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AGAM-P (M) (3 Mar 69) FOR OT UT 684235 10 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-SG/SHD

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned
(1 August - 31 October 1968)

THRU: Commanding General
I FFORCEV
ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT
APO 96390

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

The inclosed Operational Report Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with AR 525-15, USARPAC Regulation 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. R. STAMP
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

FORCUT UT
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

I. Significant Organizational and Unit Activities

1. Introduction

This Operational Report Lessons Learned covers the period 1 August 1968 through 31 October 1968. The 173d Airborne Brigade has continued to conduct combat operations aimed at locating and destroying Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces and installations. As I Field Force's reserve, the Brigade remained ready to meet any required mission, and continued operations in the Brigade's TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility). Its civic action program continued to play a key role in the Brigade's counterinsurgency efforts.

To best accomplish its mission, the 173d Airborne Brigade conducted four major operations during the reporting period. Operation Dan Hoa, which commenced 17 September 1967, continues to be conducted in Phu Tet Province by the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry and C Company 16th Armor. Operation Walker, including the defense of Camp Radcliff at An Khe and the surrounding AO, is being conducted by the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 50th Infantry. Operation Cochise, involving the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry and the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry continues to be centered in the Bong Son plains area of Binh Dinh Province. The 3d Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry continued to remain OPCON to Task Force South, conducting Operation McClain in southern II Corps.

The 173d Airborne Brigade continued to be under the leadership of Brigadier General Richard J. Allen, who assumed command of the unit on 20 March 1968. A native of Atlanta, Georgia, General Allen joined the Army as an enlisted man in 1940 and rose in rank to First Sergeant. After attending and graduating from Infantry OCS in 1942, he served as an officer with the 101st Airborne Division during World War II and participated in the invasion of Normandy, the invasion of Holland, and the battle of Bastogne.

General Allen's last assignment was as assistant division commander of the 101st Airborne Division. His decorations include the Silver Star, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Combat Infantryman's Badge, Distinguished Unit Citation with one oak leaf cluster, Army Commendation Medal, and Croix de Guerre with Bronze Star (France).

He is a graduate of Georgia Military Academy, the University of Maryland, Infantry OCS, Parachute School, Armor Advanced Course, the Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Air War College.

On 6 September 1968, General Craigton W. Abrams, Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, presented the Meritorious Unit Commendation to the 173d Airborne Brigade for the period May 1965 to May 1967.

After attaching the red Meritorious Unit Commendation streamer to the Brigade colors, General Abrams said, "That little streamer represents months and years of devoted and dedicated service by the men of this Brigade. It represents the sacrifices of a great many...who have served their government, their country and their people."

The Meritorious Unit Commendation reads: "In every confrontation with the stubborn insurgents the 173d Airborne Brigade displayed marked aggressiveness which enabled them to neutralize enemy strongholds and capture thousands of logistical items. In addition to remarkable skill and tenacity in combat the Sky Soldiers of the Brigade carried on an extensive civic actions program characterized by sincere compassion for the suppressed local populace. During each of the Brigade's combat operations, the Sky Soldiers immeasurably aided the allied counterinsurgency effort by winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people."
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

The 173d Airborne Brigade celebrated its fifth anniversary on 25 June 1968. Organized from the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry, and activated on 25 June 1963 on Okinawa as a quick-strike guerrilla-warfare reaction force, the past five years have been filled with impressive victories. The Sky Soldiers have trained, deployed into combat and jumped into combat. In doing so, the Sky Soldiers have compiled a proud record of FIRSTS in time, place and accomplishments that can be held by all with pride.

While on Okinawa, the 173d underwent extensive airborne, guerrilla and jungle warfare training, and traveled throughout the Asian theatre on training missions prior to deploying to the Republic of South Vietnam. It was during this period of training that the paratroopers received the nickname "Sky Soldiers," from the admiring Nationalist Chinese Army and the population of Taiwan.

On 5 May 1965, C-130's carried the Brigade from Okinawa to Bien Hoa, Republic of South Vietnam. They were the first American Army combat troops to be committed to the strife-ridden country.

Shortly after arriving, the paratroopers became the first American unit to fight in War Zone D, and several operations later, the first to move into the Iron Triangle. On February 22, 1967, the Brigade achieved still another "first" as the first to make an American combat parachute assault since the Korean War. Spearheading Operation Junction City, the Brigade accounted for 266 enemy killed and the destruction of a most vital enemy propaganda office.

However, it was in November of 1967 that many feel the Brigade had its finest hours. Near Dak To, in Vietnam's Central Highlands, the Sky Soldiers made repeated heavy contacts with large NVA forces in a bitterly contested, twenty day period. On Thanksgiving Day, 1967, the paratroopers swarmed to the crest and ousted the last NVA defenders on a remote hill designated 875, in one of the most brutal actions of the Vietnamese conflict. The battle was that of Dak To.

Four Sky Soldiers from the 173d Airborne Brigade have received the Medal of Honor in Vietnam, an outstanding record for a single brigade, a small fraction of the military strength in the Republic of South Vietnam.
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2. Organization

During the past quarter the major organizational changes in the Brigade was the organization of the Special Troops Battalion (Provisional), the attachment of Company E 20th Infantry (Long Range Patrol) and the reorganization of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 173d Airborne Brigade and Company A (Administration) 173d Support Battalion (Airborne).

The Special Troops Battalion (Provisional) was organized by authorization of the Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade, General Orders Number 2146, dated 17 August 1968. Its mission is to provide supervision and coordination of administrative and logistical activities to the following selected units assigned or attached to the 173d Airborne Brigade:

- Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 173d Airborne Brigade
- Troop "E" 17th Cavalry
- 173d Engineer Company
- 173d Signal Company
- 172d Military Intelligence Detachment
- 7th Infantry Detachment (LRP)
- 39th Infantry Detachment (Scout Dog)
- 75th Infantry Detachment (Combat Tracker)
- 46th Public Information Detachment
- 51st Chemical Detachment
- 24th Military History Detachment (Airborne)

The Special Troops Battalion (Provisional) is authorized three officers and two enlisted men. Equipment was provided initially from resources within the Brigade, and personnel were provided from current resources. Personnel are assigned to and carried on the morning report of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 173d Airborne Brigade. It is notable that the Battalion provides supervision and coordination of logistical and administrative activities only, and does not exercise operational control over any of the subordinate units. The Provisional Battalion Commanding Officer does not have disciplinary authority nor does he rate or endorse the officer efficiency reports of any officer in the assigned or attached units.

Company E, 20th Infantry (Long Range Patrol) was attached by authorization of the Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, General Orders Number 4755, dated 14 October 1968. It was attached for all purposes, to include transfer, promotion and requisitioning of personnel. Operation control is retained by I Field Force Vietnam, and at present one platoon of Company E 20th Infantry (LRP) is OCPON to the 173d Airborne Brigade.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 173d Airborne Brigade and Company A (Administration), 173d Support Battalion (Airborne) were reorganized under the authority of the Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, by General Orders Number 505, dated 10 September 1968, and became effective 20 September 1968. Implementation was complete by 31 October 1968.

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3. Intelligence:

3a. The enemy situations before and during each operation conducted by the Brigade are broken down as follows: Operation Dan Sinh (formally Cochise), Operation Dan Hoa (formally Rolling 11) and Operation Waller.

(1) Operation Dan Sinh.

(a) Enemy Situation:

1. Disposition: The 173d Airborne Brigade relieved the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and assumed operation in AO Cochise on 30 March 1968. AO Cochise is centered around the city of Bong Son (BR 8796) in Binh Dinh Province, and the Brigade TOC is located north of Bong Son at LZ English.

Historically, Binh Dinh Province has long been a "hotbed" of enemy activity. It was the last province to be left by the Viet Minh after the signing of the Geneva Convention Accords in 1954, and the strategic port city of Qui Nhon had previously served as the Viet Minh capital city. Thus, the Viet Cong infrastructure in Binh Dinh Province is old and well-based, and Binh Dinh has long been a stronghold for the Viet Cong and its sympathizers.

Binh Dinh Province is characterized by low, fertile coastal plains which break abruptly 15 to 20 kilometers inland into high, heavy-canoped north-south mountain ranges. It is heavily populated, with almost one million inhabitants. It includes the province capital, Qui Nhon, and the smaller but still vital cities of Bong Son and An Khe. Bong Son and its surrounding villages and hamlets, which comprise AO Cochise, account for nearly 350,000 people. Thus, the Brigade's units are almost constantly working in and around heavily populated areas.

It is also significant that Binh Dinh's coastal lowlands are some of the richest agricultural areas in Vietnam, its main crops being rice and vegetables. Three or four rice crops can be grown and gathered each year. The farmers of the Province also have and raise cattle for market. The coastal waters support a bustling fishing industry, the greater part of it being carried on by individuals in their own small boats. Fishing is aggressively pursued, perhaps 25% of the population being engaged in fishing itself or its offsprings, and contributes a great deal to the area's prosperity. It is significant that both farming and fishing produce excesses, to be sold in markets along the coast and in the Highlands. Thus, Binh Dinh Province is an economic "breadbasket."

In addition, Route QL 1, Vietnam's coastal highway and the country's primary land communication route for all business and commerce (it is the only highway that runs the length of the country), runs through Binh Dinh's center. Because of its importance, QL 1 has now been almost completely surfaced with asphalt in Binh Dinh Province. The Vietnam National Railroad, which runs parallel to QL 1, is heavily damaged, and has not been in use since late 1964.

One can easily realize then, that the enemy has long been aware of the Province's political and economic importance. The enemies main force units, both Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, by and large remain in the jungle areas to the west of the rich, populated plains. Here they train and resupply, periodically making sorties into the lowlands in attempts to attack both American and Vietnamese military installations or local governmental headquarters. The main force units are also continually sending agents into the plains with many missions. By one, two and in small groups, they come to purchase rice, fish, corn, coconuts, vegetables and medical supplies. They also acquire intelligence information and act as couriers.
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The following units are reported within the Bong Son area or close enough to have influence with the Cochise area of operations:

a. HQ & support units NT 3 NVA Division
b. 2d VC Regiment
c. 93d Bn/2d VC Regiment
d. 95th Bn/2d VC Regiment
e. 97th Bn/2d VC Regiment
f. 10th NVA Regiment
g. 7th Bn/18th NVA Regiment
h. 8th Bn/18th NVA Regiment
i. 9th Bn/18th NVA Regiment
j. 22d NVA Regiment
k. 7th Bn/22d NVA Regiment
l. 8th Bn/22d NVA Regiment
m. 9th Bn/22d NVA Regiment
n. D Co, 40th Sapper Bn
o. XCIIF Bn
p. 300th Sapper Bn
q. 50th LF Bn

In early June, agent reports alerted the S2 to the movement of the 3d NVA Division and the two of its three subordinate regiments, the 2d VC and 22d NVA Regiments. These units were moving north into Quang Ngai Province and the American Division's area of operations. Stay-behind forces of approximately 100 men each remained in our area of operations. The third regiment of the 3d NVA Division is the 18th NVA Regiment. It did not accompany the 3d NVA Division in its move north and was in heavy contact with NVA forces in the Nui Ba Mountains in Phu Cat (D) Binh Dinh (P) during June and early July, suffering heavy casualties.

In mid-July two of the three battalions of the 18th NVA Regiment, the 7th and 9th, moved north from Phu Cat (D) into the southern portion of our AO and into the Suoi Ca and Vinh Thanh Mountains. The 8th Battalion, the third battalion of the 18th NVA Regiment, continued operations south of our AO in the Phu Cat (D) area.

During the month of August the 3d NVA Division headquarters, with the 2d VC Regiment and the 22d NVA Regiment, continued to remain out of the 173d Airborne Brigade's area of operation in southwestern Quang Ngai Province. The 18th NVA Regiment, located in the Suoi Ca-Vinh Thanh Mountains since mid-July, remained out of contact, though it was presumed that their reorganization and re-equipment should soon be complete, based on the ability of replacement personnel to reach the 18th NVA Regiment. For a second month, due to the withdrawal of the main force 3d NVA Division, there was an increase in activities on the part of local force VC units.
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The XC II Local Force Battalion became quite active in late June, and remained active throughout July and August. Organized in January 1968 and operating with an estimated 155 men, XC II operates in Hoai Nhon and Hoai An Districts and has four subordinate companies. On 22 August Operation Dan Sinh 22-6, a combined US-ARVN operation target against the XC II IF Battalion, began.

In September the 3d NVA Division headquarters, with its 2d and 22d Regiments, continued to remain in southwestern Quang Ngai Province. However, the earlier estimation and presumption that the 3d NVA Division's 18th NVA reorganization and re-equipping would be complete in September was proven correct. On 22 September, elements of the 41st ARVN Regiment of the 22d Infantry Division (ARVN) made contact with elements of the 7th and 9th Battalions of the 18th NVA Regiment east of Suoi Ca Valley (BR 8064). On 23 September the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry and the 1st Bn 69th Armor (OPCON) reinforced ARVN forces in contact. This contact ended on 6 October with VC/NVA losses of 198 KIA (BC) and 3 VC/NVA CIA. A prisoner captured by the 41st ARVN Regiment on 28 September 1968 revealed that the 161st Infiltration Group had provided replacements to the 18th NVA Regiment and that he had arrived at the Regiment on 11 September. However, the high enemy losses in the Suoi Ca contact offset the replacements gained. (For further information, refer to CAAR, Battle of Suoi Ca Valley, 173d Airborne Brigade.)

Operation Dan Sinh 22-6 continued against the XC II IF Battalion during September, entering into its second phase, and by 30 September had accounted for 237 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

Activity throughout AO Cochise was light during October as again the 3d NVA Division and its 2d and 22d NVA Regiments remained in southwestern Quang Ngai Province and out of our area of operations. During the month, however, reports were received that the 3d NVA Division was experiencing difficulties in locating sufficient foodstuffs to supply its personnel. Follow-up operations continued in the Suoi Ca and Vinh Thanh Mountains. However, the 18th NVA Regiment remained out of contact, and is presumed to be receiving more replacements in order to regain combat strength after the Battle of Suoi Ca Valley losses and gathering and storing foodstuffs. Of notable importance are ammunition cache finds by elements of the 1st Bn 503d Infantry in the vicinity of BR 8271. During the four day period of 28 to 31 October, 44 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, 23 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle ammunition, 6 rounds of 82mm mortar and another 82mm mortar, minus tube, were found. This capture significantly reduced the offensive capabilities of the 18th NVA Regiment's hard-hit 7th Battalion, the probable former owners.

2. Peculiarities and Weaknesses:

A. The enemy continues to be vulnerable to sustained friendly operations, attempting to evade and avoid contact. The first three phases of Operation Dan Sinh 22-6 have proven particularly effective against the VC infrastructure.

B. The enemy continues to be vulnerable to air and artillery retaliation, aerial observation and photography, intermittent artillery firings, APD and Red Haze readings.

C. The enemy continues to be prone to hunger and personal illness through sustained living in the jungle environment.

D. Psychological warfare will no doubt continue to have effect on enemy morale and effectiveness, especially due to successful allied operations during the past quarter, and the growing effectiveness of combined US-ARVN operations and the continued use of National Police screening operations.
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1. 

a. The enemy continues to carry out small-scale attacks, gaining for him a certain degree of success, allowing him to cause friendly casualties at a minimum risk to his forces. He can be expected to continue such operations.

b. The enemy can be expected to continue his interdiction of lines of communication, mining of primary and secondary routes of communications, sabotage operations against pipelines and small-scale attacks against isolated outposts.

c. The enemy can be expected to use extensively, with increased emphasis, specialized sapper units. This, as did last quarter, showed a marked increase in such activities. Sappers enjoy an elite status among VC/NVA units, specializing in spearheading infantry operations, in explosives and demolitions, land and water mine warfare, assassination, terrorism, kidnapping, sabotage and bridge destruction. Their primary mission is to precede enemy infantry in attack, breaching barbed wire and other obstacles impeding the infantry’s advance.

d. The enemy can be expected to continue to employ mortars and recoilless rifles against airfields and landing zones, as this type of attack involves little risk to his forces, and, if successful, can cause considerable damage and cause both aircraft and equipment to be inoperable for varying periods.

e. Reports continue on the possibilities of the enemy launching full-scale company-sized attacks against convoy operations, isolated outposts, possibly Bong Son or LZ English and other related population centers.

f. Likely targets for sapper unit activities, company and battalion size attacks, are by 4th District Headquarters, ARVN installations, Bong Son bridge, LZ English, LZ Tom, LZ Uplift and the restriction of vehicular movement on Highways 1 and 3A.

g. It is of interest that the enemy may be establishing a CBR capability, as during October the enemy has employed CS gas in the northern sector of AO Cochise three times.

h. Propaganda lectures, involuntary drafting and kidnapping of fighting-age civilians, laborers and specialists (doctors and nurses), continued infiltration and harassing activities, making full use of sapper-type units, are expected to continue in AO Cochise.

i. Combat Efficiency: Successful combat operations conducted during the months of August and September, which were based on combat intelligence, rendered hardships on existing VC/NVA units (see Year Order of Battle and Decisions and Plans Adopted with Reasons Based on Enemy Situation), caused enemy units to remain out of further major contacts with allied units for the remainder of the quarter. It is believed that replacements, with supplies, are coming into Binh Dinh Province, and that, once up to combat strength and possessing supplies and equipment necessary, the enemy will again commit himself to large-scale attacks.

(b) Significant Contacts:

1. August:

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1. 011030 BR910850 Elements of 1/69 engaged an est VC sqd w/SA and AW. The VC had engaged a 40th ARVN patrol loc on the E side of Highway 1 w/6 rds M79 fire. The contact broke at 1040H w/enemy fleeing W. The area was searched w/neg results. There were neg US or ARVN casualties.

2. 010900 BR916937 LRF Tk"E" approached a base camp and heard movement in a house. A team member went to investigate resulting in 1 VC KIA w/knife. The base camp had many bunkers and tunnels w/HC. Movement was heard 150m to the south andarty was fired into the area. A reaction force from E/17 was inserted into the area.

3. 021345 A/2/503 rec'd 10-15 rds of SA fire from the SSE. Fire was rtn'd w/SA and AW and the area searched w/neg results.

4. 062105 BR91732 B/1/69 engaged an est 25-35 indiv's and employed cannister and .50 Cal MG's. Arty was called in and the contact broke at 2135H w/und enemy results. There were neg US casualties. Spooky expended in the area.

5. 080917 BS925002 D/2/503 rec'd SA fire fm the E fm an und size enemy force resulting in neg US casualties. SA and mortars returned fire. Gunships also expended in the area. There were negative results.

6. 081925 BS944003 D/2/503 rec'd SA fire from 10 indiv's and resulted in 1 US WHA who later became KIA. Fire was rtn'd w/SA and AW and 81mm mort w/und enemy cas.

7. 082115 BS970930 B/2/503 made contact w/est 3 VC and rec'd AW fire and M79 rds. Fire was rtn'd w/SA and AW fire resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC). The contact was broken at 2127H w/neg US casualties.

8. 091850 BS994003 D/2/503 made contact w/est 3 indiv armed w/AW and 1 SA. Fire was exchanged and arty called on the enemy psn. There was 1 US WHA as a result of this contact and neg enemy casualties.

9. 091800 BR97774 A/1/69 elements in contact w/est VC plt employing AW, SA, B-40 rktls and und type mort fire. Fire was rtn'd w/SA, 90mm tank fire, AW, and arty. Gunships were employed and the enemy w/drew to the NE w/elements in pursuit. Spooky was requested and supported the contact w/AW and flares. This contact resulted in 4 US WHA. Contact broke at 1950H resulting in 1 B-40 RL, misc equip CIA and 1 VC KIA.

10. 100145 BS941008 D/2/503 amb engaged 2 VC in a boat crossing the river towards their loc resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). The element then rec'd a heavy volume of AW fire fm theN bank of the river and called arty on the enemy psn w/und results.

11. 100834 BR970866 C/2/503 engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 3 M79 rds and 1 pound of documents CIA.

12. 120330 BS946505 A/1/503 OPCON engaged movement on the E side of their perimeter w/M16 and rec'd approx 6-10 rds of AK47 fire. Neg US cas; 1 NVA KIA (BC) and 1 NVA gas mask, 2 AK47 magazines, and 2 Chicom HE's, were CIA.

13. 121557 BR945983 2/503 recon element observed 2 VC in blk PJ's moving W and engaged them w/SA resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

14. 121700 BR958977 2/503 recon element engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

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q. 121821 BR932856 A/1/503 OPCON 2/503 made contact w/und size enemy force and rec'd 15 M79 rds. Fire was rtn'd w/SA and AW w/neg results. There was 1 US WHA (not evacuated).

r. 121825 BR970955 D/2/503 rec'd SA fire from a bunker and returned fire w/SA and M79. The area was searched resulting in 1 VC KIA (VC). Neg US casualties.

s. 132122 BR964957 D/2/503 amb engaged 2 VC w/SA and Ht's. SA fire was returned resulting in 1 US WHA (slightly). Swift boats fired in support of the contact. There were und enemy results.

t. 131140 BR909898 L5P Tm "A" set up an amb and at 1745H engaged 2 VC armed w/SA resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC PW. There was 1 M16 and 1 SKS CIA.

u. 160858 BR933854 A/1/503 rec'd AK47 and M79 rds fr the E and SE resulting in 3 US WHA. Fire was rtn'd and the area checked w/neg results.

v. 161600 BR900829 A/1/503 rec'd AW fire from an unk size force. SA fire and arty returned and the area searched w/neg results.

w. 170950 ES855207 C/2/503 engaged 3 VC/NVA w/SA fire resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 SKS rifle and an und amt of documents CIA.

x. 181708 BR819705 D/1/503 engaged movement to their front w/SA and rec'd SA fire in rtn. A search of the area resulted in 60 rucksacks and 1 75mm RR rd CIA.

y. 191228 ES828054 B/2/503 rec'd 20 rds of AK47 fire and 2-3 rds M79 fire from the NW. SA fire was returned and arty employed. Area searched w/neg results.

z. 191245 BR816707 D/1/503 engaged 5 VC/NVA armed w/3 carbines, 1 AK47 and 1 M16, with negative results.

a. 202001 BR886738 A/1/79 engaged 1 NV/ w/SA fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA (BC). At 2040H the element reconed the area by fire resulting in 2 NVA KIA (BC) and 1 SA (Chicom) rifle CIA. Spooky was on station and suspended in support of the contact.

b. 221640 BR824709 C/1/503 rec'd SA fire resulting in 1 US WHA. SA fire was returned and the area searched w/neg results.

c. 230600 BR956981 A/2/503 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 M16 w/full mag and 40 rds, 2 M26 HG's CIA. A search of the area produced 5 detainees.

d. 231945 BR975982 A/2/503 received an unk amt of frag grenades. 2205H element rec'd 1 more frag grenade. Element rtn'd fire w/SA w/und results.

e. 241205 FSB Corregidor 2/503 rec'd SA fire and mort rds fn the S fr an est VC sqd. Fire was rtn'd w/SA & AW and 4.2 mort's. Gunships expended in the area. The contact broke at 1213H w/enemy fleeing S. The area was searched w/neg enemy cas and 1 US WHA.

f. 251840 BS915051 B/1/503 made contact w/2 VC and SA fire was exchanged. The VC evaded into the wire-line, resulting in 1 US WHA.
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2. 251320 BR956999 A/2/503 made contact with an estimated 2 VC squads. SA/AW fire was exchanged resulting in 10 VC KIA (BC). No US casualties.

3. 251338 BS947007 D/2/503 made contact with an estimated 6 VC and SA fire was exchanged. Element searched area with negative results.

4. 251340 BS963005 A/2/503 made contact with an estimated VC force and reciprocal fire from the NW, SE, and E. Fire was returned with SA and guns supported the contact. The area was searched with negative results.

5. 251400 BS947007 D/2/503 received light SA fire from a woodline. SA fire was returned and guns supported the contact. The area was searched with negative results.

6. 261940 BS902036 A/2/503 ambushed en route to ambush site and hit a booby trap and received fire from AK47 & M79 resulting in 5 US WIA. The larger site at BS905036 also received AK47 and M79 fire resulting in 2 US WIA. Fire was returned with unknown results.

7. 291200 BS879179 C/2/503 searched for 6 VC/NVA with weapons and made contact at 1240H at BS872176 resulting in negative US casualties, 3 VC KIA (BC) and 7 VC suspects detained.

8. During the period 1-31 August 1968 there were 11 incidents on the perimeter at LZ English including 1 mortar attack which resulted in 9 UH-1H damaged slight to moderate and 1 US WIA for the period there were 6 WIA, 1 US and 5 ARVN.

9. 020625 BR915986 D/1/503 engaged 4 individuals with SA fire resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 1 NVA WIA and 2 VC WIA. Individuals were armed with M-26 HG's and carried a total of $41,960 VN currency.

10. 030935 BS692080 CSF Co 222 made contact with an estimated VC unit. Artillery supported the contact which was broken at 0950H when the enemy fled N. CSF element re-established contact at 1009H at BS694008. Contact resulted in 1 CSF WIA and unknown enemy results.

11. 040145 BS895720 A/1/503 ambushed an estimated 6 VC/NVA with SA support by 4.2 mtr, resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC).

12. 041900 BR891814 A/1/503 ambushed an estimated VC squad resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

13. 061700 BS899157 C/1/69 engaged an estimated VC squad with SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (VC), 4 VC suspects (WIA) detained, 1 AK-47 CIA, 4 Chicom HG's CIA, 1 US carbine CIA, and 1 M-16 bayonet CIA. Area searched and 18 additional VC suspects were detained for interrogation.

14. 071030 BS867058 B/2/503 engaged 4 VC with SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), other VC (WIA) fled in unknown direction.

15. 081237 BS884036 B/2/503 engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The other 2 VC evaded the area to the SE. Artillery was fired and the area was searched with negative results.

16. 081630 BS669052 C/2/503 engaged movement in the brush resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 magazine of AK-47 ammo CIA.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. 082055 LZ English perimeter defense rec'd SA fire and AW fire and und type mtr fire. Counter mtr fire was fired and Spooky supported w/und enemy results. Contact broke at 2205H.

2. 080215 BR896721 A/1/69 amb made contact w/an est 15 VC. SA fire and HG's were exchanged resulting in 1 US WHA. The VC broke contact and fled to the NW. The area was searched w/neg enemy results.

3. 090040 BS799063 B/2/503 amb moved to their front resulting in 1 US KIA. Indiv was checking security of the amb when WIA. Dustoff was requested and indiv died on the dustoff helicopter.

4. 091335 BS659021 C/2/503 made contact w/8 VC and SA fire was exchanged resulting in 1 US WIA. 81mm mtr was fired in support and 1 rd was erratic resulting in 2 US WIA. Dustoff was requested and completed at 1406H.

5. 091230 BS88112 C/1/503 engaged 1 indiv running from the area w/SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). Indiv was approx 35 yrs old w/no identification.

6. 091400 BS868141 C/1/69 made contact w/est 12 VC armed w/AK-47 and carbine hiding in bunker. This action resulted in 8 VC KIA (BC) and neg US cas. The remaining VC evaded the area. There were 12 bunkers in the area w/36 00G. 1 of these was destroyed by the element.

7. 091600 BS830109 C/1/503 engaged VC w/SA fire resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 M-26 HG's CIA. Indiv was approx 25-30 yrs old. Documents captured indicated he was a security agent.

8. 110705 BS665014 C/2/503 made contact w/und amount of VC resulting in 2 US WIA and 1 VC KIA (BC). .45 cal pistol, 1 pistol belt, 1 bayonet, and 1 first aid pack CIA. The enemy broke contact and then fled N.

9. 111034 BS690002 C/2/503 engaged 6 VC moving w/SA resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). Indiv was approx 25-30 yrs old. The remaining VC evaded the area. There were 12 bunkers in the area w/36 00G. 1 of these was destroyed by the element.

10. 121635 BS869096 C/1/69 engaged 4 indiv w/SA fire who were running from the area resulting in 4 detainees. (2 detainees wounded). The 2 wounded were extracted 13 Sep for questioning and classification.

11. 121735 BS869106 C/1/69 made contact w/20-25 VC wearing blk PJ's, moving N and engaged them w/90mm tank fire, SA, and arty w/und results. Ele will continue the sweep of the area at 8h30.

12. 150043 BR804948 A/1/503 rec'd 12 frag grenades resulting in 1 US WHA (slightly). SA fire returned and arty fired w/und results.

13. 151012 BR82199 A/2/503 engaged 1 VC fleeing the area w/SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). Ele detained 2 VC suspects. Indiv extracted and were classified as innocent civilians.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. 160956 BR27937 A/2/503 engaged 1 VC suspect fleeing the area resulting in 1 VC suspect WIA. Indiv was dusted off for medical treatment to Qui Nhon before questioning could be completed. Indiv is unclassified.

2. 190945 BS86088 D/1/503 made contact w/5 VC and SA/AW fire was exchanged resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The enemy broke contact and fled W. Ele pursued w/neg results. There were no US casualties.

3. 191000 BS891095 B/1/69 w/NP entered a village. The NP engaged 1 indiv fleeing the area resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

4. 190937 BS804916 A/2/503 rec'd approx 100 rds of AK-47, SA and M-79 rds from the E resulting in 1 US WHA (slightly). Gunships were requested and expended in the area of the enemy pos w/und results.

5. 191434 BS804912 A/2/503 rec'd SA fire from an est VC sqd loc to the S resulting in 2 US WHA. Dustoff was completed w/o incident. Ele returned fire and gunships expended in the area.

6. 191557 BS779983 D/2/503 rec'd SA fire from an est 4 VC loc to the S. Ele returned the fire and searched the area resulting in 5 VC suspects being held. Indiv were extracted and 4 were classified as civil defendants, and 1 is unclassified.

7. 200500 BS820092 D/1/503 moved S to search the village of Hoi Phu. They were spotted by 2 trail watchers. Indiv were engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). Neg US casualties.

8. 200755 BS868993 B/2/503 rec'd SA fire from an est 3 VC. Indiv were engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The rest of the force fled SW and evaded the area.

9. 211150 BS800620 LRP Tm "D" amb 2 NVA resulting in 2 NVA WIA CIA. Ele captured 2 rucksacks, web gear, and 1 SKS rifle. The final result of this contact is 1 NVA KIA (BC), and 1 NVA PW.

10. 221755 BS860160 D/1/503 rec'd light AK-47 fire and possible M-79 rds. Ele engaged 3 VC w/SA resulting in 1 VC WIA (Pqss). Artillery was fired on the enemy pos and the area searched w/und results. Neg US casualties.

