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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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2
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RG 38052 - 65 (W-MDD-TO-A) (U)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Command.

(1) During the reporting period there were eight major changes in the staff of II FFORCEV.

(a) On 1 August, Major General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr. became the Acting Commanding General, replacing Lieutenant General Fredrick C. Weyand. On 1 September 1968, Major General Kerwin became the Commanding General and was promoted to Lieutenant General.

(b) On 1 August, Major General Walter B. Richardson became Deputy Commanding General, replacing Major General John H. Hay, Jr.

(c) On 18 August, Brigadier General Charles Cantrell became Chief of Staff, replacing Colonel Paul E. Hunt.


(e) On 20 September, Colonel Fredrick C. Krause, became the ACoS, G3, replacing Colonel Marvin D. Fuller.

(f) On 5 October, Colonel Dale J. Crittenberger became the Senior Liaison Officer to the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, replacing Colonel Norman F. J. Allen.

(g) On 14 October, Colonel H. S. Long, Jr., became the ACoS, G1, replacing Colonel Harry G. Williams.

(h) On 6 September, Major Barney L. Brannen, Jr., became the Staff Judge Advocate, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Irwin M. Kent.

(2) The overall assigned/attached strength of II FFORCEV decreased during the quarter. A comparison at the end of the last four reporting periods follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Warrant Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 January 1968</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April 1968</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July 1968</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1968</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2947</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CICOR - 65 (0) HHC-T-0-A) (U)

b. Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety and Discipline.

(1) The personnel situation within units assigned, attached and under the operational control of II FFORC-V remains satisfactory.

(2) The health of the command continues to be excellent.

(3) The morale of the troops continues at a high level.

(4) The awards and decorations processed, approved and issued are listed below. The marked increase during this reporting period was due to the assumption of awards authority for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Type</th>
<th>May 68 - Jul 68</th>
<th>Aug 68 - Oct 68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SILVER STAR</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLDIER'S MEDAL</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRONZE STAR MEDAL</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR MEDAL</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>703</td>
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<tr>
<td>PURPLE HEART</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>652</td>
<td>1575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Development of II FFORC-V base camp continues satisfactorily. The status of significant projects as of 31 October 1968 follows:

(a) Officers Club - Basic building complete.

(b) Repair of perimeter defensive positions is continuous.

(c) II FFORC-V underground Tactical Operations Center became operational on 20 September 1968.

(6) On 21 October, Headquarters, II FFORC-V participated in the country-wide conversion of Military Payment Certificates.

c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II Field Force Vietnam Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) are discussed in the Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by units under the operational control of this headquarters.

(2) Intelligence Collection.

(a) Significant in the production of intelligence developed by human resources was the adoption of a daily briefing on selected agent...
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CJFOE - 65 (R) (4-DHO-TO-A) (O)

reports by Collection Division. Agent reports are selected on the basis of unit size (battalion or larger), significant incidents or the presence of specialized combat units which could influence the tactical situation with the II FFORCEN Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAO).

Agent report briefings are presented for a 24 hour period and are presented to representatives of all GG Divisions. Each selected agent is discussed separately and a conclusion is reached as to the validity, agent reliability and impact on the tactical situation. Intelligence developed is the result of an "all source" analysis and is used by each GG Division for targeting, updating of intelligence assessments and recommending to GG areas considered likely for possible combat responses. Although relatively new, this procedure has enhanced the reliability of information reported by human resources.

(b) During the reporting period the 5th Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Group, in an attempt to improve the quality and reliability of its human resources, submitted to GG II FFORCEN all information reports produced by selected sources covering approximately a three month period, for detailed analysis. This analysis was accomplished by Production Division and the Order of Battle Section, GG. The purpose of this analysis was to pinpoint those sources which were producing reliable information as well as those who were producing unreliable information. Based on these impartial evaluations the Group Commander is better able to decide which sources warrant retention and which agents should be terminated. It is felt that this process is beneficial to the intelligence community in the elimination of unproductive sources and upgrading those sources who produce reliable information.

(c) On 23 September II FFORCEN was given authority by MACV to task directly the 4th Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Group. This further development of decentralized collection gave II FFORCEN additional assistance in supporting 9th US Infantry Division operations in IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ).

(d) During the past quarter the objective of the PHOENIX program was to increase the number of Viet Cong infrastructure eliminated. During the period Operation PHUNG HOANG I was initiated. This was the first corps-wide PHOENIX Operation aimed at eliminating infrastructure and considerable experience was gained, particularly at the province and district levels. Based on the lessons learned, a new operation, PHUNG HOANG II was prepared and initiated by the Commanding General of III Corps. Operation PHUNG HOANG II provided the PHOENIX program needed emphasis from corps level and provided all agencies of the GVN as well as the provinces and districts with detailed guidance on their responsibilities in regard to the elimination of Viet Cong infrastructure. Some successes were gained during PHUNG HOANG II, especially in Long An Province. Experiences learned will be incorporated in an upcoming intensified pacification campaign which will be country-wide in scope.

(e) Command emphasis resulted in further improvement in the exploitation of prisoners of war and Ho Chi Minh. Time for the submission of the preliminary interrogation report was reduced by 40 per cent to 6.7 hours, while tactical response to information provided by prisoners and Ho Chi Minh increased almost 50 per cent to 455 responses.

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(C) G2 Air.

1. Intensive aerial reconnaissance and surveillance were continued within the III CTZ throughout the reporting period. Full utilization was made of II FFORCEV assets, and requests for 7th Air Force tactical air reconnaissance support (aerial photography and infrared (RED HAZE) surveillance) were increased. In the Visual Reconnaissance (VR) field, reconnaissance of the entire Cambodian border along the III CTZ boundary and the coastline of the CTZ was conducted daily in support of the KAV HANTUCKET and CAPE COD Programs. During the period, a total of 17,318 VR sorties were flown within the III CTZ by both Army and Air Force aircraft, resulting in 1,037 significant sightings being reported in the II FFORCEV INTSUM, and an average of 50 to 61 established VR areas being covered daily.

2. Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) reconnaissance was conducted nightly with most of the III CTZ being covered by OV-1B Mohawks of the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC) and the Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ASTA) Platoon of the 1st Infantry Division. SLAR reconnaissance was concentrated on the avenues of approach into the Saigon area from the south, southwest, and west, around the Capital Military District, the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex, and along the border in the vicinity of the areas of Cambodia referred to as the Parrot’s Beak (XT 0030) and the Angel’s Wing (XT 2030). During the period, additional reconnaissance was extended to other areas within the III CTZ according to the tactical situation and indications developed by other intelligence sources. At the end of the period, reconnaissance was regularly being conducted along the northern border areas of Binh Long and Phuoc Long provinces. During the latter part of August, daytime SLAR reconnaissance along the entire Cambodian border of the III CTZ was used as an innovation to determine the extent of moving activity during daylight. This resulted in the detection of little or no moving activity except on Highway 1 within the Angel’s Wing area of Cambodia. SLAR Mohawks and armed helicopter Firefly Teams continued hunter/killer interdiction operations along waterways in the Hau Nghia and Long An provinces, and on the Saigon and Dong Nai Rivers. Results at the end of the period were 601 sampans destroyed with ten secondary explosions observed.

3. Infrared (RED HAZE) surveillance was concentrated upon the traditional and suspected intermediate enemy base camp and staging areas which circle the Capital Military District to maintain a continuing watch for indications of another general enemy offensive aimed at Saigon. Extensive surveillance of the Rocket Belt on the Dong Nai River also was conducted. As with SLAR reconnaissance, additional RED HAZE surveillance was shifted according to intelligence reports to cover enemy base areas and infiltration routes in VC War Zones C and D, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces, and in southeastern III CTZ. A considerably greater amount of Air Force RED HAZE surveillance support was requested and received during the period.

4. II FFORCEV requests for 7th Air Force tactical air photography showed an increase of requests for camouflage detection, night strip, and infrared photography.

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The southwest monsoon during the period was more detrimental to Air Force tactical air reconnaissance support (photo) than to Army air reconnaissance and surveillance. Low ceilings and weather turbulence caused more Air Force mission aborts than those of the previous period. The weather had a slight effect upon the accomplishment of Army Mohawk SLAR and RED HAZE missions; however, on the night of 20 October, all SLAR and RED HAZE missions had to be cancelled due to severe weather.

2 G2 Targets continues to develop targets for B-52 strikes, combat sky spots, artillery, herbicide operations and persistent CS drops. Targets are developed from a data base which is constantly updated from all intelligence sources. In addition the G2 Targets Section coordinates the planning of surveillance in order to obtain needed data on enemy activities in possible target areas.

(a) This quarter was the first time that II FFORCEV had continuous heavy ARC LIGHT support throughout the period. ARC LIGHT targeting was concentrated into five main areas and was directed in many instances against specific, located major enemy units.

1 A majority of strikes were targeted against the 5th Viet Cong Division, the 82d Rear Services Group and infiltration groups in the area between Nui Ba Den (center of mass XT 2959) and the Fishhook (XT 5795).

2 The second most active area was in the vicinity of the Trapezoid (XT 5943), Boi Ida (XT 5533), and Hobo Woods (XT 6039) in Sub Region 1. These strikes were primarily targeted against Sub Region 1 forces.

3 The 267th, 269th and 6th Local Force Battalions and the 100th Rear Service Group were also targeted in the area astride the Van Co Dong River in Hau Nghia Province with strikes running west to the Cambodian border in the vicinity of Ba Thu (XT 2704).

4 Strikes were also programmed into the Catcher's Mitt (XT 0825) against the Dong Nai Regiment and 2-208th Artillery Regiment.

5 The last major area of concentration for ARC LIGHT strikes was west and northwest of Tay Ninh. These strikes were targeted against elements of the 9th Viet Cong Division and the 174th Regiment.

(b) During October, the 29th Chemical Detachment, a II FFORCEV assigned unit, initiated personnel detector (sniffer) operations supported by the 503d Chemical Detachment of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. On completion of operator training the 29th Chemical Detachment will provide a sniffer capability directly responsive to Headquarters II FFORCEV.

(4) Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Description: The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) remains the supreme political military headquarters controlling all
Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) activities in the Republic of Vietnam. Military units in II CTZ are subordinated either directly to COSVN or to one of COSVN’s 13 province-level subdivisions in III CTZ (See Inclosure 9). During the quarter there were minor revisions of sub region boundaries to facilitate coordination of enemy activity. Most notable were the inclusion of Thu Duc City into Sub Region 4, and the adjustment of the southern boundary of Sub Region 3 to allow enemy units from Military Region 2 (IV CTZ) to operate against Tan An. The five sub regions surrounding Saigon (VC Sub Region 6) have continued to function as political, economic and military command and control structures, directly subordinate to COSVN (See Inclosure 9). The enemy had apparently assigned a lower priority during this quarter to the maintenance of these sub-regional forces, and therefore allied operations resulted in their effectiveness being reduced during the course of the quarter. Enemy strategy during the quarter stressed the strengthening of the three divisions which operate directly subordinate to COSVN. The strength of these units was augmented and they were used as COSVN’s main offensive force.

(b) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

The number and effectiveness of enemy units located in the II Field Force Vietnam underwent several significant changes, although the overall number and effectiveness of the combat elements remained relatively unchanged. The increase in regiments reflects the augmentation of enemy forces in III CTZ with three regiments from II CTZ plus the formation of a new regiment in Military Region 2. The drop in the number of battalions is partially due to the four battalions now included in the new regiment, and partially to the dissolution of five battalions during the quarter. Several new sapper battalions were identified during the quarter, underlining the enemy’s emphasis on this type unit. The apparent rise in number of artillery battalions is primarily the recognition of divisional support artillery battalions although it also reflects one artillery battalion which is newly formed in Sub Region 1. The table below portrays the combat effectiveness of regiments and separate battalions at the beginning and end of the quarter. Units believed to be present, but not confirmed, are shown in parentheses. The table includes units in the portion of IV CTZ in which the 9th US Infantry Division conducts operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Effectiveness of Enemy Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOR CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF REGT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY REGT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPPER BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECON BN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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FOE - Fully Combat Effective
CE - Combat Effective
MCE - Marginally Combat Effective
NCE - Not Combat Effective

2. The arrival of three new regiments from II CTZ necessitated the reorganization of the 5th VC Division and 7th NVA Division. The 5th Division is presently composed of the 88th NVA Regiment, the 275th VC Regiment, and the 33rd NVA Regiment, one of the three new regiments. The 7th NVA Division absorbed the newly arrived 32nd NVA Regiment in addition to the 161st NVA and 165th NVA Regiments. The third new regiment, the 174th NVA, is subordinate to COSVN and operating in War Zone C.

3. The 274th VC Regiment, formerly subordinate to the 5th VC Division, is now under COSVN and operating in Sub Region 4, its traditional base area. It was replaced in the 5th Division by the 88th NVA Regiment which had previously been operating independently in northwest Michelin (XT 5155).

4. Sufficient information was accumulated during the quarter to confirm the 308th Battalion in Sub Region 2. The battalion arrived in the sub region through Ba Thu (XT 2704) sometime after TET. The battalion took part in the May Offensive and was decimated. Subsequently it went to Ba Thu, received replacements and returned to Sub Region 2 where it operates in the southeastern portion of the Pineapple (XS 5985).

5. A prisoner taken on 3 September stated that he was a member of the 156th Battalion of Binh Long Province. The prisoner revealed that the battalion is composed of the C70, C72, and C73 local force companies which had operated independently in Binh Long Province prior to the formation of the battalion. The battalion is considered to be subordinate to Military Region 10.

6. A rallier in Phuoc Long Province provided information which indicates the probable formation of a provincial battalion from four local force companies. On 22 August a rallier at Phuoc Binh revealed that the D168 Provincial Mobile Battalion had been formed from the C70, C71, C73 local force companies and a local force unit of K17 district. The normal operating area of the battalion is reported to be south of Phuoc Binh.

7. Captured documents indicate the probable presence of a new sapper battalion in Sub Region 4. The D5 Battalion is composed of two companies and is broken down into 12-man assault cells. The mission of the unit is "To operate independently in order to destroy key agencies, warehouses, harbors, and water demolitions units".

8. Prisoners taken on 13 September confirmed the presence of a second battalion in B-1 Province, the newly identified D-1 Sapper Battalion. The battalion was formed in July 1968 from elements of the
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disbanded 4th NVA Sapper Battalion. The new battalion is composed of
the C11 and C12 companies and a C13 support company. The support company
is currently armed with mortars and a recoilless rifle but was reported
to be anticipating the receipt of rockets. The battalion is targeted
against Bien Hoa Airbase.

On 10 and 21 September elements of the 1st Australian Task
Force captured documents in the vicinity of Hot Dihg which revealed
the possible establishment of 27 Military Region. Indications are
that this new military region had been created by COSVN in the eastern
portion of III CTZ prior to the May Offensive. It is believed that when
the 5th VC Division relocated to War Zone C, it left behind a small cadre
which was to coordinate with sub region and province personnel in form-
ing the new military region. The 27 is believed to control Ba Bien
Province, Sub Region 4, Kien Province and possibly War Zone B, both
politically and militarily.

On 23 August captured documents and a Captain Tien Bang, Chief of Staff of the Dong
Thap I Regiment, were captured in early August. Evidence indicates
that a Dong Thap II VC Regiment, subordinate to Military Region 2,
has been formed. The new regiment is composed of the 265A, 514A,
514B and the 5140 VC Main Force Battalions. This regiment has been
added as a confirmed unit to II FFORCEN order of battle holdings.

On 1 October, elements of the 9th US Division captured a
member of the 9th Regiment captured an
alleged member of the 5th LF Battalion (aka 550th Battalion).
According to the prisoner, the 550th Battalion of Military Region 2
has a strength of 300 and a mission of mortaring the Ben Tre area.

During mid-September, the composition of the Cu Chi Regiment
was altered in the II FFORCEN order of battle holdings. Three
battalions had been carried under the Cu Chi: The 17th VC Battalion
and the 7th VC Battalion, both confirmed, plus the K3 VC Battalion.
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a "possible" unit. However, the Order of Battle Section has confirmed the 7th VC Battalion as an independent unit subordinate to Sub Region 1. There are still three battalions subordinate to the Cu Chi. The confirmed 170th VC Battalion and two "possible" VC battalions, the K2 and K3. All four battalions probably continue to operate in the Trang Bang - Cu Chi area.

14 A prisoner captured from the relatively inactive 101st NVA Regiment indicated morale of the regiment was good, but strength was low. Another prisoner, captured in the 16 September attack on Fire Support Patrol Base (FSPB) Pope (XT 5431), stated that the regiment had suffered heavy losses to friendly artillery and air strikes.

