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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
AGAM-P (M) (10 Mar 69) FOR OT UT 684034 14 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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   1st Battalion, 40th Artillery
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 40TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96269

AVLAC-C

31 October 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

See Distribution

1. (C) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities

   a. General.

   (1) The battalion remains assigned to 108th Artillery Group with the
mission: General Support of XXIV Corps, Reinforcing the fires of 12th
Marine Regiment and 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Artillery. At the
beginning of the reporting period the firing batteries were positioned at
TRUC SON (ID 215673), DONG HA COMBAT BASE (ID 215678), and LZ Jane (ID 380429).
During the reporting period batteries have occupied positions at LZ Sally
(ID 637972), LZ Sharon (ID 329492), TENV HOI TEN (ID 447510), and X TOT BONG
(ID 1332542). The firing batteries are presently located at TRUC SON (ID 215673),
X TOT BONG (ID 1332542), and TENV HOI TEN (ID 447510). During this period,
the battalion fired in support of the 1st Marine Regiment, 2d Regiment (ARVN),
1st Brigade 5th Mechanized Infantry Division, the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry of
the 9th Infantry Division, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion of the 3d Marine
Division, elements of the 1st Airborne Division (Airmobile), and elements
of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

   (2) During the month of August there was considerable increase in enemy
initiated contacts and attacks particularly in the central and eastern
portions of the DMZ area. Heavy vehicular traffic was noted on highway 9
from Khe Sanh into the Ba Long Valley during this period. Dong Ha Combat
Base and all major LZ's and FSB's in the Quang Tri Province received incoming
mortar and artillery fire frequently during the first part of August. The
US Marines, US Army, and ARVN forces continued to bring pressure on the enemy
by conducting several operations up to multi-regiment size. The discovery
of large caches of arms, ammunition, rice, and medical supplies during these
operations greatly reduced the enemy's effectiveness and morale. The battalion
furnished forward observers and fired in support of many of those operations.
Enemy and Allied operations were greatly decreased in early September
due to the effects of Typhoon Boss. Enemy activity remained on the decline
during the remainder of the reporting period.

FOR OT OUT
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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
(3) The battalion continues to emphasize improvement of defensive positions and living conditions both in the fire bases and the base camp area. Procedures for computing and checking Fire Direction Data to ensure timely fires are constantly reviewed and improved.

(4) Staff visits and frequent informal inspections by the Battalion Commander continue to insure a high state of unit readiness and adherence to overall doctrinal guidance provided by Department of the Army Field and Technical Manuals, with particular emphasis on gunnery techniques as outlined in FM 6-40.

(5) Due to the inaccuracy of maps and the lack of surveyed registration points, the battalion continues to use the high burst method of registration exclusively. This method is used in conjunction with both the AI/MPQ-44 Counter Mortar Radar and surveyed observation posts. Registrations are conducted concurrently with meteorological message flights. Metro messages are received three times each day and are used for computation of current MET plus VE GFT settings.

b. Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Plans. Current plans for the battalion are:

(a) To provide artillery support in defense of allied installations along the DMZ.

(b) To be prepared to move firing batteries to any location in the XXIV Corps area.

(c) To maintain one firing battery at TRUC SON to support allied operations in and below the eastern end of the DMZ.

(d) To conduct training as outlined by United States Army Vietnam (USARV) training directives, with sufficient section training to ensure that all units and individuals are capable of performing their missions.

(e) To maintain administrative-control over 235th, 236th, 239th, 240th, 245th, and 250th Field Artillery Detachments (Counter Mortar Radar) which provide counter mortar surveillance for the 12th Marine Regiment at DONG HA COMBAT BASE and the GIO LINE outpost (MX 213743); 3d Bn, 12th Marines at fire support base CATES (Hill 661, YD 92644), and Signal Hill, YD 949443; 1st Bn, 12th Marines at CAMP JJ CARROL (YD 065555); and 1st Bn, 13th Marines near QUANG TRI (YD 311545).