11. 221925 BS869172 D/1/503 moved to amb site engaged est 5 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC), 1 M-1 carbine and 1 bag of documents CIA. The KIA's were approx 19 yrs old.

12. 231025 BS871169 D/1/503 in contact w/est VC Co and SA/AW fire was exchanged. Artillery and gunships supported the contact w/und results. There were 3 US WIA and dustoff was completed w/o incident at 1104H.

13. 231650 BS833633 D/1/503 rec'd a report from 2/1 Cav of 15 bunkers w/enemy troops inside. Ele moved to check and made contact w/unk size enemy force resulting in 2 US KIA and 1 US WIA. Indiv was dusted off. Gunships were called in w/unk results.

14. 231716 BR784999 D/2/503 engaged an est 4-5 VC w/SA fire. VC returned fire w/SA & HD's resulting in 1 US WHA. Ele checked the area w/und results.

15. 231610 BR201304 C/1/503 rear security engaged 3 NVA, armed w/AK-47's & M-79 fire. Ele searched the area and found heavy blood trails. Neg US casualties and und enemy results.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 November 1968

M. 241038 BR333633 D/1/503 engaged an est NVA Co in bunkers w/SA, MG & AW. The Co rec'd heavy AW/SA fire. At 1120H the Co u/drew to allow airstrikes and arty fire in the enemy pan. There were 2 US WHA and 1 US KHA in this contact. The 2 US WHA were dusted of w/o incident. Enemy results were unk.

N. 241230 BR37796 Hqs 2/503 1/ ton vehicle driver engaged 1 VC w/SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

O. 251430 BR952006 C/2/503 engaged 5 VC w/SA fire fleeing the village area resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). Indiv was dressed in blk PJ's and approx 30 yrs old. Villagers said 15-20 VC had fled E from the village earlier.

P. 250002 BR892594 A/1/69 and A/1/503 rec'd 6-8 rds of unk type mtr fire in area resulting in 1 US KHA and 2 US WHA. Tank fire was employed against the enemy pan w/und results. Dust off was completed for the 2 WIA's w/o incident.

Q. 251010 BR786668 LRP Tm E engaged 3 VC/NVA w/SA fire resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 AK-47 and 1 rucksack CIA.

R. 261035 BR65550 C/1/503 in contact w/unk size enemy force and SA/AW fire was exchanged resulting in 6 US WHA and 6 VC/NVA KIA (BC). Contact broke at 1135H.

S. 261140 BR875654 C/1/503 in heavy contact w/est reinforced Co and SA/AW fire was exchanged resulting in 3 US KIA and 7 US WHA. There were 10 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 4 AK-47's, 1 RPD MG and 300 12.7 amm CIA.

T. 270700 BR813650 C/1/503 engaged a 3 man NVA OP resulting in 1 NVA KIA (BC) and 1 AK-47 CIA. The 2 NVA remaining evaded the area in unk direction.

U. 271625 BR804668 C/1/503 made contact w/unk size enemy force and rec'd heavy SA/AW fire and MG's. Ele rptd enemy dragging away bodies to the NW. There were 3 US KIA and 14 US Wha as a result of this contact. 9 US WHA were evacuated by dust off to LZ Uplift at 2250H. The main contact broke at 1845H. Harassing fire continued throughout the night.

V. 270806 BR288810 C/2/503 engaging 1 VC approaching their pan w/SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 AK-47 CIA.

W. 271625 BR804667 C/1/503 made contact w/unk size enemy force and rec'd heavy SA/AW fire and MG's. Ele rptd enemy dragging away bodies to the NW. There were 3 US KIA and 14 US Wha as a result of this contact. 9 US WHA were evacuated by dust off to LZ Uplift at 2250H. The main contact broke at 1845H. Harassing fire continued throughout the night.

X. 271345 BR819637 A/1/503 made contact w/unk size enemy force and SA/AW fire was exchanged. Contact broke at 1500H w/1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and neg US casualties. Ele searched the area and found 2 B-40 boosters, 2 NVA Protective masks, 7 Chicom MG, 3 entrenching tools, 1 Pick (VC), und amt of rucksacks, and misc documents and clothing.

Y. 271545 BR806668 C/1/503 made contact w/unk size enemy force resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 rucksack CIA.

Z. 272355 BR808662 C/1/503 platoon attempted to reach the downed helicopter in this area, but were forced back by heavy ground fire. Ele returned to their N/L w/o casualties. The Co rptd many NVA were killed in in the con-
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

At 1445H as est 30 NVA KIA (POss) as a result of the action. The Co saw many bodies being dragged away by the enemy as a result of the airstrikes, arty and SA fire.

aa. 281525 BR806668 D/1/503 captured 1 NVA PW suffering from sickness. Indiv was dressed in green fatigues and said he was a 20 yr old NVA. Indiv died at 1600H before he could be extracted and questioned. 1 NVA KIA (BC).

bb. 281105 BR920997 C/2/503 made contin. w/est 6 VC and SA/AW fire was exchanged. The VC broke contact at 1100H and fled N. The ele searched the area and found 1 VN boy with frag wounds. Indiv was extracted for medical treatment. There were neg US casualties and neg enemy results.

c. 281345 BR783910 D/2/503 rec'd 1 burst of AK-47 fire from 1 VC/NVA loc to the W. Ele returned fire w/SA/AW and searched the area w/neg results. There was 1 US WHA as a result of this contact. Indiv was dusted off.

d. 291110 BR784490 C/2/503 rec'd SA/AW fire and M-79 rds resulting in 1 US WHA. AW/SA fire was returned and the area searched w/neg results.

e. 291345 BR854940 C/2/503 ele rec'd SA/AW fire and VC/NVA armed w/AK-47 and carbines and rec'd approx 150 rds of SA fire resulting in neg US casualties. Ele returned fire and a search of the area was conducted w/neg results. Ele found a sleeping area for 3 persons and a tunnel and 3 bunkers that could hold 3 indiv each. The bunkers were destroyed.

ff. 291905 BR93981 C/2/503 rec'd light SA fire from est 4 VC loc in a house. Ele returned fire w/light organics and the VC broke contact and fled N. Ele checked the area w/neg results. There were 9 VN Civ WHA and 1 Civ KIA. Dust off was completed at 1930H for the wounded. The contact broke at 1905H w/neg US casualties.

3. October:

a. 021730 BR957840 A & B/1/69 received fire from a village and engaged unknown number of VC, who were running from the area, which resulted in 6 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC suspects detained. Individuals were extracted for questioning and are unclassified.

bb. 031235 BR792697 B/1/503 observed 5 VC/NVA with weapons and rucksacks. Elements moved closer and engaged them with SA fire resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 2 rucksacks and 1 AK-47 CIA.

c. 030933 BR951852 A/1/69 engaged 1 VC running from the area with SA fire resulting in 1 VC WHA. Individ was extracted for medical treatment and died at approx 1030H. 1 VC KIA (BC).

d. 040930 BR789684 B/1/503 made contact with unknown size VC force and SA fire was exchanged resulting in 1 US WHA. VC broke contact and evaded the area in an unk direction. Dust off was completed without incident.

e. 051125 BR788693 B/1/503 made contact with estimated 45 VC/NVA. Arty, 3 gunships, and 1 airstrike were employed. The contact broke at 2137H resulting in 1 NVA KIA (BC) and 1 AK-47 CIA.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

x. 061107 BR883706 E/1/503 engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA WHA CIA. The element also CIA 1 ruck sack and 2 Chicom HG's. The PW was extracted for medical treatment and questioning and has been classified as a NVA PW. Indiv was extracted to Qui Nhon before interrogation could be completed.

g. 061900 BR889945 LRP Tm "E" made contact with 5 VC and the Tm rec'd approx 20 rds of AW fire and 15 rds of SA fire. The Tm returned the fire and moved to the E and N. Artillery was fired in the area and the Tm evaded w/o incident.

h. 071215 BR934855 C/1/69 rec'd 3A fire. Element also was moved to check the area and rec'd 2 bursts of AK-47 fire and 2 MG fire. Fire was returned w/90mm tank fire with neg results.

l. 070620 BR884947 LRP Tm "E" made contact w/est 3 VC resulting in 1 US WHA (slightly) and 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 SKS CIA. Artillery was fired into the area to allow the team to break the contact.

j. 081254 BR890885 C/2/503 engaged 3 VC w/M-60 MG fire and checked the area resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 M-26 HG CIA.

i. 092015 BR895849 C/1/503 rec'd heavy AW fire and N-79 rds from the N resulting in 2 US KHA. Element returned 90mm tank fire, SA/AW fire and artillery was fired in support of the contact. The contact broke at 2035H w/und enemy results.

k. 091850 LZ English BS8801 rec'd 18 rds of mortar fire resulting in 1 US WHA (slightly) from 61 HTH. There were 4 helicopters damaged in the attack and extent of damage is unk. The 74th Inf LRP element observed enemy mortar flashes at BR884995 and artillery and gunships fired into the area w/und results.

i. 110950 BR698605 D/1/503 rec'd SA fire from the N resulting in 1 US KIA. The unit returned fire and checked the area w/und results.

l. 111015 BR794919 LRP Tm "B" engaged 4 VC w/und results, 2 VC fleeing S. Artillery AO from 203 RAC adjusted on VC from 203 RAC and checked the area and found misc equipment and documents. There were many blood trails in the area.

m. 110950 BR698605 D/1/503 rec'd SA fire from the N resulting in 1 US KIA. The unit returned fire and checked the area w/und results.

n. 11125 BR686637 C/1/503 rec'd 5 rds of SA fire from the S resulting in 1 US WHA. Unit returned fire and checked the area w/und results.

q. 121518 BS965013 Rcn team 1/2/503 rec'd a heavy volume of SA/AW fire from a platoon size enemy force. The team returned fire and artillery fired in support of the contact. Gunships expended in the area and airstrikes were employed w/und results. A reaction force from B/2/503 was committed and landed in the area at 1635H. The contact broke at 1527H w/und friendly casualties.

r. 120915 BR902848 A/1/503 engaged 2 VC w/und friendly casualties and neg enemy results.

s. 121330 BR926734 B/1/69 w/40 ARVN sighted 3 VC with weapons and called for artillery. Artillery was fired and element moved to sweep the area. At 1500H the element rec'd SA fire and returned fire with SA/AW and 90mm tank fire. The contact broke at 1600H w/und friendly casualties and neg enemy results.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

A. 121200 BR574804 LRF Tm "E" rec'd SA fire from an unknown enemy force and the team returned fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

B. 131510 BR666317 0/1/503 rec'd SA fire from 2 VC while on the LZ resulting in 3 US WHA. Dust off was completed at 1610H w/o incident, w/gunships firing suppressive fire.

C. 130945 BR918790 E/17 Cav OPCON made contact w/est 4 VC armed w/Ak-47's resulting in 3 US WHA. Arty was fired in support of the contact which broke at 0950H w/neg enemy results.

D. 131015 BR911765 B/1/69 engaged 20 VC w/90mm tank fire and checked the area w/neg results.

X. 131115 BS665025 B/2/503 engaged 1 VC w/SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

Y. 150930 BR693615 C/1/503 rec'd 6 rds of SA fire from the NW of the laager site resulting in 1 US WHA. Element returned fire and searched the area w/neg results.

Z. 151418 BR885955 D/2/503 engaged 3 VC/NVA resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and misc equipment and documents CIA. Documents indicated indiv was from NVA.

A. 170515 BS885009 B/2/503 ambush engaged est 6 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 M-60 HE CIA. The other 5 VC broke contact and fled N leaving blood trails.

B. 181025 BS872033 B/2/503 engaged 4 VC w/SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The VC broke contact at 1027H and fled W. Element pursued resulting in finding of 1 VC KIA (BC). At 1040H total results were 2 VC KIA (BC) and neg US casualties.

C. 191135 BS666025 B/2/503 engaged 3 VC moving SE on a trail w/SA/AW fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). Arty was employed in support of the contact and the contact broke at 1140H w/neg US casualties.

D. 190830 BS7023 LRF Tm "F" engaged an und size enemy force resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). Team evaded the area while being pursued by the enemy and moved to BS697225 where the team was extracted at 1210H w/o incident.

E. 200800 BS853208 1/2/503 engaged 4 VC suspects who refused to halt resulting in 2 VC suspects detained and 1 VC KIA (BC). The indiv were extracted for questioning. 1 detainee carried documents which may indicate indiv is an NVA.

F. 211230 BR790974 G/2/503 rec'd SA fire from est 10 VC located to the E of the company. Unit returned fire and arty was employed in support of the contact. The contact broke at 1255H resulting in 1 US WHA and und enemy results.

G. 221145 BS858190 D/2/503 rec'd SA fire from the S resulting in 1 NP KIA and 2 NP WHA. Dust off and gunships were requested. At 1210H the unit rec'd SA fire from 100-115m N of their position. The contact broke at 1218H with neg US cas. Arty was employed and subsequent search of the area resulted in neg findings.
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AVBE-SC/MGD

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

H. 221400 BS5355 helicopter flying at 1200 ft rec'd approx
100 rds of SA fire resulting in 3 hits and minor damage to the A/C. The A/C landed
at An Khe w/o incident.

I. 231500 BS65526 B/2/503 elements engaged 2 VC re-
sulting in 1 VC WIA. The VC fled W and the element followed a block trail to a
sleeping area for 10 individuals. The area was searched resulting in 1 carbine
round, a diary and miscellaneous clothing, 1 plastic anti-personnel mine and mis-
cellaneous documents. The area appeared to have been used to make propaganda post-
ers. All items were extracted.

J. 240915 BS658016 Rcn 2/503 rec'd fire from an est VC
squad. The element returned fire and requested gunships to support the contact.
61st AHC gunships expended in the area on suspected enemy positions and the Rcn
team searched the area resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

K. 261555 BR837325 C/1/503 found a fresh E-W trail that
was 3-4 feet wide and rec'd SA fire from the N from an est 2 VC. The unit returned
fire and checked the area resulting in 3 hammocks, 2 gal salad oil and approx 100
D batteries CIA.

L. 260815 B8850170 C/2/503 engaged 3 VC w/SA fire result-
ing in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 AK-47 and blasting caps CIA. The 2 remaining VC fled S with
element in pursuit. At 0908, C/2/503 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

M. 260905 BS858191 A/2/503 engaged 4 VC suspects armed
with 1 weapon and moving W with results of 1 VC suspect WIA and detained. Element
pursued the remaining 3 VC W w/neg results. The VC suspect was extracted for medical
treatment and questioning.

N. 261830 BS858158 61 Avn Mini Cav gunships engjged the
enemy/W fire resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). The mini Cav fired in support of a 10th
ARVN rwd security element returning to LZ Ollie that rec'd fire from est VC squad.
The contact broke at 1850H w/neg friendly cas and 2 VC KIA (BC).

O. 281250 BR824717 C/1/50 engaged 3 VC/VNA in a bunker,
resulting in 3 VC/VNA KIA (BC).

P. 281355 BR823717 C/1/503 rec'd sniper fire from 1 VC/VNA
in a cave. Fire was returned w/SA/AW fire. Action resulted in 1 US KHA, 2 US WHA
and und enemy results.

Q. 291500 BS864136 C/2/503 engaged 10 VC/VNA, SA/AW
fire was exchanged. Enemy fled S w/und cas. Element found several blood trails.

R. 291735 BR823716 C/1/503 found and engaged 1 VC/VNA
resulting in 1 VC WHA CIA. PW died of wounds before he could be extracted and is
being carried as 1 VC/VNA KIA (BC).

S. 301700 BS877121 C/2/503 sighted 1 male 25-30 yrs old.
He was challenged and refused to halt. He was engaged w/small arms resulting in 1
VC KIA (BC).

T. 301745 BS886157 A/2/503 rec'd an und amount of SA fire
from the N resulting in neg US and 1 civ WIA. M-79, 81mm and SA fire was returned.
The womam, hit in field of fire, stated that there were 4-5 VC armed w/AK-47's, M-16's,
M-79's and M-26 HE's. At 1800 the 81mm section saw 5-6 VC/VNA in the area for a
moment but were unable to observe arms or equipment.

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AVBE-SC/MHD

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 November 1968

U. 312346 BS862016 Rcn 2/503 sighted 10-14 individuals moving towards their position. The enemy force was engaged w/claymores, HO's, and M-79 fire. No fire was returned. Illumination was fired and 2 bodies were observed. The team checked the area of incident and found 5 VC KIA (BC), 2 AK-47's, 1 M-79 and assorted clothing CIA.

V. 311805 BS861133 C/2/503 sighted and engaged 1 VC/NVA resulting in 1 VC/NVA WIA. Blood trails were followed w/neg results. Element also found and destroyed 3 unk type booby-traps.

W. 311850 BS890100 C/2/503 engaged 12 VC moving S. Unit maneuvered against 6 VC w/contact breaking at 1910H. There were neg friendly and unk enemy cas.

X. 310950 BS659009 LRP Tm "B" engaged an und size enemy force w/SA fire and CS resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and neg friendly cas. In the area the team found a cave large enough to hold 10-12 individuals. The entire complex accommodates 1 company. Element found and destroyed food stuffs and NVA uniforms. KIA was a montagnard VC w/no weapon.

(c) Enemy Disposition:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

UNIT                                   EST STRENGTH PROBABLE LOCATION
                                          AUG  SEPT  OCT  AUG  SECT  OCT
D Co, 40th Sapper Bn                   120  65  65 BS9202 BS8510 BS8305
XG II LF Bn                             155  155  155 BS9301 BS9301 BS9599
300th Sapper Bn                        200  200  165 CR1532 CR1532 BR9854
50th LF Bn                             150  150  150 CR1133 CR0949 CR0949

(2) Operation Dan Hoa

(a) Enemy Situation:

1. Disposition: AO Bolling is located north and west of Tuy Hoa City. The major enemy force close enough to have influence within the Bolling area of operations continues to be the 5th NVA Division, with an estimated strength of 5,200 men. Currently located in the general location of BQ 8920. The 5th NVA Division has two subordinate regiments, the 18th operates to the south of our AO in the Nha Trang area, and has recently been involved with elements of the "White Horse" ROK Division, suffering heavy casualties.

The 95th NVA Regiment suffered heavy losses during the TET offensive in the Battle of Tuy Hoa North (see 173d Airborne Brigade CAAR) and withdrew to the west to receive replacements and train. It appeared next on 5 April at BQ 0943, and had its 4th and 6th Battalions soundly beaten by a combined ARVN/POK Task Force. After this second defeat, the 95th again withdrew to the mountains and jungles to the west.

On 11 July a captured document indicated that the 95th NVA Regiment and its 4th and 5th Battalions had moved further west into Cambodia for resupply and to conduct a training cycle, leaving the 6th Bn as a stay-behind element in AO Bolling. The current strength of the 6th Bn, 95th Regiment is estimated at 500. It is expected that the 95th NVA Regiment will return to AO Bolling in November from its Cambodian base camps.

The 30th MF Bn, with a strength of 140, is subordinate to the 5th Division and continues to operate in AO Bolling. It is currently operating in squad-sized "sapper" units, being targeted against military installations in Phu Yen Province, particularly in Phu Hiep. Since August, the 47th Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division (ARVN) has had two contacts with the 85th LF Bn, resulting in 74 enemy KIA (BC).

Thus, the following units are located within the Tuy Hoa area or close enough to have influence within the Dan Hoa area of operations:

a. HQ, 5th NVA Division
b. 6th Bn/95th NVA Regiment
c. 30th MF Bn
d. 85th MF Bn
e. DK-7 LF Company
f. DK-9 LF Company
During August and September, enemy activity was generally light in AO Bolling, which added credence to earlier reports of the 95th NVA Regiment's moving west to train and receive replacements. A prisoner captured by the 4th Infantry Division indicated that the 95th NVA Regimental Headquarters and its 4th and 5th Battalions had relocated in the Duc Lap area, close to or into the Cambodian border.

The 6th Bn, 95th NVA Regiment continued to operate in AO Bolling and in September conducted company-sized harassment attacks, for the most part designed to keep Republic of Vietnam forces from protecting the civilian rice harvests so that the 6th Battalion's own rice supply might be supplemented. These attacks were not successful.

The 30th MF Battalion continued to remain out of contact, south of AO Bolling in the ROK area of operations. The 85th IF Bn continued its harassment attacks along Highways QL 1 and 68 and conducted rice-gathering operations but, as previously mentioned, suffered substantial losses at the hands of the 47th ARVN Regiment.

In October activity remained light, with the major elements of the 95th NVA Regiment continuing to remain along the Cambodian border. Low level agent reports, however, indicate that the 95th NVA Regimental Headquarters, with its subordinate 4th and 5th Battalions, will return to the Bolling area of operation within the next 30 to 60 days. The 6th Battalion 95th NVA Regiment continued its harassment attacks against the rice harvest and traffic along Highways QL 1 and 68 as did the 85th IF Bn. The 30th MF Bn remained out of contact south of AO Bolling, in the ROK area of operations.

The most significant allied achievement was the 27 October discovery of a hospital complex at BQ 9356, by elements of the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry. The complex, 100 meters in diameter, included beds, medical supplies, seven NVA rucksacks and a POW from the 5th Bn 95th NVA Regiment, who was a patient in the hospital. Loss of this facility will be a severe setback for VC/NVA forces, as this hospital is reportedly the only one in Phu Yen Province capable of surgical operations.

2. Peculiarities and Weaknesses:

a. The enemy supply system flows from west to east and can best be interdicted on the western edge of Phu Yen Province. The enemy's logistics system is currently operating at a marginal level, thus the indications of a move by the 95th NVA Regiment to the west. The major weakness of the enemy has been his inability to sustain contact due to their marginal logistics system.

b. The success of US, ARVN and ROK operations from January through October makes the VC/NVA vulnerable to psychological warfare, especially as the enemy continues to be prone to hunger and personal illness through both sustained living in the jungle environment and a marginal logistics system.

c. The enemy continues to be vulnerable to air and artillery retaliation, aerial observation and photography, intermittent artillery firing, APD and Red Haze readings.

3. Enemy Capabilities:

a. The enemy can be expected to continue harassment, terrorist and base camp and installation infiltration, making full use of sapper-type units. The enemy is also capable of attacking population centers and allied installations in reinforced battalion strength, utilizing the 6th Bn 95th NVA Regiment and the 85th IF Bn. Principal targets are TUY HOA prison, bridges south of TUY HOA City district headquarters and allied airfields.
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b. The enemy will continue to rebuild their units through infiltration, involuntary conscription, native recruitment and kidnapping of civilians of fighting age, common laborers and specialist (doctors and nurses).

g. The enemy can be expected to attempt company or perhaps battalion-sized attacks, reinforced by local forces, on weakly-defended district headquarters and out-posts, as a victory for propaganda means.

d. The enemy can be expected to continue interdiction of communication lines, mining of primary and secondary routes of travel, sabotage operations and small-scale operations against such targets as the bridge at CQ 201351, as this is the primary crossing across the SONG BA River at TUY HOA City.

g. In line with a continuing country-wide emphasis, the enemy can be expected to employ sapper-type units, their primary mission continuing to be infiltrating the TUY HOA and PHU HEIP airbases, with the mission of destroying allied airplanes, helicopters and equipment.

f. It is expected that VC/NVA tax collecting and rice-gathering activity will increase in the TUY HOA area of operations with the coming rice harvest.

g. Combat Efficiency: The suspected re-entry of the 95th NVA Regimental Headquarters and its subordinate 4th and 5th Battalions suggests that large-scale multi-battalion attacks are probable in the future, as it is likely that large-scale multi-battalion attacks are probable in the future, as it is likely that replacements have been obtained and trained and that more efficient logistical chain will have been established. It is also likely that the 95th Regiment will return with a 122mm rocket capacity. Emphasis will also continue to remain on sapper-type units conducting missions for the purpose of destroying or damaging allied airplanes, helicopters and equipment at TUY HOA Air Force Base and other principal targets. These type of attacks can also come in the form of mortar and recoilless rifle fire, as this causes considerable damage to vital equipment and a minimum of enemy forces are employed to perform such missions.

(b) Significant Contacts:

1. August:

a. 011805 BG835785 A/4/503 made contact w/1 VC armed with SA. SA fire was exchanged and indiv fled W leaving a blood trail. Thr trail was followed w/neg results.

b. 061100 BG987554 B/4/503 received SA fire from approx 6 indiv's. Fire was returned w/SA and arty employed. There were neg enemy casualties and 2 US WIA evacuated.

c. 080925 BG960525 C/4/503 engaged 1 VC/NVA w/SA fire resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 M-26 HD, 1 M-26 (VN) and a small amt of documents CIA.

d. 111123 CQ012503 C/4/503 engaged 1 NVA w/SA resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC), and 1 M-25 rifle, 1 rucksack and 1 hammock CIA.

e. 111140 CQ045447 A/4/503 made contact w/est 3 VC and engaged them w/SA, AW. The VC fled and the area searched resulting in 1 SKS rifle CIA.

f. 111521 CQ045420 Recon A/4/503 made contact w/unk size VC force resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 Chicom HG CIA.

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1. 122700 CQ041488 D/16 Armor rec'd 3-4 M-79 rds fm the N resulting in 1 US WHA slightly; fire was returned w/neg results.

2. 121445 CQ035482 B/4/503 found a sqd size rest area and observed 2 weapons and a hammock in a tree and moved to check the area. Elem rec'd AW fire from 3 indiv and engaged w/SA resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 3 M1 carbines CIA.

3. 150240 CQ046437 A/4/503 made contact w/und size enemy force employing SA/AW and HG. Fire was returned w/und enemy results and 1 US WHA not evacuated.

4. 150950 BQ98572 LRP Tm 12 engaged 4 VC w/SA & AW resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 Russian 7.62mm pistol, 1 rucksack and 1 M-26 HG CIA.

5. 151940 CQ050413 A/4/503 established contact w/posa Co sized enemy force and was reinforced by D/16. Art, gunships and spookie were employed and contact broke at 2045H. There were 5 US WHA and neg enemy results.

6. 151945 CQ04032 E/V503 rec'd 2-3 rds of (poss) 60mm mort and SA fire. Fire was returned resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC).

7. 160833 CQ046435 elements of 4/503 made contact w/und size enemy force. Fire was exchanged resulting in 1 US WHA.

8. 211341 CQ034511 A/4/503 engaged 1 VC w/SA resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 rifle CIA.

9. 221240 CQ055920 A/4/503 engaged 1 VC sqd resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47, 2 Chicom HG and 1 wallet w/papers CIA.

10. 270945 CQ015420 Tm 16 made contact w/an und size enemy force. SA fire was exchanged and the team broke contact and moved to an LZ and were extracted at 1035H.

October: From period 28 September 1968 to 15 October 1968, the 4th Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry was OPCON to the 4th Infantry Division: Operation McArthur. For review, see ORLL, 1 August-30 October, 4th Infantry Division.

2. October:

a. 24135B BQ939649 C/4/503 rec'd 2 SA rds of harassing fire. Artillery was fired on the enemy position and the area searched with neg results. Neg US casualties.

b. 250830 CQ123298 A/4/503 reported FAC A/C sighted 7 VC and arty fired resulting in 1 VC WHA. The other 6 VC filed SE from the area. 0939H, at CQ122284 a reaction force from 4/503 was inserted and made contact with an est VC squad and SA fire was exchanged. Contact broke at approx 0915H w/neg US casualties and und enemy results. The reaction force searched the area and found and destroyed 15 kilos of rice, 4 bottles of vitamins and 8 bandages. The reaction force was extracted at 0920H w/o incident.

(c) Enemy Disposition:
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UNIT

STRENGTH

LOCATION

AUG  SEPT  OCT  AUG  SEPT  OCT

5th NVA Division
UNK  4010  4010  BQ8730  BQ8730  BQ9920

95th NVA Regt
1175  1260  1260  Tri-Border Area
YU8575  Unloc Cambodia

4th Bn/95th Regt
200  200  200  Tri-Border Area
YU8575  Unloc Cambodia

5th Bn/95th Regt
200  200  200  Tri-Border Area
YU8575  Unloc Cambodia

6th Bn/95th Regt
250  360  360  BQ9999  CQ0350  CQ0052

30th MF Bn
200  200  250  CQ1630  CQ0624  CQ2325

85th MF Bn
150  150  200  CQ0554  CQ9960  CQ0459

IK-7 IF Co
UNK  UNK  UNK  BQ9961  BQ9961  BQ9961

DK-9 IF Co
UNK  UNK  UNK  BQ9880  BQ9880  BQ9880

(3) Operation Walker

(a) Enemy Situation:

1. Disposition: The 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry and the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry of the 173d Airborne Brigade continued operations in AO Walker during the months of August, September and October 1968. This area of operations has remained relatively secure for some period of time, the enemy not being able to form his forces for large scale attacks due to the continued presence of US units since 1965. Also notable in AO Walker is the good rapport that has continued with the Vietnamese citizens and the successful efforts of the government's Revolutionary Development program.

The following enemy units are within the AN KHE area or close enough to have influence within the Walker area of operations:

a. 9th NVA Regiment
b. 4th Bn/95th NVA Regiment
c. 5th Bn/95th NVA Regiment
d. 407th Sapper Battalion

During the months of August, September and October enemy activity was, for the most part, slight, but showed an increase in late September and October. The 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry continued Operation Walker until 18 August, when the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry assumed operational control of Operation Walker and the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry replaced the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry in AO Cochise. See attached CAAR, 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry: Operation Walker 31 March-17 August 1968).

The primary mission of the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry is to provide and maintain road and bridge security along QL 19, which runs from Qui Nhon through AO

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Walker to Pleiku and points west. QL 19 is a primary communications and logistics route and has been asphalted from Qui Nhon to Pleiku.

The major enemy unit in AO Walker has continued to be the 95 B NVA Regiment, which is subordinate to the B-3 Front. The Regiment has two battalions, the 4th and 5th, and its primary mission continues to be interdiction of QL 19. Following TET, the Regiment conducted numerous small-scale ambushes and attacks by fire at both convoys and checkpoints and bridgepoints. In July, 95 B withdrew to the south of Highway 19 to conduct a training cycle. In early August the 95 B NVA Regiment moved north to positions of interdiction, and in September and October conducted some twenty small ambushes and attacks by fire along QL 19. Due to agent reports and visual reconnaissance, on 14 September 1968 Task Force Schnoor, under the command of LTC Dean F. Schnoor, the Brigade Operations Officer, was formed, with the mission of halting any enemy forces build-up in southern Binh Dinh and northern Phu Bon Provinces. OPCON to 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry, Task Force Schnoor was successful in their mission. For further information concerning Task Force Schnoor, see attached CAAR, 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry, Attack on Camp Radcliff, 30 October 1968.

