<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD500666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO: UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM: CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 06 MAR 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Army Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, DC 20310. Document partially illegible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ago d/a ltr 29 apr 1980; ago d/a ltr 29 apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (27 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684044 6 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1 Field
Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance
with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should
be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days
of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate
benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and
may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

as

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Development Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Adjutant General School
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Missile and Munitions School

Regraded unclassified when separated
from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Chaplain School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School
US Army CBR Weapons Orientation Course

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
CINC Strike Command
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
OSD(SA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Defense Documentation Center
Security Officer, Hudson Institute
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Joint Action Control Office
USAF Air Ground Operations School
Commanding Generals
US Army Forces Southern Command
US Army Weapons Command
US Army Materiel Command
I Field Forces Vietnam
Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96350

AVFA-CC-OT 15 November 1968


SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES
   a. (C) General:

   (1) During August, September and October 1968 United States and Free World Military Forces (PWMF) with 37 maneuver battalions (19 US and 18 ROK) supported by 21 artillery battalions and Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) with 28 maneuver battalions supported by six artillery battalions continued operations in the II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). Operations were conducted in the west along the Cambodian/Lao/Republic of Vietnam (RVN) border in Quang Duc, Daklac, Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, and along the east coast in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa and Minh Thuan Provinces and in the south in Tuyen Duc, Lam Dong and Binh Thuan Provinces. As the quarter started, military operations were offensive in nature and oriented toward the location and destruction of enemy forces, interdiction of enemy infiltration routes and surveillance of the western border. On the east coast, cordon and search operations to destroy enemy forces and support revolutionary development were emphasized. By early July, large enemy forces had been detected in the Nam Ly area of Cambodia and ARVN/US forces were deployed for an anticipated attack in the Ban Me Thuot area. When the enemy crossed the border in late August, the most significant battle in the II CTZ since the Tet Offensive was fought in the Duc Lap area. Increased reconnaissance operations geared to locating the enemy forces were partially successful; however, where possible, the enemy continued his evasive tactics and refused to become engaged except at Duc Lap. During the quarter, emphasis was placed on upgrading ARVN combat effectiveness, accelerating the pacification effort and revolutionary development programs and projects.

   (2) Friendly losses for the period were 993 KIA and 3056 WIA. Enemy losses were 4784 KIA, 167 captured and 2148 small arms and 161 crew served weapons captured. Additionally, II CTZ accounted for 594 Ho Chi Minh.

   b. Intelligence:

   (1) General: During the quarter, emphasis was placed on improving the cooperation and integration of agencies within the II Corps intelli-
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-0T 15 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

gence community. Particular attention was paid to development and improved utilization of the Province and District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (PIOCCs and DIOCCs). These agencies are considered critical to a successful counter-guerrilla effort in general and the anti-infrastructure campaign in particular. Increased interest in targeting against the VCI during the quarter has resulted in special intelligence planning and operational procedures.

(2) Significant Sources, Agencies and Techniques:

(a) There were no major changes in sources, agencies or techniques noted during the reporting period.

(b) G2 Air:

1 Through coordination with requesting units, steps have been taken to eliminate all preplanned infrared and photo reconnaissance missions. The additional aircraft available will permit quicker response by the Air Force on immediate requests.

2 In order to prevent excessive processing time, waste of paper and laggard dissemination of aerial photo products, measures have been implemented to print only those photos which allow stereovision to be obtained. This policy will insure that resources are expended only when usable products will result.

3 During the period, 934 photo targets, 1505 IR targets and 435 SLAR target areas were planned. Information from the completed missions was furnished to the commanders concerned.

(c) 55th MI Detachment (Corps):

1 For the period 30 July through 27 October 1966, the 55th MI Detachment, Imagery Interpretation (II) Section, received 789 missions and processed 500. In addition, 30 Dorsal Fin missions were received and processed and 31 Yankee Team missions were received of which 27 were processed. Thirty-six Special Photo Interpretation Reports were submitted which included 13 area studies, two trafficability studies, 17 area studies in Southeastern Laos, one river crossing study and three Artillery Damage Assessments. Thirty Supplementary Photo Interpretation Reports were also submitted covering the Dorsal Fin area.

2 In addition to reports submitted, the following was accomplished by the Imagery Interpretation Section:

a. Two area studies covering approximately 16,335 square kilometers were continued.

b. Twenty-five mosaics were constructed for requestors.

c. Twenty-nine of 44 town and airfield studies for 64th Engineer Det (T) were completed.

d. Interpreted all missions covering the NVA road network and border area and provided current information on these areas to the G2 Air and 64th Engr Det (T).

(d) Detachment D, 1st MI Bn (AJS):

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 2
During the reporting period, Detachment D flew 276 sorties in support of units of the II CTZ, transporting 7,915 pounds of cargo. The detachment also interpreted 937 targets and made 333,867 prints of which 216,102 were processed; prepared 933 II reports including 1,134 items.

Hand-held photographic missions continued to receive emphasis within the Detachment's overall operations. It flew 32 hand-held missions resulting in 2,688 developed prints.

Long Range Patrol (LRP) Company:
1. Training: Retesting of approximately 100 ARVN students who failed the LRP Qualification Test at Duc My Ranger Training Center last July has been scheduled for 4 November 1968. An additional 100 ARVN LRP's from the second training cycle will also be tested at this time. Training Cycle Three commenced on 14 October and is the last U.S. sponsored training cycle. ARVN LRP training will be continued indefinitely under ARVN control beginning 2 December 1968. Medium Range patrolling for RF units is scheduled to begin on the same date. RF units will be trained by U.S. teams for the first two cycles. RF cadre will conduct cycles three through 15 from January to May 1969. To date, 500 ARVN LRP's have been trained by U.S. training teams; of these 300 successfully completed training. The 200 personnel being tested at Duc My on 4 November are included in the 300 who have completed training. Future testing of ARVN LRP personnel is contingent on ARVN Joint General Staff (JGS) scheduling.

2. Operations: During the reporting period, Co E (LRP), 20th Inf inserted 1Lt LRP's which resulted in 120 enemy sightings and 33 enemy KIA (Killed in Action). The LRP losses were 13 WIA. Integration of ARVN and U.S. LRP's continues to have excellent results. To date 154 ARVN LRP's have been integrated into U.S. units.

Terrain: Analysis Overprint (TAO) stock was inventoried and stock in ready access storage was reduced to 10 sheets per map sheet. Requests for TAO's were minimal during the quarter. Excess map sheets have been placed in Conex storage.

A folio of 1:100,000 map sheets covering II CTZ has been annotated showing locations of construction materials (rock, sand, gravel) in the II CTZ. Map annotations are keyed to a booklet describing them. Reproduction has been initiated and several copies of the folio are being produced.

Requests for photo coverage of civilian and military built-up areas in the II CTZ have been made to H & I Branch, USAVE Engineer in order to complete tinting requirements for the L 607 series map overprint project.

The backlog experienced of posting master tactical data to the 1:50,000 map sheets has been eliminated. The cause of this backlog was personnel leaving the detachment on normal PCS. Reprinting of tactical data has begun and distribution should begin 2 Nov 68.

Results from field units of their evaluation of the orthophoto maps have been received and are being analyzed. This project was completed 31 Oct 68.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Force Internal
Period Ending 31 October 1966

(3) Deviation from current intelligence doctrine: No change from
previous quarter.

(a) Significant changes from previous reports: None.

(5) Enemy Order of Battle:

(a) Disposition of NVA, VC Main Forces and VC Local Forces is shown
at Inclosure 1.

(b) Changes in Order of Battle holdings during the period:

1. Units Accepted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K37 Sapper Bn</td>
<td>Probable</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240th NVA Bn</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303d LF Bn/DAKLAk</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>810th LF Bn/MR 6</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Units removed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33d NVA Regt (-)</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(To III Corps)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>325C Div HQ (To NVN)</td>
<td>Probable</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174th NVA Regt (To III Corps)</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>1490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d NVA Div PQ (To I Corps)</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d VC Regt (To I Corps)</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d NVA Regt (To I Corps)</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>1065</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Changes in subordination:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101D Regt from 325C Div to the K3 Front.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95C Regt from 325C to K1 Div.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-39 Bn from 32d Regt to the K3 Front.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Enemy losses during the period: (DOW is 35% of KIA based on MACV criteria).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>DNR</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>KOI CHNG</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>G/S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>2239</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>1357</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1094</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of headquarters, I FORCENV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 HCS CSFOE-65 (R1) (U)

(d) Total Enemy Strength in II CTZ as of 31 Oct 68:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>18,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC MF/LF Units</td>
<td>8,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
<td>12,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>16,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin</td>
<td>5,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>60,770</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities:

(a) Enemy Capabilities:

1. In Kontum Province the enemy has the capability to:
   a. Conduct standoff attacks or combination standoff/sapper attacks against US/Allied installations and Kontum City employing mortars of up to 120mm, 75mm RR and rockets up to 110mm as well as 100mm/105mm artillery with or without a coordinated ground follow-up attack.
   b. Conduct ground attacks against US/Allied bases vicinity of Dak Seang, Ben Het and Dak To in up to multi-battalion strength supported by RR, mortar, rocket, artillery fire and possibly armor.
   c. Employ battalion size NVA/VC forces to interdict and conduct harassing operations along QL-1AN, Highway 512 and other major friendly LOCs.
   d. Restrict friendly air activity with fire from 54, 12.7mm 14.5mm and 37mm anti-aircraft weapons.

2. In Pleiku Province the enemy has the capability to:
   a. Selectively attack Duc Co, Plei Xa Tro, Plei Nrong and Plei Ne CIDG Camps or Edap Enang, Thanh An and Le Trung in regimental strength supported by mortar, rocket, RR fire and possibly some armor.
   b. Attack Pleiku City and US/Allied bases utilising 82mm mortar, RR, 122mm rocket and sapper techniques.
   c. Employ battalion size NVA/VC forces against friendly convoys and installations along QL 19E and QL 19C, supported by 75mm RR and 60mm/82mm mortar fire; attack LOCs 509, TL 6C, 437, TL 7C and TL 7B with company sized VC elements using anti-tank grenades, RR and mortar fires.
   d. Conduct standoff attacks against CIDG camps, district headquarters, US/Allied installations and refugee resettlement areas.

3. In Darlac Province the enemy has the capability to:
   a. Attack district headquarters of Buon Ho and Lac Thin and isolated hamlets in up to battalion size force.
   b. Attack Xrang Phuc and Tieu star CIDG Camps in up to multi-battalion strength supported by mortar, RR and possibly 122mm rocket fire.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FRCUSOC for Quarter Period Ending 31 October 1968

2. Conduct ambushes and harassing activities along QL 21.

4. Attack Ban He Thout City with multi-battalion forces employing 75mm RR, 60mm/82mm/120mm mortars and 122mm rocket fire.

4. In Quang Duc Province attack Duc Lap in up to a multi-regimental size force and conduct standoff attacks at Gia Nghia, Bu Prang and Nhon Co.

5. In Phu Bon Province, the enemy is capable of harassing Cheo Ne and district headquarters.

6. In Binh Dinh Province the enemy has the capability to attack the population centers, US/CVN installations and units in multi-company strength, and can restrict movement on QL 1 and 19 by employing mines or conducting standoff attacks and raids against friendly convoys and installations on and along the highways. The enemy is capable of conducting sapper and terrorist activities against friendly installations along the seacoast.

7. In Phu Yen Province the enemy is capable of attacking population centers and allied installations in reinforced battalion strength. The enemy can conduct standoff attacks and terrorist and sapper activities against friendly controlled areas and restrict movement along LOCs.

8. In Khanh Hoa Province conduct sapper attacks and standoff attacks with 60mm mortar and 75mm RR against Allied installations in the Nha Trang and the Cam Ranh Bay areas, and conduct company size attacks against lightly populated areas.

9. In Binh Thuan and Tuyen Duc Provinces attack local villages and Allied outposts in up to two battalion strength when augmented by LF companies and continue interdiction of QL 1 in Binh Thuan Province.

10. In Lam Dong and Binh Thuan Provinces attack small Allied outposts and villages in up to battalion strength. Interdict QL 11 and QL 20.

11. The enemy is capable of employing chemical agents, by various delivery systems, during any attack.

12. Withdraw forces to base areas and sanctuaries for replacements, resupply and retraining.

13. Continue disruption of the CVN nation-building effort.

14. Enter outlying villages without opposition or as a result of minor combat action to conduct propaganda lectures, recruit personnel, impress civilians as laborers/porters and to obtain provisions and information.

15. Establish limited political entities, i.e., liberation councils and committees in contested and VC controlled areas.

16. Receive support from reserves and reinforcements which are located in sanctuaries in Cambodia, Laos and the I CTZ and III CTZ border areas. Some enemy units which are currently active in I CTZ and III CTZ could be expected to enter II CTZ if the enemy shifts his area of interest to II CTZ. Size of reserves or reinforcements in sanctuaries cannot be determined at this time.

17. Employ combinations of the above capabilities.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities:

1. Enemy LOCs are extended and insecure with the exception of those

CONFIDENTIAL
traversing neutral countries or international waters, which afford some degree of security.

2. The enemy's limited capability to conduct operations for extended periods makes him vulnerable in any large-scale offensive.

2. The numerous means available to the enemy for reconnaissance and observation of trail movement limits the enemy's mobility and activity.

4. Low morale, in many units, is caused by one or more factors, i.e., Allied firepower, sickness, lack of food and significant victories. Thus the enemy is highly susceptible to friendly psychological operations.

(7) Weather:

(a) Interior: Southwest monsoonal type weather dominated the interior during August and September 1968. Northeast monsoonal flow began to push into the II Corps area the week of 22-28 Sep as the transition season from the southeast to the northeasterly monsoon began to affect the area. Generally, throughout the period from August through 21 September, skies in the interior were mostly cloudy with extensive low cloudiness and poor visibilities in intermittent rain, drizzle and fog during the night and morning hours. Ceilings and visibilities were frequently below 500 feet and one mile during the morning hours lifting to above 1000 feet around noon time and lowering again after dark. During occasional strong surges of the southwest monsoon the low ceilings and poor visibilities would persist throughout the day for two to five day periods. Scattered rainshowers and thunderstorms were common during the afternoon and evening hours with the heaviest activity usually occurring between 1700 and 2100 hours. Mountains and hills were frequently obscured in heavier showers during the late afternoon and early evening hours. Weather around the Ban Me Thuot area was usually slightly better than the remainder of the interior but during the strong monsoonal surges, conditions would deteriorate considerably. By 22 Sep the transition to the northeast monsoon began and conditions in the interior began to improve. Skies were predominately fair to partly cloudy with patchy low clouds and heavy fog during the morning hours between 0500 and 1000 hours. Isolated to few rainshowers and thunderstorms developed during the afternoon hours and lasted until midnight occasionally lowering ceilings and visibilities to less than 500 feet and one mile. Cloudiness began to increase again on 13 Oct with occasional light rain during the morning hours as moderate to strong northeasterly flow began to spillover the Annamite Mountains into the interior. By late on the 18th of October clouds and rain increased considerably as Tropical Storm Hester began to churn toward the Vietnam coast. Heaviest rain and cloudiness occurred south of Ban Me Thuot in the southern highlands. Skies throughout the interior then returned to fair or partly cloudy by 22 Oct, as a cool, dry high pressure air mass moved over the area behind Hester.

(b) Coastal: Weather along the coast was variable throughout most of the period as occasional strong surges of the southwest monsoon moved through the area. Generally, the weather during the night and morning hours was fair to occasionally partly cloudy. Clouds usually began to form over the coastal mountains during the late morning hours and thicken and increase during the early afternoon. Isolated rainshowers generally formed over mountain areas by 1600 hours with isolated thunderstorms developing by 1600 hours. Showers would become scattered to numerous and would occasionally drift off the mountains over the immediate coast.showers and thunderstorms would begin to dissipate by 1900 hours with the maximum activity ending by 2000 hours. Isolated thunderstorms occasionally persisted through the night and into the early morning hours over the mountain areas. Skies during the afternoon and early evening were generally partly cloudy over the immediate coast and mostly cloudy over the mountains. Heavy showers over the coastal areas were accompanied...
mountains would frequently obscure the mountains. During strong surges of the southwest monsoon, usually associated with tropical storms located in the South China Sea north of Da Nang, the coast would be mostly cloudy to cloudy with intermittent light rain and showers for two to four day periods. Patchy low clouds and fog would form in the river valleys during the early morning hours as these strong surges pushed across the area.

Total cloudiness along the coast increased significantly the week of 22 Sep as the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) began to move southward and wave back and forth across the II CTZ. Heavy clouds and rain occurred during the night and morning hours with the maximum amounts north of Ia Drang; however, strong northeast surges would intermittently push along the entire II CTZ coast using extensive cloudiness and rain as far south as Phan Thiet. Intense low cloudiness and heavy rains and strong winds began to affect the coast late the evening of 18 Oct. Hester tracked west-southwestward the 18th and the 19th making her landfall near Phan Thiet early in the morning of 20 Oct. Winds increased in intensity as Hester approached the coast with sustained winds of 15 to 20 knots with gusts to 40 to 45 knots and occasional gusts of 55 to 60 knots. Winds weakened considerably the 20th as the storm pushed across III Corps but intermittent heavy rains continued until the morning of 22 Oct. Skies then became fair to partly cloudy on 23 and 24 Oct as a cool, dry high pressure airmass moved over the area behind Hester. By 24 Oct, however, clouds were again on the increase as northeasterly flow began to dominate the coastal weather pattern with an increase in precipitation activity from Phan Rang northward.

Topical northeast monsoonal weather then continued the remainder of the period.

(c) Effects on Operations: There were approximately 670 TAC sorties cancelled due to weather. Exact total is unknown due to the fact that all information is not in yet through 31 Oct 68. One hundred thirty-eight sorties were cancelled during the week 13-19 Oct due to Tropical Storm Hester.

(d) Detachment 31, 5th Weather Squadron has the mission of supporting I FFORCEV and USARV tactical units in II Corps, XXIV Corps plus the American Division and the 1st Air Cav Div. Support is being provided in the following manner:

1. I FFORCEV:
   a. Staff Weather Officer (SWO).
   b. Forecast Support Center for II CTZ.
   c. Climatological Support.
   d. Mobile Observation Teams.
2. 4th Infantry Division.
   a. SWO and Forecaster support at base camp.
   b. Observations at Brigade Tactical CPs.
   c. Observations at base camp.
   d. Climatological support.
3. Da lat (Cam Ly Airfield).
   a. Observations.
   b. Forecasts on as required basis.
4. An Khe:

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FFOHCKV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

a. Observations.

b. Forecasts on as required basis.

c. LZ English:

a. Observations.

b. Forecasts on as required basis.

d. Phan Thiet:

a. Observations.

b. Forecasts on as required basis.

e. Americal Division:

a. SWO and forecaster support at Chu Lai.

b. Observations at Brigade Tactical CPs.

c. Climatological support.

d. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile):

a. SWO and forecaster support at base camp.

b. SWO and forecaster support at Division Forward when operational.

c. Observations at Brigade CPs and Division Forward CP when operational.

d. Climatological support.

f. XXIV Corps:

a. SWO Support.

b. Forecast support center for I CTZ.

c. Climatological support.

g. Task Force South:

a. Observations.

b. Forecasts on as requested basis.

c. (C) Operations and Training Activities:

(1) (C) Plans: During the quarter, no major plans were developed; however, two fragmentary orders were published. Three letters of instruction (LOI) were developed and published, for the 4th Inf Div and TF South. The quarterly summary of progress toward achievement of the Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) goals was completed. The quarterly review to analyze the summary of progress scheduled for 29 Oct 68 was postponed until 12 Nov 68. The monthly measurement of progress briefings and weekly special operations briefings were continued. Plans were developed and guidance furnished to OPCON units to increase the capabilities of LZ units. These plans included an ambush phase in areas where a high probability of enemy movement or activity, was indicated. The CIDG camps also integrated the Hunter-Killer (Ambush) phase in their operations to enable them to intercept more successfully the enemy's
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FFGRCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

movements. Two Senior Commanders' Conferences were held during the period.

(a) FRAG Orders: During the reporting period the following FRAG Orders were published:

1. FRAG Order 25-68 dtd 26 Aug 68 directed a three Co LRP/MSF TF to deploy to AO Orange (BQ 300100), 50 km E of Ban Me Thuot, in cooperation with the 23d ARVN Inf Div and conduct reconnaissance in force (RIF) operations to locate and destroy enemy forces attempting to interdict QL 21. Subsequently, the LRP/MSF TF shifted its operations to AO GRLEN (BQ 300300), north of QL 21. Artillery support for this operation was provided by the 23d ARVN Inf Div.

2. FRAG Order 26-68, dtd 19 Sep 68 directed a MSF RIF operation to locate and destroy enemy forces and to develop targets for attack by TAC Air, artillery, and conventional forces 30 km SW of Pleiku City, Pleiku Province (ZA 000300). The operation commenced on 21 Sep 68 for a 20 day period and was supported by the 52d Arty Gp. The 4th Inf Div was tasked with the reaction force mission for this operation.

(b) Letters of Instruction: During the period the following letters of instructions were published:

1. LOI #1-68 was published on 8 Aug 68 directing the 4th Inf Div to prepare plans to coordinate reinforcement of the highland area. Further discussion of this LOI is precluded by the classification of this report.

2. LOI #3-68 was published on 29 Sep 68 providing the 4th Inf Div with instructions for the conduct of combined operations with the 23d ARVN Inf Div and the 24th STZ. The LOI also provides instructions to assist in the upgrading of RF and PF and extensive coordination with advisory elements at all levels. This letter formally instituted the Pair Off Concept, discussed in the previous ORLL, for the 4th Inf Div with the 23d ARVN Inf Div and 24th STZ.

3. LOI #4-68 was published on 26 Aug 68 directing TF South to formulate specific plans in coordination with the 23d ARVN Inf Div light CP for destruction of enemy units. Further discussion of this LOI is precluded by the classification of this report.

(c) Combined Campaign Plan:

1. The 1969 MACV Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) AB 144 was received during the reporting period. The I I CQT CCP in support of MACV's CCP is currently being developed and will be published to reach MACV NLT 1 Dec 68.

2. The quarterly summary of progress toward achievement of 1966 MACV Combined Campaign Plan goals was submitted to MACV on 16 Oct 68.

3. Currently, new concepts for the reporting of progress toward CCP goals are being developed. The new criteria will attempt to provide a more objective evaluation of improvement and also identify critical problem areas. The present reporting criteria do not provide for the surfacing of problem areas which effect goal achievement thereby denying commanders some flexibility in placing command emphasis where it is needed most.
AVFA-GC-OT

CONFIDENTIAL

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEN for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS C3FOR-65 (R1) (U)

(2) (C) SUMMARY OF GROUND OPERATIONS: During the quarter, friendly operations throughout II CTZ consisted of intensified reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force (RIF), security missions and reaction operations. Many of these were combined operations of ARVN, ACR and US forces. Throughout the quarter VC/NVA forces largely avoided decisive contact. Notable exceptions were his attempts in August to overrun the Dak Seang CIDG camp and Duc Lap Subsector and CIDG camp, which appeared to signal the beginning of the third NVA offensive. The months of September and October witnessed a marked increase in ground attacks, stand-off mortar, recoilless rifle and rocket attacks, sabotage, terrorism, ambushes and enemy initiated contacts. The following summary covers the quarter's significant activities in the four major geographic areas in II CTZ. (Incl 2 Map II CTZ)

(a) Western Highlands Operations August: In the highland provinces of Pleiku, Kontum, Daklak and Quang Duc the most significant action that occurred during August was the enemy's attempt to overrun the Duc Lap CIDG camp and headquarters, Duc Lap Subsector. Allied forces, to include elements of the 23d Inf ARVN Div, Regional and Popular Forces and Camp and Mobile Strike Forces participated with support (artillery and gunships) from the 4th Inf Div and US TAC Air and B-52s.

1. Battle of Due Lap: On 23 Aug at 0105 hours, the Duc Lap Subsector headquarters (U 855770) and the 411th Scout Co compound (U 913751) one km northwest of the subsector headquarters were attacked by a reinforced NVA battalion, employing 840 rockets, 60mm, 82mm and 120mm mortars and satchel charges. Heavy contact continued through the night. Early in the morning of the 24th, another reinforced NVA battalion attacked the CIDG camp (G91751). The 379th RF company and the 21st and 28th PF platoons were defending subsector headquarters. The CIDG camp was defended by three CSF companies. On 24 Aug, 2d Bn (-) 45th ARVN Regt combat assaulted into the area and reinforced subsector. On 23 and 24 Aug, three CSF companies were inserted by CA near the CIDG camp. The 213th T3F Co (-), part of a three company T3F TF attacking to relieve the camp, fought its way into the CIDG camp. The other two companies withdrew under heavy fire, 221st Co suffering 50% casualties. On 25 Aug, 211th T3F Co replaced the 221st T3F Co. The 3d and 5th T3F Co's were also sent in south of the CIDG camp. Heavy fighting continued. On 25 Aug, A Btry 4th Bn 44d US Artillery was helicopter into a fire support base six km south of subsector (U 964712). The battery with TAC Air provided close and continuous support and was credited with breaking up numerous enemy attacks. Bon Sar Pa Outpost located (U 306727) six km SW of subsector was also repeatedly hit during the battle, initially by mortars followed by ground attacks. Two platoons from the 31st RF Co successfully defended the outpost. On the 27th, the 35th A Co and the 1st Bn 65th ARVN Regt were committed to reinforce subsector and relieve the pressure around the Scout Co compound. Heavy contact continued until 29 Aug. The Duc Lap battle, which began on 23 Aug, was officially coded on 12 or more actions in the area after this date as an individual basis. The total cumulative casualties for the period 23 Aug to 10 Sep were: Friendly - 140; KIA - 35; WIA - 542. Enemy - 840 KIA, 10 KIA's, 173 WIA and 63 SJ captured. The battle at Duc Lap was primarily an ARVN operation and the most significant one fought by ARVN forces in the II CTZ, possibly in all SVN. Combat operation after-action reports were submitted in September through .ACV and historical channels covering the highly successful ARVN operation.
US Operations: US units participated in the Battle of Due Lap by providing combat support including artillery, TAC Air, gunship and B-52 support as well as helicopter troops and supply lift. Other significant actions follow. On 14 Aug, 25 km SW of Dak To in Kontum Province, A Co 3d Bn 12th Inf was attacked by an unknown size enemy force employing small arms, 60mm and 82mm mortars and 75mm recoilless rifles. Results were: Friendly - 14 KIA; eight WIA; Enemy losses are unknown. On 21 Aug, 40 km NE of Ban Me Thuot, elements of A and D Trp 7th Sqdn 17th Air Cav and A Trp 1st Sqdn 10th Cav engaged an unidentified NVA force of unknown size. Results were: Friendly - 3 KIA; Enemy - 22 KIA and four 3A captured. Troop deployments, both ARVN and US to reinforce Due Lap Subsector, Quang Duc Province, prompted the movement of the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf to Ban Me Thuot on 24 Aug to reinforce the 2d Bde 4th Inf Div. On 27 Aug, 12 km south of Ban Me Thuot, D Co 1st Bn 22d Inf and C Btry 4th Bn 42d Artillery repelled an attack on their perimeter by an enemy force of unknown size supported by mortars. Results were: Friendly - four KIA, 16 WIA, one howitzer rendered temporarily inoperable; Enemy losses were five KIA. On 28 Aug, 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf and an aerial reconnaissance platoon, 7th Sqdn 17th Air Cav made contact with an unknown size NVA force. Results were: Friendly - one KIA, nine WIA; Enemy - 10 NVA KIA and one large weapons cache captured. On 29 Aug the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf and an aerial reconnaissance platoon, 7th Sqdn 17th Air Cav made contact with an unknown size NVA force. Results were: Friendly - one KIA, nine WIA; Enemy - 10 NVA KIA and one large weapons cache captured. On 31 Aug the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf discovered another cache. The total weapons and equipment captured for the two-day period was 30 motors and 17 warheads for 122mm rockets, 14 B-40 rockets, 39 rounds 75mm RR, 24 rounds 82mm mortar, one 60mm mortar, one 82mm mortar tube, four 3A (two cal 30, two 560) and 13 3A.

ARVN Operations: ARVN units participated in the Battle of Due Lap as indicated above. Other significant actions follow: On 10 Aug, 25 km south of Ban Me Thuot, an element of the 1st Bn 45th ARVN Regt engaged a VC force of unknown size. Results were: Friendly - no casualties; Enemy - 10 KIA, two 3A captured. On 11 and 12 Aug the 1st Bn 45th ARVN Regt engaged six VC in three separate contacts killing three and capturing two female VC. Two 3A were also captured. On 16 Aug, eight km east of Plei Krong on TL 14, the 3d ARVN Cav reacted to an attack on a US convoy by two NVA companies. Results were: Friendly - two KIA (US); Enemy - 41 KIA, one 2A and 14 3A captured. In a sweep of the area on 23 Aug, the 3d ARVN Cav found 24 additional enemy bodies, believed to have been killed in the 16 Aug contact. On 18 Aug the 403d and 406th Scout Companies and elements of the 1st Bn 40th ARVN Regt made contact with an enemy force 20 km north of Pleiku City. Results were: Friendly - five KIA, four 3A; Enemy - 87 KIA, two 2A and five 3A captured. On 25 Aug, 20 km north of Pleiku City, the 2d Bn 40th ARVN Regt supported by artillery and gunships, engaged an NVA force of unknown size. Results were: Friendly - five KIA, four 3A; Enemy - 15 KIA. On 21 Aug, 11 km east of Plei Krong, elements of the 3d Bn 40th ARVN Regt, while conducting ground follow-up operations after LAC light strikes, made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Results were: Friendly - three KIA, 20 WIA; Enemy - 15 KIA. In this same general area during the period 16 Aug to 1 Sep elements of the 3d ARVN Cav, 42d ARVN Regt and 1st Bn 35th Inf killed a total of 225 NVA, captured four NVA and 35 weapons. At daybreak on 19 Aug, three patrols were sent to reconnoiter suspected enemy withdrawal routes. All patrols brought back numerous items of equipment. They also located enemy aid stations at TB 883341 and 906407 which contained many indications that enemy had suffered numerous 41A during the attack.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 17 Forcible for quarter ending 31 October 1963. RG: CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

4. CIDG Operations: CIDG units participated in the Battle of Due Lap as indicated above. Other significant actions follow. The most significant action in Kontum Province was the 17 Aug attack on the Dak Seang CIDG camp by an estimated NVA battalion supported by mortars and 122mm rockets. The attack, which breached the perimeter, was repulsed with the following results: Friendly - two KIA (CIDG), three WIA (one US, two CIDG); Enemy - 39 KIA, nine POW's, 50 3A and 13 crew served weapons captured. On 18 Aug, 66 km NW of Ban Me Thuot, a Tieu Atar CSF company engaged an unidentified NVA battalion. Results were 12 NVA KIA, with no friendly losses.

5. RF/FF Operations: RF/FF units participated in the Battle of Due Lap as indicated above. Other significant actions follow. The RF and FF forces in the western highlands continued other operations during the month with several contacts. On 8 Aug, 17 km SE of Ban Me Thuot (AF 968814) at 1200 hours the 670th RF Co made contact with an estimated NVA platoon. Result was 12 KIA (10 RF/FF and two CIDG). On 19 Aug, 17 km east of Due Co (ZA 003277) at 1000 hours a RF patrol made contact with 20 NVA. Results were 4 KIA (10 RF/FF and 10 NVA). On 28 Aug, 10 km ENE of Plei An, vicinity ZA 200704, the 230th RF Co received 3A fire from an unknown number of enemy. Fire was returned, resulting in one enemy KIA. There were no friendly casualties. Ten km NW of Due Lap (AV 817715) at 1600 hours on 28 Aug, the 281st RF Co made contact with an unknown enemy force. Artillery and TAC Air supported the contact which resulted in four NVA KIA and three NVA WIA. Enemy losses are unknown, however, numerous blood trails were found in the area. The continued coordinated efforts of the allied surveillance screen, patrolling and extensive reconnaissance in force operations throughout the month produced a few enemy contacts. Due Lap remained the focal point of enemy activity during the first two weeks of the month. Significant actions are as follows:

1. US Operations: On 4 Sep at 0032 hours, four km west of Dak Seang, B and D Co 3d Bn 32d Inf supported by artillery, repelled an attack on their perimeter by an unknown size enemy force. Results were: Friendly - eight KIA, 31 WIA; Enemy - six 3A captured. On 7 Sep, six km SW of Due Lap 37 Camp (UY 8871), A Co 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf received a heavy mortar and sapper attack. Casualties were: Friendly - nine KIA, 30 WIA; Enemy - 11 KIA. On 14 Sep, nine km NW of Due Lap (UY 849815), B Co 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf made heavy contact with an unknown size enemy force in entrenched positions. Results were: Friendly - three KIA, nine WIA; Enemy - 14 KIA. On 18 Sep at 1950 hours, 11 km SW of Due Lap, two Short Range Patrols (SRP) from C Co 2d Bn 35th Inf observed 550 NVA moving north toward Bon Jar Fa. While avoiding contact, the SRPs directed 748 rounds of artillery on the enemy (720 rounds HE, 23 rounds Improved Special Munitions). The SRPs reported hearing numerous screams during the artillery fire. In a ground follow up on the morning of 22 Sep, C Co 3d Bn 35th Inf found six NVA KIA, captured one PW, one CSW and found numerous blood trails. The PW stated that six companies from the 307th NVA Regt were hit by artillery on the night of 21 Sep. He did not know how many casualties were taken because he had been seriously wounded by the artillery. It is believed that the artillery fire, which included the Improved Special

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st FFORCEV for quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1963 RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

Munitions, preempted an enemy attack on Bon Jar Pa. On 25 Sep, 10 km SW of Duc Lap, C Co 2d Bn 35th Inf was attacked by an estimated company size enemy force. Results were: Friendly - three KIA, 10 WIA; Enemy - 23 KIA, one PW, 10 SA and two CSW captured. On 27 Sep, A Co 2d Bn 35th Inf again made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Company A was reinforced by D Co 2d Bn 35th Inf and one platoon from 1st Bn 22d Inf. Results were: Friendly - 10 KIA, 17 WIA; Enemy - 37 KIA.

2. ARVN Operations: On 3 Sep, six km NE of Duc Lap (TU 866794) the 1st Bn 44th ARVN Regt made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The results were: Friendly - one KIA, 13 WIA; Enemy - 50 KIA, 13 SA and one LMG captured. On 8 Sep the 1st Bn 45th ARVN Regt was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. Results were: Friendly - two KIA, two WIA; Enemy - NVA KIA, two B-40 RL, two LID's and three AK-47's captured. On 9 Sep approximately six km NE of Duc Lap at 1230 hours, a helicopter, carrying the 23d ARVN Inf Div Commander, his wife and the Senior Advisor to the 23d ARVN Inf Div crashed killing all but two crew members. On 16 Sep, fire km S of Duc Lap, elements of 1st Bn 44th ARVN Regt made contact with an unknown size force. Results were: Friendly - 12 KIA, 24 WIA, 10 MIA and one LMG captured. On 16 Sep 25 km NW of Pleiku City (ZA 201710), elements of the 3d ARVN Cav while conducting road clearing operations, engaged an enemy force of unknown size. Results were: Friendly - two KIA, 25 KIA, 11 SA and three CSW captured.

