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IN REPLY TO AGAM-P (M) (3 Mar 69) FOR UT-684131

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile) (26)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile)
AVDAAR-CO

1 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R)

Commanding General
1st Cavalry Division (AM)
APO 96490

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

   a. The reporting period began with Operation JEB STUART III still in progress.

      (1) Organization.

         (a) Direct Support Artillery. The month of August began with the 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery (A/2/19 on LZ Pedro, YD 245582, C/2/19 on LZ Anne, YD 294398, and B/6/33 reinforcing 2/19 on LZ Sharon, YD 340495, in DS of the 1st Brigade north of Base Area 101. The 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery (A/1/77 on LZ Hoard, YD 460512, B/1/77 on LZ Carol, YD 34192, B/1/40 reinforcing 1/77 on LZ Jane, YD 33426, and B/2/19 OPCON 1/77 on LZ Barbara, YD 328334), was in DS of the 2d Brigade near Hai Lang. The 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery (A/1/21 on LZ Joanie, YD 549389, B/1/21 on Camp Evans, YD 540320, C/1/21 on LZ Jack, YD 497280, and C/1/77 OPCON to 1/21, on LZ Mooney, YD 445192), was in DS of the 3d Brigade on Camp Evans.

         (b) General Support Artillery. The 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery (ARA) was in General Support of the Division. At the beginning of the reporting period B/2/20 was located at LZ Sharon, B/2/20 was at LZ Jane, and C/2/20 was located at Camp Evans with the battalion headquarters. Medium artillery general support was provided by 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery. At the beginning of the period, Battery A, GSR to the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery, had elements located on LZ Jane and LZ Carol. Battery B, with the mission of GSR to the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery, had elements occupying LZ Anne and LZ Sharon. Battery C, GSR to the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery also had elements in two locations, LZ Maureen, YD 426118, and LZ Jack. In addition, G Battery, 2d Battalion, 34th Artillery (8" howitzer SP) located on LZ Jane provided General Support for the Division.
AVDA-00

Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (RDA) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, WSS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(1) ADA and Searchlights. G/1/60 Artillery with four 75/50 twin 50's was located at LZ Sharon with the mission of reinforcing 2/77 Artillery. E Battery, 1/44 Artillery was providing four 35/44 40's with two on LZ Duke, reinforcing 1/77 Artillery and two on Camp Drums reinforcing 1/21 Artillery. Btry B, 41st Artillery (attached to G/1/40 Artillery) provided four 145S with two reinforcing 2/19 Artillery and two reinforcing 1/71 Artillery. B-29 and C-29 provided six SLT's under the operational control of 1ACD Artillery. These assets were divided between 1/21, 1/77, and 2/19 Artillery.

(2) Operation JEB STUART III.

(a) Operation JEB STUART III, which began on 17 May 68, continued throughout the reporting period. This operation was primarily geared toward destruction of the Viet Cong infrastructure and denial of rice to the enemy. Since 1 August 1968 the operation has been characterized by small unit contacts and seizure of several significant rice caches.

(b) On 12 August ARA provided cover for a medevac from a hot LZ in the vicinity of YD 333202. A mixture of WP and HE warheads were utilized to support and lay a smoke screen. The WP provided an effective screen and no enemy fire was received throughout the medevac operation.

(c) At approximately 1700 hrs August 1968 LZ Nanny, YD 445404, which was under construction, was hit with a mortar and sapper attack. Artillery and Aerial Rocket Artillery were employed in defense of LZ Nanny until contact was broken at approximately 170300 hrs August. A first light check revealed 27 enemy killed. US losses were 18 KIA, 55 MIA and numerous items of equipment destroyed or damaged by sappers. During this attack the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery suffered 1 KIA and 6 WIA from an advance party work detail from BNS Battery.