The 403rd Sapper Battalion also remained relatively inactive until October, when incidents along the Camp Radcliff perimeter began to increase. The enemy's most successful incursion was 30 October. For further information see attached CAAR, 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry, Attack on Camp Radcliff, 30 October 1968.

2. Peculiarities and Weaknesses:

a. The enemy is vulnerable to aerial observation and air and artillery retaliation in most areas of the TAOR. He is also vulnerable to intermittent artillery firings, APC sensings and Red Haze readings.

b. Due to the widespread support of allied operations in AO Walker, the continued successful rapport with the Vietnamese civilians, through such means as the hiring of Vietnamese workers on Camp Radcliff, the success of revolutionary-development programs, and the protection offered the Vietnamese farmer through the continued presence of US troops, the enemy is not able to coerce populace through terrorist or sabotage activities as evident in other areas of South Vietnam.

c. By virtue of the Allied-Vietnamese relationship, the operational successes of US troops, and our continued presence, the enemy, most especially the VC, is particularly vulnerable to the Chieu Hoi and other psychological operation programs.

2. Enemy Capabilities:

a. The enemy is able to employ, to a limited extent, mortars and recoilless rifles against Camp Radcliff. If successful, such an attack can cause personnel injury, damage to fixed-wing and rotary aircraft and damage to logistical storage areas and logistical items.

b. The enemy is able to conduct company and perhaps larger sized attacks in both isolated villages and hamlets and outpost and checkpoints maintained by US forces along Highway 19.

c. The enemy can conduct isolated mining of primary and secondary routes of travel, interdiction of lines of communication, sabotage oper-
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Sporadic but effective sniper firings, against the outposts and checkpoints maintained within the AO along Highway 19.

The enemy can be expected to attempt to use extensively and with increased emphasis sapper units, most particularly in the destruction by explosives and demolitions of vital bridges along Highway 19 and aircraft, logistical points and primary buildings within Camp Radcliff itself.

Combat Efficiency: The continued successes of the government revolutionary development programs within AO Walker, the maintenance of good relations with the Vietnamese within the Provinces and the continued presence and strength of the allied forces themselves all combine to form the belief that no large-scale enemy attacks can be formed in the near future. Enemy emphasis will, in all probability, continue to be placed on harassment and terrorist activities, and propaganda lectures, with an increase of sapper-type infiltration activities.

(b) Significant Contacts:

1. August:

a. 030845 BR313402 C/1/503 engaged 2 NVA w/SA fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA (BC) and 1 AK-47 w/9 loaded magazines and 1 rucksack CIA. The other NVA was WIA but evaded the area as a search proved neg further results. There were neg US casualties.

b. 101335 BS856056 A/1/503 engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 3 M-79 rds and 1 lb of documents CIA.

c. 111555 BR846058 A/1/503 OPCON engaged movement on the E side of their perimeter w/M16 and rec'd approx 6-10 rdc of AK-47 fire. Neg US cas; 1 NVA KIA (BC) and 1 NVA gas mask, 2 AK-47 magazines, and 2 Chicom HG's, were CIA.

d. 131140 BR395559 Recon/1/503 made contact w/est VC sqd. SA fire was exchanged resulting in 1 Kit Carson WHA (slightly). Gunships were employed w/und enemy results.

e. 230905 BR263472 CP27 and convoy 69 rec'd SA armor piercing rds, B-40 rkt rds, 57mm RR rds and 60mm mortar rds. SA/AW fire was rtn'a and gunships expended in the area. Arty fired counter mort fire. The contact broke at 1130H resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC) and 7 60mm mort rds CIA. There were 6 US WHA, 1 US KHA, 1 5 ton truck dest and 8 vehicles damaged.

f. 240258 CP 26 QL 19 elements of 1/50 on CP 26 was attacked by an est reinforced VC pit. Gunships supported the contact and arty fired blocking fire. At 0218H the CP was overrun and the US personnel escaped on an APC to CP 25 where the wounded were dusted off. At 0413H 3 APC's and 2 dusters arrived at the contact area. Spooky came on station sni expended in the area. At 0447H 1 US WHA was found and evacuated. The area was swept and neg enemy casualties found and there were 3 US KHA and 6 US WHA. There was no damage to the bridge.

g. 250940 BR295435 B/50 (1 pit) and the scout pit made contact w/und size enemy force receiving B-40 and SA & AW fire. Gunships and arty supported the contact. The results were 1 US KHA, 16 US WHA, and 5 VC KIA (BC).

h. 252030 CP 25 QL 19 1/50 elem's exchanged fire w/an enemy elem w/neg results.

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1. 31046 BR291448 1/1/50 LZ Action rec'd 19 82mm mort rds and SA fire. Strong points 13 BR242493, 14 BR233502, and 15 BR228515 rec'd SA fire. Gunships were requested and elem returned fire w/SA and mort's. Gunships, arty, and airstrikes supported the contact. Results were 4 US WHA, 6 NVA KIA (BC), 2 AK-47's, 1 B-40 RL w/2 rds, 1 9mm pistol and 1 M-16 CIA.

2. 311000 BR266467 88 Trans Convoy was hit by AW fire on an unk size force resulting in 5 trucks damaged (ext unk). At 311038 the convoy was hit again w/AW fire. This action resulted in 1 US KHA and 2 US WHA from 88th Trans. There was 1 US WHA fn the 647th QM.

3. During the period 1-31 Aug 68 there were 13 incidnets on the perimeter at An Khe including 1 mortar attack which resulted in 3 US WHA.

4. September:

a. 0116100 BR237453 LRP Tm 13 rec'd SA/AW fire from the SW/NE/SW. Gunships arrived on station at 1635H and expanded in the area. At 1640H 1 A/C took 4 hits resulting in one US WHA. The firing temporarily ceased at 1650H. At 1720H the firing began again and at 1722H, airstrikes were made at BR243425. At 1730H a reaction force from A/2/503 was committed. Air-strikes and arty continued support until 1818H at which time all firing ceased. There were neg further US casualties and unk enemy results.

b. 080555 BR306447 A/1/50 ele on bridge security at CP 22, engaged VC who tripped a flare on the E end of the bridge w/N-60 fire resulting in 1 VC WHA.

c. 140104 BR370465 LZ Schualler rec'd 18 82mm mtr rds resulting in 5 US WHA. Arty fired on suspected pans at BR362465 and BR365465 w/und results. The contact broke at 0135H.

d. 150423 BR243477 A/1/50 amb engaged 6 indiv w/claymore mines and several were hit. Area was searched at first light w/neg results.

e. 161300 BR275333 C/1/503 engaged an est 6 NVA w/SA fire resulting in 4 NVA KIA (BC) and 1 NVA PW. Ele CIA 3 rucksacks, 3 '26 HG's, 4 documents, 3 sets of web gear, and 3 nortf'lies of separate documents. The Co detained 6 Montagnards for questioning and classification. All had short NVA type haircuts. The NVA KIA were wearing blk PJ's, misc clothing and kahiks.

f. 201710 BR250265 C/1/503 OPCON engaged 2 NVA moving on a trail resulting in 1 NVA KIA (BC), 1 AK-47 w/misc web gear CIA. The other VC evaded the area.

g. 202130 BR435447 A/1/50 engaged 2 VC 100m W of CP 21. The VC fled the area into a cemetery and were trapped there by the ele. Arty supported the contact w/illumination and 1 indiv attempted to evade the area and was engaged w/und results.

h. 260910 BR394458 C/1/50 on bridge security at CP-25 rec'd SA fire from the SW. A convoy between bridge 24 and 25 was hit w/SA, 82mm mtr, and B-40 rks resulting in 1 APC dest and 1 APC heavily damaged and 2 US KHA and 2 US WHA. Fire was returned w/SA/AW/arty w/und results. The contact broke at 0930H.

i. 281030 BR552222 Jungle School made contact w/3 VC and SA fire was exchanged. Ele searched the area and found many blood trails. At 1115H, contact was re-established w/est VC sqd and SA fire was exchanged w/unk enemy results. Ele returned to CP 18 w/neg US casualties.
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2. October:

a. 041139 BR76479 B/1/50 received 10-15 rounds of SA fire from the east resulting in neg US casualties. Element returned fire and searched the area with neg results.

b. 121810 BR3746 LZ Schueller rec'd SA fire from the N/S/SW, a white tracer hit a HE or detonation cord in a conex container resulting in 2 explosions and approx 2500 rds of .50 cal, 5.56 and 7.62 ammo destroyed. Element returned fire w/ neg results and contact broke at 1820H w/ neg US Cas.

c. 151010 BR24096 convoy rec'd SA fire from east VC resulting in 2 US WHA. Gunships from the 134th AVN expended in the area and the convoy returned AV/SA fire with unk results. The contact broke at 1020H w/ the VC evading the area.

d. 160415 BR72458 1/50 elements at LZ Schueller rec'd 20 rds of unk type mortar fire resulting in 4 US WHA (3 from 1/50 and 1 from 4/60th Artillery). Artillery was fired in an area 500m S/SW of the perimeter w/ neg results. The contact broke at 0440H and dust off was completed at 0520H.

e. 231400 BR95418 IFFV LRP 1s 14 made contact w/ 4 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The 3 remaining VC evaded the area.

f. 250200 BR356458 C/1/50 reported LZ Schueller rec'd 6 rounds of incoming SA fire and element returned w/ SA fire. A pipeline was damaged in the contact resulting in a fire.

g. 271543 BR35430 D/2/1 Cav engaged 1 VC in the open carrying ammo cans. The indiv. ran under tree and Cav fired resulting in 2 small explosions. LOH checked the area resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

h. 272045 BR98582 1/50 reported OP RF/PF elements rec'd B-40 rockets and AW fire from BR95579 and AW fire from BR498585. The contact broke at 2131H w/ neg friendly casualties reported and unk enemy results.

i. 300202 BR44856 1/50 TOC reported that Camp Radcliff rec'd a mortar attack of approx 50 unk type mortar rds and a ground probe in the vic of towers 1 through 5 consisting of SA and AW, B-40, and satchel charges. Between 0200-0220H tower 1 was hit by an unk type mortar rd with its sleeping quarters hit by a B-40 rocket. Two satchel charges were found nearby. 1st Cav Div R & R Center rec'd 5 unk size mortar rds inside the perimeter. Contact resulted in 2 US WHA, 1 US KHA, 2 VN Security guards KHA, 1 VN security guard wha, 7 bldgs destroyed, 2 2½ ton trucks destroyed, one ½ ton trailer destroyed, and 46,000 barrels of asphalt burning (unable to extinguish).

j. 311205 BR241419 D/2/1 Cav OPCON reported hitting 2 VC/NVA and possibly killing them while wounding 1 more. Aircraft also took 2 SA hits w/ minor damage to the A/C and no casualties during the extraction.

k. 311205 BR241419 20th Infantry LRP Team 13 was extracted by helicopter under fire from SA and mortar fire. 403 RAC A/C observed 15 muzzle flashes in the area. D/2/1 Air Cav observed many SA/AW and mortar rds during the extraction. There were neg friendly casualties and 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC). This credited to Tm 13, 20th Inf LRP (IFFV).
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b. Decisions and Plans Adopted with Reasons Based on Enemy Situations:
During the months of August, September and October maximum utilization of all intelligence resources were utilized in attempts to locate and fix enemy forces.

(1) August:

(a) As a result of APD sensings, infrared readings, visual reconnaissance and agent reports, on 251320 Aug 1968 vic BR956999, A Company, 2d Battalion 503d Infantry made contact with an estimated two VC squads. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged resulting in 10 VC KIA (BC) and negative US casualties.

(b) As a result of APD sensings, infrared readings, visual reconnaissance and agent reports, on 291200 August 1968 vic BS879179, C Company, 2d Battalion 503d Infantry made contact with six VC/NVA with weapons. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged, resulting in 3 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 7 VC suspects detained and no US casualties.

(c) Based on infrared, APD and LRP operations, artillery, naval gunfire and air strikes were directed against small enemy formations, base areas and infiltration routes. These operations keep the enemy off balance and interdict his routes of supply and communications. The majority of fires, air strikes, and naval gunfire was based on combat intelligence.

(2) September:

(a) On 161730 September 1968 at BR275335 C Company, 1st Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry engaged 6 NVA with small arms fire, resulting in 4 NVA KIA (BC), and 1 NVA PW. The element captured 3 rucksacks, 3 M-26 hand grenades, 3 sets of web gear and 3 sets of documents. The element was conducting a sweep based on agent reports, SLAR and Red Haze readouts and APD sensings.

(b) As a result of agent reports, LRP operations and APD sensings, during the period 22-28 September, elements of the 1st Battalion 69th Armor, 1st Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry, and 41st ARVN Regiment were in contact with the 7th and 9th Battalions of the 18th NVA Regiment. This operation resulted in 191 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 45 VC/NVA KIA (Posa), 2 VC/NVA PW's, 5 crew served weapons captured and 25 individual weapons captured.

(c) Based on infrared, APD and LRP operations, artillery, naval gunfire and air strikes were directed against small enemy formations, base areas and infiltration routes. These operations keep the enemy off balance and interdict his routes of supply and communications. The majority of fires, air strikes, artillery and naval gunfire was based on combat intelligence.

(3) October:

(a) On 021730 October 1968 at BR957840, A and B Companies, 1st Battalion 69th Armor engaged an undetermined number of VC running from an area from which the elements had received small arms fire. The action resulted in 6 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 2 VC suspects detained. The elements were conducting a sweep based on agent reports and analysis of enemy movement patterns.

(b) As a result of agent reports, B Company 2d Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry on sweep operation on 170515 October 1968 vic BS889009, engaged 6 VC/NVA resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA (BC) and 1 M-26 hand grenade captured. The other 5 VC broke contact and fled north leaving blood trails. The element followed the trails and found 2 SKS rifles, 2 M-26 hand grenades, 2 Chicom hand grenades and 1 B-40 rocket round. There were no friendly casualties.

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While on an ambush position as a result of Red Haze readings, agent reports, and analysis of enemy intentions, Recon 2d Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry sighted 10-14 VC/NVA moving toward their position on 312346 October 1968, via BS862018. The enemy force was engaged with claymores, hand grenades and M-79 fire. A check of the area found 5 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 5 rucksacks, 4 Chicom hand grenades, 2 sets of load bearing equipment, 2 AK-47 rifles, 1 M-79 grenade launcher and 1 .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver captured.

Based on infrared, APD, and LRP operations, artillery, naval gunfire and airstrikes were directed against small enemy formations, base areas and infiltration routes. These operations keep the enemy off balance and interdict his routes of supply and communications. The majority of fires, airstrikes, artillery and naval gunfire, was based on combat intelligence.

c. Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses: As a result of operations for the months of August, September and October 1968, the following enemy personnel and equipment losses are reported, by combat operation.

(1) Enemy personnel losses as of 31 October 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPN</th>
<th>DAN SING</th>
<th>OPN</th>
<th>DAN HOA</th>
<th>OPN</th>
<th>WALKER</th>
<th>BRIGADE TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>NVA/VC KIA (BC)</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>399</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVA/VC KIA (POSS)</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>51</td>
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(2) Enemy equipment/supply losses:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>OPN</th>
<th>DAN SING</th>
<th>OPN</th>
<th>DAN HOA</th>
<th>OPN</th>
<th>WALKER</th>
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<td>Pistol</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-1 Carbine</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-1 Rifle</td>
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<td>Spanish/American War Muzzle-Loader</td>
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<td>RPG-2</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>AK-47</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>24</td>
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## Operational Report Lessons Learned

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report Lessons Learned  
**Date:** 15 November 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>OPN DAN SINGH</th>
<th>OPN DAN HOA</th>
<th>OPN WALKER</th>
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<tr>
<td>Springfield</td>
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<td>Mauser</td>
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<td>Chicom 7.62mm</td>
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<td>M-2 SMG (French)</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.7 AA MG</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>82mm Mortar</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-40 Rocket Launcher</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-16 Bayonet</td>
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### AM/10, MINES and EXPLOSIVES

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<td>Small Arms Rds</td>
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<td>Chicom Claymore Mine</td>
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<td>M-26 Hand Grenade</td>
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<td>81mm Mortar Rds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicom HG</td>
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<td>Chicom AP Mine</td>
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<td>Chicom Antitank Mine</td>
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<td>US Antitank Mine</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Claymore</td>
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<td>US Anti-Personnel Mine</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2 mm Mtr Rds (Mined)</td>
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<td>105 mm Mtr Rds (Mined)</td>
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<td>155 mm Mtr Rds (Mined)</td>
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<td>8 inch Rds (Mined)</td>
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<td>Pineapple Booby-Trap Grenade</td>
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<td>12.7 AA Rds</td>
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<td>B-40 Rocket Rds</td>
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**CONFIDENTIAL**
## Operational Report Lessons Learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>OPN Dan Shin</th>
<th>OPN Dan Hoa</th>
<th>OPN Walker</th>
<th>Brigade Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62mm Mortars</td>
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<td>60mm Mortars</td>
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<td>Banglor Torpedos</td>
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<td>CBU</td>
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<tr>
<td>57mm RR Rds</td>
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<td>75mm RR Rds</td>
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<td>Explosives (lbs)</td>
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### Food

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice, (lbs)</td>
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### Miscellaneous

<table>
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<th>OPN Walker</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rucksack (VC/NVA)</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>127</td>
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<td>Boots, pair</td>
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<td>Shoes, pair</td>
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<td>Propaganda Leaflets (lbs)</td>
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<td>MAG (M-16)</td>
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<td>MAG (AK-47)</td>
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<td>Batteries</td>
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15 November 1968
AVBB-SC/HD
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned
15 November 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>OPN SING</th>
<th>OPN HOA</th>
<th>OPN WALKER</th>
<th>BRIGADE TOTAL</th>
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<td>Hammocks (NVA)</td>
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<td>Ho Chi Sandals</td>
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<td>Documents (lbs)</td>
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</table>

d. Use of Long Range Patrols (LRP): Extensive use was made of the 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP) during the months of August, September and October. A resume of their activities follows:

(1) Extensive use was made of the LRP in Operation Cochipe during the month of August. A total of 24 LRP operations were conducted. The mission assigned to the teams was generally that of trail watching in areas of suspected enemy activity. Secondary missions of bomb damage assessment, artillery assessment and the capture of prisoners were assigned. In conjunction with these missions the LRP teams on 22 occasions adjusted artillery fire into observed enemy personnel, as well as employing airstrikes on two occasions, and successfully captured one VC POW on one occasion. All of these missions included US LRP and ARVN.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

LRF personnel. These patrols have proven to be highly profitable and will be continued as in previous months. Based upon observations of the LRP teams, several company size operations were conducted in the AO and a platoon size reaction force was committed on six occasions to exploit LRP observations.

Again the LRP's were utilized to maximum capacity during the month of September. A total of 22 LRP patrols were conducted during the month, one of three days duration and the others of four days duration. The mission assigned to the teams was generally that of trail watching in areas of suspected enemy activity. Secondary missions of bomb damage assessment, artillery assessment and the capture of prisoners were assigned. These patrols accounted for 6 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 3 VC/NVA KIA (Poss) and 3 VC ELV's. The patrols made 171 sightings, totaling 1,265 VC/NVA personnel observed. In conjunction with these LRP teams on 8 occasions adjusted artillery fire into observed enemy personnel and called for six airstrikes. All LRP missions included US LRP and ARVN LRP personnel. These patrols have proven to be highly profitable and will be continued as in previous months.

Based upon observations of the LRP teams, several company size operations were conducted in the AO and a platoon size reaction force was committed twice to exploit LRP observations.

LRP training of volunteers from within the Brigade was conducted during the month. A total of 56 personnel underwent training. The training consisted of map reading, weapons training, repelling, patrolling, adjustment of artillery and tactical air fires and LRP techniques in airmobile operations. The training teams started their operational patrols under the supervision of their instructors. Graduation is scheduled for early October.

The 74th Infantry (LRP) also conducted a review of previous instruction for 35 ARVN LRP trainees at 22d ARVN Division at Ba Gi, in preparation for the trainees final examination prior to their achieving ARVN LRP status.

Extensive use was made of the 74th Infantry (LRP) in Operation Cochise during the month of October. A total of 23 LRP patrols were conducted during the month; two of three days duration, one of a one day duration, 19 of four days duration and one of five days duration. The mission assigned to the teams was generally that of trail watching in areas of suspected enemy activity. Secondary missions of bomb damage assessment, artillery assessment and the capture of prisoners were assigned. These patrols accounted for 5 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 2 VC/NVA KIA (Poss) and 7 VC suspects detained. The patrols made 123 sightings totaling 809 VC/NVA personnel observed. In conjunction with these missions, the LRP teams on ten occasions adjusted artillery fire into observed enemy personnel and called for two airstrikes. All LRP missions included US LRP and ARVN LRP personnel. These patrols have proven to be highly profitable and will be continued as in previous months.

Based upon observation of the LRP teams, several company size operations were conducted in the AO and on one occasion a reaction force was committed to exploit LRP observations.

LRP training of volunteers from within the Brigade was completed on 5 October with a total of 34 volunteers receiving certificates as qualified LRP's. The training consisted of map reading, weapons training, repelling, adjustment of artillery and tactical air fire and LRP techniques of airmobile operations.

The 74th Infantry (LRP) also conducted training for 36 ARVN LRP trainees at 22d ARVN Division at Ba Gi. In addition, 39 ARVN LRP trainees received training at LZ English under the supervision of the 74th Infantry.
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The 74th Infantry (LHP) employed Hunter Killer teams for the first time during the month of October. These small, highly mobile teams were given the mission of seeking out and destroying the enemy with primary emphasis on ambush operations. The Hunter Killer team concept is expected to prove most valuable and its use is expected to increase greatly in future plans.

e. Operational Methods of Sapper Units:

(1) Sapper action is often a specific sabotage tactic employed in two levels: in separate attacks on installations and in support of infantry and artillery attacks.

(a) In separate attacks conducted by small forces, the sappers penetrate deep into US and FPAF controlled areas to sabotage airfields, docks, vital bridges and important buildings and equipment. In this small force the sapper also has the mission of kidnapping, assassinating and performing other terrorist acts. Their greatest aid is their relative freedom of movement through a possible area of operation, affording the sapper unit access to and surveillance of their intended targets.

(b) In employing sapper units in support of infantry and artillery units in a general, all-out attack, their mission is to create a breach in the defensive network of the attacked installation to permit an infantry-type frontal assault. They use sticks, prongs and C-hooks to raise or spread the outer perimeter barbed wire, or either, with wire cutters snip the lower strands of wire. The sapper units also mark passages through mine fields with pegs or other means of identification. The infantry and heavy weapons units will wait in concealment while these tasks are being accomplished.

(c) The final task in preparing for the assault is the destruction of installation barricades, watchtowers, machine guns and other targets with satchel charges and grenades, and, at the same instance, to detonate explosives planted along the perimeter defenses or in the minefields. After breaching an entrance for the infantry, the sapper units may remain in the battle or withdraw and prepare to cover the infantry withdrawal.

(d) Other sapper-type actions are to conduct ambushes prepared along principal roads and waterways; conduct surprise raids on airfields, supply areas and other facilities in rear areas not easily approached by large infantry units and terrorism and sabotage, especially in large cities. The size of sapper units varies from complete sapper battalions with up to 300-man strength in the larger cities down to separate sapper platoons at the lower level (district and province). Sappers also collect detailed intelligence from bar girls, cycle drivers, civilian employees of free world forces, and numerous others under their employ on potential sapper targets. Their tactics range from concealing a grenade in a loaf of bread to driving an explosive-laden vehicle into a target area.

(2) Sappers are well-schooled, selection criteria are high, and only the most outstanding and dedicated are selected for training. Thus they enjoy a higher esprit de corps than conventional units, and, as a result, their combat effectiveness is generally high.

(3) Sapper units employ five basic tactical principals:

(a) Detailed planning and reconnaissance, insured through minute planning and rehearsal until performance without error is assured.

(b) Secrecy and surprise in the planning and performance of the assigned mission.
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(c) Speed, with sapper units moving rapidly to enable assault troops to reach their objectives in as short a time as possible and thus exploit all aspects of the defender's disorganization.

(d) Initiative, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances which might arise during the performance of the mission. Initiative is constantly encouraged through training and indoctrination.

(e) Flexibility, sapper units tailor its needs for men, weapons and equipment according to the mission.

f. Terrain and Weather:

(1) Terrain - Operations Pan Sinh and Pan Hoa

(a) Existing Situation: In the northern part of Binh Dinh Province the principal urban area is Bong Son (BR 8796). In the flat seasonally inundated coastal plains, there are three low mountain spurs with numerous adjacent hills and hill locks. The lowland plains grade westward into rolling plains, foothills, and then into steep heavily dissected mountains. The terrain becomes increasingly rugged from east to west. The predominant vegetation is rice cultivation in the lowlands and light to dense undergrowth in the hills and mountains. There are numerous valleys which facilitate movement; however, all expedient movement is restricted to existing trains, roads and waterways.

The principal avenues of movement are in a north-south direction. The coastal lowlands area is a preferred avenue of movement to rugged western mountains. In the south avenues of movement are broad with numerous alternate routes, but to the north they become constructed and the alternate routes become limited. Expedient movement in the coastal lowlands in a north-south direction would be to the east of and parallel to Route 1. Consoled movement would probably be north along the Suoi Ca River Valley (BR 802654) to the Nuoc Lang River (BR701879) Valley and then along the Kim Son River Valley (VR818899). The An Hai River Valley (BR768669) is a major avenue of movement from the north to either the south via the Kim Son River Valley or to the east along the Lai Giang River Valley (BR862942). The Kim Son River Valley affords many good avenues of movement from east to west through the Nuoc Tuong (BR701879), Suoi Tim (BR684829) and S Lon (BR773838) River Valleys. Accompanying trails allow movement further west to the Suoi Kon River Valley (BR593831) in the extreme west. The Bon River Valley (BR587662) is the only major north-south avenue of movement in the west.

(b) The steep slopes encountered in these rugged areas are obstacles to movement. Swollen rivers and streams also present an obstacle to movement in these areas. Avenues of movement in the coastal plains are unrestricted in all directions; however, flooding in the wet season will present some problems to movement. The numerous streams and canals in this area will also present an obstacle to movement.

(2) Terrain - Operation Walker: Relief was characterized by high mountains with dense undergrowth with triple canopy in certain areas throughout the AO. Streams were generally full throughout the AO with the main river flowing SSW, with its source in the northern portion of the AO. Cultivated fields are found throughout the AO, especially around AN KHE. Trails are numerous throughout the AO and were generally well used. Because of the wide area for maneuver and the unlimited staging areas available to the enemy, he can easily avoid contact, engaging US forces only on his own terms. Highway 19 bisecting the TAOR from the east to the west, is paved and passable. There are two mountain passes on each side of the AO.
(3) Weather - Operations Dan Sinh, Dan Hoa and Walker:

(a) August: During the month of August, the area continued under the influence of the southeast monsoon. The weather continued a pattern of clear mornings and early afternoons, with afternoon showers noted on a majority of days. Cloudiness continued during the month on an equal level with the month of July. Low ceilings occurred on a few mornings, but were relatively rare during the afternoons and early evenings. Increased cloudiness was noted in late evening and early mornings. Visibility was relatively good to excellent. The average temperature and humidity remained about the same.

(b) September: During the month of September, the area continued under the influence of the southwest monsoon. There was a noted increase in overall cloudiness during the latter part of September. The amount of rainfall increased significantly during the latter part of September. The amount of rainfall increased significantly during the month, especially along the coastal plains. Temperatures decreased several degrees from the preceding month. Visibility was generally good, but there were a number of days that poor visibility hampered air mobile operations.

(c) October: During the month of October, the area came under the influence of the northeast monsoon. Cloudiness increased greatly during the month and precipitation was extremely heavy during the month of October. Visibility decreased greatly and air mobile operations, tactical air support and air support and aerial target acquisition capabilities were severely hampered on a number of occasions.
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f. Enemy and Friendly Casualties by Operation:

(1) Operation Dan Sinh:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA LOSSES</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (BC)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>246</td>
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<td>KIA (POSS)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendants</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Operation Dan Hao:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA LOSSES</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (BC)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (POSS)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Operation Walker:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA LOSSES</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (BC)</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>37</td>
</tr>
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<td>KIA (POSS)</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Combat Support Activities:

(1) Aviation Support: The 173d Airborne Aviation Platoon (Casper) continued to support all combat operations during the months of August, September and October. The statistical report of the Aviation Platoon's activities for these three months is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command/Control</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>SUMMER</th>
<th>AUTUMN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hours flown</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>SUMMER</th>
<th>AUTUMN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Hours Flown</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Naval Gunfire Support: Additional artillery support was provided from United States Navy destroyers and the battleship New Jersey, on station with either two or three twin-mounted 5" guns or, in the case of the New Jersey, 16" guns. The destroyers, the battleship and their on-station sequence for the period August-October are reported as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>VESSEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2 Aug</td>
<td>USS Preston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-20 Aug</td>
<td>USS McKeen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug-2 Sept</td>
<td>USS Eversole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-15 Sept</td>
<td>USS Fletcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 Oct</td>
<td>USS Harwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Oct</td>
<td>USS New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Oct</td>
<td>USS New Jersey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Naval gunfire liaison was provided by Sub Unit One, First AGLICO, composed of Navy and Marine personnel.
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4. Combat Operations:
   a. General: During the months of August, September and October 1968 the 173d Airborne Brigade continued to conduct combat Operations Dan Sinh (formally Combat), Dan Hon (formally Rolling II) and Walker. The operations encompassed the area of influence assigned the Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade, encompassing BINH Dinh, PHU Yen and PHU BON Provinces and coinciding with the area of operations assigned to the 22d Infantry Division (ARVN). The Brigade Forward CP continued to be located at LZ English, north of Bong Son, and the Brigade Rear continued to be located in Camp Radcliff (An Khe).