3. CIDG Operations: Both NSF and CSF elements were engaged in small unit contacts with favorable results throughout the month. On 2 Sep, one km SW of Duc Lap, the 211th NSF Co, while on patrol found a mass grave containing 45 NVA bodies KIA. On 7 Sep, four km NW of Plei Hrung (ZA 092709), a CSF company engaged an NVA force estimated at two companies, on 8 Sep revealed 20 NVA KIA. There were no friendly casualties. On 17 Sep, 43 km SSW of Pleiku City (ZA 021101), a CSF company from Plei He, supported by US artillery and gunships, engaged an estimated NVA battalion. While conducting a sweep of the area they found a weapons cache. Results were: Friendly - three CSF WIA; Enemy - one KIA, one SA captured; 20 SA, three LMG's, nine B-40 RL's and nine B-40 rockets found in the cache. On 19 Sep, in the same vicinity (ZA 021007), CSF elements found another cache containing 47 SA, 10 B-40 rockets, 99 60mm mortar rounds, 42 82mm mortar rounds, 5000 rounds of 7.62 ammo and miscellaneous equipment.

4. RF/PF Operations: On 3 Sep, ten km SSW of Ban Me Thuot (AP 823132), the 904th and 243d RF Companies, while conducting road clearing operations, made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Troop A 1st Sqdn 10th Cav reinforced. Results were: Enemy - 24 KIA, 16 SA, two B-40 RL, 15 B-40 rockets and two radios captured. On 24 Sep the village of Buon D'Ham, 22 km east of Plei Le, was attacked by an estimated enemy company. Sixty-eight dwellings were destroyed and 200 civilians abducted, 128 of which have since returned to the village. On 24 Sep, 35 km SSW of Ban Me Thuot (AP 915685), an estimated enemy battalion attacked the hamlet of Buon D'Ham. Results were: Friendly - 19 KIA (six PF, eight Civ), six KIA (4 PF, two Civ) and 17 weapons lost; Enemy - one KIA, two SA captured.

(a) Western Highlands Operations October: Ground combat in the western highlands continued at a low level during the month. In the latter part of the month, the activity increased slightly as the enemy launched several standoff mortar and rocket attacks against Firebase's and installations in northern Kontum Province and interlieted Highway 19 between Pleiku and Kontum Cities with mines. Some US units were withdrawn from Ban Me Thuot and Duc Lap and deployed nearby to facilitate Operation Sanctuary in the area. The 1st Bn 69th Armor (-) was deployed from 10th Co to 1st Bn 69th Armor and placed OPCON to 3d Div 4th Inf Div. Intensified allied

CONFIDENTIAL
efforts were directed towards elimination of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), interdiction of enemy Lines of Communication (LOC's) and destruction of his base areas. No significant enemy contacts were made by the CIDG forces during the period.

1. US Operations: On 11 Oct at 1130 hours, eight km SW of Duc Lap (25337104), a Short Range Patrol (SRP) from Co A 2d Bn 35th Inf found graves containing 23 enemy bodies killed by artillery. On 13 Oct at 1040 hours, 20 km NW of Tieu Atar (25317692), a FAC observed a bunker complex and enemy in the open. Tactical air was employed and the FAC confirmed nine KIA and estimated an additional 32 KIA. On 21 Oct at 0915 hours, 31 km SSW of Ban Me Thuot (24214755) a dustoff crew discovered the wreckage of an Air Force C47 aircraft which had crashed due to engine failure while enroute to Hong Kong from Saigon. Twenty-four US were killed in the crash (20 AF, two Army and two civilians). On 27 Oct at 1150 hours, 30 km SW of Pijke City (26292237), C Trp 7th Sqdn 17th Cav, investigating a sighting of an enemy bunker complex, engaged an NVA force of unknown size. Air strikes and artillery supported the contact. Co A 2d Bn 8th Inf conducted a sweep toward the contact area but did not make contact. The engagement resulted in 37 NVA KIA, three 3A, seven CSS, one field switchboard, 1000 blasting caps, three miles of comm wire, 69 packs and assorted munitions captured or destroyed. Friendly casualties were two KIA, five WIA and one LOH destroyed.

2. ARVN Operations: On 3 Oct, 13 km NW of Pijke City (22292666), the 1st Bn 42d ARVN Regt found 80 enemy killed by an ARC Light strike approximately one month ago. Three tons of rice were found in the same area. On 23 Oct at 1225 hours, 23 km SE of Kontum City (17770666) KDF Co 262 and elements of 2d Bn 1st ARVN Regt received six rounds of 82mm mortar as they were being inserted into an LZ resulting in 31 WIA (13 MSF, 18 ARVN).

3. RG/PF Operations: On 4 Oct at 2340 hours, three km SE of Dak To (23094652), an attack by an estimated VC company on the village of Dak Long was repelled by a FF platoon and an 3D team. US and ARVN arty supported the contact. Results were: Friendly - two KIA (RD), eight WIA (three RD and five Civ); Enemy - six KIA and three JA captured.

(d) Binh Dinh Province Operations August: With the apparent departure of the bulk of the VC/NVA main force units from the coastal region and the An Khe Plateau area, there was only scattered action throughout the month of August in Binh Dinh Province. The most pronounced was the enemy's harassment of Highway 19. Other enemy activity centered on acts of terrorism along the coastal plain.

1. US Operations: Contacts during August consisted mainly of small unit meeting engagements with local VC forces. No significant contacts were made.

2. ARVN Operations: On 8 Aug seven km west of Dong Jon, elements of the 2d Bn 49th ARVN Regt and elements of the 3d ARVN Cav killed 25 members of a VC sapper company and captured one. On 22 Aug, elements of the 1st and 2d Bn 49th ARVN Regt, 1st Bn 61st ARVN Regt, 9th Trp 3d ARVN Cav; Regional, Popular, CIDG, and National Police Field Force units; 1st and 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf and the 1st BN (-) 69th Armor commenced Phase I of Operation DAN JIEN 22-6 in the coastal area north of the Lai Giang River to the 1 CIT boundary and east of Highway (JL) 1. Phase I was a search and clear operation which terminated on 28 Aug. Phase II, a cordon and population screening operation, began on 28 Aug. This operation was specifically directed at destroying the VC infrastructure in the area and regaining control of the population. A total of 11,102
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FORCSV, for Quarter Period Ending 31 October 1963. RG 930 GFOR-65 (R) (U)

were screened. This operation continued into September. Cumulative results for both Phase I and II are shown in the September summary. On 25 Aug, the 4th BN 40th ARVN Regt, in a combined operation with elements of the 173d Abn Bde, killed 21 VC and captured seven prisoners in six separate engagements.

2. ROK Operations: The CRID continued operations in the coastal region of the vicinity of Qui Nhon. Operation BI HO 16 continued with the 1st Regt operating north of Qui Nhon throughout the month.

3. CIDG Operations: Continued normal operations within assigned AO's with no significant contacts.

4. RF and PF Operations: RF and PF units made repeated contact with the enemy throughout the province during the month of August. Their contacts were numerous and averaged two or three VC killed on each occasion.

(e) Binh Dinh Province Operations September: Binh Dinh Province was the most active province in the II CTZ throughout the month with the highest incidence of ground and mortar attacks.

1. US Operations: Co C 1st BN (Abn) 503d Inf, part of Task Force 1-503, made contact with an unknown-size enemy force 10 km west of Phu Ky in the Soi Ca Valley on 27 Sep. Results were: Friendly - three KIA and 13 WIA; enemy - 15 KIA. The operation in the Soi Ca Valley continued into October.

2. ARVN Operations: The most significant ARVN operation during the month was in the Soi Ca Valley. During this operation on 23 Sep, 3d BN 41st ARVN Regt made contact with an estimated enemy battalion 16 km west of Phu Ky. The 2d BN 41st ARVN Regt reinforced. Contact broke the following day with 28 enemy KIA and one captured. ARVN forces suffered 12 KIA and 47 WIA. Contact continued through the end of the month. The cumulative results as of 6 Oct were: Friendly 51 KIA (40 ARVN, 11 US), 121 WIA (72 ARVN, 49 US, six CIDG), eight KIA (ARVN; or my 195 KIA, three F/F's, 30 SA and five CSW captured. Phase II of Operation DAN SIKH 19-6 also continued through the end of September. The cumulative results for Phase I and II as of 6 Oct were: Friendly 18 KIA (13 ARVN, five US), 113 WIA (50 ARVN, 63 US); Enemy 222 KIA, 242 F/F's, 47 SA and four CSW captured.

3. ROK Operations: The CRID continued operations in the coastal region of the province. Operation BI HO 17 continued north of Qui Nhon with the 1st BN (-) 1st Regt in PHONE 5 AO.

4. CIDG Operations: GSF continued normal operations within assigned AO's. Camp Strike Force companies from Vinh Thanh, Ha Tay and Dong Tre participated in the Soi Ca Valley operation with TF 1-503. Ten km NE of Vinh Thanh (ER 6358) at 1300 hours on 20 Sep, a Ha Tay GSF Company attacked 16 VC/WVA in a building, killing 15 and capturing five 3d. Five less significant contacts by the GSF elements during the month resulted in 16 enemy KIA.

5. RF and PF Operations: The RF/PF continued operations within the province with numerous minor contacts. There were no major engagements involving these forces.

(f) Binh Dinh Province Operations October: Activity in Binh Dinh Province was characterized by the slow methodical destruction of the enemy's lines of communication, supplies and infrastructure. The absence of heavy contact during the month, particularly in the NE portion of the province, indicates the enemy was on the ret-und from the heavy
subject: Operational Report of Headquarters, I PFCFRE for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

losses incurred during the Soul Ca Valley battles in September. The VC units continue their harassing efforts on unprotected hamlets through terrorism. There has been considerable decrease in enemy initiated incidents directed against Routes 1 and 19.

1. US Operations: The 2nd Bn 503rd Inf conducted an amphibious/Combat Assault into the Tiger Mountain (BR 9393) on 9 Oct. The operation was a combined operation with Camp Strike Forces lasting until 13 Oct. Results were negligible. The Battleship New Jersey was on station off Phu Cat (BR 9149) during the middle of the month. A damage assessment of the ship's shelling of targets rendered negligible results. Company A 1st Bn 50th Inf was active in the Camp Radcliff - An Khe area in disrupting enemy lines of communication and infiltration routes throughout the AO. At 0200 hours on 29 Oct, the perimeter of Camp Radcliff was penetrated by an enemy sapper unit. During the 30 minute engagement inside the compound, their satchel charges ignited 46,000 barrels of asphalt and destroyed two vehicles and damaged five buildings. Three soldiers were killed (one US, two ARVN) and 15 wounded, (nine US, six ARVN) as a result of the attack.

2. ARVN Operations: The 40th and 41st Regiment ARVN were actively engaged throughout the month in cordon and search operations of villages and hamlets aimed at destroying the enemy infrastructure. For the most part these operations were conducted in conjunction with NPPF elements and were highly successful in reducing the enemy's offensive capability.

3. ROK Operations: Ten companies from the Cav Regt, Capitol ROK Division (CIRD), on operation BUN KAE 68-30, conducted cordon and search operations in villages and hamlets SW of Phu Cat (BR9149) during the period 2-11 Oct. Results were: friendly one WIA; enemy 21 KIA, 23 SA and seven CSS captured. Operation BI HO (Flying Tiger) 17 ended on 19 Oct north of Qui Nhon for the 1st Regiment (CIRD). Results were: Enemy 78 KIA, four PW's, 57 SA and seven CSS captured; friendly four KIA and 19 WIA.

4. CIDG Operations: CSF units continued operations oriented toward gaining control over population centers within their Camp TAOR. The 271st NSF Company was active in RIP operations west of the An Lao Valley (BS7507) throughout the month. as was the 223d NSF Company northwest of Ha Tuy (BS8083).

5. RF/FP Operations: RF/FP units continued operations throughout the province with numerous contacts. Although the majority of these contacts were enemy initiated and limited, the results indicate a marked improvement in the fighting proficiency of these units within Binh Dinh Province. Also apparent was an increase in their alertness and resourcefulness in combating terrorist attacks against the local populace.

(a) Central Province Operations August: In the central provinces of Phu Bon, Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa there were numerous small unit contacts resulting from ambush, reconnaissance in force (RIF) and patrol activities. Several successful operations were conducted by the ROK forces in this region and a combined ARVN/ROK/US operation in the Ky Lo Valley (vic BQ 8377). Significant actions are as follows:

1. US Operations: 4th Bn (Abn) 503rd Inf continued operations in AO DAN HOA-BONG with the 47th ARVN Regt. This unit operated mostly in an area 10 km west of Ty Hoa conducting RIP and Bushmaster (ambush) operations resulting in several light contacts. An enemy stand-off attack of 44 rounds of 82mm mortar against the airbase at Phu Hiep on
5 Aug resulted in six US WIA and six aircraft damaged. On 24 Aug the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf moved to Ban Me Thuot to participate in the operation at Cuc Lap.

2. ARVN Operations: On 9 Aug 4th Bn 47th ARVN Regt nine km NW of Tay Hoa repelled an attack by an unknown size enemy force. Results were: friendly four KIA, 16 WIA, four MIA and four weapons lost; enemy 20 KIA. The 47th ARVN Regt conducted patrol and ambush activities with numerous small contacts in the vicinity of Tay Hoa. On 24 Aug the 2d Bn 47th ARVN Regt was moved to Ban Me Thuot to reinforce the 23d ARVN Inf Div.

3. ROK Operations: On 10 Aug 24 km west of Cam Ranh Bay, elements of the 30th Regt, in four contacts, killed 16 VC and captured three weapons without friendly loss. This action was part of Operation SHUNG MA 13, conducted 9-18 Aug. Final results were: enemy 36 KIA, one PW and five weapons captured. Friendly results were on ROK WIA. Other ROK contacts were brief engagements resulting from ambush and patrol operations. On 6 Aug there were seven such contacts by elements of the 26th, 28th and 29th ROK Regts, resulting in 29 enemy KIA and eight weapons captured with only one ROK WIA.

4. CIDG Operations: Patrol action from Dong Tre and Cung Son CIDG Camps resulted in several small contacts, none of which was significant. A sweep operation by elements from the Nha Trang Installation Defense Command (IDC) produced only a few small unit contacts.

5. RF and Pf Operations: RF and PF units made sporadic but significant contacts while conducting ambush and RIF operations throughout the three provinces.

(h) Central Provinces Operations September: In the Central Provinces activity was generally characterised by small unit contacts from ambush and reconnaissance in force activities. Significant actions are as follows:

1. US Operations: There were no significant US contacts during the month of September. US personnel were involved in three standoff attacks of Nha Trang Air Base occurring at 0035 hours on 3 Sep, 2330 hours on 21 Sep and 1107 hours on 22 Sep. During these attacks 11 US Airmen were wounded. Two helicopters and one C-47 were damaged.

2. ARVN Operations: Approximately 9 km SW of Tay Hoa (CQ 094424) on 20 Sep, 1st Co 3d Bn 47th ARVN Regt was attacked by an estimated two enemy companies. Results were: enemy nine KIA and six SA captured; friendly one KIA and 27 WIA. During September the 47th ARVN Regt conducted patrol and ambush activities with several small contacts in the vicinity of Tay Hoa.

3. ROK Operations: Two significant operations were conducted by ROK forces during the month of September. From 19 to 29 Sep, six companies from the 28th Regt conducted Operation DOK SURI JUN MA 3,30 km SW of Tay Hoa. Results were: enemy 25 KIA and 12 SA captured; friendly no casualties. DOK SURI BAK JEE 1-3 (21-27 Sep) was conducted 30 km NW of Minh Hoa by five companies of the 29th Regt. Results were: enemy 20 KIA and 10 SA captured; friendly three KIA and four WIA.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-GT

1. CIDG Operations: Patrol action from Dong Tre and Cung Son CIDG Camps resulted in several small contacts, none of which were significant.

2. RF and PF Operations: RF/PF units made light contact while conducting ambush and reconnaissance operations throughout the three provinces; none were significant.

(i) Central Provinces Operations: October: In Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa Provinces there were numerous small unit contacts resulting from combat sweep operations and ambushes. The enemy was able to inflict a considerable number of casualties by booby-traps, mining incidents, sniper fire, limited surprise ground attacks and three standoff mortar/rocket attacks. The only significant operation was conducted by elements of the 9th ROK Division in the Dong Bo Mountains. There were no significant contacts made by US, ARVN, CIDG and RF/PF forces in the central provinces.

1. ROK Operations: At 0600 hours on 11 Oct Operation BAEK MA 9 commenced in the Dong Bo Mountains nine km SW of Nha Trang (vic BP 9547) and continued throughout the month. The operation was executed by 24 infantry companies of the 9th ROK Division plus reinforcing elements from the ROK Special Forces. The US forces supporting this operation consisted of helicopters, naval gunfire, artillery and TAC Air. External to the area of operation, VN Special Forces established screening positions. The operation was conducted as a well-executed cordon and search attack to rout the enemy inhabiting the vast complex of tunnels and caves in this mountainous area. During the first 13 days of the operation, there were several small contacts as the cordon closed to an area of approximately 500 by 1200 meters. On 24 Oct the first heavy contacts occurred resulting in 58 enemy KIA while friendly forces sustained six KIA and nine WIA. Contacts the following days were the most significant of the operation and resulting in enemy losses of 204 KIA, one W and 59 weapons captured. During the numerous contacts on 25 Oct the enemy failed to inflict any casualties on the ROK forces. During the next six days the ROK forces completed closing the cordon and continued to search the tunnels and caves engaging light enemy resistance. Results as of 31 Oct were: friendly 15 KIA, 30 WIA; enemy 368 KIA, seven W, 90 SA and 31 CSW captured.

(ii) Southern Provinces Operations August: Enemy activity in the southern provinces of Ninh Thuan, Ninh Thuan, Lam Dong and Tuyen Duc for the month of August was characterised by his willingness to become more decisively engaged. This was a vivid departure from his activities of recent months. There were no significant contacts made by the ROK forces during August. Significant activities are as follows:

1. US Operations: On 21 August at 0225 hours, LZ Betty (AN 865069) received 25 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Gunships and 81mm mortars supported. There were no casualties; however, a JP-4 bladder holding 10,000 gallons was hit and destroyed.

2. ARVN Operations: The 1st Bn 53rd ARVN Inf completed training on 31 Jul and was activated on 1 Aug. The new battalion's mission was to support the revolutionary development program in Ninh Thuan Province. The unit is assigned to the 23rd ARVN Inf Div. On 21 Aug at 0245 hours, Dl Linh (AN 8181) received a mortar and rocket attack followed by

CONFIDENTIAL
a VC/NVA battalion size ground attack. The 124th RF Co, 407th Scout Co, 3d Plat A Co 3d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf plus two RF platoons defended. Di Linh was reinforced by the 906th RF Co and the 3d Bn (Abn) 503d Inf. By 0720 hours the enemy withdrew. Results were: enemy 56 KIA, two RF's, 11 SA and three CSW captured. Friendly casualties were 10 KIA (three US, six ARVN, one NP), 32 WIA, (14 US, 15 ARVN, three NP), five 3A lost, eight civilians killed and 20 wounded.

2. RF and PF Operations: On 21 Aug three km NW of Phan Thiet (AN 826125), the 3d RF Co was attacked by an estimated VC/NVA battalion. The 3d and 4th Bn 44th ARVN Regt, 4th Trp 8th ARVN Cav, five RF companies and D Co 3d Bn 506th Inf reinforced the contact. Results were: friendly four KIA (RF), 24 WIA, (14 RF, eight ARVN, two US). Enemy losses were 22 VC/NVA KIA and five SA captured. On 25 Aug sev. km north of Phan Thiet, the 288th RF Co engaged two VC/NVA companies. The 288th RF Co became heavily engaged and was reinforced by the 3d and 4th Bn 44th ARVN Regt and B Co 3d Bn 506th Inf, supported by artillery and naval gunfire. Results were: friendly 17 KIA (16 ARVN, one US), 71 WIA (59 ARVN, 12 US); enemy 25 KIA, one RF and 18 SA captured.

(k) Southern Provinces Operations September: There were very few significant contacts in the four southern provinces during September and no significant US or CIDG contacts were made.

1. ARVN Operations: On 18 Sep eight km SE of Song Mao, Hoa Da District Headquarters was attacked by an estimated VC battalion. Artillery, gunships, Spooky and naval gunfire supported the contact. Elements of 2d bn 44th ARVN Regt, 4th Trp ARVN Cav and 4th Bn 44th ARVN Regt participated. Friendly losses were 39 RF and PF KIA, 42 WIA, one CSW and 23 SA lost. Enemy losses were seven KIA and three SA captured.

2. RF and PF Operations: On 9 Sep 20 km east of Song Mao (BN 490430), the 299th RF Company was attacked by an estimated two VC platoons. The contact resulted in 15 RF KIA, five RF WIA, 14 SA and one radio lost; enemy losses were one VC KIA and one SA captured.

3. ROK Operations: On 11 Sep during Operation RUN MA 8 conducted 19 km NE of Phan Rang, the 1st Bn 30th ROK Regt, while on a search and clear operation, killed 15 VC and captured three SA, without friendly loss.

(1) Southern Provinces Operations October: There were no significant contacts in the southern provinces during October. Ground activity continued at a low level throughout the month. Standoff attacks composed the majority of the activity and were directed against RF and PF units. The enemy attacks, both standoff and ground, were conducted by forces seldom larger than one company and usually by only one or two platoons. The contacts resulted in a decrease in the number of friendly casualties while enemy losses continued to rise. Enemy harassing techniques such as mining roads and trails and the use of booby traps, accounted for the few friendly casualties. There were three enemy mortar attacks on radio relay site in Binh Thuan Province resulting in negligible damage and no casualties. A railroad bridge outside of Phan Rang in Ninh Thuan Province was damaged by explosives rendering the bridge temporarily impassable. Pressure
by allied units has forced the enemy to evacuate his well established base areas as several of the enemy's hospital and bunker complexes plus cultivated areas were destroyed during the period. US forces continued intensified attacks against the VCI and supported pacification programs conducted by RD teams, ARVN and RF/PP units. Two ARVN battalions received pacification training in Binh Thuan Province during the period.

(a) Results for the II CTZ for the period 1 August 68 to 31 October 1968.

1. Friendly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
<th>RF/PP</th>
<th>CIIC</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>3056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. See page four for enemy casualty figures.

(b) Results for US operations for the period 1 August to 31 October 68.

FRIENDLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DAN SING</th>
<th>DAN THANG</th>
<th>DAN HOA</th>
<th>BINH TAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WALKER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENEMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DAN SING</th>
<th>DAN THANG</th>
<th>DAN HOA</th>
<th>BINH TAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSW</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Cumulative results for US operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DAN SING</th>
<th>DAN THANG</th>
<th>DAN HOA</th>
<th>BINH TAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WALKER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

ENEMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WALKER</th>
<th>DAN SINC</th>
<th>DAN THANG</th>
<th>DAN HOA</th>
<th>BINH TAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA 197</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>5516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F 10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET 188</td>
<td>1777</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>2394</td>
<td>1157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL 32</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>1268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSW 19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Organizational and Training Activities:

(a) All units that were assigned or under operational control of
this headquarters as of 31 October 1968 are listed at Incl 3.

(b) The command relationship of major US, ARVN and PWNAF units
within II CTZ is at Incl 4.

(c) The following units were assigned, attached or became OPCON
to I FFORCEV or major subordinate units during the period.

1. Air Cav Troop D, joined the 2d Armd Sqdn, 1st Cav by USARV GO
   3912, 11 Aug 68.

2. E Co, 20th Inf (1RP) released from attachment to 4th Inf Div
   by USARV GO 4794, 12 Oct 68 and attached to 173d Abn Bde (Sep) by USARV
   GO 4792, 12 Oct 68.

3. 253d FA Det, 254th FA Det, 255th FA Det and the 256th FA
   attached to I FFORCEV Art by I FFORCEV GO 724, 19 Sep 68.

4. 313th RR BN OPCON to I FFORCEV by Army Security Agency GO 47,
   8 Jun 68.

(d) Following units were reassigned from I FFORCEV during the
period: None.

(e) Manpower Authorization:

1. Ptry B (Searchlight), 29th Arty was reorganized under MTOE
   6-553E PAC 2/68 by USARPAC GO 318, 25 June 1968.

2. HHB, I FFORCEV Arty was reorganized under MTOE 6-501G PC2
   by USARPAC GO 478, 5 Sep 68.

3. HHB, 32d Arty Op was reorganized under MTOE 6-401G PSL by
   USARPAC GO 384, 7 Aug 68.

4. 209th Sig Det was reorganized under MTOE 11-5000 P16 by USARPAC
   GO 394, 9 Aug 68.

5. The 6th Inf Det (GSR) was reorganized under MTOE 7-16G PC2
   by USARPAC GO 340, 8 Jul 68.

CONFIDENTIAL
6. The 64th Eng Det was reorganized under 5-500C PAC 8/18 by USARPAC GO 267, 17 Jun 63.

7. The 5th PI Det was reorganized under 6045-500E P01 by USARPAC GO 389, 9 Aug 63.

8. The 11th PI Det was reorganized under 45-500E PAC 2/68 by USARPAC GO 297, 17 Jun 68.

9. The 297th Trans Co (CAR) was reorganized under ITOE 55-193 P09 by USARPAC GO 328, 2 Jul 63.

(f) Research and Development (R&D) Activities:

1. Requests for information on R&D items from USARV and ACTIV were monitored by this headquarters. There were no requests for USARV (Expediting Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment) items received from assigned, attached or OPCO units. No USARV requests were submitted to USARV from II, IFFORCV.

2. Testing of a series of sensors to detect enemy movement was completed 9 Sep 68. These are seismic and acoustic types of sensors emplaced by hand or by air and information from them is monitored at a location apart from the sensors. No significant results were obtained during the testing phase probably due to lack of enemy activity and limited numbers used. The sensors were accepted for operational use and the program changed to the staff supervision of the ADofJ, G2.

(g) Training:

1. Assigned and attached units, less artillery groups and battalions, are inspected semi-annually. Six units were inspected during the last quarter and all were rated satisfactory.

2. The "Tactical Notes" publication initiated in May 1968 has continued. The overall objective of IFFORCV Tactical Notes is to provide a recurring publication in which new ideas and lessons learned regarding operational and intelligence matters are exchanged. These tactical notes are attached as inclusions to this CM.

   a. Tactical Notes for August, incl 5.

   b. Tactical Notes for September, incl 6.

   c. Tactical Notes for October, incl 7.

3. During the quarter, the 13th Military History Detachment prepared a monograph of 2LT Nguyen Van Thong, a VC who had been a platoon leader in the Reconnaissance Company, 50th Regiment, 1st Air Division. A copy of the monograph is at incl 3.

4. An ARVN/ARVN/US Officer Exchange Program was initiated within II CTZ in October 1968 and conducted for a two-week period. Subsequent two-week cycles will begin on the first Monday of each month thereafter. The objective of the Officer Exchange Program is to increase the combat effectiveness of units within II CTZ by the exchange of ideas and experiences in a realistic field environment. Additionally, the program will promote mutual understanding at unit level and increase mutual understanding.

CONFIDENTIAL
cooperation and coordination between allied forces within II CTZ. The concept of this program is to exchange experienced artillery and infantry captains and lieutenants in ARVN, NVA and US battalions. The exchange officer maintains a record of tactical tips and lessons learned from the host unit to share with others when he returns to his unit.

(4) Chemical

(a) Herbicide operations during this reporting period included both crop and defoliation missions. Unfavorable weather conditions throughout the II CTZ resulted in the cancellation of 381 sorties of 570 sorties scheduled.

1. The results of US Air Force, UC-123 herbicide missions are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>NO. OF SORTIES FLOWN</th>
<th>HECTARES DEPOLLATED</th>
<th>MT CROPS DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3,733</td>
<td>2,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daklak</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,604</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh Hoa</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam Dong</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninh Thuan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Duc</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4,462</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuyen Du</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>189</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,358</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,432</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Units in II CTZ used UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters and truck based power spray apparatuses to spray small areas not conducive to spray by UC-123 aircraft. The results of helicopter spray operations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>HECTARES DEPOLLATED</th>
<th>MT CROPS DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st, I FFORCSV</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.KFY-FC</td>
<td>1,199</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1a, II Corps</td>
<td>260.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL


UNIT  HECTARES DEPOLIATED  M/T CROPS DESTROYED

173d Abn Bde (Sep)  864.8  3
3 Bn 506th Abn Inf  8  0
Total  3,459.3  493.3

(b) Riot Control Agents (RCA) were employed in both offensive and defensive operations. On 6 Oct 68 the 4th Inf Div dropped eight E158 CS Canister Clusters from a UH-1 on VC/NVA in bunkers vicinity AQ815319. The drop was preceded and followed by air strikes and resulted in five VC/NVA KIA. During the period 29 Aug - 4 Sep 68, E158 CS Canister Clusters were carried on all MPD missions conducted by the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) from LZ English. When very high readings were recorded, the E158s were dropped on the suspected area. Gunships and artillery then expended on the targets. On 6 Aug 68 the 3d Bn 506th Abn Inf used 3,600 lbs of CS-1 to contaminate a suspected VC/NVA base camp vicinity BN 055305 to BN 055325.

(c) Personnel detectors (APD and MPD) operating within the II CTZ provided a continual source of reliable information concerning enemy locations. In most instances, gunships, TAC Air and H&I fires were employed against the locations of the heavy readings. All readings were submitted to the appropriate G2/S2 for evaluation.

1. The summary of personnel detector operations in II CTZ is as follows:

UNIT  MPD MISSIONS  APD MISSIONS

ROKFV-PC  0  0
4th Inf Div  2  79
173d Abn Bde (Sep)  41  57
3d Bn 506th Abn Inf  0  47
3d Bn 503d Abn Inf  47  0
2d ARVN Div Advisory Team  41  0
IDC Nha Trang

Total  141  183

2. Nine officers from ROK units were trained in the maintenance and operation of MPDs. They will finish their training by OJT with US MPD operators on helicopter missions. The 23d ARVN Div continued to be supported by US advisory personnel. US Advisory personnel from three provinces are being trained and will support units in the 22d ARVN Div TAOR.

3. On 22 Sep 68 an MPD mission from the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) recorded high readings vicinity BR 8458-8471-8971-8957. Eighty-eight VC/NVA were later killed by the 41st ARVN Regiment in that area. On 23 Sep 68 another MPD mission by the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) recorded heavy readings vicinity BR 5036-5616-5045-545. An agent was inserted and counted at least 90 VC/NVA. On 24 Sep, 58, the MPD mission aircraft from 173d Abn Bde (Sep) received one round of SA fire vicinity BR 830561 while flying with D Trp 2d Sqd 1st Air Cav. The pilot was killed.

CONFIDENTIAL
The enemy continued to use riot control agents on a small scale during offensive operations. There have been five reported actions during which the enemy has initiated use of riot-control type chemicals. At Bu Prang CIDG Camp, Quang Duc Province, during an attack on 24 Aug 68, the enemy forces used satchel charges containing CS. At Bon Sar Pa RF outpost on 12 and 14 Sep 68 the enemy used chemical rounds during mortar attacks. On 12 Sep approximately 10 rounds of CS were mixed in with approximately 70 HR 82mm mortar rounds. On 14 Sep, the enemy employed an unidentified type of chemical round during a mortar attack. On 22 Sep 68, vic BS 859179, Co D 1st Bn 503d Abn Inf, while in contact, received CS agent, disseminated by grenades. The enemy broke contact under cover of the CS. This is the first recorded instance in II CTZ of enemy use of CS to break contact. Two US vehicles from Co B 1st Bn 503d Abn Inf received tear gas from an unknown source on 17 Oct 68, north of LZ English.

(d) The number of sorties flown daily varied from 0 to 111 with a mean of 52 per day for this period.

(b) Approximately 15.3% of the missions flown for I FFORCEV and ROK Forces were combat skycrop, while 21.6% of sorties flown were immediate missions.

(c) There were 4749 tactical sorties flown in support of operations as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>DAY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Tay/MacArthur</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>67 KBA (Conf), 63 KBA (Est), 33 secondary explosions, 130 secondary fires, 284 bunkers destroyed, 9 bunkers damaged, 193 bunkers uncovered, 15 bridges destroyed, 15 bridges damaged, 1 foot bridge destroyed, 17 road cuts, 47 structures destroyed, 3 structures damaged, 2 mortar positions uncovered, 10 trucks destroyed, 1 MW position destroyed, 4 AW positions damaged, 5 AAA positions destroyed, 1 RR position destroyed, 1 50 cal machine gun destroyed, 2 rocket launchers destroyed, 1 base camp destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Thang/McAin</td>
<td>1072</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6 KBA (Conf), 57 KBA (Est), 12 secondary explosions, 34 secondary fires, 270 bunkers destroyed, 12 bunkers damaged, 1 bridge destroyed, 47 structures destroyed, 38 structures damaged, 1 AW position destroyed, 47 fighting positions destroyed, 8 fighting positions covered, 2 trail cuts, 3 defensive positions destroyed, 1 tunnel destroyed, 3 caves closed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>DAY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th ROK</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 KBA (Conf), 5 KBA (Est), 11 secondary explosions, 14 secondary fires, 8 bunkers destroyed, 1 bridge damaged, 16 structures destroyed, 2 structures damaged, 25 caves destroyed, 4 sampans destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP ROK</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 KBA (Conf), 2 KBA (Est), 10 secondary explosions, 76 secondary fires, 13 bunkers destroyed, 6 bunkers damaged, 55 structures destroyed, 74 structures damaged, 5 caves destroyed, 3 caves damaged, 2 caves uncovered, 5 caves closed, 11 trail cuts, 1 truck destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAN S/NH/COCHISE</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>42 KBA (Conf), 3 KBA (Est), 5 secondary explosions, 16 secondary fires, 24 bunkers destroyed, 2 bunkers damaged, 1 bunker uncovered, 21 structures destroyed, 3 structures damaged, 2 caves uncovered, 1 boat destroyed, 3 tunnels closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAN HQA/WOLLING AND WALKER</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 secondary explosion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RACER</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>NBDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONGOOSE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>NBDA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) B-52 Support: There were 630 B-52 sorties flown this quarter in support of ground operations as indicated at inclosure 9. Last quarter, there were 1346 sorties.

(6) Army Aviation Operations.

(a) The major objectives in employing the tactical aviation assets available to I FFORCEV are:

1. Provide air mobility to combat elements of Free World Military Assistance Forces in II Corps Tactical Zone.
2. Provide aviation support to the PSAs and COHED personnel in II CTZ for command, control and resupply.
3. Support the aerial reconnaissance and surveillance program.

(b) Resources available from the 17th Combat Aviation Group are:

1. Assault Helicopter Assets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10th Combat Aviation Battalion</td>
<td>GS Southern Coastal, GS Southern Highlands and Task Force South, Reconco, Special Forces, IVN and 9th ROK Inf Div.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92nd AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192nd AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281st AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
**SUBJECT:** Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52d Combat Aviation Battalion</td>
<td>GS Northern Highlands, Prairie Fire and Omega, 4th Inf Div and ARVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268th Combat Aviation Battal</td>
<td>GS Northern Coastal, 173d Abn Bde, GRD, ARVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61st AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134th AHC (-)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>335th AHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>BATTALION</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>179th ASHC</td>
<td>52d CAB</td>
<td>GS 4th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243d ASHC</td>
<td>10th CAB</td>
<td>GS Southern Coastal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180th ASHC</td>
<td>268th CAB</td>
<td>GS Central Coastal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196th ASHC</td>
<td>268th CAB</td>
<td>GS Northern Coastal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Heavy Helicopter Assets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>BATTALION</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>355th HHC</td>
<td>268th CAB</td>
<td>GS II CTZ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Armed Helicopter Company:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>BATTALION</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>361st HC (Escort)</td>
<td>52d CAB</td>
<td>GS II CTZ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The 183rd, 185th, 203d and 219th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies support the visual reconnaissance program and provide GS throughout II CTZ.

6. The 228th Surveillance Airplane Company is employed throughout the II CTZ in a surveillance role.
I The 18th Utility Airplane Company provides GS logistical resupply and radio relay throughout the II CTZ and for the provisional corps operating in the I CTZ.