(d) On 20 August elements of the 1st Bn, 8th Cavalry encountered heavy resistance from a village in the vicinity of YD 415176. The village was cordoned by late afternoon and received continuous artillery fire throughout the night. On the morning of 21 August, an attack through the village was conducted; infantry units found 88 NVA killed, 14 POW's and 4 Chieu Hoi — all from the KB Battalion. The casualties were caused primarily by artillery fire and air strikes. On 22 August, the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry again cordoned a village, at which time the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery shelled the village for about three hours (YD 415176). When infantry units attacked through the village they found 50 NVA killed and numerous individual and crew served weapons.
OPERATIONAL REPORT OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION ARTILLERY (AR) FOR
Period Ending 30 October 1968: ROCS CRCH-65 (RI)

(a) During late August all major fire bases were subjected to mortar/rocket attacks. On 23 September, LZ Sharon, LZ Avis, and Quang Tai were subjected to combined mortar/rocket attacks. The battalion's mortar/rocket program was immediately executed and the standoff attack ceased. Surveillance of the target area later in the morning revealed mortar/rocket equipment in those areas taken under counter battery fire.

(f) On 5 September 1968 a tropical storm swept through the AO; 56 inches of rain fell in a 72 hour period. Roads were washed out, helicopters were grounded, and flooding was widespread in all lowland areas. A/1/40th located at LZ Hardcore was the hardest hit by the storm. Four guns were called out of action due to the rising water and approximately 800 rounds of ammunition was rendered unserviceable due to wet powder bags. All LZ's reported some flooding and damage to personnel bunkers.

(g) Throughout the first half of the reporting period 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery with four howitzers from Battery C on LZ Maureen and two howitzers from Battery A on LZ Carol engaged enemy supply lines in the A Shau Valley. Organic aircraft assets from Division Artillery provided continuous daylight surveillance of the Valley and reported significant target data for effective fire direction. "Hit list" data was developed along well used roads and trails. This data was used to augment night fire plans in an effort to interdict enemy movement.

(3) Operation COMANCHE FALLS. The most significant operations in addition to JEB STUART III were Operation COMANCHE FALLS I and II conducted by the 2d Brigade with the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery in direct support. In COMANCHE FALLS I elements of 2d Brigade and 1st ARVN Division, supported by US and ARVN Artillery, attacked through base area 101 to destroy enemy personnel, equipment and fortifications prior to the beginning of the northeast monsoons.

(a) Planning. The following units were initially designated to participate in COMANCHE FALLS I: 1/5th Cav, 1/8 Cav, 1/7 Cav, 1/9 Cav (-), 1st ARVN Regiment and RF-PF forces. Artillery units supporting the operation were Alpha and Bravo Batteries 1/77, A/1/20, (155) (GSR), C/2/94 (8") (GS), A/1/11 (105) (ARVN) and 1 platoon of A/34th Artillery (155) (ARVN). A quick-fire channel was established between 1/77 and C/2/19th, which was located at LZ Ann in the 1st Brigade AO. The 1st Battalion 77th Artillery was tasked with the responsibility of coordinating the fires of all supporting artillery. To assist in this, a US liaison team was placed with the ARVN battery and US forward observer parties were located with each of the three ARVN maneuver battalions. The scheme of maneuver called for 2 US and 3 ARVN battalions to be inserted in the southeastern portion of base area 101 and attack to the northeast while one US battalion and 1 Regional Force battalion were placed in blocking positions on the east.
flank and to the north. The 1/9th Cav (-) acted as a screening force to the west and south. This operation was unique to Vietnam in that the basic maneuver plan called for the fire participating battalions to attack abreast through the southeastern portion of base area 101, using planned phase lines and battalion zones for control purposes. This type of maneuver plan permitted the artillery to exercise the technique of scheduling preparatory fires in support of the ground elements. During the initial phases of the operation the artillery fired massive scheduled fires along the entire front of 10 minutes or more duration. Targets for these fires were taken from a master target list and assigned to appropriate firing elements based on the nature of each target. Air strikes were integrated into the fire support plan for the operation.