   There continued to be two areas of operation in BINH Dinh Province. In TAOR Walker, centered generally over the An Khe area, is located the 173d Support Battalion (Airborne) and the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry. Until 18 August 1968 the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry replaced the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry at LZ Uplift in AO Cochise, and the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry assumed the operational responsibility for TAOR Walker, being headquartered at Camp Radcliff. The second AC is Cochise, in which LZ English is located. In AO Cochise are the 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, at LZ English, and the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, at LZ Uplift. The 1st Bn 69th Armor (OPCON) was operational in AO Cochise until 18 October, when it returned to its parent unit, the 4th Infantry Division, leaving one armor company behind for road and bridge security. Co-located in AO Cochise are the 40th and 41st ARVN Regiments (22d ARVN Division) and two Camp Strike Forces, Ha Tay and Vinh Thanh.

   In PHU Yen Province (AO Rolling) is located the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry and Company D, 16th Armor. Co-located in AO Rolling is the 47th ARVN Regiment (22d ARVN Division) and two Camp Strike Forces, Cung Son and Dong Tre.

   The 3d Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, with direct support artillery, remained OPCON to Task Force South during the reporting period.

   b. Operation Dan Sinh: AO Cochise is the Brigade's most densely populated AO, with nearly 350,000 people. Of these, an estimated 215,000 are considered as being under VC control or are living in contested areas. Most of these people live along the coast in the rich, rice-producing lowlands, either producing rice (three to four crops each year) or being engaged in commercial fishing on an individual basis. This area has long been identified as a VC stronghold, dating back to French occupation.

   Due to the movement of the 3d NVA Division Headquarters element and its 2d VC and 22d NVA Regiments into Quang Ngai Province in late June and early July, the Brigade has been able to concentrate its operations in the coastal lowlands against local force Viet Cong units and the Viet Cong infrastructure. At the same time, it has continued its surveillance in areas northwest for signs of the 3d NVA Division's return south, and has renewed its search for enemy base camp areas in the Vinh Thanh Mountains. In the Suoi Ca - Vinh Thanh area the Brigade continued its search for the 18th NVA Regiment left behind by the 3d NVA Division in its move north.

   Due to the absence of main force NVA units in AO Cochise, the Brigade was able to plan and conduct Operation Dan Sinh 22-6. This operation has as its mission the disruption of Viet Cong activities and the destroying of the Viet Cong infrastructure in the rich, rice producing Bong Son Plains area.

   Operation Dan Sinh 22-6 began the 22d of August, utilizing combined forces of the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 40th ARVN Regiment, 22d Infantry Division (ARVN). It is a three phase operation. The first phase, lasting from 22 August until 6 September, was a search and clear operation designed to sweep the entire Bong Son Plains Area. The area is characterized by many tunnels, trenches, and caves used
by the VC and many mines and booby traps. For this reason, the Rome Plows were used extensively throughout phase I to clear hedgerows and trench systems and to destroy tunnels and caves. Thus, the VC was denied the use of the caves and tunnels for storage of supplies and of personnel.

Phase II of Operation Dan Sinh 22-6 began on 7 September and lasted until 27 October. Phase II consisted of detailed interrogation and reclassification of all civilians living in the Bong Son Plains area. This was further accomplished by using one National Police Field Force company. With the National Police it became possible to screen a large number of people rapidly and efficiently. Never before had this been possible, as utilizing United States soldiers with interpreters had proven to be too lengthy a process to be successful. It is also noteworthy that the National Police are trained in police tactics and interrogation techniques, while our own forces are not. Perhaps most important, however, is that the National Police possess police powers, something again that the soldier does not.

The Brigade utilized the strategy of air assaulting a rifle company to surround a village early in the morning or cordoning a village at last light of the day prior to the search. Utilizing the National Police, a complete investigation would be made of all inhabitants and personnel without identification cards and any other suspects would be detained for further investigation. Villages were searched, personnel were screened, caches were uncovered, Viet Cong and Viet Cong sympathizers were identified and contact was made with many three to five man Viet Cong units.

Phase II of Operation Dan Sinh 22-6 proved to be most successful. As of the last day of Phase II (27 October) the Brigade had killed 237 Viet Cong (VC) and detained 122 confirmed Viet Cong and 115 suspected Viet Cong. A total of 12,615 individuals were interrogated. Sixty-three small arms and eight crew served weapons were CIA. This was accomplished at a minimum loss to allied forces engaged in Phase II.

Phase III of Operation Dan Sinh 22-6 began on 28 October and is to continue for an indefinite time period. Phase III is designed to saturate the Bong Son Plains area with allied military forces in order to prevent the return of VC/NVA forces, to develop the confidence of the civilian populace in the allied forces and to protect the civilian populace from exploitation by VC/NVA forces so that the rural pacification program, especially the continued upgrading of hamlet and village RF/PF units, might continue.

Throughout the reporting period the Brigade has continued to ambush jungle and lowland trails used by small Viet Cong squads, courier, liaison and intelligence teams and carrying parties. The elements who carry out these ambushes have been designated Hunter-Killer, or "Hawk" teams, and they have proven to be particularly effective.

"Hawk" teams could be utilized due to the continued absence of NVA main force units from the Brigade area of operations. By continually placing ambushes on trails, "Hawk" teams have proven to provide a constant source of harassment and interdiction directed toward small enemy units and covering a wide area.

Rome Plow operations were also utilized in the 506th Valley, to the southwest of Bong Son. The 506th Valley has historically been a main avenue of travel for VC and NVA units from the jungle highlands into the coastal lowlands and the Tiger Mountains. It has also long been used as a staging area for VC/NVA attacks along NC 1 and on small ARVN and RF/PF strong points and bridge points. The 506th Valley was heavy with trench systems and cave networks that harbored rice brought in from the lowlands for use by the NVA units in the jungle highlands and caches.
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of supplies and ammunition. The Rome Plows were able to clear extensive areas on both sides of the Valley, destroying many trench and cave systems. Due to the Rome Plow operations, it is felt that ambushes will be significantly reduced, better control of the Valley road will be realized and the Valley road's being open will promote civilian travel and open the Valley and the "Crow's Foot" area to further commercial exchange.

During the reporting quarter the Brigade continued making forays into the jungle highlands, to watch for the return of the 3d NVA Division from the northwest and to pinpoint the location of the 3d NVA Division's 18th NVA Regiment to the southwest in the Suol Ca - Vinh Thanh area. Elements of the 41st ARVN Regiment, 22d Infantry Division (ARVN) made contact with the 18th NVA Regiment in the Suol Ca Mountains on 22 September 1968. The 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry reinforced this contact on 23 September and by 6 October, 197 VC/NVA had been killed (BC). For a further resume of the Battle of Suol Ca Valley, see Section II - Intelligence and attached CAAR.

After the Battle of Suol Ca the Brigade continued to conduct combat operations in the Vinh Thanh Mountains, along the Kron River, in the Tiger Mountains, in the crescent area and along the Dam Trao Plains. In the conduct of the operations the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, as reported in Section II, made significant findings of enemy ammunition and supply caches, severely cutting into the enemy's offensive capabilities. The purpose of these operations in the above areas was to destroy VC/NVA strongholds and base camp areas and destroy the offensive capabilities of the local Viet Cong. Thus, if the main force NVA units of the 3d NVA Division do return to their former areas, they will find their VC logistical and intelligence networks destroyed and their base camps depleted and destroyed also. Significant contacts are as reported in Section VI, Intelligence: Operation Dan Sinh.

c. Operation Den Hau: AO Bolling is located in Phu Yen Province, to the west and north of Tuy Hoa, and contains an estimated 150,000 people, most of whom live in the coastal rice-producing lowlands or along the Song Ba River. Of these 150,000 people, less than 5,000 are considered as being under Viet Cong control and about 13,000 are in contested areas. The principal occupations, as in AO Cochinchina, are fishing, again on an individual basis, and farming, with rice being the main crop. AO Bolling is the normal area of operation of the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry and Company D, 16th Armor. From 24 August until 15 October the 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry was OPCON to the 4th Infantry Division in Operation jackson.

For the reporting period the main enemy force in AO Bolling, the 95th NVA Regiment of the 5th NVA Division, remained out of the AO, for the most part in Cambodia, re-supplying, and receiving new replacements. The 6th Bn/95th NVA Regiment was left in AO Bolling, but has remained out of contact with allied forces for the reporting period.

The continuing mission of TF 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry was that of locating and destroying the 6th Bn/95th NVA Regiment, providing security for the continuance of the civilian rice harvest (in conjunction with the 28th ROK Regiment and the 47th ARVN Regiment, 22d ARVN Division), providing security for the 577th Engineer Battalion and the 173d Engineer Company for their mission of construction along Highway 436 and Routes 68 and 2D, and constantly providing Phu Yen Province with a company designed for rapid reaction. Throughout the reporting period, TF 4th Bn 503d Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force and search and destroy operations west of TUY HOA CITY in effort to locate and destroy enemy forces. The enemy was not to be found, and though enemy bunkers, rice caches and 'ase camps were located, few proved to be fresh.
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Thus for the period the enemy had no desire to either be located or to enter contact. In addition to its continuing search and destroy and reconnaissance in force operations, TF 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry, utilizing Company D 16th Armor, continued to provide security for the Vietnamese rice harvest, provide security for the 577th Engineer Battalion for their construction and mine sweeping missions along Highway 436 and Routes 68 and 2D and assist the Air Force in the defense of Tuy Hoa Air Force Base and provide at all times an infantry company for a ready reaction force as needed. For significant contacts during the months of August, September and October in AO Mollai, see Section III, Intelligence: Operation Pan Hoa.

d. Operation Walker: From 1 August until 18 August the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry continued to secure the Camp Radcliff/An Khe complex, secure and maintain for vehicular traffic QL 19 in the tactical area of responsibility. It also conducted reconnaissance in force, search and destroy and cordon and search operations within AO Walker and continued to support revolutionary development and civic action projects.

On 18 August, the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry assumed the tactical responsibility of TAOR Walker and continued to carry out combat operations designed to locate the NVA and secure QL 19 and Camp Radcliff. The 47th Support Bn (Abn) continued to furnish perimeter guards (2d Provisional Rifle Company) and emergency support for Camp Radcliff.

Contact as a whole was light, but continued to increase during the reporting period. The 1st Bn (Mech) 501st Infantry, under the command of LTC John B Carter, continued to guard against increasing enemy pressure along QL 19 and on Camp Radcliff, employ company-sized search and destroy operations, night ambushes, joint US-ARVN operations (there are no ARVN units in TAOR Walker) and constantly held one mechanized company as a ready-reaction force. It is felt that continued close cooperation between the Vietnamese civilian populace, RF/FF units and the US forces were instrumental in keeping enemy incidents along the Camp Radcliff perimeter and QL 19 to a minimum.

Intelligence sources in middle September indicated the enemy would launch a major attack against Camp Radcliff in the coming days. Accordingly, BG Allen reacted to these intelligence reports and Task Force Schnoor was formed on 14 September, under the command of LTC Dean F. Schnoor, the Brigade Operations Officer. Its mission was to halt the enemy forces build-up in southern Binh Dinh and northern Phu Bon Provinces. OPCON to the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry TF Schnoor was successful in its mission. For further information see Section III, Intelligence, Operation Walker and attached CAAR, 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry, Task Force Schnoor.

The most successful enemy foray in TAOR Walker was the 407th Sapper Battalion's attack on Camp Radcliff on 30 October 1968. For further information, see attached CAAR, 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry, Attack on Camp Radcliff, 30 October 1968. For significant contacts in TAOR Walker during the reporting period, see Section III, Intelligence, Operation Walker.

e. Combined Operations: A keynote of the Brigade's combat operations throughout the reporting period has been the continued emphasis on combined operations with the 22d Infantry Division (ARVN) and RF/FF units. These operations have been facilitated by "pairing off" US battalions with ARVN Regiments. The 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry and the 47th Regiment are at Tuy Hoa, the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry and the 41st ARVN Regiment in the southern portion of AO Cochise and the 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry and the 40th ARVN Regiment in the northern portion of AO Cochise. These combined operations are designed to enhance Republic of Vietnam progress in pacification and revolutionary development and to make better use of combined combat and combat support assets. For further information combined US-ARVN operations, see Section V, Combined Operations.
5. Combined US - ARVN Operations and Training

a. Operations: The 173d Airborne Brigade has continued to increase its use of the combined US-ARVN combat operation as a basic means of accomplishing its tactical mission. The purpose is not only to, by combining forces, better defeat the VC/NVA forces but also to assist Republic of Vietnam forces in attaining a higher level of combat efficiency, to continue the progress attained in the areas of rural pacification and revolutionary development and to make more available to Republic of Vietnam forces United States logistical support, particularly in the areas of aviation and heavy equipment assets. The following is reported, by months.

1) August:

(a) 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry: The 1st Battalion was located and conducted all operations in TAOR Walker from 1 August to 19 August at which time it was deployed to A0 Cochise. There being no ARVN units in A0 Walker, operations were directed toward working with RF/FF units in the area. The 1st Battalion 503d Infantry has conducted 3 battalion size combined operations in A0 Cochise. These were conducted 21-22 August northeast of LZ Uplift, 22-25 August northeast of L2 English and 26-31 August northwest of L2 English. Daily liaison visits have been conducted to the 41st ARVN Regiment Headquarters and to L2 Salem. No logistical assistance was required during the conduct of these operations. Operations did not require aviation support.

The 1st Battalion conducted combined operations with RF/FF units in An Tuc District (TAOR Walker) during the period 1-19 August. During this period 2 RF soldiers from An Tuc were stationed on a permanent basis at check points 18-27 to assist in civilian traffic control and in guarding the checkpoints. On 6 August, 108 RF Company and the 132d RF Platoon conducted a combat sweep south of L2 Schueller. C Company 1st Battalion 503d Infantry acted as a blocking force for this operation. During the period 5-11 August a platoon from the 1st Battalion and a RF platoon escorted an armed propaganda team in the vicinity of OP Tom and checkpoint 22. After movement to A0 Cochise the 1st Battalion conducted one combined operation on 29 August. This operation consisted of one platoon from A Company 1st Battalion 503d Infantry and the 215th RF Platoon conducting a combined ambush south of L2 Uplift. On 25 August the 1st Bn 503d installed a land line between bridge # 367, manned by the 134th RF Platoon, and the 1-503d TOC at L2 Uplift. This land line allows the bridge platoon to communicate with the battalion in case of an attack on Van Truong Hamlet. The Battalion Commander of the 1st Battalion 503d Infantry attended a PF graduation at Phu My District Headquarters on 28 August and then made a social visit to the District Chief. The District Chief reciprocated and visited L2 Uplift on 31 August. Staff officers and LNO's made daily visits to the district headquarters.

(b) 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry: The 2d Battalion conducted combined operations with the 40th ARVN Regiment commencing 22 August and continuing through the end of the reporting period. Aircraft were provided for the 40th Regiment for two combat assaults for 500 troops and for five resupply missions, in which a total of 7500 lb of supplies were moved. The CP's of the 40th Regiment and 2-503d Infantry are located at L2 English. Daily liaison visits and exchanges of sitrep's were made. In addition, a social call by the CO 2d Bn 503d Infantry, LTC John W. Nicholison, was made to the Regimental commander on 23 August. The 2-503d Infantry conducted combined training for 1 platoon from the 2-503d and one platoon from the 40th Regiment on 1 and 2 August. Classes were held four hours each morning and were given by both US and ARVN instructors. Classes were conducted by 2-503d Infantry instructors in patrolling, by 40th ARVN instructors in reaction firing and by EOD personnel in mines and booby traps. Additional training was
The 2d Battalion also made liaison visits to Hoai Nhon subsector headquarters on 5, 7, 13, 23 and 27 August. Although the 2d Bn 503d Infantry was committed to field operations remote from populated areas throughout the reporting period, one combined cordon and search operation utilizing one US rifle company and one RF company was conducted on 26 August.

(c) 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry: The 4th Battalion and Company D 16th Armor conducted combined operations with the 47th Infantry Regiment in Phu Yen Province. During the period 13 - 15 August D-16th Armor and 1 rifle company from the 47th Regiment conducted blocking/screening missions for the 2d Bn 47th Regiment to north and northeast of the Tuy Hoa Valley. On 15-17 August D/4-503d Infantry and D-16th Armor conducted blocking and screening operations for the 47th Regiment in the vicinity of the Soul Cal stream (CQ 045490 to CQ 075490). On 20 August the 4-503d Infantry and D-16th Armor assisted the 47th Regiment in a two day combat sweep by establishing blocking/screening positions. On 1 and 2 August the chemical NCA, 4-503d Infantry assisted by ARVN interpreters conducted 4 hours of instruction for the 2d company 3-47th Infantry on the employment of fougasse in the defense. Two hours of instruction on demolitions were also presented. In addition, on 7 August the 2-47th Infantry conducted a separate operation with the aviation assets made available from the 2d Bn resources. Two UH-1H, 2 CH-47 supported by helicopter gunships moved 450 personnel. During combined operations a combined helicopter command post successfully controlled the air assault phases of the operations.

The 4th Battalion and D Company 16th Armor also continued support of RF/PF efforts in Phu Yen Province. During the reporting period the CO and staff of the 4th Battalion and the 173d Airborne Brigade Deputy Commander made a total of 38 visits to the Phu Yen and Phu Bon Sector headquarters. A combined reconnaissance in force operation was conducted from 7-12 August, utilizing D Co 16th Armor and a RF mechanized platoon. The 201st RF Company and 4th Bn 503d Infantry conducted 2 combined operations during the period 18-23 August and 23-27 August. During each of these operations one platoon from the 201st Company was assigned to work with a US rifle company. On 17 August, FF Platoon # 16 was helilifted to CQ 981422 to occupy blocking positions with D Co 16th Armor. This operation terminated on 20 August. On 26 August the 101st RF Company and D Co 16th Armor conducted a search and clear operation west of Tuy Hoa vicinity CQ 132579. From 24 August to 15 October the 4th Bn was OPCON to the 4th Infantry Division, participating in Operation McArthur. For a resume of their activities during this period, see ORLL, 4th Infantry Division, 1 August-31 October.

(d) 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 50th Infantry: The 1st Battalion participated in a combined operation with the 41st ARVN Regiment from 4-7 August in the Soul Cal Valley. Command Posts were co-located during the operations. In addition, the Battalion Commander 1-50th visited the Regimental commander at Phu My. The 41st Regiment was provided six UH-1H helicopters for combat assaults on 4 August and six x 4-101st CH-47s for extractions on 7 August. Four CH-47 sorties were flown, eight for combat assaults and eight for the extraction on 7 August. Eight CH-47 sorties were flown during the operation to effect resupply of water and supplies. The only logistical support rendered to the 41st Regiment was the air support requested for external loads. Approximately 2 tons of cargo was moved. Throughout the reporting period sitreps and intelligence information were exchanged daily. On 19 the 1-50th Infantry deployed to An Khe and AO Walker.
The 1st Battalion (Mech) undertook sponsorship of the PF platoon at Van Truong Hamlet during the period 1-19 August. During the period the PF platoon was encouraged to improve the village defensive works. The Battalion provided personnel to give technical assistance and advice throughout the reconstruction period. The 1st Bn (Aba) 503d Infantry assumed this sponsorship on its arrival in the AO and the 50th Infantry's departure to AO Walker. The 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry arrived in An Khe on 19 August 1968. Coordination was made with the An Tue District Chief regarding the conduct of combined operations.

(e) 1st Battalion 69th Armor: The 1st Battalion 69th Armor conducted one combined operation with elements of the 3d Battalion 40th ARVN Infantry Regiment. This operation was conducted on 20 August to conduct cordon and search operations. The results of this operation were one VC KIA, two VC CIA, two US carbines and 18 mixed RPG-2 and RPG-7 rockets and boosters CIA. One UH-1H helicopter was provided the 3d Bn 40th Regiment for command and control. US advisors from 1-69th Armor were positioned with the ARVN units to assist and encourage an aggressive call for tank supporting fire. Frequent liaison visits were made to the CO, 3-40th ARVN Infantry to coordinate fires, reinforcements, combined operations and assistance.

(f) 3d Battalion 319th Artillery: The CO 3d Bn 319th Artillery and CO 7-32d Artillery have continued efforts toward the mutual coordination of all supporting fires.

The 3d Bn 319th Artillery assisted the A-222 Battery, 40th ARVN Regiment in the construction of two high angle pits at LZ English and 2 pits at LZ Orange. In addition, 1200 pounds of cement, 300 feet of lumber, 100 feet of engineer stakes and 30 pounds of nails were provided to assist this project. A liaison officer was provided to the headquarters of the 40th and 41st ARVN Regiments during the combined 173d Airborne Brigade-22d Division operation conducted during the period 22-31 August 1968.

The CO, 319th Artillery visited the 40th ARVN CSCC on 23 August to coordinate artillery fires for a combined operation by the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 40th and 41st ARVN Infantry Regiments. All movements of US artillery is reported to ARVN counterparts. In addition, requests for preplanned fires in support of future operations are exchanged and the amount of ammunition and the result of all missions fired are exchanged. On 6 August the 319th Artillery conducted a four hour class on illumination procedures covering FDC and firing battery procedures for the ARVN A-222 Battery at LZ Orange. A practical exercise concluded the instruction. On 28 August the 319th radar section instructed the A-22 Battery FDC in the conduct of mean point of impact radar registration employing the AN/MPQ4 radar.

At the request of LTC Long, CO 40th ARVN Regiment, the 319th investigated the cause of a number of 155mm Howitzer duds. Investigation showed that the B-37 Battery (155) had been issued a fuze by the ARVN ammunition depot at Qui Nhon which was designed for use with a 105mm Howitzer shell. This fuze has been suspended from use, pending further investigation by IFFV Artillery. No further reports of excessive duds by the 40th Regiment have been received.

Throughout the reporting period the 3d Bn 319th Artillery fired 55 missions and expended 1042 rounds in support of ARVN units. There were two Naval Gunfire missions expending 137 rounds in support of RVN forces. 6-32d Artillery in AO Baoing expended 486 rounds in 81 missions for RVN forces. 7-13th Artillery expended 3-15 rounds in 164 missions for GVN forces. 7-15th Artillery expended 1094 rounds in 94 missions for ARVN forces. During the same period ARVN artillery fired 69 missions and expended 1492 rounds for US Forces. It should be noted
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this is a six fold increase over the July reporting period, in the number of missions fired by ARVN artillery in support of US troops. ARVN and US Artillery massed fire four times during August and extended 212 rounds. The 3d Bn 319th Artillery provides a liaison section on a continuing basis to the 40th ARVN Regiment. 7-13th Artillery provides a liaison section to the 1st Regiment and 6-32d Artillery provides a liaison section on a continuing basis to the 47th ARVN Regiment. Six FO sections were provided to RVN forces, three sections during the period 1-21 August and three sections during the period 21-31 August. 7-13 Artillery provides a FO to Phu My District on a permanent basis.

(g) Mobile Strike Force and Camp Strike Force Operations: Continuous operations have been conducted with Mobile Strike Force and Camp Strike Force elements. In AO Cochise MSF Companies 201, 209 and 221 conducted operations during the period 1-15 August 1968. From 15-24 August CSF Companies 222 and 225 conducted operations and CSF Company 225 and MSF Company 227 conducted operations from 24-31 August. These elements conducted operations with the 2d Bn, 503d Infantry throughout the period. Continuous artillery and mortar support was provided. The MSF requested and received an airstrike and on three occasions requested and received helicopter gunship support. MSF and CSF units were provided aviation support for combat assaults, extractions and resupply. UH-1H helicopters flew 81 sorties moving 453 passengers and 10,000 lbs of resupply items. CH-47 aircraft flew 13 sorties moving 551 passengers in support of the MSF/CSF units. The 4th Battalion 503d Infantry coordinates the efforts of the Cung Son CSF Cm. in Phu Yen Province and provides fire support and aviation assets. On 7 August a composite CSF company from Cung Son began a combined operation with the 4th Bn 503d Infantry which continued to 15 August 1968. Six UH-1H, two CH-47 and two helicopter gunships were provided to facilitate the CSF mobility and resupply during this operation. Helicopter support was also provided to Cung Son CSF units on 20, 22 and 29 August.

(2) September:

(a) 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry: The 1st Bn conducted three Battalion size combined operations in AO Cochise. A search and clear operation with the 2d Bn 40th ARVN Regiment took place from the first to the 23rd of September. From 19-23 September and from 23-30 September, the 1st Bn conducted joint operations with the 4th Bn and 2d Bn, 41st ARVN Regiment respectively. Command liaison visits were made on numerous occasions during the month of September and sitreps and instums were exchanged with the 40th and 41st Regiment. Aircraft support was provided to the 40th ARVN Regiment for five combat assaults, lifting 620 troops, and for five resupply missions which moved a total of 15 tons of supplies. In addition, aircraft were provided to the 41st ARVN Regiment, which conducted six combat assaults, lifting 2435 troops. It might also be noted that the 1st Bn also continued its participation in Operation Lam Binh 22-6.

A combined operation in the Suoi Cai Valley (BR 8065), AO Cochise, was conducted by units of the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry and the 41st ARVN Regiment from 22 through 30 September 1968. The operation consisted of jointly-planned and combined combat assaults, following with reconnaissance in force and search and clear operations. During the course of the Suoi Cai Operation coordination between units was conducted several times daily and fire support was coordinated continuously. Two battalions of ARVN troops were airlifted into the AO and resupply missions were flown daily. ARVN artillery was lifted to a fire support base, providing additional support for the operation. Results of the Battle of Suoi Cai Valley included 198 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 3 VC/NVA CIA, 30 small arms CIA and 5 crew served weapons CIA. (For further information, see inclosed CAAR, Battle of Suoi Cai Valley.)
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On 8 September a squad from D/1-503d Infantry conducted an ambush with a PF platoon from Van Truong Hamlet, Phu My District. A similar operation involving the same PF platoon and a squad from B/1-503d Infantry was conducted on 15 September. Both were effective in improving the efficiency and confidence of the local defense force and the US troops involved gained a better appreciation of the problems and attitudes of the Vietnamese. Additional platoon-sized ambushes were conducted with PF units near LZ Sitta and Phu My District nightly from the 2d through the 22d of September. Daily visits to the Phu My District Headquarters were made by liaison personnel of the 1st Bn and the Bn CO, LTC Francis J. Percy, and five social visits were made to the Phu My District Chief during the month. Sitreps and instums were exchanged daily. It is felt that such interaction will continue to be productive in producing good working relationships and thus enhancing the efforts of both the Battalion and the District.

(b) 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry: The 2d Bn continued Operation "Hnh Minh" with the 40th ARVN Regiment for the entire month of September, with the 40th ARVN employing two battalions and the 2d Bn utilizing three airborne infantry companies in the adjacent areas of operation. The 40th ARVN Regiment, supported by US aircraft, conducted two combat assaults, lifting 220 troops, inserting a 21-man interrogation team and moved 13,000 pounds of barrier materials in support of its combat operations. The command posts of both the 40th ARVN Regiment and the 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry were located at LZ English, thus facilitating daily liaison visits, social calls and the exchange of sitreps and instums. Many commander's visits were made during the month and on 17 September a luncheon was held in the 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry Mess, attended by key personnel of the 40th ARVN and the 2d Battalion.

The 2d Bn also initiated a combined operation with RF/PF units in Hoai Nhon District beginning on 23 September and continuing through the end of the month. In addition, a combined training program was initiated on 23 September to familiarize RF/PF soldiers in the use of the 81mm mortar. Six RF/PF soldiers will be taken to FSB Corregidor each week and given classes in basic mortar procedures and will conduct practice firing. During the month six students completed the training and nine new students began a new cycle. Four staff visits to Hoai Nhon District were conducted by staff personnel of the 2d Bn. In these visits a combined training effort was coordinated and numerous administrative and logistical matters in support of the program were resolved.

(c) 1st Battalion, 69th Armor: The 1st Bn 69th Armor, OPCON to the 173d Airborne Brigade, conducted 4 combined operations with elements of the 22d ARVN Division during the month of September. The first operation, on 3 September, was conducted with one company of the 4th Bn 40th ARVN Regiment. As this was the first such operation to be conducted with elements of the 4th Bn, it served in part as a coordination exercise. During the period 5 through 10 September, B Company 1st Bn 69th Armor received OPCON one infantry platoon from the 3d Bn, 40th ARVN Regiment to assist with the security of the Rome Plow operations in the Bong Son Plains area. On 13 September 1968, B-1st Bn 69th Armor conducted reconnaissance in force operations with the 4th Bn, 40th ARVN Regiment; results were 4 VC KIA (2C) and 5 VC CIA. Command and control were enhanced during the operation because the Battalion Advisor, the ARVN Battalion Commander and the Armor Company Commander were co-located, permitting coordination to be immediately effected. On 30 September B-1st Bn 69th Armor conducted a joint operation with the Intelligence Platoon of the 2d Bn, 40th ARVN Regiment. The 2d of the 40th had one infantry company operating to the north of the tank team on an independent mission. The ARVN infantry company made contact with an estimated VC squad; and the tank team supported the contact after linking up with the intelligence platoon. The operation was conducted as a training operation, and gave both units a better understanding of mutual problems. The ARVN units rotate in LZ Salem monthly, and are not experienced in tank-infantry operations. Initially, the ARVN soldiers were hesitant to
walk in front of the tanks, but after a short time began to feel secure, and normal infantry/armor mutual support was thus achieved. Experience has proven that positioning US advisors with ARVN units is a key to command and control. The advisors provide the necessary guidance and interpretation needed for both commanders to understand what his counterpart desires. Liaison by personal visits or through electronic means is effected daily. In numerous instances, by coordinating the intelligence gathering effort, duplication of effort was prevented and resulted in a larger area coverage. One example of coordination occurred during an operation conducted in the western crescent area of AO Cochise when a company from the 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry made contact with an estimated VC platoon. The VC platoon withdrew to the south and was observed by an ARVN platoon positioned at LZ Itchiebon. The ARVN Bn Commander kept the CO, 1st Bn 69th Armor advised of the enemy location, which assisted in employment of US Forces in pursuit of the enemy. In addition, staff visits have assisted in an understanding of operational procedures of units involved.

Task Force Schnoor: Operational from 13 through 26 September in AO Walker. Task Force SCHNOOR, under the command of LTC Dean F. Schnoor, Brigade S3, was a battalion-sized unit formed from resources of the 173d Airborne Brigade in response to a request from the Senior Advisor of Phu Bon Province. The mission of the Task Force was to combat assault in the AO, interdict enemy movement from south to north and conduct search and destroy operations within the AO. Task Force Schnoor established a fire support base (Brigadoon) southwest of AN KHE CITY near the Phu Bon Province border in order to provide artillery support to Operation Phu Bon 142, being conducted in an adjacent AO and consisting of two companies from the 47th ARVN Regiment and two PF companies from Phu Bon Province. Daily visits were made to the ARVN Field CP, where fire support was coordinated and intelligence exchanged. The Commanding General of the 22d ARVN Division also made a coordination visit to Fire Support Base Brigadoon. Results of Task Force Schnoor were 5 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC CIA, 1 AK-50 CIA and 2.1 tons of rice confiscated. (For further information, see enclosed CAFR, Task Force Schnoor.)