(f) To conduct limited scale civil affairs operations in the villages around the DONG HA COMBAT BASE with increased emphasis on coordination of civil affairs with the local (2d ARVN Regiment) host nation military commander.

(2) Operations.

(a) The battalion continues to provide reinforcing artillery support while participating in operations conducted in Scotland, Lancaster II, Kentucky II, Napoleon-Saline II, California, and Highrise. The battalion also provided support for a number of ARVN operations.
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(b) Battalions Headquarters, Headquarters Battery, and Service Battery have remained in base camps at DONG HA COMBAT BASE.

(c) Battery A began the reporting period at LZ Jane (YD 380429) with the mission of General Support, Reinforcing the fires of 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Artillery. On 31 August, the battery displaced to THON Hoi Yen (YD 447510) with no change in mission and has remained at this location for the remainder of the reporting period. During the middle of September the battery was isolated by Typhoon Boss. All roads and bridges to THON Hoi Yen were impassable for a two-week period. All resupply and personnel movement was conducted by air. This problem will occur again during periods of heavy rains due to the physical location of the fire base and the inability of the engineers to keep the roads open.

(d) Battery B began the reporting period at DONG HA COMBAT BASE (YD 218596) with the mission of General Support, Reinforcing the fires of 12th Marine Regiment. On 2 August the battery displaced to LZ Sally (YD 637272) to assume the mission of General Support, Reinforcing the fires of 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Artillery. On 21 August, Battery B displaced back to DONG HA COMBAT BASE to reassume a reinforcing role of 12th Marine Regiment. Three days later, on 24 August, the battery moved to LZ Sharon (YD 335492) with the mission of General Support, Reinforcing the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Artillery. During Typhoon Boss, Battery B was also cut-off from support by the battalion, for three days. On 20 September the battery moved to X TOT BONG (YD 132642) to assume the mission of General Support, Reinforcing 12th Marine Regiment with priority of fires to 5th Bn 4th Artillery of the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Infantry Division.

(e) Battery C spent the entire reporting period at TRUC SON. Its mission was General Support, Reinforcing the fires of 12th Marine Regiment and remained unchanged throughout the reporting period.

(f) The types of missions for all batteries have remained the same as previously reported and the battery at TRUC SON continued to receive the most lucrative targets and the best target surveillance. It has fired in close support of US Marine and ARVN operations, and on 13 and 14 September fired over 800 rounds in preparation for an ARVN operation.

(g) Battery A at THON Hoi Yen has had the fewest number of significant missions, firing mostly at suspected enemy locations with little or no surveillance. Battery B, since moving to X TOT BONG, fired more significant missions than reported previously.

(h) The deployment of the six attached counter mortar radar detachments, remains the same as previously reported with the exception of the 235th and 240th detachments who exchanged positions to provide relief for the 240th after they had suffered damage from a heavy mortar attack while at LZ CATES. Also, the 245th detachment is in the process of moving to SIGNAL MOUNTAIN (YD 943454).

(i) The battalion was credited with 220k enemy KIA (Confirmed) at the close of the period and had fired 580,367 rounds since 27 October 1966.
(3) Training.

(a) Training is conducted every day, using on-the-job training as the primary training vehicle.

(b) Familiarization firing of all types of individual and crew served weapons continues to be scheduled monthly and, with the exception of the firing batteries, is accomplished.

(c) All incoming personnel receive a proscribed 16 hour block of RVN and unit orientation training plus familiarization firing on small arms. Training on propulsion defense, emplacement of Claymore mines, proper handling of artillery ammunition, warning signals, and individual protection continues to be emphasized.

(4) Chemical. Scattered incidents of enemy use of riot control agents necessitates that operational protective gear be kept immediately available. The M17 protective mask is the only item of CBR equipment authorized in the battalion. Frequent inspection of masks and instruction of personnel insure readiness to operate successfully in a CBR environment.

(5) Forward Observers.