(c) Major accomplishments

1. Airmobile assets were provided to the following US operations for the period indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WALKER</td>
<td>1st Bn 503d Abn Inf</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Bn 50th Mech Inf</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAN HOA/BOULING II</td>
<td>4th Bn 503d Abn Inf</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47th ARVN Regt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAN SINGH/COCHISE</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde (-)</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40th &amp; 41st ARVN Regts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINH TAY/MCARTHUR</td>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24th ARVN STZ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAN THANG/CLAIN</td>
<td>TP Sout./23d ARVN Div</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUC LAP/BAN ME THUOT</td>
<td>2d Bde 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>23 Aug - 10 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4th Bn 503d Abn Inf</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. ROKFV were allocated (on a daily basis) one AHC and two CH-47 aircraft per division. Additional support was provided on a mission basis for major airmobile operations. One AHC supports the airmobile requirements of ARVN For es in II CTZ, on a daily basis.

3. Airmobile assets were provided to the following special operations directed by MACV:

- Delta: Provisional Corps (I CTZ)
- Omega: Recondo
- Prairie Fire: DSA II Corps

4. Airmobile assets were provided to the following units or agencies on a general support mission basis:

- I FFORCEN Staff
- IDC-Nha Trang
- CORDS-PSTOPS
- 21st Signal Gp
- MACV Engrs
- 100th Log Cmd (ROK)
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968, RGS CS FOR-65 (RI) (U)

18th Engr Bde
Cam Ranh Bay Spc Cda
Qui Nhon Spc Cda

US Navy Spc Fac
II ALC (ARVN)
MACV

6th Bn 32d Arty
V ALC (ARVN)

(USAF)

Logistical Activities:

1. The primary US logistical effort during the period was devoted to operations BINH TAY - MACARTHUR, DAN SINH - COCHISE, DAN HOA - BOLLING, DAN THANG - MC LAIN and WALKER.

2. ACofS, G4 continued to monitor the materiel and supply posture of units assigned, attached and under the operational control (OPCON) to this headquarters. The stock status and scheduled resupply of the following forward support activities were monitored daily:

   a. FSA English - In support of operation DAN SINH - COCHISE.
   b. FSA Dak To and Ban Me Thuot - In support of BINH TAY - MACARTHUR.
   c. FSA Phan Thiet and Bao Loc - In support of DAN THANG - MC LAIN.

3. The second logistical seminar was conducted at Headquarters, I FFORCEV on 2 Sep 68 for the purpose of identifying potential problem areas, clarifying procedures and relationships and exploring methods by which problems can be solved. Logistical staff officers, advisors and liaison Officers within II CTZ as well as representatives of the Support Commands of Cam Ranh and Qui Nhon attended.

4. The issue of M-16 rifles to all ARVN maneuver battalions in the II CTZ was 99 percent completed during the quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ISSUED</th>
<th>SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22,238</td>
<td>22,164</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Supply: a. The overall supply of troop requirements in II CTZ continued to be satisfactory. There are no existing shortages of supplies and equipment which significantly impair the operational capability of the command; however, shortages of water trailers, 5-Ton wreckers, tactical generators and AN/FRC-25 radios continue to plague the command. Concertina wire is also in short supply, but has not had a serious impact due to the availability of barbed wire.

   b. There are 10 items under ASR control at the end of the quarter. These items are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DODIC</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B534</td>
<td>40mm, MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B568</td>
<td>40mm, HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C256</td>
<td>81mm, HE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL

ITEM

D544  105mm, HE
D572  4.2" HE
G910  4.2", ILLUM
G940  155mm, HE
G940  175mm, HE
G940  Gren, Hd, Offensive
G940  Gren, Hd, Green

(6) Services: Nothing significant to report.

(7) Transportation:

(a) AIR. The volume of daily airlift operations throughout II CTZ decreased during the quarter as compared to the previous quarter. This decrease stems from the closing of several fields to C130 aircraft operations and because of the increased use of highways throughout II CTZ. The daily average of emergency airlift for the quarterly period ending 31 Oct 68 is as listed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>S/TONS</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr 68</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May - Jul 68</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct 68</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) HIGHWAY. QL 21 was opened on a full time basis during the quarter with resupply convoys completing the round trip between Cam Ranh Bay and Ban Me Thuot on an alternate day schedule. A total of 7676 short tons (3201 S/T less than last quarter) of mixed classes of supply were moved during the period by US and ARVN convoys. Increased usage of QL 1, 11 and 20 for resupply to Dalat and Bao Loc from Cam Ranh Bay is planned for the coming quarter. Last quarter a total of 3897 S/Tons of all classes of cargo was moved by US and ARVN convoys. Typhoon "Hester" caused land slides and numerous wash-outs on all major routes. Nineteen bridges were washed-out or damaged during the storm on 19 Oct 68. The major routes were closed on 19 Oct 68 and remained closed until the dates listed:

QL 19 - Open 221700 Oct 68
QL 11 - Open 231800 Oct 68
QL 1 - Open Song Hao - North 251700 Oct 68
QL 20 - Open 271700 Oct 68
QL 21 - Open 2718X Oct 68
QL 21A - Open 290800 Oct 68
HL 1 - Open 311700 Oct 68
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I PPORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) RAIL. During the quarter, a meeting was held at HQ I PPORCEV for the purpose of discussing the feasibility of transporting non-critical bulk cargo on the Vietnamese rail system. The first train transporting building material (bulk timber) from Cam Ranh Bay to Ninh Hoa for the 35th Engr Grp and ROK Forces was accomplished. Due to the successful move additional movement by rail is planned to haul cargo both north from Cam Ranh Bay to Ninh Hoa and South from Cam Ranh Bay to Phan Rang.

(d) WATER. During the quarter there was a shortage of LCU and LST type vessels available for the movement of cargo from Cam Ranh Bay to Phan Thiet. Delays due to this shortage of vessels resulted in cargo arriving from three days to three weeks after the established required delivery date. Availability of LCU and LST should increase next quarter as vessels loaned to other support commands on a TDY basis will return to Cam Ranh Bay support command.

e. (c) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)

1 New Life Development (NLD)

(a) Agriculture:

1 The highlight of the quarter has been the rice harvest. Official figures from the GVN have not been released from the provinces but the Than Hong (TH) 8/5 harvest of the first season plantings has been completed. There were 2,568 hectares harvested with a total yield of 14,471 metric tons or 5.65 metric tons average per hectare for the II CTZ. The Ministry of Agriculture goal for the second planting has been set at 2,123 hectares which will total almost 5,000 hectares compared to the original goal of 4,000 hectares. Unofficial local rice figures indicate that 90% of the total rice acreage in II CTZ has been harvested. There were 168,200 hectares with a yield of 303,133 metric tons or an average of 1.9 metric tons per hectare. A harvest of 50,000 - 60,000 metric tons can be expected during Oct through Dec.

2 Slight to moderate damage was caused to coastal vegetable crops because of tropical storm Hester in Oct but only minor damage to stored rice. Provinces reported that some temporary irrigation dams were destroyed but there has not been any damage reported on permanent irrigation dam structures.

3 The Central Farmers Association, Saigon, has received the first shipment of 50 combination rice-hammer mills. These mills are being distributed to local Farmers Associations on the basis of need, available facilities to maintain the unit and ability to train operators. Other commodities for resale are irrigation water pumps, rototillers, hand pack sprayers, vegetable seeds and animal health products. These products are being distributed by the Central Farmers Association on a credit program.

4 The Nha Ho Experimental Station, Phan Rang, has prepared 1.5 hectares of land for banana multiplication. One thousand seed pieces will be purchased from the Japanese banana plantation at Vinh Long for planting at the Nha Ho Station. The Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief has purchased 14,500 pineapple (Khom) suckers for planting along the Dak To-Kontum road, for the refugee program.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-07.  15 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I PPCECV for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS GPPE-45 (Rl) (U)

5 Logistical problems are being encountered in the protein production
program. Baby chicks, pigs and livestock feed is available in the
Saigon area at the Vinafecco Corp, but this organization will assume no
responsibility for shipment outside of the immediate area and all prices
are based on cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Saigon. A reliable feed
industry in the II CTZ is necessary to stimulate poultry and hog produc-

tion.

(b) Education:

1 Activities this period centered on elementary teacher training and
hamlet school construction. The 90 day hamlet teacher training program
was conducted with a total of 745 new teachers trained. Quang Duc Pro-
vince will train 15 more in Nov, bringing the total to within 20 of the
goal of 780. A 60 day training course for assistant supervisors was
initiated in Nha Trang 30 Sep 68 for two representatives from each province.
It is an extremely valuable and successful enterprise which will have a
multiplying effect on in-service education throughout the II CTZ.

2 School construction moved at a slow rate. Of the 613 classrooms
programmed under the hamlet school construction program, approximately
400 were completed at the end of this quarter.

3 Entrance examinations were given during this period for acceptance
at various schools. Qui Nhon Polytechnic School accepted 200 of 539
applicants, Qui Nhon Normal College accepted 550 of 2,000 applicants,
and Ban Me Thuot Comprehensive High School accepted 275 of 1,250 partici-
pants in the Seventh Form examinations. Many of the secondary school
teachers with draft status reported for nine weeks military training.
This will have an adverse effect on school activities until the first
of the year, necessitating the closing of classes in some cases.

(c) Public Administration: Activities in the field of public admin-
istration have climbed perceptibly and encouragingly. Interest and
emphasis on local government became acute as most provinces began positi-
ve campaigns to strengthen village administration. Programs were
directed toward assisting the Village People's Council and the Village
Administrative Committee to function as intended. Quantitatively,
attendance and completion of the village/ hamlet officials training courses
and seminars grew steadily, and generalized orientation training began
to be supplemented by province-sponsored specialized training in adminis-
tration, finance and taxation. The quality of training must, however,
be improved. Province, district and village administrations, weakened
by loss of key manpower through mobilization, began a steady recovery as
individuals learned and performed in dual and, in some cases, triple roles.
However, governing officials maintained their optimistic attitudes as
some previously mobilized personnel were returned to their posts or replace-
ments were provided. An interesting feature of village/hamlet officials
training has been the inclusion of six to eight hours of Self Help training
from lesson plans developed by the Self Help Branch, II CTZ.

(d) Ethnic Minorities Affairs:

1 A significant activity this quarter has been the attempted re-
settlement of approximately 80 Montagnard refugees to Khanh Duong District,
Khanh Hoa Province, from their temporary camp in Dien Khanh District, Khanh
Hoa Province. Within two weeks all of these refugees had returned to
Dien Khanh (see lessons learned).

CONFIDENTIAL

33
2. An audit of Ministry for Development of Ethnic Minorities (MDEM) construction projects programmed for 1966-67 was initiated in Oct 68. This audit team visited Phu Bon, Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. Construction of the MDEM community center guest house complex at Kontum has been started. Construction of a well and water tank, new dormitories and repair of kitchen facilities at the MDEM boarding school in Kontum is approximately 85% completed. Construction of the MDEM boarding school and facilities in Lac Thien District, Dak Lak Province has started. Construction of the MDEM boarding school and facilities at Chao Reo, Phu Bon Province, has stopped, even though the project is 90% completed, primarily because of construction cost difficulties. Action is being taken to complete this project prior to the end of the year. Construction of a new dormitory for the MDEM boarding school in Khanh Hoa District, Khanh Hoa Province, is 30% complete. An earthen dam is being constructed by GVN provincial personnel at Edap Enang resettlement village, Toan An District, Pleiku Province, to alleviate the serious water shortage experienced at Edap Enang last year. Preparations and plans are continuing for the eventual take-over of the Pleiku Trung Son Training area by MDEM. It will be developed into a Montagnard Training Center by 1 Jan 69.

3. Urban Development: This is the first reporting period for this newly organized branch of NLD. The quarter has been primarily one of development of objectives, orientation of personnel and functions and determining priorities of programs for the urban areas to be developed. Objectives are city planning, beautification projects, utility systems improvements, service department improvements, street improvements and fire protection. A pilot project, the Nha Trang Clean-up Campaign, was conducted and initial results were excellent but follow up by the village to maintain standards attained during the campaign has faltered. The majority of the provincial capitals throughout the II CTZ have, or plan to have, similar campaigns to improve sanitary conditions. New equipment programmed for delivery in II CTZ during CY 68 includes seven automatic packing refuse collection trucks, 25 5-ton dump trucks for refuse collection and nine fire trucks.

4. Youth Affairs: Highlights of the quarter were the successes of the Summer Employment Program and the organization of Revolutionary Development (RB) Childrens Groups throughout II CTZ. There was a Youth Camp and Skin Diving Championship held on Hon Tre Island, Khanh Hoa Province, 5-9 Sep 68, and over 400 youths from all of South Vietnam participated. English language classes are being taught two nights a week in Nha Trang to approximately 350 youths by US volunteers.

5. Self-Help: There has been satisfactory progress in the implementation of the self-help program during this period. In excess of 1,600 projects have been completed for CY 68 with approximately 50% of these being completed during this quarter. It is estimated that 900 more projects will be completed by the end of the year. It has been observed that the people are contributing significantly to project construction. For example, in Sep contributions amounted to 1.5 million piastres in materials and 3.5 million piastres of free labor. This indicates the people are assuming their responsibilities in community development projects. The success of the program can probably be attributed to the educational and informational campaigns designed to familiarize the GVN functionaries and lay leaders with self-help concepts and principles, conducted separately or in conjunction with Public Administration training programs.

(2) Public Safety Division (PSD)

(a) The new National Police (NP) Command appointments made by the Director General of National Police (DGNP), Saigon, for Binh Dinh and Cam Ranh have been well received. The change over from military Chief’s of Police to career NP within II CTZ has been achieved with a minimum of difficulty. The National Police Field Forces (NPFF) commander, II CTZ, has been replaced. Numerous changes of NPFF company commanders have solved some of the problems which the former commanders were partly responsible for in Phu Yen, Tuyen Duc, Binh Dinh, Kontum, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan Provinces and Cam Ranh Special Sector.

(b) Improvement in Resources Control continues to receive priority attention with additional mobile combined patrols surpassing the goal set for 1968. NP recruitment has slowed but improved utilization of existing manpower has been stressed. NP strength in district level or below has been increased by seventeen percent.

(c) The GVN has demonstrated increased interest in solving the problems of detention centers, by expansion of existing facilities and construction of additional detention centers. This attitude is closely aligned with heavy emphasis placed on the elimination of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). The directive issued on 12 September 1968 by the Minister of Interior, stressing the proper use of the NPFF, has resulted in the release of NPFF from static guard posts and fragmentation of companies into platoon size units operating at district level as action arms for DiOCC's in Binh Thuan, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Tuyen Duc, Binh Dinh and Kontum. Strong advisory effort will be directed to place platoon size units in all districts.

(3) Refugees:

(a) Tet Refugees: All of the original 176,251 Tet refugees have been resettled or integrated into the regular province refugee programs. Approximately 1800 Tet refugees were integrated into the regular refugee program and are receiving refugee support.

(b) During this quarter an average of 2700 new refugees were reported each month. This is a reduction of more than a thousand a month over the previous quarter. However, census information received from refugee camps has revealed another 8,700 previously unlisted refugees that had to be added to the rolls.

(c) Heavy rains over 19-21 Oct 68 caused flooding in several coastal provinces. Several thousand people were forced to leave their homes and seek shelter for a few days. They were provided emergency relief and returned to their homes as the water level receded.

(d) Approximately 3,000 Montagnard refugees were generated in Daklak Province as a result of increased VC/NVA activity in the Montagnard hamlets. These refugees abandoned their homes and came into a government controlled area to escape enemy terror and taxation.

(4) Civic Action:

(a) Self-help civic action projects continue to be emphasized throughout II CTZ. A good example of this was the clearing and leveling of 17 hectares of farm land in Ninh Thuan Province. The farmers, working together, cleared the land of vegetation within their capabilities; then a Seabee Detachment provided the services of a bulldozer to level the land. Then this

CONFIDENTIAL
accomplished CORDS provided a roto-tiller, trained personnel in its use and supervised the preparation of the land for farming. The irrigation system installed for this project was also a combined effort. The people provided the labor and the military units provided technical assistance and materials.

(b) The Civic Action Permanent Bureau in Ninh Thuan continues to plan, coordinate and support all civic action projects within the province. The bureau now consists of members of the GVN, RVNAF, representatives from CORDS and representatives of all US/FWMAF stationed in the province. This has eliminated coordination problems in all civic action endeavors.

(c) In Pleiku, the civic action projects continue to be routed through the GVN RD council. This has proven highly effective in ensuring that all civic action projects complement the RD program.

(d) The following projects are examples of civic action projects completed during this quarter.

1. Quang Duc Province. The roads in Gia Nhia City were improved by a joint effort of US, PF and RD cadre personnel.

2. Cam Ranh. The 176th Vet Det completed the inoculation against rabies of 1,107 dogs and cats in the Cam Ranh City area.

3. Darlac Province. A bridge was constructed at Quang Nhieu Village (AQ 835192) by the 4th Bn 45th Regt 23d ARVN Div using villagers and RD cadre as labor force. The battalion furnished materials, transportation and technical assistance for the self-help project.

4. Tuyen Duc Province. The RF/PF units assisted in a Dalat City clean-up project.

5. Pleiku Province.

a. US units assisted in the rehabilitation and building of a new kitchen in the Pleiku Province Hospital with labor and technical assistance.

b. A new dining hall and expanded living quarters were built at the Montagnard boarding school. The roof was also replaced.

6. Phu Yen Province. The 577th Engr Bn trained residents of Hoa Ne village in construction techniques. This will allow the local people to participate more fully in self-help projects planned for their village.

7. Khanh Hoa Province: The 1st Bn, 47th ARVN regiment assisted in the electrification of Cheo Hao, water works system installation for Cheo Hao and the construction of playground equipment. The battalion constructed twelve swings, twenty-four see-saws, four sliding boards, one park and two playgrounds.

8. Khanh Hoa Province: US units furnished the material for the repair of schools, dispensaries and village/hamlet administration buildings throughout the province.

9. Laot Dong Province: A major project to improve the main road leading to Tai Hai Thuong refugee hamlet was completed and playgrounds were constructed in various hamlets.

10. Military units continued to use the MEDCAP as a major pacification implement throughout the II CTZ.
(5) Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PP):

(a) During the reporting period the trend of RF/PP operations has continued to progress toward a more aggressive role of ambushing, patrolling, conduct of night operations and increased individual and unit training. A significant increase in proficiency and morale of the individual RF/PP soldier has been noted. A notable contribution to the overall improvement of RF/PP equipment during this quarter has been the continuing progress of Phase I of the weapon upgrading program. This program calls for the issue of M-2 Carbine rifles in lieu of the older M-1 model. To date 33,529 of the 34,665 authorized M-2s, 8,373 of the authorized M-113 M-113s and 1,472 of the authorized 3,970 M-79s have been issued in II Corps. Total RF/PP unit authorizations increased to 302 RF companies and 1,182 FF platoons. Currently 295 RF companies and 1,181 PF platoons have been activated. Those units in direct support of ID have increased 121 to 131 RF companies and from 465 to 475 FF platoons for an overall increase of 10 RF companies and 10 PF platoons. An additional 26 Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs) were deployed within II Corps bringing the total number of teams now deployed to 72 of the end CY 68 goal of 96. All engineer and 3-1 advisors as well as the A&ECSL company advisory team augmentation have been deployed. In addition to the GVN directed training programs, numerous FWMAF sponsored training programs are in effect to assist in the overall improvement of the RF/PP in II Corps.

(b) Artillery Assistance Programs: A complete study of supporting artillery coverage for RF/PP units has been completed. The study reveals that 91% of all RF companies and 89% of the FF platoons in II Corps are covered by US, ROK, AVN or GVN artillery. Further coordination with I FFORCEV Artillery is being effected to increase this coverage. This artillery assistance is designed to increase the responsiveness of fire, emphasizing coordination at the district and province levels. Areas being emphasized are the establishment of fire request channels, fire planning, forward observer training and the conduct of defensive artillery fire employment.

(c) The ten day RF/PP Jungle Leadership Course, established at An Khe, Binh Dinh Province, by the 173rd Abn Bde, to date has graduated 86 Regional Force Officers and 128 RF and PF NCOs. Present plans call for the establishment of two additional schools sponsored by the 4th Inf Div and IF South. This plan calls for a total participation of 150 students per ten day cycle.

(d) In Binh Thuan Province, selected RF soldiers are receiving Medium Range Reconnaissance Patrolling Training. Current plans call for the expansion of this program throughout II CTZ in December.

(e) The Capital and 9th ROK Inf Div are conducting a 44 hour course of instruction for PF platoons within their TAOR. To date the Capital Division has trained 63 platoons and the 9th Div 97 platoons.

(f) The Vietnamese continue to emphasize the Revolutionary Development Refresher/Mobile Training Team (RDR/MTT) and Revolutionary Development/Motivation Indoctrination Program (RD/MIP) training for RF companies and PF platoons respectively. To date 59 companies have completed the new RDR/MTT training and 1,007 platoons the RD/MIP training.

(g) Presently four Vietnamese Inspection Teams, each accompanied by a US advisor, are operating within II Corps, to evaluate the overall status of equipment, personnel and overall effectiveness of the II Corps RF/PP units.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFFDENTIAL

AVPA-GC-OT

S0SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FOrChV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(6) Public Health Division (PHD):

(a) Plague/Cholera Control:

1. During the third quarter CY 1968 endemic bubonic plague has continued to be a medical problem in II CTZ and South Vietnam. The Ministry of Health has undertaken a national program to control plague. All provinces are conducting primary rat plague surveys, insecticide dusting, secondary rat plague surveys and rat killing. Most of the provinces began early in October but due to delays in supplies, some provinces have just started.

2. Greater efforts in the immunization program in Provinces has pushed the immunization rate for 1968 over that of 1967 during October. The immunization program for plague, coming soon with the national plague program, should boost the immunization rate for plague much higher than the present 3%. The cholera immunization rate is 36%.

(b) Maintenance of Water Pumps: With an increase in the number of wells, the number of pumps installed has increased, with the resultant problem of maintenance. Under the Ministry of Health's water program, twelve repairmen will be trained and assigned to Region II. Pipes and pumps are being shipped to provinces. In addition, in-service training for provincial sanitary agents in the installation and repair of pumps will be conducted. The course will be conducted by COMDEG/region II/PHD and has been approved by the Ministry of Health. It is hoped that this program will get under way in November.

(7) Chieu Hoi/Military PSYOP Division (CH/A/PD)

(a) General:

1. The US, GVN and NOD forces conducted active PSYOP aimed at both friendly and enemy target audiences in II CTZ from 1 Aug 68 to 31 Oct 68. In II CTZ operations, 515 million leaflets were disseminated of which 47 million were printed locally by the 8th PSYOP Br. In addition, 1,327 hours of aerial loudspeaker time were directed against enemy target audiences. There were 574 Ho Chi Minh during the period, the highest three month period of the year. The Kit Carson Scout Program strength stands at 182 men, which was an overstrength condition until the recently authorized increases. The Armed Propaganda Team strength stands at 552 an increase of 171 during the period.

2. In August enemy operations intensified, particularly in Duc Lai and Long Xuyen areas of Dong Nai Province. The PSYOP effort was increased in these areas to counter enemy operations. Several quick reaction tapes and leaflets were developed in response to intelligence and a campaign involving leaflet drops and loudspeaker use at night was initiated. In early August a special campaign was launched in Kien Hoa Province against a group of nonagriculture who were known to be a greater
support element for the VC. The 8th PSYOP En developed several tapes and leaflets for use against this audience. An example of a leaflet used for this operation is at enclosure 10. This operation brought in over 160 people to government control of which 11 were declared Ho Chi Chanh.

2. In September a special PSYOP was initiated by Phu Yen Province involving the use of armed helicopters, a command helicopter and a PSYOP speaker aircraft. The district chief and PSYOP advisor ride in the control helicopter which clears the armed helicopters to fly into an enemy controlled area. Following the armed helicopter, the speaker plane plays a tape especially recorded for the mission. To date 12 Ho Chi Chanh have rallied due to these missions, bringing in three weapons. This operation was described in the October I FFORCEN Tactical Notes - Enclosure 7. The 4th Inf Div initiated an "Operation Surrender" targeted against the 24th NVA Regiment. Intelligence indicated that this unit was very vulnerable due to heavy losses, lack of food and low morale. The theme of NVA hardship was stressed in an attempt to get the NVA to surrender either individually or in groups. There have been no measurable results; however, the 24th NVA Regiment has remained out of contact since Operation Surrender was initiated.

4. In October the level of enemy activity and contacts decreased. The decrease in activity, in conjunction with periods of bad flying weather, served to slightly reduce the level of PSYOP requests and missions. To support the first operation of the battleship New Jersey in the II CTZ, two special leaflets were developed, one of which is shown as Enclosure 11. The New Jersey follow-up mission generated a great deal of interest and tri-service cooperation.

The Chieu Hoi rate for the third quarter reached the highest quarterly figure this year. Quarterly figures have shown a gradual increase over each preceding quarter: 1st Quarter 365; 2d Quarter 414; and 3d Quarter 557. Inducement efforts have included the use of all available PSYOP assets. The principal asset in the Chieu Hoi inducement effort is the utilization of the Armed Propaganda Team (APT). This asset has been used in conjunction with military activity such as cordon and search operations. In province initiated operations, the APT is used to explain the Chieu Hoi program to all potential VC ralliers. The Intensified Pacification Campaign due to begin on 1 Nov 68, with the objective of upgrading more villages and hamlets to a more secure category, will present an additional opportunity to employ the APT's. As more KF/PF units and KD Cadre groups occupy contested areas, more of the countryside will be brought under SVN control, establishing security in the area. Attachment of APT elements to the KF/PF and KUC groups will enable them to explain the Chieu Hoi program to the populace of the "liberated areas". In a sense, the liberated area will be under SVN control and remain so with the presence of KF/PF and KUC groups. The fact that SVN presence in an area is physical proof that the area to a degree is secure, reassures a potential Ho Chi Chanh that retaliatory measures will not be taken against him. Recent Ho Chi Chanh have indicated that their main reason for not rallying sooner is that they did not feel that they would be properly protected from their former comrades in the VC.

(b) Support:

1. The major PSYOP support agencies in II CTZ were the 6th PSO En, the 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOO), the 2d Coastal Zone "Junk and Swift Boat" Fleet, the 106th CA/PSYOP Co and the 20th AVN POLIAF En.

2. For examples of leaflets printed during the period see:
   a. Enclosure 10: Montagnard Leaflets...
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U)

b. Incl 11: New Jersey follow-up leaflet.
c. Incl 12: Leaflet printed by Kontum Province.

2. Several Military Assistance Command Psychological Directorate (MACPD) directed campaigns were conducted, initiated or completed during the period.

a. Operation "Camel Path" was conducted weekly with the exception of two weeks in August when there was a shortage of leaflets.
b. Operation "Elephant Walk" was complete on schedule.
c. Operation "Buffalo Tract" was begun on schedule.
d. Operation "Nguyen Trail" was begun on schedule. Several preliminary reports from the field indicate that ARVN PSiOP personnel are conducting this campaign in a satisfactory manner.

f. In August the CH/HPD section began participating in the HQ I FFORCEV Weekly Special Operations Briefing. These weekly briefings are resulting in a greater awareness of PSiOP activities and programs.

f. (G) Personnel:

(1) Roster of Headquarters I FFORCEV key personnel is at Incl 13.
(2) Personnel strengths of assigned, attached and OPCON units are at Incl 14.
(3) Military Personnel Management:

(a) During the past quarter, substantial progress has been made in the infusion program within I FFORCEV. No problems are anticipated in the elimination of the remaining rotational humps within this command. The following rotational humps have been eliminated during the past quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 92d Arty</td>
<td>Oct 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 6th Arty</td>
<td>Nov 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 22d Arty</td>
<td>Dec 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 27th Arty</td>
<td>Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 60th Arty</td>
<td>Jan 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 14th Arty</td>
<td>Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 17th Arty</td>
<td>Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>May 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 15th Arty</td>
<td>May 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
Personnel strengths of assigned and attached units have been generally satisfactory throughout the period. A problem continues to exist in obtaining 05B20 (Radio operator), 05C20 (Radio teletype operator), 13E40 (FA opn and Intel asst) and 17B20 (Radar Crewman) qualified replacement personnel. USAV is aware of the shortages and is filling them as rapidly as possible from the replacement stream. One of the more critical personnel shortages during the period was MOS 13A10 (Field Artillery Basic). USAV has provided a steady flow of replacements and has indicated that requirements should be met with a minimum of complications. The most critical shortages are MOS’s 13D40 (Field Artillery Crewman) and 13E40 (Field Artillery Operations and Intelligence Asst), in grades E5 and E6. USAV has indicated these are Vietnam wide shortages and that this headquarters will be receiving equal input with other USAV units.

The assignment of air defense artillery officers with little or no field artillery experience to field artillery battalions continues to have an impact on operations. Although the assignments for these officers are carefully selected the percentage of air defense artillery officers necessitates their distribution through the field artillery battalions. In a combat zone, field artillery experience is of utmost importance, especially in delivering timely and accurate fires and preventing artillery incidents. USAV is aware of this problem and considers the distribution of field and air defense experience when making officers assignments to its major subordinate commands; however, this does not solve the basic problem of lack of field artillery.

Civilian Personnel Management:

During the period, local national direct hire spaces were increased from 217 spaces to 276 spaces. Emphasis was placed on coordination between all levels of command and the servicing area civilian personnel offices in order to achieve improved administration and management of civilians. A study concerning authorizations and requirements revealed that 14 spaces are no longer required and will be turned into USAV.

The 3d quarter CY 68 allocation of assistance in kind (AIK) funds (2.5 million piasters) was overexpended by approximately 300,000 piasters. The overexpenditure was adjusted from the 4th quarter allocation (2.7 million piasters).

Awards and Decorations: During the previous quarter, a change in the procedure in the IFFORCEV Awards and Decorations Board was initiated. Previously, recommendations for awards were processed through one board with each board member making his recommendation in turn. Under the new system there are two separate boards reviewing recommendations for service and achievement, and a Valorous Award board which reviews all recommendations for acts of heroism. Under this new system each member receives the recommendations simultaneously. A Headquarters, IFFORCEV Awards and Decorations (A&D) regulation was drafted during this quarter which is expected to be published in early November. The A and D section processed an average of 290 awards per month during the past quarter. Resume of awards made is at Incl 15.

Rest and Recuperation: During the past quarter, R&R allocations increased from approximately 450 per month to 690 per month. During the months of September and October 1968, this office obtained 117 extra allocations from USAV to help eliminate part of the backlog of R&R requests.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

from our artillery units. Through cooperation with units in the field, this headquarters was able to fill numerous late cancellations with as little as two days notice, thereby keeping the utilization rate as high as possible. A command letter was sent to all subordinate units with a list of common errors that occur at the R&R Processing Centers. The I FFORCEV R&R utilization rate during the past quarter averaged 97%. Resume of R&R allocations is at Incl 16.

(7) Resume of promotions for I FFORCEV is at Incl 17.

(8) Chaplain activities:

(a) There were no personnel changes in the staff chaplain's Sections during this period.

(b) II CTZ has 112 US Military Chaplains.

(c) Religious Services:

1. The II CTZ is adequately staffed with protestant chaplains, thus, there are no problems in providing coverage for protestant personnel in the Zone. A great deal of travel is required to provide adequate chaplain's coverage to MACV teams and Special Forces Camps. Chaplains have been able to provide coverage for personnel of these teams on an average of once every two weeks.

2. The Catholic program has been enhanced during this quarter by an increase in the number of assigned Catholic chaplains, only a minimum of civilian clergymen are needed to augment the program. In providing religious coverage for MACV teams and Special Forces Camps both protestant and catholic chaplains travel as a team.

3. Jewish Area coverage is adequate. The Jewish congregation in the II CTZ is organized to function with lay leaders in all areas where there is a large troop concentration. These leaders coordinate visits of the I FFORCEV Jewish Chaplain. High holy day services during this quarter were held in Nha Trang with approximately 300 Jewish personnel from the II CTZ attending. The Jewish Chaplain spent about 60% of his time visiting Jewish personnel outside the Nha Trang area.

4. In the Nha Trang area, the following services are conducted:

a. Sunday: 22 Protestant, 12 Catholic, one Lutheran, two Episcopal, one Christian Science and one Latter Day Saints.

b. Weekday: Friday - Jewish Services, Saturday - Jewish Services, Daily - Two Masses. Discussion groups are held in the 8th Field Hospital and I FFORCEV Chapel for protestant personnel.

(9) Military Police:

(a) Discipline, Law and Order:

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-OC-OT
15 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational report of Headquarters, I FFORGEV for Quarterly Report Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (K) (U)

a. Aggravated Assaults: During the reporting period from 26 Jul to 25 Oct 68, there were 61 reported aggravated assaults in II CTZ, an increase of 30 over the last quarterly period. Forty-one assaults occurred between US military personnel while the remaining 20 assaults involved US personnel and Vietnamese.

b. Self-inflicted Wounds: During the reporting period, 28 accidental self-inflicted injuries resulted from gunshot wounds, five less than during the preceding quarter. The majority of these injuries were clearly attributable to carelessness and gross neglect on the part of the individual soldier. Additionally, four suicides and three attempted suicides with firearms were reported in II CTZ.

2. Khanh Hoa Province Police Officers' Meeting: The Khanh Hoa Province Police Officers Meetings which are hosted by various police agencies on a rotating basis were held in Aug and Sep 68. Topics discussed at these meetings included traffic enforcement and safety, combined patrols, youth programs and a police reporting net for fast dissemination of perishable information, e.g., stolen vehicle reports, the latter being implemented in Oct 68.

(b) Prisoners of War:

1. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): On 26 to 28 Aug 68, the International Committee of the Red Cross visited the Phu Tai PW Camp, 4th Inf Div's collecting point at Camp Enari, 173d Abn Bde (Sep) collecting point at LZ English and the 542d Med Ctr Co near Qui Nhon. The ICRC inspected the facilities for compliance with the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of PWs. The following discrepancies were noted:

a. 4th Inf Div collecting point had an innocent civilian in the PW collecting point.

b. 173d Abn Bde (Sep) collecting point did not have sanitary napkins for female prisoners.

c. 542d Med Ctr Co did not provide the prisoners with fish sauce.

2. The Phu camp at Pleiku was not inspected during this period by the ICRC.

(c) VIP Security and Special Events:

1. Installation Security Inspection and practice Test Exercise: The Provost Marshal (PM) representative is a member of the I FFORGEV inspection team that conducts a quarterly inspection of ten major US installations in II CTZ. During the practice test exercise the PM representative observes the notification procedures and checks the reaction plan of the local military police. During the security inspection, the PM representative inspects the physical security safeguards such as protective lighting, perimeter barriers, towers, bunkers, guard force and control of local nationals. Ten such inspections were conducted during the reporting period.

2. Physical Security Survey of the CG's Mess Compound: A PM representative conducted a Physical Security Survey of the CG's mess compound on 6 Sep 68. A significant improvement had been made since the last survey of 1 Sep 67.
CONFIDENTIAL

AFOS-CC-OT

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1 FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

3. Distinguished Visitor Security: Personal Security was provided for 13 distinguished visitors (four star general or flag rank officers or civilian officials of equal or higher rank) visiting HQ 1 FFORCEV and the Nha Trang area.

(d) Conversion of Military Payment Certificates: On 21 Oct 68, the conversion of MPC took place in the RVN. As prescribed by 1 FFORCEV Staff Memo 37-10, the following procedures were carried out by the 272d MP Co at the Grand Hotel and Roberts Compounds:

1. Extra Military policemen were stationed at the entrance gates to the Roberts and Grand Hotel Compounds. The remaining gates were closed to all traffic.