RF/PF forces in AN TUC District (TAOR Walker) combined with elements of the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry during the month to secure vital bridges and strongpoints along highway QL 19, with two RF/PF personnel being assigned to each bridge. On 26 September the 1st Bn (Mech) established a battalion MATS team to train and assist RF/PF platoons in AO Walker, and to date two platoons have been trained. 17 social and liaison visits were made by staff personnel to An Tuc District Headquarters, and sitreps and instuns were exchanged daily.

3d Battalion, 319th Artillery: The 3d Bn 319th Artillery continued its efforts toward the mutual coordination of all supporting fires. It established a permanent liaison section of three enlisted personnel with the 40th ARVN Regiment CSC. Daily liaison visits were made by the Battalion S3 to the 40th ARVN CSC or their US advisors. The CO, 3d Bn 319th Artillery visited the 41st ARVN Regiment, headquartered at LZ Crystal, on 22 and 25 September to discuss combined artillery support for the Suoi Cai Valley combined operation.

Movement of artillery is always reported to the 40th ARVN Regiment. In addition, requests for preplanned fires in support of up-coming operations are exchanged and the amount of ammunition and results of all missions fired are exchanged. All changes in fire direction frequencies are also reported.
On 12 September, 3-319th and C/7-13th Artillery conducted training with B/37th Artillery, LZ English, on mean point of impact radar registrations. The class was four hours long. The 3d Bn 319th Artillery coordinated with 203d Aviation Company, LZ English, to provide an O-1 aircraft to A-222 Battery, LZ English for aerial adjustment and registration of artillery. An O-1 aircraft was provided twice during the month.

Throughout the reporting period the 3d Bn 319th Artillery has provided forward observer parties from its own resources and from 41st Artillery Group resources to five MSF/GSF companies operating in the 173d Airborne Brigade's AO Cochise. Two parties have been provided for the entire month. Three parties have been provided during the operation in the Soul Ca Valley which commenced on 22 September 1968. 3-319th firing batteries fired 468 rounds in 31 missions in support of MSF/GSF operations.

During the period 1-16 September, while A/3-319th was located at LZ Tony, the battery made regular liaison visits to Ha Tay Special Forces Camp. The 3-319th will continue to provide forward observer teams to MSF/GSF companies which function under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade. The 3-319th fired 97 missions in support of RVN forces during the reporting period, expending 1975 rounds. The 6-32d Artillery fired 511 missions, expending 2317 rounds in support of RVN forces. The 7-13th Artillery expended 3424 rounds in 125 missions and the 7-15th Artillery expended 1073 rounds in 138 missions for RVN forces.

During the reporting period ARVN artillery fired 19 missions expending 214 rounds in support of US forces. ARVN and US Artillery massed fire twice during the reporting period, expending a total of 176 rounds. The 3-319th Artillery provides a liaison section on a continuing basis to the 40th ARVN Regiment. Likewise, the 7-13th Artillery and 6-32d Artillery provide liaison sections on a continuing basis to the 41st and 47th ARVN Regiments respectively.

October;

(a) 1st Battalion 503d Infantry: The 1st Battalion conducted two combined operations during the month, one with the 41st ARVN Regiment from the 1st to the 9th of October, and one platoon-sized operation on the 31st with elements of the 40th ARVN Regiment. The first operation, which involved two battalions, took place in the vicinity of the Soul Ca Valley. Sitreps and intsums were exchanged prior to the operation and several reciprocal command liaison visits were made which contributed to its success. The results of the operation were three VC KIA, one VC CIA, two Chicom hand grenades, two AK-47's, two rucksacks, and 250 pounds of rice CIA.
During the reporting period there were numerous liaison and social visits made to the 1st ARVN Regiment, Phu My District Headquarters, and various villages.

One squad from C Company, 1st Bn 503d Infantry conducted a joint security operation with a Van Truong PF platoon on the 6th and 7th of October. From the 7th to the 11th of October the 1st Bn 503d Infantry conducted joint training for one RF company at LZ Courage. The training consisted of squad tactics, care and cleaning of individual weapons and the organization of perimeter defenses. The commander and staff of the 1st Bn, 503d Infantry made 20 visits to Phu My District Headquarters during the reporting period and there were exchanges of Sitreps and Intsums daily. In addition, several RF/PF units were visited and given approximately 5000 sandbags, some medical supplies and soap.

(b) 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry: The 2d Battalion and the 40th ARVN Regiment continued to operate together throughout the month of October as a continuation of Operation Dan Sinh 22-6 (see OPERATIONS).

The 40th ARVN Regiment received US helicopter support during the month of October to conduct 8 combat assaults lifting 840 troops and delivering approximately 8,000 pounds of resupplies in support of operations.

The command posts of the 40th ARVN Regiment and the 2d Battalion 503d Infantry continued to be located at LZ English. Daily liaison visits, exchange of Sitreps and Intsums, and frequent social calls continued to enhance operations. Personal meetings between LTC Long and LTC Nicholson have been very beneficial in mutually understanding and appreciating the challenges and progress made in executing the phases of Dan Sinh 22-6.

A combined training program to familiarize RF/PF soldiers in the use of the 81mm mortar was initiated on 25 September and has continued through the reporting period. A total of 13 RF/PF personnel received this training during the month. They were transported by helicopter to and from FSB Corregidor and were provided rations, quarters, and ammunition during the training cycle.

Several liaison visits were made by members of the 2d Bn 503d Infantry staff to Hoai Nhon District Headquarters during the month which facilitated coordination of training and the exchange of tactical information. In addition, numerous administrative and logistical details were resolved which enhanced the joint relationship of US RF/PF units.

The 2d Bn, 503d Infantry conducted two combined operations with Hoai Nhon District RF units during the month of October. Each operation involved one US and one RF company. In both cases the US unit maneuvered, while the RF unit acted as a blocking force. The first operation in the west Tiger Mountains was initiated on 7 October and terminated on 13 October and resulted in one VC KIA. The second operation in the South An Lao Valley, was conducted from the 12th to the 13th of October and resulted in two VC KIA. Both operations were effective in that the two areas were searched and cleared through the cooperation and efforts of both forces. Several liaison visits were effected prior to each operation which contributed to their success.

(c) 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry: From the 1st to the 14th of October, the 4th Bn 503d Infantry operated OPCON to the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division. The 4th Battalion closed at Tuy Hoa North on the 15th of October and on the 21st participated in a combined operation with two battalions of the 47th ARVN Regiment. The operation which terminated on the 29th, initially involved a combat assault by the 4th Battalion into an AO west and north of where two ARVN battalions were located, and subsequently a reconnaissance in force.
On the 16th and 17th of October, the 4th Bn S3 conducted liaison visits with the 47th ARVN Regimental Commander. The 17th October visit included an awards ceremony attended by LG Peers, IFFV Commanding General. This ceremony was hosted by Colonel Ba, Phu Yen Province Chief, and LTC Binh, Commanding Officer, 47th ARVN Regiment. LTC Binh has displayed a keen interest in combined operations and for first time has suggested that one US and one ARVN company work together as a task force under a single commander.

During the period 10-15 October, D Company 16th Armor and the 3d Bn 47th ARVN Regiment conducted a joint operation in defense of the Tuy Hoa District rice harvest. In addition, D Co 16th Armor (-) conducted a combined operation with one company from the 3d Bn, 47th ARVN Regiment on the 24th of October.

On the 24th of October, the 735th RF company of Son Hoa District was combat assaulted into an AO to conduct a screening mission for the 4th Bn 503d Infantry. Elements of the company conducted night ambushes on the 24th and the unit was extracted on the 25th.

A 35 man RF platoon of the 151st Company was lifted from Tuy Hoa North by CH-47 to FSB Judy on 25 October. They were attached to Co D, 4th Bn, 503d Infantry for security operations and training. Training and classes were conducted on the use and employment of claymore mines and trip flares with the aid of an RF platoon interpreter. Liaison visits by the 4th Bn S3 and S2 precipitated the above operation and training.

First Platoon, RF Company 151 is presently being sponsored by Co D, 4th Bn 503d Infantry. Plans are currently being formulated to have each unit of the 4th Bn 503d Infantry sponsor an RF/PF unit.

(d) 1st Battalion 69th Armor: From the 1st to the 18th of October, the 1st Bn, 69th Armor continued operations in AO Cochise as directed by the Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade. On 19 October 1968, the battalion (-) moved to Camp Enari to prepare for future operations with the 4th Infantry Division. Company C remained at LZ Uplift under the OPCON of 1st Bn, 503d Infantry. During the period 2-5 October the 1st Bn, 69th Armor conducted a combined combat operation with elements of the 40th Regiment, 22d ARVN Division in the crescent area, south of Bong Son in AO Cochise. The ARVN units participating were the 4th Bn, 40th Regiment, two companies of the 2d Bn, 40th Regiment, and an APC troop of the 3d ARVN Cavalry Squadron. The US units were two tank companies and an airborne company under OPCON of the 1st Bn, 69th Armor. Two task forces were organized. The first consisted of the 4th Bn, 40th Regiment, under the control of the commanding officer of the 40th Regiment. The second task force was organized into three teams under the control of the commanding officer, 1st Bn, 69th Armor. The first team was organized with one US tank company, one APC ARVN troop, and one ARVN infantry company. The team was under the control of the APC troop commander. The airborne company was the third team. Command coordination was effected between commanders with liaison officers or advisors clarifying doubtful points between commanders at all levels. The combined teams made contact with VC and NVA forces resulting in ten VC/NVA KIA, ten VC CIA, six civil defendants CIA, and the following material CIA: one B-40 rocket launcher, one Russian carbine, one WAS-36, three Chicom SKS, one BAR, one M1 rifle, one US carbine, one Japanese mauser, one AK-47, one NVA anti-tank mine, three Chicom anti-tank grenades, two M26 hand grenades, 30 M-79 HE rounds, 27 handmade hand grenades, two B-40 rockets with three charges, one 15 pound satchel charge, one 10 pound satchel charge, assorted SA rounds, documents, clothing, webgear, ponchos, and medical supplies.

Employment of US Armor units jointly with ARVN infantry units has proved to be very successful. The tanks give the ARVN units confidence and the ARVN units
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The tanks provided the rapid reaction and security force necessary for this type of operation.

Elements of the 1st Bn, 69th Armor secured the Bong Son Bridges nightly with ARVN units during the reporting period. A platoon size force was provided by the 1st Bn, 69th Armor each evening during the reporting period to assist in the security of Phu My District Headquarters.

(e) 1st Battalion (Mechanized) 50th Infantry: During the reporting period the 1st Bn, 50th Infantry (Mech) combined with elements of RF/PF forces in the An Tue area to secure bridges along Highway 19. Two RF/PF soldiers were assigned to each bridge guarded by US personnel. On 23 October a cordon and search of Cuu Dao Village was conducted by the 1st Bn, 50th (Mech) consisting of a 3rd ARVN platoon, an intelligence squad from An Tue District Headquarters, and RF platoons 123, 124, and 126. This operation commenced at 0500 and was terminated at 1400 hours. On 24 October a search and clear operation lasting one day was conducted by RF platoon 252 and one platoon from A/1-50th Infantry. The US and RF platoons worked well together and the area covered was thoroughly searched.

Two RF platoons, 241 and 252, totaling a total of 60 men, have been given training on building defensive fortifications and base camps, map reading, land navigation and patrolling by the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry RE/3 team. The close relationship which exists between this team and the two RF platoons has contributed to a unit spirit of corps being developed by the 1st bn.

The CO, 50th Infantry and his staff made numerous staff visits to the 1st Battalion and his staff during the month of October and discussed operations, as well as armor and infantry and continued to develop a better working relationship.

The five RF platoons which the 1st bn, 50th Infantry has worked with most have indicated a willingness to learn and have exhibited a potential for being good soldiers. The RF-3 team itself has been a great aid in the 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry's program of working with the RF's. With the help of the 1st Bn 50th Infantry, two RF platoons have built and occupy a new outpost.

(f) 3d Battalion 319th Artillery: The 3d Bn, 319th Artillery has continued its efforts toward the mutual coordination of all supporting fires and the continued improvement of all artillery performance in the 173rd Airborne Brigade's area of operation. The 3d Bn 319th Artillery arranged to have the ARVN 105mm howitzer of A-229 Battery inspected and borescoped by the 173rd Airborne Brigade Maintenance Team. The howitzers were found to be in good condition and the borescope was completed on 23 October.

The 3d Bn 319th Artillery fired 132 missions in support of RVN forces during the month of October, expending 1,463 rounds. The 6/32d Artillery fired 74 missions expending 1,774 rounds, and 7/15th Artillery fired 238 missions expending 1,949 rounds in support of RVN forces. ARVN artillery fired 12 missions expending 260 rounds in support of US operations during the same period. US and ARVN artillery massed fires twice during the month expending 215 rounds.

The CO, 3d Bn 319th Artillery visited the 40th ARVN Regimental Commander on 1 October to discuss a joint operation in the Dan Truc Plain involving the 40th ARVN and the 1st Battalion 69th Armor. On 2 October, the CO, 3d Bn 319th Artillery accompanied the CO, 40th ARVN and his Senior Advisor to observe a combat
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assault and coordinate the artillery fire for the Dam Trao Plain operation.

The 3d Bn 319th Artillery continued to maintain a permanent liaison section of two enlisted personnel with the 40th ARVN CSCC. Movement of any artillery or changes in fire direction frequencies were coordinated with the 40th ARVN Regiment by this team and they exchanged such information as reported enemy movement, target data, and surveillance readings. In addition, daily liaison visits were made by the Battalion S3 to the 40th ARVN Regiment CSCC or their US advisors.

The 3d Bn 319th Artillery furnished a two man FO team to Hoai Nhon District Headquarters on 17 October for a two day operation. Several staff visits have been made by 3d Bn 319th Artillery personnel to Hoai Nhon District Headquarters. The primary objective of these visits were the continued improvement of artillery support for the RF/FF outposts to include calls for fire, fire adjustment, and defensive targets for each outpost. Additionally, a plan to provide MECCAP to the RF/FF outposts has been discussed. All movement of artillery units and changes in fire direction frequencies are forwarded to Hoai Nhon District. Each night Hoai Nhon District provides the 3d Bn 319th Artillery with the location of all their RF/FF elements.

(g) Mobile Strike Force and Camp Strike Force Elements: MSF and CSF elements continued operating within the 173d Airborne Brigade's AO/TAOR during the month of October. The 1st Bn 503d Infantry conducted one battalion sized operation with the Vinh Thanh Special Forces Camp from the 10th to the 23rd of October and one company sized operation involving MSF 271 and MSF 223, which began on the 26th Of October, and continued thru 31 October. MSF 223 was supported on a combat assault by 4 sorties of US Army UH-1D helicopters, lifting 125 troops. Coordination and cooperation between the 1st Bn and MSF units continues to improve.

The 2d Bn 503d Infantry conducted the following joint reconnaissance in force operations with MSF/CSF during the reporting period: 1-16 Oct, MSF 221; 6-16 Oct, CSF 222; 7-16 Oct, CSF 221; 17-26 Oct, MSF 271; 26-19-26 Oct, MSF 223. The results of these operations were four VC KIA, two VC CIA, one detainee and two pounds of documents captured. A total of 13 UH-1H sorties were flown on seven resupply missions in support of MSF/CSF units, moving a total of 5,750 lbs of cargo. In addition, 335 troops were lifted. MSF 223 was supported by five 2 ton trucks on one occasion. The 2d Bn 503d Infantry has experienced much success in working with strike forces and has observed that their techniques of movement and maneuver are constantly improving. Their ability to carry seven to nine days rations greatly enhances the effectiveness of their operation. The 2d Bn 503d Infantry feels that their association with the Strike Forces has substantially contributed to a mutual understanding of efforts and goals.

On the 16th of October the Battalion S3, 4th Bn 503d Infantry made a liaison visit to Cung Son and conducted a briefing on future joint operations. On the 25th of October the Battalion Commander, 4 Bn 503d Infantry and his S3 conducted a liaison visit to the CIDG unit at Dong Tre. As a result of this visit, one CSF company was committed to participate in a planned joint operation to be conducted on 5 November.

Throughout the month the 3d Bn 319th Artillery provided forward observer parties from its own resources and from the 41st Artillery Group resources to seven MSF/CSF companies operating in the 173d Airborne Brigade's AO Cochise. Firing units from the 3d Bn 319th Artillery fired 88 missions expending 1,199 rounds in support of these elements. During the period 19-26 October, A Battery, 3d Bn 319th Artillery was located at Vinh Thanh Special Forces Camp. Daily liaison visits were made between the CO, A Co 3d Bn 319th Artillery and the Special Forces Company Commander.

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b. Training: Through the Office of RF/FF Affairs the Brigade continues to place command emphasis on the improvement of ARVN and Regional Force/Popular Force personnel through various training elements and programs. BG Allen writes of this emphasis in a letter of 16 October 1968, Subject: Improvement of RF/PF Capabilities: "I firmly believe that the success of future long-range defense of the democratic principles of Vietnam and its citizens will be, to a large extent, dependent upon the ability of these forces to conduct and maintain the momentum of a well-executed and intensive program aimed at defeating VC activity at village and hamlet level. It is obvious that in order to reach this goal, it is incumbent upon all of us to do everything possible within the capabilities of our resources to help improve leadership, instill confidence, provide training and encourage aggressive and increased conduct of operations of the RF/PF units."

(1) The Office of RF/FF Affairs: This office, continuing under the direction of Major Leonard Keller, continued its mission of coordinating and assisting the efforts of RF/PF Project Officers in the various battalions and the strengthening of the Brigade's RF/PF program.

(2) The RF/PF Affairs Officer: An battalion and separate unit level officer has been designated as RF/PF affairs officer. His mission is to know the various RF/PF companies and platoons and their mission, level of training and current esprit. Based on this knowledge he is to design specific assistance programs to supplement the combined operations currently utilized in RF/PF affairs, including such areas as village defenses, weapons training and the conducting of MEDCAPS for platoon members and their dependents.

(3) The RF/PF Leadership School: The Leadership School continues to realize benefits. Utilizing the facilities of the Brigade Jungle School and directed by the RF/PF Leadership School Commandant and a selected NCO training cadre, the Leadership School POI covers thirteen training days, and presents high caliber instruction to 45-60 RF/PF personnel from Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Phu Bon Provinces. The class cycles are designed to include both officer and NCO personnel, on the basis of one officer class per three NCO classes. The Leadership School is operationally organized under the 173rd Support Battalion (Airborne). For a review of the Leadership School's program of instruction and other information concerning its curriculum, see attached enclosure. The Leadership School's activities are reported by month as follows:

(a) August: The RF/PF Leadership School graduated two RF/PF NCO classes. Class 68-2 began on 29 July 1968 and finished on 9 August 1968. Class 68-3 began on 19 August and finished on 31 August 1968. Class 68-2 had 51 graduating students out of 51 students attending. The student breakout of class 68-2 was 20 students from Phu Yen, 20 students from Binh Dinh and 11 students from Phu Bon Provinces. The honor graduate was Sergeant Ra Phong of Phu Bon Province. Class 68-3 had 51 students graduate out of 51 students attending. The student breakout was 20 students from Binh Dinh, 20 students from Phu Yen, 7 students from Phu Bon Provinces and 4 students from Task Force South. The honor graduate was SFC Tran Van Bong of Phu Yen Province. Brigadier General Hue, CG, 22d ARVN Division, was present at the graduation of class 68-2 and attending the graduation of class 68-3 were Major General Lu Lan and Brigadier General Hue.

(b) September: The RF/PF Leadership School graduated 48 students during the month from Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Phu Bon Provinces. The honor student was SFC Mai Ngoc An from Binh Dinh Province. Brigadier General Allen; Mr. Wood, the Senior Advisor of Binh Dinh Province; and LTC Ly, Chief of Staff, 22d ARVN Division participated in the graduation ceremony. Another class cycle was initiated on 30 September with 45 officer students from the three provinces.
Based upon a specific request from Task Force South, 10 students from the Provinces in the Task Force South area will be added to each leadership class starting the week of 21 October. Total number of students then attending each class will be 60.

(c) October: The RF/PF Leadership School class 68-5 began on 30 September and was graduated on 12 October 1968. 44 students graduated of which 18 were from Binh Dinh, 19 from Phu Yen, 4 from Phu Bon and one each from Phu Thuan, Minh Thu, and Tuyen Duc. Class 68-5 was the second all officer class to complete the course. There were 30 warrant officers, 5 second lieutenants, and 1 first lieutenant. The honor graduate was Warrant Officer Le-Dinh-Que, from Phu Yen Province. With the completion of Class 68-5, there have been a total of 334 students (86 officers and 248 noncommissioned officers) graduated from the Brigade RF/PF Leadership School.

(4) The "Kit Carson" Scout Program: The Brigade Kit Carson scout program was fully implemented on 24 June 1968, with an initial complement of 70 scouts. Since this date scouts have been working at company level, aiding the paratroops with their knowledge of the terrain and territory of operation, the various and suspected enemy locations and the enemy locations and the enemy placement techniques of booby traps and explosive devices. The infantrymen, while hesitant about the Kit Carson program in its incipiency, was quick to grasp the value of the knowledge the scout possesses and now regards the scout as an integral performer in his organization.

At present, the Brigade employs 74 Kit Carson scouts, the breakdown being:

- 1st Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry - 13
- 2d Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry - 21
- 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Infantry - 26
- 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Infantry - 10
- E Troop 17th Cavalry - 1
- HHC Brigade - 3

The Office of the G3, USARV, in a letter dated 10 October 1968, at the request of the 173d Airborne Brigade, increased the Brigade's allocation from 70 to 130 scouts. At the close of the reporting period the Brigade S5 was recruiting Ho Chi Minh's to fill these vacancies. The Brigade S5 holds primary staff responsibility for the scouts, assigning them to the various elements. Their pay is 5,000 piasters per month, the total amount being drawn monthly from the Assistance in Kind Fund, Saigon.

(5) The Brigade Awards Program: Initiated by the Office of RF/PF Affairs, the Brigade Awards Program is designed to award RF/PF personnel and Vietnamese citizens who assist the Brigade in its conduct of combat operations. Awards, by month, are as follows:

(a) August

1. In Hoai Nhon District, Binh Dinh Province, 1SG Pham Dai, platoon leader for PF platoons 005 and 009 has been recommended by the 173d Airborne Brigade for the Bronze Star with "V" device for valorous actions while executing successful ambush operations on 1 July and 15 July 1968. (This award has since been presented to 1SG Dai.)
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2. In Phu My District, Binh Dinh Province, RF Company 972 has been recommended for a Brigade outstanding achievement plaque for valorous action in the district. A letter of commendation for the Company Commander is to be awarded.

(b) September: Awards were given to 2Lt Le Nghien of RF Company 972, Phu My District, for his unit's valorous action on 12 August 1968. The awards included a certificate, plaque, 173d Airborne Brigade pin and other momentos.

(c) October: A Brigade award was earned by Platoon Leader Nguyen Deoung of RF Platoon 227, Hoai Nhon District for his efforts in attempting to warn US personnel of an imminent ambush. He received a certificate, plaque and 173d Airborne Brigade pin.

(6) ARVN Long Range Patrol Training: The Brigade program for training ARVN LRP teams continued during the reporting period. Utilizing the resources of the 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP) for administration and training, the following is reported:

(a) August: The Brigade program for combined patrols and for the training of ARVN LRP's continued during the month of August. 22 ARVN LRP's were currently attached to the 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP) for patrol operations. During the reporting period 24 combined patrols were conducted. On 29 August 24 ARVN personnel completed four weeks of training at the 173d Airborne Brigade LRP School and were graduated.

(b) September: 20 ARVN LRP's were attached to the 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP) for patrolling operations. 22 combined Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols were conducted during the month of September.

(c) October: During the month of October, a total of 23 US/ARVN LRP patrols from one to five days duration were conducted. The mission assigned to the teams was generally that of trail watching in areas of suspected enemy activity. Secondary missions such as bomb damage and artillery assessment, and capture of prisoners were assigned. These patrols accounted for five VC/NVA KIA, and seven VC suspects detained. The patrols made 123 sightings totaling 808 VC/NVA personnel observed. On ten occasions LRP teams adjusted artillery fire into observed enemy personnel and called for two airstrikes. The 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP) conducted training for 36 ARVN LRP trainees at the 22d ARVN Division, BA Gl. In addition, 39 ARVN LRP trainees received training at L2 English under the supervision of the 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP).
6. Training:

a. During the reporting period the 173d Airborne Brigade continued to conduct jungle warfare training of newly arrived replacements. A breakdown of personnel trained by month follows:

(1) August:
   (a) Personnel assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 33 Officers and 316 Enlisted Men.
   (b) Personnel not assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 9 Officers and 75 Enlisted Men.
   (c) ARVN: 54

(2) September:
   (a) Personnel assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 28 Officers and 683 Enlisted Men.
   (b) Personnel not assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 10 Officers and 137 Enlisted Men.

(3) October:
   (a) Personnel assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 18 Officers and 681 Enlisted Men.
   (b) Personnel not assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade: 4 Officers and 95 Enlisted Men.

b. The 173d Support Battalion (Airborne) conducted a Brigade Jumpmaster School (four classes), the purpose of which was to provide qualified jumpmasters for the Brigade. For further information refer to inclosed CAAR, 173d Support Battalion (Airborne): Jumpmaster School.
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7. Psychological Operations and Civic Action

a. August:

(1) Community Relations and Civil Affairs Projects:

(a) The 173d Engineer Company repaired the market place road in Bong Son. The objective was rehabilitation of the road in order to support pedestrian and light vehicular traffic along its entirety, especially in the market place area. At the start of the project, the market road was impassable to vehicles at several points. The Engineer Company hauled approximately 1150 cubic yards of laterite fill between 29 July and 4 August. Throughout the project, engineers directed all efforts, provided work site guards, and worked with the local Vietnamese populace in spreading, shaping, and tapping the fill, with the Vietnamese performing the majority of the actual labor. During the filling operations, one culvert, twenty feet in length was emplaced. This project was particularly significant and timely as the coming monsoon season would have rendered the road totally useless.

(b) Combined or unilateral assistance in commodity distribution for the month was as follows:

1. Food:

   a. 2,050 pounds of food was distributed to three refugee camps and one hospital in Bong Son by the Brigade S-5 Section. The food consisted of excess canned fruit, vegetables and meat.

   b. Company A (Admin), 173d Support Battalion supplied 2,000 gallons of food scraps to feed pigs in the An Khe area.

   c. Company C (S & S), 173d Support Battalion provided 500 pounds of food to villages in the An Khe area.

2. Building Materials:

   a. The Brigade S-5 distributed 54,000 board feet of lumber, 800 sheets of tin and 2500 pounds of cement in the month of August.

   b. An Dong Hamlet was supplied with tin and lumber after 89 huts were destroyed by a flare fired from the Bong Son Bridge, BR870960.

   c. The hamlet of Ngo An was burned by the Viet Cong when the people refused to move from the GVN area. Lumber and tin were supplied to the hamlet populace. This was a combined project between the Brigade S-5 Section and Hoai Nhon District S-5 Platoon.

   d. Materials were supplied to the Hoai Nhon, District S-5 to supplement various projects in their area.

   e. The school at Van Trong Hamlet (BR940769) was given 4.2 inch and 155mm ammo boxes to build benches and desks. The boxes were supplied by the 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.

   f. The 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry delivered 14,000 board feet of lumber to Phu Loc Village, CQ018043, in conjunction with this area's reconstruction and rehabilitation project.
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The 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry delivered 9,000 board feet of lumber to the Tuy Hoa Catholic Church School, CQ162/69, to assist in construction of a new two-level high school where 2000 students will attend classes.

The 3d Battalion 319th Artillery was instrumental in sponsoring the construction of a grade school in the village of Truong Lung. Construction of desks and chairs for the school were made from 105mm ammo boxes.

2. Visits to Local Institutions and GVN Districts:

a. The Brigade S-5 met with the representatives of the districts in AO Cochea a minimum of twice weekly. In the case of Hoai Nhon District, visits were on a daily basis during August.

b. The S-5 from the 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry has visited the hamlet of Van Truong BR940769, on daily basis since 18 August 1968.

g. LTC Angel, the Commanding Officer of the 173d Support Battalion, attended a welcome party for Major Thuo, the new An Tue District Chief.

4. Educational Assistance:

a. Plans are being made to re-establish English classes in Bong Son.

b. Plans are also being made to start training medics for volunteer hamlet self-defense groups.

5. Medical: 79 MEDCAPS were conducted throughout the reporting period and a total of 3,092 patients were treated.

Rural Development:

(a) The Brigade Chaplain's Fund donated $5,000 to the Catholic Church in An Khe. The money will be used to complete and equip the high school.

(b) The Brigade S-5 Section with assistance from the 3d Battalion 319th Artillery supplied a 2-1/2 ton truck to the Hoai Nhon District's S-5 an average of four times a week. The truck used to meet the transportation requirements of the local GVN civil affairs projects.

(3) Psychological Operations: On 17 August 1968, town meetings were held in Hoi Duc and An Duong Hamlets which surround LZ English (BR880010). The local officials met with the hamlet elders in an open discussion of problems and how they might be solved. The 173d Airborne Brigade was represented by the Brigade S-5. Armed propaganda teams and the Vietnamese Information Service were also present.

b. September:

(1) Community Relations and Civil Affairs Projects:

(a) The 173d Engineer Company rebuilt the Hoi Duc Hamlet access road from Highway QL 1 to Hoi Duc Hamlet. Three hundred and four loads of fill were hauled from LZ Dog (BR881998) and placed on the road. This was a self-help project utilizing the people of the hamlet for tamping and drainage control, the district S-5 platoon for security, and US Engineers to haul fill and grade. The
Engineers also built an 18' x 30' bridge and placed one culvert 22' long and 24" in diameter in conjunction with the road rebuilding. The project took seven days and was completed on 26 September 1968. The 173d Engineer Company also constructed two wooden buildings, 16' x 32' each, near the North Gate of LZ English. One is to be used as a MEDCAP dispensary while the other will serve as a classroom for teaching basic medical skills to hamlet medics for this and adjacent districts. The dispensary and school will be in operation on or about 1 November 1968.

