<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>UNCLASSIFIED</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AD NUMBER</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AD500298</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</strong></td>
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<td><strong>TO:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROM:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LIMITATION CHANGES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TO:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTHORITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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  US Army Flight Training Center
Commanding Officers
  US Army Limited War Laboratory
  US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
  US Army Aviation Test Activity
  307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion
AVEN-P  15 November 1968


1. SECTION I OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:

   a. (U) MISSION: There has been no change in the battalion's mission or area of operation since the last Operational Report.

   b. (U) ORGANIZATION: There were no changes in the primary subordinate units assigned to the battalion. There was a reassignment of four Quartermaster Detachments; the 5th, 52nd, 53rd and 62nd, from the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 307th Combat Aviation Battalion to the 164th Aviation Group. The battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company relocated from Soc Trang (APO San Francisco 96296) to Can Tho (APO San Francisco 96215) on 25 October 1968.

   (See complete Organization and Stationing Chart, Incl 1)

   c. COMMAND GROUP PERSONNEL:

      (1) (U) The battalion had very few key personnel changes in the command group and among the subordinate units. Significant is the fact that the battalion functioned throughout the complete reporting period without a battalion S-2 officer. The intelligence tasks were handled by the battalion’s S-3 section aided by an Intelligence Sergeant assigned on 29 September 1968. There are no significant peak rotational humps foreseen in officer, warrant officer or enlisted strength in the coming quarter.

      (2) (C) Composition of the Battalion Command Group:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ASN</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>RELEASED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Charles N. Allgood</td>
<td>061488</td>
<td>13 Jul 68</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Off</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Alvin E. Walker</td>
<td>095640</td>
<td>6 Jun 68</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>John A. Duff</td>
<td>089909</td>
<td>28 May 68</td>
<td>27 Sep 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>Frederick Vollmuth</td>
<td>05345838</td>
<td>28 Sep 68</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Leonard L. Boswell</td>
<td>078572</td>
<td>13 Jul 68</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For OT UT 684217 Confidential

Inclosure

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CONCEN\\L

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS, CSFOR-65 (R)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ASN</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>RELEASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>James R. Hill</td>
<td>072483</td>
<td>8 Aug 68</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Joseph S. Smith</td>
<td>05537569</td>
<td>13 May 68</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C Maint</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Harold L. Boyd</td>
<td>02314491</td>
<td>15 Jun 68</td>
<td>2 Aug 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Donald A. Couvillion</td>
<td>093640</td>
<td>24 Aug 68</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Willis B. Anderson</td>
<td>09999030</td>
<td>6 Apr 68</td>
<td>11 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Forrest H. Williams</td>
<td>076752</td>
<td>12 Sep 68</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) (C) Subordinate Unit Commanders: (Changes)

(a) Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 307th Combat Aviation Battalion: CPT Jack D. Ragsdale, 099235, commanded from 2 April 1968, to 10 September 1968; CPT Walter G. Hicks, 05317127, assumed command 10 September 1968, to present.

(b) Commanding Officer, 244th Surveillance Airplane Company: Maj James A. Bond, 099556, commanded from 31 January 1968, to 20 August 1968; Maj Joe Neely, 034497, assumed command 20 August 1968, to present.

d. Unit strength as of 31 October 1968 and Casualty Status for Quarter Ending 31 October 1968:

(1) (C) Military:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBORDINATE UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>199th RAC</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221st R.C</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235th AHC</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244th SAC</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC 307th</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307th CAB</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>307th CAB</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>907</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(2) (C) Civilians:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBORDINATE UNITS</th>
<th>DAC</th>
<th>VN</th>
<th>3rd K.T.'L</th>
<th>CONTRIBUTOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>199th R.C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221st R.C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235th AHC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244th SAC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC 307th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307th CAB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS FOR QUARTER ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>PROCESSED</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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307th Cab 438 416 285

AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBORDINATE</th>
<th>UH-1</th>
<th>AH-10</th>
<th>O-1</th>
<th>OH-1</th>
<th>U-6</th>
<th>OH-6</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199th RAC</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221st R.C</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235th AHC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244th SAC</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 307th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