(a) The battalion maintains its two organic liaison teams at the 2d ARVN Regiment FSCC and the 12th Marine Regiment FDC. A permanent forward observer position is maintained at the outpost position A-1. Forward observer teams are rotated periodically at this position. A liaison team and three forward observer teams are operating with the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry of the 9th Infantry Division near THON MY THU (TD 490563). The battalion also has an FO team with Special Forces elements near MAI LOC (TD 089508).

(b) The remaining forward observer teams are employed as required with units supported by the battalion. FO's from the battalion normally accompany each battalion of the 2d ARVN Regiment during operations. During the first part of the reporting period, a liaison team and two FO teams accompanied elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) in the A Shau Valley operation.

c. Logistics.

(1) During the reporting period the battalion has consolidated all its maintenance activities and personnel under the Battalion Motor Officer. All log books and maintenance records are being maintained at Battalion Maintenance. The only exception to this policy is that log books for M108 Howitzers are maintained at the forward battery positions. Consolidation was necessary due to lack of qualified maintenance supervisors. At present there is only one battery motor sergeant in the battalion. Consolidation will be terminated when sufficient qualified personnel are assigned to the battalion.

(2) Contact teams from battalion maintenance continuously visit the firing batteries to render necessary maintenance support. Second and third echelon maintenance and quarterly and semi-annual maintenance services are performed by these teams on site, when possible.
(1) The battalion surgeon and his aidmen continue to conduct weekly Medical Civic Action Project (MEDCAP) visits to Dong Ha Hamlet. The visits are becoming more and more successful. Recently, in celebration of a Vietnamese children's holiday, the battalion furnished candy to the children in conjunction with the weekly MEDCAP.

(2) Rodent and pest control has been emphasized during this period, and much progress is being made.

(3) Battalion medical personnel have been working with other medical units and the G-5 in the area to establish a hospital for the native population of Dong Ha. An old abandoned French hospital of ten rooms is being rehabilitated into an in-patient facility with a capacity of about 20 to 25 beds. The hospital will be staffed by military physicians from Dong Ha COMBAT BASE on a daily basis. Medical supplies are presently being accumulated and the facility should be in full operation within the next month.

c. Personnel.

(1) The battalion suffered two wounded during the reporting period due to hostile action. One man received mortar fragments while working on the 210th radar at FSB CAES (Hill 692, TD 926443) and an FO received small arms and artillery fragments while participating in the A Shau Valley operation.

(2) The battalion suffered three wounded not due to hostile action. Two men received fragmentation injuries from a 155mm round fired by a supporting unit and one man was injured when a bunker collapsed from heavy fire.

f. Artillery.

The battalion is still equipped with the M106 Self-Propelled 105mm Howitzer. The M577A1 Command Post vehicle is available for the FDC of each firing battery and two are authorized for the Operations/FDC/Intelligence complex at Battalion headquarters; however, due to the semi-static positions in this area of operations, FDC's operate in bunkers and the M577A1 is seldom utilized. The battalion's FDC and each battery FDC are authorized one Gun Direction Computer M19 (GDC) and two generators for the equipment. The armor protection afforded by the M106 continues to be of great value in this area where enemy artillery, rocket and mortar attacks are frequent. The rapid traverse and high rate of fire of the howitzer continue to be invaluable in close-in emergency defense of surrounded friendly forces.

d. Scheme.

(1) All battalions underwent a Command Maintenance Management Inspection administered by XXIV Corps during the month of August. All battalions received an overall rating of satisfactory.

(2) The battalion underwent its semi-annual Military Intelligence inspection during the month of September. No deficiencies were found.
During the reporting period (92 days) the battalion trained on 92 days, conducted tactical operations on 92 days and displaced on 5 days.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel: None

   b. Operations:

      Accessibility of Support Maintenance Facilities.

      (a) OBSERVATION. Excessive organizational deadlines are due to inaccessibility of the direct support unit.