2. Military policemen located at the entrance gates maintained control of individuals and vehicles entering or leaving the compounds. US personnel were allowed to leave the compounds on official business if they had in their possession written authorization (FL 172 (R)) signed by an officer.

4. Implementation of "C" day procedures brought to light several unforeseen problems and difficulties. Observations and recommendations for improvement were made a matter of record and were submitted to the HQ Cmdt for inclusion in his after action report.

(e) I FFORCEV Crime Prevention Program:

1. The PM Section has initiated a Crime Prevention Program by publishing notices in the I FFORCEV Daily Bulletin for use by commanders in implementing the provisions of USARV CIR 190-1, the Monthly Crime Prevention Themes.

2. Other topics of PM interest and responsibility recently published are: Load Capacity of Motor Vehicles, Driver Permits, Operation of Vehicles, Authorized Parking Areas in Nha Trang, Unauthorized Use of Military Vehicles, Custody and control of Firearms and Dangerous Weapons, Illegal Transferring of PX Items and Security of Personal Property.

(f) Return of the 272d MP Det from LZ English: A platoon from the 272d MP Co supporting the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) at LZ English since January 1966 returned to its parent unit in Nha Trang on 21 Sep 68. This adjustment of Military Police resources was necessary to support Military Police commitments at HQ, I FFORCEV.

10) Safety and Accident Prevention (I FFORCEV assigned and attached units only):

(a) The I FFORCEV Safety Program was reviewed for first quarter FY 1969 and statistics are included at Inclosures 16 and 19. Of special interest was the upsurge of injuries and fatalities resulting from accidental gunshot wounds. Military vehicle accidents resulting in casualties among local nationals also increased. Recent correspondence was received from Deputy Commanding General, USARV indicating his concern over the increasing number of accidents that are taking the lives of US military forces and Vietnamese at such an appalling rate. Commanders have been instructed to insure that:

1. Motor vehicle accident reports include a statement of any disciplinary or corrective action taken and measures instituted to prevent recurrence.
2. Accident reports covering the mishandling of firearms or explosives include an explanation of how the accident occurred, as well as any disciplinary or corrective action taken.

(b) Changes 1 and 2 to 1 FGCOVER Reg 385-1, were published during this quarter. Change 1, dt 19 Aug 68 established the requirement for an investigation of any accident or incident resulting from the accidental discharge of weapons or explosives or from motor vehicle accidents that result in death or injury or which require submission of an accident report, DA Form 285. Change 2, dt 4 October 1968 changed certain criteria for accident reporting.

(c) Recently announced policy from USAV has stated that the accident and injury expectancy ceiling must be computed on the basis of the number of injuries per 1,000,000 man hours or number of accidents per 1,000,000 miles of exposure which ever is applicable. The old rate was computed using a base figure of 100,000. The expectancy ceiling for the 1 FGCOVER units is now 10.0 accidents for each 1,000,000 miles driven and 45.0 disabling injuries for each 1,000,000 man hours.

(11) Medical:

(a) The general health of the command remained good throughout the quarter. Sanitary discipline and unit-level sanitation were excellent in all units of the command because of command emphasis and a vigorous program conducted by teams from the 172d Preventive Medicine Unit.

(b) A high incidence of malaria continued through the quarter in the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) despite ever increasing command emphasis on preventive measures. This unit operates in a highly endemic area but with a good malaria control program should have a lower malaria rate. Recently units are being spot checked on an unannounced basis to see if chloroquine is present in the urine of the troops. A negative urine chloroquine test indicates that the individual probably has not taken his malaria chemoprophylaxis.

(c) The quarter saw the rotation of a large number of physicians from all units and infusion of numerous replacements. All units, at the end of the quarter, approach 100% physician strength. The change over was affected without disruption of medical care.

(d) Field siting of medical evacuation helicopters continues to be an effective method of employment and is received enthusiastically by field commanders.

g. (C) Artillery:

(1) Intelligence: Hostile artillery fire throughout the month of August climaxed on 23 Aug 68 when the enemy expended 316 artillery rounds in the early stages of his "Third Offensive". The enemy's artillery attacks continued through Sep 68, but declined in intensity each succeeding week. From the artillery viewpoint, the "Third Offensive" lacked the intensity of the "Second Offensive", as evidenced by an enemy artillery expenditure of 52 rounds per day during Sep 68 compared to 116 rounds per day during May 68. The majority of enemy initiated attacks during Aug and Sep 68 occurred in the western highlands. It is estimated that 53% of the total
enemy artillery capability is located in this area. An extremely high level of enemy artillery activity was noted throughout the II CTZ during Oct 68. The basic enemy artillery weapons employed during Oct 68 were mortars and recoilless rifles. One 122mm Rocket attack and one 120mm Mortar attack were reported during Oct 68.

(2) Operations. During the reporting period, I FFORCEV Arty supported US, FNMAF, ARVN, RF/TP and USSF/CIDG forces in the II CTZ. The I FFORCEV Arty organization remained unchanged from that report on 31 Jul 68. Two group headquarters with four attached battalions, three separate battalions, three separate batteries and ten detachments supported operations conducted in II CTZ. Continuing operations in BINH PHU-CUOJYE, BINH THUONG-CUOJYE, DAN SINH-CUOJYE, DAN THANG-HI and WALKER, ARVN and ROK forces in CRID AO and 9th ROK Inf Div AO supported. The 9th ROK Inf Div Operation BARK MA 9 was supported by TF Strike in Oct 68. The 5th Bn, 27th Arty (105T) continued support of US and ARVN maneuver elements in the four southern provinces of the while the 6th Bn, 32d Arty (175mm/8") supported ROK and ARVN maneuver in the central coastal area. The 4th Bn (155T) 60th Arty continued support of US forces throughout the II CTZ.

(a) On 23 Aug 68 the enemy staged a multi-battalion attack on Lap SF Camp. To counter this action, which was the major threat in the CTZ during the reporting period, one US 105 battery was deployed to support ARVN operations; later, when US forces were introduced into the area, a total of eight US artillery batteries were deployed in the Duc Lap Thuot area of Quang Duc and Darlac Province:

I FFORCEV Arty

Btry B, 5th Bn, 22d Arty (175mm/8") (SP)
Btry C, 1st Bn, 92d Arty (155mm T)

4th Inf Div Arty

4th Bn, 42d Arty (105mm T) (3 batteries)
Btry B, 2d Bn, 9th Arty (105mm T)
Btry B, 5th Bn, 16th Arty (155mm/8") (SP)

173d Abn Bde (Sep)

Btry D, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (105mm T)

At the end of the reporting period seven batteries remained in the Duc Lap-Ban Me Thuot area. Btry D, 3d Bn, 319th Arty returned to the Cochise AO and assumed its mission of direct support of 173d Abn Bde (Sep).

(b) Btry C, 5th Bn, 22d Arty (175mm/8" SP) was deployed to AO Dan Thanh-McCain on 10 Aug 68 to provide heavy artillery support for TF South. The battery is positioned in Binh Thuan Province to support operations in the Phan Thiet area.

(c) In mid-Aug 68 a collocated ARVN/US Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) was established in Binh Thuan Province of the TPF South AO. Fire support normally available to maneuver forces in the province includes US artillery, ARVN artillery, a US destroyer, US gunships, US tactical air support and ARVN tactical air support. The FSCC organization includes a US and ARVN artillery element, a targeting element, NGID element and US AIO element. The FSCC has direct communications.
with US and ARVN liaison officers at Province HQ, ARVN and US liaisons with US and ARVN maneuver elements and all fire support elements. The collocated FSCE has enabled efficient coordination and utilization of available fire support. Military and political clearance is obtained in two or three minutes and massing of US/ARVN artillery is coordinated effectively.

(3) Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE).

(a) Continued emphasis was placed on naval gunfire support, primarily in the DAN THANG-MCLAIN AO. Of particular interest was the stationing of the USS HEM HEN HEN in waters off II CTZ for a six-day period in late October. Considerable fire support coordination preceded the arrival of this unique addition to fire support resources in II CTZ. Firing by the main battery was limited to 70 rounds of observed fire each day. Planning of these fires was integrated with other fire support means and coordinated with schemes of maneuver. Targets in DAN SINH-COC, DAN HOA-BOLLING and DAN THANG-MCLAIN AO's were scheduled for attack on separate days during the period. A total of 176 rounds (16 inch) were expended on 20, 22, and 23 Oct. A preliminary report from one target area indicates several bunkers destroyed and numerous caves sealed. A naval gunfire spotter reported an estimated 12 enemy X1A. An average of three ships were on station each day in the coastal waters of II CTZ to provide naval gunfire support. The following is a resume of naval gunfire for the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>TOTAL ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1505</td>
<td>38,823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) During the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct, an average of 1985 Immediate Reaction/Hangfire targets were processed each month compared to a monthly average of over 2400 for the previous quarter. The term, Immediate Reaction, is associated with those targets located within the AOs of US units; the term, Hangfire, is given to targets within the AOs of FWMAF. A total of 1118 Hangfire and 4838 Immediate Reaction targets were developed by FSCE. At the request of units subordinate to I FFORCEV Arty, targets were developed to support an average of three artillery hip-shoots/raids each month. In most cases these special missions lasted between 24 and 72 hours. At the direction of CG, I FFORCEV Arty, a preliminary study has been initiated which will recommend ammunition expenditures on acquired targets.

(c) I Field Force Vietnam Regulation 95-4, 16 May 1968, subject: Aviation Artillery Warning System, established standard, unclassified procedures for providing warning of artillery fire to aircraft in II CTZ. A recent change requires Artillery Warning Control Centers (AWCC) to report to the nearest Control and Reporting Post (CRP) all artillery fire with a maximum ordinate of fire of 5,000 ft or higher above ground level. Whenever possible, the reporting altitude should be progressively reduced to achieve an end objective of reporting all fires over 3,000 ft. The present requirement includes reporting 4.2cm mortar firings. HQ I FFORCEV Artillery recently granted authority to 17th Combat Aviation Group to publish all unclassified AWCC frequencies in that organisation's monthly fact sheet to airmen. In connection with its AWCC responsibility, FSCE closely monitors all Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs).
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters I FFORCERV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFQR-65 (R1) (U)

(d) During the quarter, FSCE issued a daily average of 11 ARC Light suppressions of 175mm firing. Because of the critical requirements for safety, each suppression calculation is done by an officer. It is estimated that the total time for suppressions per day is three hours. Generally, these are suppressions of firing higher than 28,000 ft above mean sea level and concern only those units near the aircraft flight path. During the quarter, commanders were requested to keep an informal record of the number of 175mm gun fire missions that could not be fired because of these suppressions. Results are not yet available.

(e) A policy study has been initiated which is directed at placing information in the hands of small unit ARVN, RF/PF and ROK forces. The study will outline methods and procedures to request all types of fire support e.g., spooky, gunships, Tac Air, naval gunfire and artillery. The purpose of such a program is to decrease dependence on US Advisor/Liaison personnel and increase initiative on the part of allies.

(f) FSCE has received MACV Dir 525-13, dated 12 Oct 68, subject: Combat Operations – Rules of Engagement, in the RVN for use of Artillery, Tanks, Mortars, Naval Gunfire and Air and Armed Helicopter Support (U).

(4) Meteorological Quality Control Team (MQCT). During the reporting period the MQCT continued analysis of weather data provided to firing units by nine electronic sections and three visual teams deployed throughout I CTZ. The team checked a record 776 weather soundings of a total 981 soundings taken during Sep 68. Only 0.26% of these soundings were found unsatisfactory. This unprecedented low percentage of unsatisfactory soundings has unquestionably contributed to the reduction of artillery accidents and ammunition expenditures and increased the probability of first round hits.

(5) US Artillery Assistance and Support to RVNAF. The three programs established previously to assist in improving artillery support of RVNAF continued during the reporting period.

(a) Assistance rendered ARVN artillery units through the Associate Battery Program enabled increased coordination between US/ARVN batteries for mutual defense and joint artillery missions in support of allied maneuver forces.

(b) Training assistance was provided to CIDG artillery personnel upon receipt of a 105mm howitzer at each of the USSF/CIDG Camps at Tieu Atar and Trang Phuc. The 52d Arty Gp provided a contact team which conducted the training and assisted in emplacing the howitzers. Of the 31 USSF/CIDG Camps in I CTZ, 27 Camps are sponsored by US Artillery units. Seventeen of the 27 sponsored camps now have organic artillery.

(c) US Artillery units completed the survey of RF/PF elements in respective areas of responsibility. Consolidation of the reports showed that approximately 90% of the RF/PF positions in I CTZ are within the range fans of allied artillery units. In addition to the training assistance in forward observer procedures, US units are now aiding in the improvement of fire support requirements. Through US Advisors, the artillery units assist in communications and fire support coordination. Emphasis in the program is being applied to maintaining the proficiency of RF/PF forward observers by conducting reaction tests and firing-in defensive targets for RF/PF positions.

CONFIDENTIAL

48
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-DT

15 November 1968


(d) During the period, US Artillery units began training Revolutionary Development (RD) group personnel in forward observer procedures. A total of 121 RD personnel were given 10-14 hours of training by the I FFORCEV Arty Forward Observer School. Fourteen RD personnel attended the regular forward observer course during Sep 68.

(e) The Forward Observer School trained a total of 12 ARVN, RF/PF or CIDG personnel. The Fire Direction Officer School trained 5 ARVN personnel.

(6) Artillery Seminar. The second quarterly artillery seminar was hosted by CO, II Corps Arty (ARVN) on 8 Oct 68. Artillery commanders of ARVN, ROK and US forces at corps, division and group level with associate US artillery advisors attended the one day conference. Among the topics presented and discussed were Assistance and Training Provided for RF/PF, Collocated FSCC, Targeting Techniques and Ammunition Expenditure Trends. The topics presented stimulated discussion and subsequent action by the allied artillery organizations.

(7) Ammunition Expenditure Analysis.

(a) In Sep 68, an Ammunition Analysis Section consisting of one officer, one NCO and two computer operators was established. The personnel perform all operations inherent in the ammunition analysis and management programs. Basically, the section's functions include computer operations, general and detailed analysis of expenditures and expenditure trends, allocation of ASR ammunition and preparation of reports, messages and briefings on ammunition expenditures.

(b) Since full implementation of the I FFORCEV Artillery management and analysis system in Jun 68, several favorable expenditure trends have developed. Analysis of overall expenditures viewed objectively in relation to enemy and friendly activity has revealed a general reduction in total expenditures. At the same time, the percentage of expenditures in the confirmed and acquired target categories increased steadily and accounted for 58.3% of the total expenditures (91,226 rounds) for Sep 68.

(c) The trends noted indicate that I FFORCEV Artillery units are utilising their artillery more effectively by emphasising target acquisition, target analysis and fire planning.

(8) In Oct 68, an Artillery Safety Section was established consisting of two officers, one Major and one Captain. The section is responsible for investigation of artillery firing accidents involving all artillery units with I FFORCEV. The section is also responsible for analysing artillery accidents, defining trends in causes and publishing and disseminating lessons learned to US artillery units in II CTZ.

(9) The radar chronograph, M36, was issued to artillery units in the II CTZ on the basis of two per artillery group and one per division artillery. Operator training on the M36 was conducted by a New Equipment Training Team in Long Binh, RVN, during Oct 68. The receipt of the chronograph will expedite calibration of artillery tubes throughout the II CTZ. Presently, USARV provides a contact team for this purpose.

(10) During the month of August the USARV calibration team visited I FFORCEV and 4th Inf Div artillery units. The number of tubes calibrated in each major unit was:

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT 15 November 1968


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I FFORCEV</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>51/69</td>
<td>6/6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The team returned on 26 Oct to start calibration of the 22d ARVN Arty, with calibration of all 105K artillery to follow. Highest priority for US artillery are the new 80K howitzers of the 6th Bn 32d Arty.

(11) Artillery Organization, II CTZ.

(a) Non-divisional.

I FFORCEV Artillery

- 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T)
- 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)
- 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (155mm SP)
- Battery B, 29th Artillery (SLT)
- Battery E, 41st Artillery (RAD)

Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Artillery

- 77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 253d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 254th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 255th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 256th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

41st Artillery Group

- 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T)
- 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (155mm/8 inch SP)
- 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (105mm T/155mm T)
- 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery (155mm T)

52d Artillery Group

- 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP)
- 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)
- 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)
- 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T)

(b) Divisional

4th Infantry Division Artillery

- 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm T)
- 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm/8 inch SP)
- 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105mm T)
- 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105mm T)

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

- Battery D (Provisional), 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (105mm T)

CONFIDENTIAL

50
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT 15 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFGRCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (Rl) (U)

173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)
3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105mm T)

(12) Artillery Strength: The following table reflects artillery tube strength by caliber for US, ARVN and MWAP Artillery units in II CTZ, at the end of the quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery Type</th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US DIVISIONAL</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK DIVISIONAL</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US FORCES ARTILLERY</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN ARTILLERY</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL FORCES (CIDG)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>370</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(13) Ammunition Statistics for US Artillery in II CTZ for the Reporting Quarter:

(a) Expenditures by Target Category:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONFIRMED</td>
<td>41,114/1180</td>
<td>37,112/1178</td>
<td>24,114/320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACQUIRED</td>
<td>49,410/2564</td>
<td>54,086/2873</td>
<td>61,769/7602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTERBATTERY</td>
<td>5,868/102</td>
<td>6,309/334</td>
<td>5,723/330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPARATION</td>
<td>26,136/1263</td>
<td>20,043/165</td>
<td>15,931/877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERDSTION</td>
<td>17,286/10,474</td>
<td>15,701/10,114</td>
<td>9,733/637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL PURPOSE</td>
<td>24,651/3990</td>
<td>20,025/3223</td>
<td>20,712/3129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>3,276/607</td>
<td>3,112/795</td>
<td>2,764/443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>178,051/25,389</td>
<td>156,446/25,256</td>
<td>117,185/19,333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Expenditures by Caliber:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>RDS EXPENDED</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL</th>
<th>RDS/TUBE/DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>111,884</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>30,844</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>15,577</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>10,152</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>168,051</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>104,495</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>26,903</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>13,725</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>11,323</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>156,446</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>75,131</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>20,183</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>11,996</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>9,975</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>117,185</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>441,168</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Prorated Average
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

h. (C) Signal Operations: The upgrading of communications within the II CTZ was the major activity of the Signal Section during the quarter.

(1) The 5th Signal Battalion continued to provide communications support for OPLAU DAN THANG-MAC ARTHUR, K1N CH-THANG, DAN HOA-BOLLING and DAN SINHI-COCHRANE. Multi-channel telephone and teletype-writer circuits were provided in support of ROK operations. Road convoy movements from Cam Ranh Bay to Ban Ke Thuot and Bao Loo were supported with mobile single-sideband equipment. Radiotelephone service was extended to RSA II Corps and RSA Phan Rang to provide an alternate routing records communications capability.

(2) Multi-channel VHF radio systems were extended in support of TF South, TF Bright, TF Spoiler, 70th Engr Bn and the 5th SF Det at Ban Ke Thuot East. The system between Hon Tre Island and Ban Me Thuot East spans over eighty miles without a relay.

(3) Telephone capacity at LZ English was increased by replacing the SB-86 switchboard. With an AN/HNC-1, studies were conducted and additional trunks were provided for the 4th Inf Div switchboard. A telephone circuit quality control program has been instituted for circuits terminating in the I FFORCEV switchboard to evaluate the quality of the circuitry and the performance of operating personnel. Requests were initiated for five Army subscribers in the Nha Trang area to have access to the world-wide Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON). Detailed planning and engineering of the Automatic Secure Voice Network (AUTOSEC-VOCOM) terminal for I FFORCEV was completed and installation has begun. A Transportable Secure Voice Terminal (TSVT) was requested from USARV to provide secure telephone capability for TF South.

(i) The tropical storm of late October caused damage to antennas at Vung Ro and Vung Chua mountains, but all communications were restored within 24 hours.

1. (C) Engineer:

(1) The predominant effort of the engineer section during this reporting period was directed towards planning, coordinating and supervising 18th Engr Bde units in combat support of I FFORCEV, 5th SFGA, ROKFV and ARVN operations. The activities of organic engineer units, the 9th Engr Bn (C) and the 173d Engr Co (Abn) were monitored by the engineer section while their total effort was in support of their parent organizations. Tactical operations supported during this period were in AO's DAN THANG-MACARTHUR, DAN HOA-BOLLING and SINHI-TAY-MACARTHUR. Specific engineer combat support extended by US engineer units in II CTZ in support of tactical operations is outlined below.

(2) Support of Tactical Operations:

(a) SINHI-TAY-MACARTHUR: The 937th Engr Gp was in general support. Engineer effort in the northern half of this AO included daily mine sweeps of GL-12 between Pleiku and Dak To, Route 512, GL-19 to Ngan Gianh Pass and GL-19W. A3P Mary Lou, approximately five kilometers south of Kontum, was partially constructed by elements of the 8th Engr Bn prior to the 29th Engr Bn (C) assuming the mission of completing the facility. Daily convoys of engineer trucks hauled sand from Kontum to Pleiku. Two GL-47 revetments were constructed at both Dak To and Kontum, and bunkers damaged by enemy action at Plei Djereng were repaired. An artillery fire...
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

15 November 1968


RCFOR-65 (R1) (U)

base at Oasis, including four concrete gun pads, was completed on 10 Aug. In the southern portion of this AO, considerable engineer effort was directed to the construction of an F3A at Ban Ke Thuot East Airfield. The onset of the SE Monsoon, coupled with confusion of command/coordination responsibility, resulted in hesitancy in the initial setting of support facilities. With the absence of a brigade engineer authority was delegated to coordinate all engineer effort in the area. This resulted in a lack of cantonment traffic discipline and this, combined with an obvious sense of complacency and futility among the officers and men of the supporting engineer elements, produced an undesirable situation which required direct command intervention. Only after basic drainage patterns were established, area command relationships confirmed and aggressive supervision of engineer troop efforts assumed, were the engineering problems overcome. Ultimately, the resulting construction achievements were impressive. Achievements included a fourteen-cell ASP with internal and external access roads and the erection of forty-three UH-1 K8A1 revetments, two CH-47 and three O-1 revetments at Ban Ke Thuot City Airfield. Arrangements were made with the Directorate of Airbases, GVII for the loan of 5,000 m³ of rock for use on roads throughout the ASP, other F3A facilities and the cantonment area. This rock was replaced by a civilian contractor by 31 Oct 68. Expedient repairs were made at Duc Lap II Airfield. Four artillery gun pads were built west of Ban Ke Thuot and a signal cable ditch was dug from Ban Ke Thuot to Ben Ke Thuot East Airfield. Two gunship revetments and ammunition and fuel storage revetments of K8A1 were constructed at Khan Tho, subsector and eight K8A1 helicopter revetments were erected at Buon Ma Thuot. Emergency and expedient repairs of bridges and bypasses were made on QL-21 between Ban Ke Thuot and Khan Duong, to keep the road open to convoy traffic. Tropical storm Hester struck I CTZ on 19 and 20 Oct and washed out four bridges and bypasses on QL-21 within this AO. Repairs were completed by 26 Oct.

(b) DAN THUONG-LOC: The 35th Engr Gp provided general support. The majority of engineer effort was directed towards LOC maintenance and upgrading. Tactical support included the construction of a guard tower and revetments for an Army aviation unit, gunpads for the 5th Bn 22d Arty at Thien Giao and the installation of double-triple concertina for the perimeter defense of the 3d Bn 506th Inf (Abn). The 116th Engr Bn (C) arrived from CONUS and established its base at Bao Loc in the latter part of September to commence repair and upgrading of QL-20.

(c) DAN JINH-COLPAAS: The 35th Engr Gp was in general support. Engineer support of tactical operations consisted of daily minesweeps of QL-1 between Bong Jon and No Duc (41.6 miles), the construction of a watch tower at LZ English for the 173d Abn Ech and four gun pads at LZ Pony. The most extensive engineer effort in this AO was devoted to LOC upgrading and repair.

(d) ROK AO: The 35th Engr Gp was in general support. During this quarter an extensive perimeter clearing program was accomplished at Vung Ro Bay. The 589th Engr Bn (Const) built two ammunition revetments for the Air Force at Phan Tang and accomplished expedient repairs on major bridges and LOC's in the latter part of October due to damage caused by tropical storm 'Hester'.

(e) DAN HLA-BOLLING: The 35th Engr Gp provided general support. A minesweep team was furnished by the 377th Engr Bn to support an operation conducted by 6th Bn 22d Arty along TL 7D from Tuy Hoa to Vung Jon. One dozer was utilized to clear a fire base and road clearing was performed along portions of TL 6D to support ROK tactical operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

53
During this report period, the 337th and 35th Sngr Gps reported a total of 372 enemy incidents (mines, ambushes, sniper and mortar attacks) resulting in friendly losses of 112 WIA and 9 KIA.

Airfield Upgrading and/or Repair.

(a) Bao Loo (IT 061728): The 339th Sngr 3n (Const) commenced expedient repairs early in Aug to keep this field operational during the monsoon season. On 15 Aug a C-123 damaged the ESAL matting and the airfield was temporarily reduced to type II C-7A while repairs were made. The field was opened to type II C-130 again on 23 Aug. The 18th Sngr Gp submitted a DA 1391 to USAV on 10 Oct recommending upgrading.

(b) Buon Blech (IK 004977): During an inspection in the latter part of July it was noted that the steep shoulders at the west end of the runway were seriously eroded and would soon wash out under the ESAL matting. The 20th Sngr 3n (C) moved on site in Aug to terrace and pump the shoulders. Project was completed on 26 Aug.

(c) Dak Jeang (IT 955906): This airfield was closed on 4 Jul due to erosion and standing water on the runway. Repair continued until 23 Aug when heavy monsoon rains combined with damage inflicted by enemy mortar attacks made it impractical to continue construction. This airfield is scheduled for upgrading within the next quarter.

(d) Dalat/Can Ly (SP 105220): This field was closed to C-130 traffic on 23 Jul due to failures in ESAT surface. The 87th Sngr 3n commenced work in Aug to repair and upgrade. On 13 Sep the old runway was opened to C-130 traffic and on 3 Oct the new runway became operational for C-130 aircraft.

(e) Luc Lap II (IT 952722): During the last week of August 1963 a heavy enemy attack on Luc Lap II SF camp damaged the T-17 airstrip. Several areas of the runway subgrade were exposed and saturated with water necessitating closure of the strip. On 2 Sep the 70th Sngr 3n (C) moved a platoon of Airmobile engineer equipment to the site. Expedient repairs were completed by 16 Sep allowing the field to become operational for C-7A aircraft. One squad remained on site to continue emergency repairs. On 16 Oct the west half of the runway had deteriorated to such an extent that repair was necessary. However, sufficient runway on the east remained operational for continued use by C-7A’s. At the close of this reporting period this airfield is rapidly deteriorating and can be expected to be closed in the early part of Nov. This field has long passed its design life and major upgrading is scheduled during the next quarter.

(f) Luc Nguyen (SP 352408): This C-7A field was closed in July due to subgrade failure. One platoon from the 70th Sngr 3n (C) moved to the site to perform expedient repairs sufficient to keep the strip open through the monsoon season. This field was opened to C-7A traffic on 14 Sep. Major upgrading is planned during the next quarter.

(g) LZ English (IT 279029): On 29 Jul the 10th Sngr 3n commenced upgrading this airfield with an asphalt surface with the expected date of completion of 1 Oct. Heavy monsoon rains during the latter part of this report period prevented completion. As of the close of this quarter 300 feet of asphalt surface on the south end has been completed and work on the next 400-foot section is in progress. The north 1300 feet of ESAL matting is being maintained for C-7A aircraft operations.

CONFIDENTIAL
(h) Phan Thiet (AV 301068). This field was closed to C-130 traffic in Aug and subsequently closed to C-123 aircraft on 4 Sep. The 37th Engr Bn initiated repair in Sep and on 2 Oct the field was opened to C-123 aircraft. Permanent repair and upgrading was initially scheduled to start 15 Nov but USAV directed that work be discontinued until proper administrative procedures for closing airfields have been executed. The temporary repair was completed 25 Oct with the airfield approved for Type I C-130 operations. Permanent repairs are planned for the next quarter.

(i) Phu Tue (BG 504593). This T-17 field was closed in July due to rips in the T-17 membrane and subgrade failure. A platoon of the 20th Engr Bn (C) commenced repair on 22 Jul. Upgrading included the removal of the membrane, reworking and compaction of subgrade, application of a pentaprime seal coat. Work was completed on 17 Sep. The field is open on the west end of the runway to Type II C-7A traffic. The remainder of the runway is operational but remains closed in order to maintain a C-130 emergency capable airfield if future operations so require.

(j) K100. Due to extensive use in July and August the matting on the parking apron required repair. In addition, drainage ditches required clearing and reshaping. Repairs were accomplished by the 37th Engr Bn on 9 Oct.

(3) Land Clearing Operations. The 35th Land Clearing Plt continued in direct support of I FFORCVN. During the past three months 7,370 acres were cleared. These areas were:

(a) Route 1-11 between Song Pha and Phan Rang.
(b) Route 506 from vicinity BR 831320 to BR 397716.
(c) Phu Cu Pass BR 830000.
(d) Area vicinity LZ English 33 915038 was cleared.
(e) Area vicinity 95 920040 was cleared.
(f) Route Upgrading in III CTZ.

(a) During the reporting period approximately 44.12 km of LOC were paved to KACV standard. Paving operations throughout are progressing steadily.

(b) Within the 35th Engr Gp A0 the following route upgrading tasks were achieved:

1. Route 1-11: Elements of 86th Engr Bn have completed paving the section from Nhon to Cu Kong Pass and from Nhon to Dong Son. Paving continues on several sections of 1-11.

2. Route 69: RJ CL-1 to CAP RCG IV/IV II. has been paved. Elements of the 86th Engr Bn have upgraded 22 km of the southern section to a limited all weather road.

3. Route 19: The 201st ARVN Engr Bn has completed the last of four bridges in coordination with 351st Engr Gp. Elements of the 389th Engr Bn completed paving the section from An Ibe to Long Giang Pass.

4. Route 11: Elements of 589th Engr Bn have completed upgrading the section from Phan Rang to Song Pha. Work continues on the section from Song Pha to Dalat with an SCC of 31-36 G5.
AVFA-GC-67
15 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORC3V for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS C3F0R-65 (Rl) (U)

I. Within the 997th Engr Gp AO the following LOC upgrading has been accomplished.

1. Route 146: Elements of 20th Engr Bn, 399th Engr Bn and 315th Engr Bn completed the upgrading of the section between Pleiku to Dak To.

2. Route 512: Elements of 399th Engr Bn installed 233 meters of tactical bridging, 1230 meters of culverts and seven bypasses. Maintenance was performed on 635.15 km of LOC, 32 bypasses and 79 bridges.

II. Information Office

(a) Representatives of the Information Office provided publicity coverage for numerous awards and promotion ceremonies as well as for special events during this period, including:

(a) Presentation of the Silver Star Medal to CPT Cymbay, II Corps, by LTG Peers - 10 Aug 68.

(b) Assumption of command, I FFORC3V Art'y, by BG Richard A. Edwards - 11 Aug 68.

(c) Presentation of the Legion of Merit to LTC Junk, G3, I FFORC3V by LTG Peers - 12 Aug 68.

(d) Presentation of the Legion of Merit to LTC Teahan, G3, I FFORC3V by LTG Peers - 14 Aug 68.

(e) Presentation of seven Purple Hearts to wounded personnel at the 37th Field Hospital by BG Richard A. Edwards, CG, I FFORC3V Art'y - 18 Aug 68.

(f) Presentation of the Silver Star Medal to CPT Guthrie, G3, II Corps by LTG Peers - 29 Aug 68.

(g) Presentation of the Distinguished Flying Cross to LTC Lukert, Deputy Avn Officer, by LTG Peers - 30 Aug 68.

(h) Graduation of Naval Officer Candidates from the Vietnamese Naval Academy at Kha Trang attended by President Thieu and LTG Peers - 17 Sep 68.

(i) Ceremony honoring the ROI, Tiger Division at Qui Nhon - 23 Sep 68.


II. Photographic coverage was provided for numerous distinguished visitors, including:

(a) General Leonard F. Chapman, Commandant USNC, 5 Aug 68.

(b) General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., CG, MACV, 15 Aug 68.

(c) Mr. Richard C. Steedman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 21 Aug 68.

(d) BG William E. Potts, ACom, USAFRAC, 29 Aug 68.

(e) General Ralph E. Haines, CG, USAFRAC, 29 Aug 68.

(f) LTG Frank C. Hildren, Deputy Commander, USAFRAC, 27 Aug 68.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968, RG5 CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(g) BG Spurgeon Neel, Chief Surgeon, USARV, 16-17 Sep 68.
(h) General Curtis R. LeMay, USAF (Ret.), 17 Oct 68.
(i) COL Norman Farrell, CO, Institute of Land Combat, 19 Oct 68.

(j) The following media representatives were granted an interview with the CG and/or G2/G3 briefing during the period covered by the report:
(a) Tony Baker, Reuters Wire Service, 13 Aug 68.
(b) Lee Lescase, Washington Post, 19 Aug 68.
(c) William Touhy, Los Angeles Times, 19 Aug 68.
(d) R.W. MacClennon, Reuters Wire Service, 20 Aug 68.
(e) Don Moser, Life Magazine, 5 Sep 68.
(f) John Wheeler, AP, 9 Sep 68.
(g) Ennio Iacobucci, Free Lance, 12 Sep 68.
(h) Bob Stokes, Newsweek, 12 Sep 68.
(i) James R. Wardrop, Free Lance, 12 Sep 68.
(j) Bennet Marsh Clark, Wallace Terry, Time-Life, 21 Sep 68.
(k) David Morrison, Australian News, 25 Sep 68.

(4) Command Information Initial Orientation Briefings for personnel newly assigned to I FFORCEV were conducted twice monthly.

(5) A branch of the I FFORCEV Information Office was established at CORDS on 29 October 1968. The branch is composed of one officer and two EM from the 5th Public Information Detachment. It is headed by CPT Randolph D. Brock, Assistant Information Officer (CORDS). The purpose of the branch is to provide both internal and external information support for CORDS activities throughout II Corps.

(6) The 5th Public Information Detachment, under the supervision of the IO, I FFORCEV, published and distributed its "Morning News" on a daily basis, and a bi-weekly summation of news in II Corps Tactical Zone, the "Wrap-Up". The 5th PID also produced a weekly 15 minute radio program known as the "Feature Page". The I FFORCEV magazine, the "TYPHOON", was published in August, September and October.

(7) The 11th Public Information Detachment continued to provide transportation, escort, billets and other aid to correspondents and visiting information personnel, handling 412 personnel during the period covered. 1LT David P. Hooks was assigned on 16 Sep 68 and assumed the duty of press officer, MACV Press Camp, Pleiku.
k. (U) Inspector General Activities:

(1) A total of 43 complaints and 44 requests for assistance were received during the period. Of the 43 complaints, only six were considered to be justified. There was no indication of conditions detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of the command.