15 Documents and prisoners captured from the Dong Hai Regiment in September and October continued to indicate low morale due to a food shortage and friendly artillery and air strikes. Also, there was mention of crowded hospital conditions, as evidenced by the reported release of patients still unfit for combat. Furthermore, indications were that the Dong Hai would remain in southern Sub Region 5 with K1 in reserve in Le Thi Du District and with the K2, K3 and K4 Battalions located, respectively, near Tan Uyen, near K1 An and in Chan Thanh, conducting local operations and keeping the corridor to Saigon open for the 7th NVA Division.

16 Documents found in a cache (XT 582277) contained the following information about the 7th LF Battalion (aka 7th Cu Chi Battalion).  Strength on 13 September was 245; subordinate units were listed as companies C1 through C5. A report dated 25 September, from the Military Intelligence Section, Sub Region 1, dealt with Allied activities around base camps at Phu Hoa Bong and Paris Tan Qui. The previous 7th LF Battalion's area of operations was primarily the Trang Bang - Cu Chi area (See Paragraph 13 above).

17 Following contact by the 25th US Division with the 7th LF Battalion east of Trang Bang on 5 September, a prisoner reported that the Quyet Thang Regiment (273C) had been disbanded, with the 1st MF VC Battalion and the 2d VC Battalion operating separately under the control of Sub Region 1.

18 II FFORCE order of battle has confirmed the upgrading of the Doan 10 VC Sapper Battalion to sub-regional subordination. This unit, with an estimated strength of 180 men, is now under Sub Region 4. Doan 10 is presently operating in northern Dayen Hoi and southern Nhon Trach Districts.

19 The enemy artillery organization has remained unchanged during the quarter but additional information and research have refined our understanding of the organization. All artillery in III CTZ other than divisional and regimental support battalions are subordinate to the 69th Artillery Command, which is directly under COSVN.

a. The 56th Anti-Aircraft Battalion remains directly subordinate to the command. Recent reports indicate that this battalion may have
Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R) (D-50-90-A) (U)

recently acquired a 120mm mortar capability.

b. The 58th Artillery Battalion is also directly subordinate to the command. The battalion now has a 122mm and 107mm rocket capability.

c. The 84A NVA Artillery Regiment controls three rocket-capable battalions.

d. The 208th NVA Artillery Regiment controls three rocket-capable battalions.

e. The 96th Artillery Regiment controls the 52d Artillery Battalion, the K33 and K34 Artillery Battalions. The 84A, 208th and 96th Regiments have 122mm and 107mm rocket capabilities.

f. The enemy utilized several innovations in artillery employment during the quarter. In September a twelve-tube 107mm rocket launcher was uncovered in Sub Region 5. In August a time delay firing device was captured at a rocket launch site north of Bien Hoa Airbase. The device, based on an ordinary wrist watch, was capable of any delay up to 12 hours. These innovations were probably the enemy's attempts to evade friendly counterbattery fire. An innovation which the enemy employed to increase the explosive charge of rockets was the fabrication of overcaliber rockets. A 122mm rocket with an explosive filled 400mm oversleeve was recovered in the Rung Sat. A 107mm rocket with a 200mm explosive-filled oversleeve was recovered near Katum. In both cases the fins were enlarged but the aerodynamic characteristics of the overcaliber rockets were so poor as to render them extremely inaccurate. Employment of these rockets was judged to be primarily a psychological threat and was not repeated during the quarter.

(c) Recapitulation:

1. The Viet Cong regions, provinces and special zones in III CTZ, controlled 55 Local companies and 12 Local Force Platoons.

2. The battalion and regimental sized units located within III CTZ were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69th Artillery Command</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84A NVA Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>69th Artillery Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208th NVA Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>69th Artillery Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56th VC AA Battalion</td>
<td>69th Artillery Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58th VC Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>69th Artillery Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274th VC Regiment</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>275th VC Regiment</td>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>22d Artillery Battalion</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>273d VC Regiment</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>66th VC MF Base Security</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Sub Region 1</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>D16 NVA Battalion</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>267th VC MF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>267B VC MF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 2</td>
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<td>Sub Region 3</td>
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<td>265th VC MF Battalion</td>
<td>Sub Region 3</td>
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UNIT
506th VC MP Battalion
520th VC MP Battalion
Dong Phu VC MP Battalion
D5 VC MP Sapper Battalion
Dien 10 VC MP Sapper Battalion
Thu Duc VC Regiment
Dong Hai VC Regiment
C-10 VC Sapper Battalion
14th VC MP Battalion
D440 VC LF Battalion
D445 VC MP Battalion
D1 VC LF Sapper Battalion
D2 VC LF Sapper Battalion
211th NVA Battalion
212th NVA Battalion
46th Recon Battalion
24 VC MP Guard Battalion

SUBORDINATION
Sub Region 3
Sub Region 3
Sub Region 3
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 4
Sub Region 5
Sub Region 6
Tay Ninh Province
Ba Bien Province
Ba Bien Province
U-1 Province
U-1 Province
Military Region 10
Military Region 10
Unknown

The following units are located in northern III CTZ in the II FFORCE TAOI:

UNIT
Dong Thap I VC Regiment
Dong Thap II VC Regiment
295th VC MP Battalion
502d VC LF Battalion
504th VC LF Battalion
512th VC LF Battalion
516th VC LF Battalion

SUBORDINATION
Military Region 2
Military Region 2
Military Region 2
Kien Phong Province
Kien Tuong Province
An Giang Province
Kien Hoa Province

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UNIT
518th VC LF Battalion
550th VC LF Battalion

SUBORDINATION
Kien Hoa Province
Kien Hoa Province

4. Units possibly present in III CTZ are listed below:

UNIT
96th NVA Artillery Regiment
K33 Artillery Battalion
K34 Artillery Battalion
33rd NVA Regiment
324th NVA Regiment
174th NVA Regiment
Cu Chi Regiment
Cu Long II Regiment
Song Be VC Regiment
21st Ind Battalion
E2 VC MF Battalion
E3 VC MF Battalion
Gia Dinh 4 VC Sapper Battalion
12th VC LF Sapper Recon Battalion
67th Engineer Battalion
D168 Battalion
D560 Battalion

SUBORDINATION
69th VC Artillery Command
96th Artillery Regiment
96th Artillery Regiment
5th VC Division
7th NVA Division
Possibly CCSVN
Sub Region 1
Sub Region 2
Possibly Military Region 10
5th VC Division
Sub Region 1
Sub Region 1
Sub Region 1
Sub Region 2
Possibly CCSVN
Phuoc Long Province
Binh Long Province

(d) Summary of Recent Activities.

1. The enemy has chosen to avoid major contact with Allied forces during most of the quarter while conducting attacks by fire on friendly installations and interdicting friendly lines of communication. In spite of this the enemy did initiate the Third General Offensive on 17-18 August with concerted attacks on Tay Ninh and Loc Ninh. These attacks were followed by a continuing series of engagements in the area southeast
of Tay Ninh culminating in another series of attacks on Tay Ninh and Loc Ninh on 11-12 September. These attacks were judged to be diversionary thrusts primarily designed to draw Allied reserves away from Saigon. The failure of these attacks to uncover Saigon, coupled with successful Allied ground and air operations against enemy supply bases and base areas resulted in repeated postponement of enemy offensive operations. In an effort to build up adequate combat force to effect an assault on Saigon the enemy drew back along his LOC to base areas along the Cambodian border in northern and northwestern III Corps Tactical Zone.

5th VC Division: During the reporting period, this division maintained headquarters in War Zone C. The 88th NVA Regiment has avoided major contacts and has remained unlocated for most of the quarter. The 33d NVA Regiment took part in the 18 August Offensive against Tay Ninh, and thereafter, continued to operate in the area west of Dan Tieng sustaining heavy losses. The 273rd Regiment maneuvered freely during the period - engaging Allied forces in the Trang Bang area in early August, taking part in the offensive against Tay Ninh, returning to the Trang Bang area in early September, then around the third week of September, replacing the 33d NVA Regiment which fell back to the Boi Loi Woods (XT 5553) to recoup its heavy losses. At the end of September, the bulk of the 5th NVA Division had withdrawn from contact to War Zone C to prepare for the next phase of the offensive.

7th NVA Division: This division was located in the Tri-Border Area at the beginning of the period. It is believed that the 32d NVA Regiment, relocated from II CTZ, probably came under its control at this time. The 7th NVA Division took part in the 18 August attack against Loc Ninh. On 14 September elements of the 141st Regiment and the 32d Regiment suffered heavy casualties in a contact north of Loc Ninh. The division, with an estimated strength of 5,400, remained in northern Binh Long Province avoiding contact at the end of the quarter.

9th VC Division: This division was unlocated at the beginning of the reporting period, but its regiments were identified in the offensive of 18 August against Tay Ninh. However, it seems that only elements of the regiments made attacks against targets in Tay Ninh Province, while the majority of the strength remained in base camps in the southwestern part of the province and in Cambodia. The same tactic was used in the attacks in the Tay Ninh area on 7 and 11 September. Since mid-September the 9th VC Division has been avoiding contact and is believed to be located along the Tay Ninh-Cambodian border area. Its strength is estimated to be 6,000 men.

The 101st NVA Regiment was unlocated in the Boi Loi (XT 5553) - Trapezoid area (XT 5943) at the start of the quarter. In late August and September, the 1st and 2nd Battalions performed the 101st Regiment's mission of attacking Allied positions in the Trang Bang area. However, these efforts resulted in heavy casualties. Thus, the 101st NVA Regiment, with an estimated strength of 800, is still not combat efficient.

The 274th NVA Regiment, which was formerly subordinate to the 5th VC Division, became independent sometime toward the end of the last reporting period. It is now believed to be subordinate to COSVN. The
regiment has been resupplying and is probably located in Base Areas 300 and 302 in VC Ba Bien Province. Tenuous indications are that the regiment is preparing for the next offensive with Long Binh and Bien Hoa as its objectives.

7. The Dong Nai Regiment, broken down into company sized units, trained new replacements and refitted along the Song Be throughout August. In September, the regiment moved from below Phuoc Vinh south into Sub Region 5, but avoided contact. There were indications of serious morale problems due to a shortage of supplies caused by Allied ground and air activity. It is believed that the battalions are dispersed throughout Sub Region 5.

8. In the five sub regions around Saigon, the enemy continued to reorganize his forces. The majority of reorganizations (described in detail in paragraph 2.c(4)(b) were attempts to adjust the enemy organization to losses which were not made good by infiltration.

5. Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Battle Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Prisoners</th>
<th>C/S</th>
<th>R/I/E</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>4,415</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>4,617</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>2,752</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army Tactics:

(a) In this quarter the enemy's efforts were primarily aimed at destroying friendly forces, but his overall strategic objective was to uncover Saigon, making it vulnerable to another major assault.

(b) The first part of August was a continuation of the standdown the enemy had begun in June. However, on 17 August the enemy launched his Third Offensive. The initial round of attacks were concentrated on Tay Ninh and Loc Ninh. A second series of attacks on Tay Ninh and Loc Ninh were initiated on 11 September.

(c) The pace of the Third Offensive was slower than either the Tet or May Offensive and seemed to be mainly intended to induce the commitment of Allied reserves away from Saigon.

(d) To create the impression of a massive commitment the enemy adopted the tactic of committing one battalion each from several regiments. This created the impression of a multi-regimental attack which was intended to induce an Allied reaction.

(e) The creation of several new sapper units indicates that the enemy continues to emphasize special actions.
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(7) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Relative Probability of Adoption at the end of the Quarter.

(a) Capabilities:

1. Attack:

a. The enemy is capable of conducting another offensive aimed primarily at Saigon/Tan Son Nhut and/or Long Binh/Bien Hoa employing elements of the 7th NVA Division, and the 5th and 9th VC Divisions, the Dong Nai Regiment and sub region battalions.

b. The enemy is capable of repeating his attacks on Tay Ninh and Loc Ninh or An Loc utilizing elements of the 7th NVA Division or the 5th and 9th VC Divisions.

c. The 84A NVA Artillery Regiment, the 208th NVA Artillery Regiment and the 96th NVA Artillery Regiment are capable of attacking civilian and military targets throughout III CTZ, independently or in support of ground attacks.

d. The enemy is capable of conducting limited ground attacks, or attacks by fire against friendly units, outposts and installations within their areas of operation.

e. The enemy is capable of temporarily interdicting and staging ambushes along friendly lines of communication.

2. Defend:

a. The enemy is capable of defending base areas in northern Binh Long Province with elements of the 7th NVA Division.

b. The enemy is capable of defending base areas in War Zone C and Tay Ninh Province with elements of the 5th and 9th VC Divisions.

c. The enemy is capable of defending base areas in the Kichelin, Trapezoid, Ho Bo and Boi Loi areas with elements of the 5th VC Division and the forces of Sub Region I.

3. Reinforce:

a. The enemy is capable of reinforcing an attack on Saigon with regiments from the northern provinces of IV CTZ.

b. The enemy is capable of reinforcing with infiltration groups of unknown size which are now indicated to be moving through Cambodia.

c. The enemy is capable of reinforcing with units up to divisional size from II CTZ.
Withdraw: The enemy is capable of breaking contact and withdrawing to relatively secure areas within III CTZ or base areas in Cambodia at a time of his choosing.

The enemy is capable of replacing losses and increasing strength by upgrading guerrillas, recruiting civilians, and receiving replacements from North Vietnam.

The enemy is capable of conducting resupply at the required rate when not interdicted by Allied operations.

Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses:
1. The enemy's continuing heavy losses of personnel have caused a lack of personnel familiar with the terrain, a deterioration of leadership, a drop in the level of experience and training of individual soldiers, and an overall lowering of morale.
2. The replacement of VC cadre and soldiers with NVA personnel has led to conflicts, loss of popular support and has decreased the enemy's capability to evade Allied operations.
3. Upgrading of guerrillas has weakened the enemy's influence in the countryside.
4. Successful Allied operations against the Viet Cong Infrastructure has resulted in a reduced enemy capability to support their forces.
5. The enemy's medical facilities are not adequate and he is short of medical supplies.
6. The enemy's supply system based on extended lines of communications and caches in the forward areas is vulnerable to Allied operations.
7. The subordination of the enemy's military operations to political goals has caused him to be vulnerable to heavy concentrations of Allied forces, firepower and mobility in the area of the Capital Military District.
8. The enemy is vulnerable to being misled by his own propaganda concerning the state of morale of Allied forces and the civilian population.
9. The enemy's continued use of known base areas while avoiding contact with friendly forces renders him susceptible to B-52 strikes.

Relative Probability of Adoption at the end of the Quarter.
1. Increase offensive activity throughout the II FFORC V AOI with effort concentrated on the Capital Military District.
The enemy is likely to reposition sub region forces around the Capital Military District into an attack configuration.

2. The 5th, 7th and 9th Divisions will probably be redeployed into positions to support or conduct attacks on Saigon.

4. Logistical and replacement activity will probably increase to support the enemy's offensive posture.

d. Operations, Plans and Training.

(1) General.

(a) During the reporting period II FFORCEN continued operations in the III and IV CTZ to seek out and destroy enemy forces in those areas. The enemy initiated a Third Offensive during the night of 17-18 August with a series of attacks in the northern III CTZ. These attacks were designed to give the appearance of a major effort to take and hold critical outlying areas. In actuality they constituted an attempt to draw friendly forces from the Capital Military District thereby weakening the Saigon defense, and to provide an opportunity to ambush friendly units moving to reinforce the northern areas. The enemy failed in this effort, suffering heavy losses. On 10-11 September the enemy again struck at targets in the northern III CTZ, principally at Tay Ninh which was attacked at nine points. With the exception of these actions, until October the enemy largely avoided decisive engagement, holding his major forces in outlying areas along the Cambodian border. On 18 October, three battalions of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division moved into the Tong Le Chon - Fishhook area (XT 5080) to destroy enemy elements there and to slow enemy movement through that region toward Saigon. The enemy reacted violently to this invasion of his base areas, striking fire support patrol bases occupied by US units with heavy mortar, rocket and ground attacks. These attacks inflicted generally light casualties among friendly forces while the enemy lost heavily in both men and materiel. As the reporting period closed, it was clear that the aggressiveness of Allied offensive operations, coupled with a determined program of B-52 strikes, had disrupted the enemy's timetable and forced the enemy to delay carrying out attacks against his prime objective, the city of Saigon.

(b) Operations in the III CTZ.