      (b) EVALUATION. Direct support for tracked vehicles and artillery pieces is performed by the 63rd Support Detachment at Dong Ha. This unit provides excellent support for tracked vehicles, and replacement of cannon tubes. The problem lies with the 63rd Support Company at Quang Tri, the battalion's only direct support for all repair parts and wheeled vehicles. The capability of units at Dong Ha to pick up parts and deliver wheeled vehicles, requiring support maintenance, to the 63rd Direct Support Company at Quang Tri is extremely limited due to road conditions during the monsoon season.

      (c) RECOMMENDATION. That an appropriate size direct support maintenance unit for parts and wheeled vehicles be located at Dong Ha.

   c. Training: None

   d. Intelligence: None

   e. Logistics:

      (1) Body Armor, Protection, with 3/4 collar FSN 8470-823-7371.

      (a) OBSERVATION. U.S. Army Body Armor FSN 8470-823-7371 appears to be less durable and to provide less protection than the USMC body armor FSN 8470-576-4193.

      (b) EVALUATION. Under normal wearing conditions in this battalion the U.S. Army body armor begins to deteriorate in approximately four months. The seams of the exterior covering tear and the inner protective webbing begins to roll and mat. The US Army body armor clings to the body preventing adequate air circulation around the upper body, thus greatly contributing to heat casualties. The USMC body armor, worn by many of the men in this battalion, does not have any of these faults. It is also believed that the fragment stopping power of the USMC body armor is greater. An EII concerning the durability faults of the US Army body armor was submitted by this organization on 30 April 1968.
(c) RECOMMENDATION. That armor, body fragmentation protective, FN 8470-523-7371 (US Army) be re-evaluated and compared with armor, fragmentation protective FN 8470-576-4293 (USMC) for durability and fragment protection and that the better armor be adopted for use by both services.


(a) OBSERVATION. Neither TDS 6-4650 dated 21 October 1966, nor FTDS's 6-4660, 6-4670, 6-4690, all dated 27 November 1967, provide a sufficient number of water trailers for the water requirements of this battalion.

(b) EVALUATION. The battalion is authorized five 400 gallon water trailers by TDS. As of this date there are five trailers on hand plus one float trailer that is on temporary loan from an ARMY unit. Tactical deployment requires batteries to operate independently at widely separated fire bases. Water must either reach the batteries over long and often insecure roads or by helicopter. At approved water points, vehicles wait in line for several hours, sometimes not returning to the battery area until the next day. When on an operation, a battery must often provide water for infantry and other security elements which at times number up to one hundred men, therefore doubling the requirement for water. The water is used for cooking, washing utensils, cleaning kitchen equipment, and drinking. Non-potable water is used for washing and showering. Five water trailers were requisitioned in April 1967, canceled approximately six months later, reacquisitioned and again canceled. Justification was submitted to I Field Force on 17 April 1967 and local approval for 60 day loan was received, however no water trailers have been issued.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That five additional water trailers, 400 gallon, FN 2330-542-2039 be authorized and issued to the battalion to meet current water requirements.

(3) Direct Exchange Parts.

(a) OBSERVATION. The nonavailability of direct exchange parts is a major cause of organizational deadlines or non-commissioned days charged against a piece of equipment.

(b) EVALUATION. Parts required to keep equipment operational, such as voltage regulators, spark plugs, starters, generators, starters, and fuel pumps, are not available in the direct exchange system in sufficient quantity to meet operational requirements of supported units. It has been necessary to maintain equipment by trading and acquiring DX parts through other than normal channels.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That fast moving direct exchange parts be maintained in sufficient quantity to insure their ready availability when

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(4) **Blank Forms.**

(a) **Observation.** Many blank forms for which there is a high usage factor are not readily available, on demand, to the using unit.

(b) **Evaluation.** Blank forms for all staff sections, personnel, and fire direction control have been on valid requisition from the USA Printing and Publications Center, Japan, APO 96503, since 26 June 1968 and 8 July 1968. A follow-up was conducted in Sept 1968 and it was determined that the requisitions are valid and remain due out. Many forms presently being used must be reproduced within the battalion. Other forms such as DA-1, DA-2715, DA-2715-1, DA-17, and DA-17-1 that cannot be locally reproduced are acquired from units having recently arrived in Vietnam that still have sufficient quantities on hand.