(b) Execution: COMANCHE FALLS I started on the night of 10 Sept 68 for the artillery with an intensified planned fires program. On the night of 10-11 Sept, 644 rounds were fired on confirmed enemy locations. Beginning at 110700 hrs Sept, seven ground-air preparations were fired in support of elements participating in the operation. At 111200 hrs Sept, a 15 minute artillery preparation was fired to support the initial ground assault across the initial phase line. All available firing units participated, and fired a total of 676 rounds. The entire operation was characterized by small unit contacts, with the 1st ARVN Regiment accounting for 256 NVA killed. During this operation the 2d Brigade Headquarters conducted a pre-planned move from LZ Jane to LZ Nancy. Also displacing were the HQ 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery, A/1/30, C/2/94 and all ARVN artillery. The artillery moves were conducted on 26-28 Sept with artillery control being passed from LZ Jane to LZ Nancy at 1200 hrs 26 Sept 68. B/1/77 remained at LZ Jane to provide the mutual support required for LZ Barbara.

(c) At 031200 hrs Oct 68 COMANCHE FALLS I ended and COMANCHE FALLS II began. To support this operation, C/1/77 was airlifted during the day from LZ Miguel, YD 181206, to LZ Davis Hill, YD 250296. The following day one platoon from A/1/30th was airlifted from LZ Nancy to LZ Davis Hill. 2/12 Cav was moved from their previous area of operation around LZ Nancy to the southern portion of the Brigade AO for the operation. In addition, the 1st ARVN Regiment was given a large portion of the western part of the 1st Brigade AO and A/1/11 Artillery (ARVN) was airlifted to LZ Cindy, YD 197307. COMANCHE FALLS II was based on an intelligence report, verified by a Chieu Hoi that a large enemy force was operating in the western half of the 1st and 2d Brigade AO. During this operation large caches of enemy equipment and supplies have been uncovered. Enemy logistical facilities have yielded medical supplies, B-40 rockets, 122mm rockets, 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds and hundreds of pounds of plastic explosives. The operation is continuing and the results will be included in the next quarterly report.
AVDAAR-CO

1 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSPOR-55 (RT)

(d) During the early stages of COMANCHE FALLS II a new technique of clearing LZ's in double and triple canopy jungles was tested. The proposed LZ's were first marked by artillery firing white phosphorus rounds and then 10,000 pound bombs were dropped from CH-54 Cranes. The resulting explosion cleared areas large enough for one and two ship LZ's; however, the accuracy required to obtain target hits on narrow ridge tops was not attained. The results are still under study.

e. As the end of the reporting period approached, the 1st Air Cavalry Division was assigned to II Field Force for Operation LIBERTY CANYON. Units departed for III CTZ on the dates indicated below:

- 28 October 1968: HHE/3/21, A/1/21, C/2/20
- 29 October 1968: C/1/30, A/2/19
- 30 October 1968: 0/1/77

The remainder of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery will depart by 11 November 1968.

2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

a. Operations.

(1) Landing Area Illumination in Marginal Weather.

(a) Observation. The dusk to dawn rocket/mortar surveillance mission by AM was hampered by marginal weather conditions.

(b) Evaluation. On several occasions the LZ's were obscured by heavy rain and ground fog. Under these conditions the TO&E portable runway lights have not been adequate to mark the landing area. An improvised 110/120V lighting system with an adjustable rheostat to vary the light intensity as the visibility changes has greatly enhanced the pilot's ability to find the landing areas in marginal weather conditions.

(c) Recommendation. That the TO&E be modified to include a suitable, controlled intensity, lighting system for use on aircraft landing areas in marginal weather.

(2) Forward Observer Training.

(a) Observation. Artillery forward observers selected to assist ARVN battalions in combined US-ARVN operations should be experienced and qualified to employ all means of fire support available to the forces.
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AVDAAR-CO

1 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AAG) for Period Ending 31 October 1968; RCS GSFCR-63 (RI)

(b) Evaluation. During recent combined operations, forward observers in support of ARVN maneuver battalions encountered difficulty in the adjustment of Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA). The observers, provided by Corps Artillery Units, were unfamiliar with the employment of ARA and therefore could not properly advise the ground commander as to its employment. At present, all personnel attending the XXIV Corps forward observers school receive a one hour block of instruction on ARA. A fire mission demonstration is flown and each FO has the opportunity of flying on fire missions. Personnel receiving this instruction have become more confident in the utilization of ARA.

