorable toward the 11th ACR. Through aerial leaflets and aerial and ground broadcasts, the Vietnamese are being continuously encouraged to support the legal government of Vietnam.

9. (FOUO) CIVIC ACTION:

a. General:

(1) During the reporting period, emphasis on Civic Action (CA) shifted from the rear area of operations to the forward area. The 9th Platoon, 2nd CA Company, located XUAN LOC, is responsible for the CA in the XUAN LOC and Blackhorse Base Camp AO. The Regimental S-5 (Rear) provides support to the CA Platoon as required.

(2) In the Forward Area, the S-5 provided CA in areas not supported by other CA groups. Several villages, classified by Province Evaluators as contested, were supported. ADP's located near or in a hamlet provided...
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-WB 10 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

security for Political PayWar and Armed Propaganda Teams (APT's) working with the population.

(3) The Regimental CA fund has primarily been used to purchase sanitation aids for villagers living in outlying areas. The sanitation sundry packs were distributed during MEDCAP's along with sanitation instructional material. When available, health films were shown in conjunction with MEDCAP's.

b. The Regiment supported 7 MEDCAP's, treating 655 patients.

c. The following materials were used for Civic Action and Impact Programs, rebuilding of homes and schools, and upgrading RF/PF outposts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scrap lumber</td>
<td>40,875 BF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandbags</td>
<td>48,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>3,125 Sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>6,600 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes</td>
<td>3,500 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>11,108 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickets</td>
<td>1,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer stakes</td>
<td>1,175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. (U) INFORMATION:

a. General:

(1) During the quarter, the 17th Public Information Detachment provided widespread coverage of Operation TOAN THANG (Phase II). Printed and photographic releases covering the 11th ACR's participation in the operation received circulation in various newspapers both here and in the States. Photos covering the campaign were used in the "Stars and Stripes", USARV "Army Reporter", "Army Times", "7th Air Force News", and the MACV "Observer".

(2) The Detachment continued to operate from the Regiment's forward CP. Contributions by the Detachment to the USARV Army Daily Summary resulted in various articles in Stateside papers concerning the activities of the Blackhorse Regiment.

(3) A feature story on the 11th ACR's Air Cavalry Troop appeared in the August issue of the II FFV "Hurricane" Magazine.

b. Statistical Summary:

34

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVTC-WE
10 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68 "RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(1) A total of 696 hometown news releases (DA Form 1526) were forwarded by the 17th PID to the US Army Hometown News Center.

(2) A total of 53 news releases and 90 photo releases were given general distribution.

(3) A total of 8 news representatives were provided support. Three press briefings were held for the benefit of visiting news personnel.

11. (C) BASE CAMP DEVELOPMENT:

a. Following are projects for Blackhorse Base Camp that the 31st Engineer Battalion has assumed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT TITLE</th>
<th>FACILITY</th>
<th>% COMPLETE</th>
<th>EDC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5736-Man Cantonment</td>
<td>EM Billets</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30 Nov 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5736-Man Cantonment</td>
<td>Commo Facilities</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5736-Man Cantonment</td>
<td>EM/NGO/Officers Club</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>EM Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afld Spt Facility</td>
<td>Hangar</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afld Spt Facility</td>
<td>Avn Ops Bldg</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afld Spt Facility</td>
<td>Wash Apron</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonment Facility</td>
<td>Service Club</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonment Facility</td>
<td>Grease Racks</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10 Sep 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonment Facility</td>
<td>Post Chapel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25 Dec 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonment Facility</td>
<td>Unit Maintenance Shops</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical Strge Area</td>
<td>General Purpose Warehouse</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30 Nov 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical Strge Area</td>
<td>Ordnance Fld Maint Shops</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical Strge Area</td>
<td>Spare Parts Storehouse</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31 Jan 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc., Blackhorse Base Camp, completed 116 Maintenance Service Orders (MSO's) in August, 97 MSO's in September, and 113 MSO's in October for a total cost of $13,174.76.

Completed IJO's (Individual Job Orders) in progress at Blackhorse Base Camp as of 25 October and their percentage of completion are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>% COMPLETE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repair rusted roofing, HHT and 31st Engrs</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewire overhead power distribution line, 2/11 ACR</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Install additional overhead distribution line, 3/11 ACR</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabricate and install two steel gates 30' wide, 506th S&amp;S</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint 650 sign boards</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct one 16'x20' extension, messhall, 7th Surg Hosp</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

1. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

   a. Personnel: None

   b. Operations:

      (1) OBSERVATION: Employment of mobile patrols during night operations.

         EVALUATION: The Squadron occupying the LAM SON Area successfully employed mobile mounted and dismounted night patrols, effectively curtailing enemy infiltration through the Squadron's AO. Employment of stay-behind patrols, random movement, and sporadic illumination enabled the Squadron to interdict enemy operations over a large area.

         RECOMMENDATION: That mobile night patrols be employed by all units that have a large area of possible infiltration to cover.

      (2) OBSERVATION: Employment of tank mounted xenon searchlights along the DONG NAI River.

         EVALUATION: A tank company effectively used tank mounted xenon searchlights along enemy infiltration and supply routes. Two incidents of interdiction along the DONG NAI River resulted in the sinking of 2 VC sampans and 2 VC KIA.

         RECOMMENDATION: That xenon searchlights be used where possible when interdicting streams and rivers at night.

      (3) OBSERVATION: Employment of 4.2 mortars at troop level.

         EVALUATION: Three mortars, controlled by troop forward observers, were used effectively at troop level in conjunction with cordon and search operations to bring more accurate and timely illumination and fire support on small confined objectives.

         RECOMMENDATION: That organic mortar vehicles can be effectively used at troop level on small confined objectives.

      (4) OBSERVATION: Firing HE in the rain.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68

EVALUATION: When firing the high explosive (HE) projectile in the rain, fuze TSQ, M56, should be used. This fuze should be set on maximum fuze setting, giving the same explosion as the point detonated fuze (PD). This unit, however, has experienced premature burst when using this technique. Apparently, the problem is the result of rain striking the aluminum foil nose of the projectile and causing superquick action, regardless of the setting.

RECOMMENDATION: That firing be avoided with the HE projectile during heavy rain. If artillery must be fired, fuze MTSQ, M56A, should be set on maximum fuze setting, giving the same explosion as the point detonated fuse (PD).

(5) OBSERVATION: Ambush Patrol

EVALUATION: A study of ambush patrols at Blackhorse Base Camp has indicated that the best patrols are those organized as teams, i.e., the same personnel go out on a patrol as a team each time. These patrols have the advantage of having had the experience of working together. Teamwork permits the AP to set up, move, and react much more effectively than those patrols which have similar experiences but which are grouped together at random for a single patrol.