(c) **Recommendation.** That publication contors stock larger quantities of fast moving forms and establish a record of demands system to eliminate long due out periods.

(5) **Individual Clothing.**

(a) **Observation.** In the past two months the following items of individual clothing have not been available for issue at the direct support units: trousers, tropical poplin, size medium-regular and boots, tropical, sizes 9R, 9W, 10R, 10W, 11R, and 11W.

(b) **Evaluation.** Constant building and rebuilding of battery positions, working with lumber, ammunition boxes and sand bags, cause the trousers to wear out or become torn long before the coat. Normally the man of an artillery battery work with their coats off, which also causes trousers to wear out long before the coat. The shortage of boots in the above mentioned sizes is due to personnel arriving in the unit without boots or with only one pair of boots. There is no problem with the boots wearing out.

(c) **Recommendation.** That trousers in all sizes, especially medium regular, be stocked in greater quantity by the direct support units, and consideration be given to the possibility of reissue of the tropical combat boot, especially in sizes of great demand.

f. **Organisation.** None

g. **Medical.**

(1) **Unit Notification of Status of Evacuated Personnel.**

(a) **Observation.** There presently exists no reasonably prompt method of informing parent units as to the condition, prognosis, and estimated length of absence due to a medical evacuation for illness or injury.
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(b) EVALUATION. Information concerning the condition and estimated time loss to the unit are important from a command standpoint in evaluating maneuver needs and possible replacements. The existing system provides for no immediate feedback of information and delays of weeks to months before units are notified as to a patient's status are commonplace. Moreover, in the event of an outbreak of infectious disease, the delay of important preventive measures caused by poor communication is a very real threat to the health of the unit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That an effective method of communication feedback be established to a parent unit by the evacuation facility's Patient Affairs Office. One suggested solution is a simple postcard type form (Pre-addressed) accompanying the patient to an evacuation facility upon which could briefly be noted the information discussed above. The card could then be mailed (In-Country) and the unit would receive valuable data without needless delay.

(2) Pharmaceutical Supplies.

(a) OBSERVATION. On occasion the battalion aid station is in receipt of drug preparations which are not in their most economical form and is without the means of affecting the necessary alterations.

(b) EVALUATION. An example of the above is the distribution of a fluorinated synthetic topical steroid preparation (Triamcinolone Acetonide Cream, Topical, FSN 6505-071-6547) which is an expensive but valuable therapeutic adjunct to the dermatologic armamentarium. This cream is supplied in a concentration of 0.5% in water-washable base in 3 oz jars intended by the manufacturer to be used by pharmacists. The uniformly recommended strength for topical application however, is only 0.025%. There is no demonstrated dose-related increase in effectiveness due to the higher concentration in the literature, and aid stations are not equipped to effect the "cutting" of the strength of the 0.5% cream to 0.025%. Since this item represents a considerable expense, the present form of availability is wasteful both from the standpoint of drug utilization and monetary expenditure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That pharmaceutical preparations be furnished in the most economical and usable concentrations.

(3) Medical Reports

(a) OBSERVATION. The battalion surgeon is responsible for the submission of periodic health reports which are often complicated and in which none of the authorized aid-station personnel are trained.

(b) EVALUATION. The only personnel instructed in reports such as the weekly morbidity report and the monthly command health report are medical service personnel who are not authorized at the unit level.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That instruction in the completion of required forms and reports be given as a part of the formal course of instruction at Fort Sam Houston (Medical Training School).

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(4) **Post Identification.**

(a) **Observation.** There presently exists no readily available publication for the use of aid-station personnel in identifying potentially dangerous species of insects, spiders, and snakes.

(b) **Evaluation.** In tropical combat settings, insect, spider, and particularly snake bites present a problem of toxicity evaluation. Although medical corps officers receive sketchy training by means of a display at the H.F.S.S., there is a need for a handy, illustrated field reference manual or publication on the identification of dangerous creatures or animal species.