1. Campaign TOAN THANG. Phase II of Campaign TOAN THANG continued into this reporting period, with ground operations in the III CTZ designed to locate and destroy enemy forces and to prevent attacks on major population areas and critical installations. Ground combat operations were conducted in Long Khanh, Phuoc Long, Binh Long, Binh Duong, Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh, Bau Nghia, Gia Minh and Long An Provinces. In the III CTZ, a total of 5459 battalion days were employed in combat operations against enemy forces. At the beginning of the reporting period, the 1st Infantry Division was conducting offensive operations in the Phu Loi, Bi An, Gia Minh, Quan Loi, Thu Duc and Lai Khe areas. The 17th Armored Cavalry
Regiment remained under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division throughout the period. The 9th Infantry Division continued offensive operations south of Saigon with one brigade (and in the IV CTZ with two brigades). Capital Military Assistance Command continued offensive operations in Gia Dinh Province to locate and destroy enemy forces and to counter the enemy's rocket/mortar threat to Saigon. The 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) remained under its operational control throughout the period. The 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division also conducted operations under the operational control of Capital I&II Assistance Command until 6 October when it was replaced by the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. The 25th Infantry Division continued conducting offensive ground operations in the C-Dau, Tay Ninh, and Cu Chi areas. The 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (airmobile) remained under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division until its departure from the III CTZ on 10 October. The 1st Australian Task Force initially conducted offensive operations in Phuoc Tan province between Ba Tab and Bearcat. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment continued operations in the Bearcats - Binh Son area until 15 August when the regiment returned to Thailand. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force closed into Bearcat on 20 August, conducting offensive operations in that area.

Results of Operations in the III CTZ.

a. Significant results of Campaign TOAN THANG during August, September and October were: 638 US/PWMAF killed (609 US, 14 Australians, 14 Thais and one New Zealander), 3,954 wounded (3821 US, 57 Australians, 73 Thais, and three New Zealanders), 12 US missing, 6,998 enemy killed, 521 enemy captured and 10 ralliers. In addition, 1594 small arms, 454 crew served weapons, 505,080 rounds of small arms ammunition, 6,602 high explosive rounds, 4,679 grenades, 65 122mm rockets, 123 107mm rockets, and 272.92 tons of rice were captured or destroyed.

b. The number of enemy killed, captured and rallied in US/PWMAF operations in the III CTZ is the equivalent of the personnel needed to fill 21 enemy battalions. The materiel captured is sufficient to equip five enemy battalions with individual weapons, 10 battalions with crew served weapons, and provide basic loads of small arms ammunition for nine battalions and grenades for 11 battalions. The rice captured and/or destroyed could have provided field rations for three enemy battalions for a period of 10 months.

c. Cumulative results of Phase II Campaign TOAN THANG through 31 October include 960 US/PWMAF killed (including 19 Australians, one New Zealander and 17 Thais), 15 US missing, 5,021 US/PWMAF wounded (including 144 Australians, 90 Thais and three New Zealanders), 9,574 enemy killed and 650 captured, 4,608 detainees, and 2,557 small arms, 619 crew served weapons, 678,175 rounds of small arms ammunition, 12,399 high explosive rounds, 7,744 grenades, 126 122mm rockets, 266 107mm rockets and 767.81 tons of rice captured or destroyed.

In the IV CTZ, the 9th Infantry Division continued Operations KUDZU and CHUONG CONG DINH, and commenced Operation QUYET CHIEN. Operation KUDZU, with the mission of securing the DONG TAH base camp, continued.
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throughout the period. Operation TRUONG CONG DINH, designed to seek out and destroy enemy main force units operating in the IV CTZ, was replaced on 4 August by Operation QUYI1 CHIMT, which continued the mission of Operation TRUONG CONG DINH. Elements of the 9th Infantry Division under the operational control of II FFORCLV employed a total of 525 battalion days against the enemy during Operations KUIU, TRUONG CONG DINH, and QUYI1 CHIMT.

(2) Summary of Combat Operations.

(a) 1st Infantry Division. A major change in task organization occurred on 12 September when the 1-16 Infantry was attached to the 9th Infantry Division and the 5-60 Infantry (Mechanized) was attached to the 1st Infantry Division. During the reporting period the division conducted reconnaissance in force operations in Gia Dinh, Bien Hoa, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces. Contacts with enemy elements were made throughout the division tactical area of interest. The first significant contact occurred on 9-10 August when B/D/2-16 Infantry, two platoons of M/3-11 Cavalry and 1/8 Infantry (ARVN) conducted a cordon and search operation at the hamlet of Trum Thap, eight kilometers east of Ben Cat. US forces formed the cordon while ARVN elements searched the village. Sporadic contact with an estimated enemy company caught inside the cordon continued through the 30-hour operation, which resulted in 17 enemy killed and 74 captured, and six ARVN wounded. Discovered in the hamlet were 33 RPG-2 rounds, 18 RPG boosters, 26 B-79 rounds, three US claymore mines and sizeable quantities of food and medical supplies. The following day in the same area, 1/8 Infantry (ARVN) captured an additional 11 enemy, 11 small arms, 45 hand grenades and seven motorcycles; 235 detainees were apprehended. On 18 August, four kilometers south of Loc Ninh, Troop C/2-11 Armored Cavalry Regiment made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in one friendly wounded. A sweep of the area of contact resulted in locating 17 enemy dead, and 10 individual and four crew served weapons. First Brigade elements continued to make contact near Loc Ninh on 19 August when a six-hour contact by the 2-11 Cavalry resulted in 18 enemy killed and one prisoner, and two individual and one crew served weapon captured. Friendly losses were five killed and 41 wounded. On 23 August elements of the 1-2 Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force two kilometers southeast of Loc Ninh. Friendly forces were supported by light fire teams, artillery and tactical air strikes. Enemy losses were 39 killed, seven small arms and one crew served weapon captured. Two US were killed, 48 wounded. On 24 August two kilometers east of Loc Ninh, B/1-2 Infantry contacted an enemy battalion, the contact reinforced by Companies A and C and supported by light fire teams, artillery and tactical airstrikes. Enemy losses were 54 killed compared to two troops killed and 56 wounded. On 12 September two kilometers east of Loc Ninh, B/1-2 Infantry and A/2-11 Cavalry engaged an unknown size enemy force. Initial contact was made at 0610 hours, and as action continued in this area throughout the day, elements of the 1-2 Infantry, 1-28 Infantry and 2-11 Cavalry reinforced, supported by artillery, airstrikes and light fire teams. Enemy casualties were 147 killed as compared to 15 friendly forces killed and 60 wounded. Contacts in the same area the following day by elements of the 1-2 Infantry resulted in 35 enemy killed. At 0900 hours 6 October, five kilometers southwest of An Loc, A/B/1-4 Cavalry engaged an enemy force of undetermined size. The contact, which
continued until 1645 hours, resulted in 45 enemy killed, and 13 rifles and four RPG launchers captured; friendly losses were one US and one ARVN killed, and six US wounded. That same day, 10 kilometers northeast of Tan Uyen, B/1-26 Infantry located a cache containing 45 82m mortar rounds, 50 RPG-2 rounds, 10 rifles, five sub-machineguns, four Browning automatic rifles, six carbines, two light machineguns, one 60mm grenade launcher, four claymore mines and 5500 rounds of rifle and machine-gun ammunition. On 7 October, five kilometers northeast of Buu Son, B/2-16 Infantry located a base camp containing a large quantity of material including 619 RPG rounds, 400 RPG boosters, 1000 anti-personnel mines, 1450 grenades, 100 60mm mortar rounds, 50 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 10 small arms, 1200 pounds of medical supplies and 20 pounds of documents. On 15 October, 11 kilometers northeast of Tan Uyen, A/1-28 Infantry found a cache containing 132 small arms, 20 60mm mortar rounds, one 57mm recoilless rifle and 1000 rounds of AK ammunition. On 18 October, elements of three battalions of the 1st Infantry Division commenced operations in the Fishhook - Tong Le Chon area (XT 5080) to seek out and destroy enemy forces operating there, and to interdict enemy movement south from Cambodia into the III CTZ. These units, which included the 2-20 Infantry and elements of the 1-16 Infantry (Mechanized) and the 1-26 Infantry, established fire support patrol bases and conducted extensive reconnaissance in force, patrol and ambush operations. At 0630 hours 26 October, seven kilometers northwest of Tong Le Chon, a 2-26 Infantry night defensive position received a ground attack supported by mortars from an enemy force of unknown size. Friendly forces, supported by air-strikes, artillery and light fire teams, continued the contact until 1331 hours. Results were six US killed and 25 wounded, 103 enemy killed and 103 enemy killed and three captured; 26 rifles, three RPG launchers and five RPG rounds also were captured. On 30 October, elements of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), having closed into Quan Loi, were placed under the operation control of the 1st Infantry Division. Initially, the 2-7 Cavalry commenced operations in the Tong Le Chon area, the 2-8 Cavalry in the vicinity of Ninh Thanh, and the 2-12 Cavalry near Quan Loi. At 1030 hours 31 October, 13 kilometers northwest of Tong Le Chon, elements of 1-2 Infantry engaged an estimated platoon of enemy in bunkers. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged as the friendly force called in artillery, air-strikes and light fire teams. The contact continued until 1531 hours and resulted in five US wounded and 42 enemy killed. At the close of the reporting period, the 1st Infantry Division was conducting offensive operations in the Tong Le Chon, Lai Khe, Minh Vinh, Quan Loi and Tha Dae areas.

(b) 9th Infantry Division.

1 Campaign TOAN THANG. (Includes the Royal Thai Volunteer Regiment until its departure from Vietnam on 15 August). Initial Task Organization included the 2-59 Infantry, 1-60 Infantry (Mechanized), 2-80 Infantry, 4-59 Infantry, 6-31 Infantry, 3-11 Cavalry, Co F (LRP), 31st Infantry, D/3-5 Air Cavalry and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment. The 9th Infantry Division conducted reconnaissance in force operations in Long An, Bien Hoa and Long Thanh provinces in III Corps Tactical Zone and in Co Gia, Binh Duong and Kien Tuong Provinces in IV Corps Tactical Zone.
There were a number of significant contacts. At 2110 hours 4 August during a reconnaissance in force operation nine kilometers northwest of Can Duoc, A/2-39 Infantry of the 1st Brigade engaged an enemy force of unknown size. At 1538 hours, E/2-39 Infantry, dispatched to reinforce, inserted into a hot landing zone, and at 1700 hours made contact between 1700 and 2300 hours the contact was reinforced by A/B/C/2-60 Infantry and C/5-60 Infantry and supported by light fire teams and artillery. Contact broke at 1900 hours. Two US were killed and 10 wounded; 52 enemy were killed and 20 individual weapons captured. At 1030 hours 7 August, six kilometers southeast of Can Giooc, C/6-31 Infantry received sniper fire from an unknown number of enemy. The company returned fire with organic weapons and called in light fire teams, air strikes, artillery, moonshine and CS gas drops. By 1540 hours the contact was reinforced by A/6-31, A/B/C/4-39, A/B/0/2-60 and C/5-60 Infantry and a cordon formed around the contact. At 1800 hours, contact with the enemy was lost. Results were eight US killed and 24 wounded, 48 enemy killed and 24 captured, and 14 small arms, one 82mm mortar and one RPG-2 launcher captured. Several minor contacts by elements of the division on 8 August resulted in 45 enemy killed and 13 small arms captured. On 12 August 5-60 Infantry (Mechanized) contacted a large enemy force in a bunker complex three kilometers west of Can Duoc. Seven companies from the 2-39 Infantry, 4-47 Infantry and 2-60 Infantry reinforced the contact. The battle was cordoned and artillery, air strikes, artillery, spooky, light fire teams and flares ships supported the friendly forces through the following day. Enemy losses were 104 killed, 24 detainees, three Ho Chi Minh and 21 small arms and five crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 18 killed and 27 wounded. The enemy unit was identified as the 92nd Local Force Battalion. At 1006 hours 12 August, eight kilometers southeast of Can Giooc, C/4-17 Cavalry engaged an enemy force of unknown size. By 1245 hours, A/B/C/4-39 had reinforced and were in heavy contact. Light fire teams, artillery and spooky supported until contact was lost at 2003 hours. A second day, light revealed 36 enemy killed. Additionally, friendly forces captured eight prisoners and 13 small arms while losing eight US killed and seven wounded. At 1120 hours 12 August, nine kilometers east of Rich, light fire teams of A/4-17 Cavalry engaged an enemy force of unknown size in a four-hour contact, killing 35 enemy and capturing five while losing two US wounded. On 19 August elements of the division made several minor contacts and lost a number of enemy killed from previous actions. Results of the day's operations were three US killed and 23 wounded; enemy losses were 91 killed, five Ho Chi Minhs, 16 detainees and three prisoners, 51 small arms and eight crew served weapons captured. Also on that day, Commanding General, II FFORV instructed Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division to move the land based riverine brigade to the Can Giooc area on 20 August to begin operations to interdict enemy lines of communication leading from the south into the Capital Military District between the Song Rock Cac and the Song Rua Du, to locate enemy base and assembly areas and to fix and destroy enemy forces moving to the south toward Saigon. On 27 August C/4-39 Infantry contacted an unknown size enemy force seven kilometers north of Can Giooc. Companies A and B reinforced the contact. Light fire teams, artillery and air strikes supported the friendly forces. Friendly losses were four US killed and seven US wounded.
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Army losses were 17 killed and one prisoner, 16 small arms and two crew served weapons captured. At 1510 hours 3 September, three kilometers east of Rach Kien, B/2-60 Infantry engaged an enemy force of undetermined size, exchanging small arms and automatic weapons fire. Light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes supported the contact. By 1730 hours, A and C/2-60 Infantry and B/5-60 Infantry reinforced, taking positions to the south, east and north of the enemy, while B/2-60 Infantry swept from the west. At 1810 hours B/2-39 Infantry inserted to the southeast and began sweeping toward the contact. The following morning at 0905 hours, B/2-39 Infantry was inserted. The contact, lost at 1030 hours, resulted in four US killed and 22 wounded. One enemy killed, three prisoners, one 60mm mortar and eight small arms, two 60mm mortars and four RCL launchers captured. At 1637 hours 5 September, three kilometers north of Rach Kien, C/2-60 Infantry engaged an enemy force of undetermined size, exchanging small arms and automatic weapons fire. By 2100 hours B/5-60 Infantry, C/2-39 Infantry and A, B and reconnaissance platoon, 2-60 Infantry had reinforced and formed a cordon around the contact area. Sweeps continued through the night and at 1200 hours 6 September contact was lost. Results were two US killed and nine wounded, 40 enemy killed and seven captured. Four detainees were apprehended. That same day 4/3-17 Cavalry captured one prisoner and 15 tons of rice seven kilometers southeast of Can Giuoc. At 1031 hours 7 September, eight kilometers south-southeast of Rach Kien, A/B/C/2-60 and A/2-39 Infantry engaged an estimated enemy battalion with small arms, automatic weapons, light fire teams and air strikes. By 1742 hours, C/2-59, A/3-39 and B/2-39 Infantry had been inserted to reinforce the contact. At 1756 hours, C/2-60 Infantry captured a prisoner of war who said the enemy unit, the 1st Long An Battalion, had segmented into groups of four or five men each that had scattered through the area of contact. At 1900 hours, A/2-39 Infantry was inserted into the area. Firing continued until 0000 hours. The action resulted in five US wounded, 47 enemy killed and one prisoner and 11 individual weapons captured. On 10 September, forces of the 2d Brigade exploited a light fire team contact five kilometers south of Rach Kien, developing a major action. At 0055 hours a light fire team of A/3-17 Air Cavalry engaged elements of an enemy battalion, killing 10 immediately. By 1100 hours, B/2-39 Infantry was inserted and in contact. A/2-17 Air Cavalry, artillery and Spooky supported the action as A/B/C/2-39 and C/2-60 Infantry reinforced. At 1920 hours, A/3-39 Infantry was inserted followed by B/2-60 Infantry, and at 2130 hours friendly elements completed a cordon around the area. Enemy activity ceased at 0400 hours; results of the engagement were three US killed and eight wounded, 46 enemy killed and three captured. Eighteen individual weapons also were captured. On 11 September, five kilometers northeast of Ben Loan, 2-60 Infantry located a cache containing 92 individual weapons. The 9th Infantry Division participation in Campaign TOAN THAG was reduced in scope on 12 September when the 3d Brigade commenced Operation QUYET CHIEN in IV Corps Tactical Zone. On 20 September, small contacts by elements of the 1st Brigade resulted in 32 enemy killed. At 1308 hours 11 October, four kilometers north of Can Dao, E/2-39 Infantry received small arms fire from an enemy force of undetermined size. Returning fire with organic weapons, the company maintained the contact until 1600 hours, killing 25 enemy while losing five US killed. During this same period approximately 800 meters to the
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RG 35F-65 (RI) (V-200-70-A) (U)

northwest, 1/5-17 Cavalry engaged an estimated 20 enemy with automatic weapons and rockets, killing all of them. At 1115 hours 10 kilometers east of Can Giuoc, 1/5-17 Air Cavalry, reacting to Intelligence Reports, located and engaged an unknown number of enemy. By 1230 hours 4/2/2-39 Infantry had reinforced and maintained a sporadic contact through the daylight hours. Results were eight US wounded, 31 enemy killed and one captured. Three small arms and 2 RPG-7 launchers also were captured. Contacts during the remainder of the period were light and at the end of October the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued operations south of Saigon.