307th CAB 5 4 21 21 56 49 18 17 4 1

R&R ALLOCATIONS: 1 AUGUST 1968 - 31 OCTOBER 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Totals: 52 41 45

3

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3. (U) CAB ORDERS PUBLISHED: 1 AUGUST 1968 - 31 OCTOBER 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>SPECIAL ORDERS</th>
<th>LETTER ORDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND EVENTS:

(1) (U) The reporting period has been one of relative quiet in the Delta. Enemy initiated incidents were extremely low during the first half of August. During this period intelligence reports indicated the enemy were preparing for a "third offensive". The "third offensive" became a reality the week of 18 - 24 August as enemy activity increased over the previous week. The "third offensive" did not have the power of the first two offensives. There were attacks on U. S. installations, but they were not of the intensity of those initiated during TET. The majority of the Viet Cong's wrath was directed at outposts and district and province towns. The added enemy harassment continued through the first week in October and was highlighted by enemy sapper type activity. Enemy actions remained light until the last five days of October. At this time incidents increased significantly, but the only battalion location receiving damage was the Ca Mau FOL yard which was hit by enemy mortar fire on 26 October. There were no battalion casualties in this attack.

(2) (C) Operation Phantom III, the battalion's own offensive effort, continued during the reporting period. Initiated to interdict and harass supply and commo-laison routes in the lower Ca Mau peninsula, Phantom III became well known throughout the Delta. Other sectors became interested in the offensive and requested similar operations to be conducted in their areas. In keeping with the battalion's motto of "Search and Destroy", the Phantom III operation moved north during late September and began to operate daily in different provinces to include An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen and Bac Lieu. These were quickly followed by Choung Thien and Phong Dinh Provinces and in every case the results obtained, justified the movement into these new areas. The results for the entire reporting period are indicated below.
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PH-INTO-I III RESULTS 1 AUGUST 1968 - 31 OCTOBER 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>KBA</th>
<th>DAM</th>
<th>DFS</th>
<th>DM</th>
<th>DFS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>An Kuyen</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ba Kuyen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>An Kuyen</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>An Kuyen</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ba Kuyen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cheung Thien</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bac Lieu</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>123</td>
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<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phong Dinh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) (C) In an effort to deny the enemy movement during the hours of darkness, the battalion once again began to conduct their "Delta Nighthawk" operations with the mission designed to detect and provide an immediate air reaction force based on reliable intelligence relating to enemy night movement. "Delta Nighthawk" employs two OV-1 "Hawk" and a light fire team of AH-1G Cobras. Ideally the lead "Hawk", with infra-red, will detect the target. The second "Hawk" will then drop a flare to illuminate the area and the trailing light fire team will engage the target. The operation has been conducted on numerous occasions throughout the Delta, but reportable results are negligible, since there is no way to assess the total results. A review of the total missions scheduled during the reporting period reveals that of twenty-three (23) missions scheduled, only one effort produced any significant results. All other missions were either cancelled because of weather or resulted in only an occasional sighting of a single heat producer, such as a camp fire or a motorized saipan. Most of these targets resulted in unknown results when attempts were made to neutralize them. Studies are currently being conducted to determine the feasibility of continuing the "Delta Nighthawk" operation.

(4) (U) The assigned O-1 companies continue to be one of the major intelligence gathering agencies within the Delta, because the pilots and aircraft are assigned, live and support within their assigned area of responsibility. This has resulted in an exceptionally close working relationship between supported and supporting units. There has been no change in the battalion's O-1 aircraft missions or stagefield locations since the last operations report.
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November 1968


(5) (C) The battalion's Mohawk company accomplished its mission by participating in combat operations throughout the IV Corps by providing timely and accurate information concerning enemy movement, target detection and target identification. Three (3) Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) missions were flown daily covering the coastline, the border and the major inland routes with a purpose of detecting any infiltration or enemy movement within these areas. Infrared missions were flown on a daily basis in order to support the IV Corps reconnaissance plan and to provide immediate coverage of designated areas of interest. Photo coverage and visual reconnaissance missions were flown as required. The "Delta nighthawk" operation was also flown by the Mohawks when requested.