(2) Command inspections were conducted of the following units on dates indicated; all were rated satisfactory:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54th Sig Bn</td>
<td>2 Aug 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209th Sig Det</td>
<td>2 Aug 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam Dong Prov Adv Tm</td>
<td>4 Aug 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st Arty Op</td>
<td>12 Aug 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bon Prov Adv Tm</td>
<td>18 Aug 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co E 20th Inf (IRP)</td>
<td>23 Aug 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167th Sig Co</td>
<td>23 Aug 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Arty Op</td>
<td>26 Aug 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuyen Duc Prov Adv Tm</td>
<td>1 Sep 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn 17th Arty</td>
<td>9 Sep 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st CA Co</td>
<td>13 Sep 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh Hoa Prov Adv Tm</td>
<td>15 Sep 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th FI Det</td>
<td>27 Sep 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th MI Det</td>
<td>27 Sep 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th Engr Det</td>
<td>27 Sep 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlac Prov Adv Tm</td>
<td>6 Oct 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Bn 26th Arty</td>
<td>7 Oct 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn 60th Arty</td>
<td>7 Oct 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB I FFORCEn Arty</td>
<td>11 Oct 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku Prov Adv Tm</td>
<td>13 Oct 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn 27th Arty</td>
<td>14 Oct 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272d MP Co</td>
<td>25 Oct 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn 32d Arty</td>
<td>31 Oct 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subject: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

(3) Inspector General Guidance Material consisting of special areas to be covered during inspections was received from USARV and disseminated to all assigned and attached units.

(4) Acting inspectors general were appointed for all battalion sized units assigned or attached to this headquarters.

(5) One investigation was conducted involving alleged abandonment of government property and other matters.

(6) HQ I FFORCEV Arty published Reg. No. 20-1, Command Inspections, on 3 Oct 68. This regulation is a companion piece to I FFORCEV Reg 20-1 and is directive upon all artillery units assigned and attached to the command.

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate Activities.

(1) There were six trails by general courts-martial convened by the Commanding General, I FFORCEV during the quarter compared to two cases the previous quarter. One hundred twenty-five special and fifty-nine summary courts-martial records of trial were reviewed for legal sufficiency. This reflects an increase of 60 special and 24 summary courts-martial cases over the previous quarter. For the month of October alone, 73 special and 25 summary courts-martial were received for review. The explanation for the substantial increase of courts-martial records for the month of October is due to I FFORCEV assuming general court-martial jurisdiction for an additional 18 special court-martial jurisdiction. Headquarters I FFORCEV now assumes general court-martial jurisdiction over 38 separate special court-martial jurisdictions.

(2) Forty claims of Army personnel for loss of, or damage to, personal property incident to service were adjudicated and paid, compared to 13 the previous quarter. The claims totaling $13,937.90 were approved for payment in the total amount of $11,310.50.

(3) Nine claims of Vietnamese nationals for personal injury or property damage were forwarded to and paid by this office. The total amount of these payments amounted to $483,650 VN.

(4) The Legal Assistance Office provided advice and assistance on civil matters to 676 individuals during the quarter compared to 828 the previous quarter.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT
15 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS GSOR-65 (RL) (U)

2. SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER’S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The majority of lessons learned by I FFORCEV during the quarter were submitted monthly by staff sections to a Tactical Analysis Board which, after evaluation, developed them into lessons learned directed specifically to units in the II CTZ. These lessons learned along with ones submitted by units are published monthly as "Tactical Notes" (Incl 5, 6 and 7) and are widely disseminated throughout the II CTZ. The majority of these lessons learned, although oriented toward operations in the II CTZ, would be applicable to operations throughout Vietnam.

a. (C) PERSONNEL:

(1) Personnel Selected for Long Range Patrol Units.

(a) OBSERVATION: The soldier between the ages of 20 and 25 years who has limited civilian obligations seems best suited for LRP duties.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience has shown that an NCO with 10 to 15 years service has accrued obligations such as family, house and automobile payments, and has invested enough time in the Army so that retirement is a near goal, or he has developed other objectives which do not coincide with LRP duties. The younger man who is still looking for new experiences and is anxious to test himself in challenging experiences has proven to be best suited for LRP duty. It should be noted that motivation and physical fitness are still the prime requirements.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In the selection of individuals for LRP duties the above evaluation be considered.

(2) LRP Replacements.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the period July - September 1968 all LRP units in I FFORCEV experienced a loss in operational readiness due to a rotational hump. This problem was not as serious in division and separate brigade units as in the I FFORCEV LRP company. In varying degrees, trained LRP replacements were not available for operations until after the rotational hump occurred. The duration in which the number of operational teams was lower than normal varied from two to six weeks.

(b) EVALUATION: This observation is basically a problem of organization and management. It is apparent that at the unit level, LRP commanders had identified projected losses in advance. In some cases replacements were requisitioned through normal channels and in others a recruiting program was effected. Nevertheless these actions were not taken early enough to offset a reduction in operational patrols.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In division and separate brigade units the capability of recruiting LRP replacements may be exercised when LRP unit commanders expect a large rotational hump (more than 15% of authorized strength in one month). LRP unit commanders must review projected losses regularly. This will ensure that rotational humps are identified early enough to permit long range planning for infusions. In cases where a rotational hump is apparent, the appropriate personnel management section should be notified immediately. Preferably action will be taken to infuse personnel from local resources. Special training requirements for LRP volunteers should be taken into account. Normally at least three weeks of training are needed before LRP replacements are available for operations.
the required replacements not be available from local resources, it is the responsibility of the personnel management section concerned to seek assistance from Headquarters, USARV under the provisions of USARV Reg 610-9* dated 26 Jul 68. The LRP unit commander should seek other relief from the rotational hump concurrently with efforts to program infusion. There are many aspects of infusion which are undesirable, particularly for LRP units. Therefore, commanders should attempt to alleviate the rotational hump by encouraging voluntary extensions of tours when appropriate. The newly instituted program authorizing extensions for "early out" may also be appropriate. The key, however, is not to get people, but people who possess the unique qualifications of a LRP.

b. (C) OPERATIONS:

(1) Military Police Uniform for Guard Duty.

(a) OBSERVATION: The white markings on MP helmet liners are visible during the hours of darkness.

(b) EVALUATION: Military police providing perimeter physical security for installations during the hours of darkness can easily be seen by personnel outside the installation due to the wearing of the distinctive MP helmet liner.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Only those military policemen posted on operating entrances and exits to an installation and inside buildings should wear the MP helmet liner. Military Policemen posted to bunkers, towers or walking posts should wear the standard OD helmet during the hours of darkness.

(2) Prisoners of War Camp Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: When a disturbance takes place in a Prisoner of War Camp, prisoners may provide inaccurate accounts of the treatment they received from the guards during the quelling of the disturbance.

(b) EVALUATION: Should disturbances in Prisoner of War Camps occur, the prisoners might make unfounded charges and allegations to Red Cross representatives concerning the methods used by camp officials to bring the camp under control.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: PW Camp authorities should, where possible, request the presence of Red Cross representatives to witness the quelling of a disturbance. This could save time and effort in conducting investigations of alleged misconduct by PW camp officials.

(3) Integrated Patrols.

(a) OBSERVATION: A desirable ratio for integrated Long Range Patrols (LRP) is 4 US and 2 ARVN, 4:2.

(b) EVALUATION: The 4:2 ratio has proven successful in LRP operations. The ARVN soldier, with proper training, makes a good point man, and with two ARVN's assigned, this duty can be rotated. There was little intra-patrol communication problem caused by language in that mutually understood hand and arm signals are preferred to talking. With two ARVN soldiers, knowledge that they can communicate with someone is far better than having one out on patrol by
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GG-O7

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U)

himself. It has also been found to be effective if an interpreter is available at the base radio station.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That integrated patrols use the ratio of 4 US and 2 ARVN.

(4) Utilization of Helicopter Resources.

(a) OBSERVATION: During a recent ROK operation, the initial planning provided for insertion of all combat elements within three and one-half hours and movement of all air-lifted elements within four and one-half hours. Adequate resources were available to accomplish this end. However, changes in unit assignments and LZ locations continued until the last minute. Some of these changes can be attributed to the fact that the regiment was directed to broaden the operation with final approval given less than 24 hours prior to H-Hour. The resulting changes were integrated with minimal confusion and little wasted effort.

(b) EVALUATION: After the operation started, it became obvious that some of the previously selected LZ’s no longer satisfied the tactical situation. New ones were hastily selected and secured. After the initial flights debarked at the new LZ’s, three of them were found to be inadequate for use by CH 47’s. This necessitated substitution of UH-1 aircraft and resulted in a delay of the second lift of approximately one hour. An additional delay developed when the area selected for the Regiment Tactical CP was determined to be unsuitable. This necessitated diversion of follow-up loads and relocation of two CH 47 loads of supplies and equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That thorough and complete planning be accomplished prior to movement of the initial lift to insure maximum benefit is derived from the helicopter resources provided. Map and positive visual reconnaissance must encompass suitable alternate LZ’s as well as primary LZ’s. Adequate time for thorough planning will pay great dividends.

(5) Control of Rice Sales.

(a) OBSERVATION: Intelligence sources have substantiated that VC/NVA elements have forced excessive rice purchases from local villagers and pilferage of rice as a means of resupply.

(b) EVALUATION: Indigenous families often require purchased rice to supplement their regular crop production. VC/NVA forces attempt to collect a variable portion of each family’s rice supply regardless of US Civic Action assistance. To discontinue making purchased rice available would create extreme hardship among the villagers. The formation of consolidated, fortified villages also requires a commitment to provide assistance in economic functions while the newly introduced civic improvements are being accomplished.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That rice purchases documentation be made by the villages to preclude excessive amounts of rice purchases, insure an adequate supply for the villages and require enemy forces to alienate themselves from the civilian population when attempts are made to tax this amount. A mandatory effective reporting system of all rice purchases or pilfered by the enemy will impose a psychological deterrent to collaborators. An inventory of rice available within a village.
and a record of rice consumed within a given period will provide some basis for control.

(6) Combined Update Briefings.

(a) OBSERVATION: Daily at II Corps Headquarters a combined update briefing is held with both ARVN staff and US advisors participating. During this briefing both US and ARVN operations and significant enemy contacts are discussed. A weekly update briefing is also conducted, with presentations from Company B, 5th Special Forces Group and 4th Infantry Division representatives.

(b) EVALUATION: These briefings have been instrumental in keeping II Corps Commander and his staff, as well as advisors, informed of Free World force operations and enemy activity. These combined update briefings have also helped to create a working atmosphere of mutual cooperation and coordination between ARVN and US forces in II Corps Tactical Zone.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that combined update briefings be held at other headquarters where applicable.

(7) ARVN Acceptance of US Programs/Plans.

(a) OBSERVATION: The seeming reluctance of ARVN commanders and staff officers to accept and immediately implement all ideas generated by US military personnel is not an indication of the inability of the ARVN officer corps to accomplish a mission nor is it a sign of bad faith towards their US counterparts.

(b) EVALUATION: The status of US Army personnel in relation to the personnel of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam is either that of advisors or that of an adjacent tactical headquarters. The capability of ARVN units to make radical changes as far as organization or method of operation is not presently inherent in their basic organization. The change must be initiated by the top of their command structure and pass through the chain of command to the unit level. Each level must weigh the merits of the proposed change against the disadvantages and then analyse their capability to institute the change. The basic thought process of the ARVN officer does not include the sense of urgency that characterizes the American thinking. They will not be pushed into making a "snap judgement" on an issue.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that US personnel continue to make suggestions and provide advice to ARVN at all levels of command. Personal contact and assistance must be continued by US advisors to instill a sense of urgency and to help develop necessary leadership traits in the ARVN officer.


(a) OBSERVATION: A marked improvement in the pride and morale has been noted in ARVN units having personnel who have been presented US impact awards.

(b) EVALUATION: US recognition of significant ARVN achievement in combat has created an atmosphere of better understanding and cooperation between ARVN and US forces. Impact awards have emphasized the
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Operational Report of Headquarters PFOCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U)

importance of combined operations and combined recognition of valorous actions on the part of ARVN personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that impact awards be continued and, when possible, that combined award ceremonies be conducted to demonstrate joint recognition of ARVN valorous achievement.

9) Target Categories for Tactical Air Expenditures.

(a) OBSERVATION: Prior to 1 September, units OPCON to PFOCEV, ROKFV-FC and II Corps operated under a seemingly standard set of tactical air terms. Such terms as troops in contact, known enemy location, suspected enemy location, landing zone construction and landing zone preparation were in common use. However, over a period of time each major field command came to attribute a slightly different meaning to each of these terms thus developing a variation in interpretation. This variation often becomes apparent during the preparation of weekly, monthly and quarterly reports on TAC Air.

(b) EVALUATION: To resolve this problem, Headquarters PFOCEV established a working committee composed of staff officers from AASC Alpha, G2, FSCB and C3 Air. The objective of the committee was to develop a standard set of terms with clear, concise definitions which would be used by units within the II CTZ to describe targets to be attacked by TAC Air. On 1 Sep 66 the new terminology was placed into effect for all US/FVWAF units receiving air support from PFOCEV. II Corps has been requested to adopt the terms developed by the committee so that all units within the II CTZ would report under a common criteria. To date, II Corps has not completely integrated all facets of the program but is working towards that goal. Once complete integration is effected by II Corps, all units within II CTZ can evaluate and compare their efforts against those of other units. Further, field commanders will be able to determine exactly where their air effort is being expended and can determine where ordinance shifts can be made to attack more profitable targets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Will be made after the standard terms now used are analysed.

10) ARC Light Briefings.

(a) OBSERVATION: Prior to the publication of MACV Dir 95-11, Aviation ARC Light Operations (U), 3 Jul 66, the ARC Light program was governed by a series of ARC Light policy messages, and two publications. Many of these messages were not available to this headquarters or field units. Consequently, an element of uncertainty was prevalent throughout the II CTZ in regard to current concepts and employment of the ARC Light force.

(b) EVALUATION: To alleviate this situation, an PFOCEV ARC Light Briefing Team was established. Composed of senior staff officers from G3 Air, FSCB and G2, the team presented detailed and comprehensive briefings on the ARC Light program to major field commanders operating within the II CTZ. The briefings were conducted in two parts and had the objectives of providing field commanders with basic knowledge, technical procedures, current concepts on the employment of the ARC Light force and current targetting and requesting procedures. As a result of the ARC Light briefings, a marked improvement in the employment of the ARC Light force was observed. More profitable targets are being nominated with reasonable TOT's and target valid periods. Prescribed request procedures are followed closely which expedites coordination and processing of field
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEN for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

unit requests at corps level. Continued emphasis on employment procedures to include target selection and request procedures should be a continuing requirement for all units who utilise the ARC Light force in the accomplishment of their mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other field forces evaluate their ARC Light program for possible implementation of this briefing team concept.

(11) Ground Designation of Targets.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the battle of Duc Lap, the enemy was observed to continue mortaring friendly positions even when a FAC was circling overhead. However, when the FAC moved in to mark the enemy position with WP rockets, the enemy would cease firing and take cover.

(b) EVALUATION: To counter this action, the US Ground Advisor and the FAC coordinated on an idea developed by the ground advisor. Instead of the FAC marking the target with his rockets, the ground unit would fire on the enemy position with a mortar smoke round. This action did not cause the enemy to take cover. The time from shot to splash wash was taken into consideration, to insure that the fighter aircraft was on its final attack heading, just as splash was received. As a result, the bombs struck the target area with more effective results. Eye witnesses confirmed the effectiveness of this tactic.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the above technique be considered and if accepted, be disseminated for possible inclusion with other defensive measures.

(12) Spooky/TAC Air Techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the battle for Duc Lap, it was observed that the NVA forces would launch their attacks during the early morning or early evening hours. These were the time periods when Spooky was least effective and it was either too early in the morning or too late in the evening for TAC Air to be most effective.

(b) EVALUATION: To counter the NVA tactic, the following techniques were employed. Realizing that the NVA were taking advantage of a period of ineffectiveness when Tac Air and Spooky were at a disadvantage, friendly forces at Duc Lap devised a plan to exploit this condition. At approximately 1400 hours each day, the FAC would head for home but at the same time maintain a set of fighters high overhead. Assuming the FAC and fighters had left the area, the NVA would launch their attack. The FAC would immediately return and expend the fighters on as many targets as possible before darkness blanketed the area. In the meantime Spooky arrived on station and continued the support as the fighters and FAC returned to base. During the daylight hours FAC's and fighter aircraft were scheduled to arrive in the target area at first light so as to engage enemy targets as they returned to their day positions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that this technique be evaluated and, if accepted, disseminated for possible inclusion with other defensive measures.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 1 FFOSGBV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS OSGSAR-65 (Rl) (U)

(13) Combined Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Combined operations under the Pair-Off Concept initiated in Jun 68 in I I CTZ are an effective means of improving the effectiveness of ARVN and upgrading the RF and PF.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. The best example of the implementation of the Pair-Off Concept is found in AO DAN THAN – MCLAIN where the 23d ARVN Div Light CP and RF South are conducting combined operations. The units have collocated their CP's to simplify coordinating plans and operations. Bilingual operations plans and orders, sitreps and briefings are the norm. Support, to include artillery, tactical air, and aviation is shared based on the tactical operations being conducted. RF and PF units are frequently integrated into operations and work closely with ARVN and US units. In September for example, B Co, 3d Bn (Atn), 506th Inf conducted a six day combined operation with the 442d RF Co to include a combat assault. During two multi-battalion operations conducted by the 3d Bn (Atn) 503d Inf and the 2d ARVN Rngr Gp, the respective CP's were collocated to facilitate coordination and control of the operation. The collocation of CP's and combined operations provide an excellent opportunity for ARVN and RF/PF personnel to observe US staffs and combat troops performing their respective tasks. This provides a springboard to enhance competence in ARVN and RF/PF and leads to an increased degree of self-confidence. Probably the most important result of the Pair-Off Concept has been increased ARVN participation in combat operations. Pairing off ARVN units with US units, which also provides increased artillery and aviation support, appears to have inspired ARVN to perform an ever increasing number of operations.

2. On 22 Aug 68, Operation DAN STNH 22-6 began. The operation, a coordinated effort involving elements of the 22d ARVN Div and the 173d Abn Bde (Sep), was planned in three phases. Phase I was a search and clear operation to clear the armed VC/NVA from the operational area, northeastern Binh Dinh Province generally east of the 61st grid line and north of the 96th grid line to the province border. Phase II was a detailed search of the area to include a screening and classification of all personnel. Phase III, a saturation phase, continues with allied forces operating in the area to deny the return of VC/NVA forces, develop the confidence of the population in allied forces and to protect the population from VC/NVA exploitation. This operation is significant for two reasons, it is a completely combined and coordinated operation at times involving three ARVN and three US battalions and it is consistent with plans for the stepped up pacification effort. The results to date are quite impressive. There have been 243 VC/NVA KIA. With 12,315 personnel processed through the established screening points, there have been 122 persons classified VC and 115 civil defendants held. This operation has shown that combined efforts will work and can be beneficial.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Pair-Off Concept be considered for implementation within the other Corps areas of RVN.

(14) Friendly Losses Due to the Establishment of a Fixed Routine.

(a) OBSERVATION: While playing volleyball in a hamlet, a PF platoon was engaged by a force of 9-10 VC and suffered heavy losses of personnel and equipment. The VC, wearing RF uniforms, infiltrated the hamlet in groups of threes and fours.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, I FFORCEN for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968

AVFA-GC-OT 15 November 1968

RE: CSFCR-65 (R1) (U)

(b) EVALUATION: This FF platoon was considered first rate by both the province and district senior advisors. It had acquitted itself well in several previous actions, but had established a well-known routine for playing volleyball and stacking its weapons at a distance from the volleyball court every afternoon. This enabled the enemy to get between the personnel and their weapons.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. Units must take every precaution to ensure that security is maintained during physical training.

2. Units should avoid establishing fixed routines.

3. Population controls must be established enabling units to make positive identification of friendly personnel. It must be assumed that the enemy will attempt to achieve surprise by wearing friendly uniforms or the clothing of the local civilians.

(d) Security for Operating Bases.

(b) OBSERVATION: Two FF platoons and a RD team located in an operating base came under attack by an enemy force of approximately 28 VC. During the ensuing battle, the defending force was routed and suffered disproportionate casualties to the size of the attacking force.

(b) EVALUATION: An analysis of this action revealed that listening posts were not employed. A commander was not appointed to control the activities of the three units in the operating base. They operated independently of one another.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. In situations where more than one unit is employed an overall commander must be appointed.

2. Listening posts or observation posts must be employed in all defensive situations.

(16) Span of Control.

(b) OBSERVATION: In many instances, district and province chiefs and RF/PF group commanders have more units under their command than they can effectively control.

(b) EVALUATION: One successful solution to this problem has been the division of provinces into specified areas of operations (AO), following village boundaries where possible. When availability of RF resources permits, an RF company is assigned responsibility for each AO. The RF commander is given military operational control of FF platoons and paramilitary forces within his assigned AO. Where an RF company is not available for positioning in an AO, an RF officer could be placed in command. Commanders of each AO report directly to an RF/B Group Headquarters or to the district chief.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That in instances where the span of control is excessive the AO concept be adopted.

(17) Ethnic Minorities Affairs - Resettlement.

(a) OBSERVATION: The attempt to resettle approximately 60 Montagnard refugees from a temporary site at Dien Khanh District to a site at Khanh Duong District, Khanh Hoa Province failed.

(b) EVALUATION: The refugees were transported from the temporary camp site in Dien Khanh District to a resettlement area in Khanh Duong District, Khanh Hoa Province. Within two weeks all of the refugees had traveled back to Dien Khanh. Their refusal to be relocated was caused by a failure to convince the elders of the group that it was in the best interests of the Montagnards to resettle in Khanh Duong, and secondarily the fact that the resettlement site had not been adequately prepared to accommodate the refugees, even though the Provincial Refugee Service Chief had indicated the site would be ready.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That hamlet or group leaders, especially Montagnards, be consulted and persuaded to support any proposed relocation; that plans and preparations be thoroughly inspected to assure completeness prior to the movement of refugees to a new location; and that an adequate education program precede the move.

(18) PSYOP Comic Strip Leaflet.

(a) OBSERVATION: It is difficult to direct PSYOP at a Montagnard target audience. They have a low literacy level, with many different languages and dialects. This makes the normal type of printed message or pre-recorded tape of very limited appeal and usefulness.

(b) EVALUATION: The Propaganda Development Center of the 8th PSYOP Bn developed "Comic Strip" type leaflets employing a series of pictures. These leaflets were understood by the target audience and contributed to the success of the operation described in the August portion of the general comments.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The "Comic Strip" type of leaflet should be utilized in PSYOP on audiences with a low level of literacy.

(19) Boundary Coordination.

(a) OBSERVATION: VC political boundaries do not coincide with SVN political boundaries.

(b) EVALUATION: A province/district VCI operating within his VC province/district could be, in effect, operating in two or more SVN provinces/districts of II Corps and in some instances spill over I Corps or III Corps boundaries. Coordination of intelligence collection and anti-VCI operations can be effected by appropriate echelons within the CTZ. However, no provisions have been made at national level for coordination between corps. The requirement for an SOP for coordination between corps areas was brought to the attention of Central PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Staff Inspection Team on 28 Oct 68.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an SOP for coordination between corps areas be effected by the proper authorities.

(20) Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Support of Cordon and Search Operations.

(a) DISCUSSION: PSYOP support of tactical operations in Darlac Province consisted of sending out armed propaganda teams with no advisors and little or no advance briefing on the operation. The results were less than desirable and at times the API's were subjected to unnecessary risks and dangers.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCIV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOh-65 (R1) (U)

(b) EVALUATION: A PSYOP advisor now goes on all tactical operations. An after-action report is completed upon his return. The report consists of the following format: (1) The purpose of the mission, (2) the PSYOP method used, (3) the results obtained, (4) Lessons Learned and (5) recommended actions for future operations. This report is then circulated to all individuals and units concerned with the operation. Arrangements have also been made for a PSYOP representative to attend all tactical planning sessions. This approach has resulted in a much more comprehensive and effective PSYOP effort. Operational support now includes the use of airborne speakers, MEDCAP teams, Armed Propaganda Teams and where feasible, the cultural/drama teams.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Wherever necessary, the APT/PSYOP should take similar steps to ensure that effective and coordinated PSYOP support is provided to cordon and search operations.

(21) GVN Acceptance of US Policy/Programs.

(a) OBSERVATION: GVN officials at province and district level have been reluctant to accept policy guidance on PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG operations from US advisors without first receiving detailed instructions from GVN superiors.

(b) EVALUATION: A recent case in point is the policy of operating PIOCC's and DIOCC's on a twenty-four hour basis. This guidance was given by US advisors with little success until the regional GVN officials issued a letter stating that PIOCC's and DIOCC's would operate around the clock. The letter did not specifically state 24 hours daily, seven days a week, so one province interpreted the letter as not applying to weekends despite insistence by US advisors to the contrary. It was necessary to have Vietnamese superiors clarify the meaning of the letter.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Matters involving operational policy should initially go through GVN channels. The US advisors then can provide technical guidance on how to best implement the planned policy.

(22) Targeting.

(a) OBSERVATION: A targeting element with intelligence trained personnel in the FSCE greatly increases its capabilities.

(b) EVALUATION: Target development and fire support must be responsive to the operational requirements of maneuver forces. In order to pass targets to the artillery, a considerable amount of intelligence information is screened and posted. Acquired targets, in particular, require a careful terrain analysis. ARC Light recommendations are based primarily upon an evaluation of current intelligence. The inclusion of intelligence trained personnel in FSCEs provides qualified personnel to perform these tasks and expedites the development of targets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That intelligence trained personnel be assigned to duty in the targeting section in FSCEs.

(23) Artillery Warning Control Centers.

(a) OBSERVATION: The proper dissemination of artillery warnings to all aircraft is a matter of command interest.

(b) EVALUATION: Many aircraft of all services and nationalities are involved in Vietnam-type conflicts. An extremely undesirable safety con-
dition exists where the responsibility for the dissemination of information and control of warnings is not coordinated by a single agency. A single agency can be established within a local area with the responsibility of providing warning of artillery firing to all aircraft. This responsibility must cross both service and national chains of command if it is to be effective. Mutual agreement for establishment of air corridors and terminals must take place between local airfield commanders and ground force commanders in proximity to airfields. The establishing and coordinating authority for all warning agencies should be the ground commander in the respective areas. In addition, all radio frequencies used must be unclassified and widely disseminated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders establish within their respective AOs a single agency to provide artillery warnings to all aircraft.

(24) Improvement of Counterbattery Programs.

(a) OBSERVATION: The success of any counterbattery program depends on detailed prior planning and rapid, aggressive execution.

(b) EVALUATION: A timely and effective counterbattery program can only be realized through close coordination between the maneuver unit and its supporting artillery. Without this coordination it is impossible to develop a sound, workable counterbattery plan. Several techniques for improving the acquisition of enemy mortar, rocket and recoilless rifle locations have been evaluated by IFFORCEV Arty. These techniques as well as suggested ammunition expenditures for specific targets are attached as Inclosure 20.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the techniques for target acquisition and the guidelines on ammunition expenditures (Incl 20) be adopted as a basis for improving counterbattery programs by other USARV commands.

c. (C) TRAINING.

(1) Teacher Training:

(a) OBSERVATION: Previous practice has been for the Elementary Education Advisor to travel throughout the provinces to attend and participate in workshops, seminars and conferences. These were one-day affairs or joint participation projects of one week duration.

(b) EVALUATION: It is believed that a more lasting effect could be obtained through an intensive two-month training course, such as is in progress in Nha Trang for two of the outstanding educators from each province. These educators would provide in-service training to teachers in their provinces during the remainder of the year, and assist in the next summer’s hamlet training course. There is every indication that this multiplying effect will be highly successful. It reduces administrative and travel time for the education advisors and, at the same time, it intensifies their influence. The responsibility of upgrading provincial teachers will be retained by the Vietnamese after they have had the opportunity of an intensive specialized course pertaining to specific in-service problems.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That more seminars and teacher training workshops be conducted. That results and lessons learned from this pilot program now in progress be disseminated to other regions for study and implementation.

(2) Public Administration.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 R.S CSPOR-65 (Rl) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: The training provided hamlet and village officials has not been as effective as it could have been. The course, as presently offered, is general and broad in nature and is in fact a training course rather than a training course. Although beneficial to some extent, it has not provided village and hamlet officials with specific items of information needed to operate a village or hamlet under present laws and regulations.

(b) EVALUATION: During this quarter, the training sessions were utilised to provide six to eight hours of specific, detailed instruction in self-help techniques and administration. The improvement in that field has been spectacular and the benefit of specific instruction was clearly demonstrated.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That in the future the generalized course should be used as an orientation for newly elected or appointed officials, and that subsequent training be directed at more specific subjects, such as fiscal procedures, preparation of tax rolls and functions and procedures of village committees.

d. (c) INTELLIGENCE.

(1) PW Interrogation:

(a) OBSERVATION: Much information of immediate tactical importance is lost because companies and battalions are unable to make on the spot interrogation of PW’s.

(b) EVALUATION: Interrogators are rarely available at battalion level and lower. This means that PW’s must be sent to brigade or division before they can be interrogated. This results in the loss of tactical information of importance to the unit engaged. Many battalions and companies have translators, but they are not trained interrogators. Some units have found that by supplying the battalion S2’s and the available translators with a list of standard questions that will fit most situations and elicit basic essential intelligence, the loss of critical information is minimised.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Whenever possible, battalion S2’s should receive basic instruction in the principles of interrogation. The division or brigade 1PM teams should prepare a list of basic questions to be asked a PW. This list can be disseminated to all battalion S2’s who will instruct that selected company personnel and all translators are familiar with the list and are briefed by the S2 on its use.

(2) Linguists Assigned to Intelligence Agencies.

(a) OBSERVATION: The presence of large numbers of Republic of Korea troops in II CTZ has created the need for the exchange of intelligence information in order that all allied forces are fully informed of developments in the enemy situation. This requirement exceeds normal liaison and exchange capabilities and necessitates the employment of organic Korean linguists.

(b) EVALUATION: The timeliness of intelligence information is critical to its utility. When a document or interrogation report is exploited by Korean forces, it must be translated before it is sent to US agencies unless the latter has an organic Korean language capability.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT 15 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

The recent employment of a Korean civilian by the 55th Military Intelligence Detachment (supporting I FFORCEV) has enabled the rapid exchange and exploitation of intelligence derived from ROKFV sources. The Korean linguist is particularly valuable when he has previous military intelligence experience in the Korean Army as in the above cited case. Korean linguists would be a valuable asset to the concerned Province and District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers in addition to US OPCON units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a FWMAF linguist be assigned to each military intelligence detachment or intelligence agency in or adjacent to allied AO.

(3) Interrogation of Wounded PW's.

(a) OBSERVATION: Much valuable intelligence information is lost because wounded prisoners of war often die before medical evacuation is completed.

(b) EVALUATION: The loss of intelligence due to the death of enemy PW's during evacuation has been avoided when precautions were taken to insure that an interrogator remained with the wounded prisoner while he was being evacuated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When a PW is medically evacuated, a knowledgeable interrogator when available should accompany him to the hospital.

(4) Remuneration to Civilians for Intelligence Information.

(a) OBSERVATION: Available resources are not adequately utilized to elicit information from the civilian populace.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience has shown that the civilian populace is willing to provide information on enemy activity such as the location of anti-vehicular mines and movement of troops. The cooperation of civilian personnel is greatly enhanced when monetary and material remuneration is given in exchange for information. MACV Directives make provision for the purchase of goods and food to offer as an incentive for the populace to provide information. It has been found that because of the limited use of money in some areas, material items provide the best incentive.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an extensive effort be made by units to utilize all available resources to obtain information on the enemy from civilian personnel.

(5) Interrogation Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: Preliminary training is necessary for newly assigned combat interrogators before they can effectively interrogate PW's for tactical intelligence.

(b) EVALUATION: There are two general types of interrogation. One type is for immediate tactical information from newly captured prisoners; the second type takes place at a later time under less pressing circumstances. The latter type of interrogation is usually made to satisfy Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR's) levied by higher headquarters. Due to the comparatively relaxed atmosphere of SICR interrogations, they provide a good training vehicle for inexperienced interrogators to learn to deal with enemy PW's.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (E) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Newly assigned and inexperienced interrogators should be assigned SICE interrogations in order to develop a technique to effectively deal with enemy personnel.

(d) Exchange of Intelligence Information.

(a) OBSERVATION: The establishment of rapport between ARVN and US intelligence agencies is of primary importance to the war effort in Vietnam.

(b) EVALUATION: The ARVN intelligence officers possess the area knowledge and area access which US intelligence officers cannot hope to obtain due to their ethnic origin and short duration in the area. The ARVN province intelligence files provide a data base for US combat units operating in the area and ARVN intelligence personnel can act as an intermediary between US intelligence personnel and the Vietnamese populace.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that close coordination and rapport be maintained between the ARVN and US intelligence agencies within a tactical area of operation and that maximum utilization be made by US tactical units S2/G2's of the ARVN military intelligence detachments (MIDs) attached to their divisions. These MID's can be of immeasurable assistance in the interrogation of PW's, exploitation of captured documents and in counter-intelligence.

(e) LOGISTICS.

(1) Direct Support of Non-Divisional Units.

(a) OBSERVATION: The logistical support of the II CTZ is provided by the Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands. The 1st Logistical Command prohibits the support commands from operating outside their assigned areas. Non-divisional units frequently move across the support command boundary in response to operational requirements. As these units move across a boundary, each loses its direct support until new support arrangements can be established. Frequently, the receiving support command is not immediately able to support the unit. Support is therefore marginal until the logistical support channel is completely reestablished. Often the unit returns to its normal area of operation prior to completion of new support arrangements.

(b) EVALUATION: When operating away from its normal direct support, a unit's effectiveness is reduced until new lines of support can be established. Often the receiving support command does not normally support the type of equipment of the incoming unit. In addition, the density of certain items is increased by such amounts to make support insufficient. A support system is required in which each non-divisional unit is married to a support unit until it is permanently assigned to a new area of operations. When the unit is moved to meet a temporary requirement, its primary support channels should move with the unit and remain with that unit until support can be established in the new area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. That the unit assigned primary responsibility provide direct support without regard to the supported unit's location.

2. That as an area of operation of a non-divisional unit is permanently changed, the old primary direct support unit be responsible to ensure the smooth transition of support data and requirements to the new direct support unit.
(2) Establishing Forward Support Areas.

(a) OBSERVATION: Logistical facilities, primarily a Class III POL storage area and an Ammunition Supply Point (ASP), are required when supporting a brigade-size task force. Procedures and requirements for planning and operating Forward Support Areas (FSA) are outlined in the 1st Logistical Command Regulation 525-1.

(b) EVALUATION: The support commands have the responsibility of establishing and operating FSAs which are capable of supporting a brigade-size force. The tactical situation, terrain and security requirements at forward support areas influence the location and physical layout of forward support areas. During early planning, consideration must be given to selection of the logistical facility sites. The task force commander must be charged with the total responsibility in his area of operations. This should include proper and prompt coordination with the support command representatives to assure that the ASP and FSA are situated so that engineer work on these critical facilities can commence immediately. During one operation, a total of 508 man-hours and 153 equipment-hours were lost in working on these critical facilities due to lack of coordination. Fortunately, the operation took place in a location where a POL point had been previously established and effort thereon was not required initially.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. During initial planning, logistical facility sites must be selected by the task force commander in coordination with the support command representative and the task force engineer.

2. Engineer work on these facilities should begin immediately and continue without interruption until completion.

(3) AN/VRC 46 Radio Maintenance.

(a) OBSERVATION: The AN/VRC 46 Radio Set is not weatherproof.

(b) EVALUATION: Although the AN/VRC 46 Radio Set is classified as weatherproof, monsoon rains in Vietnam have an adverse effect on the performance of the radio. Due to water seepage, the radio has a tendency to short out thus eliminating a means of communication for MP patrols.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Remove radio sets from vehicles when not in use. Before storing a set, it should be completely dry. It may be desirable to remove the cover and check for moisture. If moisture is discovered, leave the set open in a warm, dry, protected place until the moisture has evaporated.

(4) Safety Criteria for Ammunition Supply Points (ASP).

(a) OBSERVATION: Safety criteria established for ASP operations under 1st Log Cad Reg 525-1 and USARV Reg 700-7 are extremely difficult to meet consistent with tactical considerations.