2 Operation TRUONG CONG DINH! The 9th Infantry Division continued Operation TRUONG CONG DINH! with the mission of locating and destroying enemy forces in My Tho - Vinh Long area. Contact was sporadic with enemy forces during August. On 3 August, contacts by elements of the 2d and 3d Brigade with small groups of enemy resulted in 30 enemy killed without loss to friendly forces. Operation TRUONG CONG DINH! terminated on 3 August 1968. Significant results were 164 US killed and 1,084 wounded; enemy losses were 1,754 killed, 1,917 detainees, 335 small arms and 35 crew served weapons captured.

3 Operation KUDZU. Operation KUDZU was initiated on 1 May 1968 in IV Corps Tactical Zone as a security mission of the Dong Tam Base Camp. The initial task organization consisted of the 3-47 Infantry Battalion. Contact was light and sporadic during this reporting period. Significant results were 12 US killed and 280 wounded, 106 enemy killed and 14 captured, 563 detainees apprehended and 70 small arms captured.

4 Operation QUYET CHIEN was initiated on 4 August 1968 and continued the mission of Operation TRUONG CONG DINH!. Task Organization included the 2nd Brigade, with 3-60 Infantry, 4-47 Infantry and 6/7-1 Air Cavalry and the 3rd Brigade with 3-59 Infantry, 2/2-47 (Mechanized) and 3-5 Cavalry. On 19 August, several contacts by elements of the 4-47 Infantry and 3-60 Infantry resulted in 32 enemy killed compared to one US killed. On 25 August, 4-47 Infantry contacted an unknown size enemy force nine kilometers northeast of Mac Hoa; light fire teams, spooky and artillery supported the friendly forces. Seventeen enemy were killed. Several contacts with enemy forces on 1 September eight kilometers northwest of Giai Cau (K3 97427) resulted in 16 enemy killed. During September, operation QUYET CHIEN was reduced in scope to a two battalion size operation when enemy activity diminished. As Intelligence information indicated the possibility of increased action, this force was augmented with division elements up to two brigades. At 1440 hours 13 October, 21 kilometers east of Ben Tre, a major contact developed when 8/3-47 Infantry received sniper fire from an estimated reinforced enemy company. Returning fire with organic weapons, the company called in light fire teams, artillery and airstrike. During the next eight hours, 8/3-47 Infantry, 3/4-47 Infantry and 0/3-5-60 Infantry reinforced the contact, which continued until 2000 hours and resulted in two US wounded, 25 enemy killed and one individual weapon captured. At 1316 hours 18 October, 12 kilometers northeast of Cai Be, 8/3-5 Cavalry engaged an estimated enemy company.

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exchanging small arms and automatic weapons fire. Light fire teams supported, and at 1450 hours, A/1-16 Infantry was inserted to the east of the contact. Between 1510 and 1906 hours, C/D/I1-16 Infantry, C/B/C Reconnaissance Platoon/0-31 Infantry and C/2-47 Infantry reinforced, forming a cordon. At 2000 hours an enemy element attempted to break out of the cordon and fighting became heavy. Contact was lost at 0625 hours, and at 0830 friendly forces began a sweep of the area. At 1150 hours two kilometers west of the initial action, elements of 1/16 Infantry restablished contact with an estimated enemy platoon and was supported by light fire teams and artillery. Results of the two-day operation were four US killed and 60 wounded, 50 enemy killed and one captured, four sampans and 52 bunders destroyed, three detainees apprehended, and six M-16 rifles, one 75mm recoilless rifle with seven rounds, 1,007 protective masks, and 10 .45 caliber pistols captured. At 1205 hours on 23 October, B/3-60 Infantry of the 2d Brigade inserted into a landing zone 10 kilometers southeast of Ben Tre and immediately received heavy automatic weapons fire. Light fire teams and artillery were called in to support the contact. At 1205 hours, A/3-60 Infantry inserted 700 meters to the northeast and received fire from small arms, automatic weapons and RPG. One UH-14 aircraft was hit by an RPG round and exploded; within the next six hours, three other helicopters were forced down as a result of ground fire. As airstrikes pounded the area, C/3-60 Infantry, and D/3-47 Infantry inserted to reinforce, followed at 1615 hours by Companies 5 and 4, 3d RVN Marine Battalion. Fighting continued until darkness when contact became sporadic. This action resulted in 70 enemy killed and one US killed and six wounded. As the period ended, the 2d and 3d Brigades, 9th Infantry Division continued operations in the Cai Lay-Ny The-Ben Tre area to locate and destroy enemy forces in the northern IV CTZone. Cumulative results of Operation QUY CAU include 62 US killed and 574 wounded, 964 enemy killed and eight captured, 515 detainees, 14 ralliers, and 195 small arms and 94 crew served weapons captured.

(c) 25th Infantry Division (Includes the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) until its departure from the III CT Zone). Initial task organization included the 1st Brigade with 1-5 Infantry (Mechanized), 3-22 Infantry, 4-23 Infantry (Mechanized), 2-27 Infantry; 2nd Brigade with 3-4 Cavalry and 2-14 Infantry; C/2-17 Air Cavalry, and the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) with 1-506 Infantry and 2-506 Infantry. The 25th Infantry Division conducted offensive ground operations in Tay Ninh, Gia Nghia and Long An Province during this quarter, engaging in a number of significant actions, and locating a number of sizeable caches. On 1 August, Companies A and C/2-14 Infantry, while operating four kilometers north of Duong Son, destroyed 82 RPG rounds, four mortar rounds, 56 grenades, one mine and 770 rounds of small arms ammunition and captured one 122mm rocket warhead and 16,500 rounds of small arms ammunition. D/3-4 Cavalry engaged two ox carts with automatic weapons and rockets in the Hinchin Flotation (22535350), and destroyed 40 122mm rockets. On 4 August, C/2-14 Infantry captured 41 122mm rockets in an area four kilometers northeast of Duong Son. On 9 August, air strikes in support of the 1st Brigade, which was operating in the area 15 kilometers northeast of Katum, resulted in 11 enemy killed. On 17 August,
two kilometers east of Filhol plantation, Company B/2-14 Infantry captured 107 80mm rounds, 170 82mm mortar rounds, 23 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 50 Bangalore torpedoes, 29 mines and 29,040 rounds of small arms ammunition. At 0123 hours on 18 August as the enemy commenced his Third Offensive, Fire Support Patrol Base Buell, seven kilometers north of Tay Ninh, received 500 rounds of 82mm mortar and 12 rounds of 107mm rocket fire followed by a ground attack. Friendly forces returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons, light fire teams, artillery and air strikes. A sweep of the area at first light resulted in locating 84 enemy killed, 15 enemy weapons and large amounts of ammunition. Thirteen enemy were captured. United States losses were one killed and 26 wounded; 17 of the wounded returned to duty. At 100244 August the signal facility on Nui Ba Den mountain, seven kilometers northeast of Tay Ninh, received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force. A/3-4 Cavalry received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire while conducting road clearing operations on Highway 26 seven kilometers southeast of Tay Ninh. Company B reinforced the contact which lasted until 1630 hours and resulted in 42 enemy killed and seven individual weapons and three heavy machineguns captured. US losses were seven wounded. At 0940 hours on 19 August, A/3-4 Cavalry, while conducting road clearing operations on Highway 26 seven kilometers southeast of Tay Ninh, received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force. A/1-5 Infantry (Mechanized) and B/4-23 Infantry (Mechanized) reinforced the contact as air strikes, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Results were 34 enemy killed, four US killed and 19 US wounded. On 19 August B and C/1-5 Infantry (Mechanized) received heavy fire while conducting a reconnaissance in force operation in the Ben Cat Plantation, southwest of Dan Tieng. One platoon of A/5-4 Cavalry reinforced; light fire teams, artillery and AC47 (Spooky) supported. Ten US were killed and 62 wounded; enemy losses were 76 killed. Also on 19 August, A/2-27 Infantry conducted a reconnaissance in force operation nine kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh. Upon completion of the operation, Company A established a night ambush position along a suspected enemy route of movement. At 0102 hours an estimated two reinforced enemy companies entered the ambush site. The ambush was sprung with small arms, automatic weapons, M-79 grenade launchers and mortars; air strikes, artillery, light fire teams and AC47 (Spooky) supported. Five friendly personnel were killed and eight wounded. Fifty-seven enemy were killed immediately. A follow-up search of the area during the next two days resulted in locating 45 enemy dead in one location and 53 at a second location. Total enemy losses from this contact were 155 killed and three captured. On 21 August Task Force 1-5 Infantry (Mechanized) conducted a reconnaissance in force operation four kilometers southeast of Dan Tieng. At 1245 hours, the Task Force contacted an estimated two enemy battalions. Friendly forces were supported by light fire teams, artillery and air strikes. The enemy employed human wave attacks with an estimated 500-600 enemy in the initial attack.
The results of the contact were 182 enemy killed, and 18 US killed and 25 wounded. On 22 August, Task Force 3-22 Infantry, while occupying night defensive positions seven kilometers north of Tay Ninh, received mortar and rocket fire followed by a ground attack at 0115 hours. Artillery, air strikes and light fire teams supported the contact which continued until 0530 hours. Sixty enemy were killed in the action and 11 prisoners were captured; friendly losses were three US killed and 18 US wounded. At the same time, Task Force 4-23 Infantry (Mechanized), occupying night defensive positions two kilometers southeast of Tay Ninh, received mortar fire followed by a ground attack. Light fire teams, artillery and air strikes supported the contact which continued until 0530 hours. Artillery, air strikes and light fire teams supported the contact which continued until 0430 hours. Sixty-two enemy were killed and four prisoners captured. On 24 August, Task Force 2-27 Infantry, located in a night position eight kilometers southwest of Dau Tieng, received heavy small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire followed at 0330 hours by a ground attack from an estimated three enemy companies. Light fire teams, artillery and AC47 (Spooky) supported the contact which continued until 0430 hours. Sixty-two enemy were killed and one prisoner, 24 crew served weapons and 12 individual weapons were captured. United States losses were eight killed and 42 wounded. On 22 August a convoy traveling on Highway 8 between Cu Chi and Tay Ninh received automatic weapons, RPG and mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force. 0/4-23 Infantry (Mechanized) and B/3-4 Cavalry reinforced the contact. Contact continued until 260030 August. Friendly losses were 19 US killed, 55 wounded, three US missing, 11 trucks and one armored personnel carrier destroyed. Enemy losses were 104 killed. On 27 August A/2-506 Infantry conducted a combat assault eight kilometers north of Trang Bang. At 0227 hours, the company received small arms, automatic weapons, RPG and 60mm mortar fire from an estimated enemy battalion. The remainder of the 2-506 Infantry reinforced; light fire teams, artillery and air strikes supported. Contact continued through the afternoon, resulting in 105 enemy killed, one US killed, 19 prisoners captured, and 16 US killed and 22 wounded. On 3 September, Companies A and C/4-5 Infantry (Mechanized) conducted a reconnaissance in force operation in the Ben Gui Plantation three kilometers southwest of Dau Tieng. At 1715 hours the two companies received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force; light fire teams, artillery and AC47 (Spooky) supported. One US was killed and 34 US were wounded while 19 enemy were killed. Also on 3 September, Commanding General II FFORV directed that the 25th Infantry Division participate with two battalions in a five-day multi-battalion operation to be conducted on about 5 September by the 25th ARVN Division in the Trang Bang area. Two days later, five kilometers east of Trang Bang, B/2-506 Infantry received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from an estimated enemy battalion. Artillery, light fire teams and air strikes supported the friendly forces. B and C/2-27 Infantry, A/2-506 Infantry, A and B/3-187 Infantry and A/3-5 Cavalry reinforced to establish a cordon. At 0023 hours the enemy conducted a two-company attack against the cordon. An estimated 60-70 enemy escaped, but 105 enemy were killed. This contact resulted in 31 US killed and 41 US wounded. At 1500 hours 27 September, C/3-187 Infantry, while conducting eagle flights eight kilometers northeast of Trang Bang, engaged an unknown number of enemy. Company D
reinforced the contact while light fire teams, artillery and air strikes supported. Contact continued until 0030 hours the following day and resulted in 12 US killed and 20 wounded, 40 enemy killed and 10 prisoners, 11 individual weapons and five crew served weapons captured. On 9 September, Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, directed the 25th Infantry Division to participate in a combined reconnaissance in force operation to begin on 11 September in the Dau Tieng - Go Dau Ha - Trung Lap area. Other units scheduled to participate were the 3rd ARVN Airborne Battalion, a Vietnamese Marine tank force, Special Forces Detachment B-56, and Company B (Long Range Patrol) 51st Infantry. The 25th Infantry Division was to conduct the operation with elements of the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and one mechanized battalion. At 0425 hours 11 September, five kilometers southwest of Dau Tieng, A/1-5 Infantry (Mechanized) received heavy mortar fire followed by a ground attack from an estimated enemy battalion. A heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons, light fire teams, artillery and air strikes were employed against the attacking enemy force. O/1-5 Infantry (Mechanized) reinforced the contact. The effective employment of chain link fence around the night location prevented enemy penetration and was credited with minimizing United States casualties from RPG rounds. Three US were killed and 20 wounded; enemy losses were 39 enemy killed, and 20 individual weapons and five crew served weapons captured. On 12 September the 3-22 Infantry base camp, located three kilometers west of Tay Ninh, received 600-1000 rounds of mixed 60 and 82mm mortar fire, 50 rounds of RPG fire. This preparation was followed by a ground attack from an estimated enemy battalion. Friendly forces delivered a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire into the attacking force; light fire teams, artillery and AC47 (Spooky) supported the friendly force throughout the attack. Firing ceased at 0400 hours when the enemy withdrew. Friendly losses were 17 wounded; enemy losses were 25 killed, 22 individual weapons and 17 crew served weapons captured. On 14 September several minor contacts with enemy forces throughout the division resulted in 24 enemy killed and 24 US wounded. One significant contact occurred at 0933 hours when B/4-23 Infantry (Mechanized), operating along Highway 26 between Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng, contacted an unknown size enemy force. The ensuing battle resulted in one US killed and seven wounded, and 40 enemy killed. On 16 September, A/1-5 Infantry (Mechanized) conducted local security operations four kilometers southwest of Dau Tieng. At 0121 hours the company received mortar fire followed by a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force. Light fire teams, artillery and AC47 (Spooky) supported the contact which resulted in five US wounded and 42 enemy killed. The next day, 1-5 Infantry continued the mission of local security operations in the vicinity of Dau Tieng and Company B established a night defensive position five kilometers southwest of Dau Tieng. At 0205 hours Company B received a ground attack from an estimated enemy battalion. Artillery, light fire teams and air strikes were called in to support the friendly forces. Contact was lost at 0425 hours when the enemy withdrew. Two US were killed and 14 wounded; enemy losses were 49 killed. That evening at 2330 hours Fire Support Patrol Base Popa, 11 kilometers northeast of Trang Bang, received heavy small arms, automatic weapons, RPG, M-79 and 82mm mortar fire which was immediately
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followed by a ground attack. Fire was returned with a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons, 79mm and mortar fire; light fire teams, AC47 (spooky) and air strikes supported the friendly forces. Four US were killed and 40 wounded; enemy losses were 131 killed. On 19 September, elements of the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) under operational control of the 25th Infantry Division conducted offensive operations north of Highway 1 between No Iau Hoa and Trung Bang. Several minor contacts with enemy forces resulted in nine US killed; enemy losses were 36 killed and two prisoners captured. At 2100 hours September, A/1-3 Infantry (Mechanized) while located in a night defensive position four kilometers southwest of Nau Iau, received mortar and 83mm fire followed by a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force. Artillery, light fire teams, AC47 (spooky) and air strikes supported the friendly forces. Results were five US wounded, 37 enemy killed and two prisoners and 17 weapons captured. On the same day, 4-23 Infantry (Mechanized) while conducting road clearing operations on Highway 1 nine kilometers southeast of Tay Ninh, received small arms, automatic weapons, RPG and mortar fire followed by a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force. Air strikes, artillery, light fire teams and AC47 (spooky) supported the friendly forces. Two US were killed and three wounded; enemy losses were 28 killed and two captured. On 22 September, 3-4 Cavalry conducted road clearing and security operations from the Hau Chong Bridge to Tay Ninh. At 0445 hours Troop A received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force. Troop A returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons, 79mm and 90mm tank guns, supported by light fire teams and artillery. Two US were killed and 12 wounded; enemy losses were 21 killed. On 2 October, 12 kilometers northwest of Cu Chi, B/2-12 Infantry located 14 cases of RIG-2, 37 cases of 82mm mortar ammunition, 75 Bangalore torpedoes, 15 cases of 60mm mortar rounds, and three small arms. On 7 October, at 0900 hours five kilometers northwest of Trung Bang, A/3-12 Infantry received fire from an enemy force identified as the 101st NVA Regiment, exchanging small arms and automatic weapons fire. As the contact developed, A/B/H/3-187 Infantry reinforced, and artillery fired in support. The contact continued until 1930 hours when friendly forces began a sweep of the area. At 0045 hours contact was reestablished, with artillery and light fire teams resuming support. At 0430 hours contact was lost. Results were 145 enemy killed and one captured, and 35 rifles and two light machineguns captured; eight US were killed and 13 wounded. On 10 October, elements of B/4-9 Infantry were led by a Hoi Chanh to a cache seven kilometers northwest of Cu Chi and found 53 SKS rifles, 20 boxes of AK rifle ammunition, 120 82mm mortar rounds, 450 grenades and 21 claymore mines. Fifteen kilometers northwest of Cu Chi, the same unit later found another cache containing 123 rounds of RIG-2, 19 Bangalore torpedoes and 232 RPG boosters. On 11 October, four kilometers northeast of Trung Bang, elements of the 25th Infantry Division exploited a contact initiated the previous day and killed a total of 26 enemy. The previous day at 0820 hours A/2-12 Infantry had engaged a enemy force of unknown size with organic weapons, artillery, airstrikes and light fire teams. As the contact continued, B/2-12 Infantry, B/G/2-27 Infantry, and two companies of 4-9 Infantry reinforced. At 0715 hours the following day, contact was reestablished.