(6) (C) The following statistics show the effort expended in support of the IV Corps surveillance plan:

SORTIES FLOWS FROM 1 AUGUST TO 31 OCTOBER 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE, AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1 OV-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) (C) It appears that the 235th armed helicopter company has passed from the experimental stages into a fully operational category, now that the unit's ASL/PL has increased to normal proportions, the AH-1G availability has also improved. For the entire reporting period an average of 17 AH-1G's were mission ready daily which is a considerable increase from previous quarters. With the emphasis now on the attack role of the Cobras the unit has been capitalizing on the aircraft's stand off attack capability which has resulted in far less enemy hits being taken.

(8) (U) During the reporting period the battalion's safety record showed a marked improvement over previous quarters. There were two accidents for the reporting period. Both involved 0-1 aircraft. The first occurred in September, when an 0-1 of the battalion collided in mid-air with a Vietnamese Cessna 172 aircraft. There were four fatalities in the accident. The second accident occurred in early October during a standardization ride. The pilot landed on the narrow 101 strip, lost directional control of the aircraft and struck a Vietnamese Armored Personnel Carrier nearby. There were no injuries. Safety Statistics for 1 August - 31 October 1968 are indicated below.

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SAFETY STATISTICS 1 August - 31 October 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>INCIDENTS</th>
<th>PRECAUTIONARY LANDINGS</th>
<th>ACCIDENT RATE PER 100,000 Hrs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>199th RAC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221st RAC</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235th AHC</td>
<td>0</td>
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(9) (U) The battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company moved to Can Tho on 25 October 1968. The move was made in conjunction with the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion Headquarters, who also moved and occupied our former headquarters at Soc Trang. The purpose of the relocation of the two headquarters was to co-locate the battalion headquarters with as many of its subordinate units as possible, thus decreasing command and control problems within each battalion. The move was executed in a flawless manner utilizing CH-47 aircraft from the 271st Aviation Company and a vehicle convoy which was organized and commanded by the Transportation Corps. Small advanced parties of each unit moved to Soc Trang and Can Tho, respectively, on 23 October 1968. The main body of each headquarters moved on 25 October 1968, with all personnel and equipment of both units closing into their new locations on the same day. No major problems were encountered during the relocation and the Headquarters of the 307th Combat Aviation Battalion continued to function throughout the move without the cancellation or postponement of a single combat mission.

(10) (U) The battalion has accomplished all assigned combat and direct combat support missions assigned during the reporting period. The battalion has been constantly on the offensive, searching out and destroying the enemy whenever the occasion may arise. Statistics generated in support of its mission are in Inclosure 2.
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AVEN-P


2. SECTION II. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

   a. PERSONNEL: None

   b. OPERATIONS:

   (1) (C) Wind effects on the 17 Pound Warhead

      (a) OBSERVATION: The 17 pound warhead attached to the 2.75" aerial rocket tends to seek the relative wind after rocket burn-out.

      (b) EVALUATION: When the 2.75" rocket with 17 pound warhead is fired into a direct cross wind at stand off range of 1200 to 1500 meters, it has a tendency to turn into the wind. As a result of this tendency, errors in warhead impact have been as high as 50 meters outside of the normal rocket dispersion pattern. This cross wind condition produces a more pronounced effect on the 17 pound warhead than on the 10 pound warhead.

      (c) RECOMMENDATION: That information be disseminated to all newly assigned armed helicopter pilots concerning the increased accuracy of the 17 pound warhead when fired from a direction which will minimize cross wind effect on the rocket during flight.

      (d) COMMAND ACTION: The 235th Aerial Weapons Company is strictly adhering to USAVR Regulation 350-6 while training the pilots in the use of different types of warheads. The tendency of the 17 pound warhead to seek the relative wind is being explained during gunnery training. Pilots receiving training are divided into two groups: the experienced gunner/pilot and the inexperienced gunner/pilot. In teaching ground school, the experienced gunner/pilot receives 24 hours, whereas the inexperienced man receives 48 hours. When training the pilot in the air, the experienced pilot receives, as a minimum, 10 to 15 hours of practical experience utilizing actual targets prior to completing his training to become an aircraft commander. The inexperienced gunner/pilot will receive, as a minimum, 25 hours before he is considered for duty as an aircraft commander. In order to keep aircraft commanders abreast of current firing techniques, each is given a 90 day standardization ride. At this time all weapons systems are fired with emphasis being placed on safety standards, target acquisition and target engagement.

   (2) (U) Revetment Construction for the AH-1G

      (a) OBSERVATION: Many revetments are positioned in such a manner that prevailing wind conditions present a hazard to the AH-1G.

      (b) EVALUATION: The ability of the AH-1G aircraft to negotiate downwind or in a quartering downwind condition is limited. In many cases the AH-1G has been forced to use revetments that were constructed
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AVBM-P
15 November 1968
SU.NJCT: Operational Support of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, AGS 0596-65 (RI)

for other type aircraft. Many of these revetments are positioned in such a manner that the prevailing wind conditions present a hazard to the AH-1G. On numerous occasions, due to adverse wind conditions, pilots have been forced to land their aircraft on the taxi-way or the ramp and have it rolled into the revetment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That future revetments be constructed with the prevailing wind conditions in mind.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Periodically safety classes covering down wind and cross wind tail rotor control techniques are discussed. Emphasis has been placed primarily on directional control of the helicopter. All pilots and aircraft commanders have been instructed to make extremely low and slow approaches into revetments. If the pilot feels he is losing directional control of the helicopter while entering a revetment, he will lower the pitch. He will never increase pitch as this will tend to aggravate the situation. The aircraft commanders and pilots are instructed, if they have any doubt as to their ability to maintain control, the helicopter will be landed and the ground crew will roll the helicopter into the revetment. The above mentioned procedures are being taught to all newly assigned aviators and are reviewed during all 90 day standardization rides.

3 (U) Microphone and Rocket Firing Switches

(a) OBSERVATION: Recent inspections of O-1 aircraft microphone and rocket firing switches revealed a possible safety hazard in that the switches were excessively corroded.

(b) EVALUATION: Because of the close proximity of the switches and associated wiring, activation of the microphone switch could inadvertently fire a rocket.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all O-1 aircraft have a periodic inspection (100 hours) pulled on the rocket firing electrical system and the microphone to insure that all corroded areas are properly cleaned.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: All aircraft were checked by Technical Inspectors and corroded areas around the microphone and rocket firing switches were cleaned. All electrical systems are presently being checked during each periodic inspection to insure corroded parts are clean and that there are no short circuits in the system.

4 (U) Firing Weapons from Inside the Aircraft

(a) OBSERVATION: During a periodic inspection of an O-1 aircraft, a potentially hazardous situation was discovered. The Technical Inspector discovered, after pulling the lower inspection plate, that a control cable was excessively worn due to chaffing on a spent cartridge which had fallen through the floor of the aircraft.
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(b) EVALUATION: An investigation revealed that the pilot, in an emergency situation, had used his weapon to mark a VC location for ARVN ground troops. Neither the pilot nor the crew chief was aware that the casing could pass through the fuselage of the aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All firing of weapons from inside an aircraft will be logged on the DA Form 2408-13. Crew chiefs will be required to pull belly inspection plates prior to signing off the entry.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Instructions were issued directing that if weapons are fired from inside an O-1, a write-up will be entered on the DA Form 2408-13. This entry will necessitate the crew chief removing the belly plate of the aircraft and inspecting the fuselage for spent cartridges prior to the aircraft's next flight.

(5) (U) Retro-fit Program for U-6A Aircraft

(a) OBSERVATION: Avionics problems have cut the availability of the battalion's U-6A aircraft to an average of approximately 50%.

(b) EVALUATION: The battalion's four U-6A aircraft have the old series of radios installed. There are few direct exchange avionics components available for these radios. In addition, newly trained avionics technicians are unfamiliar with this old series of radios. As a result, it is extremely difficult to get the old series of U-6A radios repaired in Vietnam.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an effective U-6A radio retrofit program be initiated in Vietnam immediately.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The anticipated arrival of U-6A radio retrofit kits is November 1969. The arrival of these kits is being closely monitored by this headquarters and upon their arrival, all U-6A aircraft in this command will be systematically retrofitted.

(6) (C) APS-94C (SLAR)

(a) OBSERVATION: An excessive amount of down time has been experienced with APS-94C's due to RO 166's blocks and tanks.

(b) EVALUATION: Because of insufficient operational RO 166's which provide a near real time read out of information, the 244th Surveillance Airplane Company is running dry imagery in the aircraft and using the two operational RO 166's in the ground data terminal station.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: RO 166 heads, to include the block and tank, should be constructed to last a minimum of 500 hours and then be turned in as a direct exchange item.

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(d) COMMAND ACTION: This headquarters submitted a Significant Problem Area Report to the 164th Combat Aviation Group on 1 October 1963. This report expressed the problem which is outlined above. Other actions being taken in an effort to eliminate the problem are as follows:

/1/ The problem was discussed during the 1st Aviation Brigade Avionics Conference on 16 August 1963 and the Mohawk Avionics Conference on 19 September 1963.

/2/ A weekly liaison visit is being made to the Avionics DS facility in order to ascertain the status of repair and calibration work orders.

/3/ 1st Aviation Brigade Form 76-R is submitted monthly showing the current ASL status.

/4/ A weekly reconciliation of all requisitions is made with the DS facility.

(7) (C) KA-30 Cameras

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit is experiencing an excessive amount of down time on the KA-30 Camera due to body drive malfunction.

(b) EVALUATION: The unit fluctuates between one and six operational cameras of the 21 assigned. An attempt is being made to maintain a minimum of three operational cameras to accomplish assigned missions. This requires performance of maintenance beyond authorized level.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Provide a functional camera system capable of operation (a minimum of 500,000 pictures) from five hundred feet to twenty thousand feet within a speed range of 80 to 350 knots in moist or dry environment. The camera should be a high speed resolution type with various lens cones. It must provide 60% overlap for both day and night photography.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This headquarters submitted a Significant Problem Area Report to the 164th Combat Aviation Group on 1 October 1963. This report discussed the KA-30 Camera problem. Also SO&I Technical Representatives and Chicago Aerial Field Service Representatives have visited the 21st Surveillance Airplane Company and have provided repair and instructional assistance in the field of maintenance. Further actions taken are as follows:

/1/ The problem was discussed during the 1st Aviation Brigade Avionics Conference on 16 August 1963 and the Mohawk Avionics Conference on 19 September 1963.

/2/ 1st Aviation Brigade Form 76-R is being submitted monthly showing the current ASL status.

/3/ A weekly liaison visit is being made to the Avionics CS facility in order to ascertain the status of repair and calibration work orders.

/4/ A weekly reconciliation of all requisitions is made with the Avionics CS facility.

(8) (C) TEST SET CALIBRATION

(a) OBSERVATION: Signal/Avionics maintenance units are finding it increasingly difficult to have their test equipment calibrated.

(b) EVALUATION: At present, there are two methods available for the calibration of test set equipment. Both of these are undesirable. The first is calibration by a team that periodically visits signal detachments. These teams consist of approximately ten members. They are severely limited by the amount of repair parts and test equipment they can carry and the short period of time they are allowed to spend at each location. In one case a signal detachment had 39 items requiring calibration and because of the limited parts and time available only twelve (12) items were completed. The second method is to take the equipment requiring calibration to the signal repair facility located in Vung Tau. The needed calibration can be accomplished there, however the using unit loses utilization of the equipment for an extended period of time. There is also a transportation problem in getting the equipment to and from the repair facility.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A more practical and responsive system of avionics test equipment calibration must be devised if the quality and quantity of repair work by signal maintenance detachments is to improve.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This Headquarters submitted a significant Problem Areas Report to the 18th Combat Aviation Group on 1 October 1968. Included in the report was a synopsis of the test set calibration problem. This headquarters is presently conducting a further study of the problem in an attempt to provide a more positive recommendation.

(9) (C) SIGNAL TEST SET REQUISITION

(a) OBSERVATION: The 180th Signal Detachment is experiencing difficulty in filling the requisition for the AN-10CL/ARC which is a test set utilized in repairing the AN/ARC 134 (VHF Radio).
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15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, 305 JORF - 65 (RI)

(b) EVALUATION: At present, the 190th Signal Detachment is operating without the badly needed AK-100/ARC. The Detachment supports 21 AH-1G aircraft which utilize the AN/ARC-134 (VHF radio), but has no test set for checking this type radio. They have had one on requisition since 19 April 1968. The present solution is to replace an entire receiver-transmitter unit and submit it for direct exchange to the GS facility. This method is used because no test set is available to isolate and identify the exact component causing the failure. The present system is extremely costly as well as time consuming. In most cases, a repairman working with the applicable test set, could easily pinpoint the problem and repair the faulty item with minimum time and cost.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Because of the critical need for the test set and the failure to fill the valid requisition, dated 19 April 1968, it is recommended that command emphasis be placed in this area prior to the loss of the VHF capability.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This Headquarters included a synopsis of the above problem in its Significant Problems Area Report of 1 October 1968.

(10) (C) DEPLOYMENT OF THE AH-1G AT NIGHT

(a) OBSERVATION: The effectiveness of the AH-1G during the execution of night missions is reduced because of the tandem seating arrangement, the lack of adequate attitude instrumentation, the glare resulting from the instrument and console lights and the lack of an efficient landing light.

(b) EVALUATION: Because of the AH-1G tandem seating arrangement the pilots often experience a considerable amount of difficulty while making night approaches. As the aircraft assumes a decelerating attitude the pilot's visibility is greatly reduced and he must focus his vision approximately 45 degrees from the center line of the approach path in order to acquire ground references. He must rely entirely on his peripheral vision in order to accomplish a safe landing. The effectiveness of his peripheral vision is greatly reduced by the glare or reflection from the console and instrument light on the canopy. Even when all cockpit lights are dimmed the glare is persistent. The deficiency of the landing light was recognized by the manufacturer resulting in the installation of a search light in place of the landing light; however, the intensity of this search light is not sufficient to compensate for the loss of the landing light. The deficiency noted in the attitude indicator was recognized by the manufacturer and their modification has improved the attitude indicator, however it still possesses a tendency to "float and precess". The above noted deficiencies severely limit the use of the AH-1G during night operations.
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A/3N-P
15 November 1968


(c) RECOMMENDATION: Missions for employment of the AH-1G during periods of darkness should be carefully scrutinized. Except for tactical emergencies the AH-1G should not be employed during the hours of darkness when limited visibility is predominant, i.e. no ground reference or visible horizon.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: All night missions are closely monitored and are not flown during periods of darkness unless there is sufficient ground reference or a definite visible horizon. When daylight missions allow training, all pilots are required to practice hooded instrument flying. Also EIR's have been submitted on all of the above mentioned deficiencies in the aircraft.

c. TRAINING: None

d. INTELLIGENCE: None

e. LOGISTICS:

(a) OBSERVATION: During the months of August and September hydraulic fluid was being issued to the units of this battalion in 55 gallon drums.

(b) EVALUATION: The economics of issuing hydraulic fluid in 55 gallon containers to aviation companies is questionable. The normal demand for hydraulic fluid is by the quart. After opening a 55 gallon drum and extracting several quarts the remainder of the fluid normally becomes contaminated unless it is used immediately.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That hydraulic fluid be issued to aviation units in quart containers rather than 55 gallon drums.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The battalion and companies are no longer receiving hydraulic fluid in 55 gallon drums. All units have been directed to requisition hydraulic fluid in quart containers.

(2) SURVEILLANCE AIRPLANE COMPANY SUPPLY PERSONNEL

(a) OBSERVATION: Difficulty has been experienced in accounting for and maintaining control of property belonging to the 244th Surveillance Airplane Company.

(b) EVALUATION: The assigned TOME 1-128T dated 26 July 68, authorizes one E6 Supply Sergeant, one E4 Armorer and one E5 Supply Clerk to handle all the duties associated with supply. One additional supply slot (E5) is allocated to the 502nd TC Detachment. It is impossible for four personnel to accomplish the required supply action
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15 November 1963

Subject: Operational Report of the 3-7th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for Period ending 31 October 1968, C3 CSR 65 (I)

associated with this unit when considering that 350 personnel are assigned and approximately $125 million dollars worth of equipment is on hand.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a change to the 244th Surveillance Airplane Company TOE be considered and in the interim period their supply section be augmented with three personnel to accomplish necessary work. Also, a non-rated supply technician (CPO), should be assigned as property book officer.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The company has been directed to submit a change to the TOE with written justifications included. Periodically the non-rated supply warrant assigned to this headquarters spends several days in the 244th Surveillance Airplane Company supply room assisting and providing guidance to the supply sergeant.

f. ORGANIZATION: None

g. OTHER: None

SECTION III DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY PERSONNEL: ESCAPE AND EVASION AND SURVIVAL: None

CHARLES N. ALGROD
LTC Sig C
Commanding
AVGN (15 Nov 68) 1st Lt.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for the period ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

DA, HQ, 164th AVIATION GROUP, APO 96215, 30 November 1968

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1(U) The attached 307th CAB ORLL for the period ending 31 October 1968 has been evaluated by this headquarters as required by USARV Reg 525-15.

2(U) The authorized civilian strength for 307th CAB units is as listed below:

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3(C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Wind effects on the 17 pound warhead: Concur with the recommendation. Pilots assigned this company receive intensified training in the employment of all available warheads. The wind deflection error associated with the 17 pound warhead is not considered a shortcoming. Adequate training permits the pilot/gunner to deliver close-in fire support with this new warhead.

b. Revetment construction for the AH-1G aircraft in a down wind condition makes landing into the wind more desirable and safer. Present revetments at Can Tho AAF were built to provide maximum protection for the aircraft, based on the probable direction of enemy attack. Sufficient area for revetment relocation is not available. Future plans at Can Tho AAF include relocation of the AH-1G revetments to a new area that has recently been filled. The down wind characteristics of the Cobra are being considered prior to the new revetment construction. Completion date of this project is expected to be the end of 4th Quarter FY 69.

c. Microphone and Rocket Firing Switches: Concur with the recommendation. The corroded firing switches on O-1 aircraft have caused no firing incidents. This corrosion may be limited to the Delta Region of Vietnam.

d. Firing Weapons from Inside Aircraft: This inspection is being performed on all assigned O-1 aircraft. This headquarters does not concur in world wide dissemination, due to all armed O-1 aircraft being located in the Delta Region of Vietnam.

e. Retrofit Program for U-6A Aircraft: Appropriate action has been taken to assure retrofit of all assigned U-6 and U-1 aircraft. Retrofit

GROUP 4 Downgraded at 3 year intervals; Declassified after 12 years.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for the period ending 31 October 1968, RG 0 GSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

of these aircraft is expected to be completed during the period December 1968 – January 1969. It would be more desirable to retrofit all aircraft prior to arriving in Vietnam.

g. APS-94C (SIAR): Concur with the recommendation. Improved SIAR components will reduce maintenance down time and increase the operational capability of the system.

h. 101-3 Camera: Concur with the recommendation. The present KA-30 camera, with its constant maintenance problems, greatly reduces the photo capability of this command.

i. Test Set Calibration: Concur with the recommendation. Diagnostic and test equipment utilized for functional tests of aircraft, components, and accessories must be calibrated at prescribed intervals. A mobile calibration team, properly equipped with repair parts, should visit each installation at least once each 90 day period. The calibration team should also be on call for unscheduled visits as required.

j. Signal test Set Requisition: Concur with the recommendation. Appropriate follow-up action on the requisition has been taken by the 307th CAB.

k. Employment of the AH-1G at Night: Concur with the recommendation. Redesign of the AH-1G instrument panel to reduce glare will greatly improve its capability for night operations.

l. Logistics: Non Concur with the recommendation as stated. Issue of hydraulic fluid in various size containers is considered essential and economical by this headquarters. Proper storage will prevent contamination of the unused portion in 55 gallon drums. Units having a small requirement for hydraulic fluid should requisition the quart size containers.

m. Surveillance Airplane Company Supply Personnel: Concur with the recommendation. An MTOE to include additional supply personnel is being prepared.