(b) Combined or unilateral assistance in commodity distribution for the month was as follows:

1. Food:
   a. 50 cans of C-rations confiscated from indigenous personnel were given to the orphans by the 3d Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry.
   b. 96 boxes of candy and 400 pounds of assorted foodstuffs were given to the Bong Son Catholic Refugee Camp by the 2d Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry.
   c. The 1st Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry gave 50 pounds of candy to the village of Van Truong (BR9970786).
   d. The 173d Support Battalion gave 500 pounds of fruit to the Red Cross to be distributed in the village of An Khe. They also provided 225 gallons of food scraps for pigs. 700 pounds of food were also donated to the An Khe Catholic Orphanage.

2. Building Materials:
   a. The 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry furnished 50 sheets of tin, 25 pounds of nails, and 5 gallons of tar for the Ngoc Son Orphanage.
   b. The 3d Battalion 319th Artillery provided 960 board feet of lumber for the construction of a classroom, desks, and chairs. 1100 pounds of cement and 860 square feet of roofing tin were also donated for the school house annex in Bong Son Catholic Refugee Camp.
   c. The 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry is currently providing scrap lumber on a weekly basis to the Tuy Hoa Province Hospital (CQ174472).
   d. The Brigade S-5 distributed materials as listed:
      (1) 400 pounds of cement, 25 sheets of tin, and 200 feet of lumber were provided for a family in Hoi Duc whose house was destroyed by fire from the perimeter at LZ English.
      (2) 800 pounds of cement, 60 sheets of tin, and 1000 board feet of lumber were provided for three families of De Duc (BR877998) whose homes were destroyed by US 155mm Howitzers.
      (3) One 2½ ton truck of ammo boxes was given to the Bong Son Refugee Camp.
   e. The 173d Support Battalion donated 50,000 feet of scrap lumber through the New Zealand Red Cross to the village of Hoai Ca to help build three schools and make furniture.
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The 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry donated 30 gallons of paint and two paint brushes to the village of Van Trong (BR930786).

Hygienic Items.

a. 16 toothbrushes, 21 tubes of toothpaste, and 275 bars of soap were donated by the 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry to the Ngoc Son Orphanage.

b. The 3d Battalion 319th Artillery gave 150 bars of soap to the Bong Son Catholic Refugee Camp.

g. The Brigade S-5 gave away 500 bars of soap and 30 toothbrushes during the Brigade's MEDCAP missions.

d. The 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry donated 75 bars of soap to Van Truong Village.

School Supplies; The 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry gave 200 notebooks and 150 ink pens to the Ngoc Son School.

Visits to Local Institutions and GVH Districts:

a. The 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry visits to Phu Hiep and Phuoc My village chiefs homes were conducted by the Battalion's S-5 officer in order to coordinate future MEDCAPS in that area.

b. The 3d Battalion 319th Artillery S-5 made five good will visits to the Bong Son Refugee Camp and attended Sunday Mass there.

g. The 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry Battalion Commander or his representative made a total of 15 visits to the Ngoc Son Orphanage.

d. The Brigade S-5 made three visits to the village of Duc to evaluate damage and make restitution for an artillery mishap. Seven visits were made to Hoi Duc while the road was being built. Visits to the district headquarters at Hoai Nhon are conducted daily.

g. The 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry S-2 made five visits to the village of Van Truong to discuss installation of a culvert at BR 933760.

Educational Assistance;

a. Vietnamese hamlet and village medics are being trained daily during MEDCAPS by the 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.

b. The 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry made arrangements with the Ngoc Son Elementary School to conduct English Language classes 3 days weekly.

MEDCAPS; 45 MEDCAPS were conducted during September and a total 3,652 patients were treated.

Rural Development:

(a) Material assistance - see "Building Materials" above. A total of 500 man hours went into the construction of the Hoi Duc road and the dispensary/classroom.

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(a) Assistance in road improvement - Hoi Duc road as explained above.

(3) Psychological Operations:

(a) Town Meetings - 11 county fairs were held in the major hamlets in the vicinity of LZ English. The Brigade PSYOPS team operated these meetings and were augmented by Armed Propaganda Teams, National Police, and Brigade MEDCAP teams. The theme used was "End the War in Vietnam" with special emphasis on VIP, US/GVN Image, and Chieu Hoi. During these meetings the APT's and National Police met with the people and MEDCAP was also performed. Chieu Hoi T-shirts, cigarettes, matches, and soap were distributed. At the end of each meeting the village elders were presented with a Vietnamese flag.

(b) Armed Propaganda Teams:

1. The 173d Airborne Brigade presently has a 48-man Armed Propaganda Team Platoon.

2. The following units have Armed Propaganda Team capability:
   a. 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry
   b. 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry
   c. 1st Battalion 69th Armor
   d. Brigade S-5

3. APT's have been used principally on MEDCAP and cordon and search missions. This gives them the best opportunity to mingle with the people. Four APT's were used in the "county fairs" mentioned above.

(c) Loudspeaker and Leaflet Missions:

1. Total speaker time - 60 hours.
2. Total leaflets dropped - 2,508, 900.

(c) October:

(1) Community Relations and Civil Affairs Projects:

(a) The LZ English Dispensary and Health School was officially opened on 28 October 1968. The first class consisted of 22 students who are presently being taught the fundamentals of communicable diseases and sanitation. The dispensary is being operated jointly by US and ARVN medical personnel and treats an average of 100 patients per day. The 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry continued unilateral sponsorship of the Ngoc Son Orphanage in Bong Son. The 3d Battalion 19th Artillery continued unilateral sponsorship of the Catholic Refugee Camp in Long Son. The 173d Engineer Company constructed an incubator for the Bong Son hospital, a display board for National Day, and three observation towers for the district of Tam Quan.

(b) Combined or unilateral assistance in commodity distribution for the month was as follows:
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1. Food:
   a. Thirty kits of IR-8 rice and sixty pounds of candy were donated to the village of Van Truong by the 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.
   b. Five cases of potatoes, two boxes of grapefruits, one box of lemons, two cases of indigenous rations, three gallons of salad oil, fifty pounds of rice, and five pounds of rock salt were donated to Ngoc Son Orphanage in Bong Son by the 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.
   c. Seven cases of fresh grapefruit and two hundred pounds of candy were donated to the Catholic Refugee Camp in Bong Son by the 3d Battalion 319th Artillery.
   d. 700 pounds of foodstuffs were donated to the An Khe Catholic Orphanage and 1500 pounds of food scraps for the pigs was also donated to the villages in the An Khe area by the 173d Support Battalion.

2. Clothing:
   a. Approximately 100 articles of clothing were donated to the village of Van Truong and the refugee camp south of LZ Uplift by the 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.
   b. 100th helmets were donated to the Bong Son Catholic Refugee Camp by the 3d Battalion 319th Artillery.

3. Building Materials:
   a. 500 feet of lumber, 15 sheets of tin, and 3 gallons of paint were donated to the Van Truong School by the 1st Battalion 503d Infantry.
   b. 140 feet of lumber, and two rolls of concertina were donated to the Ngoc Son Orphanage by the 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.
   c. 160 bags of cement were donated to the Tuy Hoa Catholic Church and 600 feet of scrap lumber was delivered to the refugee camp by the 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry. The unit also gave 15 gallons of paint to the Tuy Hoa Chieu Hoi Center and 900 feet of scrap lumber to the Phu Yen Province Hospital.
   d. 2300 board feet of lumber, 2 gallons of paint, 65 sheets of tin, and six 2½ ton track loads of scrap lumber were delivered to the Bong Son Catholic Refugee Camp by the 3d Battalion 319th Artillery.
   e. 25 bags of cement and 5 resettlement kits were donated to villages in the An Khe area through the New Zealand MIIPAP team by the 1st Battalion (Mech) 50th Infantry.
   f. 600 feet of lumber and 70 sheets of tin were donated to the village of Roui Ca by the 173d Support Battalion (Airborne).
   g. The Brigade S-5 donated 2000 feet of lumber, 100 sheets of tin, and 50 bags of cement to villages in Hoai Nhen and Hoai An Districts.

4. Hygienic Items:
   a. 250 bars of soap, 4 toothbrushes, and 5 tubes of
toothpaste were given to Van Truong Village by the 1st Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry.

b. 325 bars of soap, 20 tubes of toothpaste, and three SP packs less tobacco was delivered to the Ngoc Son Orphanage by the 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.

g. 400 bars of surgical soap, 100 tubes of toothpaste and 100 toothbrushes were given to MEDCAP patients by the 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.

d. 250 bars of soap were donated to the Bong Son Catholic Refugee Camp by the 3d Battalion 319th Artillery.

g. The Brigade S-5 donated 1000 bars of soap, 20 tubes of toothpaste, and 50 toothbrushes on MEDCAP missions.

5. Medical Supplies: Medical supplies are used on MEDCAP missions only and are not donated except to the New Zealand MEDCAP team or as individual prescriptions,

6. School Supplies:

g. 350 school books were given to Van Truong School by the 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.

h. 100 notebooks and 100 inks pens were given to the Ngoc Son School by the 2nd Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.

2. Visits to Local Institutions and Villages:

a. 25 visits were made to local villages and institutions by the 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.

b. 15 visits were made to the Ngoc Son Orphanage by the 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.

c. 10 visits were made to the Long Son Catholic Refugee Camp by the 3d Battalion 319th Artillery.

d. Visits were made weekly to the An Tuc District Farmers Cooperative by the 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.

e. 20 visits were made by the Brigade S-5 throughout the districts of An Tuc and Hochin.

7. Educational Assistance:

a. Training was given to the nurses and midwife of Lo Ha Hamlet by the 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry.
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22 students are in their second week of training at the LZ English Health School.

7. MEDCAPS: 62 MEDCAPS were conducted during the month of October and 5,588 patients were treated.

(2) Rural Development:
   (a) Material Assistance - see "Building Materials" above.
   (b) A total of 200 man-hours went into the repair of Highway QL 1 and the Market Place Road in Bong Son.

(3) Psychological Operations:
   (a) Armed Propaganda Teams - all propaganda teams were returned to Province Control at the direction of the Binh Dinh Province Chief.
   (b) Loudspeaker and Leaflet Missions:
      1. Speaker time - 24.1 hours.
      2. Total leaflets dropped - 2,363,500.
      3. Basic themes:
         a. Chieu Hoi.
         b. VIP.
         c. Safe Conduct Passes.
         d. Gun Image.
8. Logistics: During the reporting period, the Brigade's capabilities have been required to be continuously split three ways and furnish logistical support to the BOND SCN area, the AN KHE area and the TUT NDA area. The BAO LOG area is supported by task force from Cam Ranh Bay Support Command (as noted). The logistical posture continues to remain excellent. Tactical operations were supported by land and air lines of supply. A logistical summary by classes of supply is furnished by month in Inclosure 3.
9. Personnel and Administration:

a. General:

(1) August: The Brigade personnel posture was good during the month of August. Overall, the Brigade was over-strength 331 EM. There was, however, certain MOS skills that were short. The shortages were as follows:

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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>35G</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Powerman (Generator Operator)</td>
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<tr>
<td>52D</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>68C</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>68G</td>
<td>Airframe Repmn</td>
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<td>71T</td>
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<td>76S</td>
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<tr>
<td>81A</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82C</td>
<td>Artillery Surveyor</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall, the Brigade was over strength 429 KM. There continued to be however, certain MOS skills that were short. The shortages were:

(2) September: The Brigade personnel posture continued to be good.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOSC</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASG</th>
<th>SHORT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63K</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>68C</td>
<td>Aft Turbine Rng Rpm</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>68G</td>
<td>Air frame Rpm</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>71M</td>
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<tr>
<td>71T</td>
<td>Maintenance Data Specialist</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76J</td>
<td>Med Supply &amp; Parts Specialist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76S</td>
<td>Automotive Repair Parts Spec</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>76X</td>
<td>Subs Storage Spec</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>81A</td>
<td>General Draftsman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82C</td>
<td>Arty Surveyor</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>84B</td>
<td>Still Photographer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84C</td>
<td>Motion Picture Photographer</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>91G</td>
<td>Social Work/Pay Spec</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>92B</td>
<td>Med Lab Specialist</td>
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<td>03C</td>
<td>Phys Act Spec</td>
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<td>05B</td>
<td>Radio Operator</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>49</td>
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</table>

(3) October: The Brigade personnel posture was good during October. Overall the Brigade was over-strength 141 EM. Certain MOS skills continued to be short. The shortages were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASG</th>
<th>SHORT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11F</td>
<td>Inf Ops &amp; Intel Sp</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>12C</td>
<td>Bridge Specialist</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>12D</td>
<td>Powered Bridge Specialist</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>13B</td>
<td>FA Crewman</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E</td>
<td>FA Ops &amp; Intel Asst</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>26C</td>
<td>Cbgt Area Surv Radar Rpm</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31G</td>
<td>Tactical Comm Chief</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
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</table>

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CONFIDENTIAL
**Subject:** Operational Report Lessons Learned

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<th>ASC</th>
<th>Short</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>35E</td>
<td>Sp Elec Devices Rpmn</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35G</td>
<td>Med Equip Rpmn</td>
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<td>35L</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Fire Control Inst Rpmn</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>42Z</td>
<td>Metal Working Foreman</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45C</td>
<td>FA Repairman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45J</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Powerman</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52D</td>
<td>Power Gen Equip Rpmn</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>68C</td>
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<td>68G</td>
<td>Air frame Rpmn</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>71E</td>
<td>Court Reporter</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>71M</td>
<td>Chaplains Assistant</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>71T</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>76J</td>
<td>Med Supply &amp; Parts Specialist</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Subs Storage Spec</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>81A</td>
<td>General Draftsman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82C</td>
<td>Arty Surveyor</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82B</td>
<td>Still Photographer</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84C</td>
<td>Motion Picture Photographer</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Clinical Specialist</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91G</td>
<td>Social Work/Psy Spec</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>92B</td>
<td>Med Lab Specialist</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>05B</td>
<td>Audio Operator</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>49</td>
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</table>
b. Personnel:

(1) The strength of the Brigade as of the last day of each month was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>WOs</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>AGG</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Authorised: 381</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6364</td>
<td>6780</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assigned: 415</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6608</td>
<td>7058</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present for Duty: 349</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6133</td>
<td>6517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Authorised: 381</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6464</td>
<td>6780</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assigned: 397</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6539</td>
<td>6970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present for Duty: 355</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6006</td>
<td>6392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Authorised: 391</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6642</td>
<td>7074</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assigned: 406</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6783</td>
<td>7230</td>
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<td>Present for Duty: 347</td>
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<td>6670</td>
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(2) Losses and gains by month were as follows:

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<th>WOs</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>AGG</th>
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<tr>
<td>August: Losses:</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEROS &amp; ET3</td>
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<td>440</td>
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<td>TRANSFERS</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>903</td>
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2. Gains:
## Operational Report Lessons Learned

### September:

1. **Losses**:

<table>
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<th>HO</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEROS &amp; ETS</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>498</td>
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<td>TRANSFERS</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>1022</td>
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2. **Gains**:

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<th>FM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
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<td>Reassignment Gains</td>
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<td>507</td>
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<td>Hosp. Returnees</td>
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<td>372</td>
<td>382</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>889</td>
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### October:

1. **Losses**:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHA</td>
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<td>304</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHA</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEROS &amp; ETS</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>343</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>740</td>
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2. **Gains**:

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**CONFIDENTIAL**
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHE-SC/MID
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 November 1968

<table>
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<th>OFF</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>PM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
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<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>583</td>
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</table>

(3) Key Personnel Losses and Gains: Key personnel losses and gains, to include principal heads of staff sections, special staff sections, and battalion commanders were:

(a) August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOSSES</th>
<th>GAINS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC Loesch - CO, 2/503d Inf</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Rasig - CO, 3/319th Arty</td>
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(b) September:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOSSES</th>
<th>GAINS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC Gunderson - CO, 1/50d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Willis - Bde Signal Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) October:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOSSES</th>
<th>GAINS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC Fisher - CO, 3/503d Inf</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Awards and Decorations: There were a total of 3029 awards for valor and meritorious service during the reporting period. A breakdown follows:

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<tr>
<th>AID</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal (Merit/Achievement)</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Service)</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEPT</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (Merit/Achievement)</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>859</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>1238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Discipline, Law and Order:

1. The 173d Military Police Platoon is based on a six Squad structure. Platoon Headquarters and three Squads (+) are supporting the Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade and his staff at LZ English. One Squad (-) is in support of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Rear) at An Khe. One Squad (-) is in support of the 4th Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry at Phu Hiep and one Squad (-) is in support of Task Force South at Bao Loc.

2. Base Camp Operation:

   a. The daily commitments at the end of this reporting period for a 24 hour period were: 2 Desk Sergeants, 2 Desk Clerks, 1 Patrol Supervisor, 14 Patrolmen, 2 Security Guards to set up at the Bong Son, National Police Station for fire support, 3 TOC guards, 4 IPW Cage Guards, 3 Gate Guards, and a Special 2 man unit that sets up a checkpoint at LZ Uplift twice weekly to check 173d Airborne Brigade vehicles for proper authorization to leave AO Cochise.

   b. A total of 17 indigenous personnel were processed by the Brigade Provost Marshal Office for the issuance of Brigade Identification Cards during the reporting period.

   c. The total number of detainees processed by the 173d Military Police Platoon during the reporting period is as follows:

   1. Prisoners of War - 30
   2. Civil Defendants - 185
   3. Innocent Civilians - 878
   4. Unclassified - 8
   5. Total - 1001

   d. During the reporting period the 173d Military Police Platoon escorted a total of 127 convoys.

   e. There is no registration of privately owned weapons done at the Brigade level. All registration is done at the USARV Provost Marshal Office and the Brigade Provost Marshal Office will assist Brigade personnel with the necessary forms and information. With the exception, in emergency situations when an export license has not been received prior to departure of weapons owner, the Brigade Provost Marshal can prepare a certificate for the Vietnamese Customs Export to serve as a temporary export license.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

The following is a breakdown of all violations recorded at the Brigade Provost Marshal Office during the reporting period:

1. Non-traffic Violations - 381
2. Cases Investigated - 82
3. CID Cases - 28
4. Traffic Violations - 69
5. Motor Vehicle Accidents at Fault - 15
6. Motor Vehicle Accidents not at Fault - 12
7. Motor Vehicle Fatalities - 9

Tactical Support:

(a) During the reporting period the 173d Military Police Platoon was in operational support of OP Cochise, OP Bolling, OP Walker, and OP McLain.

(b) The total number of detainees processed by each area of operations is as follows:

1. OP Cochise - 979
2. OP Bolling - 0
3. OP Walker - 36
4. OP McLain - 0

Staff Judge Advocate:

(a) The discipline of the Brigade has been good during this reporting period. In addition to the activities listed below, the SJA Section gave 21 commander briefings, legal instruction to over 2100 replacement personnel, reviewed 24 reports of survey, and 27 CID investigations. The stockade population for the Brigade as of the end of October was 4 personnel as a result of post-trial confinement.

(b) Legal assistance was rendered to 840 personnel. This includes Brigade and non-Brigade personnel.

(c) Article 15 and non-judicial punishment involved 832 cases. Following is a breakdown of personnel punished by month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sept</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-4 and below</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5 and above</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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15 November 1968

(d) The following is a breakdown by month of the type of court-martial cases for the Brigade during this reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEPT</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. General</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Special</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Summary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) The following is a breakdown of the types of claims processed for the Brigade during this quarter:

1. AR 27-28 (Foreign Claims) - 40
2. AR 27-29 (Personnel Property Claims) - 23

(d) Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) Morale within the Brigade remained excellent due to increased and improved services and facilities.

(2) Finance: The Brigade Finance Section (Company "A", Administration) continued to provide financial support throughout the reporting period. Newly arrived replacements were made aware of the Soldiers Savings Program and the various allotments available to them through orientations and various newsletters. Conversion day was implemented on 21 October 1968. The operation was conducted in an orderly and efficient manner by the Brigade Finance Office personnel. The total payments and pay complaints processed during the quarter was as follows:

(a) Regular monthly payments - 22,352
(b) Partial payments made - 10,271
(c) Travel vouchers paid - 2,201
(d) Pay complaints processed - 249
(e) Travel pay, TDY, etc., processed and paid (number only) - 2241

(3) Chaplain:

(a) General: During this reporting period religious activities were widespread. There was good coverage of all units in the Brigade as well as some of the rear elements of the 1st Cavalry Division. The statistics on the specific activities speak for themselves. The location in which these activities occurred were base camps, areas of operation, check points, strong points, observation points and hospitals. They occurred both on group and individual levels.

(b) Total services conducted and attendance during the quarter were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Protestant</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>7,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Catholic</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>9,633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

e. Administrative Services:

(1) Postal Services:

(a) General: Postal services were good with incoming mail being received on 91 out of 92 days. The average days in transmission of mail from San Francisco to actual recipient at field locations was 7 days. Outgoing mail was dispatched on 92 out of 92 days. The average days in transmission of mail from sender to the APO in San Francisco was 5 days.

(b) Mail Processed (pounds).

1. August:
   a. Received - 81,753 lbs (daily average - 2,760 lbs).
   b. Dispatched - 19,541 lbs (daily average - 947 lbs).

2. September:
   a. Received - 31,115 lbs (daily average - 1,070 lbs).
   b. Dispatched - 25,166 lbs (daily average - 839 lbs).

3. October:
   a. Received - 120,882 lbs (daily average 3,899 lbs).
   b. Dispatched - 26,524 lbs (daily average 855 lbs).

(c) Total amount of money orders sold:

1. August - $241,422.94
2. September - $359,269.33
3. October - $398,156.56

(d) The total amount of postage and parcel post fees was as follows:

1. August - $3,755.00
2. September - $4,250.00
3. October - $3,250.00

(2) Special Services Activities:

(a) August:

1. General: The Special Services Program continued during August with R & R being the main attraction. The entertainment center in An Khe is almost finished and is scheduled for completion soon.

2. There were 2 USO shows along with 3 other live shows during the month of August.
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3. Number of R & R's:

4. There were a total of 243 films shown during August.

(b) September:

1. General: Special Services activities continued with R & R continuing to be the main attraction. The opening of the Brigade swimming pool in An Khe has been delayed due to a difficulty in procuring materials and equipment needed to complete the project. Another new attraction of Special Services is the "Battle of the Bands" that will be held in Qui 'hon in October.

2. There was one USO show in September with an estimated attendance of 1,400 personnel.

3. Number of R & R's:

4. There were a total of 120 films shown during September.

(c) October:

1. General: R & R remains the main Special Services attraction. The Entertainment Center in An Khe is scheduled for completion on 2 November 1968. The opening of the Brigade swimming pool is still delayed because of a lack of materials and equipment. The Brigade Band, "The Highland Sounds" won the "Battle of the Bands" held in Qui 'hon. The band will be going on a circuit throughout the Brigade during the month of November.

2. There was one live show and no USO shows during the month of October.

3. Number of R & R's:

4. There were a total of 210 films shown in the month of October.

(3) Public Information Office Activities:

(a) August:

1. General: The 173d Airborne Brigade Information Office is making provisions to include six color pages in the next quarterly publication of the "Sky Soldiers." Previously the magazine had been done in black and white. Coordination with the 221st Signal laboratory has given the information office the capability of producing greater photo coverage of combat and civic action operations.
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2. Significant coverage was allotted to:
   a. Father Gille picture story.
   b. Check Point picture story.
   c. Project Marketplace picture story.
   d. Efficient coverage on Abandoned Money.
   e. A successful landing of LRP's by swiftboat.

3. Information Activities were as follows:
   a. News releases 163
   b. Press visits 1
   c. Press accommodations 1
   d. Hometown releases 647
   e. Hometown tapes 0
   f. Hometown pictures 48

(b) September:

1. General: September's total of 911 hometown news releases, the greatest amount for a one-month period since the Brigade came to Vietnam, was the result of an enlarged program to write more individual features and cover those personnel on R & R. In the last two months, more photos were released than in any other similar period of time because of the capabilities of newly acquired photo equipment. During the last month the Brigade had more column inches in news stories and pictures used by the "Pacific Stars and Stripes" and the "Army Reporter" than any other unit in Vietnam.

2. Significant Coverage: During the month, the Brigade Information Office made maximum utilization of personnel to insure adequate coverage in the Brigade's five areas of operation. One writer-photographer was slightly wounded while on a mission to cover "A" Company, 4th Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry, when Fire Support Base Lance was attacked by an NVA sapper platoon. Two writer-photographers were dispatched to cover the 4th Battalion, operating out of Ban Me Thuot, when it was expected to come into heavy contact with fresh NVA insurgents near the Cambodian border. Several stories and photo releases resulted from this coverage.

2. Information Activities:
   a. News releases 66
   b. Press visits 0
   c. Press accommodations 0
   d. Hometown releases 911
   e. Hometown tapes 0
   f. Hometown pictures 48
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15 November 1968

(c) October:

1. General: The production during October was the Information Office's highest of the calendar year. Two photos were released per day throughout the month. In addition the Office is adding six pages of color to the January edition of the quarterly magazine. Also a 24-page brochure of the Brigade will be published. It will contain pictures of historical value, unit histories and chain of command. One of its purposes is the orientation of incoming personnel.

2. Significant Coverage: The Information Office provided sufficient coverage to the increased enemy activity in An Loa Valley, 10 miles northwest of the Brigade CP at Bong Son. Photographic and editorial coverage in both general and hometown releases was prominent in the period's battle involving Charlie Company, 1st Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry, in the Suoi Ca Mountains, highlighting the month's combat action.

3. Information Activities:
   a. News releases 113
   b. Press Visits 1
   c. Press Accommodations 1
   d. Hometown releases 708
   e. Hometown tapes 0
   f. Hometown Pictures 1

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10. Chemical Operations: The 51st Chemical Detachment of the 173d Airborne Brigade provided chemical support on a standby basis whenever requested by elements of the Brigade. The following missions were accomplished:

a. Herbicide Missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>METHOD</th>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Aug 68</td>
<td>UH-1D with Jerryrige</td>
<td>AO Bolling NW of Tuy Hoa</td>
<td>Rice paddies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>220 Gal BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Aug 68</td>
<td>UH-1D with Jerryrige</td>
<td>AO Bolling North of Quang Son</td>
<td>Rice paddies &amp; Corn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75 Gal  BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Aug 68</td>
<td>UH-1D with Jerryrige</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>Green Line of Camp Radcliff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110 Gal BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Aug 68</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>Green Line of Camp Radcliff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55 Gal  BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 68</td>
<td>Ground Spray</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>Green Line of Camp Radcliff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55 Gal  BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug 68</td>
<td>UH-1D with Jerryrige</td>
<td>AO Cochise FSB Corregidor</td>
<td>Perimeter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110 Gal BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Sept 68</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 Gal Bladder</td>
<td>LZ Schueller to LZ Action along QL 19</td>
<td>High Grass/Ambush Sites</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2400 Gal WHITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Sept 68</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 Gal Bladder</td>
<td>An Khe Pass Along QL 19 AO Walker</td>
<td>High Grass/Ambush Sites</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>600 Gal WHITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Sept 68</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 Gal Bladder</td>
<td>An Khe Pass Along QL 19 AO Walker</td>
<td>High Grass/Ambush Sites</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2400 Gal WHITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Sept 68</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 Gal Bladder</td>
<td>Camp Radcliff An Khe Grass Along Green Line</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1800 Gal WHITE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Sept 68</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 Gal Bladder</td>
<td>Camp Radcliff An Khe Grass Along Green Line</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1800 Gal WHITE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Sept 68</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 Gal Bladder</td>
<td>LZ Schueller to LZ Action along QL 19 AO Walker</td>
<td>High Grass Along QL 19 Walker</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1800 Gal WHITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Sept 68</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 Gal Bladder</td>
<td>Southwest of LZ Action in AO Walker Tree Line used by Snipers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1200 Gal WHITE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Oct 68</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 Gal Bladder</td>
<td>41st Signal Bn Install, Vung Chaw Mtn Shrubs &amp; Grass in Perimeter</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1800 Gal WHITE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report Lessons Learned  
**DATE:** 28 Oct 68  
**METHOD**  
CH-47 with 600 Gal Bladder  
**AREA**  
Strong Points Between LZ Schueller & LZ Action  
**TARGET**  
Grass Used as Ambush Sites  
**SORTIES**  
2  
**AMOUNT**  
700 Gal WHITE  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>METHOD</th>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct 68</td>
<td>CH-47 with 600 Gal Bladder</td>
<td>Strong Points and Bridge Sites from LZ Schueller to Top of Nang Yang Pass</td>
<td>Grass Used as Ambush Sites</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1200 Gal ORANGE 2100 Gal WHITE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b. Riot Control Agent CS:**

(1) On 30 Aug 1968, two E-158's were carried in the chase ship on a Snoopy run and dropped vic BR 739984 to BR 749977. Gunships expended on the area and artillery was adjusted with undetermined results.

(2) On 1 September 1968, two E-158's were employed vic BR 749984 to BR 749977 on heavy MPD readings. Gunships and artillery expended with unknown results.

(3) On 2 September 1968, two E-158's were employed vic BR 744955 to BR 743966 on heavy MPD readings. Gunships and artillery was called with unknown results.

(4) On 12 September 1968, two E-158's were employed on heavy APD readings with unknown results vic BR 840735. Gunships and artillery expended with unknown results.

**c. Personnel Detector Program:**

(1) One MPD operator from the 51st Chemical Detachment supported the 4/503d Infantry, the 6/32d Artillery and the 28th HOK Regiment in AO Boiling, flying 20 missions and a total of 31 hours and 55 minutes during August, September and October 1968.

(2) One MPD operator from the 51st Chemical Detachment supported the 1/50th Mechanised Infantry in AO Walker, flying 31 missions and a total of 45 hours and 25 minutes during August, September and October 1968.

(3) One MPD/APD operator from the 51st Chemical Detachment supported Task Force 173d Airborne Brigade in AO Cochise, flying 67 missions and a total of 94 hours and 30 minutes.

(4) On 29 August 1968, E-158 CS clusters were taken on APD/MPD missions in AO Cochise for use on hot spots.

(5) On 22 September 1968 the APD aircraft from LZ English received heavy readings vic BR 8458, 8471, 8971 and 8957. At least 39 enemy KIA were reported by the 41st ARVN as a result of this intelligence.