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when A/D/2-12 Infantry received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy. Returning fire with organic weapons, the force remained in contact until 1100 hours, and at 1520 hours completed a sweep of the area. Results of the action were six US killed, 16 wounded and one missing, 26 enemy killed, and one 60mm mortar and two 82mm mortar tubes and one SK-47 rifle captured. On 13 October, two platoons of B/3-17 Air Cavalry conducted a sweep seven kilometers west of Tan Son Nhut and located 105 82mm mortar rounds, 50 60mm mortar rounds, 14 40mm rounds, two 120mm mortar rounds, 275 recoilless rifle rounds, five RPG-2 rounds, 150 homemade grenades, and 17 107mm rocket fuses. On 27 October two kilometers west of Ky Binh, B/2-14 Infantry found a cache containing six 107mm rockets, 272 RPG rounds, 29 120mm mortar rounds and 80 pounds of TNT. On 28 October, five kilometers south of Ban Tieng, B/1-5 Infantry (Mechanized) found a cache containing 26,500 556 rifle rounds, 98 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle and 150 rifle grenades. On 30 October, 11 kilometers southeast of Ban Tieng, B/1-27 Infantry, while searching the area of an air strike the previous day, found seven enemy killed, 500 bangalore torpedoes, 500 pounds of TNT, 404 grenades, and 17 107mm rocket fuses. As October ended the 25th Infantry Division and units under its operational control were conducting offensive operations designed to locate and destroy enemy forces while providing security of the rural population of Tay Ninh and Binh Thuan Provinces.

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rounds of 60mm mortar, six rounds of 82mm mortar, one 7.62mm machinegun, 17,250 rounds of AK ammunition and 10 75mm recoilless rifle rounds. Contacts were light during the remainder of October. As the period closed Capital Military Assistance Command continues offensive operations to locate and destroy enemy elements in Gia Dinh province and to secure the city of Saigon from attack.

The 1st Australian Task Force. The 1st Australian Task Force continues reconnaissance in force and patrolling operations in its tactical area of interest during this reporting period. Task organization included A/3 Cavalry, C/1 Armored Regiment, and the 1st and 3rd Royal Australian Regiments. During this reporting period, the Task Force conducted extensive day and night patrolling operations in their tactical area of interest. Frequent contact was made by the patrols with enemy forces. In most cases, these contacts resulted in enemy losses without loss to friendly forces and attest to the ability and knowledge of the Australian Forces in patrolling techniques. On 21 August, A/3 Cavalry contacted an unknown size enemy force at Long 610, five kilometers east of Baria. Eleven Australians were wounded and 29 enemy were killed. On 1 September, C/3 EAR located six enemy killed from previous contacts five kilometers east of Ngia Gio. Several light contacts by elements of the Task Force on 16 September resulted in eight enemy killed and three small arms captured without loss to friendly forces. Commencing 15 September the Task Force commenced a combined operation with the 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force in the Phou Tich area.

The 1st Australian Task Force was specifically targeted against the 274th Viet Cong Regiment in the Hat Dinh area. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force and 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) were to conduct support operations beginning on 17 September. V/4 EAR contacted an estimated 10 enemy on 19 September six kilometers southwest of Courtenay. Six enemy were killed. All contacts by the Task Force on 19 September resulted in a total of eight enemy killed, one prisoner, eight small arms and 6,700 piasters captured. Several light contacts on 21 September resulted in 10 enemy killed without loss to friendly forces. During October contacts were light, and as the period closed the 1st Australian Task Force conducted offensive operations in Phuoc Tuy Province, between Gia Ray and Kuyen Soo, and northwest of Baria.

The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force. Initial task organization included the 1-1 Infantry, 2-1 Infantry, 3-1 Infantry. On 9 August, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force assumed responsibility for local security missions around Binh Son and Binh Son from the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and commenced reconnaissance in force operations in its assigned tactical area of responsibility. The 1-1 Infantry secured Binh Son and Fire Support Base Tak while the 2-1 Infantry and the 3-1 Infantry conducted security operations in the vicinity of Binh Son in coordination and cooperation with 9th Infantry Division rear elements. There were no significant contacts with the enemy until 21 September. At 0335 hours, B and C/3-1 Infantry at Binh Son received small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. At 0540 hours one kilometer southeast of Binh Son a ground attack was initiated by an estimated enemy battalion against elements of 3-1 Infantry. A and B/3-1 Infantry reinforced.
Companies B and C at Binh Son. At 0645 hours the four companies had pinned down an estimated 50 enemy in an area one kilometer southeast of Binh Son. US artillery and light fire teams were called to support 3-1 Infantry. The contact continued until 0715 hours and was followed by multiple company sweeps around Binh Son and Bearcat. Enemy losses were 44 killed and 12 individual weapons and two crew served weapons captured. Thai losses were five killed and five wounded. On 23 September, at 0945 hours, D/5-1 Infantry, while conducting local security operations one and one-half kilometers south of Binh Son, located 19 enemy killed from previous contacts. On 28 and 29 September a combined operation was initiated by Commanding General, II FFORCZV involving the RTAVF, and elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, in coordination with the 1st Australian Task Force. The operation, conducted in the area south of a line between Bearcat and Blackhorse base camps, was targeted against the 274th Viet Cong Regiment. Through October contacts were light, and as the period closed the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force conducted offensive operations near Bearcat base camp.

(3) Air Operations.
(a) B-52 Operations.
1. During this reporting period the program of using massive B-52 strikes in maneuver or economy of force roles was continued. The objectives of the program were:
   a. To destroy enemy forces,
   b. To interdict the infiltration of enemy units and fillers,
   c. To destroy known base areas and deny the enemy use of these areas to training, resupply and rest,
   d. Interdict resupply of food, equipment and ammunition.
2. There is evidence that the effective targeting of B-52 strikes against enemy units and known base areas has had major effects on the enemy's offensive capability. There have been reports of extremely heavy casualties inflicted on specific units, and reports of both morale and supply problems arising from B-52 strikes. It is reasonable to believe that the repeated failure of the enemy to initiate major offensive operations during this period has been in large measure due to the effectiveness of the B-52 program.

(b) Army Aviation Operations.
1. Resources.
   a. The following non-divisional resources were under control of II FFORCZV during the reporting period:

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Rotary Wing:

- 13 Assault Helicopter Companies
- 1 Armed Helicopter Company
- 4 Assault Support Helicopter Companies (Ms4)
- 1 Assault Support Helicopter Company (Heavy)
- 1 Aviation Company (CORPS)
- 1 Air Cavalry Squadron

Fixed Wing:

- 2 Reconnaissance Airplane Companies
- 1 Utility Airplane Company
- 1 Surveillance Airplane Company

At the close of the reporting period, there were 589 helicopters and 117 airplanes assigned. Operational guidance was provided by the Commanding General and implemented by the G-2 in surveillance and reconnaissance functions, and by G-3 in Air Cavalry, combat assault, airmobile, and general support functions. Command, less operational control, continues to be exercised by the 12th Combat Aviation battalion.

Allocation. Aviation resources continued to be allocated to major units based upon the overall tactical plan envisioned by Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam or as directed by higher headquarters. Support was provided all US and Allied organizations under the operational control of II Field Force Vietnam and III Corps.

Employment. The number of assault helicopter companies (AHC) continued to be insufficient to satisfy all valid requirements. During August and September the flight time per AHC increased approximately seven percent to support the additional tactical and general support missions. The AHC was unable to support the increased requirements for an indefinite period due to insufficient personal, both aviators and maintenance men, authorized by the TOE. A total of 2500 - 2800 hours was the optimum flight time per AHC for sustained operation without augmenting the TOE. A policy of allowing each AHC to stand down two days a month has been initiated to improve the quality of maintenance. In addition, an operational limitation of six hours flying time per day per committed aircraft in both armed helicopter companies and assault support helicopter companies was implemented. More thorough planning of tactical operations has increased the productive use of flight time of AHC aircraft by cutting down orbit times and eliminating the necessity for many last-minute reinforcement and resupply operations.
The use of additional preparatory fires on landing zones prior to insertion is needed to reduce the loss of personnel and aircraft to enemy fire.

1. Firefly Operations. During the period it was determined that the Armed Helicopter Company can not provide four Firefly teams each night because of other tactical requirements for the aircraft. The commitment for Firefly teams, as a result, was reduced to three teams per night. Despite this reduction, Firefly teams from August until 31 October destroyed 558 sampans and 105 structures in night operations.

(c) Statistical summaries of aviation operations are given in Inclusions 3-6.

2. Bridge Security Survey. On 22 October, Headquarters, II FFORCEV completed the initial phase of a program designed to improve the security of critical bridges in the II CTZ. In July, Commanding General, II FFORCEV directed that inspections be conducted to determine the security of critical bridges in the II FFORCEV area of operations. An inspection team was formed including representatives of the II FFORCEV G3 and Engineer staff sections, Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps, and the Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, III CTZ. A total of 31 bridges were classed as critical on the basis of location, size, length, cost of replacement, traffic flow, and the tactical and economic importance of the lines of communication they serve. By 22 October, all the bridges had been inspected and corrective action recommended to the appropriate commanders. As a result of this study, significant improvements have been made at most of the bridge sites, including upgrading of fields of fire, restoration of protective and tactical barriers, repair of bunkers, replacement of mine fields, and the installation of effective lighting systems and mine booms. A follow-up phase of inspections, scheduled to begin in November, will concentrate on the refinement and continued improvement of security measures.


(a) Gains.

1. The first increment of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) closed in RVN on 20 August 1968. The 3d Infantry Battalion, a 155mm artillery battery, and elements of lst Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company, motor transport company, medical company, maintenance battalion, and replacement company closed on 5 August 1968. The rear party closed on 20 August 1968.

2. The 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division closed in III CTZ on 13 October 1968. The brigade headquarters and maneuver units closed as follows:

3. The 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry closed 18 September 1968 and became operational 22 September 1968.
b The 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry closed 30 September 1968 and became operational 6 October 1968.

b The 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry closed 13 October 1968 and became operational 21 October 1968.

d Brigade Headquarters closed 3 October 1968 and became operational 6 October 1968.

c The 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery closed in RVN on 20 September 1968 and was assigned to 23d Artillery Group. Its units became operational as follows:

a Headquarters and Battery B - 10 October 1968

b Battery A - 11 October 1968

c Battery C - 13 October 1968

d Elements of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) closed into the III CTZ on 29 October and commenced operations under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

(b) Losses.

The 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was released by II FFORCENV to the 101st Airborne Division on 10 October 1968. The Brigade Headquarters and maneuver units were released as follows:

a Brigade Headquarters and 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry were released on 24 September 1968.

b The 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry was released on 23 September 1968.

c The 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry was released on 10 October 1968.

2 Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment returned to Thailand on 15 August 1968.

(b) Training.

(a) Seven ARVN battalions completed ARVN Infantry/Ranger Battalion Refresher Training during the period 1 August - 31 October 1968. Two additional battalions were in training at the end of October. This training is progressing on schedule and is being well received by the ARVN battalions.

(b) Reciprocal Mobile Training Teams (RMTT) were exchanged between the 1st Infantry Division and the 5th ARVN Division, the 25th Infantry Division and the 25th ARVN Division, and the 9th Infantry Division and the 7th ARVN Division during the reporting period. The type of training conducted by the RMTT varied according to the needs of the particular unit.
Operations of Company F (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry.

(a) Combat Operations.

1. Throughout the reporting period, Company F participated in Campaign TOAN THINH in the III CTZ.

2. From 1 to 11 August, Commanding Officer, Company F, conducted the defense of the Long Binh/Binh Hoa complex, an operation that had begun on 18 July and continued into the reporting period. In addition to Company F, under his operational control at the beginning of the period were the 361st Mobile Strike Force Battalion, 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVIN), D/3-17th Air Cavalry, B/2-11th Cavalry and D/3-11th Cavalry. Company F performed the mission of providing early warning through trail watch operations. This method of employing long range patrols in a screening role proved highly successful.

3. On 11 August, Company F undertook the mission of monitoring enemy movement along the Vam Co Dong River west of Saigon, between the Angel’s Wing (XT 3020), the Parrot’s Beak (XS 3044) and the Pineapple Plantation area (XS 6090). This area proved extremely difficult for patrol operations due to the constant inundation of much of the land and the rise of the Vam Co Dong River with the tides. In many instances, patrols were able to move only comparatively short distances and on occasion had to be extracted because of rising water.

4. During the three-month period, Company F inserted 213 light (five or six-man) teams and 28 heavy (10 to 13-man) teams. These patrols made a total of 193 separate enemy sightings and engaged enemy forces on 110 occasions. As a direct result of Company F operations, the enemy suffered 125 killed and 19 captured, while US losses were three killed and 48 wounded. Additionally, 32 enemy small arms and two RIG rockets were captured.

(b) New Techniques.

1. During operations in this relatively open region, the company initiated what came to be called Vulture Flights, in which light fire teams sought out and engaged enemy elements, followed immediately by ground forces which were lifted into the area to exploit the contact.

2. Company F for a time employed Underwater Demolition Teams to operate with teams in inundated areas along canals and rivers. This technique did not prove adequate because of the limited visibility in the muddy waters of the areas.

3. Company F conducted tests of the HEL-E4A Noise Suppressor designed as a silencer for the M-16 rifles. These proved extremely useful in long range patrol operations by making it difficult for the enemy to locate patrols by the sounds of their weapons.
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**Logistical Operations**

(1) **Programs and Projects.**

(a) **Preparation for Receiving Elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).** During October, numerous conferences and staff visits were made with the project officers of USARV, 1st Logistical Command, Saigon Support Command, and units under the operational control of II FFORCEV in preparation for receiving elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Helicopter pads and refuel/rearm points were improved, transportation assets were increased, supplies were pre-positioned, and installations were made available for the incoming units. Arrangements were made at Long Binh to house the advance elements of the division. Plans were formulated for road openings for convoy operations to permit maintenance and supply build-ups and port clearance. Prior planning enabled the incoming units to move into III CTZ smoothly and to set up operations with a minimum delay.