RECOMMENDATION: That each reconnaissance platoon form two twelve man ambush patrol teams to conduct all their ambush patrols.

(6) OBSERVATION: Deceptiveness of aerial reconnaissance in the jungle.

EVALUATION: Although the aerial observer is of value to ground forces in jungle operations, he is limited with regard to assisting ground movement. Even when flying at tree top level, the aerial observer cannot correctly gauge the height or density of trees or grass. Even more important is the inability to correctly judge soil trafficability from the air. On several occasions, ground commanders have been directed by the aerial observer into areas which appeared to have excellent trafficability but were actually too soft to support vehicles.

RECOMMENDATION: That ground, and not aerial, reconnaissance determine trafficability of terrain and density of foliage.

(7) OBSERVATION: Difficulty in adjusting elevation on E-8 Launcher.

EVALUATION: The E-8 Launcher can be secured very quickly on the tank xenon searchlight by means of the straps provided and permits elevation...
to be employed by means of the gun controls.

RECOMMENDATION: That E-8 Launcher in tank companies be mounted on xenon searchlights.

(8) OBSERVATION: Mining incidents on LTL 2 Blackhorse.

EVALUATION: Occasional thunderruns by the Blackhorse Base Camp RRF platoon during the hours of darkness reduces the number of mining incidents.

RECOMMENDATION: That thunderruns by the RRF platoon be initiated.

(9) OBSERVATION: Combination of armored cavalry and dismounted infantry.

EVALUATION: The effectiveness of the Regiment is greatly enhanced by placing one or more infantry battalions OPCON. A Squadron with an infantry company OPCON can better conduct mobile patrols, cordon and searches, and airmobile operations.

RECOMMENDATION: That at least one infantry battalion be habitually placed OPCON to the Regiment.

(10) OBSERVATION: Aviation Training.

EVALUATION: The organisational structure of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment handicaps establishment and conduct of an aviator training program. This handicap currently is most seriously felt in OH-6A transition training. The Regiment, unlike other aviation units which have a company, battalion, and group organisational structure, is a non-divisional unit. Although an attempt is made to establish a training capability at the Regimental Aviation Platoon level, it must be done at the expense of its operational capability.

RECOMMENDATION:

(a) That Aviation units assigned to II FFV assist non-divisional units, such as the Armored Cavalry Regiment and separate brigades, by providing a training capability as necessary to maintain sound training programs in these units.

(b) That every effort be made by USARV Aviator Assignment Branch to assign aviators with specific qualifications needed in these units.
(11) **Observation:** Enemy forces return to their vacated positions for security.

**Evaluation:** Enemy forces return to areas where Allied forces have recently swept, because they feel that Allied forces will not return in the immediate future.

**Recommendation:** That artillery fires during night firing be directed into areas recently swept by Allied forces.

(12) **Observation:** Enemy forces return to vacated Allied positions for supply.

**Evaluation:** Enemy forces will go through vacated NDP's and RON positions, looking for food and other useful items, such as ammunition and clothing, which have been left behind.

**Recommendation:** That artillery fires during night firing be directed into areas vacated by Allied forces.

(13) **Observation:** Artillery fire on jungle base camps.

**Evaluation:** Artillery fire directed on jungle base camps is ineffective because of the heavy jungle canopy. The use of mixed fuze quick and fuze delay on this type of target will not only kill enemy in the open but will also damage fortifications in the base camp area.

**Recommendation:** That mixed fuze quick and fuze delay be used in artillery fire on jungle base camps.

c. **Training:** None

d. **Intelligence:**

(1) **Observation:** Enemy Movement.

**Evaluation:** During operations in the CATCHERS KITT, it was observed that VC/NVA units reoccupy previously used base camps. Many camps struck by B-52 strikes were reoccupied within a month. In addition, trails and routes of movement which were used during the TET and May Offensives were once again employed by enemy units within the 11th ACR AO. Supply points have remained the same throughout the period, and VC/NVA forces seem to return to the same supply points regardless of risk.

**Recommendation:** That information on previous enemy movement be distributed to units.
be studied and employed in planning operations and targetting airstrikes against VC/NVA forces.

(2) **Observation:** Enemy movement.

**Evaluation:** During September, evidence of extensive illegal sampan traffic along the DONG NAI River was accumulated. There were several significant sightings in early September, and in mid-September PW and agent reports told of additional sampan movement along the DONG NAI. In late September, a Riverine force was employed along the river, and the indicators of illegal sampan traffic were no longer reported.

**Recommendation:** That amphibious patrolling be used as a means of deterring illegal sampan traffic.

(3) **Observation:** Attack on VC. 

**Evaluation:** During successful cordon and search operations, advice from district intelligence personnel served as a great aid in planning operations. Also, district intelligence personnel proved to be best suited for the interrogation and employment of captured VC.

**Recommendation:** That a program of close coordination be in effect between the unit S-2 and the district intelligence group.

(4) **Observation:** Rocket attacks.

**Evaluation:** From late August to early September, VC/NVA elements rocketed the LONG BINH/BIEN HOA Complex. It was found that the use of saturation patrols in rocket firing zones served to greatly inhibit enemy activity and to deny him the opportunity to prepare firing positions.

**Recommendation:** That saturation patrols, through their ability to deny the enemy firing positions, be considered as an effective means of thwarting VC/NVA rocket attacks.

e. **Logistics:** None.

f. **Organization:** None.

g. **Signal:**

(1) **Observation:** Dismounted Liaison Teams.
EVALUATION: Small liaison teams (1 Officer and/or 1 NCO) are periodically required to deploy with OPCON and/or adjacent units. These teams require a communications capability which can be man-packed, if necessary, and has a range of up to 10 miles in heavily forested terrain. TOE authorizations for the Regimental Headquarters provides only one PRC-25. A ready pool of 4 or 5 man-packed radios, e.g. PRC-25/PRC-77, should be available for issue as required to these teams and provide two units for an airborne relay, should range exceed that of the radio with its most efficient field antenna (ten-foot multi-section whip).

RECOMMENDATION: That five AN/PRC-25/PRC-77 radios be provided to the Regimental Signal Officer to support dismounted liaison teams and to provide airborne relay capability if required.

(2) OBSERVATION: Existing KAC-Q and J codes prove impractical for use in combat vehicles and aircraft.

EVALUATION: Existing KAC-Q and J codes prove impractical for use in combat vehicles and aircraft while underway, due to their cramped compartments and adverse lighting conditions. COMMSEC violations are an end result of the functional limitations inherent in the systems provided for use in the field.