(b) DISCUSSION: Quality-distance safety requirements imposed upon the tactical commander are difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in the tactical situation in Vietnam. The criteria established by regulations are acceptable to CONUS operations but are not acceptable in a tactical environment. This is due to:
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters I FFORC EW for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS GSPER-65 (Al) (U)

1. The general non-availability of real estate in South Vietnam.

2. Excessive engineering effort required for the construction of ASP's which results in the diversion of engineer assets from other critical requirements.

3. Compatibility and distance requirements result in overextending defensive perimeters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That every effort be made to provide flexibility in ASP safety criteria.

(f) (C) ORGANIZATION.

(1) Reorganization of Long Range Patrol Teams.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is no requirement for radio operators (MOS 05B) in the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol MTOE (7-157E).

(b) EVALUATION: There is no requirement for this MOS since the basic patrol radio of the LRP team is the PRC/25, which is operated by the patrol leader. Thus, radio operators are not required. However, additional infantrymen (MOS 11B) are required.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the 05B MOS in MTOE 7-157E be deleted and MOS 11B be added. An MTOE reflecting these changes has been submitted to USARV.

(g) (C) OTHER.

(1) Sandbag Bunkers Construction.

(a) OBSERVATION: Frequently, bunkers collapse as a result of monsoon rain, termites, poor design or improper methods and materials used during their construction.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience has shown the following factors to be beneficial in preventing the collapse of sandbag bunkers:

1. Load bearing sandbag wall design should definitely not be used if proper construction materials can be obtained. When available, commercial timber should be used for support members.

2. In all cases, emphasis should be placed on tying in each layer of sandbags properly (headers alternated with stretchers). Sandbags should be placed so tied ends and seams are not exposed.

3. Sandbag bearing walls should not exceed two feet in height, nor be less than one and one-half feet from the edge of the excavation.

4. Sandbags should be either burlap or cotton cloth as plastic bags have the greatest tendency to slip when saturated.

5. Sandbags should be uniformly three-quarters full.

6. Overhead beams should extend a minimum of six inches past outer edge of walls.

7. Whenever possible, waterproof the top and sides with suitable
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-GT

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

material, e.g., salvaged T-17 membrane, plastic interliners from 105mm ammo boxes or salvaged canvas.

2. Inspection for soundness of timber and roof sag should be performed by qualified engineer personnel when possible.

10. Constructing drainage structures (ditches, sumps) will prolong bunker life.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above "Lessons learned" be properly distributed to all units engaged in bunker construction.

(2) Press Media Accommodations.

(a) OBSERVATION: The lack of timely advance notification of the arrival of members of the press creates numerous problems, primarily in the areas of providing adequate billeting, transportation and communications.

(b) EVALUATION: Headquarters, I FFORCEV operates two MACV Press Camps, one at Nha Trang and the other at Pleiku. These camps, which are operated by the 11th Public Information Detachment, are designed to provide billets, mess facilities, transportation service and several other administrative-type services for MACV-accredited news media representatives. In addition, the detachment is designed to provide personnel and administrative assistance to assigned, attached and OPCON units in the II CTZ when these units receive more press representatives than they can effectively accommodate. Requests for such assistance should be made to the I FFORCEV Information Officer as expeditiously as possible. The effectiveness of this system depends primarily on rapid notification of the impending arrival of new media representatives and of the deficiencies in the on-site locations which require specified assistance to alleviate. During the Dac Lap operation, notification of arrival was not consistently made and newsmen arrived both in Nha Trang and in Ban Me Thuot region without any accommodations. The lack of advance notification of press arrival hampered this process since three actions are required by the I FFORCEV Information Office to insure smooth coordination: First, notification of the local unit to ascertain the scope of the problem and the accommodations available; second, notification of higher headquarters of the information received; and, third, advising new media representatives of the anticipated problem areas and, where appropriate, recommending to them desirable alternative courses of action. Attempts to effect such necessary coordination after the arrival of newsmen in Ban Me Thuot during the Battle of Dac Lap proved to be most difficult.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. That in the future, responsible personnel notify this headquarters of all news media representatives entering the II CTZ regardless of the unit or area they wish to visit.

2. That major units notify the Information Officer, this headquarters, as expeditiously as possible, of all press requirements in which the assistance of I FFORCEV IO is deemed necessary. Such assistance would normally include, but would not be limited to, billeting and transportation. Specific problem areas applicable to the press should also be conveyed with a minimum of delay.

3. That non-appropriated-fund messes in the area feed news media representatives. When non-appropriated-fund messes are not available, that the major unit provide rations for the press. Newsmen would be required in either case to pay for rations consumed.

CONFIDENTIAL
That in the future, coordination be made with the major signal unit in the area and that phones be made available for correspondents' use. It would be desirable for specific areas to be set aside for use of the press and IO personnel, thereby minimizing interference with operations.

3. Non-Releaseable Information.

(a) OBSERVATION: On occasion, members of the press have acquired items of non-releaseable information, e.g., friendly casualties, number of aircraft downed by enemy fire and unit designations of US and ARVN units. This type information is sometimes gained from briefings when the information is necessary to the press' understanding of the situation. In other cases, military personnel have been overheard by news media representatives who either glean non-releaseable information from the conversations or who form erroneous conclusions based on insufficient data.

(b) EVALUATION: The problem has been resolved by IO personnel accompanying correspondents informing the press as to what constitutes non-releaseable information. In addition, predicated upon timely notification of impending press arrival, IO personnel coordinate with the commander concerned in order to advise him of the guidelines pertaining to non-releaseable information. Cooperation by members of the press in observing these guidelines, once defined, has been good.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the IO representative advise commanders or their designated representatives of the guidelines concerning release of information either prior to or immediately after the arrival of press in operational situations and that the IO attend all briefings to insure that the press is advised of any specific non-releaseable information provided them in briefings for the express purpose of enhancing their understanding of the tactical situation.

4. ARVN and ROK Press Coverage.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many US newsmen express reluctance to cover activities of other than US units due to what they regard as a lack of interest in ARVN, ROK and other FMARF operations in the US.

(b) EVALUATION: Discussions by the IO with several news media representatives indicated that some would like to cover ARVN and ROK operations. However, they felt that the material would not be well-received by their editors in the US due to the above stated reason. These newsmen are aware of the improvement in ARVN units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That US commanders, as well IO's, who come in contact with news media representatives tactfully emphasise the accomplishments of ARVN and other FMARF.

5. IG Complaint System.

(a) OBSERVATION: An analysis of the 87 complaints and requests for assistance received during this quarter revealed that 59% could
have been resolved at unit level if the commander or junior officers and senior NCOs in the unit had taken time to explain pertinent regulations, policies and procedures. However, it was also apparent that complainants were either unaware that the information sought was readily available in the unit or simply chose to approach an Inspector General (IG) with the hope that the IG possesses unique powers to circumvent regulations or to alter normal conditions.

(b) EVALUATION: The IG Complaint System is clearly described in AR 20-1. However, it is unlikely that the average soldier has been exposed to the regulation or that he knows more than the fact that he has the right to see an IG. Although the complainant is encouraged to discuss a problem first with his unit commander, he is not compelled to do so and this is quite proper. Nevertheless, the fact remains that many complaints or requests for assistance must ultimately be returned to the unit commander for resolution. USAV Fact Sheet, Issue No. 2-69, The IG and You, 20 Aug 68 contains an adequate discussion of the IG Complaint System and stresses the thought: "The First Step is Your Commanding Officer".

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a presentation concerning the USAV Fact Sheet, Issue No. 2-69, The IG and You, 20 Aug 68, suitably augmented with local information be included in orientation briefings for newly assigned personnel.

(b) MEDCAP II Projects.

(a) OBSERVATION: When a major unit arrived in the I CTZ in 1965 they found the civilian population of one of the larger cities served only by an austere dispensary, staffed by several lay employees and supervised by the District Medical Chief who was trained only in the fundamentals of preventive medicine. The unit recognized the need for a better medical facility and saw it as an opportunity for an impressive civic action project. Despite lack of sanction by the Province Chief, the unit eagerly pressed the project. A generator, messing facilities, kitchen equipment, an x-ray unit, surgical sites, an electrocardiograph machine, dental chair, dental instruments, air conditioners, refrigerators, hospital beds and vehicles were provided from U.S. sources. A laboratory was opened and equipped. A pharmacy was created and stocked. An Army physician and eight enlisted corpsmen were assigned on a full-time basis. Ultimately and predictably the unit was ordered to depart that area. It became necessary for the unit to withdraw the staff assigned to the dispensary. The venture was threatened with collapse and failure; consequently, all of the "hearts and minds" won by the initial success were jeopardized by the resulting backlash. At this point the problem was taken to higher headquarters and the 1 FFORCEV Surgeon was given the task of salvaging the project. After numerous meetings with all officials concerned, arrangements were made to assign a Medical Service Corps officer to assume the full responsibility for the administration of the facility and its equipment. Doctors, nurses, and dentists of a field hospital provide professional coverage on a daily basis. This less than ideal solution has permitted the dispensary to survive and avoid embarrassment to the US Army and Ministry of Health, GVN.

(b) EVALUATION: This experience emphasizes the need for careful planning and sound judgment when initiating MEDCAP II projects, especially those as elaborate and extensive as the one described. This project violated two of the three cardinal objectives of our medical civic action program as authorized in USAV Reg 40-39. First, the project was not conducted "at a level of professional capability that can be reasonably sustained by local GVN health resources upon eventual withdrawal of the military elements concerned." Secondly, the project
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT

15 November 1968


did not have "the support of local government representatives."

If the provisions of USAV Reg 40-39 had been followed initially and a proper plan submitted for approval prior to embarking on a project of this magnitude, this difficult situation might have been avoided.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That such ambitious projects not be started until it is ascertained that they can and will be eventually sustained by local civilian elements.

7) Provincial Drama Team.

(a) OBSERVATION: Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) drama teams, hampered by the loss of personnel to the draft and by inadequate leadership, virtually ceased to exist during the past quarter. This resulted in some provinces not having a PSYOP element of proven effectiveness.

(b) EVALUATION: The RD cadre, operating independently, had attempted to form a drama/propaganda team along Van Tu's lines. Because such a team was not specifically authorized, there were no funds or equipment and little guidance. JUSPAO, working with the RD advisor provided the team with a projector and films, amplifier and speaker system and a quantity of various JUSPAO publications for distribution. Musical equipment was purchased with AIX funds and suggestions were made for operational guidance. The RD team now is beginning to function regularly and effectively, utilizing not only its musical and dramatic talents but also that support obtained through JUSPAO. It has the added benefit of operating without per diem expenses; team members receive draft exemptions; and the nature of the RD program frequently places the team in areas previously inaccessible to such operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: RD Cadre should be assisted in forming drama teams when regular PSYOP teams are not available.

8) School Construction.

(a) OBSERVATION: School construction, programmed by the Ministry of Education (MOE) and locally financed for which USAID could provide commodities, has not been initiated in the provinces.

(b) EVALUATION: The primary difficulty has been the absence of clear-cut communications among the different ministries involved as well as the USAID divisions and field operations. Directions must be substantiated by official documents which are circulated to all groups concerned. These in turn must be read and accepted by those responsible to initiate action.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the GVN Ministries and USAID representatives prepare and disseminate clear-cut directives on the initiation and implementation of the school construction program. These directives must be issued to all RD councils as well as to Education Service Chiefs to insure prompt issuance of materials.

9) Urban Development.

(a) OBSERVATION: Impact civic action projects, especially those requiring continued action, must be preceded by effective education and information campaigns. Both the populace and GVN officials must be
thoroughly informed as to the nature and benefit of the action.

(b) EVALUATION: Late in August and early September an effective and successful clean-up campaign in Nha Trang was conducted. Free World Military Forces put forth the major effort although GVN officials participated. The information program accompanying the project was not sufficiently extended or intensive to succeed in effecting followup, and the unsightly garbage piles in the streets returned.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Similar campaigns or projects in the future should be preceded, accompanied and followed by a more intensive educational and informational campaign, and the plans for the followup action carefully prepared and approved by GVN officials prior to initiation of the project.

3. SECTION III - ESCAPE AND EVASION INFORMATION: (Headquarters, Department of the Army - Survey Information): None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES G. KALERGIS
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - DA, ACOE
2 - CINCPAC
5 - CG, USARV
2 - CG, II FFORCEV
ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H
1 - CG, Atl Inf Div
1 - CG, 173rd Abn Bde
1 - CG, II FFORCEV Arty
1 - CO, Task Force South (Prov)
1 - DSA, II Corps
1 - AGMF, G1
1 - AGMF, G2
1 - AGMF, G3
1 - AGMF, G4
1 - US Army War College, ATTN: Library Q-2149
1 - Comdt, USA CACSC, Ft Leavenworth
2 - 13th Mil Hist Det
1 - CORPS
1 - Cmdt, USAIS, Ft Benning, Ga 31905
1 - USACDC In Off
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 68) 1st Ind (C) 3 DEC 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from
Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning targeting, page 69, paragraph 2a(22):
Concur in the observation and evaluation that the inclusion of intelligence-
trained personnel in FSCE would increase its (FSCE's) capabilities. The
specific use, organization and physical location of staff elements and
assets rest with the local commander.

b. Reference item concerning improvement of counterbattery programs,
page 70, paragraph 2b(24): Concur. The techniques outlined in Inclosure
20 are standard procedures used, to some extent, by all subordinate
commands.

c. Reference item concerning PW interrogation, page 71, paragraph 2d(1):
Concur with recommendation that battalion S2s receive basic instruction in
the principles of interrogation. However, interrogation by battalion per-
sonnel must be limited to questions concerning information of tactical
interest to the battalion. Battalions do not have the necessary back-
ground to conduct a detailed interrogation.

d. Reference item concerning training of interrogators, page 72, para-
graph 2d(5): Concur with recommendation that newly assigned and inexperi-
enced interrogators be assigned SIGR interrogations in order to develop a
technique of dealing with enemy personnel before being utilized to
interrogate PWs for tactical information.

e. Reference item concerning direct support for nondivisional units,
page 73, paragraph 2e(1): Nonconcur. DS support is provided on an area
basis with areas of responsibility defined so as to preclude overlap and
duplication of effort. When a relocating unit receives a warning order

81

CONFIDENTIAL
in preparation for a move, the supply personnel of that unit should effect immediate liaison with the DS unit in the new area. It is the responsibility of the DS unit in the new area to support the unit that relocated. Early liaison by representatives of this headquarters will identify problem areas which can be resolved between the support commands concerned.

f. Reference item concerning safety criteria for ammunition supply points (ASP), page 74, paragraph 2e(4): Nonconcur. Commanders have been afforded a recourse to the quantity distance standards by obtaining waivers. The waiver is evaluated on the basis of total loss and effects resulting from a major incident. The present policy of granting waivers is considered adequate and flexible in consideration of ASP safety criteria.

g. Reference item concerning reorganization of long range patrol teams, page 75, paragraph 2f(1). The cited MTOE request to change the 05B MOS to the 11T3 MOS has been received by this headquarters. A complete reorganization is pending for all long range patrol companies in Vietnam. This reorganization will include the MOS change as well as major equipment changes. A MTOE will be submitted to USARPAC/DA upon receipt of the long range patrol company summary output from higher headquarters. The summary output document is required to confirm current personnel and equipment authorizations.

h. Reference item concerning press media accommodations, page 76, paragraph 2g(2): Concur. It is USARV policy to make every effort to notify subordinate command information officers of all news media representatives entering their AO. MACV Directive 360-1 specifies that accredited newsmen are entitled to use government messing facilities when outside the Cholon-Saigon area.

i. Reference item concerning ARVN and ROK press coverage, page 77, paragraph 2g(4): Concur. This theme is presently being supported by all USARV information personnel. Recognition of ARVN and other allied accomplishments constituted a major area of emphasis during the most recent USARV information conference which was held 5-6 November 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT (15 Nov 68) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, IFFORCEV for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
endorsement and concurs in the report, as indorsed, except as noted in
the following paragraph.

2. (C) Reference (page 72) paragraph 2d(3): Non-concur. Accompaniment
of wounded prisoners through the evacuation channel is a poor practice,
except in those cases where wounded POW's are extremely knowledgeable
and capable of communications. Generally practiced, it would diffuse
the interrogation effort already practically nonexistent at the battalion
level or lower.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96350

AVFA-GC-OT

SUBJECT: I FFORCEV Tactical Notes

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded are I FFORCEV Tactical Notes #4.

2. Addressees are reminded to forward items for inclusion in the Tactical Notes by the 15th of each month.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ARTHUR B. BUSHEY, JR.
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

1 Incl

REPRESENTED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE

INCL 5
## INDEX

### I FFORCEV TACTICAL NOTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTILLERY</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Re-laying of Artillery Pieces</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHEMICAL</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA/VC Crop Production</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORDS</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor Movement Techniques are Prone to Ambushes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Use of Land Mines</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Fire Support</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor Infantry Operations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy Security</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Successful Ambush</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials Required for Fire Base Clearing and Construction</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedgerows</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expedient CS Crystal Grenade</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Vehicles in Night Locations</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing Fields of Fire</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insertion of LRIF Stay-Behind Ambush Elements</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night LZ Extraction</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of CSF Elements into US Units</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Flares</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Detection</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Saturation OP's and LP's</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA Tactics</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNAL</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Antenna</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86
ARTILLERY

1. (U) **Rapid Re-laying of Heavy Artillery Pieces.** It is frequently necessary to re-lay heavy artillery pieces to engage targets in a different direction of fire in the minimum amount of time. A simple technique for accomplishing the re-lay involves the gunner having referred deflection settings for the various directions of fire readily available. This information enables the gunner to set off the proper deflection on the sight after placing the tube in center of traverse and direct the shifting of the carriage simultaneously. When the gunner sees the aiming circle in the sight, the spade is emplaced. The final lay of the piece is usually within 10-20 mils of the center of traverse. (1 PFC, 3 Arty)

CHEMICAL

2. (U) **NVA/VC Crop Production.** The NVA/VC farmers are resorting to small, widely dispersed fields to preclude mass crop destruction by C-123 spray aircraft. To avoid detection by friendly recon aircraft, these farmers work from 1700-1900 hours and from 0400-0600 hours. During the day they stay in heavily wooded areas or in houses which have bunkers to protect them from artillery fire. Personnel involved in reconnaissance should be aware of NVA/VC techniques used to conceal vital food production areas and report these areas and the type of crops so that crop destruction missions can be scheduled. C-123 spray aircraft can be scheduled to destroy large targets and UH-1 helicopters with spray apparatuses can be used to destroy small, isolated fields to deny the NVA/VC this resource. (Chemical)

ORDS

3. (U) **Poor Movement Techniques are Prone to Ambushes.** In a recent combat action in Binh Thuan Province a RF Company was successfully ambushed by the VC, the latter succeeded in killing 9 RF troops, 1 US and wounding 7 RF troops and 1 US. All this was done without the VC suffering any casualties. The action was initiated upon report of a hasty roadblock across Highway 1. The District Chief ordered one RF Company to move out and clear the roadblock. On several other occasions in this area, the VC had defended their roadblocks rather tenaciously with ambushes. Ignoring previous experience, the RF company moved directly down the road with no flank security. The terrain is rather open with large sand dunes on either side of the road. The RF company made no effort to maneuver and attempt to envelop the suspected ambush site. The unit commander could have spread the unit out several hundred meters and still maintained effective control. A VC platoon of 20 to 30 men opened fire when the RF unit approached the roadblock. The majority of casualties were inflicted in the initial volume of fire. The advisor reported the contact and gunships were immediately dispatched to the ambush area along with 3 USAF fighter aircraft. The gunships were utilized to keep the VC occupied while the friendly unit pulled back. The US advisor's radio was left at the contact site. It was carried by a Vietnamese interpreter, who in his haste to get out of the area, dropped it and ran. Due to the loss
of communications the fighters orbited overhead and were not immediately utilized. This allowed the VC to relocate their ambush and eventually escape unhindered. During the period in which communication was lost, the US Advisor decided to move to the area of contact by vehicle and bring the situation back under control. This was the advisor's second trip into the ambush area that morning. Earlier he had gone in by vehicle to the site of the roadblock but had observed nothing nor did he draw any fire. He drove out again this time without any clear picture of the ground situation. He had no security other than an interpreter riding in the jeep with him. About 2 kilometers from the original ambush site the US advisor was ambushed and killed by the VC at a relocated ambush site, a tactic used many times by the VC/NVA. The following were lessons learned:

a. Always envelop a roadblock; never move directly to it when clearing the roadblock. Once the flanks are secure then check the roadblock itself.

b. Maintain communications with higher headquarters at all times.

c. In moving into areas of suspected VC activity personnel should always travel with security.

d. VC/NVA frequently use the tactic of relocating ambush sites within a few kilometers of the original ambush.

(e. If gunships are available, they should be used to cover the relieving force. (Added by CG, I FFORCEV)

OPERATIONS

4. (C) Enemy Use of Land Mines. The enemy has trained units whose mission is to locate unexploded ordnance for re-use as land mines. Specialists in these units have been trained to disarm all types of ordnance and to reconstruct them into land mines. The specialists remove the detonator from the head of the projectile and place TNT into the hole where the detonator had been. Two wires are then attached into the TNT. These wires lead to two 1/2 volt flashlight batteries that are attached to the side of the projectile with rubber bands. The batteries are placed end to end and held in place by three bamboo sticks and rubber bands. Approximately one-quarter inch over the positive end of one of the batteries is placed a small piece of tin, which is attached to the wires. Once buried, these mines are sensitive to weight. The weight would push the piece of tin onto the batteries, which would explode the TNT, in turn exploding the artillery projectile. If in future operations artillery projectiles or any munitions are accidentally dropped from helicopters or vehicles, every effort must be made to recover these items. Fire support bases must be thoroughly policed. Every artillery projectile that is lost is a potential land mine or booby trap; and once it is in the hands of the enemy, our own munitions can inflict casualties among friendly forces. Artillery projectiles have been used as land mines in Binh Din Province against friendly forces.

(G3)
5. (U) **Extended Fire Support.** When US units establish a FSB, enemy forces often locate just outside the artillery fan. To exploit this situation, friendly forces should emplace supporting 4.2" mortars at edge of artillery fan and work infantry outside of artillery fan but within 4.2" mortar range.

6. (C) **Armor Infantry Operations.** ARVN 3d and 8th Armored Cavalry Squadrons working in conjunction with ARVN Infantry units have developed several tactical formations and maneuver techniques which have proven highly successful in defeating VC/NVA forces.

   a. Wagon Train and Wedge Formations: The Wagon Train Formation has been employed effectively when Armored and Infantry elements make initial contact with large enemy forces. This is a circular formation, which permits armored vehicles to place their massive firepower in all directions without fear of hitting friendly forces. It is used until the enemy's location and strength is determined. When deployed in the Wagon Train Formation, infantry forces have the responsibility of protecting armored vehicles from enemy anti-tank fire, particularly from the rear and flanks. Once the enemy's location and strength have been determined, elements can deploy into the wedge formation allowing maximum firepower to be placed on the enemy during assault and still maintaining security to the flanks and rear. Employment of both formations permits Infantry and Armor units to mutually support when contact is established and when assaulting enemy positions. See sketch provided at Appendix I.

   b. Movement by Bounds: Small enemy forces often avoid contact with armored units. Therefore, when infantry and armored cavalry elements conduct joint combat sweeps, movement by successive bounds has been found to be a particularly effective technique to establish contact. Infantry elements lead the sweep with the armored cavalry element remaining one terrain feature behind. This helps prevent detection of the armored vehicles by the enemy and provides an immediate reaction force in case of ambush. Once enemy contact is established the infantry elements move in as close as possible to fix the enemy, while the armored vehicles maneuver to the enemy's flanks and rear to prevent his withdrawal. Once the enemy is trapped an infantry-armor assault is conducted. See sketch provided at Appendix II.

   c. Mobile Blocking Force: Armored Cavalry units have been employed successfully as mobile blocking forces in conjunction with airmobile operations. The effectiveness of armored vehicles as a blocking force is reduced if blocking positions become stationary. Not only are stationary vehicles highly vulnerable to anti-tank fire, but a stationary block is easily avoided by enemy forces. By successively occupying a series of blocking positions along probable enemy avenues of withdrawal and by conducting intensive mounted patrolling armored vehicles can establish effective blocks. See sketch provided at Appendix III. (DSA, II Corps)
7. (C) Convoy Security. It has been found that a convoy consisting of a direct support artillery battery, one rifle company and a cavalry platoon can provide continuous fire support by using a "leap frog" method of movement. The convoy splits, with the infantry and cavalry providing security for the sections of artillery. While one artillery section with its accompanying security emplaces to support the moving convoy, the other artillery section with its security element moves ahead to emplace at the limit of the rear artillery fan. The resulting "leap frogs" made by the split sections do not slow the convoy to any appreciable degree, yet in conjunction with aerial support continuous fire support is maintained. Several precautionary measures can be taken to minimize casualties caused by land mine detonations during convoys. They include:

a. Wear protective vests during convoy operations. Serious wounds caused by fragments can be prevented.

b. Sandbag all vehicles. The sandbags serve as a barrier and prevent unnecessary casualties.

c. Strive for uniformity in vehicle markings. De-emphasize special markings on command element vehicles. There is a tendency to mark command vehicles in such a manner as to clearly distinguish them from all other vehicles in the column.

d. Disperse after a mining incident and clear the area with a mine-sweep team. The most common reaction is to gather around personnel wounded during the mining incident and attempt to assist them. However, further and unnecessary casualties have resulted from this due to the command detonation of a nearby mine.

(4th Inf Div)

8. (C) A Successful Ambush. On 29 July 1968 the platoon leader of Combat Platoon Bravo, CIDG forces located at Cung Son, Binh Dinh Province, issued instructions to his ambush patrol and checked equipment that was to be taken on the patrol. It is very important to assure that each man understands the part he is to play in the ambush and that his equipment is operational. The patrol traveled to the ambush location using all available cover. At approximately 2000 hours 29 July 1968 the ambush patrol arrived in the vicinity of the ambush site. Prior to occupying the predetermined site, the patrol leader sent a small element to check and assure the ambush site was clear. Upon finding the location clear, the patrol leader moved his platoon into position. An "L" shaped ambush was planned on a trail where enemy movement was anticipated. See sketch of "L" shaped ambush as shown at Appendix IV. Flank and rear security was established for the patrol. Once the ambush patrol moved into position, no noise or movement was allowed. Three claymore mines were positioned along the trail approximately 10 meters apart. All of the claymore mines were placed in the predetermined "killing zone." The claymores were placed with their backs to dirt mounds so as to have a tamper and to give force to the shrapnel. Automatic weapons were spaced so as to give interlocking fire. Each member of the patrol was assigned a target.
area of responsibility to insure that the "killing zone" was completely covered. Approximately 0430 hours on 30 July 1968, one platoon of VC numbering approximately 25 men was sighted moving southeast on the trail. As the VC platoon moved through the "killing zone," the patrol leader triggered the ambush by detonating one claymore mine which was located in the center of the "killing zone." The two remaining claymore mines and a heavy volume of fire was immediately brought to bear on the enemy column. The decimated VC platoon broke contact and dispersed in all directions. The results of this action were 9 VC KIA, 10 mauser rifles, 2 light machine guns and numerous documents CIA. The CIDG ambush patrol received negative ambush casualties. This is a fine example of a well planned and executed ambush operation.

(Co B, 5th SF GA)

For planning purposes when requisitioning construction materials for battalion fire support bases, the following is offered. The factors given are general in nature since many variables are involved and should only be used with due consideration of the particular area, size of unit, nature of growth and type of defense planned.

a. Demolitions Materials.

(1) Heavily Wooded Area - (Hardwood):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-4 Explosive</td>
<td>10,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detonating Cord (12000 ft)</td>
<td>250 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caps Blasting Non-Electric (500)</td>
<td>30 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuse time (500 feet)</td>
<td>20 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detonator, Delay, Friction (300)</td>
<td>200 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,500 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Bamboo Thickets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C4/500 ft sq to be cleared</td>
<td>176 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detonating Cord, 20 ft</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap Blasting, non-electric, 2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detonator Delay, Friction, 2</td>
<td>4 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>180 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
b. Perimeter Wire Fencing/300 meters of perimeter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Fence</th>
<th>Long Pickets</th>
<th>Short Pickets</th>
<th>Reels/Balls Wire</th>
<th>Rolls Concertina</th>
<th>Total Weight/300m lbs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Double Apron, 4 pace</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>3200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double Apron, 6 pace</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple Standard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertina</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Timber for Overhead Cover in areas where native timber is not available. For 3 man bunker (8' x 12' roof section):

1" x 12" x RL 108 linear ft. 360 lbs
6" x 8" x RL 80 linear ft. 1040 lbs
Nails, 30 D 5 lbs 5 lbs 1495 lbs

d. Sandbags:
Per bunker, above 800 bags
Per TOC/TDC/or similar structure 1600 bags
Per 105/155 How position 1200 bags

10. (U) Hedgerows.

a. In lowlands hedgerows exist in many areas though not shown on current maps. They provide excellent concealment for ambushes, caches and bunkers. A trench line or troop movement on the far side of a hedgerow is impossible to detect from the ground. Thus an aerial observer can be of tremendous benefit to the ground commander when operating in this type of terrain, as he is able to see behind and beyond the hedgerow. The observer can give the ground commander a "feel" for the situation and in case of ambush, inform the commander of enemy location and movement. In contact, the aerial observer can also place fire more effectively.

b. The 81mm mortar is effective in reconnoitering hedgerows by fire as it can safely be called in closer to troops than can artillery. It also needs only ground commander clearance, thus quick first-round placement. The enemy will often use the cover and concealment of hedgerows to snipe at friendly forces. With attention drawn to the front the enemy may try to slip to the flank, where lesser attention is centered. Commanders should be aware of this enemy tactic. (173d Abn Bde)
11. (U) Expedient CS Crystal Grenade. The destruction of extensive fortification and bunker complexes is time-consuming and frequently ineffective without requesting large quantities of pioneer tools and demolitions. A quick and effective method of denying the enemy use of these complexes is the use of an expedient CS grenade. The grenade is fabricated by filling the fiber hand grenades or smoke-packing container with CS crystals. The container is taped and wrapped with two or three loops of detonating cord and equipped with time fuze, nonelectric blasting cap and igniter. A mask and protective clothing should be worn when fabricating these grenades. Fortifications and bunkers are quickly rendered unserviceable and contaminated for long periods by the employment of this device. (173d Abn Bde)

12. (U) Protection of Vehicles in Night Locations. When vehicles are to be employed as part of the defense for a night location, measures should be taken for the protection of these vehicles. The radiators and tires of the vehicles should be sandbagged, thus protecting them from small rounds and/or shrapnel. Such protection is particularly needed when using 106mm RR and Cal. 50 vehicles, which generally face out from the center of the perimeter. (173d Abn Bde)

13. (U) Clearing Fields of Fire. An expedient method of clearing underbrush in thickly vegetated areas is to employ detonating cord and composition C-4. The area to be cleared is prepared with concentric "ring mains" of det cord. Large shrubs and trees are further prepared with C-4. The result is a pattern of C-4 and det cord shaped something like a spoked wheel. Once in place, the ring main is detonated, clearing the desired area. This technique tends to blow away secondary growth to chest level, and also enables personnel to shape the area to be cleared to conform to the shape of the defensive position perimeter. (173d Abn Bde)

14. (U) Insertion of LRP Stay-Behind Ambush Elements. A method used to start the insertion of LRP teams is to insert them at the same time a large unit extraction is initiated. The same ships used to lift out the larger unit can carry the LRP team in. LRP teams inserted in this fashion provide excellent security for the last flight of extraction aircraft. It is an opportune time to enter the AO undetected to set-up a stay-behind ambush force or observe enemy scavengers. This technique further reduces the requirement for additional C&C ships and gunships if the team was to be inserted separately. (173d Abn Bde)

15. (C) Night LZ Extraction. Artificial illumination greatly assists in final extractions conducted during the hours of darkness. Even during daylight hours, final extraction from an LZ is an extremely sensitive task that requires detailed planning and coordination. During periods of darkness the employment of flare ships inhibits enemy action, minimizes unfavorable flying conditions, and allows the use of daylight techniques.
for final extraction. When a night extraction is planned, consideration should be given to the employment of flare ships in order to permit daylight extraction techniques. (4th Inf Div)

16. (C) **Integration of CSF Elements into US Units.** Integration of CSF elements with US units during combat operations can be mutually beneficial. Because of their knowledge of the land, native CSF elements make excellent guides, scouts, and security elements when integrated with US line units. Unit commanders report great success in integrating these elements in that the CSF unit is reinforced with heavier firepower than normally available, whereas the US unit is more effective in its reconnaissance operations. Integration of these forces also fosters a mutual respect and sense of cooperation between both elements. (4th Inf Div)

17. (C) **Use of Flares.** Because of restriction placed on long range employment of booby-traps, other early warning devices are necessary. Trip flares placed in four concentric belts around a fixed installation provide satisfactory long range early warning when coupled with a hand flare. The device called a "Bauer Flare" operates when the trip flare activates the hand flare. It has been successfully observed at distances up to six kilometers and is ideally suited for an artillery ambush. See sketch at Appendix V. (4th Inf Div)

18. (C) **Mine Detection.** Standard mine detection devices alone are not adequate to locate plastic anti-tank mines often used in the Highlands. Plastic mines are undetectable by the metallic mine detector; consequently the only successful means of detection continues to be the eye and the bayonet. Foot prints along the shoulders of the road, fresh piles of dirt in nearby shrubs or overly symmetrical depressions in the road itself are all indicators of possible mines. A successful technique which has been used to sweep roads suspected of being mined is shown at Appendix VI. (4th Inf Div)

19. (C) **Use of Saturation OP's and LP's.** It has frequently been found that enemy build-up for an attack cannot be detected through the use of conventional reconnaissance techniques such as reconnaissance patrols and reconnaissance in force operations. This is especially true when the enemy is intimately familiar with the terrain and when he chooses to confine his movements to the hours of darkness. In operations involving infantry battalions with the mission of preempting an anticipated attack, extensive use is being made of four to five man groups with radios located on high ground and astride likely infiltration routes. The mission of these groups is to detect and give warning of all enemy movement. Much valuable intelligence has been obtained using this technique. When coupled with conventional reconnaissance techniques which force the enemy to move in order to avoid contact, the technique has been particularly effective. (4th Inf Div)
20. (C) NVA Tactics. Enemy tactics during a recent engagement suggest that the NVA forces select targets by orienting on the shout of "Medic." During an engagement with a large NVA force a US platoon received four WIA. Following the initial exchange of fire, the enemy patiently waited until the WIA shouted "Medic" and then took the area under intense fire. The correlation between shouts for medic and incoming fire over a period of time suggests the validity of this observation. Shouts for aid on the battlefield should be no longer than necessary, and covering fire must be provided for personnel moving to the aid of wounded. (4th Inf Div)

SIGNAL

21. (U) Field Antenna. Units should carry 50-100' copper content wire (not WD-1) to extend PRC-25 antenna beyond normal operating range. The copper wire is tapered to fit the auxiliary antenna recess of PRC-25. The extended antenna is tied to a tree or structure to insure elevation and the radio range is greatly increased. (TF South)
Wagon Train Formation

Wedge Formation
APPENDIX II

CONFIDENTIAL

Infantry elements lead sweep then close with the enemy on contact

Armored Cavalry remains one terrain feature behind infantry elements and moves to the enemy's flank and rear when contact is established.

CONFIDENTIAL
Infantry element conducts combat assault and sweeps suspected enemy location.

Armored Cavalry Elements occupy successive blocking positions and conduct intensive mounted patrols.
APPENDIX V

STEEL ROD

HAND FLARE

TRIP WIRE

TRIP FLARE

"BAUER FLARE"
1. Point men: Survey road surface for signs of tampering, soil discoloration, or footprints.