(b) **Logistics Conference for Attached/Assigned Units.** A G4 conference was conducted on 12 September for commanders, supply, and maintenance personnel of the II FFORCEV attached/assigned units to promulgate USARV and II FFORCEV policy. Topics were: elimination of excesses at unit level, requisition priority designators, asset reporting in accordance with AR 711-5, preparation of MTOE, proper utilization and control of organizational vehicles, ammunition storage and basic loads.

(c) **Logistic Readiness Program.**

1. The quarterly meeting for Logistic Readiness Officers of II FFORCEV assigned/attached units was held on 18 October. Topics discussed were: reconciliation of requisitions, problem areas of the one-quarter ton truck (M151), organization of the 185th Maintenance Battalion, Project Counter Repair Parts Supply School, the II FFORCEV Vehicle Maintenance and Utilization Team and the Commander's Critical Items List.

2. Twenty-two organizational maintenance and supply inspections were conducted during the reporting period. Included in this figure were six Annual Inspector General Inspections. Eleven units received a satisfactory rating and eleven were rated unsatisfactory, six of these to be reinspected. The major cause for the unsatisfactory rating was maintenance management operations.

3. A program was established recently wherein the II FFORCEV Logistic Readiness Officer will visit each assigned/attached unit during the next quarter.

(d) **Province/District Advisor Support.** A conference was held at II FFORCEV Headquarters during October to brief headquarters personnel on current agreements, policies and directives relative to the logistical support for US advisors assigned to provinces and districts in III CTZ. Problem areas were defined and possible solutions were discussed that were within the capabilities of Headquarters, II FFORCEV. Actions were initiated to improve the support of US advisors at province and district level.
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(e) Bridge Defense. During the period, increased emphasis was placed upon up-grading the illumination and barrier protection of all bridges. Additional chain link fence, lighting material and generators were the major items of logistical support in the overall bridge defense.

(f) M-16 Rifle Distribution. In September the defensive posture of three locations (Katum, Thien Ngon, Bu Dop) was improved by action to modify the MACV program for distribution of M-16 rifles. Permission was obtained from COMUSMACV by the Commanding General to redistribute 450 M-16 rifles to be employed by Mobile Strike Force units at these locations.

(2) Supply Operations. The G4 Section, II FFORCEV carried on a wide variety of supply activities during the period of this report in support of operations in III CTZ. Among these were:

(a) Providing assistance in the preparation for the receipt and support of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force.

(b) Receipt and issue of helicopters. During the period, 9 AH-1G (Cobra) and 38 OH-6 (Cayuse) helicopters were received. They were issued as follows:

1. AH-1G (Cobra) Helicopters:
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. OH-6A (Cayuse) Helicopters:
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>199th Inf Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>12th Avn Gp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Managing critical ammunition items issued to II FFORCEV.

1. Ammunition items in short supply are managed through the use of Available Supply Rates (ASR) to permit equitable distribution of available stocks.

2. During the period 1 August to 31 October 68, the number of items on ASR showed an upward trend. The number of items under ASR control for the allocation periods was as follows:
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Aug - 12 items
Sep - 14 items
Oct - 18 items

(3) Maintenance.

(a) A major problem among II FFORCENV units has been the dropping of external loads from aircraft. The primary reason was failure of aerial slings. It was found that slings were not being date-stamped with the date they were placed into service by the using unit. The service life of these slings is six months.

(b) The OH-6A helicopter has been below the operational readiness criteria established by the Department of the Army. A contributing factor has been a critical shortage of tail rotor assemblies both in CONUS and RVN.

(c) In the 12th Combat Aviation Group the average UH-1 and CH-47 flight time increased rapidly and had reached a level which could not be supported by maintenance. As a result, a two day per month company maintenance stand down program was instituted by II FFORCENV.

(4) Transportation.

(a) Operation Golden Sword, which began 1 September 1968, was completed 24 October 1968. This operation involved the movement of the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), from III CTZ, and the movement of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, from I CTZ to III CTZ. A summary of the airlift for this operation follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>CARGO (LBS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-82</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>4,143</td>
<td>5,418,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-101</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>3,195</td>
<td>6,259,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>7,338</td>
<td>11,678,023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) USAF C130/C123 sorties flown in support of II FFORCENV units are summarised in Incl #3.

(5) Status of Primary Land Lines of Communication as of 31 October 1968.

(a) For the purpose of this report the following terms concerning the condition of land lines of communication are defined:

1. Condition I: The route is capable of carrying up to class 50 loads (all division loads).

2. Condition II: Up to class 35 loads (the majority of logistical transport, e.g., 5000 gallon fuel tanker).

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3. Condition III: Up to class 16 loads (armored personnel carriers
and 2 1/2 ton trucks).

4. Condition IV: Can carry only light civilian traffic; therefore,
it is open only to light reconnaissance vehicles.

5. Condition V: Closed to all traffic.

(b) Route QL 1.

1. Cambodian border (XT 284244) to Go Dau Ha (XT 383250), bridge
blown at XT 382250, condition V.

2. Go Dau Ha (XT 383250) to Cu Chi (XT 628126), lowest bridge
capacity class 60, condition I.

3. Cu Chi (XT 628126) to Saigon (XS 793942), lowest bridge capacity
class 60, condition I.

4. Saigon (XS 793942) to road junction 316 (TT 072130), lowest bridge
capacity class 30, condition III.

5. Road junction 316 (TT 072130) to Xuan Loc (YT 456090), lowest bridge
capacity class 40, condition II.

6. Xuan Loc (YT 456090) to II CTZ boundary (XT 180014), lowest bridge
capacity class 50, condition III.

(c) Route QL 4.

1. Road junction QL 4 (XS 845914) to Ben Luc (XS 618758), lowest bridge
capacity class 50, condition I.

2. Ben Luc (XS 618758) to IV CTZ boundary (XS 599600), lowest bridge
capacity class 50, condition I.

(d) Route QL 13.

1. Road junction QL 13 (XS 879971) to An Loc (XT 755885), lowest bridge
capacity class 30, condition III.

2. An Loc (XT 755885) to Cambodian border (XU 683233), condition V.

(e) Route QL 14. Dong Xoai (YT 079759) to II CTZ boundary (YT 166820),
bridge out at YT 166820, condition V.

(f) Route QL 15.

1. Bien Hoa (YT 002114) to Baria (YS 380607), lowest bridge capacity
class 55, condition I.

2. Baria (YS 380607) to Vung Tau (YS 274414), lowest bridge capacity
class 12, condition IV.

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(g) Route QL 20. Road junction QL 1 (YT 343101) to II CTZ boundary (YT 763572), lowest bridge capacity class 20, condition III.

(h) Route QL 22. Go Dau Ha (XT 384251) to Tay Ninh (XT 199500), lowest bridge capacity class 55, condition I.

(i) Route LTL 16. Bien Hoa (YT 002114) to road junction LTL 1A (XT 887373), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

(j) Route LTL 1A.

1. Dong Xaoi (YT 079759) to Phuoc Vinh (XT 970490), lowest bridge capacity class 60, condition III.

2. Phuoc Vinh (XT 975491) to road junction QL 13 (XT 812140), lowest bridge capacity class 60, condition I.

(k) Route LTL 2. Road junction QL 1 (YT 437045) to Baria (YS 380607), lowest bridge capacity class 24, condition III.

(l) Route LTL 54.

1. Saigon (XS 816990) to Ong Thin Bridge (XS 815775), lowest bridge capacity class 16, condition III.

2. Ong Thin (XS 815775) to Can Giuoc (XS 830731), lowest bridge capacity class 16, condition III.

3. Can Giuoc (XS 830731) to Cau Noi Ferry (XS 786568), lowest bridge capacity class 12, condition IV.

(a) Route LTL 23.

1. Baria (YS 380607) to (YS 628653), lowest bridge capacity class 40, condition II.

2. YS 628653 to II CTZ boundary (YS 815700), condition V.

(a) Route LTI 9A. Road junction QL 1 (YT 739033) to Duc Hoa (YS 598966), lowest bridge capacity class 45, condition II.

(o) Route LTL 26 and Route 239. Tay Ninh (XT 259500) to Dau Tieng (XT 490460), lowest bridge capacity class 60, condition II.

(f) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs/Civic Action.

(2) Significant Psychological Operations Activities.

(a) The II FFORVN Psychological Operations Program directed against enemy personnel and civilians under the influence of the enemy increased slightly in scope during the reporting quarter. A total of 561 million
leallets were disseminated by Army and Air Force aircraft. More than 3,875 sorties were flown in support of the psychological warfare program during the reporting period and 3,815 hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were transmitted in support of tactical operations.

(b) A total of 812 Hoi Chanh rallied to the GVN during the reporting period.

(2) Significant Civil Affairs/Civic Action Activities.

(a) With an increase of active participation by II FFORCEV units within III and IV CTZ, military civic action continued at an accelerated rate. Areas of interest continued to be the improvement of both the Vietnamese living standard and the image of the US/FWAF.

(b) There has been an increase in participation of military civic action projects by US/FWMAF and GVN officials. This has been accomplished through better relations with the Vietnamese people, and continued stress on the self-help program.

(3) Civil Affairs Support of Mobile Advisory Teams.

(a) Reports have been received of increasing activity by the Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) civil affairs self-help projects in upgrading their living conditions as well as helping the local populace. Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) have been largely responsible for providing the stimulus and guidance for this progress in civil affairs activity. The continued and growing participation of the RF/PF in civic action projects is highly desirable as a further means of enhancing the image of the Government of Vietnam in the eyes of the Vietnamese people. Unit commanders assigned responsibility for supporting MAT within their respective operational areas have been encouraged to render civil affairs support (especially materiel and transportation) to the MAT in their role of furthering RF/PF participation in civic action projects. In determining requirements for such support, commanders have been coordinating with Province and District Senior Advisors to which the MAT are assigned. The civil affairs platoons operating in direct support of the MACV Advisory Teams serve as the coordinating link between the MAT and the US units providing civil affairs support.

g. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

(1) New Life Development.

(a) Economic Development.

Advisory efforts in the field of economic development were concentrated on increasing projects that would increase each income rather than on random service projects. The ultimate goal is to develop a stable middle class, interested in maintaining an equally stable government and economic life. Although some success was realized the problem to date has been hampered by a lack of means by which the individual, as opposed to
2. During the period of this report, the first test crop of IR-8/5 rice was harvested. Production from the 6,358 hectares planted in the new high-yield rice averaged 280 per cent of that of the strain formerly grown. Farmers appeared enthusiastic about the possibility of second and third crops which will be grown providing sufficient water for irrigation can be arranged.

3. A total of 22,410,313 VN$ was loaned to farmers through the Agricultural Development Bank. Problems were encountered in the field of agricultural credit as a result of the late arrival of funds to nine provinces and the general lack of information on the part of the farmers concerning available credit.

4. The planned rapid development of the poultry program was hampered by a limited supply of day-old chicks, feed, antibiotic additives and vaccines. Improvement in this program should result from a recent increase in import permits for day-old chicks, under which III CTZ was allocated 72,000 for November and 95,000 for December. Feed outlets were established in nine of the 12 provinces in the III CTZ, and feed was made available to those provinces not having dealers. The Animal Health Branch of the US Agency for International Development in Saigon and the Animal Protection Branch of the Animal Husbandry Directorate, Government of Vietnam, are taking measures to insure that an adequate supply of antibiotics and vaccines are on hand.

5. The project to increase the production of swine in Bien Hoa Province was set back during the period by an outbreak of hog cholera. Although the epidemic was stopped by a vaccination program, 5,000 swine were lost.

b) Education. In the field of education a plan was initiated to accomplish pre-service and in-service training for teachers, inspectors and education chiefs. The objectives are to insure the repair of schools damaged during recent combat actions and the construction of new classrooms, quarters for principals, water systems and other school facilities. Additionally, workshops for adult education teachers and a training course for Vietnamese teachers of English have been instituted.

c) Government Administration. During the period, the Acting Civil Affairs Assistant conducted inspections of the governmental administrations of all provinces in the III CTZ. Although hampered by a delay in the appointment of a Regional Inspectorate, the inspections accomplished a number of objectives, including confirmation that provinces had resumed an active village-hamlet training program, that recovery from the Tet and May offensives was nearing completion in spite of an overall reduction in security, and that the province governmental operations were being hampered by a loss of personnel to the military draft.
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(d) Public Works. Little progress was made during the period of
this report on the up-grading of provincial and hamlet roads, due to a
shortage of personnel who had been called into the military service and
to the heavy volume of deadline construction equipment. During the
previous reporting period the deadline rate was 33 percent. During the
past three months this level was reduced to 25 percent, mainly through
eliminating pieces of equipment considered non-repairable. Contributing
to this problem was the supply operation of the Suoi Lo 0 Public Works
Yarn. Many of the required parts were in stock but, because of weaknesses
in the stock record system, parts could not be located. A step
that is expected to lead to an improvement in the status of the equipment
was the hiring, in October, of third-country nationals who are trained
mechanics to assist in maintaining this equipment. The assignment of
additional engineer advisors to province Public Works Organizations should
assist in improving the quantity and quality of public works projects.

(e) Youth Programs. Increased emphasis on youth affairs programs
during recent months has generated considerable local interest in activ-
ities such as scouting, archery, field sports and other recreational
areas designed to promote a sense of unity and mutual identity among
the people.

(2) Revolutionary Development. The Revolutionary Development Program
continued to accelerate during the reporting period, further eliminating
the effects of the enemy Tet and May offensives and showing significant
progress in a number of areas. Enemy attacks during August and September,
however, disrupted operations in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong and Phuoc Long
Provinces. Programs in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Province had resumed
productive operation prior to the end of October, however, the Phuoc Long
program was not expected to recover until after the end of November. Of
the 287 hamlets included in the Revolutionary Development program, work
was under way in 121 hamlets, and certification of completion had taken
place in 107 hamlets by the end of October. The Outer Belt Hamlet plan
was terminated on 31 October, having achieved modest results. During
October detailed planning was undertaken to provide for a Special Pacification
Offensive. The objective of the offensive will be to extend GVN control to
80 percent of the population and territory in the III Corps through the em-
ployment of both GVN and US/FN/MAR assets, by 31 January 1969. This will re-
quire bringing under GVN control an additional 256 hamlets, a significant
increase in expansion of GVN control. In the past, Revolutionary Development
emphasis has been divided, with 60 percent of the effort directed toward
GVN-controlled hamlets and 40 percent toward contested or enemy-controlled
hamlets. This offensive will be targeted exclusively against hamlets in
contested areas (categories D and E under the Hamlet Evaluation System).

(3) Chieu Hoi.
(a) From 1 August to 31 October, 812 Ho Chi Minh rallied to the
Government of Vietnam, a marked increase over the previous period when
there were 568 ralliers. A total of 277 rallied during August, 196 in
September and 339 in October. The figure for October exceeds that of any
other month this year. Hau Nghia Province received 98 returnees during October, the largest number since August, 1967. The increase in ralliers is credited to two factors: The intensified activities of the Armed Propaganda Companies and the accelerated offensive operations by Allied forces.

(b) On 16 August, after approximately two months of negotiations, 93 Khum Kamprechea Kimer (Cambodian mercenaries) rallied to the GVN. This is the second largest group of these personnel to surrender in the III CTZ. In late October they were undergoing Kit Carson Scout training with the 1st US Infantry Division.

(c) A workshop on teacher literacy training was conducted at the Regional Chieu Hoi Center, Bien Hoa. A total of 26 persons attended the workshop and were returned to their provinces to teach illiterate Hoi Chanh and other Vietnamese reading, writing, spelling, and arithmetic.

Refugee Program.

(a) Population Relocation. In September, 734 persons, mostly Montagnards in Duo Phong District, Phuoc Long Province, were successfully airlifted by helicopter in a relocation operation to a GVN-controlled area. These people, who had requested evacuation because of enemy harassment and terrorism, were allowed to bring much of their food, personal belongings and some livestock. This operation, which required moving a security element, pre-positioning rice and other commodities at the resettlement site, as well as transporting the people and their goods, required extensive coordination with II FFORCEV, Province and District Senior advisors, Special Forces elements, Refugee Mobile Cadre and GVN officials. Mobile Cadre Team personnel, because they are indigenous to the area, proved valuable in preparing the evacuees psychologically for the move, as well as assisting in the overall organization. The pre-positioning of food at the resettlement site was required to insure that the immediate needs of the people were met; bad food been in short supply upon arrival, much of the goodwill generated by the move would have been dissipated.

(b) Field Program Reporting. During this period the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief and CORDS reached an agreement in principle with respect to the establishment of a Joint Automatic Data Processing Reporting System which would yield the first fully accurate and comprehensive statistics on the refugee program. The reporting requirement had been submitted to the field on the US side and the first results were received at the beginning of the next period. The initial experiments in the use of this system have already begun to give a clearer picture of the nature and magnitude of the refugee problem in the III CTZ, and have been of assistance in program monitoring and management. It is anticipated that the system will be improved during the next period and will go into full effect in January 1969.

Territorial Security.
AFTEC-WW-31

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RGS OSPOR - 65 (UL) (BH-70-A) (2)

(a) During the reporting period the Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) continued to operate against local force enemy units, securing local areas, conducting extensive night ambushes and participating with US/F4MAF forces in increasing numbers of cordon and search operations. Use of the RF/PF Group Headquarters to mass several RF and PF units for specific operations increased during the last quarter. The Vietnamese have found that the Group Headquarters is an effective means of meeting the need to employ RF/PF in multi-company operations. Particularly in Gia Dinh and Long An Provinces the RF/PF Group Headquarters concept has been well implemented. The RF and PF have been employed successfully on many cordon and search operations with US/F4MAF units throughout the corps area. It has been found that these operations are most successful and are becoming more commonplace to both the RF/PF and US and F4MAF. During the initial enemy attack on Tay Ninh during September, RF/PF units bore the brunt of the fighting until US and GVN units joined the battle. In Tay Ninh the RF/PF forces gave an excellent account of themselves.

(b) The RF/PF improvement program to include the issue of more and better weapons, the use of Mobile Advisory Teams, and the total overall increase in concern for the well-being of the RF and PF soldier and his family has resulted in substantial increased effectiveness on the part of RF/PF.

(c) The PF Housing Program was postponed during the period as a result of problems encountered in supplying the necessary building materials. In several instances when materials were shipped to a province, some items needed for construction were omitted. As a result the housing units could not be built and the materials were subjected to pillage. Another problem encountered was the lack of transportation, since provisions were not made to transport housing units to the provinces. As a result of these and other complicating problems, the program has been postponed temporarily. The program is basically an excellent one in concept but in practice, too many problems have been encountered. At the end of the reporting period, a study was being conducted to try to resolve the existing difficulties.

h. Communications: Significant improvements in command and control communications have been accomplished during the reporting period ending 31 October. Means of communications have been increased and improved to provide greater flexibility and response in support of II FFORCEV operations.

(1) During the month of August, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) arrived at Bearcat, Vietnam and went under the operational control of II FFORCEV. The US Liaison team supporting RTAVF did not include a Signal representative; therefore, the II FFORCEV Signal Section provided guidance and assistance to the RTAVF. The RTAVF installed its own MTC-1 switchboard to replace an older one previously installed at Bearcat. To provide more efficient utilization of sole user circuits in the RTAVF Tactical Operation Center, a stacked SB-22 switchboard was installed rather than individual sole user telephones as originally planned. Because the RTAVF were not familiar with the US equipment, continuous guidance and
assistance was required during installation and initial operations. The telephone system soon became overloaded with administrative traffic. The agreement between RTAVF and US Army Republic of Vietnam was changed to increase the number of dial telephones from four to fifty. With the dial telephones being used for administrative traffic the existing tactical circuits were adequate for operational traffic.

(2) On 9 September, the Mode IV AUTODIN Terminal became operational at Headquarters, II FFORCEN. The terminal is van mounted in a mobile configuration and located adjacent to the II FFORCEN main communication center. This terminal provides Headquarters, II FFORCEN an entry into the worldwide AUTODIN network. Initially, the terminal was operated by the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) but due to the operator and maintenance problems encountered, responsibility for operation of the terminal was transferred to an Army area signal battalion.

(3) In September the Automatic Secure Communications (AUTOSEDCOM) terminal was removed from the ACoS, G3 building for shipment to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey to be used for training maintenance personnel on secure voice equipment. The secure voice equipment was scheduled to be placed in the new underground II FFORCEN Tactical Operations Center during November. For the interim period a temporary secure voice terminal mounted in a mobile electrical equipment shelter was placed in operation next to the above ground ACoS, G3 building. The temporary terminal was cut over to the existing signal lines of the fixed secure voice terminal and was operational after a few minor adjustments.

(4) An active 12-channel radio relay system and a standby four-channel radio relay system to the 54th Artillery Group were discontinued when the 54th Artillery Group moved from Xuan Loc to a location near Headquarters, II FFORCEN on 25 September. Circuits to the 54th Artillery Group Headquarters were provided through an existing cable. This resulted in additional radio relay and terminal equipment being made available for other uses.

(5) Three radio terminals, AN/TRC-97B, were received by the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) in August. A troposcatter system was established on a test basin between Headquarters, II FFORCEN at Long Binh, and Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, Dong Tan.

(6) Critical circuits to the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light), the 12th Combat Aviation Group and the 79th Engineer Group were transferred from an overhead cable to an existing 100-pair underground cable. A 200-pair underground cable from Hurricane patch panel located at II FFORCEN AN/TSC-97 site has been installed. Fifty pairs of this cable are being extended to service the 54th Artillery Group Headquarters, located in the same compound as the AN/TSC-97 site.

(7) A new 1000-Line Plantation dial telephone exchange building was constructed at II FFORCEN Headquarters during this period. Revetments surrounding the building are under construction. The dial exchange will become operational within approximately 30 days after the arrival of air conditioners which are due in-country in December.
(6) Contingency plans were completed for circuits through the area systems to supplement tactical circuits to subordinate units from the II FFORCEV Tactical Operations Center and the Alternate Tactical Operations Center.

(9) The communications security of Headquarters, II FFORCEV was enhanced by revising the Signal Operating Instructions (SOI) and Standing Signal Instructions (SSI) to meet the criteria in FM 32-5 and United States Army Vietnam Regulation 380-13. The communication security improvements made in these documents set the precedent for signal publications in subordinate commands. Random selection of radio call signs and frequencies which change on a monthly basis was incorporated in the SOI. Improved instructions for using National Security Agency-produced KAC codes and for passing various signal reports were published in the revised SSI.

1. Information:

(1) Production in the Radio Broadcast Section of the Information Office continued to increase. Hometown tapes produced numbered 849 and ten radio features were produced. During the period, the broadcast section expanded its coverage by developing a television feature capability, which produced 12 television tapes.

(2) The Public Information Section produced 122 news stories and 453 Hometown News Releases, and supported visits from 20 civilian news media representatives.

(3) The Command Information Section continued production of the newly expanded (36,000 issues) II FFORCEV magazine. In the August, September and October issues pacification and related subjects were covered in 13 articles, Army units in seven stories, other US forces in three articles, Allied forces in one story and general subjects in two other articles.

J. Inspector General. During the reporting period the Inspector General, Headquarters, II FFORCEV conducted inspections of six assigned and/or attached units, and processed 48 individual requests for assistance.

K. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) During the reporting period personnel of the Staff Judge Advocate's section continued to visit units in the field to provide legal assistance and guidance in the handling of military justice matters. This program was substantially reduced from the previous reporting period because of a shortage of lawyers and an increased general court-martial workload. However, a lawyer from this office travelled to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's base camp for one day each week to provide these services.

(2) The Staff Judge Advocate verified the classification by the 219th Military Intelligence Detachment of a number of detainees as to their status as civil defendants or prisoners of war.
(3) Eight general courts-martial were conducted for such offenses as robbery, manslaughter, larceny and possession of narcotics.

(4) The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate continued to provide frequent legal support to the Office of the Deputy for CORDS, II FFORC/III CTZ, especially concerning the problem of compensating Vietnamese nationals for private property used by the US Army in the III CTZ.

(5) The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate continued to provide legal support for post, camp and station functions. The number of requests for review of nonappropriated fund contracts, reports of survey and reports of investigation increased over the previous reporting period.

(6) This headquarters was given general court-martial jurisdiction over the 3d Battalion, 197th Artillery (New Hampshire National Guard) on 13 September and the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division on 4 October 1968.

(7) During the reporting period the Staff Judge Advocate worked closely with the II FFORC Provost Marshal to publicize general regulations applicable to the conduct of individuals, for example, illegal disposition of exchange purchased items, search of Vietnamese citizens and third-country nationals, and currency violations.

(8) On 24 August a change to USARV Regulation 27-1 was promulgated to discourage the extended confinement of men convicted by inferior courts-martial and to encourage early return to duty of all sentenced prisoners. To implement these policies, II FFORC Regulation 27-2 was changed to require written justification by unit commanders for either the confinement of first offenders or the confinement for more than thirty days of men convicted by summary or special courts-martial. The Chief of Staff was delegated the power to act upon requests for confinement in these cases.
Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None.

b. Operations:

(1) Cordon and Search Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION. The analysis of several recent unsuccessful cordon and search operations has indicated measures that can be employed to improve the results of these operations.

(b) EVALUATION. Among the weaknesses noted in certain operations were gaps in the cordons, the lack of specific targets within the areas cordoned, inadequate security of information pertaining to impending search operations, and failure to complete seals rapidly. The following measures have been shown to assist materially in eliminating these deficiencies:

i. Selection of a specific target within the capability of the cordon elements. Too large a target results in leaks in the seal which the enemy is quick to discover and exploit.

ii. The use of intelligence sources to determine a specific target, a house, hospital or a factory rather than an entire hamlet or village.

iii. Conduct of the operation without employing aerial reconnaissance to avoid disclosure of the target area.

iv. The use of all possible speed in completing the seal to prevent the enemy from escaping.

v. Coordination for RVN assistance in cordon and search operations only at the highest levels. The area of search should not be disclosed to the search force until just prior to employment to preclude security leaks.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That this information be made available to commanders and service schools concerned with these operations.

(2) Pile-On Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION. When fighting an elusive enemy, it is mandatory that all potentially large contacts be exploited to the fullest.

(b) EVALUATION. The Pile-On technique has proved valuable in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy through the rapid reinforcement of contacts by large numbers of maneuver elements. While basically a reinforcement operation, the Pile-On operates on the principle that maximum losses should be inflicted on any enemy force that has been located positively, and that efforts to locate and destroy other enemy elements may need to be deferred until this has been accomplished. This will, of necessity,
require taking units from other potentially profitable operations, but such action is considered worthwhile to obtain the forces required to surround, fix and destroy the known enemy force. Numerous such operations have been conducted successfully with as many as seven infantry companies inserted within a few hours, and resulted in heavy losses to the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the "Pile-on" technique be incorporated into Infantry doctrine and that this information be disseminated to commanders and service schools concerned.

(3) Jitterbug Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION. The application of the Jitterbug concept as an economy of force/quick reaction technique to seek out and destroy the enemy has proved highly successful in the III CTZ.

(b) EVALUATION. The Jitterbug technique employs a light reconnaissance and quick reaction force composed of one airmobile infantry company, one helicopter employing a Personnel Detector (People Sniffer), one helicopter carrying 6202 CS gas dispenser munitions, one light or heavy fire team, and 10 UH-1 aircraft. Initially the People Sniffer helicopter, the aircraft carrying the CS gas, the fire team and five UH-1 helicopters, each carrying six infantrymen, are deployed to reconnoiter suspected enemy locations. The remaining UH-1 aircraft and infantry are held either on standby alert nearby or orbit in the immediate area. The People Sniffer aircraft leads, searching likely enemy locations. When high sniffer readings are obtained, CS gas is employed. If enemy troops are sighted, they are engaged by the fire team while the force in the five troop-carrying helicopters is inserted. At the same time, the remainder of the company can be airlifted quickly to reinforce, the area cordoned and the enemy destroyed. Should the target be of sufficient size, a "Pile-On" operation can be initiated. The Jitterbug technique provides a number of concrete advantages over reconnaissance by ground forces, including rapid surveillance over large areas, employment of minimum numbers of aircraft and personnel until a positive contact is made, and provisions for quick exploitation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That information concerning this technique be made available to commanders and service schools concerned with the conduct of combat operations in Vietnam.

(4) Night Hunter Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION. A new concept, the Night Hunter Operation, has been employed by the 9th Infantry Division to conduct night interdictions against enemy forces and logistical traffic through the combined employment of ground-based radar and quick reaction forces.

(b) EVALUATION.

1. The Night Hunter Task Force is composed of an AN/SPS-25 radar, an air cavalry element, waterborne roving patrols, gun boats and supporting artillery. The command and control element, located at the ground surveillance radar direction center, includes the brigade commander and S-3 representative, direct support artillery battalion commander, commander or S-3
of the supporting air cavalry element and a command element from the battalion controlling the waterborne forces.

2. The command and control element directs the radar search pattern and analyzes radar sightings as they are acquired and plotted. The object is to detect, whenever possible, a target of sufficient size to warrant the employment of the air and waterborne forces. Small, isolated sightings are normally attacked only by artillery fire.

3. When a suitable target complex is acquired, the entire Night Hunter Task Force swings into action. An artillery time on target mission is initiated to deliver illumination and variable time-fused high explosive shells on to one or more of the sightings in the target complex at the proper moment. Illumination only is fired if the entire target complex falls within 500 meters of a populated area. The waterborne force maneuvers into an area adjacent to the target complex, water routes permitting, to engage enemy personnel attempting to flee the target area. The air cavalry element scramble and is vectored into the target area so as to arrive simultaneously with the artillery time on target, thus maximizing the shock and surprise of the artillery attack and illumination. Targets acquired by the air cavalry element are subject to immediate attack by machinegun, grenade and rocket fire. The artillery illumination continues, adjusted by the air cavalry fire team leader, until the entire target complex has been searched and neutralized.

4. The Ist Brigade scored 47 kills and 11 sampans destroyed in three Night Hunter operations conducted in Can Giuoc District, Long An Province. The 9th Division Artillery AN/RPS-25 ground surveillance radar, elements of A/3-17 Air Cavalry, B/2-4 Artillery (105mm towed), C/5-42 Artillery (155mm towed) and elements of the 3-39 Infantry were employed on these operations.

5. On the first Night Hunter operation, on 31 October, the air cavalry element of the task force registered 14 kills from four separate engagements, three of which resulted in contact. All were within ranges of 100 - 300 meters. Starlight scopes acquired the personnel targets.

6. It is planned to have the Task Force stand down periodically to allow the enemy to regain some confidence in their ability to move undetected at night. When radar sightings indicate the enemy are again moving the Task Force will be activated and brought to bear on them.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That information concerning this technique be made available to commanders and service schools concerned with the conduct of combat operations in Vietnam.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1968, IDS CSFOR - 65 (R) (1) (R)

(b) EVALUATION. At 0100 hours 20 September, the 163rd RF Company, defending Phuoc Thanh Outpost four kilometers east of the Cambodian border in Tay Ninh Province, was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. Not realizing immediate success, the enemy repeatedly attacked the outpost. At one point enemy elements overrun a portion of the position but a determined RF counterattack ejected them. At first light the enemy broke contact leaving 35 dead around the outpost. In addition, 16 AK-47 rifles, four RPG launchers, one flamethrower, and one prisoner were recovered. Friendly forces suffered 11 killed, 18 wounded, and two missing. At 0215 hours the 161st and 276th RF Companies were airlifted into the outpost as reinforcements. The 1st Vietnamese Marine Battalion was designated reserve for the RF companies and was standing by at Tay Ninh West. At 1015 hours the 161st and 276th RF companies were airlifted into the Phuoc Thanh position, leaving three dead around the outpost. At 0215 hours the 161st and 276th RF Companies were airlifted into the outpost as reinforcements. The 1st Vietnamese Marine Battalion was designated reserve for the RF companies and was standing by at Tay Ninh West. At 1720 hours the 161st and 276th RF Companies were airlifted into the outpost as reinforcements. The 1st Vietnamese Marine Battalion was designated reserve for the RF companies and was standing by at Tay Ninh West. At 0240 hours the following morning the enemy resumed the attack which continued until dawn. Results of this contact were four marines killed and 55 wounded, and one RF killed and five wounded. The enemy lost 125 killed and two captured. In addition, 21 AK-47 rifles, six RPG launchers, and one heavy machinegun were captured. The 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion relieved the Marine unit at 2220 hours 26 September and the enemy again attacked the Phuoc Thanh position, sustaining 126 killed, and losing 48 small arms, 11 RPG launchers, and three light machineguns. The Airborne battalions suffered six killed and 77 wounded, while RF casualties were one killed and 47 wounded.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS.
1. That the Phuoc Thanh Outpost battle be utilized as an example to illustrate the success that military commanders can achieve by a rapid transfer of forces to counter enemy action.
2. That this example be utilized to demonstrate the success that can be achieved by RF troops tenaciously defending a well-fortified position.
3. That it be used to point out the inflexibility of the enemy in attempting to salvage victory from an already unsuccessful endeavor.