A cipher system designed by USAFSS for use in the SEA Theater, entitled the "Southeast Asia Tactical Air Control Mission Code (SEATACS Mission Code), promises to be far more functional for the users above. Limitations of use due to poor light, manipulability, durability, etc. are largely overcome by the SEATACS system. A request for approval of a similar system for use by the 11th ACR has been submitted to higher headquarters.

RECOMMENDATION: That USARV or higher headquarters explore this code for possible application for US Army units.

(3) OBSERVATION: Teletypewriter Message Traffic Routing.

EVALUATION: Operational and logistical record message communications destined for the Commanding Officer, 11th ACR, have consistently experienced inordinate delays. These delays were attributable in part to the fact that these messages were addressed to LONG GIAO, RVN.

Only limited functions, exclusive of selected administrative nature, continue to be performed at the Regimental Base Camp. Action officers for the most part are at the Regimental Tactical CP located elsewhere. This
forward CP is consistently served by a communications center operated by the unit to which the Regiment is OPCON or by a major nearby command. Traffic of an operational, logistical, and certain defined administrative nature should be routed to the forward CP in order to receive expeditious delivery and accomplishment.

RECOMMENDATION: That 11th ACR periodically notify commands with which it communicates on a regular basis of the preferred addresses and communications center routing to effect a more timely delivery of communications.

(4) OBSERVATION: Utilization of Voice Security Device KY-38/TSEC.

EVALUATION: Utilization of KY-38 voice security devices solely with AN/PRC-77 radios at authorized levels does little to improve the COMMSEC posture of the 11th ACR. Far better utilization of resources is obtained from interfacing the KY-38 with the VRC-12 series radios throughout the Regiment.

PRC-77/KY-38 usage provides voice security at only the section/squad level. Enemy intercept activities are ineffective when directed against nets at this level, because reaction times to traffic passed would not be rapid enough for substantial effect on actions underway. Far more lucrative intercept sources are the Regimental/Squadron Command Nets, Regimental Admin/Log Net, Regimental Fire Coordination Nets, and Battery Fire Direction Nets.

Security of these nets requires interface of KY-38 with VRC-12 radios. Although such interface is possible only if a special interconnecting cable is made available, it is crucial that KY-38 voice security devices be used to provide voice security at higher levels.

Another benefit to be gained is the reduced heat generation of the KY-38 versus the KY-8 in use on other nets. Dissipation of heat generated by communications equipment is a major problem in this environment and any reduction of heat sources is a benefit.

RECOMMENDATION:

(a) That continued emphasis be given to obtaining through logistical or crypto-logistical channels, the properly fabricated interconnecting cables for interfacing KY-38 devices with VRC-12 series radios.

(b) That the application explained above be affected
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AVIC-WE 10 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 31 Oct 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

as a more efficient utilization of available ciphony assets to deny usable
information to the enemy.

h. Civic Action/PSYOPS:

(1) OBSERVATION: PSYOPS operations in familiar hamlets.

EVALUATION: PSYOPS teams should not go into even a familiar
hamlet before checking present security conditions. A simple check with the
hamlet chief and PF or security commander can provide vital information con-
cerning the security condition of the target hamlet. They may recommend
and detail a special security force if it is advisable. This habit insures
that the cardinal rule of informing local officials of your presence and inten-
tion is not violated.

RECOMMENDATION: That PSYOPS teams check with the hamlet chief
or security commander on the security condition of the hamlet as soon as
they arrive in the hamlet.

GEORGE S. PATTON
Colonel, Armor
Commanding

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AVIC-WB

10 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 Oct 68 RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

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1 Staff, 11th ACR
1 CO, 1st Sqdn, 11th ACR
1 CO, 2nd Sqdn, 11th ACR
1 CO, 3rd Sqdn, 11th ACR
5 28th Mil Hist Det, 11th ACR
AVDB-T (MHD) (10 Nov 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CS for - 65 (R1)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, APO San Francisco 96345 12 Dec 68

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: G3 Analysis,
APO San Francisco 96266

Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC (DST),
APO San Francisco 96375

Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20315

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed the attached Operational Report
Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and concurs
with it.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GARY C. TUCKER
1LT, AGC
Asst AG
AVFBC-RE-H (10 Nov 68) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 15 DEC 1968
THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for the period ending 31 October 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

O. R. FORY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG
AVHGC-DST (10 Nov 68) 3d Ind
SURTJCCT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 31 Oct 68 RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 22 JAN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPUP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning existing KAC-Q and J codes that prove impractical for use in combat vehicles and aircraft, page 41, paragraph g(2). Concur in the recommendation. It is planned to issue the USAFSS cipher system to the 11th ACR for test and evaluation. Upon completion of the evaluation, any required modifications will be incorporated, and a determination will be made as to the further application of this cipher system for use by other units in Vietnam.

   b. Reference item concerning utilization of voice security device KY-38/TSFC, page 42, paragraph g(4). Concur in the recommendation. Interconnect cables for using the KY-38 with the AN/VRC-12 series radios are being fabricated in-country by the 1st Logistical Command and USAECOM is having additional cables constructed in CONUS.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. W.  
C. D. W.  
1LT. ACY  
O/C 3D IND
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ 11th Armored Cav Regiment for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTY
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
Air Cavalry Troop
919th Engineer Company (Armor)
37th Medical Company
506th Supply and Service Company (Support)
551st Light Maintenance Company (Support)
  1st Detachment, Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion
  7th Army Postal Unit
  17th Public Information Detachment
  28th Military History Detachment
  398th Transportation Detachment
  9th Signal Detachment (Avionics Maintenance)
  407th Radio Research Unit
  541st Military Intelligence Detachment
  5th Field Team, Company B, 6th PSYOP Battalion
  202nd Military Intelligence Detachment

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
A Troop
B Troop
C Troop
D Company
Howitzer Battery

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
E Troop
F Troop
G Troop
H Company
Howitzer Battery

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
I Troop
K Troop
L Troop
M Company
Howitzer Battery
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INCLOSURE 8

Combat Engineer Vehicle – Lessons Learned

1. GENERAL: The 919th Engineer Company (Armored) received two M728 Combat Engineer Vehicles (CEV’s) on 20 July. Each CEV is attached to a line platoon of three ACAV’s.