(c) **Recommendation.** That an army field manual (with illustrations) be published concerning common poisonous varieties of biting creatures which represent a definite health hazard to all military personnel.

3. **(U) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.**

Negative Report.

_Lawrence H. W. Williams_
LTC, ARTY
Commanding

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ATTN: G&OP-DT
APO San Francisco 96558

3-CG, USARV
ATTN: AVHD (DST)
APO San Francisco 96375

10-CG, 108th Artillery Group
APO San Francisco 96269
AVGL-C (31 Oct 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery for
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 108th Artillery Group, ATTN: AVGL-C, APO San Francisco
96269, 11 November 1968

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps Artillery, ATTN: AVIT-AT, APO
San Francisco 96908

Concur in the comments and recommendations made in Section 2, subject
to the following comment: Page 2 paragraph b (1)(e), 1st sentence,
should read, "To maintain operational and administrative control over..., 13th Marines near Quang Tri (YD11545)."

[Signature]
ROBERT V LEE JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
AVII-ATC (31 Oct 68) 2d Ind

DA, HQ XXIV CORPS ARTILLERY, APO 96308, 25 Nov 68
TO: Commanding General XXIV Corps, ATTN: AVII-GOT, APO 96308

1. Concur with comments and recommendations made in Section 2 of the basic report and comment made in first indorsement. Additional comments are listed in succeeding paragraphs.

2. Reference paragraph 2b (c), page 6, concerning accessibility of support maintenance facilities. Concur. Da Nang Support Command is taking action to improve direct support maintenance by supplementing the 63d Support Detachment with 50 men from the 237th Light Maintenance Company in Quang Tri.

3. Reference paragraph 2e (4), page 8, concerning nonavailability of blank forms. Concur. Most units have reported a lack of responsiveness on the part of the distribution center in Japan.

4. Reference paragraph 2g (1), page 8, concerning status of evacuated personnel. Concur. While all personnel evacuated are dropped from the unit, many of these personnel are eventually returned to the unit per USARV policy. In these cases great personal inconvenience is caused the individual when personal property is shipped out of the area. Also, units feel a great responsibility for wounded personnel. Status of wounded personnel, available on a timely basis, would improve morale and increase confidence in the medevac system.

5. The required organizational charts, omitted from the basic document, are included as enclosure one to this indorsement.

[Signature]
ALLAN G. FISHER
BG, USA
Commanding
TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam. APO 96375

1. (U) The ORLL of the 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comments on Section 2: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

   a. Concur with commander's recommendations noted in paragraphs 2b, 2e(1), 2e(4), and 2g(4). Concur with 2d Ind, paragraphs 2 and 3 without further comment.

   b. Item: Water Trailer, 400 gallon FSN 2330-542-2039, page 7, para 2e(2). Use of the ORLL as a means to request authority for additional water trailers is inappropriate. Authority for additional water trailers should be requested through NTOE submission. As an interim measure, the unit can request temporary loan of additional water trailers IAW USARV Reg 700-20.

   c. Item: Direct exchange parts, page 7, para 2e(3). Concur. The 26th General Support Group has been informed by this headquarters of the unit's comments.

   d. Item: Individual clothing, page 8, para 2e(5). Concur. The 26th General Support Group has been informed by this headquarters of the unit's comments.

   e. Item: Unit notification of status of evacuated personnel, page 8, para 2g(1) and 2d Indorsement, para 4. Nonconcur with suggested solution.

   (1) A card system similar to the recommendation was tried during the Korean War and found to be unsatisfactory. In most cases the cards were lost or improperly prepared.

   (2) All hospitals send daily admission and disposition sheets to those units having individuals admitted, transferred or discharged from the hospital. The 108th Artillery Group Surgeon was notified to inform subordinate units to contact the XXIV Corps Surgeon if admission and disposition sheets are not received.