Training. None.

d. Intelligence

(1) The Intelligence-Operations Cycle.

(a) OBSERVATION. An operational response to limited intelligence can often lead to the accumulation of further intelligence. The repetition of this cycle leads to more and more definite intelligence and finally may result in a fruitful, major operation.

(b) EVALUATION. The operations of the 25th Infantry Division north of Tay Ninh in the period immediately prior to the 18 August attacks provide a valuable lesson. The analysis of intelligence information in the early part of August indicated the likelihood of an enemy attack from War Zone C against Tay Ninh. Further analysis indicated likely avenues of approach. This in itself did not offer a solid basis for operational planning since several essential elements of information were missing. However, it did
indicate the desirability of establishing fire support patrol base (FSPB) north of Tay Ninh in positions to control likely avenues of enemy approach. This was done. The FSPB were used as bases for aggressive patrolling both day and night. These patrols further refined the Allied information about the area. This information in turn led to the establishment of a successful night ambush, prematurely uncovered the enemy's advance on Tay Ninh and served as a major factor in blunting this important enemy offensive.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(2) Treatment of Prisoners of War.

(a) OBSERVATION. Interrogation of suspected high ranking members of the VC Infrastructure is extremely desirable and essential to the collection of valid intelligence, however, approved interrogation procedures can not be violated.

(b) EVALUATION. On 17 October 1968, the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) conducted a visit to a Prisoner of War Collecting Point in III Corps Tactical Zone. While touring the facility a member of the committee designated three prisoners he desired to interview. One of the three alleged that he had received an "electric shock treatment" during interrogation. The ICRC representative was reluctant to reveal complete details of the allegation, he said, to prevent possible reprisals. It is believed that the prisoner who stated he had received the shock treatment was an influential member of the Viet Cong Infrastructure in Hau Nghia Province. At this particular prisoner of war cage, prisoners are taken to separate buildings within the collecting point for interrogation. Whenever possible, the interrogation and prisoner of war collecting points should be constructed within the same facility to preclude moving detained persons away from the cage for interrogation. Change of custody and type of treatment afforded all detainees must be meticulously recorded to provide a substantial basis for refuting false allegations. Leaders of VC elements can be expected to continue their resistance after capture by attempting to discredit our methods and procedures through complaints to the ICRC whenever an opportunity is afforded.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.


(1) OBSERVATION. Positive measures can be taken to limit the utilization of helicopter assets to a level that can be supported by maintenance personnel without adversely affecting combat operations.

(2) EVALUATION. During August and September, as a result of accelerated combat operations, the utilization of assault helicopter company aircraft increased approximately seven percent to a level that could not be sustained by the maintenance personnel authorized by TO&E. To correct this situation in mid-October 2800 hours was established as the optimum maximum flight time per month for each assault helicopter company. A policy of allowing each AHU to stand down two days each month was initiated to insure a high quality of maintenance, and a limitation of six flying hours per day for each committed aircraft was imposed. In addition, commanders were encouraged to plan combat operations with a view to increasing the productivity of aircraft used by cutting down the duration of orbit times and eliminating the necessity for many last minute reinforcement and resupply operations. The results of this program during the latter part of October indicate the goals of achieving a high standard of maintenance while keeping to a feasible level of utilization and rendering effective support for combat operations can be achieved.
(a) OBSERVATION. The overall quality of the regional public administration field advisory effort has been sharply reduced. Neither GVN nor CORDS officials in the provinces are receiving the advisory assistance that is required to make substantial improvements in government administration.

(b) EVALUATION. The sharp cutback in public administrative regional field staff personnel has directly and adversely affected the ability of the region to furnish adequate public administration advisory assistance to the provinces. The present one-man staff is unable to give the necessary close attention to both US and GVN public administration operations in the field and at US and GVN regional headquarters as well. The return of even one advisor would substantially improve the program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to restoring at least some additional public administration advisory staff to the regional level.

(2) AUTOVIN Terminal Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION. A corps signal battalion is unable to operate and maintain AUTOVIN equipment within its TO&E assets.

(b) EVALUATION. Initially the corps signal battalion operated the AUTOVIN terminal at Headquarters, II FFORCIN. Many problems were encountered with maintenance. The corps signal battalion has no authorization for AN/PRC-25 crypto repairmen or for AN/FGC-25 teletype repairmen. A Yd-26 crypto repairman was attached for duty with the corps signal battalion, but proper repair parts, tools, and test equipment were not available for internal assets. The AUTOVIN circuit was frequently non-operational due to the lack of sufficient spare parts and trained repairmen. Subsequently, responsibility for the operations was transferred to an Army area signal battalion. AUTOVIN circuit outages have been reduced substantially as a result.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. When new or sophisticated communications equipment is introduced at the tactical level, that provisions be made to provide the receiving tactical signal unit with the necessary assets over and above its TO&E allowance to operate and maintain this equipment, and that provisions be made for the tactical unit to secure spare parts above those previously authorized.

8. OTHER.

(1) Project Early Word.

(a) OBSERVATION. Project Early Word is a system of aerial loudspeaker operations developed by Flight B, 5th Special Operations Squadron by which
messages can be transmitted through the airborne speaker system aboard USAF U-10 aircraft by individuals on the ground. This technique is made possible by a hand-made adapter which interconnects the AIC-10 intercom system in the aircraft with the airborne speaker system. Any radio signal transmitted to the AIC-10 system can be broadcast through the speaker. The system will accept FM/AM and VHF radio signals.

(b) EVALUATION. Limited tests were conducted on 23 September 68. The voice of an observer on the ground was transmitted from an AN/FRC-35 radio to the AIC-10 system, then through the airborne loudspeaker. The voice was clear and easily understood by observers on the ground. The quality of the voice was at least as good as that which is transmitted in a taped message. The parts necessary for equipping all U-10 aircraft in Flight 58, 5th Special-Operations Squadron have been received, and installation will be completed early in November. The system will provide more rapid reaction in live loudspeaker exploitation of Ho Chi Minh, and live broadcasts required in connection with cordon and search operations. There will be no requirement for the aircraft to land in order to pick up the broadcaster. This will be most advantageous in areas where the broadcaster is located that are inaccessible to fixed wing aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the proposed system become available throughout the US Air Force psychological operations system.

(2) Multiple Responsibility for Circuit Restoration.

(a) OBSERVATION. Unacceptably long and frequent circuit outages have occurred as a result of coordination problems.

(b) EVALUATION. Corps level communication circuits through the Army area system are often complicated in that various long-haul circuits pass through numerous frames and are maintained by several different units. For example, one particularly troublesome circuit involved three different divisional and corps - level tactical units and two different Army level units. At the circuit controller's level, this presents several problems, to include understanding the circuit routing, locating the trouble area within a reasonable time period, and determining the proper channels to use if command action is required to obtain swift restoration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That circuit routing in Vietnam be kept as simple as possible, for example, through minimum intervening points involving a minimum number of units.

(3) The Importance of the Village Government.

(a) OBSERVATION. United States civilian and military officials responsible for establishing basic mission policy in Vietnam increasingly are directing projects toward the village government, rather than the hamlet.

(b) EVALUATION. In the past, most US program emphasis, both civil and military, was centered on the hamlet. It has been realized, however,
that the village, rather than the hamlet, constitutes the basic unit of
local government in Vietnam and should receive US program emphasis. Un-
like the hamlet, the village has a governmental budget, and elected
legislative body and a broad grant of authority and responsibility for
rendering essential services. Reflecting this change of focus, the
projected programs for 1969 will provide new resources for the support
of functions at the village level.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That continuing US program emphasis be directed
toward the village.

(4) Employment of Refugee Mobile Cadre Teams.

(a) OBSERVATION. Refugee Mobile Cadre Teams have proved useful in
assisting in organizing evacuees and their possessions in advance of
population resettlement operations.

(b) EVALUATION. Resettlement operations by air requires extensive
preparation in organizing and assembling the people and their goods.
Psychological preparation of the people involved is also a very important
aspect in the movement of refugees. Many of the people are fearful of
traveling by air, not to mention the disruption caused by being forced
to leave their homes to go to a strange area. The Mobile Cadre Teams,
because they are indigenous to the area, have been found to be valuable
in assisting with both the logistical aspects of population, relocation
operations and with preparing the evacuees psychologically for movement.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That Refugee Mobile Cadre personnel be employed
in population resettlement operations.

(5) The Benefits of Letting Construction Contracts to Local Contractors.

(a) OBSERVATION. The letting of construction contracts to local
Vietnamese contractors offers long range benefits in terms of promoting
economic development and individual enterprise.

(b) EVALUATION. The policy of letting limited construction contracts
to private Vietnamese contractors has resulted in developing considerable
interest in bidding within the III CTZ. Each bid announced by DEPCORDS,
III CTZ, has been responded to by an average of 27 to 30 bidders. Further,
the average of the lower one-third of the bids has been closely aligned
with the engineers' cost estimates. As well, contractors have shown their
ability to execute contracts they have received. An expansion of this pro-
gram could contribute to the goal of developing the economy on a firm base
by enhancing individual enterprise.

(e) RECOMMENDATION. That the scope of work offered to local con-
tractors be broadened to include such projects as the building and main-
tenance of nontactical roads in the III CTZ.

(6) The Need for Supplemental Pay for Civil Service Employees.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-H


(a) OBSERVATION. Low salaries in the Government of Vietnam Civil Service result in a loss of trained personnel needed to improve the quality of administration of the government.

(b) EVALUATION. Recent training programs undertaken by CORUS, III CTZ have shown that the Vietnamese are eager to obtain education that will offer them better jobs and higher standards of living. A number of these trained have been government employees, who have left the Civil Service upon completion of their courses to take higher-paying jobs in private industry. These people are needed by the Government, but are unwilling to remain in their jobs because more advantageous opportunities are available elsewhere. Other problems, including graft and corruption, are fostered by the low pay scales. Many employees feel that because of their small salaries they are justified in accepting money for services performed in connection with their jobs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the salaries of Government employees be raised, if necessary, by the infusion of supplements from the US Government.

(7) Interprovincial Transfer of RF Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. Interprovincial transfer of Regional Force personnel is a delicate matter. It should be avoided if at all possible, and great care should be taken to insure that the transfers are done on a voluntary basis whenever they are required.

(b) EVALUATION. During the reporting period the Joint General Staff authorized III CTZ to recruit railroad security RF companies. Because of the sparse population of Binh Tuy Province, recruitment of five of these companies allocated that province was not possible. As a result, Bien Hoa Province was directed to transfer several Regional Force companies to Binh Tuy Province. When the first company was transferred 40 of the 90 Regional Force soldiers who were assigned deserted. It is the policy of RVNAF that Regional Force personnel be recruited from within a province for assignment to that province, if at all possible. Recently, conscription has been used to provide Regional Force soldiers for provinces short of personnel. Draft-age men often volunteer to become Regional Force members in order that they may remain near their homes and families. The reassignment of Regional Force personnel outside their provinces creates hardships unacceptable to these soldiers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the policy of interprovincial transfer of Regional Force units not be implemented, and that Regional Force conscripts be assigned and used as filler personnel in other provinces rather than reassigning entire units.

(8) Coordinated Activation of Heavy Weapons Platoons.

(a) OBSERVATION. In an effort to boost the firepower of territorial forces, Joint General Staff authorized a Heavy Weapons Platoon for each province.

(b) EVALUATION. In July of this year, Joint General Staff, in a memorandum signed by the Chief of the Joint Staff, authorized the activation of 44 Heavy Weapons Platoons, 11 of which were allocated to III CTZ.
The major pieces of equipment for these platoons are two 81mm mortars and two 57mm recoilless rifles. Upon initiation of the training cycle for these platoons, these weapons were not available, and platoons were required to report for training with major equipment shortages, which resulted in a serious lowering of morale within the units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That advisory staff agencies inform subordinate headquarters of impending unit activations so that surveys can be conducted on the availability of weapons, and that Joint General Staff be advised of existing shortages so that command emphasis may be employed to equip the heavy weapons platoons adequately.

3. (U) Section 5, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information. None.

9 Incl

WALTER T. EISENHOWER, JUN.
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

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AVHGC-DST (31 Oct 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R1) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 6 DEC 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning reduction of public administration staff, page 55, paragraph 2f (1). Concur in the observation; Nonconcur in the recommendation. One of the most important CA roles is to assist and advise government administration. With the preponderance of management tools being employed in the control of the pacification effort, it is essential that the administrative advisory capability increase in order to meet the demands being placed on regional administrative staffs. To make substantial improvements in government administration, it is imperative that the regional administrative advisory staffs be maintained at operational level. Nonconcur in the recommendation for additional staff personnel, because there are 19 Civil Affairs Platoons working in this region, any number of which can be diverted from less important tasks to perform this function at region and province level.

   b. Reference item concerning AUTODIN terminal operations, page 55, paragraph 2f (2). The problem of having a tactical signal unit operate AUTODIN equipment within its TO&E assets is recognized. A MTO&E is authorized for tactical units when new equipment is issued that cannot be supported, operated, and maintained by existing TO&E. The unit will be advised of MTO&E procedures.

   c. Reference item concerning multiple responsibility for circuit restoration, page 56, paragraph 2g (2). Every effort is made to minimize the number of points through which a circuit must pass. Army Area Communications Systems (AACOMS) circuit information containing complete routing and circuit cards is sent to the circuit controller and subscriber terminals. On 23 November 1968, a new control procedure was initiated in which appropriate circuit cards are sent directly to the 2d Signal Group Systems Controller for proper distribution. This new control procedure should
improve coordination and circuit restoration problems. This headquarters will evaluate the procedures in effect and make recommendations as required.

d. Reference item concerning employment of Refugee Mobile Cadre Teams, page 57, paragraph g (4). Concur. The extended use of Vietnamese Refugee Mobile Cadre Teams in population resettlement will enhance the image and effectiveness of the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief. Utilizing persons indigenous to the area is always recommended and promulgates the feeling of local participation in National Government programs. Currently, several US Army civil affairs platoons are in direct support of refugee centers. By expanding the use of Refugee Mobile Cadre Teams, the civil affairs platoons will be released to perform their primary role of tactical and logistical command support.

e. Reference item concerning the benefits of letting construction contracts to local contractors, page 57, paragraph g (5). Informal coordination with the office of the Officer in Charge of Construction, RVN reveals that they are receptive to increased use of local Vietnamese contractors where appropriate. However, experience indicates that Vietnamese contractors do not have sufficient equipment resources to participate in the LOC Restoration Program.

f. Reference item concerning need for supplemental pay for civil service employees, page 57, paragraph g (6). Nonconcur. Supplements from the US Government may be a short range solution but not a lasting one. The Joint Economics Office, USAID, is conducting a study which will identify the inadequacies in the Vietnamese Civil Servant Salary System. Upon completion of this study, recommendations and proposed solutions will be presented to the GVN. This study will afford GVN the opportunity to resolve the problem and to meet their own goals within GVN budget restrictions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNITZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (31 Oct 68) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II FFORCEV for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

25 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2f: This headquarters supports the USARV nonconcurrence.

   a. Supplements from the U.S. Government may provide a short range solution to the employee turnover problem; however, as employment opportunities for trained personnel increased throughout Vietnam, it can be expected that employees will continue to seek and accept jobs which offer higher salaries and other benefits.

   b. A more realistic approach to the problem is to encourage the Vietnamese government to adopt appropriate reforms within its civil service system based on the recommendations resulting from the USAID study referred to by Headquarters USARV. The present Vietnamese civil service pay system follows French theories on administration. An employee's rank and pay is based primarily on his educational attainment rather than job assignment. Employees of one rank sometimes are found supervising employees of higher rank who have many more years of government service. Expediency rather than regulation govern job assignment. The overall result is such a melange of employment situations and a variation in pay rates that problems in employment status and morale are inevitable.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

FRED E. HAMSARD
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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# II Field Force Vietnam Troop List

**Operational Units**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>LOCATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
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<td>LAI CHI</td>
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<tr>
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<td>22 Jul 66</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Inf Div</td>
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<tr>
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**Assigned Units**

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**REMARKS**

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

CG, II Field Force Vietnam
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