(6) On 23 September 1968, the MPD aircraft at An Khe received heavy readings vic BR 5036, 5056, 5045 and 5045. One agent was inserted and counted at least 90 NVA.
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(7) On 24 September 1968, the APD aircraft received one round of small arms fire vic BR 830651 while flying with D/2/1 Cavalry. The aircraft pilot was killed.

(8) On 8 October the APD aircraft (D/2/1 Cav) received heavy readings and scotted bunkers, fires, foxholes, and other other evidence of enemy activity.
INTRODUCTION:

"The 173d Airborne Brigade has been conducting combat operations along the north central coast of South Vietnam, in Binh Dinh Province, since April of 1968. The Brigade's area of operation, code-named Dan Sinh, is important for several reasons. Binh Dinh Province is heavily populated, with almost one million inhabitants. It includes the province capital, the strategic port city of Qui Nhon, and the smaller but still vital cities of Bong Son and An Khe. Bong Son and its surrounding villages and hamlets account for nearly 350,000 people. Thus, the Brigade's units are almost constantly working in and around heavily populated areas."

"Binh Dinh's coastal lowlands are some of the richest agricultural areas in Vietnam, rice and vegetables being its main crops. Three or four rice crops can be grown and gathered each year, and the farmer's also have and raise for market cattle. The waters along the coast support a bustling fishing industry, the greater part of it being carried on by individuals in their own boats. Fishing is aggressively pursued, perhaps 25% of the population being engaged in fishing itself or its offsprings, and contributes a great deal to the area's prosperity. It is significant that both farming and fishing produce excesses, to be sold in markets along the coast and in the highlands. Thus, Binh Dinh Province is an economic 'breadbasket.'"

"In addition, Route QL 1, Vietnam's coastal highway and the country's primary land communication route for all business and commerce (it is the only highway that runs the length of the country), runs through our center. Because of its importance, QL 1 has now been almost completely surfaced with asphalt in Binh Dinh Province. The Vietnam National Railroad, which runs parallel to QL 1, is heavily damaged, and has not been in use since late 1964."

THE ENEMY:

"One can easily realize that the enemy is also aware of the Province's political and economic importance, and, as a result, this has long been a stronghold for the Viet Cong and its sympathizers. His main force units, both Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, by and large remain in the jungle areas to the west of the rich, populated plains. Here they train and resupply, periodically making sorties into the lowlands in attempts to attack both American and Vietnamese military installations or local governmental headquarters. The main force units are also continually sending agents into the plains with many missions. By one, two and threes, in small groups, they come to purchase rice, fish, corn, coconuts, vegetables and medical supplies. They also acquire intelligence information and act as couriers."

"The Viet Cong guerrilla operates in Binh Dinh Province's populated area in small units, platoon and sometimes company-sized. Their mission is to maintain a constant campaign of harassment and terrorism against both the military and civilian populace, and to gain intelligence data and needed supplies for the main force units in the mountains. Their purpose is to tie up the military forces, and to drive the people away from the government. They have not been successful."

"One night in late July the Viet Cong entered the refugee hamlet of Ngoc An, south of Bong Son, and attempted to talk the Vietnamese into moving back into their coastal village, where, under Viet Cong hands, they had been in virtual slavery. The villagers, who had asked to be moved into Ngoc An, refused, and the Viet Cong, in retaliation, burned all their houses and possessions. Ninety-six families were burned out, but I think it is significant that none returned with
the Viet Cong, and, in a matter of weeks, the Brigade had supplied the refugees with the materials needed to rebuild their hamlet.

"When we first began operations here, the Viet Cong must have had quite a good communications system, as it was observed that simultaneous acts of terrorism or military activities would appear throughout an entire area. However, these co-mounted attacks have been, in the past eight months, very much reduced." 

"The assistance that the local Viet Cong provide to the main force units is not limited to their para-military or their intelligence-gathering activities. The local guerrillas also assist in kidnapping young males and females to serve in forced labor parties. This is not at all unusual; we recently freed forty-five Vietnamese from a forced-labor camp near Tuy Hoa, where some had been held up to four months. In another incident, a captured ARVN soldier escaped from armed guard and made his way to our troops. He had been held working rice fields for the Viet Cong, and had been brutally mistreated." 

"Guerrillas also sometimes enter neighboring hamlets at night, to conduct propaganda missions aimed at turning the Vietnamese away from the Government. It is important to note that this technique of propagandizing the people is a continuous, well-organized effort. It is so carefully organised, in fact, that often we are able to receive an excellent analysis on the status of the villages from captured enemy documents. This information is, of course, very useful, for the Allies can then concentrate their efforts on those villages in which the enemy estimates he has the most influence."

OPERATIONS:

"This was the general situation when the 173d began Operation Dan Sinh (then Cochise) eight months ago. Immediately learning the modus operandi of the enemy, the Brigade's maneuver battalions were sent into the jungles and mountains to locate and destroy the enemy's main-force unit, the 3d NVA "Yellow Star" Division. In our contacts with the 3d NVA Division were many successes: the 173d defeated and inflicted many casualties in a series of battles in the An Lao Valley, 506th Valley, the Tiger Mountains and the Crescent region. In late June and early July, the 3d NVA Division withdrew to the north, taking two of their three regiments, and leaving another regiment outside of our area of operations."

"Thus, when the enemy main-force units were not to be located, these battalions and other available Allied forces were put into the heavily-populated coastal areas, to root out and destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure, which had been so carefully built up in the hamlets and villages."

"But two problems immediately became obvious. One was that the Brigade needed the type support that only the National Police can provide, the other was that the Viet Cong resumed their activities as soon as Allied forces moved out of the operational areas, especially in those areas in which there were no ARVN or RP/PF forces."

"With little National Police support in their operations around villages, the 173d frequently had to make do with one rifle company and an ARVN interpreter. The process of searching a village and screening the inhabitants thus proved to be extremely slow and difficult. This was so not only because of the language barrier and the limitations of one interpreter, but also because the interpreter was not trained in police questioning techniques or other important methods for identifying the Viet Cong and their sympathizers."

"The difference between operating with and operating without the National Police was clarified when the Brigade was provided a highly-trained National Police Company the first of September. The Company is placed under the 173d's operational
control by the Province Chief of Binh Dinh Province. Trained in the National Police Academy in Dalat, and made up of selected Vietnamese, they possess police powers, which, of course, neither the ARVN nor the American soldier does. They are, of course, also well-trained in interrogation techniques, and the results of having these elements working with our units have been most significant. To date over 12,000 people have been screened, and out of 12,000 we have identified approximately 150 Viet Cong sympathizers and 100 "hard core" Viet Cong."

"By long experience, the ingenious and tenacious Viet Cong are masters at the art of hiding their weapons and assuming the roles of peaceful civilians when Allied forces move into their area, and waiting until the troops leave to resume their activities. Very frequently, it seems that just as our troops were boarding their helicopters to depart an area in which they have been operating for seven to ten days and have found nothing, they would receive sniper rounds and small arms fire."

"As our operations progressed in the populated areas, another related problem became apparent. Our men could operate for days and weeks without seeing the enemy or having any shots fired at them, but they would sometimes take several casualties daily from devastating booby traps. The Viet Cong in this area are experts in the use of explosives for booby traps and mines. They use any explosives they can acquire, including artillery rounds, Air Force bombs, grenades, mortar rounds and C-4. We have had approximately 300 booby traps and mines explode during our operations, and have found, prior to their explosion, about 125 more. Our casualties have amounted to approximately 150 men, with many of them sustaining serious wounds or losing limbs as a result, and several killed."

"Apart from the casualties, booby traps are very bad psychologically for our young paratroopers and commanders, in that the men develop a sometimes bitter hatred for the local villagers. The men have every reason to believe, and are sometimes correct in this belief, that the booby traps are made by the very people they see living in the villages. The situation is worsened by the fact that the Viet Cong use certain other tactics which frustrate my men. One example is when our troops receive small arms fire from a hut in a village. As our point man or lead squad prepares to return fire, women and children burst out the entrance of the hut and smile and wave their hands, because they know the soldiers will not fire. While this is happening, the enemy escapes through a tunnel complex."

COUNTERMEASURES:

"Partly because of this psychological problem, I immediately established an enforced policy of courtesy, kindness and humanity in dealing with every civilian, every detainee and every prisoner of war. Although our basic Brigade policy in this respect is certainly not unique in Vietnam, I emphasize it because in the 173d we have gone to great lengths to enforce it because of its necessity in heavily populated areas. We are ever aware of the possibility that one individual might lose his sense of balance and break this policy, thereby causing people to stay with or to go over to the Communist side."

"To see that this is properly enforced, I have ordered my battalion commanders to frequently observe their companies' operations on the ground. I personally accompany my rifle platoons and companies as often as possible. In this way we can be certain that we know how our paratroopers are conducting themselves. In addition, we have the requirement that a detailed formal investigation be made of every incident or injury and break this policy to a civilian detainee or prisoner of war. When we have to detain women and children, as sometimes we must, we always make sure that they are given medical aid and are treated with special care."

"To back up this overall approach, we do everything possible to make right any errors we may have made, even when we do not consider it to be our responsi-
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For example, when village or hamlet houses are destroyed during a fire-fight, we do our utmost to provide materials to rebuild the houses, although we may suspect Viet Cong use. Everything we do is designed to convince every person with whom we come in contact that its best to be on the Allied side."

"As a result of this policy, we have had only a few occasions in the Brigade's eight months on the coastal plains in which a large number of homes were destroyed during a battle. In each case, the destruction resulted from the fact that a main-force enemy unit chose to use the housing area as a defensive position. Fortunately, the civilian casualties in these engagements were very few, because each home in the area had a strongly-built bunker complex for the family. In addition, because the war has continued here for so many years in varying degrees of intensity, the entire area is literally covered with spider holes, caves, foxholes, bunkers and other types of entrenchment. More important that this, however, is the fact that when an enemy main-force unit moves into a populated area, the war-wise civilian population moves out before the battle begins. We have had very few, I repeat, very few, civilian casualties as a result of our continuous operations in these heavily populated areas."

"Our tactics have, of course, been affected by the special problems we have encountered in this area. We use tanks and armored personnel carriers whenever possible to lead infantrymen into an unsecure area because of the numerous booby traps. Our point men and lead squads are required to carry a grappling hook with a twenty to thirty foot nylon cord attached to it. The point man can then throw the hook out into a suspicious area and, while in the prone, pull it back, discharging any unseen booby trap wires. Another technique, used in areas where we definitely expect to encounter booby traps, is to have two or three men on the point. Thus, one man can be free to scan the area for the enemy, while the others can concentrate on looking for booby traps. In addition, we continually question prisoners to find out what signs the enemy uses to mark their traps, and pass the information on to the troops on a regular basis. The 'Kit Carson Scouts,' extensively used by the Brigade, are past masters on booby trapping, and they are a great help in spotting signs and traps, and thus cutting down on injuries."

"Mines are discovered by electronic detectors and by observation of disturbed terrain. They seldom cause any casualties to personnel in tanks. Due to the size of the mines in this area, however, personnel in APC's are often injured when the APC hits a mine."

"Our most effective tactic in the populated areas has been to saturate one particular locale with troops over a long period of time, in order to totally disrupt Viet Cong activities and attempt to destroy his infrastructure. One such operation was carried out on the Bong Son Plains from August 22 until October 1, 1968, utilizing three US battalions and three ARVN battalions. Villages were searched, personnel were screened, Viet Cong and Viet Cong sympathisers were identified and contact was made with many three to five man Viet Cong units. The results of this operation were most significant. Allied casualties were light, while 183 Viet Cong were killed or captured. We also screened out 107 Viet Cong and detained approximately 350 Viet Cong sympathisers. A total of 11,500 Vietnamese had their identification cards checked or reissued to improve future control."

"An operation as this is so successful primarily because of the long length of time we remained in the area and the saturation effect of the six battalions. Another significant factor, again, was the National Police Company which worked with us. With them we could screen a large number of people rapidly and efficiently; never before had this been possible. I am a great believer in utilizing the National Police. Their results speak for themselves."

"On a smaller scale, one of our rifle companies will make a sudden airmobile assault to surround a village early in the morning. With the help again of the
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National Police, a complete investigation is made and personnel without identification cards and any other Viet Cong suspects are detained. Another favorite tactic of ours is to ambush the jungle and lowland trails used by Viet Cong couriers and liaison personnel. These platoon and company-sized ambushes continually and effectively disrupt coordination between main-force units and the local guerrillas, and make it difficult for the enemy to complete his all-important reconnaissance missions.

"We avoid as much as is possible using artillery and air strikes in populated areas. The only exception, as stated previously, is when an enemy unit occupies a village or hamlet, and using these weapons is the only way to cause defeat without exposing our troops to unnecessary danger. We also have the support of Naval destroyers and patrol boats armed with machine guns, operating continuously along the coastline. They have proven most effective in placing accurate fire in areas that our own organic artillery is not able to reach, and in stopping and searching small sea-going vessels for contraband war articles and weaponry. The Naval forces are especially needed when our large units are operating in the highlands and our coastal strength thus needs more support."

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:

"The psychological warfare aspect of our operations is highly stressed, and especially so, because we are in such a thickly populated area. Under the direction of the 35 office, the program is aimed not only at the local people but also at the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers. Leaflet drops and pre-recorded and live aerial broadcasts emphasize the enemy's hardships and urge him to rally to the government under the 'Chieu Hoi' program. Teams from the Brigade frequently pull MEDCAPS and DENTACAPS in the villages, and our battalions are helping the people to build new schools, orphanages and dispensaries. Armed Propaganda Teams are present during these activities and during cordon and search missions to explain to the people what the government is attempting to do for them, and how it needs their help. The theme these teams use is along the lines of 'End the War in Vietnam,' with emphasis on the Volunteer Information Program, the United States/Vietnamese government image and the 'Chieu Hoi' program. 'Chieu Hoi' tee-shirts, cigarettes, matches, soap, tooth brushes and toothpaste are distributed, and the village elders are often presented with a Vietnamese flag."

SUMMARY:

"Thus, you can see the problems we've encountered and the lessons we've learned in our combat operations in Binh Dinh Province. I feel that the most important lesson here is the necessity to maintain forces at all times in such a heavily populated area, to keep the enemy from utilizing and benefitting from its political and economic resources. No permanent advantage will normally be gained by spending only a relatively short time in such an area."

"This problem of continuous control is well recognised, and Regional Force and Popular Force units are being developed and strengthened as rapidly as possible to assist in this protection, and are proving to be effective in accomplishing their mission."

"Probably the 173d's most effective program designed to assist in improving these forces is our RF/PF Leadership School. Established in June at our base camp in An Khe, we believe it to be the first of its kind in Vietnam. We train two classes of fifty RF/PF officers and NCO's each month, giving them fourteen days training in a course emphasizing leadership, tactics and weapon training. Also, we have Brigade Advisory Teams visiting the units on a regular basis, advising and assisting them in matters of defense, tactics, weaponry, logistics and
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Health and sanitation. In addition, we have an awards system to recognize RF/PF leaders and soldiers who have made significant contributions toward defeating the enemy.

"What have been some of the results of our operations and efforts in this heavily populated coastal area of Vietnam? First, there had been a defeat for the main-force Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units, and a marked decrease in Viet Cong terrorism and harassment activities. Next, there has been a significant increase in commerce, with new businesses being established and vehicular traffic increasing on QL 1. There has also been an increase in civilians willing to volunteer information about the enemy and his movements. Finally, more hamlet and village chiefs and others are beginning to discuss mutual problems with us. Since this did not happen during our first three months here, I feel that it definitely indicates that the local people are gaining more trust and confidence in the 173d and its ability to protect them. Brick homes are now under construction all around the Province, and I know of no better sign of progress than for a villager to build for his family a permanent home. Perhaps the villagers are beginning to understand that our actions and intentions are for their benefit, and theirs only. To me, this is the best sign of all, for this is our reason for being here."

NOTE: This monograph concerning combat actions in built-up areas was taken from a taped interview with BG Allen on 9 October 1968. In effect, it is a synthesis of the philosophies BG Allen uses in commanding in combat the 173d Airborne Brigade.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

During the operational period, various lessons were learned. These lessons learned were drawn from all the operations which occurred during the period extending from 1 August 1968 through 31 October 1968.

1. Personnel:
   a. OBSERVATION: Monthly Payment of Artillery Forward Observers.

   EVALUATION: Since 3d Battalion 319th Artillery Forward Observers accompany infantry units to all areas of operation, the task of paying observerarty personnel is made extremely difficult because of the distances involved. Pay Officers often traveled for a week to ten days while paying observer parties. In addition, due to unit movement, pay officers often could not pay personnel within specified time limits. Observer personnel on occasion were required to return to An Khe to draw partial payments.

   RECOMMENDATION: Arrangements should be made with the Brigade S-1 to have all FO personnel paid with their respective supported units. The necessary list of personnel and units is submitted through S-1 channels on the 20th of each month. This procedure works extremely well.

   b. OBSERVATION: Payment of personnel in remote locations.

   EVALUATION: Unit pay officers for units that are spread over a wide area at different locations usually are tied up from five to seven days using Air Force aircraft on scheduled flights. Therefore, much time is lost and an officer is not able to pay personnel as promptly as desired.

   RECOMMENDATION: Units which are spread over large areas should consolidate their pay officers in one helicopter and therefore pay all personnel in a minimum of time. This method has proven itself, as time loss is cut to a minimum and personnel are paid promptly.

   c. OBSERVATION: Personnel Actions for Personnel in the Forward Areas.

   EVALUATION: Men in the forward areas were causing unnecessary and excessive loss of man hours due to personnel constantly returning to An Khe for administrative requirements, pay problems and military justice.

   RECOMMENDATION: Company representation either the first sergeant, company clerk or company commander can accomplish most of the requirements through a trip to the forward areas at the first of the month, and regularly thereafter, thus reducing man-hours lost.

   d. OBSERVATION: Awards and Decorations for Individuals at All Levels.

   EVALUATION: There is a tendency in awards and decorations to overlook those personnel that are forward or those who have routine tasks at section level.

   RECOMMENDATION: An active program for recognition of service rendered by those individuals both raises moral and increases interest in a good job by offering just incentive for those men who are exceptional workers.

   e. OBSERVATION: Most Efficient Operation of a Battalion S-1.

   EVALUATION: The 3d Battalion 319th Artillery tried to consolidate all S-1 activities by having all battery clerks work directly for the S-1. With
Operational Report Lessons Learned

these people, the S-1 section was reorganized with each man handling a specific area, i.e. awards, courts and boards, etc, for the entire battalion. Although the system has advantages, it was found not to be the most efficient operation. The S-1 was now responsible for the operation of 5 orderly rooms and became involved in many internal problems of the batteries. In addition, the personnel working in each of the areas, did not show the interest that he would have if he had been working just for his battery.

RECOMMENDATION: The battery clerks were returned to the Brigade rear area and operated under the supervision of the battalion PSNCO. Each clerk worked only on his respective battery's requirements. The S-1 section remains with the Battalion CP and performs those duties normal to the S-1. Although 2-3 days may be lost in obtaining the S-1's signature, the fact that the clerks are located with the Brigade Finance and AG section and are responsive to their own batteries has proven the operation to be the most efficient.

f. OBSERVATION: Personnel Rotation.

EVALUATION: A records check of all personnel of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 50th Infantry indicates that 213 personnel will rotate out of the battalion in May 1969. In August 1968, the battalion experienced a similarly large rotation which resulted in a significant loss of operating ability and severe administrative problems in replacing this lost manpower. Previous infusion programs in March and May 1968 were unable to alleviate the large rotational hump in August.

RECOMMENDATION: Manpower losses due to a rotation of over 150 personnel per month cannot be efficiently handled by the battalion. An infusion program has been initiated to alleviate the projected losses of May 1969. In addition, an infusion program has been initiated to alleviate rotational losses for August 1969, thereby reducing the loss of combat operations abilities due to large rotational humps.

g. OBSERVATION: Non-battle Losses.

EVALUATION: In September and early October the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 50th Infantry experienced numerous non-battle losses due to accidental injuries and malaria. Non-battle casualties and malaria losses reduce foxhole or fighting strengths. Past experience has shown that these losses can be controlled by stringent and effective command measures.

RECOMMENDATION: An active accident prevention and malaria prophylaxis program can significantly reduce non-battle casualties.

2. Operations:

a. OBSERVATION: Minesweeping.

EVALUATION: It has been noticed that even though the entire length of QL 19 through AO Walker is well paved, this does not restrict mining incidents on the shoulders and turn off points along the highway. Both manual and electronic mine sweeping capabilities have been used along likely mining areas. This type of apparatus must be augmented by careful visual checks at all times.

RECOMMENDATION: Mine detection devices of any available type should be employed whenever the terrain or situation permits mining by enemy forces. Cracks in asphalt are especially fine places for mine placement. Do not wait to discover the first one too late.

b. OBSERVATION: Crossover in Switch board AN/MTC-10.

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EVALUATION: Installation of telephone switchboard AN/MTC-10 requires only one central grounding strap in accordance with the installation technical manual.

RECOMMENDATION: This method of grounding has proven inadequate resulting in excessive crosstalk in the switchboard. By grounding each major component of the AN/MTC-10 separately, crosstalk was virtually eliminated resulting in much higher quality of service to subscribers.

c. OBSERVATION: Defensive Targets for LRP's.

EVALUATION: Responsive artillery support for LRP teams is vital. The firing of preplanned defensive targets in support of LRP teams was performed only after a target was spotted. Often the adjustment was slow and the target dispersed prior to firing for effect.

RECOMMENDATION: Coordination can be performed prior to insertion of each LRP team. Defensive targets are preplanned on prominent terrain features and on likely avenues of enemy approach on the area which the LRP team will observe. When possible the defensive targets are adjusted by the LRP team upon insertion. LRP teams then call for immediate fire-for-effect when the enemy is within the area on which a concentration is preplanned.

d. OBSERVATION: Situation Reports.

EVALUATION: In many instances company commanders and platoon leaders have sent incomplete situation reports to the battalion CP. In most of these cases information that should have been sent in was not reported due to either the lack of immediate information or an oversight on the reporting unit's part.

RECOMMENDATION: To assist leaders in the field in making accurate and complete situation reports, the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 50th Infantry has issued a format to its units outlining the essential information to be reported. A similar format is kept with the Battalion Net Control Station. All that is necessary when calling in a spot report is the reference to the line number on the format and the information the line calls for. By following this format, commanders have greatly improved their reporting procedures. Much unnecessary traffic has been removed from the command net with the use of this format.

e. OBSERVATION: Balloon Operations in Sudden Weather Changing Climates.

EVALUATION: Balloon operations in South Vietnam are constantly subjected to sudden wind and weather changes requiring prompt weather predictions and a swift recovery devices have been tested; an electric motor driven winch and a gasoline powered winch.

RECOMMENDATION: The winch system powered by a gasoline engine is much faster for recovery and more reliable. A double safety line should be employed whenever possible to help prevent balloon loss in the event of a sudden unforecast high winds.

f. OBSERVATION: Employment of Artillery.

EVALUATION: On 21 August friendly positions at DI LINH were attacked by a MF VC Battalion. Artillery positions were located in DI LINH itself and could not suitably provide defensive fires due to range limitations and populated and built up areas.

RECOMMENDATION: Had the artillery been employed outside DI LINH,
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

effective and close in fires could have been placed around DI LINH. Enemy casualties would have been markedly increased.

g. OBSERVATION: Artillery and Mortar Raids.

EVALUATION: The enemy is often aware of the maximum range of artillery at a Fire Support Base of fixed artillery positions. He will often establish production areas, bases and infiltration routes just outside the artillery fan.

RECOMMENDATION: Displacement of artillery pieces or heavy mortars on raids near or toward the edge of the artillery fan tends to discourage the enemy's access to these areas. Displacement allows 5000 to 10000 meters more range. Usually an infantry rifle platoon or cavalry platoon provides security for the artillery during the raid. The fire support element normally returns to its original position prior to dark.

h. OBSERVATION: Security at Danger Areas.

EVALUATION: On 1 and 2 August a US patrol established an ambush at a bridge crossing a small river. After remaining in position over and during daylight hours with no sightings, the patrol was directed to move up. As no sightings had been made, the patrol started crossing the bridge. SOP security was disregarded. A VC squad moving to the bridge from the opposite direction fired on the patrol resulting in 1 US/KHA.

RECOMMENDATION: Unit SOP and small unit tactics for crossing danger areas must always be practiced. Never assume an area is secure or the enemy is not present.

i. OBSERVATION: Aerial Broadcast of Psyop Tapes.

EVALUATION: Psyops produced tapes are often broadcast from aircraft into friendly AO's. Occasionally the aircraft will fly at an altitude from which the broadcast is not understandable at ground level.

RECOMMENDATION: The aircraft can establish the altitude from which the broadcast is most fully understandable and has the widest area coverage by coordinating with and broadcasting near the friendly element on the ground.

j. OBSERVATION: Small-Unit Patrols.

EVALUATION: Often squad and platoon-sized units, while on patrols, carry only the basic essentials, leaving shovels, flashlights and ponchos behind. When an enemy cache is located and grave sites or caves are found, it is thus often necessary to return to the CP for needed equipment.

RECOMMENDATION: That small unit patrols carry their basic ammunition load at all times, and that a priority be established for ponchos, shovels and flashlights.

k. OBSERVATION: Use of CS1 in Natural Rock Formations.

EVALUATION: CS1 has been used extensively for contamination of tunnels and caves in Vietnam. Tunnels usually are closed after contamination, resulting in long term contamination. Natural rock formations usually cannot be closed after contamination.

RECOMMENDATION: Unless natural rock formations can be closed after contamination with CS1, contamination can be expected to last a maximum of 3-4 days during the rainy season.
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AVRO-SC/AMD

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. OBSERVATION: Failure to Police the Battlefield.

EVALUATION: Many of the mines and booby traps being employed by VC are constructed of US explosives.

RECOMMENDATION: All explosives, grenades, bombs, and similar items found during operations should be either destroyed or removed from the area. The enemy uses all these items against us. This is especially true of dud artillery and mortar rounds.

2. OBSERVATION: Failure to Follow Standard Security Measures During Movement:

EVALUATION: When operating in an area predominantly used by VC forces as opposed to NVA, beware of increased booby traps and mines. The VC are quick to plant mines in the tracks left by armored vehicles. These mines are placed in the tank tracks in both open areas and densely vegetated areas.

RECOMMENDATION: There have been several incidents of personnel encountering booby traps emplaced along tank trails. Also, several tanks have hit mines while following old tank trails. All precautions possible should be taken when working in a VC infested area. The use of grappling hooks has proven to be particularly effective.

3. OBSERVATION: Firebreaks.

EVALUATION: Grass and thin vegetation has been found to burn easily in Vietnam even during a moderately wet period. Around a fire base or any permanent type installation a grass fire will create a serious hazard especially if POL is being stored on the perimeter. Tracer rounds from a .50 caliber machine gun are capable of starting a fire which can quickly turn into a very large blaze.

RECOMMENDATION: A fire break should be given a high priority when a fire base is established unless the surrounding vegetation is proven not capable of burning.

4. OBSERVATION: Ambushes.

EVALUATION: It is easy to become disoriented at night and set up an ambush facing in the wrong direction. Similarly, men in a security position may not be sure where the main body is located. This situation could result in friendly casualties if someone fires at movement.

RECOMMENDATION: A daylight recon of an ambush position is a necessity to include determining the direction of North. All security positions should be positively known to the patrol leader and patrol members. The element leader at each position should use a compass to determine his principle direction of fire. All personnel should be flat on the ground before anyone fires to prevent a friendly casualty in case one position is misoriented.

5. OBSERVATION: Firing the 81mm mortar without FDC.

EVALUATION: Close-in 81mm mortar concentrations for FSB defense can be rapidly fired by using the 81mm mortar without an FDC. Concentrations can be fired in and numbered at appropriate azimuths and ranges from each mortar position. Each squad leader maintains a card with the elevation and range to each concentration (constant charge maintained). Adjustments are called in to the squad leader.
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in meters and set directly on the gun by a number of turns on the deflection and elevation wheels. Tubes are under the control of the perimeter commander and can be placed either in the center of the perimeter and fired as a section, or on the perimeter and assigned sectors of fire.

RECOMMENDATION: This method of firing the 81mm mortar has proved to be an extremely effective way to bring down heavy and accurate close-in fire for a FSB. Some disadvantages to this method exist, however. Clearance of fires becomes a problem because of the gun target line problem and not knowing exactly where the LP's or OP's are located and this method requires that a fairly large quantity of ammo be unpacked and therefore exposed to the climate.

RECOMMENDATION: It is easier to make a BDA on an ARC LIGHT strike than on a NAVAL GUN FIRE (NGF) target. An ARC LIGHT strike covers an area 3 kilometers long and 1 kilometer wide. All craters are in a straight line, therefore easy to locate. A NGF target is more difficult to locate due to the dispersion of the shell craters. One must keep in mind that due to shifting of fire, there is no definite pattern of craters. When making a BDA of NGF targets, it is best to use a helicopter and make a visual reconnaissance. A unit should also be broken down to squad size elements. These units are then dispersed to all of the areas of the target zone.

RECOMMENDATION: By using shaped or cratering charges, a hole can be blown large enough for the conexes. This can be done in a matter of minutes, and requires just two demolition qualified personnel. By using this method, much needed manpower is saved and can be diverted to other operational projects. Therefore, the TOC can be established and become operational in a shorter period of time.

RECOMMENDATION: After the defensive positions have been established, tanglefoot wire should be placed around the perimeter between ankle and knee height. It should be placed between trip flares and anti-personnel mines (claymores). The tanglefoot wire should be strung as tight as possible with 3 strands close together rather than spread out. This is due to the greater vulnerability of the enemy exposed once for 5-10 seconds than the enemy exposed three times for 2-3 seconds. When no tanglefoot barbed wire is available, a field expedient is the use of WD-1 communication wire. The best technique is to install the communication wire in a mass effect.
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AVBE-SC/AGD

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 November 1968

1. OBSERVATION: Combat Assault Techniques.

EVALUATION: The size of the standard rucksack, and the (normal) heavy load of the rucksack, combined with the relatively small troop compartment of the UH-1 assault aircraft, causes slow exits from the aircraft upon touchdown. The weight of the rucksack inhibits rapid deployment of troopers on the LZ.