(c) Recommendations.

1. That the employment and adjustment of Aerial Rocket Artillery be included in the course of instruction for the officer's basic course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

2. That forward observers selected to assist ARVN maneuver battalions operating in coordination with 1st Air Cav Div be familiar with operations in Vietnam and that they fully understand the employment of Aerial Rocket Artillery. As a minimum, the observer selected should have attended an in-country training course such as conducted by the 1st Air Cavalry Division Training Center and should have some experience as a forward observer with a US company in Vietnam.

(c) Preparation of Correction Tables for Smoke and WP Shells

(a) Observation. Battery and Battalion FDC's need a rapid method of applying range data corrections for firing smoke and white phosphorus shells.

(b) Evaluation. Many fire missions require shells smoke or WP as initial rounds. Computing the corrections to be applied to the HE firing data for these projectiles takes time and increases the possibility for error. A table can be precomputed to account for these corrections. This eliminates the need for separate computations during the mission.

(c) Recommendation. That a precomputed table to apply range corrections for smoke and WP shells be developed by the artillery school and that techniques for its use be incorporated in instruction.

(4) Failure to use Artillery Radio Frequencies

(a) Observation. Artillery fire should be conducted using appropriate artillery radio frequencies.
(b) Evaluation. During the reporting period four 105mm rounds were fired at enemy positions located on the same ridge line as the friendly elements. Three of these four rounds cleared the ridge crest and one round struck the top of a tree on the edge of the FOB killing three individuals and wounding seven. The Artillery INO with the supported battalion requested that the mission be conducted over infantry frequencies. This request was approved by the Battalion Fire Direction Officer, thereby precluding adequate supervision by the BN FDO and the Arty INO required for close support missions.

(c) Recommendation.

1. That artillery fire should continue to be conducted using appropriate artillery radio frequencies in order to insure adequate supervision by liaison and fire direction personnel.

2. That if the infantry cannot use the artillery frequency the artillery INO should control the observer on the infantry frequency and relay the request for fire over artillery fire direction channels.

b. Training.

(1) Night Gunnery and Instrument Training.

(a) Observation. Due to the onset of the monsoon during this period, the aviators of several aircraft have had to revert to instrument flying in order to accomplish their mission and return to the battery area. When firing rockets from the AH-1G at night, the aviator experiences a temporary loss of night vision. He must revert to instruments for his break away from the target and remain on instruments until he can observe ground features again.

(b) Evaluation. Instrument training has been emphasized during this period in order to prepare the assigned aviators for the monsoon season. One initial instrument ticket has been awarded and 12 instrument tickets have been renewed. Night firing from the AH-1G has been accomplished to train aviators to shoot at night with confidence.

(c) Recommendation. Continued emphasis should be placed on night gunnery and instrument training.

(2) Night Time Orientation of Forward Observers

(a) Observation. A forward observer awaking at night in an unfamiliar location may be temporarily disoriented.

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AVDAAR-00 1 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) For Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFCR-65 (RI)

(b) Evaluation. Some Forward Observers have found that if they lay out their sleeping areas facing the same cardinal direction every night, they are always oriented in that direction when awakened. When the observer must call for immediate fire, he can do so quickly without the aid of compass, map or light.

(c) Recommendation. That orienting forward observer sleeping areas in the same cardinal direction every night be taught as an aid for night-time orientation of forward observers.

Logistics

(1) Removal of Air Tanks on 155mm Howitzer.

(a) Observation. Towed 155mm howitzer air tanks are often damaged in Vietnam.

(b) Evaluation. The towed 155mm howitzers in the division use a cone-shaped pedestal modification for quick 6,000 mil traverse. The howitzer may slip off the swivel pedestal due to muddy conditions or faulty placement of the pedestal under the howitzer and frequently results in the pedestal jamming into and rupturing the air tank. This can be prevented by removing the air tanks and storing them with the section equipment until needed. They are not needed in airmobile operations. If road movement is necessary, the air tanks can be installed within 30 minutes.