2. Dismounted shoulder sweepmen: Look for wires (command detonated mines) and fresh dirt under shrubs or in grass.


4. Center sweepmen: Sweep center portion of road visually and with mine detector.

5. Probers: Assist sweepmen by probing any unusual areas.

6. Security: ACAV's provide flank security while lead tank or vehicle remains sufficiently far enough to the rear to preclude injury to dismounted sweepmen in case it hits a mine that has been missed.
SUBJECT: I FFORCEV Tactical Notes (U)

1. (U) Forwarded are I FFORCEV Tactical Notes #5.

2. (U) The theme this month, "Take a tip from someone who knows" is the essence of the message of I FFORCEV Tactical Notes. Sharing a combat experience, critiquing an operation and giving a buddy a tip are traditional for American soldiers. What these tips reveal more often than not, is a reiteration and a confirmation of the basic fundamentals of combat-proven doctrine and procedures. Recent failures to observe the tried and true "basics" of route and perimeter security have been tragically costly in terms of the lives of our soldiers and our valuable equipment. The teaching point is that proven tactical doctrine on the basics of security must be followed - at an installation, on a road march, while on patrol, or at a fire support base.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ARTHUR B. BUSCH, JR.
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General
## INDEX

### I FFORCEV TACTICAL NOTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTILLERY</th>
<th>P A R A G R A P H</th>
<th>P A G E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Control Headquarters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction of Abandoned Landing Zones and Fire Support Bases</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spade Abutments for 175mm Gun and 8 Inch Howitzer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Observer Coordination</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment of Fire by Sound Sensings</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHEMICAL</th>
<th>P A R A G R A P H</th>
<th>P A G E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flame Land Mines</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combining APD and C3 Operations</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain Denial Using Bulk CS-1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORDS</th>
<th>P A R A G R A P H</th>
<th>P A G E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification in the Employment of PsyOp Programs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENGINEER</th>
<th>P A R A G R A P H</th>
<th>P A G E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drainage Discipline</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTELLIGENCE</th>
<th>P A R A G R A P H</th>
<th>P A G E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation of PW</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation of Captured Enemy Documents</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>P A R A G R A P H</th>
<th>P A G E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense of VC/NVA Base Camp</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of Fire Support Base</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter Loading</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed Advisors and Commanders</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Coordination on Combined Operations</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilisation of Combat Tracker Teams</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Use of Plastic Mines</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suitability of Aircraft Landing Sites</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Security</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNAL</th>
<th>P A R A G R A P H</th>
<th>P A G E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency Assignment</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

103
1. (FOOU) Artillery Control Headquarters. Artillery deployment in the II CTZ makes it difficult for a battalion to control all organic firing batteries from a single location. Many times its batteries are disposed great distances apart while firing batteries of other battalions are located within close proximity. Cross attachment of firing batteries has improved control of artillery fires in support of maneuver elements. By planning the locations of battalion field command posts in areas where several firing batteries are concentrated, the fires of these batteries can be coordinated. In a typical case, a battalion command post assumed tactical and technical control of the fires of medium and heavy batteries resulting in effective and well coordinated fire support. In order to employ this concept and provide flexibility for the control of artillery fires, each battalion maintains the capability of controlling all tube artillery calibers from its field command post. (IFFORCEV Arty)

2. (FOOU) Interdiction of Abandoned Landing Zones and Fire Support Bases. Inspection of LZ and FSB sites disclosed that these areas are being searched after the departure of friendly troops. In order to deny the enemy unrestricted use of abandoned sites following actions can be employed:

a. Booby-trap the site with trip flares and cause the area to be observed for a short period of time after closing the site. When and if flares are tripped, preplanned artillery fire can be called for and placed on the area.

b. Program interdiction fires on the site and fire as the situation dictates.

c. Destroy all bunkers to prevent re-use by enemy. (IFFORCEV Arty)

3. (U) Spade abutments for 175mm gun and 8 inch howitzer. During construction of firebases at Ban Me Thuot, Son Doi and Oasis, a combination of rock and dirt was used around the perimeter of the gun pads as a base for emplacing the spades of 175mm guns and 8 inch howitzers. The rock and dirt fill provides a firm footing for the spade during firing. The fill is placed in a pit four feet deep extending eight feet from the edge of the gun pad. The preponderance of the fill is rock. This type of abutment is simple in construction, easily maintained, and is less expensive than an abutment constructed of reinforced wooden timber. (IFFORCEV Arty)

4. (U) Forward Observer Coordination. Forward observers working with Special Forces, Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) and Mobile Strike Forces must insure that extensive coordination is made prior to an operation. Although observers usually have the radio frequencies and call signs of the artillery that can support them, further coordination is necessary. The observer must insure that the Special Forces unit and
the supporting artillery have the same codes and must establish procedures for obtaining friendly locations in order to facilitate rapid response to calls-for-fire. When the supporting artillery is provided from different units, the observer should make every effort to visit each firing unit to effect direct coordination prior to the beginning of the planned operation.

5. (U) Adjustment of Fire by Sound Sensing. When adjusting fire by sound sensing in dense vegetation, forward observers have a tendency to overestimate distances to the impacting rounds. This results in giving corrections causing the rounds to impact short of the actual target area. Observers must use approved methods for adjusting by sound, wherein no bold corrections are made and extreme caution is used throughout the adjustment. The appropriate fire direction center should always be aware when the observer is adjusting by sound so that particular caution may be taken to insure that the corrections which are given are safe.

(FFORCENV Arty)

CHEMICAL

6. (U) Flame Land Mines. The life of a flame land mine can be extended by some simple actions. The fuel and thickener mixture is placed in a sealed 55 gallon drum rather than an open one to keep the napalm from breaking down as quickly. Protected in this way the mine will still be effective when fired 5 1/2 months later. The mine is also dug in at a 45° angle within the apron or concertina barrier and sand-bagged to protect the drum from friendly small arms fire. Placing the mine in a barbed wire barrier helps protect it from damage during the constant perimeter clearing operations.

(173d Abn Bde)

7. (C) Combining APD and CS Operations. A recent employment of the Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) used in conjunction with non-persistent riot control agent CS has had significant success in the Dak To area. A chase ship follows 200 meters behind the UH-1 helicopter carrying the APD. Loaded aboard the chase ship are CS munitions such as the XM-15 CS cluster and BFOS (Box full of CS Grenades), a non-persistent CS munition developed by the 4th Infantry Division. The flight also includes an OH-6 observation helicopter and two UH-1 gunships. The APD ship detects a possible target. The location is immediately relayed to the chase ship. The OH-6 makes a quick visual reconnaissance to verify the target. If enemy personnel are identified, the chase ship saturates the target with CS. This prevents the unprepared enemy from taking cover or effectively firing weapons. The target is then engaged by the gunships. This accurate and effective method of finding and finishing the enemy has demonstrated the successful use of combined resources, and has taken its toll of the enemy in the Central Highlands.

(4th Inf Div)

8. (C) Terrain Denial Using Bulk CS-1. An effective denial of potential assembly areas for the NVA 1st Division west of Ban Me Thout is the use of 55 gallon drums of Bulk CS-1 employed to contaminate the terrain. Previous experience had shown that terrain could be effectively contaminated for about three days during the heavy monsoon rains. It now appears
that despite the heavy rains the contamination remains longer, possibly up to 10 days or two weeks. 

(COADS)

9. (C) Identification in the Employment of PsyOp Programs. For the most effective use of the Chieu Hoi and volunteer information programs, it has been determined that greater success is achieved by having a readily identifiable rallying or turn-in point. A prominent terrain feature, building or in outlying areas, the use of smoke pots, smoke grenades and lights have all proved successful as points to come forward to. Utilization of an identifiable point requires adequate security to prevent stand-off or ground attacks.

(173d Abn Bde)

ENGINEER

10. (U) Drainage Discipline. Whether building a road, a bunker or setting up a tent, the experienced field soldier immediately considers drainage. Living among the elements is not easy under ideal conditions. When confronted with the monsoon rains experienced throughout RVN, the task of retaining operational mobility in the field and base camp areas is difficult at best. The lesson is brought home rapidly to the uninitiated the first time he is flooded from his bunker or misses a meal when the ration truck bogs down. The following actions should be taken to lessen the effects of rainfall on your operations.

a. Prior to establishing your base, require the supporting engineer to develop an overall drainage plan for the area. The first construction work on any project should provide drainage for the work to follow.

b. Ditch around your structure, tents and walkways to intercept and remove surface water from the area.

c. Excavate diversion ditches to concentrate all surface water in natural channels and build outfall ditches to drain low or swampy areas.

d. Maintain a crown on all roads in the area so that rapid runoff lessens the opportunity for the subgrade to become saturated. A saturated subgrade will fail under traffic.

e. Establish traffic control immediately upon moving into a new area. Restrict traffic to light vehicles and when possible stop traffic during and immediately following heavy rainfall so as not to rut the roadway.

f. Emphasize driver discipline. Do not allow vehicles to ride the ditches and destroy the established drainage system. Off-loading vehicles by hand rather than backing across ditches and rutting the land adjacent to supply areas will decrease greatly the troop and engineer equipment effort required to maintain the area.

(Engineer)
11. (C) Exploitation of PW. The handling of PW's in accordance with principles of the Geneva Convention has proven to reap dividends as shown by a recent incident. During early August, a NVA prisoner was wounded and captured near Ban Me Thuot. The prisoner initially identified himself as a MSG, squad leader of the reconnaissance company of the first NVA Division. The PW was immediately evacuated to a hospital and his wounds treated. He subsequently gave information which has proved to be invaluable. He identified major units in the highlands of II CTZ, identified personalities within these units and also gave information concerning the enemy's plans to attack Ban Me Thuot. Later in August, during the battle of Due Lap, he was reinterrogated concerning order of battle. He gave information which was most helpful in ascertaining exactly which units were in contact initially and what future course of action would probably be adopted. As a result of timely evacuation, humane treatment and proper interrogation techniques, friendly senior commanders were able to reallocate combat resources and maneuver ground forces to prevent Due Lap from being overrun and simultaneously preempt an enemy attack in strength on Ban Me Thuot. The prisoner was astonished to discover he would be treated humanely and given ample medical care. He has requested permission to become a Kit Carson Scout. (G2)

12. (U) Exploitation of Captured Enemy Documents. Timely and effective document exploitation is critical to meaningful and complete intelligence on the enemy. Additionally, the proper exploitation of documents can provide the intelligence base for friendly preemption of enemy operations and movement. In July 1968 ROKA forces captured a document in Khanh Hoa Province which proved to be a movement order for major elements of the 18th NVA Regiment. Reference was also made to movement of the 95th NVA Regiment. The document contained detailed information as to routes, destinations and time schedules. Although the egress from Khanh Hoa Province has already been accomplished when the document was captured, the information on routes and time of return can be exploited by taking counter measures based on the intelligence gained. Thus friendly reconnaissance assets are on the alert for the two returning regiments, the known trails are being closely monitored and forces are prepared to take offensive action. This was accomplished because of the speedy processing of the document after capture. It was translated from a Vietnamese copy as well as the Korean translation. Coordination between Korean, Vietnamese and US intelligence agencies made complete exploitation a combined effort. Korean forces contributed the document, information on circumstances of capture, and an analysis. ARVN intelligence personnel provided basic order of battle information and critical background information, which made the coded way-station and route designation system understandable. On the basis of information and analysis provided by all concerned agencies, maximum intelligence was derived from the document and the most complete study possible under the circumstances were accomplished. (G2)

OPERATIONS

13. (C) Defense of VC/NVA Base Camp. The VC/NVA do not normally defend...
CONFIDENTIAL

a base camp in a 360° perimeter. Enemy observation teams are scattered throughout the area surrounding the base camp in semi-permanent OPs and LPs. The enemy fights delaying actions away from the base camp proper, employing snipers and small teams to force early deployment of friendly troops thus allowing the base camp personnel adequate time for evacuation. Most avenues of approach are booby-trapped and under observation. The booby-trapped area is marked by the VC/NVA in some manner known to his own forces. The most common markings are slashes on trees at eye level 100 to 150 feet short of the trap itself. The immediate booby-trapped area is marked on the base camp side with either slash marks on trees, iridescent moss, broken twigs or piles of stones. To assist the enemy in navigating toward a base camp false trails or dead end trails are commonly identified by a single branch, stick or piece of bamboo lying across the trail. After dark the stick or bamboo is placed at chest level, thus alerting the enemy that the trail is of no use to him. US units should remain alert for any signs along trails and check them out being alert to VC/NVA tactics for employing booby-traps. When available Kit Carson Scouts should be used to help identify signs and their meanings.

(173d Abn Bde)

14. (C) Movement of Fire Support Base. In the displacement of a fire support base, a considerable number of external loads are moved by CH-47. Aircraft commanders may not always be aware of the content of their loads and units for whom they are intended. For large operations the use of a pre-arranged color code simplifies the movement of different loads and insures their delivery to the appropriate element. For example, artillery loads at both the pickup zone and landing zone are marked with violet smoke, heavy mortar loads are marked with yellow smoke and battalion headquarters loads are marked with green smoke. The pilot will be alert to an identical color code at the landing zone for set down. This technique alleviates confusion and eliminates excessive traffic on the air-ground control net. A second problem concerns radio usage when the unloading element, the receiving element and the pilot all attempt to use the same FM control frequency. This problem can be rectified by placing the air-ground controller on one control frequency and all ground to ground elements on another control frequency. The ground controller employing both frequencies runs the show.

(173d Abn Bde)

15. (U) Helicopter Loading. In the course of normal operations, certain loads become standard, based on the helicopter lift capability of the area of operation. After a unit moves to another area of operations, it has been found that a load that was suitable for a helicopter lift in one area is too heavy for the new area, even though the same type of helicopter is being utilized. The advance party that normally precedes the unit’s arrival must determine the lift capability of helicopters in the new area of operations. This information must be made available to all concerned as soon as possible so that rigging equipment can be determined, loads reconfigured and sortie requirements recomputed.

(101st Abn ORLL)

16. (U) Informed Advisors and Commanders. Due to the ever changing...
situation and mission requirements, it is necessary for advisors and commanders to travel in order to observe and supervise their areas of responsibility. Recently, it has been noted that some advisors and commanders, within II CTZ, are not being kept informed of what goes on in their particular area or what has taken place at their headquarters during an absence. All advisors and commanders must develop procedures to enable them to be kept informed and abreast of events at all times. One solution might be to receive a short briefing or update on the current situation upon arrival at an operational location and upon returning to headquarters. To adequately command or advise, all must be kept fully informed at all times. A wrong decision made or wrong advice given, due to lack of information, might cause an operation to be a failure.

17. (U) Operational Coordination on Combined Operations. Successful combat operations call for close coordination among all elements, especially in areas where RVNAF, FWMAF and US units are participating in combined operations. For the most part, in planning for combined operations, coordination exists only at the level of higher headquarters, with limited coordination being effected at lower echelons. One of the important steps in ensuring a successful combined operation is to effect complete coordination prior to the operation being initiated. When the US is providing support to RVNAF or FWMAF, it is the US commander's responsibility to initiate action in order to develop proper coordination and to make certain that all facets are covered. This coordination should always be effected even though the allied or US elements concerned are only battery or company size units. Some areas in which coordination must be effected when US support is rendered are:

a. Fire Support (to include artillery fire, air strikes, and naval gunfire).

b. Gunship support.

c. Engineer support.

d. Airlift support.

e. Communication support.

f. Medical evacuation.

Each of these areas must be fully coordinated if the best possible results are to be obtained from US support, which is the goal we are all striving for. In addition to well executed operations, an additional benefit of close coordination will be to reduce incidents of friendly forces firing on other friendly forces. To insure "one war" type operations, coordination between allied forces is a necessity. The success of future operations is dependent on how well an operation is coordinated.

18. (C) Utilization of Combat Tracker Teams. Maneuver unit commanders that utilize Combat Tracker Teams (CTT) should maintain a program to insure subordinate units are aware of the capabilities and limitations of these teams. Combat force commanders who are not aware of CTT employment...
considerations may waste valuable time by directing attached CTT's to perform missions that should be executed by combat force maneuver elements. CTT's should never be used for combat force missions, such as Reconnaissance-in-Force, Patrolling and Combat Assaults. The team is primarily designed to track down elusive enemy elements after a contact has been made and broken; CTT's may also be used to a limited extent in Cordon and Search Operations. Units sometimes lose sight of the fact that a CTT can function without a tracker dog. The team has four assigned visual trackers who receive extensive training in tracking techniques; they have been trained to follow trail signs that might normally be overlooked by the untrained eye. Some commanders prefer to augment the tracking capability of these teams by adding a Kit Carson Scout. Commanders should always consult the CTT NCOIC or OIC prior to committing a team to an operation. Until the team is committed, it should remain at battalion, brigade or division headquarters in a standby posture. The best method for informing small unit commanders of CTT employment considerations is to require team chiefs and CTT platoon leaders to conduct periodic technical assistance visits to new commanders in their field locations.

19. (C) Enemy Use of Plastic Mines. During most of 1968, mining incidents in the 4th Infantry Division AO were caused mainly by metallic AT mines. In April 1968, M14 plastic AT mines began appearing and subsequently plastic AT mines of communist bloc manufacture. Of mine incidents for the period 7 July to 7 August 1968, 27% were plastic, 10% were homemade, 40% were metal and 23% were unknown. The key to this analysis is that the supply of plastic mines is increasing. Sweep teams therefore, must use extra caution to locate mines by visual means. In most areas, the non-metallic detector AN/PFS-4 "Uncle Henry" is of limited value because of the high number of false readings.

20. (U) Suitability of Aircraft Landing Sites. In helicopter operations, the presence of shrubs, brush, stumps, rocks, holes, and soft surfaces is a definite hazard to landing. As stated in the I FORCE Army Aircraft Conservation Program, selected landing sites must be free of these obstacles. Pilots cannot see what is directly beneath the aircraft when touching down. The undercarriage of the cabin section on the UH-1H helicopter clears the ground by only 15 inches. Six Hueys have incurred stump damage during the present quarter from landing in the forward areas. This type of damage further contributes to the reduction of our limited assets, and can be prevented with a minimum of effort on the part of supported units. Increased supervision in the selection and preparation of the actual touchdown spots in the company forward areas is particularly indicated. Thorough orientation of landing site safety officers and ground guides to these hazards will also help eliminate this problem.

21. (C) Patrol Security. On 1 and 2 August 1968 a US patrol established an ambush at a bridge crossing. After remaining in position overnight with no sightings, the patrol was directed to change location. As no sighting had been made, the patrol started crossing the bridge without
security. The patrol was engaged by a VC squad moving to the bridge from the opposite direction resulting in one US KIA. Unit S-2s and small unit tactics for crossing danger areas must always be practiced regardless of the enemy situation. In this case a recon team should have preceded the element with the remainder of the patrol providing cover.

(FT South)

SIGNAL

22. (C) Frequency Assignment. Considerable interference on FM frequencies is being experienced by units in the II CTZ. FM frequencies are necessarily assigned for use by geographical location. A unit assigned a particular frequency for use in one area should not use this frequency in another area without prior approval of HQ, I FFORCENV. In some cases, units are using frequencies in areas other than that for which they are assigned. This results in interference for the unit to which the frequency is assigned for that area, creating numerous problems for both units involved. As a result, some units "bootleg" a frequency in order to accomplish a mission. Interference in the use of FM frequencies can be avoided by adherence to assigned frequencies within a given geographical area. All units should use only their properly assigned frequencies in the area assigned and coordinate closely with the I FFORCENV Signal Office to resolve frequency problems. (Signal)
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96350

AVFA-GC-OT

25 October 1968

SUBJECT: I FFORCEV Tactical Notes (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded are I FFORCEV Tactical Notes #6.

2. Addressees are reminded to forward items for inclusion in the Tactical Notes by the 15th of each month.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ARTHUR B. BUSSEY, JR.
Colonel, AGC
Adjoint General

1 Incl

CONFIDENTIAL

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE

Incl 7
# INDEX

## I FFORCEV TACTICAL NOTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combined Artillery Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Support for LRP Elements</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Adjustment by Air Observers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chemical</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XM27 Grenade Dispenser</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-8 Tactical CS Launcher on Armored Vehicles</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing of Protective Clothing in Contamination Operations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cords</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of Helicopters in PSYOP Role</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logistics</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Unit Prescribed Load Lists</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Requirements</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment of the Short Range Patrol</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listening Post Bunker</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Security</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Enemy Tactic</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Turbulence and Loss of Operational and Administrative Efficiency</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving Hoi Chanhs and Prisoners of War</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRP Replacements</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Observers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Use of Friendly Uniforms</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of CH-47 Hook-Up Man</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Explosive Devices</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of US Vehicles</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of Radios and Radio Antennas on Fire Support Bases</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of Non-Tactical Units</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belches Minesweep - Improvised</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendices I, II and III
CONFIDENTIAL

ARTILLERY

1. (U) Combined Artillery Operations. When US and ARVN artillery are collocated on a fire support base supporting an ARVN operation, the US artillery should be employed in a reinforcing role and the US and ARVN Fire Direction Centers linked by telephone communications. Fire missions requested by Vietnamese forward observers would either be fired by ARVN artillery units or passed by the ARVN FDC to the US FDC for execution. With the two FDC's closely coordinating their operations and the US Artillery Advisor exercising overall coordination and monitoring fire missions, responsiveness of artillery fires can be increased. (IFFORCEV Arty)

2. (U) Artillery Support for IUP Elements. Responsive artillery support for LRP teams is vital. In some cases, the firing of preplanned defensive targets in support of LRP teams is performed only after a target had been spotted. Thus, the adjustment is often slow, and the target is able to disperse or escape prior to firing for effect. Coordination between the artillery battery and the LRP team should be performed prior to the LRP team's insertion. Defensive targets would then be preplanned on prominent terrain features and on likely avenues of enemy approach in the area which the LRP team will observe. When possible, the defensive targets should be adjusted prior to the insertion of the LRP team. LRP teams can thus call for fire-for-effect when the enemy is within the area in which a concentration has been preplanned. (173d Abn Bde)

3. (U) Artillery Adjustment by Air Observers. A simple method of orienting with the aerial observer and the aviator is to have the fire direction center announce to the observer the gun-target azimuth in degrees. This allows the aviator to plan his flight path parallel to the gun target line thus enabling the observer to rapidly identify the gun-target line on the ground. (IFFORCEV Arty)

CHEMICAL

4. (C) XM27 Grenade Dispenser. The Dispenser and Grenade, Aircraft XM27 were used recently in suppressing enemy fire at night. The XM27 system is mounted on either UH-1C or Cobra gunships in lieu of rocket pods. As the pilot flies over the target, he has the capability to dispense 12 CS grenades per trigger pull. A total of 144 grenades can be so dispensed producing a CS line source on the ground which drifts downwind. The XM27 has been used in such roles as routine convoy cover (one gunship with rockets and one equipped with the XM27 system) in conjunction with reconnaissance by fire by Air Cavalry Troops. On one recent moonless night small arms fire was being received on a perimeter which was beyond the range of the E-8 CS dispenser. The XM27 equipped gunship flew over the position of the enemy and laid a string of grenades. Enemy firing ceased. (4th Inf Div)
5. (C) E-8 Tactical CS Launcher on Armored Vehicles. The E-8 Tactical CS Launcher can be mounted on armored vehicles and used effectively in convoy operations because of its 250 meter range and large elliptical pattern. Each of the 64 CS cartridges dispensed by the launcher burns for approximately 10-15 seconds. The launcher can be fired electrically or by a 20 foot lanyard. Mounts can be locally fabricated from angle iron and scrap metal. The launchers can be employed in reconnaissance by fire and for counter-ambush. (4th Inf Div)

6. (U) Wearing of Protective Clothing in Contamination Operations. Under conditions of prolonged exposure in a hot, humid climate, CS 1 can cause blisters to form on the skin. On the other hand, operating with full protective clothing under the same conditions can bring heat exhaustion in a short period of time. Thus, protective clothing chosen for CS 1 tunnel contamination missions should be the minimum consistent with operational conditions. The minimum essential equipment for protection from CS 1 is the protective mask with heavy cotton gloves. (173d Abn Bde)

CORDS

7. (U) Use of Helicopters in PSYOP Role. One of the provinces in II CTZ has been conducting a bi-weekly combined operation using armed helicopters and PSYOP. The operation involves one slick helicopter with 1000-watt loudspeaker system and two armed helicopters. The VN district chief and province PSYWAR Advisor ride in the slick. They spot likely target areas and authorize the gunships to fire into the area. Following the firing the district chief talks over the loudspeaker, emphasizing the Chieu Hoi program and stressing the desirability of rallying. To date eight Hoi Chanh have rallied, stating they heard the broadcasts and were finally influenced to rally by them. On 22 September the DK-7 LF Company was struck by the armed choppers. In the confusion, a three-man cell found itself separated from the rest of the company. They decided to rally, walked 28 kilometers, turning themselves in three days later. They brought with them an AK-47 and two M-1 rifles. This type of operation has been very successful in Phu Yen Province. (CORDS)

LOGISTICS

8. (U) Deployment of Unit Prescribed Load Lists (PLL). Units are deploying to meet tactical requirements without taking their PLL. This requires supporting units to provide items to meet the most fundamental support requirements. There is a definite requirement to carry the organizational repair parts to maintain the unit's ability to perform its primary mission. Units should maintain PLL items to insure availability for employment when the unit makes a tactical move. (G4)

9. (U) Supply Requirements. When a tactical unit deploys to a new operational area, certain supplies are required immediately. Normally,
a unit moves with a basic load of ammunition and rations for a specified period of time. Forward Support Areas (FSA) are deployed to support a brigade-size force, but are not usually operational for a minimum of 24 hours. Continuing problems are experienced because units do not determine their initial supply requirements prior to deployment. Requirements for items such as barrier materials, ammunition, food and POL should be prepared beforehand and the request submitted to the supporting logistical agency prior to the start of the operation. This will insure that initial requirements are satisfied. Troop strength and weapon density figures should be made available to the supporting logistical agency during the early planning stages of each operation. It is recognized that last minute changes will occur in supply requirements; however, adjustments can be made by support commands to satisfy these requests. In this area of supply, thorough prior planning is the difference between a smooth operation, conducted with little or no difficulty, and one that defeats itself because of poor initial planning. (G4)

OPERATIONS

10. (c) Employment of the Short Range Patrol. Currently the 4th Infantry Division is making widespread use of a Short Range Patrol (SRP) screen. The concept involves the saturation of an area with a series of four-man stationary teams equipped with radios and positioned for a 48-hour period astride likely enemy infiltration routes. The mission of the SRP is to adjust artillery and mortar fire and to call in air strikes and gunships on any enemy which it can observe or hear. The concept is designed to generally disrupt the enemy's activities and specifically to prevent the enemy from massing for an attack. The technique has produced several lessons learned, which if not followed, greatly increase the risk to the SRP and reduce their effectiveness.

   a. SRP's should not engage the enemy except to adjust artillery and mortar fires and to call for airstrikes and gunships. A recent violation of this principle resulted in the death of all four members of a SRP. A later sweep of the contact area revealed that the SRP had engaged a small NVA force which had withdrawn to a nearby heavily vegetated draw. The SRP pursued the enemy and was subsequently ambushed.

   b. It is essential that SRP's move into position without being observed. This is particularly difficult in areas close to villages. Two SRP's in the vicinity of Kontum were recently attacked shortly after they were observed moving into position by Montagnards in the area. To further minimize the possibility of compromise the SRP should move into position at dusk or even later.

   c. SRP's should remain stationary except when circumstances such as enemy contact or the necessity to clear the area for air or artillery fire require the SRP to move. In the event of such a move, the SRP must
insure that a different route of return to the patrol/firebase is taken. SRP's should not smoke, use scented soap or face lotion. Recently, a Ho Chi Minh commented that the NVA could usually tell where US troops were in position because of odors emanating from smoke or lotion/soap. (4th Inf Div)

11. (C) Listening Post Bunker. Listening Post (LP) Bunkers should not be connected to the perimeter by a communication trench. A recent incident disclosed that the enemy will utilize a communication trench connecting an LP bunker to the main perimeter for an approach into the perimeter. In one instance, as an LP withdrew after detecting heavy movement around his position the enemy followed him along the trench. An enemy ground attack was subsequently launched and succeeded in penetrating the perimeter through the same trench. All should be aware of this enemy tactic. (4th Inf Div)

12. (U) Communications Security. New equipment recently introduced into Vietnam has made it possible to extend secure radio capabilities down to company level. This capability has greatly reduced the enemy's ability to gain useful information from our radio nets. At the same time commanders should put increased security emphasis on administrative and logistical nets which are still largely plain mode communications. Strict net discipline and security procedures must be maintained on these nets in order to further deny the enemy valuable information on our status and operations. (4th Inf Div)

13. (C) New Enemy Tactic. The 199th Light Infantry Brigade recently observed a new enemy tactic. After enemy units conduct mortar attacks on friendly positions or installations, friendly light fire teams usually conduct reconnaissance by fire on suspected enemy firing sites. Before a sweep of the area can be conducted (usually at first light) the VC/NVA return and set booby traps between enemy firing sites and friendly night defensive positions, creating an extremely hazardous condition for friendly troops conducting the sweep. (199th Light Inf Bde)

14. (U) Personnel Turbulence and Loss of Operational and Administrative Efficiency. Because of the short tour and large summer rotation, serious problems often develop from personnel turbulence if certain measures are not taken. Among the more severe of these problems are: Key projects not being completed, reports not being submitted on time, violation of administrative procedures, compromise of classified information, messages being lost and required training not being accomplished. A very simple solution to providing the continuity is the development of standard operating procedures at all echelons. Written procedures should include areas such as:

a. Administration.

b. Required reports control.

#19
c. Security and classified material.

d. Handling of messages.

e. Required training.

f. Incomplete projects.

Once developed these SOP's must become required reading for newly assigned personnel and readily available for refresher reading.  

15. (C) Receiving Hoi Chanhs and Prisoners of War. When receiving Hoi Chanh or prisoners of war, the unit should not expose itself to ambush. A small element may expose themselves as a gesture of trust while the main part of the force covers them, but the Hoi Chanh or PWS should be required to come forward. Do not walk into an ambush where a Hoi Chanh decoy will cause you to enter the preplanned killing zone.  

(22d Inf Div Adv Det)

16. (C) LRP Replacements. During the period July-September 1968, all LRP units in I FFORCEV experienced a loss in operational readiness due to a rotational hump. The impact of the "hump" was felt for a period of from two to six weeks. The problem area is basically one of organization and management. Unit commanders can identify projected losses in advance. Even though replacements were requisitioned and a recruiting program employed, these actions were not taken early enough to offset a reduction in operational LRP patrols. Commanders must review projected losses regularly. This will insure that rotational humps are identified early enough to permit long-range planning for LRP replacements.  

(G2)

17. (C) ARVN Observers. TF South has experienced success in the use of ARVN observers as crew members on gunships. This makes it easier to establish communications with ARVN and territorial forces on the ground. Clearance for firing is also expedited. This system has application to snoopy missions as well. ARVN observers are more familiar with the terrain and the status of RVNAF in the area. By utilizing ARVN observers for gunships and snoopy missions, a shorter reaction time and more efficient utilization of aviation assets is gained.  

(TF South)

18. (C) Enemy Use of Friendly Uniforms. There have been numerous incidents throughout SVN of the enemy's use of ARVN, Kit Carson Scout, National Police and US uniforms to infiltrate into cities and military installations. On 4 August 1968 a cache of 400 pounds of ARVN and US uniforms was discovered in the vicinity of Ban Me Thuot, and on 28 August 1968, northwest of Tuy Hoa, a VC company was sighted wearing uniforms which resembled those of the 47th ARVN Regiment. When using these uniforms, the enemy will probably use recognition signs to dis-
tnguish themselves from FVMAF units. Recognition signs could take the form of colored patches on uniform collar, one sleeve rolled up, and the use of a shoulder loop.

19. Identification of CH-47 Hook-Up Man. CH-47 pilots continually have difficulties identifying the hook-up man on the ground when picking up external loads. To assist the pilot in his approach, the hook-up man should wear a brightly colored pull-over, fabricated from a colored aircraft marking panel. This will reduce pilot confusion, simplify aircraft approach and eliminate the frequent use of smoke as a marking device.

20. Enemy Explosive Devices. Any enemy explosive found by mine sweeps of infantry support units should be blown in place. This action not only eliminates possible casualties in the case of booby traps, but it also eliminates the possibility of anyone "saving" enemy devices which could result in unnecessary injury or risk to US personnel in base camp areas.

21. Security of US Vehicles. When US vehicles pass through or stop in an area inhabited by indigenous personnel there should always be an armed guard in the rear of the vehicle. On 25 August 1968, a 3/4 ton vehicle returned to its base from Bong Son with an M-26 grenade (pin pulled) hidden in a tin can in the rear of the vehicle. This occurred even though a SSG E-6 was present in the cab at all times. An armed guard in the rear of the vehicle would prevent similar incidents in the future.

22. Location of Radios and Radio Antennas on Fire Support Bases. Attacks on fire-support bases have indicated that the simultaneous destruction of all unit communications is one of the first priority missions of the enemy. The means used have included mortars, B-40 rockets and satchel charges directed against fire direction centers, executive posts, radio vehicles, and all antennas. If this tactic achieves initial success, a unit can be completely without outside communications after the initial phase of the attack. To reduce the possibility of losing all communications simultaneously, units should separate radios and antennas as much as possible. Consideration should be given to the possibility of remoting radios and utilizing other antennas as deception devices.

23. Security of Non-Tactical Units. A strong, well-manned perimeter is of first priority in the security of static, non-tactical units. The MACV standard fence should be the minimum goal in fence construction (MACV Directive 380-8). The fence should be liberally augmented with command-detonated claymores and warning devices. The perimeter should be well lighted, and cleared by defoliation to a distance of one hundred meters. Combination bunker-towers should be built with interlocking and mutually supporting observation and fields of fire. Telephone communication must be provided between towers, and from the towers to a central
control point with backup radio communication if possible. An immediate reaction force of sufficient size to reinforce the perimeter at any point must be available. Definite procedures and channels must be established and tested to obtain rapid artillery and tactical air support if required in the defense of the perimeter. Non-tactical units can develop a supplemental fire support capability using the 81mm mortar. Training of mortar crews, to include fire direction and artillery adjustment, can be arranged through tactical units. Such training must stress safety considerations. At larger locations, or in rugged, irregular terrain, sentry dogs are a valuable adjunct particularly after dark. Above all, perimeter security depends on the properly trained, well motivated and closely supervised perimeter guard.

24. (U) Belche Minesweep - Improvised, Appendix I, II & III. In August 1968, mining incidents along Highway 19 increased. To combat this threat, an informal study was made which produced the following findings:

a. All mines along the paved highway were being emplaced along the shoulders of the road, predominantly on curves where rear wheels of towed trailers leave the pavement. The shoulders of the road are also predominantly used on unpaved highways where the ground is pliable and the mine can be emplaced with the least effort and without visibly disturbing the surface of the roadway.

b. Many mines (box, bamboo and plastic) cannot be detected by the engineer minesweeping equipment. Further, if a mine is carefully emplaced, the area in which it is placed cannot be visually detected.

c. The length of Highway 19 and most other highways in Vietnam makes 24-hour defense of the highway impractical, providing the enemy ample opportunity during hours of darkness to emplace mines in unobserved areas.

The idea of minesweeping with engineer equipment, the entire length of the highway each day, is time consuming and creates unacceptable delays in the use of the highway. The minesweep - improvised, illustrated at appendices I, II and III, represents a concept developed by Major Belche, Security Officer, 8th Transportation Group, and subsequently improved on by the 506th Light Maintenance Company in An Khe. The minesweep is connected behind an APC and towed at a speed of 10-15 mph. This enables a rapid sweep of critical roadside areas. When the device detonates a mine, the device is blown up but many of the pieces are salvageable and can be reused to construct another sweep. Spare minesweeps are maintained by the unit responsible for the sweeping operation. The minesweep is in no way perfected and requires roadside rewelding because of road shock. This, however, is an acceptable price to pay for the security it offers. The minesweep can be constructed in less than seven hours by an organization with a welding capability and can be mass produced.
with ease by any maintenance company. The materials necessary to con-struct the minesweep are available in quantity in salvage yards. Note that items listed in appendices are not necessarily the only items that can be used for construction. Any scrap items that provide simi-lar strength will be acceptable. The building of this device is limited only by the ability of the builders to substitute available items as necessary in order to produce a minesweep. (Hwy 19 Coordinator)
MINE SWEEP SPECIFICATIONS

1. 5 Ton hubs complete with bearings
2. 5 Ton truck tires (flat) mounted on rims
3. 4 inch pipe 20 feet long
4. 2 inch pipe 8 feet long
5. 2 inch pipe 5 feet long
6. 2 inch pipe 5 feet, 8 inches long
7. 1/4 inch by 6 inch flat steel 2 feet long
8. 2 inch by 2 inch by 1/4 inch angle iron 6 feet long
9. 2 inch by 2 inch by 1/4 inch angle iron 5 feet long
10. 55 gallon drums.
11. Lunette
12. Chain
13. 2 inch by 2 inch by 1/4 inch angle iron 4 inches long
14. Corner braces

NOTES:

1. All material may be substituted except 5 ton truck tires, hubs, rims and lunette.
2. All parts are welded together including barrels to the frame and chain to the barrel and frame.
APPENDIX III

HITCH SPECIFICATIONS

1. 2 1/2 or 5 ton truck pinol hook 1 each
2. 5 inch by 1 3/4 inch channel 12 inches long 4 each
3. 28 inches by 2 inch by 3/8 inch steel strap 2 each
4. 9 feet 4 inch of 4 inch pipe 1 each
5. 8 feet 10 inch of 3 inch pipe 1 each
6. 8 feet 10 inch of 2 inch pipe 1 each

124
A Monograph of
2LT NGUYEN VAN THONG, Platoon Leader
Recon Co, 320th Regt, 1st NVA Div

Written by Major Billy J. Biberstein, Commanding Officer, 13th Military History Detachment from interviews with LT THONG, interrogations reports, I FFORCEV G2 Daily INTSUMS and the paper "A day in the life of an NVA soldier in South Vietnam" prepared by the I FFORCEV G2 Section.
# INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>PARA</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schooling and Social Life</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popularity of the Communist Government in NVN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Training</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay Scale</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People Sentiments to the NVA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower Status in NVN</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of NVA Men and Units</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel to SVN and Initial Operations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Routine When not on Operations</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA Tactics and Control</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Against American Tactics</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of NVA Casualties</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW’s</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA versus US/ARVN Soldiers and Units</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can the NVA Win the War?</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing in NVN</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Warfare</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT THONG Closing Statement</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historians Evaluation of the Monograph</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

126
1. **INTRODUCTION**: Nguyen Van Thong entered the NVA in 1964. He was trained as a reconnaissance squad member and assigned to a reconnaissance unit in NVN. He joined the 320th Regiment Recon Company in SVN in Jan 1968 as a sergeant. He was promoted to Master Sergeant immediately and four months later was given a battlefield commission. He was then assigned the position of executive officer of the 19th Reconnaissance Company, 320th Regiment, 1st NVA Division. He participated in the battles of Chu Do, Chu Ben, and Hill 800 in Kontum Province during 1968. His unit moved south to Darlac Province in August 1968 where they received the mission to perform reconnaissance on three possible axes of advance into Ban Me Thuot City. On 9 August 1968, while returning to his unit upon completion of his reconnaissance mission on Ban Me Thuot, LT Thong was wounded and captured in action by a 4th Infantry Division LRP team.

2. **BACKGROUND**: My parents were farmers and owned 50 hectares of rice fields but when I was born, my father was dead and my mother was renting most of the land to neighbors. My mother still farmed two hectares of rice. When I was six to 10 years old I had to move from Nam Ha to Ngol Cao village in Hoa Lu District of Ninh Binh Province (NVN) because of the fighting between the French and the Viet Minh. Generally speaking, I had a relatively good childhood because my mother rented the land and I had plenty to eat as I was the only child.

3. **SCHOOLING AND SOCIAL LIFE**: I started to school in 1953 while living in Ngol Cao. While in school I enjoyed mathematics the most and literature the least. I remained in school for eight years at which time I graduated from high school. The majority of my friends did not finish high school and only a small minority were allowed to attend the university. Before I was drafted into the NVA I had a happy social life. I was cherished by my mother as I was the only child of my family which was a rich one. I used to attend the folk festivals and dancing and often went to the movies.

   My favorite sports were volleyball and ping pong but I enjoy and practiced others such as swimming, soccer, weight lifting, and the high bars. Actually I like all kinds of sports. There is one thing that I was unable to do that I miss and that was to learn to ride a bicycle. In NVN bicycles would cost as much as two motor bikes in SVN. They were about 1500 NVN piaster (equivalent 150,000 SVN Piaster).

   The sport facilities and equipment in NVN are very scarce and you have to either make it yourselves or on occasions it can be bought.

   The first youth group I belonged to was in high school in 1960. This was not a communist organization, just a high school youth group. Before this I did not join groups as I was an irresponsible and reckless child (maybe a playboy) and I was very rich.

   The communist youth groups were organized in the high schools after my graduation. My first experience as a member of the communist youth
group was in the military service. I think every NVA soldier must be a youth group member.

4. POPULARITY OF THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN NVN: I am not pleased to be under the communist regime or yoke. Before it was established, my mother was able to sell our farm products to the people but after they came, she had to sell her products to the cooperative. She must also buy all her supplies from the cooperative. There is very little profit now. Before the communists took over, my mother could sell a cluster of bananas weighing 20kg to the people for 10 NVA piaster but now she only gets 2.40 NVA piaster at the cooperative. The only thing my mother needs to buy from the cooperative is salt and that costs one-fourth of a NVN piaster per kg. Some of the food in NVN is also rationed.

The NVN people don't like it under the yoke of the communist party but they dare not express their feeling for fear of punishment. If they speak out against the government they are immediately arrested and sent to a reform center for one to four months. If it is a more serious offense they are sent to prison for six months or more. I don't believe anyone is executed unless they commit a serious crime such as murder.

5. MILITARY TRAINING: I was drafted in early 1965 and was assigned to a reconnaissance unit from the start. I initially took a few tests but most of the tests given were later and were on Recon subjects such as map reading. The drafted personnel go into different branches depending on their civilian trade and schooling. After a period of basic training the cadre normally selects personnel for certain branches. The basic training varies from a minimum of one month, for an infantryman before he goes to the battlefield, to a minimum of one and one-half years for a recon man. Our reconnaissance units are considered to be the elite organizations. In order to become a member of one, a soldier must be selected and trained specifically for reconnaissance. Our higher headquarters normally furnishes the replacements we need and we will not accept soldiers from subordinate elements as replacements. One and one-half years is the minimum training for a recon soldier and the maximum is four years.

The recon soldier is treated best and has good quarters and food, but the training is very difficult and the hours are long and tiring. The recon units are issued and carry two sets of fatigues plus two sets of camouflaged fatigues. The regular soldier is issued only two sets of jungle fatigues. Our uniforms are manufactured in NVN. We also get the new type AK weapon manufactured in 1957. We were issued steel helmets in NVN and wore them initially in SVN but after several
incidents in which Local and Main Force VC units shot and killed our soldiers, the regimental CO ordered us to discard the helmets. We then went bare headed. The sappers are the second most elite units. They are selected by the cadre and are not volunteers. They have a required six months minimum training period and a maximum of one and a half years. They train on the use of demolitions only and many get killed because they lack training in tactics.

We had many weapons in the army while in NVN, more weapons than personnel. I personally like my K54 pistol the best (ChiCom automatic) and I also like the AK-47, which is better than the M16. Although I never fired the M16, the AK-47 is more practical as it is smaller, easier to handle and clean and the round does more damage.

6. PAY SCALE FOR THE NVA: The pay scale for soldiers in the NVA is:

* PVT 600 SVN piaster per month
PPC 800 SVN piaster per month
CPL 1000 SVN piaster per month
SGT 1200 SVN piaster per month
MSG 1700 SVN piaster per month
Aspirant (WO) 1500 SVN piaster per month
2LT 6500 SVN piaster per month
1LT 7500 SVN piaster per month
CPT 8500 SVN piaster per month
SR CPT 9500 SVN piaster per month
MAJ 12,500 SVN piaster per month

The field grade officers' pay is increased 2,000 SVN piasters per promotion. All officers must pay 2,100 SVN piasters per month for meals while in NVN and everything is free in SVN. The pay scale also has a "years in service" built into it.

We received our pay while in NVN but we do not receive pay while in SVN. It really makes no difference if we are paid as it would be SVN money and we couldn't spend it. The only soldiers I know who receive money in SVN are the intelligence agents who use it during penetration operations of cities in SVN.

Our government in NVN provides food for our dependents while we are away and the amount of food received is based on the number of dependents in the soldier's family.

7. PEOPLES SENTIMENTS TO THE NVA: The people of NVN do not like to see their men drafted into the NVA but the government says they must go. This makes the government unpopular and the people do not like the communist party. The families of the drafted youth do not like

* The pay is in NVN money but the amount shown has been converted to the SVN value.
to see their sons infiltrated into SVN, but this is an order from the party which must be executed. As very few men ever return to NVN the people know their is little hope of one's returning to NVN. They believe the soldiers are a sacrifice and will die. The only soldiers that get back to NVN, other than the wounded, are the cadre of infiltration units that bring the replacements down. They return to train more soldiers, then bring them down.

I know I'm sick and tired of the army, being in it for the duration, however, there are very few men who reject the military draft. I don't know the punishment for those who do, but you never see them again. The time of departure from NVN to SVN is the most critical time. There are a lot of volunteers in the NVA but they are the hot-bloods. The age group is from 16 to 21 years old. These are the young and hot-blooded elements and they want to fight. They haven't seen the brutality of the war.

8. MANPOWER STATUS IN NVN: There are very few of the age group 17 to 35 left in the hamlets and villages in NVN. In Xuoi hamlet, where I was living when drafted, there were 120 families and a total population of 4000 to 5000 people. There were only three or four men of the 17 to 35 age group left and they were not in good health. They were either sick, deformed or paralyzed. There will always be a constant supply of manpower for the army however, it will be furnished by the school children as they grow up. The problem is that the youths will lack combat experience and all our experienced soldiers are getting killed.

9. QUALITY OF NVA MEN AND UNITS: The quality of our officers is good to bad. Some are knowledgeable about military matters and some are not. This depends on the unit. The Officer-EM relationship in the NVA is very good. During off duty hours we talk with each other and have a mutual understanding as we all have the same problems and troubles.

Without the Local Force (LF) units in SVN the NVA is useless. The LF are the link between the NVA and the SVN battlefield areas. The NVA soldiers feel very sorry for the LF units, even pity them, as they lack weapons, food and equipment. The VC units are very poor—they are weak both politically and militarily. We all have an understanding though and the VC and NVA are close and united.

The political officer in the NVA has no military capability and is just politically indoctrinated. We did not respect our political officer as he did not go into the battles with us. Military officers are respected. The political officer was promoted from SGT to LT while in SVN; however, he still was not respected.

There are Russian advisors with all our army units such as the Artillery, Infantry and Armor, but I do not know about the Air Force.
We have many tanks in NVN, a whole army corps of tanks, but I have never seen them in SVN. During my movement through NVN to SVN I saw a regimental size force of Chinese soldiers in Thai Nguyen Province. This was in a mountainous/forest area. (Identified by their speech and looks, no question in his mind they were Chinese).

I cannot give you an example of how a man is disciplined when he fails to carry out an order as I have not seen it happen. The discipline is very good. There were fights between the soldiers but they were always about little things and the cadre just separated them.

The soldiers in our army complain frequently about their life and many times I have seen soldiers talk back to cadre. There is nothing the cadre can do except ignore it because the men have malaria and are very feverish. I have never heard the soldiers criticize their leaders and I've never had anyone disobey my orders. I always observe the men closely and issue orders only to those men I am sure can and will comply. During an operation if there is any doubt in my mind as to whether or not the order would be followed, I do not order anyone else to accomplish the task, I do it myself.

10. TRAVEL TO SVN AND INITIAL OPERATIONS: We left Hoa Binh Province NVN on 6 Feb 68 traveled down RT 12 by truck to Nghe An Province then through Ha Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces of NVN into Laos. I do not know much about Laos as we never really met the people. We were on a military road through forests and jungles. I don't really know whose side Laos is on.

I didn't get to know the Cambodian people either. In theory and practice, Cambodia is neutral. I don't know why we get to use it, I expect it's like a chess game. The NVA made the right move and uses Cambodia and I suppose the SVN could also use it if they knew how to.

In SVN I never passed through villages or hamlets and only talked with SVN laborers controlled by the NVA. They were socialable.

We arrived in Kontum Province on 28 Feb 68. We dismounted from the trucks (50km by road, 15km cross country) NW of the tri-border area and walked the remainder of the way. To get into the Kontum area we came through Laos and to get to Polei Kleng we went parallel to RT 14 staying about seven kilometers away from the highway.

During the first week of March we received the general plan of attack and our specific mission. The overall plan was as follows: The ultimate mission was to liberate Kontum City. Elements of B3 Front were supposed to secure Highway 14 from the northeast of Kontum and the 320th Regiment was to secure Polei Kleng and Chu Do, thereby securing Highway 14 from the West. When these units were in position, armor and additional infantry units were to move from the Cambodian/Laotian border south to Highway 14 and attack Kontum City. Chu Do was supposed to be an intermediate objective for my unit and Kleng (Polei Kleng) the final objective. (Chu Do Mountain is located approximately 20 kilometers West Northwest of Kontum City and 40 kilometers East of the Cambodian-Laotian border).
On 8 March 1968, my reconnaissance unit received the order to perform reconnaissance on Kleng. I was then a Master Sergeant and second in command of the regimental reconnaissance company. On this mission, 18 men from my company were selected; the regimental commander, two battalion commanders (4th and 6th), all company commanders and platoon leaders accompanied us on the reconnaissance. The 5th Battalion moved into the assembly area 15 days after the 4th and 6th Battalions. We moved by day and rested at night. We arrived at a point which was two hours distance from Kleng on 18 March 1968. We established an observation post at this location and immediately prepared defensive positions to return to for sleep, and made preparations for the reconnaissance mission ahead. The entire reconnaissance group was then organized into three parties. One party consisted of the equivalent of two platoons. Its reconnaissance mission was the airfield near Kleng. The second party consisted of approximately fifteen men, and was to determine the best southern approach into Kleng. The third party (mine) had fifteen men and we were to determine the best northern approach into Kleng.

On 1 April 1968 we began the reconnaissance which was to last a period of 10 days. My reconnaissance party was successful in penetrating all the way into Kleng where we measured the distance between fences, foxholes and other fortified positions with string. We withdrew using the same route and all three parties assembled back at the observation post on 11 April 1968. The main body of the regiment was then ordered to move from the assembly area (Kontum-Cambodian border) to our location in preparation for the attack. The Regiment arrived on 17 April 1968.

On that same day we received information from division that enemy forces had moved into Chu Do and that we were to perform a reconnaissance on Chu Do. I departed on 17 April 1968 for Chu Do. The regimental commander and officers remained at the observation post. The regimental commander designated another meeting place named Chu Barat (two hours from Chu Do) for us to report to after we accomplished our mission. It took seven hours to move to Chu Do as we followed dry and shallow creek beds. Several times as we approached Chu Do we were subjected to artillery fire but we were too close (400 meters) to the friendly positions for the fire to be effective. There was only one wire fence at Chu Do. We moved in close, located and plotted the enemy positions. We estimated there was one understrength battalion located there. We finished the Chu Do reconnaissance on 22 April 1968 and moved to Chu Barat and reported to the regimental commander. The regimental commander ordered us to make final reconnaissance on Chu Do. We did this and returned to Chu Barat on 23 April 1968.

On the night of 23 April 1968 the attack commenced. The reconnaissance personnel (myself included) remained at Chu Barat during the attack.
I am not sure, but I believe the 4th, 5th and 6th Battalions attacked; there were two companies in reserve. The infantry battalions were discovered prematurely while moving into Chu Do and enemy artillery was fired from Kleng on the attacking forces. Our artillery was not accurate and therefore ineffective. We were not successful in this attack and suffered many casualties. I heard that we had 260 men killed, 50 missing and a large number of wounded. After the attack, the regiment withdrew and took three days to bury the dead. Later we moved from Kontum Province to the Dak Dam area of Cambodia and prepared for operations against Ban Me Thuot.

When moving large units in SVN our forces do not use the existing trails. These trails do not necessarily speed our movement up because of the security requirements and fear of detection; consequently, the personnel weave on and off the trails. While moving we have a squad linking battalions to each other. When we arrive at a perpendicular trail, we break branches to show the direction. In thick vegetation we cut bamboo stalks and place them about waist high in the foliage with the pointed tip showing the direction. There is no set distance for spacing these stalks.

11. DAILY ROUTINE WHEN NOT ON OPERATION: During the day when I am not on an operation my life with the NVA is very easy. I wake up at 0600 hours daily, brush my teeth and bathe. I eat breakfast with my fellow officers at 0700 hours. The enlisted soldiers eat together in another area. After breakfast I join the men of my company and talk to them until about 1100 hours. We talk about personal matters like families, none and, of course, sex. At 1100 hours I eat lunch and take a siesta until 1400 hours. Our food is usually rice and canned meat. The food is from China and is prepared for us by the two cooks of my company. As Executive Officer of the Company I am responsible for the preparation of the food. The canned meat is usually pork and we get tired of eating it so often. Sometimes the Vietnamese people provide us food; in Darlac, Kontum and Pleiku, the people were sympathetic to us and gave us rice. In the afternoon I go fishing with one or two members of my company. We do not go more than two kilometers from our base camp. We are very careful with members of our unit who appear to be worried or if their morale is low. We watch them closely and accompany them continuously. There is nothing to do during the day except go fishing. At 1800 I eat supper and then at 1900 the entire company assembles for a meeting at which the political officer is in charge. At this daily meeting the political officer praises NVA heroes and slanders the South Vietnamese government. He also talks about the great victories we are achieving against the GVN and US units. I do not think the political officer is effective; the soldiers do not listen attentively and become bored very quickly with his speech. One reason he is ineffective is because he never accompanies us on our combat operations and he never sees us take casualties. The soldiers know this and do not believe his stories. Sometimes I get together with my men after the political meeting.
and we sing and tell jokes to try and cheer each other up. At 2100 we go to bed. If we are located away from the enemy we sleep in hammocks; if we are close to the enemy we sleep in trenches and foxholes.

When we are in the mountains avoiding contact and on a rest period our most vulnerable elements are the patrols we send out, and some of the companies that we have guarding our outer perimeter. The food we normally have in advance and the rest area will always be around some source of water.

12. NVA TACTICS AND CONTROL: It is easy to distinguish our officer during the battle as they attack with the headquarters element. The headquarters element consists of the CO, XO, radioman, and LN man or runner. The officers don't wear pistols or insignia of rank during the battle and are dressed the same as each soldier.

Prior to an attack we prepare a plan. Normally the recon unit has seen the area and can diagram it in detail. This is normally given to the sapper units who will go in first or maybe with the attacking infantry.

All units must go by this plan and a soldier must execute an order even if many get killed. They must launch the attack at all costs. The plan always shows how to get into the objective area, where key points to be destroyed are located and how best to exfiltrate. Artillery support is fired prior to the attack to confuse and pin down the enemy. During the battle sometimes artillery continues firing and kills our own men, but this is normally done only where there is a lack of communications. If the enemy gets our attacking forces pinned down, artillery is employed in order for them to withdraw. Artillery is also used when we want to break contact or exfiltrate.

There are several reasons why our artillery is inaccurate and not too effective. One reason is that we don't get to choose the terrain all the time. Another reason is because of the tactics involved and the last reason is the enemy.

After the battle if we have many dead, we rest and bury the dead. It is NVA discipline that you always try to recover a friend's body. We have no religious service for the dead, we just bury them. His personal effects are kept by his friends. If a unit has suffered lots of casualties their morale is low and replacements are needed. That unit is rarely used to attack the same objective.

We used a control technique to help weak soldiers by organizing into three man cells. The selection is not made by friendship, but by picking two skillful men and one weak one. The strong would give advice and encouragement to the weak one.
I never saw a self-criticism session and don't know if they are effective or not. The men in my unit made written statements of self-criticism but I just filed them in their records.

My reconnaissance unit is usually briefed on our mission at least one day prior to moving out. Our regimental commander or the executive officer briefs us on our mission. After we receive our mission we stay together in the unit area. We never use guides when we are conducting our movement because they are not reliable. Guides are used by larger units only for long distance moves or marches. For our movement, we use maps and compasses to navigate. The maps we use are 1:100,000 or 1:50,000 scale and are French-made with Vietnamese writing. Our division supply element can provide these maps for any area very soon after request. Normally there are not enough compasses for every man, so every 3d man is issued a compass and then we conduct our reconnaissance in the three-man groups.

During the day when my unit is on an operation, we start the day at 0430 or 0530. The necessary rations and equipment are obtained and prepared the day before the operation commences. The special equipment we usually carry consists of radios, maps, compasses, binoculars, notebooks and a knife. I inspect every man to include the condition of his weapon, ammunition (90 rds per man) two grenades and equipment prior to departure. We move out at 0600 hours. During movement to the reconnaissance objective, we usually travel about three kilometers per hour, taking a 10-15 minute break every hour. We rarely travel more than a day and a half without sleeping. During movement we keep our weapons on safety because we have had accidents with triggers catching on bushes, etc.. We do not sleep at mid-day during movement. At 1500 hours we find a place to make camp for the night. When we arrive at the reconnaissance objective, we usually establish an OP approximately one or two hours distance from the objective. Next we dispatch small teams (2-3 men) to move in as close to the objective as possible. If we possibly can, we try to penetrate and enter the objective area to determine the exact enemy strength and location. We try to locate and count the number of heavy weapons such as 105mm howitzers and 82mm mortars. If we are successful and are not detected we withdraw using the same route.

We are never assigned a straight combat mission to engage the enemy. We are told only to observe and report what we have observed. Near Chu Do, in the western highlands of Kontum, one of my reconnaissance squads saw a US reconnaissance team on three different occasions. Each time I ordered my men to hold their fire and not engage US troops unless they were discovered. If we were discovered, we would return fire immediately and attempt to disengage and withdraw. US reconnaissance teams always fire into suspected positions and this is not effective as they disclose their own location. We know where they are after they fire and all we have to do is bypass them. Often we are able to determine the reconnaissance objective of the US team because of these mistakes.
As reconnaissance personnel we do not fight in battles. During the attack we usually remain at a secure area with the regimental staff until the main body has returned.

In our reconnaissance of cities, we are normally met by local force liaison people at a prearranged location within or close to the city. The liaison people escort us to the exact positions or locations to be attacked. If there are several ARVN soldiers in the area, we usually disguise ourselves as ARVNs, but in cities where there are only a few ARVN soldiers, we wear civilian clothes. Normally we use challenge and passworks to recognize the liaison people. Before we reach the city, usually at our secret base, the code words are issued by the local force underground organizations (VCI) along with ID cards. I do not know what method of communication the VCI use to pass the code and recognition signals to my superiors.

When we complete our reconnaissance mission, we return to our unit as soon as possible. We never rely on civilians or others to relay our information. After an attack, we normally take two or three weeks off and rest and treat the wounded, and conduct "Lessons Learned" meetings. My reconnaissance unit did not train unless we had more than six weeks between missions and I never experienced a lull longer than three to four weeks.

When you do a good job in the army you are awarded by being promoted and/or given a certificate of commendation. I was happy when promoted as I knew my leaders recognized my good performance. Recently in SVN, the NVA has started giving the Medal of Victory. I did not get one and none of my men earned one. There are no monetary awards given.

13. TRAINING AGAINST AMERICAN TACTICS: We are taught and given training on sand tables about American defensive perimeters in general. We have much training on how to disarm mines, the claymore is the easiest. We have received lots of training on disarming four or five particular mines. One is the small plastic anti-personnel stepmine. The second is the claymore and the third the ground and trip flares. We also were trained in the one that has either the push or pull firing device in the bottom of it. We just dig down and stick a nail or piece of wire in the safety pin hole. I have never seen one of my men blown up while disarming a mine and have only seen two of my men step on mines and neither of those mines exploded.

All the US defensive positions are very easy to get through. I can say that I have never encountered a tough one in my experience. We just crawl slowly through the wire, cutting the bottom strands. In case we are detected while inside the camp and must make a hasty withdrawal, we use wood planks or ladders if available and go over the top of the wire. In training we have a man lie on the wire and
we run over him but we never do this in combat operations. You had lots of wire around Polie Klang but it was easy to get through. I just don’t think you have a defensive barrier that is effective against us.

We know we cannot defeat the Americans as it is almost impossible to defeat you, but the military operations just occur to back the political aspects. We will win the war politically not militarily.

14. TREATMENT OR CARE FOR THE NVA WOUNDED OR KIA: We have one doctor and one medical specialist who work at the regimental dispensary. We also have two medics in the company. Physical examinations are not routine in the NVA and are given only when you’re ill. The doctors in the NVA are very good. If a man loses a leg he is sent back to NVN after receiving proper medical treatment. I never saw a wounded soldier in NVN. When they go back the government keeps them in medical centers as they don’t want the people to see them.

When we have cuts or infections we take anti-infection pills to cure the infection. We do not take any type of medication prior to going into battle and only the doctor has morphine.

Although we take the malaria pill, most of us have malaria as the pill is used only to prevent malaria and due to the poor physical conditions of the personnel they often contact it. I believe all 70 men in my unit had contacted malaria at one time or another and it was in various degrees of seriousness.

We also take B1 Vitamins daily. Three men in my unit (of 70 men) had paralysis and couldn’t feel pain or anything. We didn’t know what this was and just sent them to the hospital. I never saw them after they went to the hospital.

The only women in the NVA were the nurses who worked in the hospitals and they didn’t go with the combat units into the battles. We didn’t have much sex life in the NVA unit, however, sometimes during infiltration we met girls at the communications and liaison stations in NVN, Laos and Cambodia. The girls in NVN and Laos were usually Vietnamese or Laotian; the ones in Cambodia were Vietnamese. The girls seemed to like us and we were nice to them, sometimes giving them NVN money and gifts.

15. PW’s: The Political Officer tells us that if captured by you we will be tortured and killed. When I was wounded and captured I expected to be killed. Of course now I have changed my mind. An ARVN major showed me a SVN brochure on treatment of PW’s and I realized then I would not be killed.

I will never forget the day I was captured. We had finished our recon of the Ban Me Thuot area and were returning to the base camp.
area when my unit of eight men became surrounded by an American infantry company. Artillery was fired on us and I received a serious wound in the stomach and another wound in the left thigh. I felt mad that my unit was leaving me but I knew they must or they would all become wounded or captured. I gave my friend my pistol, machine gun, watch, ring, and map. I kept only my compass and I placed two grenades under me. I expected to die and today I can hardly believe I'm still alive. I was going to use the grenades on my capturers if possible and kill them if they hit me or it appeared they were going to kill me. Leaving the grenades with the wounded is not a policy, I just thought maybe I could kill some of you.

Instead of being mistreated, as soon as I was found, a medic came up and started giving me medical treatment. I could have killed the medic, a US captain and two other men with the grenades as they never searched me but after getting the medical help I gave them the grenades.

I am glad to get the good treatment as a PW and the doctors and people have been very kind to me but I would rather be with my unit so I could move freely. I want to feel free. If I could I would accept a SVN citizenship and stay in Nha Trang.

If there was a PW exchange I would be happy as then I could go back to my unit, maybe another unit or be released and be a civilian. I would not be watched as the exchange would be official.

I don't know how you could make the NVA soldier believe you don't kill FW's; one way might be to let some FW's return after you have given them proper medical treatment. However, if I was released and went back to my unit I would be watched very closely and at all times.

We are told to try and capture American soldiers if at all possible because they are very valuable to our propaganda effort. I have never seen an American or SVN prisoner. While in training we were told not to hit any PW we captured and to give them good treatment. I have never heard of any PW being mistreated by the NVA.

16. NVA VERSUS ARVN/US SOLDIERS: The only soldiers who enjoy the army are the young hot-blooded one's. Most of us are draftees who don't enjoy it. We don't care about not getting paid as we couldn't spend it anyway but there are many hardships. Many times there is a shortage of food and equipment in the NVA while in SVN and this really affects the morale of the troops.

The NVN soldier is better than the SVN soldier but the ARVN have artillery. The American soldier is stronger build and more intelligent but he is not familiar with the terrain so the NVN soldier has an advantage. The US soldier is very poor when moving through the
terrain. The American infantry units are weak, their fire power is poor and their equipment is poor. An example of this is an American unit cannot take or destroy a machine gun position in a properly prepared bunker except by calling for air or artillery. However, the NVA can destroy any American bunker with its B40 or B41 rocket. I have already talked about the AK-47 as compared to the M16 rifle.

The ARVN forces are weak because their equipment is poor; more than poor. The RF/PP/CCIG are also poor. I think that 70 or 80% of all NVA casualties are caused by artillery or air.

There is some collaboration among RF/FF units done by the LF units and then the arrangements are passed on to the NVA. I feel there are many communist agents and sympathizers in the SVN units and agencies. I know that on the B52 strikes we normally had advance warning as to where and when they would occur. The warning usually came by a message from division to the regiment and it normally arrived two hours prior to the strike. As I remember the most time we ever had was four hours. One instance warning arrived just minutes before the air strike and we just made it out of the area when it was hit and demolished.

17. CAN THE NVA WIN THE WAR?

I compare the war to a Chinese Chess game. The Americans and SVN are compared to the horse (a knight of our chess game) they are strong but don't know the moves. The NVA is a weaker horse but knows the moves. The players are of generals rank or higher, we are just the participants and spectators. I don't know if we're trying to force communism on SVN or not. I don't think this war can be won by military forces. The military activities are just in support of the political struggle. I have heard a little about the peace talks on the radio from Hanoi but I have no opinion on them. I think the only answer is a North Vietnam and a South Vietnam. There are just too many differences on each side. Once divided, the country should be controlled by an International Commission at the DMZ. The UN cannot control it as they have the same problem—communism versus the free world.

The NVN people have no opinion of the allied forces assisting SVN as they are too far from the front. Among the NVA forces in SVN this kind of talk is not carried on because of the political officers presence. I am not surprised at the presence of the Free World Forces in SVN as they have a right to request aid the same as the NVN government. Both governments insult each other's intelligence about the existence of foreign armies present. It is just a political game.

I was still in NVN when the Tet Offensive started but the radio said it was a great victory achieved by the NVA. They said the NVA were controlling Saigon. After my infiltration I saw it was quite different. I do not know how many casualties the NVA suffered during the Tet period but I do remember hearing about it on the radio after I arrived in SVN.

139
The people in NVN are like the deaf and blind, they do not know what goes on, just what the communists tell them. When NVN denies having the NVA in SVN, our leader are speaking incorrectly, they are lying. I think it is silly and ridiculous. If we don't fight, our family will be harassed by the government. This kind of propaganda is for you to pick up, it is not broadcast to the NVN people or our military units. This really doesn't affect the morale of our troops as they are not made aware of it.

18. BOMBING IN NVN: I really don't know about the bombing halt as I've been in SVN since February. At first the people in NVN were very scared of the bombs but now they consider it a rule of the war. The people just complain that they don't know why you bomb them, the people don't really know the political situation. I hear they were pleased and happy when you stopped bombing them, they had guessed you (US) would stop the bombing before you did. They feel that you stopped the bombing because you wanted peace. I feel the only way to get peace is to stop the bombing. The political officer in my unit never gave us the communist or government line on the bombing halt, however, he is a very stupid man.

19. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: I have heard of the Chieu Hoi program but I don't know what it is. I heard a little about it from an airplane but we really didn't pay much attention as it was very poor propaganda and the voice did not sound sincere.

I have seen lots of the psyops leaflets but they are very poor and we laugh at them, they make no impression on the soldier of the NVA. I saw them in Kontum and Darlac provinces as we moved toward our objectives. The quality of the writing is very poor and not good Vietnamese. The Americans should let the Vietnamese write them as they know how to put the story or what you want said into poetry, the Vietnamese are a very poetic people. I know and all the men in my unit knew the lines of a poem used by the SVN and we thought of it often. The best way to tell of good will is by a poem. The SVN poem that we remember is for our mother. It goes like this:

"Since I have been away from you following my friends to Laos and then to Central Vietnam through the mountain areas being sunburned by the sun near the coastal area, I have suffered all kinds of hardships. The youth age similar to a blossom flower, due to the cost of peace, we are not afraid of difficulties. During six months of day movement and night rest I've worn out my boot soles and shirt collars by the cold weather. Oh, wise mommy I remember our home. In the evening our house is covered by the shadow of the sweet melon vine and I am sorry my hand has committed a crime."

*Some of the meaning is lost by the translation of the poem from VN to English.
All the men in my unit could read and write as they had to have a minimum of a second class education. In the infantry units, the education minimum is lower but most can read or write to some degree.

We do have radios to listen to and when we can get batteries we listen to music. We are not allowed to listen to the SVN radio station and I do not like to listen to the newscasts because it is usually propaganda and politics.

I heard about the free elections in SVN, it is quite normal for SVN to have free elections but we do not know if the elections are a political trick or if they are real.

Many soldiers worry about their loved ones. I thought of my mother many times but there was no mail. When we first entered SVN eight months ago, our superiors assembled the unit and instructed us to write a letter home to our relatives and tell them we were happy and in good health. I did have a letter box number and so did my men. Our leaders told us it would require four months for the letter to arrive in NVN and five months to return. I have never received a letter from NVN and none of my men have either.

20. LT THONG’S CLOSING REMARKS: Most of the people want a united Vietnam because they want an end to the war. They want a unification of both sides. There could be an end to the war without unification. I believe Vietnam is one country and should be under one government. I do not believe the GVN could endure with the Americans. I do not think the Americans should be in Vietnam as they are not Asiatics.

21. HISTORIANS EVALUATION OF THE INFORMATION: LT Thong is very appreciative of the life saving medical treatment given him. He was most cooperative at all times while being interviewed and appeared to be very sincere. Many of the same questions were asked during different sessions and only a few minor discrepancies were found in his answers. During his first interrogations, information given by LT THONG proved to be most valuable in revealing the enemy plans and in assisting allied forces to preempt the attack on Ban Me Thuot.

22. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: I would like to thank the following people for their assistance. The G2, I FFORCEV for his approval in allowing this monograph to be made and his cooperation in arranging for my interviews with LT Thong. The report compiled by MAJ Malcolm A. Danner, Asst G2 in charge of collection for HQ, I FFORCEV, "A Day in the Life of an NVA Soldier in South Vietnam" was used extensively in the monograph as it had been compiled from the earlier interrogation reports. LT Timothy Ramsey and Mr. Vinh Sang assigned to the interrogation section of the 55th Military Intelligence Detachment did an outstanding job as interpreters during the interviews with LT Thong.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, I Field Force Vietnam,
Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68
CG, I Field Force Vietnam

4. REPORT DATE
15 Nov 68

5. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.

6. PROJECT NO.
N/A

7. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES
144

8. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER
684044

9. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310