RPT OF THE 307TH CABIN T AVIATION (Phantom) BATTALLION FOR THE PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1968, RG 0 GSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

LTC, CE
Acting Commander

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBÜL-C (15 Nov 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for the period ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 RL (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96364 DEC 1968

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-LST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GP-OP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent.

   a. Paragraph 2(b)(1), page 8 and paragraph 3a, 1st Indorsement. The recommendation presented is a valid one, however, not for the reasons stated in the observation and evaluation. Rocket accuracy is lost when firing with a cross wind because the rocket will drift with the wind and impact downwind from the point of aiming. Judgement is required in determining how far upwind the pilot must aim to allow for the drift of the rocket. There should be no tendency for the rocket to turn into the cross wind provided coordinated flight is maintained during firing of the rockets.

   b. Paragraph 2(b)(5), page 10. The retrofit program to upgrade these U-6A to the new family of radios is called STR, and at present there are no wiring kits available in country. These kits are due during the November/December timeframe. Until such time, the 38th Avionics Detachments will have to use float AN/ARC-64 and ANG-55 systems, of which there are more than enough to go around in the avionics supply system at the 34th Group (GS).

3. This report has two indorsures, not one indosure as shown on the 1st Indorsement.

   FOR THE COMMANDER:

   [Signature]

   LEE S. PETERSON
   LIT. AGC
   ASST ADJ GEN

2 Ind.
1. Organisation and Stationing Chart
2. Operational Statistics Chart
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 68) 3d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for the period ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 RL (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 307th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning wind effects on the 17 pound warhead, page 8, paragraph 2b(1); 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3a; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2a: Concur. All armed helicopter pilots are required to receive training in handling and firing the XM-229 rocket warhead as prescribed in USARV Regulation 350-6, dated 20 September 1968. An addition to USARV Regulation 350-6 is being made to include special considerations for crosswind drift.

   b. Reference item concerning APS-94C (SLAR), page 10, paragraph 2b(6): Concur. With the oncoming OV-1D aircraft that will be fielded during CT 1969, it is unrealistic to redesign the RO-166. Action is being taken to increase the in-country repair capability for RO-166’s which will make it possible to direct exchange serviceable assemblies for unserviceable ones. Test equipment and repair parts are being made available to the AVKL companies at Vung Tau and Qui Whon.

   c. Reference item concerning KA-30 cameras, page 11, paragraph 2b(7); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3g: Concur. The KA-76 camera is replacing the KA-30 camera in new production aircraft, but will not replace the KA-30’s currently installed. The unit should participate in the Closed Loop Retrograde of KA-30’s for Rebuild Program. All OV-1 units have been informed by message of the KA-30 retrograde schedule, and their required participation.

   d. Reference item concerning test set calibration, page 12, paragraph 2b(8); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3h: Concur. Periodic visits to units in the field for calibration of test equipment are conducted by the 2d Logistical Command, Secondary Transfer Teams. Equipment and
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for the period ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 RL (U)

personnel with which the 34th General Support Group can establish a more effective maintenance calibration and repair of avionics test equipment have been requested by this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 307th CAB

20

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 307th Cbt Avn (Phantom) Bn for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
AVEN-P


CONFIDENTIAL

November 1960

24th

357th

502nd

24th

30th

236th

40th

236th

24th

100th

100th

506th

506th

21st

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CONFIDENTIAL

Incl 1
CONFIDENTIAL

SUJET: Operational Report of the 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion for the period ending 31 October 1966, CS, O3F01-65 (AI)

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Incl 2 CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1968.

CO, 307th Combat Aviation (Phantom) Battalion