(c) Recommendation. That until a satisfactory equipment modification can be devised, air tanks should be removed from towed 155mm howitzers that do not move frequently by road. The air tanks should be stored in the battery area ready for rapid installation. An EIR has been submitted.

(2) Aerial Resupply of Separate Loading Ammunition

(a) Observation. 155mm howitzer units on isolated fire bases may develop an imbalance of ammunition components unless special care is taken in aerial resupply.

(b) Evaluation. During favorable periods for aerial resupply, ammunition sections normally "sling out" projectiles and powder in separate helicopter loads. Typical loads are 6x projectiles with fuzes or four to five pallets of green bag or white bag cannisters. During bad weather, a sortie with projectiles and powder may get through, but the LZ may become weathered in before powder arrives. Prestocking before predicted periods of bad weather helps. Ammunition sections should "sling out" balanced, mixed loads during bad weather. The BN S-3 and S-4, should establish priorities of cards.
(a) **Recommendation.** That resupply of artillery units on isolated LZs during bad weather be carefully planned on a daily basis to include prestocking and delivering balanced loads.

(3) **Distance from Direct Support Maintenance.**

(a) **Observation.** With the increase of bad weather it is becoming more difficult to pick up and deliver aircraft to direct support maintenance companies.

(b) **Evaluation.** The location of direct support maintenance companies in some cases is located as much as 80 miles from the supported unit. Poor flying weather and the physical distance separation has caused up to a three day delay in transporting aircraft to and from direct support maintenance. A 10 to 20 percent lower than normal aircraft availability can be expected for units widely separated from maintenance facilities during the monsoon season.

(c) **Recommendation.** When feasible, direct support companies should be located in close proximity to their supported units. If this is not possible, direct support teams, located with the supported unit should be augmented with additional personnel and equipment.

(4) **Modification of 3/4 ton truck bed.**

(a) **Observation.** On small air supported LZ's units sometimes use a 3/4 ton truck to haul ammunition from the helicopter pad to the howitzer position. Heavy 155mm projectiles may damage the bed of the truck.

(b) **Evaluation.** If a 3/4 ton truck is to be used to move small amounts of ammunition to pieces, reinforcement of the bed is necessary. FSP material can be pre-cut to fit the truck bed. This modification should be interchangeable between trucks and removable to allow for storage when not in use.

(c) **Recommendation.** That the beds of 3/4 ton trucks used on small landing zones to haul 155mm projectiles be reinforced with FSP.

(5) **Proper Lubrication of Cradle Keyway and Cradle Liner, 155mm Howitzer.**

(a) **Observation.** 155mm howitzers may show uneven or jerky counter-recoil during periods of heavy firing with maximum charge. Slide guide keys may shear off during periods of heavy firing.
(b) Evaluation. The cradle liner and cradle keyway are lubrication points on the howitzer which require lubrication weekly IAW the lubrication order. However, during periods of heavy firing with maximum charge, this lubrication is not sufficient to ensure smooth recoil and counterrecoil. These lube points should be lightly lubricated each day to insure proper lubrication of these bearing surfaces.

(c) Recommendation. That units which are engaged in heavy daily firing with maximum charges lubricate the cradle liner and cradle keyway on the 155mm towed howitzer daily rather than weekly.

(6) Ammunition Storage Bunkers.

(a) Observation. During recent heavy rains, a 105mm How (SP) battery operating in a low-lying area lost a large number of artillery rounds due to flash flooding of ammunition storage bunkers.

(b) Evaluation. A firing battery occupied a position in the coastal plain which had been prepared and occupied by a battery equipped with M102 howitzers. To conform to the low silhouette of the M102 and to provide maximum protection for ammunition, storage bunkers were built below ground. Due to the rapid rise of water, these bunkers filled with water almost immediately and became inaccessible before ammunition could be evacuated to higher areas. Consequently, a large number of rounds became unserviceable due to wet powder increments.