RECOMMENDATION: By preparing to conduct combat assaults in the battalion light load configuration, units can facilitate both rapid exit from the aircraft and rapid deployment on the LZ. Rucksacks should be placed in the center of the troop compartment three on each side, with frames back to back. The rucksacks are pulled off the aircraft as troopers exit upon landing. Deployment, until the LZ is secured, is conducted with only light load equipment. Units then reassemble and collect rucksacks before moving away from the LZ.

2. OBSERVATION: Light Load Plan.

EVALUATION: During combat operations it is necessary for an element in contact to drop rucksacks for ease of movement and continue to operate for a sustained 24 hour period. For these reasons, the 4th Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry has developed the light load plan.

RECOMMENDATION: The light load consists of two basic loads: The normal LBE and an additional carrier. The carrier can be either two claymores or a demolition bag. The carrier is used to transport chow, RA/386 (only those designated), cleaning equipment, trip flares, and any additional gear that cannot be attached to the LBE. The carrier should be prepacked on the rucksack frame, requiring no repacking, nor transfer from rucksack to light load carrier. By utilizing the light load plan, an element can operate away from its present unit for 24 hours.

3. OBSERVATION: Manning the Strong Points.

EVALUATION: The constant manning of particular Strong Points during the entire day results in inattention on the part of the individuals occupying the Strong Points due to the limited activity. This results in a pattern being established. By having the vehicles occupying the Strong Points rotate at random times throughout the day, any possible pattern is disrupted. This also creates activity along the road and within the track crews.

RECOMMENDATION: Maximum effort should be taken to prevent creating a pattern while also keeping US soldiers alert in the performance of their mission.

4. OBSERVATION: Coordination with ARVN, RF/PF, NPFF Units.

EVALUATION: Doubts have existed regarding the thoroughness of the extraction of intelligence matter during cordon operations conducted on nearby villages by US troops because of the lack of knowledge of the language and customs. The utilisation of ARVN intelligence teams and NPFF have greatly increased the intelligence gathering effectiveness of US units. The Vietnamese and NPFF units actually carry on the search and interrogation while the US units provide the security.

RECOMMENDATION: Careful coordination with ARVN, RF/PF, NPFF units should be encouraged. Only by doing so can the US forces exploit their value completely.

5. OBSERVATION: Clearing Caves with Chemical Munitions.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

EVALUATION: When cave complexes are encountered that house VC/NVA, they should be cleared with minimum casualties. The most effective way we found is with the E-8 chemical dispenser, by lowering the E-8 through an air vent in the cave, then discharging the dispenser. The E-8 contains a sufficient amount of CS and force to spread CS throughout the cave, causing the enemy to evacuate the cave.

RECOMMENDATION: Prior to using the E-8 dispenser to clear caves, M-73 grenades were used. Once after throwing 24 M-73 grenades in a cave, we still received fire from the cave entrance. The E-8 dispenser was then used and the enemy immediately evacuated the cave complex. It provided enough dispersion to enter the various cave complexes located from the main cave area.

y. OBSERVATION: Employment of an Artillery Ambush.

EVALUATION: A method was developed to detect enemy movement at night and to bring maximum artillery fire on the position with a minimum loss of reaction time.

RECOMMENDATION: Trails and other likely routes of enemy movement are determined and pyrotechnic devices with trip flares are placed in the area. An artillery registration or adjustment is conducted within 2000 meters of the ambush site. The exact location of the ambush is sent to the FDC and fire for effect data is computed. The unit withdraws and observes the ambush site. Upon sighting a tripped pyrotechnic, fire for effect is called on the ambush site.

3. Training and Organization:

a. OBSERVATION: Mortar Flask Test.

EVALUATION: Because of the constant threat of a mortar attack by the enemy on fire support bases and landing zones, and because the attacks are generally short in duration, it becomes essential that all available means of weapon location be utilized.

RECOMMENDATION: Perimeter bunkers which afford the best observation of all possible mortar locations were surveyed and azimuth indicators were mounted on the bunkers. As a test to prepare for a mortar attack, each night 2-3 rounds are fired into possible mortar positions and bunkers send azimuths to the perimeter control which relays the information to the FDC. Azimuths are plotted to determine if intersections are close to the impact grid. An intersection of 100-200m to the impact grid is not unusual and the personnel on the bunkers have a definite interest in the accuracy of their observations. There has been a definite increase in the accuracy of the plots since the test began. This procedure can be used during actual mortar attacks.

b. OBSERVATION: Elimination of Shift Changes During Critical Periods.

EVALUATION: During the hours in which the evening meal is normally fed, 1700-1900, it is common practice to change shifts in the Battalion FDC, thus allowing all personnel to eat their meal in the mess hall. It was found on two separate occasions that the enemy chose this time to mortar friendly locations. The changing of personnel and briefing of the new shift could possibly cause confusion at a critical time.

RECOMMENDATION: Duty times were adjusted to insure that one shift was on during the period, 1600-2000. Changing prior to this time or afterwards would depend on individual requirements. The problem of eating meals would also be solved on an individual basis. This unit has found that the off duty shift can bring chow to the others with minimal disruption.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. OBSERVATION: Maintaining Firing Battery Proficiency.

   EVALUATION: Because of the nature of the war in Southeast Asia, many of the artillery procedures and techniques that are considered as standard operating procedures in the United States are not utilised. Through lack of use, these procedures and techniques are forgotten and/or the battery is unable to apply these without unnecessary delays.

   RECOMMENDATION: To counteract this trend and to insure that the firing batteries remain proficient in all aspects of fire support, a battalion inspection team has been formed and will conduct monthly inspections of each firing battery. This inspection will include all points that are necessary for the efficient operation of a firing battery.

2. Intelligence:

   a. OBSERVATION: Snoopy Missions.

      EVALUATION: Snoopy missions are normally flown with two slicks and two gunships. If many hot spots are found, only limited ordnance can be put on each target.

      RECOMMENDATION: Flying Snoopy with cavalry troops, when attached, enables more ordnance to be employed on hot spots with immediate results.

   b. OBSERVATION: Safe Combination Breaking While Safe is Closed.

      EVALUATION: When a safe containing classified documents becomes inoperable while locked due to a faulty combination mechanism, the documents in the top drawer are in danger of being burnt when the top drawer is torched open.

      RECOMMENDATION: Documents of the lowest level classified and least importance should be placed in the top drawer. If the combination mechanism becomes inoperable while closed and has to be torched, the most important documents will not be in danger.

   c. OBSERVATION: LRP Insertion and Extraction.

      EVALUATION: For several days due to inclement weather, which grounded aircraft, LRP teams could not be employed.

      RECOMMENDATION: In periods of prolonged bad weather, LRP teams should be given AO's where they can be inserted and extracted by track vehicle (M113), or on foot.

   d. OBSERVATION: VC/NVA Tactics.

      EVALUATION: While involved in Operation Walker in An Khe, the lst Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry kept up a very aggressive attitude while defending Highway 19. Several very reliable intelligence reports were received concerning attacks on various strong points or areas. Increased ambushes and patrolling in the areas normally resulted in small contact with elements that were determined to be small reconnaissance groups. When these small groups were contacted and casualties inflicted, the reported attack never materialized.

      RECOMMENDATION: The VC/NVA seldom attack static positions or installations without very detailed prior planning and reconnaissance of the area. If you are involved in a static defense mission, maintain an offensive posture. This can be done by constantly patrolling and ambushing the likely enemy routes. If
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

you contact his reconnaissance elements you will upset his planning and possibly
thwart an attack on your position or installation.

e. OBSERVATION: Preparation of Maps.

EVALUATION: Task Force Schnoor was placed OPCON to the 1st Battalion
(Mechnized), 50th Infantry on very short notice. When this occurred we found our-
selves unprepared for the adequate handling of maps. At the final minute we had
to rush the assembly of maps and there was a possibility that some errors were made.

RECOMMENDATION: It is imperative for a unit to continually maintain
on hand a set of maps properly prepared (i.e. assembled, necessary information
placed on them, and acetated). This would alleviate last minute rushes, and pos-
sible errors thereby insuring no delays in the operation to be conducted.

f. OBSERVATION: Determining Weapon Locations With Counter-Mortar Radar,
AN/MPQ-4A.

EVALUATION: At times when the enemy employs harassing type fire and
only fires 2 to 3 mortar rounds at a friendly location, the AN/MPQ-4A Counter-Mor-
tar Radar, will pick up the round prior to impact; however, before the radar can
be shifted in the appropriate direction, the firing ceases. This occurs frequently
when the radar scans the center of a large area that is highly vulnerable to enemy
attacks, and cannot quickly observe possible weapon locations to the right and left.

RECOMMENDATION: The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery Radar Section has
developed a technique by which they can obtain an e-thing and nothing of two points
where a single projectile passes through the upper and lower radar beams, respect-
ively. By plotting both points, the direction of the weapon from the impact grid
can be determined. The FDC can use this information to place fire along the direc-
tion of fire on likely weapon locations that fall on the plotted line. This gives
a target detection capability when only one round is fired and a means to selec-
tively begin firing the Counter-Mortar plan.

5. Logistics:

a. OBSERVATION: Combination Lock Repair Parts For Field Containers.

EVALUATION: The weather conditions in Vietnam cause corrosion in the
inner parts of combination locks. Some models currently in use contain small plas-
tic rings which chip or crack. Replacement parts or new locking devices are ex-
tremely difficult to obtain.

RECOMMENDATION: DAME (Defense Against Method of Entry) qualified
personnel of the Military Intelligence Detachment can remove locks from all con-
tainers turned in to BSO for salvage. These recovered locks and parts can then
be used to return other containers to a serviceable condition.

b. OBSERVATION: Reduction of Order Time for Time-Change Aircraft
Assemblies.

EVALUATION: It was learned that major aircraft parts such as engines
and blades, which are replaced on a "Time-Change" basis could be ordered on an
IPD (Issue Priority Designator) or against an RDD (Required Delivery Date) within
sixty (60) days of the anticipated component change. If major assembly had not
arrived within 14 days of required component change, the requisition would be can-
celled and reordered on an EDP (Equipment Deadlined Parts). IPD although the air-
craft is still in a flyable status.
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15 November 1968

RECOMMENDATION: This operational procedure change has greatly reduced log time normally incurred on ordering of aircraft parts which are replaced on a routine schedule. This has reduced the deadline time for aircraft by several days in the majority of cases which involve routine time-change of major components as this method allows a 1/2 day buffer in ordering parts against known future requirements.

c. OBSERVATION: Proper Maintenance and Care of Artillery Ammunition.

EVALUATION: When preparing to displace firing batteries, it has been noted that ammunition shipping containers have not been available for all rounds. Rounds in this condition can not be turned in to ASP's and are not easily or safely transported.

RECOMMENDATION: Emphasis must be placed on the need to not break out excessive amounts of ammunition and there must be sufficient containers on hand to box all rounds in the battery area at any given time. Additionally, these containers must be kept in a serviceable condition. These requirements are absolutely necessary for batteries that are capable of air mobile operations and subject to moving on short notice.

d. OBSERVATION: Use of Supply Representatives from Supported Units.

EVALUATION: When one or more units are attached, procuring items for resupply becomes a problem, not because of lack of items but because of the limited number of supply personnel to procure the needed items. Each attached unit was asked for a minimum of two supply representatives to procure items on the log requests. A vehicle is furnished, and the representative are able to do the extensive log-work required to fill some of the log requests.

RECOMMENDATION: The use of supply representatives from attached units has relieved pressure on the supply personnel of this unit. Our personnel had been procuring items for both assigned and attached companies. Close monitoring and coordination is required to insure the smooth flow of supplies to the troops in the field. This is retained by having the attached units supply representatives working directly under the battalion supply sergeant of this unit.

e. OBSERVATION: Request for VTR's over Admin/Log Net.

EVALUATION: Quick recovery of downed vehicles has been hampered because of numerous reasons. One basic problem was that the units were calling their respective headquarters and maintenance sections which at times are not as responsive as the battalion's maintenance platoon.

RECOMMENDATION: Requests for VTR's should be sent over the Admin/Log net to the S-4. By sending requests in this manner, the S-4 becomes instantly aware of the company's need and alerts the motor officer, who in turn can assess the situation as to whether the company is capable of recovery or needs assistance from the maintenance platoon. This results in prompt recovery with unnecessary delay being curtailed.

6. Other:

a. OBSERVATION: Civic Actions.

EVALUATION: Civic Action Programs must be a coordinated effort by all commands at an installation such as Camp Radcliff. It was noted by this command that all civic action projects in the An Tuc District were being centralized completely in the city of An Tuc with little or no support to the outlying areas of the district.
RECOMMENDATION: A coordinated program has been established through the Installation Coordinator to make maximum utilization of all resources on Camp Radcliff. The result had been a much more equitable distribution of civic action projects throughout the district.

b. OBSERVATION: Power Saw Operators.

EVALUATION: Power saws used for cutting LZ's in the field are on some occasions operated by untrained personnel. The operator not being trained in the operation and maintenance of the saw or how to pace the cutting to the hardness of the wood will often cause an inoperable power saw. This necessitates helllifting a replacement saw to the field and delays extraction in the case of a dustoff.

RECOMMENDATION: Selected personnel should be school trained to operate, maintain and make minor adjustments on the power saw. After a two-hour period of instruction to platoon-sized classes by the engineers, a better understanding of the power saw and its capabilities was gained and LZ cuttings are much improved.

c. OBSERVATION: Field units of the 173d Airborne Brigade in Vietnam have been experiencing high malaria rates. Particularly disturbing are the cases of P. vivax. It is currently believed that the great majority of infections from that species of malaria can be prevented by weekly ingestion of the chloroquine-primaquine tablet. At the present time, a high incidence of vivax malaria is considered evidence for poor chemoprophylaxis discipline.

EVALUATION:

(1) Earlier reports from the 172d Preventive Medicine Unit have demonstrated the efficacy of testing large numbers of urine samples for chloroquine using Wilson and Edeson's test. Controlled studies have shown that this procedure is highly efficient in detecting chloroquine urine as early as 12 hours after taking a chloroquine-primaquine tablet. Thus, a positive test on Tuesday indicates that the individual had taken his pill on Monday while a negative test suggests that he had not.

(2) The test is based on the appearance of a visible precipitate when Mayer-Tarnet's reagent is added to urine containing chloroquine. The precipitate disappears upon heating and reappears upon cooling. Albumin, if present in the urine, is the principal interfering agent. It may easily be differentiated when the specimen is heated because precipitated albumin does not go back into solution.

(3) Materials and Methods:

(a) Population: Samples were obtained from all units of the 173d Airborne Brigade whether situated in the rear area or in the field. Sample size was limited only by the tactical situation.

(b) Materials:

1. Test tubes, serology type, two for each subject.
2. Bunsen burner or alcohol lamp.
3. PH paper.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

4. Sufosalicylic acid, 3%.
5. Mayer-Tarnet's Reagent:
   a. Mercuric Chloride, 6.8 gm.
   b. Postassium Chloride, 24.9 gm.
   c. Distilled Water, 100.0 ml.

PROCEDURES: A random urine sample was obtained from each individual approximately 24 hours after supposed ingestion of the chloroquine-primaquine tablet. The urines were logged in by name, unit, and DEROS and given a number which appeared on all bottles and tubes. Within 1-2 hours of collection, the samples were checked for chloroquine, pH, and protein as outlined below:

(1) Protein - equal parts of urine and sulfosalicylic acid were added together in a test tube. Results were read as follows:
   (a) Negative - urine remains clear.
   (b) Trace - Faint turbidity.
   (c) Positive - heavy turbidity.

(2) PH - a small of pHydrion paper was dipped into urine and compared with the color chart.

(3) Chloroquine (W-E) test - to 5 ml of fresh clear urine, 5-6 drops of Mayer-Tarnet's Reagent were added. If the urine developed turbidity which disappeared on heating the test was considered positive. The turbidity was graded on the following scale:
   (a) Barely turbid - 1 plus.
   (b) Definite turbidity - 2 plus.
   (c) Cannot see through, but still transmits light - 3 plus.
   (d) Opaque - 4 plus.

RESULTS: Brigade-wide testing has been conducted for the past 5 weeks with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEEK</th>
<th>NO. TESTED</th>
<th>NO. NEGATIVE</th>
<th>% NEGATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the capability to carry out the testing in the most remote areas occupied by the 173d Airborne Brigade has improved, the number of company sized units with
negative results have increased. The battalions which have been sampled each week have shown the most improvement. The 2d Battalion 503d Infantry (Airborne) is an example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEEK</th>
<th>NO. TESTED</th>
<th>NO. NEGATIVE</th>
<th>% NEGATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The battalions which have not been sampled each week have not shown improvement. The 1st Battalion 503d Infantry (Airborne) is an example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEEK</th>
<th>NO. TESTED</th>
<th>NO. NEGATIVE</th>
<th>% NEGATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These poor results are not a reflection of the command emphasis on malaria in this battalion. The battalion commander and his officers have been as diligent as those of the more successful battalion. There is an unwillingness of the individual soldier to take the chloroquine-primaquine tablet unless there is risk that he will be detected.

During the period of testing, the incidence of malaria in the 173d Airborne Brigade had decreased markedly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEEK ENDING</th>
<th>CASE RATE (CASE/1000/ANN M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Oct 1968</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Oct 1968</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct 1968</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Oct 1968</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov 1968</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is hoped that by increasing our capability to reach all units of the Brigade each week, the malaria incidence will be further decreased.

RECOMMENDATION: Consideration should be given to use of this test in other units employed in highly malarious areas of Vietnam.
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AVBE-SC/MHD
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 November 1968

III. Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information


2. The 173d Airborne Brigade has had no reportable incidents in the areas of escape or evasion.
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AVFA-GC-OT (15 Nov 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 173d Airborne Brigade for Period Ending
31 October 1968 RCS CSPCN-65 (RL) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 10 DEC 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

(C) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs making the following comments:

a. Reference the 407th Sapper Battalion mentioned in Section I, paragraph 3a(3)(a), page 24: This headquarters has no information that identifies a specific unit in the attack on Camp Radcliff on 30 October 1968.

b. Reference Enemy Situation, second paragraph, third line, page 19, Coordinates XQ 0943 should read BQ 0943.

c. Reference Enemy Situation, third paragraph, fourth line, page 19, the 85th Regiment should read 95th Regiment.

d. Reference third paragraph, third line, page 20, 78 should be 68.

e. Reference fourth paragraph, sixth line, page 20, 78 should be 68.

f. Reference first paragraph, first line, page 24, the 85B NVA Regiment should read 95B NVA Regiment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

D.M. BARNES
LT, AGC
Asst AG

105

CONFIDENTIAL
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning determining weapon locations with counter-mortar radar AN/MQQ-4A, page 97, paragraph 4f. Concur. This technique can be gainfully employed when only the descending portion of the hostile weapon trajectory is detected. This is frequently the case when a weapon is fired from a position outside the area being scanned, but impacts in the area being scanned.

   b. Reference item concerning high malaria rates, page 99, paragraph 6c. Nonconcur. The Wilson and Edeson Test written in the OHLL is in error and has recently been modified by field usage. The modification of this test has been furnished to the Division Surgeons whose units have high malaria rates. This test is available to any surgeon throughout Vietnam who desires to employ it to check the accuracy of the ingestion of the chloroquine-primoquine weekly tablet. The test should be used only as an indicator to advise the commander that the malaria prevention program should be given additional emphasis. This test should not be made mandatory but left to the discretion of the unit surgeon. The unit has been so advised.

   c. Reference item concerning maintenance of starlight scopes, Inclosure 3, page 6, paragraph 3b(l). Concur. Average turnover time in the Repair and Return (R&R) program with Sacramento Army Depot (SAAD) is 21 days. SAAD has been contacted and could give no explanation at this time as to why there appears to be an excessive return time of starlight scopes for the 173d Airborne Brigade. SAAD is investigating this situation and will inform this headquarters of the findings.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (15 Nov 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 173d Abn Bde for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Ass AG
ORGANIZATION: 173d Airborne Brigade

ASSIGNED

ATTACHED

MI: Military Intelligence Detachment
IPSD: Infantry Platoon Scout Detachment
ME: Military History Detachment
APU: Army Postal Unit
USAF: U.S. Air Force Control Party
PI: Public Information Detachment
CTT: Combat Support Team
GSR: Ground Surveillance Radar
LRRP: Long Range Recon Patrol
AVBE-SC/MHD

SUBJECT: Supply and Combat Service Activities

1. August:
   a. Supply:
      (1) Class I: There were no critical shortages of food or associated
          products during the month of August. Rations continued to be provided by the
          FSA's (Forward Support Activity) of the 1st Logistical Support Command. The Bri-
          gade was supported by both Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon Depots, depending on the
          zone of operations of the particular battalions.
      (2) Class II and IV: Resupply of barrier materials continued on an area
          basis. During August there were no critical shortages of any barrier materials.
          The relatively decreased amount of combat activity in August produced a bre-
          ther for replenishment of Class II and IV stocks. The 1st Logistical Command has used
          this time to purify unit requirements by selectively cancelling requisitions and
          requiring units to resubmit orders based on current needs.
      (3) Class III and IIIA: No critical supply problems were encountered
          during August. The support received from FSA was very good.
      (4) Class V: No serious Class V problems were encountered during August.
          Expenditure of ammunition by type are as follows:

          | ITEM     | DAILY AVERAGE | MONTHLY TOTAL |
          |----------|---------------|---------------|
          | 105 MM   | 415.3 rounds  | 12,459 rounds  |
          | 106 MM RR| .39 rounds    | 12 rounds      |
          | 81 MM Mortar | 59.9 rounds   | 1799 rounds    |
          | 50 Caliber | 5,676.66 rounds | 170,400 rounds |
          | 7.62 MM  | 7.4 tons      | 222.8 Tons     |
          | 5.56 MM  | .297 tons     | 8.92 tons      |

   b. Medical: Casualty figures for the month were as follows:
      (1) KRA 18
      (2) KNRHA 5
      (3) IRHA 27
      (4) INRHA 9
      (5) MIA 2
      (6) Malaria 162
2. September:
   a. Supply:
      (1) Class I:
         (a) There were no critical shortages of food or associated products during September.
         (b) Class I supplies continued to be provided by the FSA's of the respective 1st Logistical Support Command at LZ English, Ban Me Thuot, Tuy Hoa, and An Khe. The ration breakdown point at LZ Uplift is operated by Company C (S & S), 173d Support Battalion (Airborne).
         (c) The total rations consumed by the Brigade was 275,290 compared to a total headcount of 327,347.
      (2) Class II and IV:
         (a) Re-supply of barrier materials continues on an area basis. Barrier material such as concertina wire, barbed wire, 8" X 8" lumber, and sandbags continue to be in plentiful supply. The momentary lull in fighting enabled re-stockage of all of these items at the Brigade Supply Points.
         (b) Continuous inventory was emphasized in the Class II and IV stocks. Accurate record keeping and knowledge of the location of stocks on hand is vital to the combat situation. A corollary result of the detailed inventory was information that led to a turn-in of excess and unneeded stocks. Thirteen conexes of excess serviceable equipment were turned in during September.
      (3) Class III and IIIA:
         (a) No critical supply problems were encountered in September and good support was received from FSA.
      (4) Class V: No serious supply problems were encountered during September. Expenditures of ammunition by type are as follows:

AVBE-SC/MID

SUBJECT: Supply and Combat Service Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DAILY AVERAGE</th>
<th>MONTHLY TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105 MM</td>
<td>7.74 rounds</td>
<td>240 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106 MM</td>
<td>287 rounds</td>
<td>8,930 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 MM</td>
<td>208.49 rounds</td>
<td>6,173 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 Caliber</td>
<td>5,166.09 rounds</td>
<td>155,008 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 MM</td>
<td>.093 tons</td>
<td>2.9 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.56 MM</td>
<td>.425 tons</td>
<td>13.2 tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Maintenance:

(1) Significant Areas of Maintenance and Maintenance Problems: During the month of September 3/4 ton truck engines became a critical item. 58th Field Depot representatives assured alleviation of this problem within the next 10-15 days.

(2) Significant Maintenance Projects:

(a) Tech Supply has completed the movement of supplies to the old 1st Air Cavalry (Airmobile) area. Phase two of this movement was started and is progressing in a satisfactory manner. Phase II is the identification and evacuation of supplies not on the ASL. A large number of items have been identified as ASL items and placed in stock. Estimated completion for this phase is 15 October 1968.

(b) Zero Balance PLL lists have been forwarded to MRE representatives in the 58th Field Depot for action. Items are being forwarded directly to units as fill is made. This action should report in fill of approximately 30% of reported items. Furthermore, some items are being filled from Tech Supply stock.

(c) Coordination has been made for an outside unit to inspect certain facets of Casper Platoon operations.

(d) An exchange of 12 generators, each 10 KW, was made at Qui Nhon. This alleviates the previous problem of generators not being available.

c. Medical: Casualty figures for the month were as follows:

(1) KRHA 33
(2) KHRHA 0
(3) IRHA 174
(4) INRHA 22
(5) MIA 2
(6) Malaria 132

3. October:

a. Supply:

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AVHE-SC/MD

SUBJECT: Supply and Combat Service Activities

15 November 1968

1. Class I:

(a) There were no critical shortages of food or associated products.

(b) Class I continued to be provided by the FSA's of the respective 1st Logistical Support Command at LZ English, Ban Me Thout, Tuy Hoa, and An Khe. The ration breakdown point at LZ Uplift continued to be operated by Company C (S & S) 173d Support Battalion (Airborne).

(c) Indigenous Personnel rations were in short supply during the month. However, sufficient quantities were recently received, which alleviated the situation.

2. Class II and IV:

(a) Resupply of barrier materials continues on an area basis. There is a shortage of barbed concertina wire this month. Stocks of this item will soon be depleted and will be replaced by barbed concertina tape which is not in plentiful supply either.

(b) Resupply of Class II and IV, other than barrier materials, continues to be made from An Khe. Bao Loc and Tuy Hoa are supported by air, while supplies to An Khe and Bong Son from Qui Nhon are hauled by truck convoys. A large portion of the transportation continues to be supplied by the Qui Nhon Support Command, Contract Transportation (Han Jim Transportation Company), and the 173d Support Battalion (Airborne).

(c) An inspection team composed of two officers and four enlisted men (QIC Colonel L. J. Scherer) from Headquarters, USARV are to conduct a physical inventory which will begin on 1 November, of selected Class II and IV items, to include repair parts, in the possession of the Support Battalion. The purpose of the inventory is to identify stocks on hand and on requisition in excess of the retention levels authorized in AR 711-16 and insure their turn-in to the appropriate 1st Logistical Command facility. 00, 1st Logistics Command is providing an officer member of the inspection team who will be responsible for the receipt of the excess stocks, to arrange for the necessary transportation, and supervise the evacuation of these stocks to the appropriate 1st Logistics Command facility as they are identified.

(d) Medical Supplies: Because of a slow down in the ordering and shipping time from the depot, a new R/O (Requisition Objective) has been established on all demand supported items. When the stock record accounts were set up, the R/O was established at 45 days. Broken down, it included a 15 day operating level, 15 day safety level, and 15 days ordering and shipping time. The new R/O is 75 days. It is comprised of a 30 day operating level, 15 day safety level, and a 30 day order and shipping time. To implement this new R/O a total of 129 requisitions were submitted to depot. By 30 November, BM50 should have received the requested items and attain the desired R/O. This will mean that no more than 3 days should elapse from the time a D priority requisition is received from a customer until it is ready for issue. A and B priorities will be filled as soon as they are received.

As of 31 October, a total of 1,052 lines were being maintained. Their breakdown by class, demand supported and fringe is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEDERAL STOCK CLASS</th>
<th>DEMAND</th>
<th>FRINGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30-6300 Medical Items Only</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6505 Drugs, Biologicals, Agents</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVEE-SC/MRD

SUBJECT: Supply and Combat Service Activities

FEDERAL STOCK CLASS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEDERAL STOCK CLASS</th>
<th>DEMAND</th>
<th>FRINGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6510 Surgical Dressing Materials</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6515 Medical and Surgical Instruments, Equipment and Supplies</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6520 Dental Instrument, Equipment and Supplies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6525 X-Ray Equipment and Surgical; Medical, Dental and Veterinarian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6530 Hospital Furniture, Equipment, Utensils and Supplies</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6532 Hospital and Surgical Clothing and Textiles</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6545 Medical Sets, Kits and Outfits</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>669700 Instruments, Lab Equipment and Medical Material</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 273 779

2. There are 32 demand supported controlled drugs and 6 narcotics, and 29 fringe controlled drugs and 33 narcotics.

(3) Class III and IIA:

(a) No critical supply problems have been encountered and support received from FSA has been good this month.

(b) During the month of October the 173rd Airborne Brigade (does not include Bao Loc) consumed the amount of petroleum products listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Gas</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>122,577 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>40,000 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogas</td>
<td>64,183 Gallons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Class V: No serious supply problems have been encountered during the reporting period. Expenditures of ammunition by type are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DAILY AVERAGE</th>
<th>MONTHLY TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105 MM</td>
<td>262.73 rounds</td>
<td>7,882 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106 MM</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 MM</td>
<td>241.33 rounds</td>
<td>7,882 rounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Supply and Combat Service Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DAILY AVERAGE</th>
<th>MONTHLY TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50 Caliber</td>
<td>2,816.26 rounds</td>
<td>294,488 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.56 MM</td>
<td>.314 tons</td>
<td>9.43 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 MM</td>
<td>4.546 tons</td>
<td>136.38 tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Maintenance:

(1) Significant areas of Maintenance and Maintenance Problems: There seems to be a problem developing on starlight scopes. Sacramento Army Depot has not repaired and returned these items as rapidly as previously experienced. A letter requesting status on open work request was sent out by Company "D" (Maintenance) in an attempt to affect repair and return of these items. This area is being carefully monitored by BMO.

(2) Significant Maintenance Projects:

(a) 3/4 ton truck engines have ceased to be a critical repair item. 12 engines have been released from the 58th Field Depot with four more engines to be issued within a few days.

(b) Phase II of Tech Supply move was completed. A reconciliation of customer due outs has been forwarded to units for action. A complete inventory will begin on or about 10 November.

(c) Mission essential PLL items were retrograded on 28 October 1968.

(d) Zero balance PLL lists are still being processed by MRE representatives. Previous estimated completion was not met. Date of completion is now estimated at 10 November 1968.

c. Medical: Casualty figures for the month were as follows:

(1) KNHA 6
(2) KNRHA 0
(3) IRHA 61
(4) INRHA 23
(5) MIA 2
(6) Malaria 200
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

CG, 173d Airborne Brigade

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