2. MISSIONS:

   a. The dozer blade and winch were used to repair a culvert site destroyed by VC sappers. This was a good mission, and the vehicle performed well.

   b. The CEV blade was used to clear a minefield near LOC NINH. The mines, all anti-personnel, were of the US M16 variety. With the blade placed approximately two inches below the surface of the ground, the CEV was able to plow the mines to the surface where they could be later destroyed. This was an excellent mission in view of the protection which the driver received.

   c. A CEV was used to remove the bodies from a downed helicopter near CAM MY. Due to the fact that the helicopter went into a 100' deep crevice in thick jungle, a crane could not get to the site. The boom and winch were effectively employed to move the helicopter and the crew members were extracted. This was a good mission for the CEV.

   d. A CEV was used to move junked aircraft at TAN SON NHUT Airbase to clear an area for a night defensive position. This was a poor mission for the CEV. Since the driver needed no protection, this job should have been done by a bulldozer.

   e. A CEV was given the mission of eliminating water puddles and shallow mud at TAN SON NHUT Airbase. The vehicle is too heavy for this type of work and turned mud puddles into approximately 8-12 inches of mud.

   f. Both CEV’s have been used extensively for pulling engine packs on all types of tracked vehicles.

   g. A CEV was used to improve approaches to an old Bailey bridge near BINH CO. The vehicle was entirely suited for this job.

   h. A CEV is being used as Rome Plow security. The vehicle is prepared to bring enemy bunkers under fire if they are uncovered by the land clearing teams. So far, all discovered bunkers have been deserted.

   i. Both CEV’s are used extensively for security. The only drawback to this use is the fact that often the Engineers travel alone—violating the theory of employing tanks together. A CEV returning from LOC NINH 50.

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was engaged in an ambush. A RPG-7 hit the vehicle, skimming the back-deck and cutting part of the winch cable. If this CEV had been put out of action, it would have had to have been abandoned since the ACAV's could not retrieve it.

j. No main gun rounds have been fired during hostile action.

3. COMPARISON WITH M48 W/BLADE:

a. Unlike the M48 W/Blade, the turret on the CEV cannot be traversed to the flanks while convoying, due to the boom overhang. The boom overhang hinders traffic and catches in trees.

b. The blade is the same as on an M48, but the added power of the M60A1 makes the blade more effective.

c. The winch is very valuable in vehicle recovery operations. Often the CEV has to recover itself with the winch. This is a clear advantage over the M48 W/Blade.

d. The 165mm gun is much more specialized than the 90mm M48 gun. To date it has yet to be proven in combat. The loading time at a minimum is two minutes which would be too time consuming in a firefight. The HEP round is also limited in application due to the 750 meter safety radius. Cannister rounds for and a range finder on the main gun would be definite assets.

e. The M85 and M73 machine guns have been used in firefights and are far superior to their old counterpart. The 250 rounds of .50-cal that may be stored in the new cupola certainly has advantages over the 50 rounds for the M48. The rapid firing rate of the M85 is perfect for counter-insurgency applications requiring quick reaction.

f. The MOS authorized for the CEV crew is 12B. When this unit is placed under MTO 5–127G, a question arises with respect to the current trained crews with an 11E MOS. The authorized CEV crew is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12B40</td>
<td>CEV Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12B20</td>
<td>CEV Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12B20</td>
<td>CEV Gunner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12A1C</td>
<td>Ammo Handler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12A10</td>
<td>CEV Loader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS:

a. The nitrogen cylinders on one of the CEV's were never charged. As a result, one of the vehicles burned out a turret motor.

b. A hydraulic leak developed in the selector valve for the blade on one of the CEV’s. The valve had to be replaced.

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c. Both CEV's have had trouble losing the pin connecting the cylinder and ram assembly to the moldboard.

d. One of the CEV's had main gun failure when several main gun closing springs became distorted. The failure may have resulted from leaving the breech open all the time; this point, however, was never brought up in initial instruction. The crews now leave the breech closed except when loading.

e. A letter from 1st Logistical Command instructed personnel to change the boom oil from OE 10 to OE 30. This may result in more power, but results are not yet established.

f. One wear plate on a CEV wore out very fast and had to be replaced.

g. Much difficulty has been encountered establishing a PLL for the vehicles. All parts recommended by the assistance instruction team on the CEV were requisitioned on 02 priority from the 551st LEMCO. Very few of these parts have been issued. The 551st was to receive a "package" of PLL for the CEV, but as yet it has not arrived. Many parts (at least 60%) ordered have no status at all. This situation is not unusual, but it makes an efficient PLL system nearly impossible for all vehicles.
COMMANDETS NOTES

1. GENERAL POLICY (Dated 24 Jul 68): During my tour of command of this Regiment, I expect to have occasional conferences and meetings with all commanders and the Regimental staff. Such a meeting is now being planned. The exigencies, however, of combat in this CTZ and the valid requirement that commanders remain with their units to the maximum extent really preclude frequent meetings. I therefore propose to forward my views and guidance through "Commanders Notes". These notes will cover the whole range of Regimental activities of particular concern to me. I consider them of prime importance to this Regiment and want you to know that their content will have been very carefully considered prior to promulgation. I, therefore, enjoin you to study them carefully, execute them with vigor, and afford them your continuing personal attention.

2. USE OF ARMED HELICOPTERS (Dated 2 Aug 68):
   a. The armed helicopter currently available for support of ground troops is an extremely valuable asset, particularly for reconnaissance missions and attacks against enemy troops in the open. They are, however, limited in the amount of ordnance they carry and almost ineffective in jungle. In addition, they are expensive in material and man-hours to maintain and quite vulnerable to ground fire.
   b. The artillery support available on a 24-hour, all weather basis to every unit of this Regiment is outstanding. Every portion of our operational area is covered by at least one battery of artillery and many areas by as many as five. The ASR is more than sufficient. Literally thousands of rounds of high explosive, white phosphorous, and HO smoke are only minutes from any potential target. This fire support is generally invulnerable to enemy in the target area. The 8-inch, 155-mm, and to a lesser extent, 105-mm shells are very effective against bunkers. Using variable time fuse, artillery is devastating against enemy troops without overhead cover.
   c. The characteristics should be well known by every soldier of the combat arms. In spite of this, the first call for support in any contact is for gunships. Artillery fire is stopped to allow armed helicopters to engage targets that too often they are not equipped to defeat. In effect, we are not using a tremendous capability in favor of a less effective one.
   d. I desire that all commanders reevaluate their fire support planning and employment procedures. We must select the weapon to fit the target. Consideration should always be given to the employment of multiple means of support. Shift, rather than cease, fires. When appropriate, plan for the simultaneous use of artillery, air, and gunships. We must expect that contacts will be close. The proper technique in this case is to start the artillery at a reasonable range and walk it into a minimum safe
distance. Our men must learn that by thus leaning against our fires they
gain security and disrupt enemy defenses. This is a problem of training
and orientation, especially for junior leaders. The basic skills requir-
ed have been mastered in earlier training. We must now strive to perfect
our technique. I expect immediate improvement in our use of the available
fire support, artillery in particular.

3. AIR CAVALRY ROLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH AIR STRIKES (Dated 16 Aug 68):

a. The most effective tool for destroying enemy base camps, staging
areas, supply depots, and entrenchments is the B-52 Strike. As with any
other type of attack, the best airstrike results are achieved by thorough
planning and vigorous execution. Those essential steps in obtaining best
results relate to prestrike analysis, attack, exploitation, and poststrike
analysis. The air cavalry's activities are critical in all three areas
and must be closely coordinated with other unit actions.

   (1) Prestrike Analysis:

      (a) This is primarily an intelligence gathering mission
and it is a key to mission success. Intelligence on enemy troop concen-
trations must be both timely and accurate to be of value, especially in
the jungle environment. Against fortified positions, location errors of
relatively few meters can make the difference between successful and un-
successful attacks. It is equally important to strike targets while they
are occupied. Although structures destroyed are of some concern, it is
the personnel, equipment, and supplies contained therein that are the
primary targets.

      (b) Many targets are suitable for B-52 strikes, but too
often we fail in timeliness of these strikes. B-52 strike requests
should be submitted for targets that are permanent or semi-permanent in
nature and in use continuously, as request approval can take several
weeks.

      (c) The Air Cavalry Troop is very well suited to prestrike
analysis. Not only must the Aeroscouts locate targets, but after they
have been located and an air strike requested, Aeroscouts must make a
thorough reconnaissance of the target area prior to the strike. This
will assist them in accurately assessing damage during the poststrike
analysis. In order not to disclose the location of strike areas, a
simple but effective cover and deception plan must be implemented as part
of the overall plan for engagement of the target.

      (d) Preplanned tactical airstrikes should be utilized on
targets that are relatively fleeting in nature and of suitable size for
the smaller amounts of ordnance delivered. These strikes can be planned
one day and exploited the following day.
(2) Exploitation: Immediately following the strike is the time
for exploitation.

(a) Psyops: In addition to the physical damage inflicted by
air strikes, there is great psychological effect on the enemy. A Psyop
plan should be implemented immediately after the strike.

(b) Air Cavalry: The Air Cavalry is the key to successful
exploitation. Immediately after the "all clear," the Air Cavalry must
be on the scene, locating targets and engaging them with organic weapons
and artillery. Additionally, they must identify objectives and landing
zones for airmobile operations. Gunships can be either airborne or strat-
egically positioned during poststrike analysis, but must be available for
immediate commitment.

(c) Ground Exploitation: When possible, an airmobile oper-
ation is employed to exploit the strikes. Each target area must be consid-
ered a tactical objective; troops should not be diverted from their object-
ive by enemy harassment.

(3) Attack: The ideal B-52 strike is not in the night but about
0600 in the morning or during the day enabling immediate daylight exploit-
ation. If, however, the attack comes at night, exploitation must follow
at first light.

(4) Poststrike Analysis: Information gained by the FAC, Air
Cavalry, and ground troops must be transmitted quickly and accurately.
The immediate assessments are made and relayed through both operations
and intelligence channels. Final assessments are as prescribed in
LOI 9-68, 1st Inf Div.

(5) The Air Cavalry Troop's actions largely determine how success-
ful the strike and exploitation will be. This segment must be prepared
to utilize the unique assets of the Air Cavalry in conjunction with other
forces to exploit air strikes.

4. AID AND COMFORT TO THE ENEMY (Dated 18 Aug 68):

a. A tremendous amount of effort, money and lives are currently be-
ing expended in Vietnam by all of our military forces in an attempt to
breakup, disrupt, and impede the enemies' resupply efforts from the
North. This effort has been at least partially successful; to the point
that we now are forcing the NVA/VC soldiers to procure equipment and sup-
plies locally in South Vietnam in order to augment existing shortages.
However, not only is the enemy capable of manufacturing much useful
equipment from locally procured items, but also we ourselves are often
responsible for supplying him with either the materials or the actual
equipment that he needs.
b. The enemy is ingenious and resourceful in his use of materials that he finds on the battlefield. The smallest item, no matter how insignificant it may appear to be, can be useful to him. For example:

1. Cans and bottles can be made into effective anti-personnel mines and booby traps simply by filling with explosives and scrap metal.

2. Commo wire makes effective trip wire or can be used for command detonated mines.

3. Barbed wire can be laid in ditches alongside ambush sites.

4. Engineer pickets can be used as punji stakes.

5. Salvaged ammunition can be used in a number of ways: detonators for mines, filler for explosive devices or in many cases, it can be used in its primary role; that is, shot back at us.

6. Discarded water and gas cans, canvas, canteens, web equipment, no matter in what condition, have hundreds of uses for him. I repeat, he can use anything!

c. Through negligence and ignorance, we are resupplying the enemy daily. The only way to stop this is to stop leaving anything on the battlefield. Henceforth, areas which are evacuated by units assigned to or under the operational control of this Regiment will be returned to their natural condition, i.e. all material and equipment will be either removed or completely destroyed in such a manner that it can be of no possible use. The only exception to this policy will occur when an established position is being immediately taken over by a relieving unit, in which case, semi-permanent structures such as bunkers, concertina wire, watch towers, and similar items may be left in place. However, in no instance will these items be left unguarded. The burial of materials or salvage is not sufficient. Items of salvage which cannot be completely destroyed will be evacuated to protected salvage points or sanitary fills.

d. During the fiscal year which ended on 30 Jun 68, 93 individual weapons were lost by personnel assigned to this command. At least 15 of these were lost under conditions where it is possible that they were recovered by the enemy. Perhaps at this moment they are being used against US/PAF. In 60 of the 93 cases, pecuniary liability was assessed against the person who lost the weapon. It is therefore reemphasized that all weapons losses, whether in the field or in a base camp area, will be thoroughly investigated by commanders concerned who will initiate disciplinary action, if appropriate, as well as a Report of Survey. These are separate actions and will be considered separately. I direct and expect my commanders to be completely ruthless in matters pertaining to weapons losses.

e. During the period 15 Apr - 1 Aug, 13 cases of accidental discharge of weapons have been recorded in this Regiment. These accidental discharges
have resulted in one dead and ten wounded. All accidental discharges of weapons will be investigated immediately. A report of investigation with recommendations for appropriate disciplinary action will be forwarded to this headquarters within seven days of the incident. A line of duty investigation will be conducted in all incidents in which a person is either killed or wounded by accidental discharge of weapons or by other careless or dangerous action. The report of investigation will be forwarded to this headquarters along with recommendations for appropriate disciplinary action.

f. All of the above, failure to police the battlefield, loss of weapons, and accidental discharge, play directly into enemy hands. By these actions we are giving aid and comfort to an enemy which we are sworn to destroy. I expect that all personnel will be informed of my feelings in these matters. Commanders at all levels are hereby directed to take all necessary action to bring these practices to an immediate halt.

5. POSITION SELECTION (Dated 27 Aug 68):

a. The matter of individual position selection by armored units in this command is of increasing personal concern to me. I believe we are forgetting the time-honored techniques of concealment and, to even more advantage, hull defilade or partial hull defilade positions. Here are some examples I have personally observed:

(1) An ACAV occupying a blocking position parked next to a shallow bank or crater which would have offered 20% more protection.

(2) A tank failing to take advantage of a pile of rubble caused by a Pome Plow operation.

(3) An ACAV in position covering a major highway and parked along the route instead of backed up in the rubber about 50 yards from the route.

(4) An ACAV platoon on a seal mission taking absolutely no advantage of brush, partially destroyed buildings or foliage by which to break the outline of the vehicles themselves and thus conceal their positions from enemy personnel attempting to exfiltrate through the seal.

b. The above examples are representative of our current sickness. One does not need nor will one get a dozer tank to scrape out a position. By the same token, material protection, stand-off plates and bar armor kits will not normally be provided. However, ingenuity and plain horse sense are always available and should be habitually used at all levels. Correct position selection is the mark of a good vehicle commander and by the same token, an armored unit is no better than its vehicle commanders. One does not just stop and park; one looks for an advantageous place to stop, selects that place and spends the next two to four hours either searching for a better position or improving the position already

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selected. Furthermore, the night position may vary from that used in daylight. This saves lives and kills VC. I emphasize that it is one mark of the professional armor leader.

c. I expect that immediate and continuous command attention will be directed to the important but perhaps forgotten matter of position selection.

6. COMMANDERS CONFERENCE (29 Jul 68):

a. GENERAL: This war is a strange mixture of both military and political factors. Many things happen that can only be explained politically. Suffice it to say that there is a political problem to everything the Vietnamese do. The key and the emphasis today is to strengthen the ARVN's before we withdraw so that they can take over. This is one of COMUSMACV's prime missions. We will support him and we must help the ARVN whenever possible. Do not criticize them openly. S-5's should keep the commanders informed of Vietnamese holidays, both religious and rational. Our key dates in this election year are also important, i.e. the Democratic and Republican conventions and the national election.

b. OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE:

(1) The following guidelines are true of all combat in Vietnam:

(a) All operations begin with a movement to contact.

(b) Meeting engagement follows.

(c) Reinforcement of forces in contact by some form of combat power is essential.

(d) Maintain contact at all costs.

(2) The VC will fight under three general conditions:

(a) If surprised.

(b) To defend a base camp.

(c) If he is certain of a favorable kill.

(3) The VC is a creature of habit. He is vulnerable to a lack of food and medicine.

(4) Our conduct of operations must function in the main around intelligence collection. Do not short change your S-2 in talent.

(5) Intelligence needs improvement. Chaplains, medics, S-5's are all potential agents and will be used as such.
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(6) US Forces must act on good, but not perfect, intelligence; a good, but not perfect, plan. For example, on 27-28 Jul 68, the 2nd Squadron acted on fairly hard intelligence and moved. 30 sorties (3 choppers) moved 233 men. The "take" was real. The info on which we got the take was pretty sketchy.

(7) ACAV's do not bunch up or move in column unless speed is essential. Further, infantry will not ride on ACAV's unless speed is essential.

(8) Explore new chemical warfare tactics. Chemicals save lives and gain POW's.

(9) Reaction time must be constantly improved. Artillery reaction time is good but must improve.

c. MISCELLANEOUS:

(1) Must have timely information on what is available for commanders to use, such as fire flies, gas, artillery, QT2, 8 million candle power searchlight and air power, etc. Control of "gadgets" must be at Squadron or Regiment.

(2) Like all army units, this Regiment has the problem of word passing, weapon maintenance, flak jacket when on operations, uniform upkeep, appearance (personal), etc.

(3) The SGM is the man who brings the needs of the men to the attention of their squadron, troop, or battery commanders and, if necessary, to me. An example of this was the new fatigues sent to the 1st and 2nd Squadrons as a result of laundry problems.

(4) Better attention must be given to the men in the hospitals. Mail, toilet articles, books, etc. Anything to make him more comfortable and let him know that we haven't forgotten him.

(5) We need more recon and map reading training for our aviators.

(6) Everyone should know at least the key phrases needed to communicate with the Vietnamese. Example—"Get down," "Where is the enemy?," etc.

(7) Radio discipline is poor. The enemy monitors our nets and evades us. Need more cover and deception operations.

(8) Should be more awards than there are. Don't forget the little guy. Example: ACAV and tank drivers, cooks, mechanics, clerks, radio operators, etc. Stress ACM.
d. PIO: Maximum coverage on troops. One article for Armor Magazine by each Squadron every 6 months as a minimum. Two or three items on the Regiment as a whole. Don't forget the little guy. PIO coverage is a big boost for morale if the man gets into the papers back home.

e. MAINTENANCE:

(1) The 11th ACR is the lowest on the USARV list in deployability. We must improve. Stress 1st echelon in field. Initiate training programs for the troops in the field.

(2) Improve PLL and storage. Must have better maintenance and a marked reduction in scrounging. Maintenance of fuel filters, cleaners, and batteries is poor. Better storage of sensitive items is mandatory.

(3) Be inquisitive; inspect constantly. Look into the "dark corners" of an organization, i.e. the commo area, mess area, maintenance track.

7. CONCEPT FOR RAPID BUILDUP OF AIRMOBILE FORCES FROM AERO-RIFLE PLATOON THROUGH INFANTRY BATTALION (DATED 1 OCT 68)

a. With the reorganization of the Regimental aviation assets along TOE lines, situations may develop in which an initial commitment of the Aero-rifle Platoon by CO, Air Cavalry Troop, leads to the commitment of a full infantry battalion, cavalry squadron, or more. We must therefore be prepared to reinforce rapidly and exploit initial contacts. Accordingly, the following sequence with concomitant command and control features is envisioned:

(1) The Air Cavalry Troop or a ground unit locates a target deemed appropriate for engagement by the troop. If the target is in the troop AO, the troop commander may decide to commit the Aero-rifle Platoon. Command and control: Air Cav Cmdr.

(2) Upon determining that commitment of the Aero-rifle Platoon is likely, Regiment directs an infantry battalion to prepare one rifle platoon, with a Captain in charge, as RRF for immediate pickup and to prepare to release OPCON of the platoon to the Air Cav Trp on lift off.

(a) The Captain provided by the infantry battalion will normally assume command of the Aero-rifle Platoon on the ground and report to the CO, Air Cav Trp. This reduces control problems of the Air Cavalry Troop CO.

(b) The Air Cav Trp Cmdr decides whether to orbit the platoon for immediate insertion, or to load lift aircraft but remain on the ground, merely to have the RRF Platoon stand by for pickup on order. Command and control: Air Cav Trp Cmdr.

60

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(3) If it is deemed likely that the RRF Platoon will be committed, Regiment immediately takes the following steps:

(a) Requests division RRF company stand by for commitment.

(b) Alerts an infantry battalion under 11th ACR OPCON to prepare a company as RRF for pickup utilizing division aviation assets.

(c) Designates a control headquarters infantry battalion or cav squadron and directs that headquarters to plan for control of the operation to include employment of the Air Cav Trp in an OPCON or DS status. (Note: OPCON is preferable).

(d) Prepares to adjust AO boundaries. Command and Control: Air Cav Trp Cmdr.

(4) If the RRF platoon is committed and further reinforcement is deemed necessary, Regiment takes the following steps:

(a) Requests division RRF company be placed OPCON to Regiment or requests immediate division airlift assets be made available for commitment of its own RRF company. (Generally, whichever is most responsive will be requested).

(b) Places the division RRF company (if used) and the previously committed platoons OPCON to the battalion or squadron providing the control headquarters.

(c) Directs additional RRF forces to prepare for commitment.

(d) Places Air Cav Trp(-) either DS or OPCON to Bn/Sqdn. Command Control: Bn/Sqdn Cmdr.

(5) If the RRF company is committed and further reinforcement is deemed necessary, the Regiment takes the following steps:

(a) Directs additional RRF forces be placed OPCON to the Bn.

(b) Requests additional divisional forces and aviation assets be alerted if deemed appropriate. Command and Control: Bn/Sqdn Cmdr.

c. (C) Since command and control features are of great importance to the operation, a checklist will be utilized by Regimental TOC personnel to facilitate operations. Subordinate units should adapt this list to their own needs.
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COMMAND AND CONTROL CHECKLIST

1. (C) Report to higher HQ commitment of the Aero-rifle Platoon.
2. (C) Designate a platoon RRF.
3. (C) Inform Air Cav Trp and Bn/Sqdn of DZ, LZ, time, frequencies.
4. (C) Resolve AO questions as appropriate.
5. (C) Designate an RRF company or request higher HQ RRF.
6. (C) Arrange airlift for RRF company to include number of sorties, PZ, LZ, time, frequencies.
7. (C) Inform fire support (Arty, Air) of status.
8. (C) Resolve command arrangements.

d. (C) Fire support for the Air Cav Trp is planned as for any airborne unit. An artillery FO or otherwise qualified individual must be in communication with the FSC in order to provide responsive fire support, especially upon insertion of the ARP. Although the ARP may be inserted outside the 9.5 km planning range of 105-mm fan (1st Div SOP), if a company is committed as reinforcement the following will apply:

1. Obtain permission to operate outside the 105-mm fan. (An operation should not, however, be planned outside the 155-mm fan).

2. Plan to move a 105-mm battery or portion thereof to a supporting location. When the Air Cav Trp is placed in a DS or OPCON status to a Bn/Sqdn, normal Bn/Sqdn fire support procedures are in effect.

8. CONTROL OF MALARIA AND RABIES (Dated 30 Sep 68):

a. Since assuming command of this Regiment in mid-July 1968, I have been pleased with the overall Malaria Prevention Program. The Regiment has always had a few cases per month, but we compare very favorably with other major commands. I am advised that Falciparum Malaria is seasonal, and its peak occurrence is September through January. It must be emphasized to all that the only way to prevent malaria is by using every available protective measure. These protective measures include: taking weekly chloroquine-primaquine, taking a daily Dapsone, rolling sleeves down at night, using insect repellents and mosquito nets when practical. It is known that some personnel suffer from diarrhea when they take their weekly chloroquine-primaquine tablets. Commanders should instruct their personnel to break the tablet in half and take one-half in the morning and the other half in the evening. If personnel still have trouble with diarrhea, refer them to the Medics.

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b. As we approach the peak Falciparum Malaria Season, I want every Commander to reevaluate his own preventive program and emphasize all the protective measures available. Remember the bite of a mosquito can be as deadly as the business end of an AK-47.

c. There is a requirement for more stringent dog control measures. The dog population of the Squadrons and Base Camp is out of control. The following policy is now in effect, effective upon receipt of these notes.

(1) One dog or cat per company/troop/battery size unit or per separate det.

(2) All female mascots will be spayed at 5 months.

(3) All puppies will be immunized against rabies at 3 months and yearly thereafter.

(4) Excess mascots will be removed from the premises.

For general information, the veterinarian will be available at Blackhorse Base Camp on the first Wednesday of each month to administer rabies and distemper immunizations. Dogs may be spayed at Long Binh; coordinate through your surgeons.

d. In cases of animal bites, the animal is to be captured, if possible, and given to the MP's for transportation to the veterinarian in Long Binh. If it is necessary to kill the animal, it will not be shot in the head.

e. For clarification, the saliva of a rabid dog is just as deadly as his bite.

f. Rabies is an incurable disease once an individual has been bitten and is not treated promptly. All personnel bitten will be returned to the 37th Medical Company after receiving initial treatment in the nearest medical facility. Rabies is endemic in Vietnam, which means that every animal is capable of carrying and transmitting rabies to our troops.

9. STANDARDS OF APPEARANCE, MAINTENANCE, AND MILITARY COURTESY (6 Oct 68):

a. Recently, it has come to my attention that the standards of appearance, maintenance, and military courtesy throughout this organization have fallen below the acceptable level. Each of these items individually is a significant indicator of the quality of leadership within a unit and collectively they form a yardstick by which the overall capability of the unit is measured. As a general rule, if standards in these areas are high, standards in other matters will be equally high. The old Army saying of, "Who ever saw a dirty soldier with a medal?", is still applicable today.
b. With regard to appearance, I have reference to not only the appearance of the individual soldier, but to the appearance of the unit as well. When I find a unit area which is poorly policed, I invariably find a unit in which little attention is paid to the appearance of its personnel. Within this area of personnel appearance, the following specific items have been noted:

(1) Personnel wearing the jungle hat with the tie-down string either at the back of the head or looped over the crown. There are only two places that the tie-down string is authorized for wear—either inside the crown of the hat or under the chin.

(2) Lack of haircuts. Hair will be kept cut short and neatly trimmed.

(3) Identification tags missing or improperly worn.

(4) Shirt sleeve rolled improperly. Shirt sleeves will be rolled above the elbow or will be all the way down and buttoned.

(5) Sagging pistol belts.

(6) Trousers not bloused.

(7) Boots dirty and/or unserviceable.

(8) Generally dirty uniforms, to include headgear. The policies and regulations covering these items should be clear to all concerned. Enforcement should start at the lowest command level, i.e. vehicle commanders, section leaders and work up to platoon and troop/company/battery level. All of the above items apply to units at Blackhorse Base Camp. Units in field locations will have greater difficulty maintaining comparable standards, but there is no reason, no matter in what conditions a unit finds itself, to condone (1-7) above. I will, however, allow the senior officer on the ground to prescribe the uniform while in a field location. For example, troops engaged in strenuous physical labor may be allowed to remove their fatigue shirts. Nevertheless, during mounted operations outside the assembly or night defensive area, I expect all vehicle commanders to be equipped with weapons and appropriate webbing and to be wearing steel helmets and body armor. The same uniform is prescribed for dismounted operations with the exception that body armor is optional.

c. Appearance of vehicle crews, particularly the manner in which they ride, is another unsatisfactory area. Tank crews will ride inside the vehicle at all times except for one man who may be on the rear deck. Crew members will wear CV helmets and will monitor the interphone. ACAV crews may ride on top of the vehicle, but will not be allowed to slouch around. They must remain alert. At no time will arms and legs be allowed
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to hang over the side of the vehicle. Howitzer crews will ride inside the vehicle.

d. Appearance of unit areas is also a matter of personal concern and is an excellent indicator of individual and unit pride and leadership. The list of deficiencies which can be found in any given area, particularly at Blackhorse Base Camp, is enormous. They run the gamut from loose papers and trash, to tall grass, to signs and fencing that have fallen down. Again, these deficiencies are not common to field units. However, for units in the field, their positions must be maintained in acceptable conditions of police and sanitation in order to maintain the proper health standards required in Vietnam.

e. Maintenance of equipment, whether it be individual weapons, radios or vehicles, has long been one of the greatest problem areas facing any commander and one deserving constant command attention. The ability to move, shoot, and communicate is directly related to the amount of supervised maintenance effort expended by the unit. Again, maintenance is a command responsibility and commanders are responsible. In order to be effective, maintenance must be supervised and it must be inspected. Although this axiom has been stated and reiterated for years, I still visit units in which there exists no semblance of system for either supervision or inspection of maintenance activities. As a result, it is a rare occasion when visiting a unit that I am unable to find rusty, dirty weapons, inoperative or damaged communications equipment and vehicles which will not pass even the most superficial inspection. Inspections which I have conducted on vehicles of this Regiment have revealed the following typical deficiencies:

(1) Fan belts out of adjustment.

(2) Dirty fuel and oil filters.

(3) Missing publications (In some cases the vehicle crews did not know they were required on the vehicle).

(4) Inoperative equipment, e.g., horn, lights.

(5) Canvas improperly mounted.

(6) Bolts and screws missing.

(7) Unsuitable and improperly maintained batteries.

(8) Low oil levels.

(9) Improperly maintained winches.

(10) Low coolant level.

(11) Missing mirrors.

(12) Loose and missing lug and sprocket bolts.
Everyone of the above items is a matter of driver maintenance; everyone of the above items is a simple matter to correct. Everyone of the above items indicates that supervision is lacking within that unit. Storage of equipment on vehicles has a definite relationship to the maintenance program. A proper stowage plan will not only create uniformity, but also allow stowed equipment to be maintained and inspected at regular intervals. I have previously directed that Squadron stowage plans be developed and utilized. I expect that directives be implemented without delay.

e. I am also concerned about the standards of military courtesy in the Regiment. The fact that soldiers on far too many occasions fail to salute me in my prominently marked vehicle is indicative of a widespread disregard of one of the fundamental elements of military courtesy. Nothing so vividly marks a proud alert unit so much as the spirit and vigor with which its soldiers salute. The saluting in a unit is a visible indicator of many things; including the effectiveness and quality of leadership in that unit.

f. I expect commanders at all levels to take an immediate and personal interest in the following:

   (1) Personal appearance and standards of military courtesy of members of their command.

   (2) Appearance of vehicular crews.

   (3) Proper police and sanitation within unit areas. I want all unit areas to be brought immediately to an acceptable level of police and continuous improvement made from that point on. I expect unit areas at Blackhorse Base Camp to be exemplary at all times.

   (4) Implementation of supervisory controls of maintenance procedures on vehicles, weapons, and communications equipment.

   (5) Development and use of vehicle stowage plans.

g. I expect routine procedures to be implemented within each unit which will allow commanders to be assured that these specific areas of interest are thoroughly inspected on a frequent and continuing basis.

10. VEHICLE RECOVERY OPERATIONS (Dated 2 Nov 68):

   a. Reference: FM 20-22

   b. It has been said many times that the terrain in Vietnam is not suitable for extensive Armor operations. We have demonstrated the fallacy of this theory by our constant record of success both against the enemy and against the terrain.
c. I am concerned, however, with the apparent lack of skill in the
techniques of vehicle recovery which I often see employed in the field.
For this reason, I desire that all personnel become concerned with the
problem and knowledgeable in the proper methods of vehicle recovery.
This is not to say that recovery operations will always be done by the
book or that proper recovery equipment will always be available. I am
completely aware that many of your recovery operations will have to be
done by expedient methods.

d. Regardless of the situation, there are certain basic principles
that must be adhered to in every operation just as there are a number of
actions that must be taken to prevent unnecessary recovery problems.

(1) Proper prior planning will insure that the necessary equip-
ment is on hand should it be needed. For example, a troop going on an
independent operation should make every effort to take a recovery ve-
hicle and a supply of tow cables not normally found in infantry type
units.

(2) In order to eliminate unnecessary recovery requirements,
vehicle commanders and drivers must be trained in terrain appreciation
and must make every effort to stay out of marginal areas. More foot
reconnaissance is required of suspect areas.

e. Once a vehicle is stuck there are several actions which must
always be taken:

(1) A thorough reconnaissance of the area in order to determine
the best procedure for recovering the vehicle is of primary importance.

(2) When planning for the recovery is completed and the amount
of effort required for the operation is determined, always increase the
amount of effort to be applied. If it is determined that two ACAV's can
recover a vehicle — use three; if an M88 can recover a tank with the
main winch — use a snatch block and increase the mechanical advantage.

f. Other recovery problems are encountered when tracked vehicles
must be towed for a distance in excess of one mile. When towing more
than one mile the drive chain must be broken in order to avoid unnec-
essary damage to the vehicle. For example, one troop recently towed a
disabled ACAV in from the field after disconnecting only one of the
final drives. The other final drive remained connected and when the
vehicle arrived at the maintenance area, it was discovered that the
entire wiring harness had been torn from the engine and wrapped around
the prop shaft.

g. The application of prior planning, preparation and a maximum amount
of good horse sense will solve the vast majority of your recovery prob-
lems and help to maintain the mobility which is our life and blood.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

10 Nov 68

N/A

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