   (3) Large units (division-size) maintain liaison NCO's at each supporting hospital to keep the unit informed of all admissions, transfers or discharges. However, this procedure is impractical for small units with few admissions. Telephonic communication with hospitals has been recommended to the 108th Artillery Group Surgeon for small units in following the status of evacuated personnel.

   f. Item: Pharmaceutical supplies, page 9, para 2g(2). Concur with recommendation. However, the item cited in the commander's evaluation does come in a smaller container as well as a less concentrated strength (FSN 6506-602-8194 15 gm tube, 0.1%). The 108th Artillery Group Surgeon was notified to inform...
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3 JAN 1969

SUiBJ1ZT: Operations; Report of 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)(U)

subordinate units of the availability of the additional items.

g. Items: Medical reports, page 9, para 2g(3). Instruction in preparation of medical reports is presently included in the formal instruction for medical corpsmen at the Medical Field Service School, Ft, Sam Houston. On 24-25 Oct 68, a two-day medical records and reports orientation course was conducted in Phu Bai by representatives from the USARV Surgeon's Office. One individual from HhB, 1st Battalion 40th Artillery attended. It has been recommended to the 108th Artillery Group Surgeon, that the 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery send a representative from their aid station to the XXIV Corps Surgeon's Office for additional instruction in medical records and reports.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

H.R. TAYLOR
CPT, AGC
ASST AG

CG, XXIV Corps Artty
CO, 108th Artty Gp
CO, 1st Bn, 40th Artty
AVHGC-DST (31 Oct 68) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 14 FEB 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion 40th Artillery.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning body armor, fragmentation, protective, with 3/4 collar FSN 8470-823-7371, page 6, paragraph 2b(1): nonconcur. The unit submitted an EIR on the Army's body armor which will result in a reevaluation of the vest. Through an interservice supply stockage agreement, USMC body armor could be requisitioned by the Army. Meanwhile, a new variable type body armor is undergoing evaluation by selected USARV units. The new vest was developed by Natick Laboratories and is designed to provide protection against fragmentation and small arms fire with the addition of ballistic plates in chest and back pockets.

   b. Reference item concerning blank forms, page 8, paragraph 2e(4): nonconcur. An excessive number of accounts and a lack of usage factors caused the Printing and Publications Center, Japan, difficulty in maintaining an adequate stock of some blank forms in the first quarter FY 69. Through account consolidation and establishment of usage factors, the stockage and supply problems were alleviated. USARV units were advised to maintain a 60 day stockage level.

   c. Reference item concerning individual clothing, page 8, paragraph 2e(5) and 3d Indorsement, page 1, paragraph 2d: nonconcur. Stockage of trousers and boots at the direct support level is based upon demand; there is no short- age of these items in the depots. Under USARV Regulation 735-1, a unit is authorized to maintain a five percent stockage of clothing for direct exchange purposes. Reissue of footwear is prohibited by AR 725-9, dated 25 June 1965. Personnel are issued two pair of jungle boots prior to departure from CONUS and any deviations of this procedure should be reported to HQ USARV, ATTN: AVHGD-SP (citing name of individual, serial number, flight number, date of departure, and CONUS POE).

   d. Reference item concerning pest identification, page 10, paragraph 2g(4): nonconcur. Identification of dangerous insects, spiders and snakes is not considered practical at dispensary or aid-station levels of medical service. A field manual on the subject would be too complex and voluminous to make it useful...
to dispensary personnel. Professional Entomologists or trained specialists are assigned to two units of the 44th Medical Brigade, the 20th and 172d Preventative Medicine Units. At these locations, ample keys and reference materials are on hand to identify pests. The unit has been advised to review USARV Regulation 40-12, Preventative Medicine Program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT AGC
OIC AG CLASSIFIED

Cy furn:
HQ XXIV Corps
HQ 1st Bn 40th Arty
GPOP-DT (31 Oct 68) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Bn, 40th Arty for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

G. E. HONEYFIELD
MAJ, AGG
Asst AG

18 FEB 1969
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug-31 Oct 68

CO, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery

Sponsor's Military Activity

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310