(c) Recommendations. Where feasible, ammunition bunkers on low-lying fire bases which may be subject to flooding should be constructed above ground. Firing batteries must implement plans to displace ammunition to higher, protected locations rapidly at the first indication of possible flooding; e.g., place the rounds on top of the bunkers and cover with a tarpaulin.

(7) Panoramic Telescope M113, M102.

(a) Observation. The Panoramic Telescope M113 is non-operational at frequent intervals.

(b) Evaluation. Although the exact cause of breakdown is not always evident, most cases indicate that wear of internal gears causes excessive play in the sight or skipping of numbers on the deflection counter. This deficiency has been somewhat reduced by instructing that personnel are made aware of the maximum RPM of the azimuth knob crank and instructed not to exceed this rate.
CONFIDENTIAL

1 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(c) Recommendation. That each battery be authorized to stock one spare Paroscopic Telescope to insure that all pieces are operational. Float sights presently available in maintenance channels could be used as the battery spare while the defective sight is being repaired or replaced as appropriate.

3. Section 3, Headquarters Department of the Army Survey Information: In reference to letter, HQ, USARV, subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned: Escape and Evasion Information, dated 6 August 1968, the following one time report is submitted: This unit has had no experience with soldiers who have been separated or cut off from their units.

William R. Wolfe
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CFOR-65 (RI)

Commanding General 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 23 November 1968
APO San Francisco 96490

Commanding General, XXIV Corps, ATTN: G-3 DM, APO San Francisco 96390

1. Enclosed is the Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Division Artillery for period ending 31 October 1968.

2. Distribution is being made in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

GONZALDO STANSBURY
CGL, GS
Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AIM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)(U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO 96308 1 JAN 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) The OIRL of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile) has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded IAW USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (U) Comments on Section 4: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

   a. Concur with Commander’s recommendations contained at para 2a(4), 2b(1), 2b(2) and 2c(1) through 2c(7) without further comment.

   b. Reference item concerning landing area illumination in marginal weather, page 5, para 2a(1). Concur. A method of varying the illumination at helicopter landing pads is desirable to properly identify the pad limits in all types of weather. An added advantage of this is the protection afforded to pilot vision as blinding can occur as the helicopter approaches the landing pad lights. A rheostat could be utilized to decrease the light intensity as the aircraft descended to the pad. The reporting unit should submit an MTOE for Light Set Operational Aircraft: 1½ KW Airfield Runway. This light set is equipped with rheostat control.

   c. Reference item concerning forward observer training page 5, para 2a(2). Concur. The training of forward observers in the employment of air delivered ordnance and other means such as naval gunfire at Fort Sill would be highly desirable.

   d. Reference item concerning preparation of correction tables for smoke and WP shells page 6, para 2a(3). Nonconcur. The present methods used to compute data for shell smoke and WP is to correct the HE data for the range difference caused by differences in weights. Introduction of the extra tables proposed would provide two voluminous tables as opposed to the simple and satisfactory method currently employed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

H.R. TAYLOR
CPT, AGC

CONFIDENTIAL
AVHOC-DBT (1 Nov 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 81 JAN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM).

2. Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning forward observer training, page 5, paragraph 2a (2) and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2c. Concur. The training of forward observers in the adjustment of Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) at Fort Sill is highly desirable.

b. (U) Reference item concerning preparation of correction on tables for smoke and WP shells, page 6, paragraph 2a (3) and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2d. Concur with the position as stated in 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2d.

c. Reference item concerning panoramic telescope M113, M102 page 10, paragraph 2b(7). Concur in recommendation that each battery be authorized a spare panoramic telescope. Units should include the additional telescope as a recommended equipment change to Phase I Standardization MTOE-update currently in progress. It should be noted, however, that the Army Material Command (AMC) reports that subject item is currently in a critical supply situation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT AGC
OIC AG CLASSIFIED
GPOP-DT (1 Nov 68) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cav Div Arty (AM) for Period
        Ending 31 October 1968, RCS GSPOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
    Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

G. S. HAYFIELD
 Maj, ASC
Army AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

CO, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile)