**UNCLASSIFIED**

**AD NUMBER**

| AD500264 |

**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

| TO:     | UNCLASSIFIED |
| FROM:   | CONFIDENTIAL |

**LIMITATION CHANGES**

| TO: | Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. |

| FROM: | Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 10 NOV 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC 20310. |

**AUTHORITY**

| AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980 |

**THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED**
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C.  20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (26 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684162  6 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Missile and Munitions School
US Army Ordnance School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army CBR Weapons Orientation Course

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
OSD(SA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Defense Documentation Center
Security Officer, Hudson Institute
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Air University Library
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force, Plans & Operations

Commanding Generals
US Army Weapons Command
US Army Materiel Command
US Army Flight Training Center

Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Aviation Test Activity
7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH ARMORED SQUADRON, 17TH AIR CAVALRY
APO San Francisco 96262

AVGD-G

10 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

19 07-UT-684162

l. Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. (C) General.

(1) Mission. The mission of the 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, is to perform reconnaissance and to provide security for the division or its major subordinate combat elements; to engage in combat as an element of a division or unit, and to provide limited air and ground anti-tank defense for the division. When directed by IFFY, the squadron may detach one or more troops to support other major combat elements in the II Corps tactical zone.

(2) Organizational Structure. The Headquarters, 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry is located at Camp Enari, Dragon Mountain RVN and is commanded by LTC Robert M. Reuter. The squadron has its full complement of cavalry troops as per TOE 17-5T. (Inclosure I reflects the organizational structure of the squadron and assigned troops.)

(a) Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Camp Enari, Dragon Mountain RVN is equipped with four UH-1H helicopters and one U-6A fixed wing.

(b) A Troop Air Cavalry, Camp Enari, Dragon Mountain RVN is equipped with AH-1G, OH-6A, and UH-1H helicopters. The 569th TC Det and the 208th Sig Det support this air cavalry troop.

(c) B Troop Air Cavalry, Phan Thiet RVN is equipped with AH-1G, OH-6A, and UH-1H helicopters. The 569th TC Det and the 114th Sig Det support this air cavalry troop.

(d) C Troop Air Cavalry, Camp Enari, Dragon Mountain RVN is equipped with AH-1G, OH-6A, and UH-1H helicopters. The 412th TC Det and the 238th Sig Det support this air cavalry troop. Prior to 24 October the 110th TC Det was in support of C Troop.
Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968

SUBJECT: D Troop Cavalry, Camp Enari, Dragon Mountain RVN.

During this reporting period there were several significant changes in the organizational structure. D Troop which was formed and deployed from Fort Campbell, Kentucky on 15 July 1968, became operational 1 September 1968. The 102nd TC Det which formed and deployed from Fort Benning, Georgia arrived here 21 October 1968. Additionally, the 230th Sig Det which formed and deployed from Fort Campbell, Kentucky arrived here in October 1968.

(c) Personnel.

(1) Awards Data. The following awards were received by personnel of the 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS w/V</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM w/V</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Change in key staff personnel and commanders:

(a) Squadron Commander 15 Sep 1968
   LTC Robert M. Reuter 070225
   vice
   LTC Stephen F. Cameron 062328

(b) Squadron Executive Officer 20 Sep 1968
   MAJ Scott T. Lyman 01937913
   vice
   LTC James D. Mardell 014023616
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS C57OR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) Squadron S-1 5 Sep 1968
MAJ William B. Wilder C05936
vice
CPT Lawrence R. Kenyon C05312050

(d) Squadron S-2 16 Oct 1968
CPT Michael W. Hodge C05210768
vice
MAJ Robert A. Heiford C075209

(e) Squadron S-3 9 Sep 1968
MAJ Richard H. Marshall C081697
vice
MAJ Robert A. Heiford C075209

(f) Squadron S-4 7 Oct 1968
CPT Paul M. Roberts C05325528
vice
MAJ John E. Smith C05513250

(g) Headquarters Troop Commander 1 Sep 1968
MAJ William D. Connolly C079567
vice
MAJ William B. Wilder C086936

(h) A Troop Commander 31 Aug 1968
MAJ William T. Glover C02921655
vice
MAJ Richard V. Doty C0F10656

(i) B Troop Commander 2 Sep 1968
MAJ James A. McCracken C05301776
vice
MAJ James E. Longhofer C0F105711

(j) D Troop Commander 6 Oct 1968
CPT David M. Hennessy C05240766
vice
CPT Anthony X. Hoyer C05221571

(k) Squadron Chaplain 26 Oct 1968
CPT (CH) Clarence H. Brooks C02332837
vice
CPT (CH) Raymond A. Young C02329187

(l) Squadron Flight Surgeon 3 Oct 1968
CPT David Waliack C05251502
vice
CPT Barry L. Kellogg
AVOG-G
10 November 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1966, RGCSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(3) Strength Figures:

(a) Military:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATE</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TRP</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B TRP</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TRP</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D TRP</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>568 TC DET</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>288 SIG DET</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>569 SIG DET</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>414 SIG DET</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>413 TC DET</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238 SIG DET</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 TC DET</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Civilian:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DAC</th>
<th>VN</th>
<th>3MARC</th>
<th>CONTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
<td>AUTH O/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TRP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B TRP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TRP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D TRP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>568 TC DET</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>288 SIG DET</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>569 TC DET</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>414 SIG DET</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412 TC DET</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238 SIG DET</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 TC DET</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(h) Orders Published:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TRP</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS GSFCR-65 (RI) (U)

(5) Emergency Leaves:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) R&R Data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;R Quotas Received</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;R Quotas Used</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;R Quotas Turned Back</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;R Quotas No Show</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Breakdown of Branch (Officers): Period ending 31 October 1968

- Artillery: 7
- Armor: 54
- Infantry: 13
- Signal Corps: 2
- Transportation Corps: 2
- Adjutant General: 3
- Chaplain: 1
- Medical Corps: 1
- TOTAL: 83

Warrant Officers: 95

TOTAL: 169

(8) Breakdown of Aviators (Officers by Grades):

- LTC: 1
- MAJ: 9
- CAPT: 15
- LIEUT: 41
- SGT: 2
- CW: 14
- WC: 16

(9) Inprocessed Personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVGD-G

10 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, KCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(10) Outprocessed Personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(11) Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of the 36 WIA, 28 were returned to duty.

c. (C) Intelligence. See Inclosure 2
d. (C) Operations.

(1) Results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SKILL</th>
<th>FLOWN</th>
<th>NVA</th>
<th>VC</th>
<th>DAM</th>
<th>DEST</th>
<th>DAM</th>
<th>DEST</th>
<th>CAPTURED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TRP</td>
<td>9095</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B TRP</td>
<td>9251</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TRP</td>
<td>5335</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D TRP</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>25100</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>WAMS</th>
<th>CAPTURED</th>
<th>ARP</th>
<th>REC'D</th>
<th>POW'S</th>
<th>DAYS A/S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TRP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B TRP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TRP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D TRP</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVGQ: Avn

S~ECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, HCS CSFC-65 (II) (U)

(2) Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Aircraft Lost</th>
<th>Aircraft Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HET</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TRP</td>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>OH-6A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>OH-6A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TRP</td>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/17 CAV</td>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>OH-6A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Operational Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ah-1G SORTIES</th>
<th>OTHER HOURS</th>
<th>OH-6A HOURS</th>
<th>UH-1C HOURS</th>
<th>UH-1H HOURS</th>
<th>TOTAL HOURS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HET</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>612</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TRP</td>
<td>8008</td>
<td>1784</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>5091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D TRP</td>
<td>7856</td>
<td>1398</td>
<td>1555</td>
<td>1289</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>14175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TRP</td>
<td>5149</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>5175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/17 CAV</td>
<td>21535</td>
<td>4915</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>14174</td>
<td>14627</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Operations, Task Forces, and Units Supported:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OP MACARTHUR</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
<th>TF SPOILER</th>
<th>TF RIGHT</th>
<th>173 AEH</th>
<th>TS SOUTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HET</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TRP</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D TRP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TRP</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D TRP</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D TRP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/10 CAV</td>
<td>OPCON TO 7/17 CAV FOR 7 DAYS IN SEP 68.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
AVGD-G

10 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

(a) Operation MacArthur is the 1st Infantry Division's general plan for battle in the central Highlands Area of Operations (AO). There are currently 90 fire support changes to this operation. As operation began 12 October 1967.

(b) Task Force Spalier was conducted for 25 August to 25 October and consisted of the entire 2nd Brigade AO centered around the Ban Me Thuot East area.

(c) Task Force Bright operated from 10 September to 7 October and controlled all allied operations in the Duc Lap area.

(d) Support of the 173rd ABn Bde consisted of providing reconnaissance for various air borne battalions in the An Khe area.

(e) Support of TF South was provided by B-Troop in the Phan Thiet area since June 1968.

(f) Unit Moves:

(a) On 31 Sept the RL team for B-Troop moved from Camp Enari to Qui Nhơn by convoy, by I ST to Phan Rang, and then to Phan Thiet by convoy. The move was completed on 2 Oct 1968. The ND team made the same move on 15 Oct.


(g) Training

(1) The AARTS: 17th Cav made maximum utilization of all AARTS allocations available. These schools proved to be extremely valuable and highly beneficial to the Squadron's maintenance program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AU</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) NETT: Flechette NETT visited the Pleiku area and presented a series of lectures attended by the 17th Cav personnel. Three aviators were qualified through the teams firing exercises. On 22 Oct 1968 the team presented a briefing to headquarters staff and C-Troop personnel at Enari; then the team was flown to Ban Me Thuot to present the same information to A-Troop, the Jump CP personnel and personnel from D-Troop.
CONFIDENTIAL

10 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(3) Aviation Training

(a) 1st Avn Bde IF/SLP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Transition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) AH-1G Armament Main Course: 5

(d) Special Training:

(a) TAHES Training: 6 personnel were sent to Nha Trang to receive training in preparation of the material readiness reports, DA Form 2406,

(b) M-16 Rifle: 3 personnel were sent to Nha Trang to receive maintenance training on the M-16 rifle.

(2) Logistics

(a) Class I material drawn daily from 88th Stock Control for the entire Squadron. Actions are broken down daily in squadron S-1 for the individual troops.

(b) Class II is drawn on requisition from the 88th Stock Control Group in Qui Nhon.

(c) Class III is handled in two parts. All packaged POL is requisitioned through 88th Stock Control on a normal requisition and held in the S-1 yard. Nopes and diesel are not handled by S-1. All JP-4 is requisitioned telephonically as needed.

(d) Class IV support is provided by the 14th Inf Div.

(e) Class V is requisitioned from 88th Stock Control and stored in a central ASP. Ammunition is supplied to the troops on request as needed.

(2) Aircraft Maintenance

(a) Maintenance Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Authorized</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Assigned</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average A/C per Troop</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RDS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Availability Rate Percentage
Nom Rate Percentage
Nors Rate Percentage

* 27 AH-1G Helicopters were issued in lieu of 27 UH-lC aircraft.

* 6 UH-1H Models have been issued in lieu of 6 UH-lC model aircraft.

(a) This squadron has now turned in all UH-C aircraft and has been able to convert all UH-1C aircraft to the T-53-113 Engine. This has enabled this unit to eliminate ASL on UH-1C and the T-53-11 Engine. The ASL has been reduced by over 1000 line items.

(b) During this quarter, a maintenance stand-down program was initiated which has improved the maintenance posture of the Squadron. Under this program all aircraft received a week down time for maintenance. This has enabled the squadron to keep a minimum down time for periodic maintenance.

(c) Each of the three air cavalry troops have a KD maintenance detachment attached. This gives each air cavalry troop IS capabilities on station. The troops and KD Detachments have been combined thus providing a maintenance platoon controlled and commanded by the KD Detachment Commander. This has proved to be the best concept of operation for an effective maintenance program.

(d) The following is a breakdown of aircraft by troop:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Hq Trp</th>
<th>A Trp</th>
<th>B Trp</th>
<th>C Trp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>10/6</td>
<td>10/9</td>
<td>10/9</td>
<td>10/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/9</td>
<td>0/9</td>
<td>0/9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shortages:

Hq Trp: 3-UH-1H
A Trp: 2-OH-6A
B Trp: 1-OH-6A, 1 UH-1H
C Trp: 1-OH-6A, 1-UH-1H

(U) Organization. See enclosure 1.
AVGD-G

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RSC CSFOR-68 (R1) (U)

h. (U) Civic Action

(1) General: During this period in the village of Plei-Do, located at coordinates AR 813 136, the CA team built a school, fences for cows, horses and pigs. Also 7 rice storage buildings were repaired and relocated to the center of the village. A store where Montagnards could sell native products was built near the main road going from Camp Enari to Pleiku. In the village of Plei-Ho Lang located at coordinates AR 774 430, a dispensary and a storage house were built.

(2) Operation and Training Activities: With the help of the people living in the village of Plei-Do, a school was built for 60 children of school age. A defense system, consisting of four rolls of concertina wire around the village of Plei Do, a moat, and bunkers spaced every 20 feet, was built. The work on this defense system was done completely by the people of Plei-Do. Fences for cows and pens for pigs were built by the CA team with help from the villagers. A store for the Montagnards was built by the people of Plei-Do. A series of fly-proof latrines were built in the village of Plei-Do to improve the sanitary conditions of the village. In the village of Plei-Do a dispensary was built with the aid of the village people. Cooperation on this project was almost 100% due to the advantages the villagers foresaw by having this dispensary. A storage house was built near the dispensary in Plei-Do. The people of Plei-Do were vaccinated for smallpox in the month of September; additional vaccinations for the people of both villages is underway.

(3) Logistics: The majority of the building materials came from the 7/17 Cav S-4.

(4) Civil Affairs: The following is a list of projects executed during this quarter:

(a) School Constructed (1)
(b) Dispensary Constructed (1)
(c) Storage Area Constructed (1)
(d) Store Constructed (1)
(e) Latrines Constructed (5)
(f) Cow Fences Constructed (11)
(g) Pig Pens Constructed (8)
(h) Rice Storage buildings Relocated (7)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS XSPC-65 (RL) (U)

(i) Bunkers Constructed (37)

(j) Perimeter defense Reinforced (1)

(k) Bulletin Board Installed (1)

(l) Wells Dug (4)

Message Center Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOMING</th>
<th>OUTGOING</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TTY COURIER</td>
<td>TTY COURIER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUG 261</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 230</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT 251</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 158</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>2214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Precedence and Classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFIED</th>
<th>UNCLASS</th>
<th>CLASSIFIED</th>
<th>UNCLASS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate 169 235</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1223</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority 75 124</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine 262 263</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>341</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 154</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>2295</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Surgeon Dispensary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PATIENTS</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>639</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1785</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INJURIES 167</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>1851</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accident Prevention

(i) The accident rate (per 100,000 flight hours) was 19.81. The following causes are cited:

(a) Aug: No accidents.

(b) Sep: Two accidents (rate 39.22).

12 Sep 68, OH-6A major: Engine stopped during practice forced landing.

(a) Left throttle can be rotated beyond flight idle position on many OH-6A aircraft causing fuel starvation and failure.

(b) IF not properly qualified to instruct in OH-6A.

(c) IF not current in autorotations to the ground.
AVGD-G

SUDJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

2. 16 Sep 68, UH-1H, minor: Tail rotor strike in POL.

3. Pilot used improper procedures for lift-off and departure.

4. Gunner/CS did not clear aircraft prior to maneuver.

(c) Oct: One accident, CH-54, majors: Aircraft spun to right after downwind pedal turn to right.

2. Pilot used improper procedure in making right pedal turn in downwind condition.

2. Pilot applied improper corrective action in autorotating from 35' hover.

Accident Rate Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TOTAL FLYING HOURS</th>
<th>NUMBER ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>5998</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>44,770</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Per 1,000,000 flying hours.

1. (U) Religious Activities

(a) Religious Activities

| (a) Protestant | 31 | 682 |
| (b) Catholic   | 27 | 455 |
| (c) Memorial   | 2  | 220 |

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

(a) Personnel:

(1) (C) ROTATIONAL HUMP (DEROS):

(c) Observations: The Squadron experienced a hump in all three (3) months during this reporting period and at present has Deros humps during the months of January, June, July, and October 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFDENTIAL

10 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RG-63 QH-5 (HI) (II)

(b) EVALUATION. The rotational humps were caused by infusion of 7/1st Cav personnel who rotate 31 January 1969, newly attached KD teams in June, assignment of new G Troop in July, and the influx of replacements in October plus a new KD Team for C Troop. In addition, the departure of numerous key personnel who brought the 7/17th Cav into HVN in October 1967.

(c) RECOMMENDATION.

1. That units do not infuse massively with other units.

2. That replacements be assigned to units at a gradual pace, i.e., 15 per month for 3 months versus 45 at one time.

3. Units continue to infuse within squadron and then request outside assistance for that remaining.

4. Utilize the 40th TC Det, which is being deactivated, to absorb some aviation related MOS to reduce humps.

(2) Shortages in Critical MOS.

(a) OBSERVATION. A shortage of 11D series MOS.

(b) EVALUATION. A shortage of 22 11D series MOS existed in the squadron. This shortage is taken up by other 11 series MOS, i.e., overstrength of 28 in 11B MOS.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That squadron continue to cross train 11B series MOS and change MOS after 60-90 day period, and that in the future, proper number of specific MOS be requisitioned based on projected losses.

(b) Operations.

(3) Air Cavalry Raid, and Cordon and Search Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION. Raids and cordon and search operations must be organized and executed in minimum time to be effective.

(b) EVALUATION. It has been found that the most successful raids and cordon and search operations have been conducted when planning and execution require less than one hour. This planning figure can be accomplished if an SOP is established, coordination in a new area is implemented to include all intelligence agencies to include national police, military intelligence, aviation support units, med-evac, artillery, tactical air, and the S-5 of the supported unit. The operation should be given a standard operational name, i.e., (Operation SLIM). The command and control unit then calls the units involved and states 'Operation SLIM', location of action, radio frequency of control element, and time of action. The requirement for planning and coordination has been accomplished, therefore all units move to predetermined locations for execution.
CON

FIDENTIAL

AVAU-4 10 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Air Cavalry Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period ending 31 October 1966, RCL 00672 (AD) (U)

(c) REDACTED.

1. That all air cavalry units establish SOPs on raid and cordon and search operations. In addition, when an air cavalry unit enters a new area of operation, immediate coordination should be made with all interested units, to include exchange of SOPs, radio frequencies, and telephone numbers.

2. That recommended improvements to this operation be submitted in future ORIL.

(2) Cavalry Employment of CS Gas

(a) OBSERVATION. The aerial employment of CS gas from E15GR2 canister clusters is an effective technique to develop the situation and permit the destruction of enemy equipment and personnel.

(b) EVALUATION. The following is one method of employment for the E15GR2 CS canister clusters. The Command and Control (C&C) aircraft carries four canisters and a representative from the supported Chemical Detachment. When the area has been selected, the C&C aircraft makes one or two CS passes. Initial guidance for aerial delivery was 65K from 1000-1200 feet altitude; however, experience indicates that at 50-55K and from 1000-1500 feet altitude achieves greater target coverage. The passes are made into the wind and after a very few drops, the pilot can find a good "sight picture" and become accurate. It is imperative that armed helicopters are in firing positions behind the C&C ship as the enemy has fired at the gas dispensing aircraft regularly. The C&C aircraft will call his break. Generally after one orbit of the area to ascertain the degree of gas dispersion, the target can be struck by the armed helicopters, Tactical air or artillery. The area can be reentered about 10 minutes after the strikes begin for a damage assessment.

1. There are two methods for determining the area to be attacked. If the scouts draw fire during the reconnaissance of an area, the enemy is then positively located and the armed helicopters make a quick firing pass to insure the scouts can clear the area. The C&C then begins the gas run. When the scouts are unable to locate the enemy positively by visual sighting or by receiving fire, the same gas technique can be employed, if enemy activity is suspected of indicated.

2. After a gas and armed helicopter strike the situation can be developed easily. The enemy forces have been disturbed from their positions by both the gas and fire and the possibility of detection is greatly increased by enemy movement or anti-aircraft fire.

3. This same employment technique for CS gas can be used to get the enemy forces out of fox holes or bunkers and to confuse them long enough to call in an air strike.

CONFIDENTIAL
4. Special consideration must be given to the use of gas. First, during mission planning, all helicopter crews and any ground reaction force must be briefed to carry protective masks for that operation. Secondly, the FAC must be advised that the area has been gassed.

5. No after action reports, damage assessment, or body count has been thus far obtained after the use of gas. This technique was used several times in the DAK TO area during poor weather conditions and late in the afternoon. No ground forces were able to sweep the area, and only a limited aerial reconnaissance was accomplished. This same technique is currently being employed in the DUC CO area and results should be forthcoming.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That other aviation units consider the employment of CS gas and armed helicopters in their regular operations.

(3) 2.75" Rocket System for OH-6A Reconnaissance Scout Helicopter

(a) OBSERVATION. During the months of August and September 1968, B Trp 7/17 Air Cav was assigned the testing and evaluation of a new 4 pod 2.75" rocket system for the OH-6A.

(b) EVALUATION. It was determined that the system proved to be surprisingly accurate and very effective in marking targets from operational altitude. The role of the LOH scout in Vietnam requires low-level and low air-speed reconnaissance, with maximum exposure to hostile fire. On occasions, heavy enemy contact has prevented the scout from maintaining close visual observation of the hostile force. Employment of the LOH rocket marking system proved to be invaluable in directing armed helicopter fire and air strikes on the enemy positions.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. That the 2.75" rocket system for the OH-6A be adapted for use in all air cav squadrons.

(4) (C) Lack of Protection of the M151 ½ Ton Truck

(a) OBSERVATION. The M151 ½ Ton does not provide the protection or maneuver capability of the M113 APC in the central highlands.

(b) EVALUATION. During several recent operations in the Ban Me Thuot area D 7/17 Air Cav equipped with M151 'Jeep' and A/1/10 Cav equipped with M113 APC's were employed together. While proceeding to a blocking position the column was ambushed by an estimated NVA company sized force. The D/7/17 Cav elements were not in the killing zone, but were receiving intense small arms fire and fragmentation. The A/1/10 Cav commander instructed the jeep mounted force to pull back when the APC's began receiving 57mm recoilless fire. The APC's, due to their armor protection, were able to withstand the small arms and recoilless rifle fire and remain in contact. Shortly, the APC's withdraw and gunships from A/7/17 Cav can begin making runs and calling in air strikes. Again the APC's were able to remain within 75mm of the enemy and to maintain contact with the hostile force during breaks in the aerial strikes. The D/7/17 elements were forced to pull back 200 meters from the area of contact to avoid the air strikes.
During similar sweep operations D/7/17 Cav found it was almost impossible to overcome the natural obstacles present in the central highlands. Many missions were aborted, or delayed, due to the M151 jeeps getting stuck in river beds, on stumps and having mechanical failure such as ruptured radiators, flat tires, and over heated engines. Veteran cavalry NCO's from Europe maintain that 90% of these delays, mechanical failures, and limited capabilities of the unit could have been overcome by the employment of APC's. Currently the Squadron is drafting MTOE changes to obtain APC's for the assigned Cavalry Troop.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all Cavalry Units located in the central highlands have APC's approved for issue in lieu of the M151 ½ Ton Truck.

(5) NVA Unit Tactics

(a) OBSERVATION. The NVA seem to gather in large groups at approximately 1500 hours to 1630 hours each day.

(b) EVALUATION. It has been noted that on numerous occasions during this quarter, the enemy has been assembled in large groups, normally on high ground, between the hours of 1500 and 1630. It has been determined that these groups are gathered together for political meetings and coordination. Gun ships and TAC air have been employed upon these groups with favorable results.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That added emphasis be given to 1500-1630 hours reconnaissance within area of operation to detect, confuse, and destroy the enemy.

(6) NVA Small Unit Tactics

(a) OBSERVATION. The enemy has been departing Villages at approximately 0500-0600 hours, moving on trails because of darkness and to increase speed of movement.

(b) EVALUATION. Aero Scouts have been able to detect the enemy and his direction of movement from villages that have been used by the enemy for night locations. It has been determined that the enemy departs the village one (1) hour prior to daylight in order to avoid contact within the village. He uses trails leading from the village to increase speed of movement. First light reconnaissance flights can detect the direction of enemy movement, allowing maximum daylight to defeat the enemy with all available fires and maneuver.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS

That recon units apply the first light technique with emphasis on trails leading out of enemy night locations.

CONFIDENTIAL
2. All units consider establishing night ambush sites some distance from villages along obvious enemy routes of withdrawal.

c. (ii) Training.

Conversion from old DA Form 759 to New DA Form 759 and 759-1.

(1) OBSERVATION. On 1 July 1966 the new DA Forms 759 and 759-1, (Individual Flight Record and Flight Certificate-Army), were to be in effect. Due to poor distribution of forms and regulations in NVA, these forms have not been received.

(2) EVALUATION. There have been many instances where aviators reported to this unit having the new forms already in effect in their records. This requires reverting to the old forms, in itself complicated, with the possibility of losing valuable information in the transfer. Also the supply of the old DA Form 759 is almost exhausted. The old and new forms are on emergency requisition but this unit has no proposed receipt date for the new forms.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That when a new system is instituted all units be issued the required forms prior to the establishment of the new system.

d. (C) Intelligence.

Local Force (Indigenous) Intelligence Sources.

(1) OBSERVATION. The use of Local Force (Indigenous) Intelligence sources supplies timely and valuable information.

(2) EVALUATION. In October the 7/17 Cav was organized into a Task Force in support of operation McArthur in the Ban Me Thout area. Upon initiating operations, the squadron Co, S-3, and squadron Liaison Officer made contact with the Darlac indigenous intelligence sources. Using all resources supplied in the Darlac area to include the 1st Div MI and the Ban Me Thout National Police, the squadron completed several successful search and cordon missions, resulting in valuable information concerning enemy status. This was the first time use of local force intelligence sources had been used by the squadron. The cooperation between the indigenous personnel and 7/17 Cav resulted in receiving information only hours old and permitted immediate reaction to the enemy situation on the same day information was reported. This method, in addition to locating and destroying enemy personnel and equipment, provides the intelligence source an opportunity to test the accuracy of their agents.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That all Air Cavalry Squadrons establish contact immediately upon entering a new AO with Local Force (Indigenous) Intelligence sources.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1966, HCM CORD-65 (U) (U)

e. (U) Logistics.

Ch: Operations.

(1) OBSERVATION. Current procedures require incoming personnel to process through the 22nd and 90th Replacement Battalions thereby receiving specified items of organizational clothing and equipment from respective central issue facilities.

(2) EVALUATION. The non receipt of complete issues of those items specified in letter AVGD-G-U, Headquarters USAV, Subject: Establishment of Central Issue Facilities, dated 21 August 1965, creates difficulties in providing similar missing items to individuals reporting to assigned units.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That maximum effort be made to provide individual processing through replacement battalions with those items which have been established for issue at that point.

f. (U) Organization. None.

g. (U) Safety.

Failure of Starter/Generator Cooling Fans.

(1) OBSERVATION. Within a two-month period two precautionary landings were necessitated by failure of the starter generator cooling fan on the UH-1H mounting the 300 cpr unit.

(2) EVALUATION. Both failures were of the disintegration type causing contamination of the engine oil supply. Research by squadron maintenance determined that the 300 cpr unit has sufficient air flow for cooling without the cooling fan. Research by the accident prevention officer determined that failures of this type are common in UH-1H aircraft.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That all cooling fans be removed from UH-1H aircraft with 300 cpr starter/generator units.

h. (U) Signal.

Avionics Mechanics Utilization.

(1) OBSERVATION. The avionics mechanics (35K20) are part of the maintenance section of the headquarters troop communications platoon. Each Air Cavalry Troop has one TOE 11-500 (RL) team in direct support.

(2) EVALUATION. The signal RL teams are organized to provide direct support maintenance of all avionics equipment organic to the Air Cavalry Troop. Because of the lack of direct contact between the maintenance section and the RL team, the Detachment Commander of the RL team does not know the
status of the aircraft he is supporting. Cross training of personnel within the MOS field is limited and the maintenance flow is interrupted.

(3) **Attach two 35K20 avionics mechanics to each of the RL teams. Divide the maintenance float and test equipment located within the maintenance section equally between the three RL teams.** Advantages of this system are readily apparent in that the RL team is placed in direct contact with the aircraft which they support and personnel within the MOS 35 career field may be cross trained to provide increased efficiency.

1. (b) Civic Action.

   **Civic Affairs.**

   (1) **OBSIb**. The availability of indigenous help for CA projects varies during harvest seasons.

   (2) **EVJIANI**. The availability of the people to work on projects during the rice harvest season diminishes. These people, normally available, must harvest their own rice as their basic food source.

   (3) **RICOBSIb**. Self help projects must be programmed around the known harvest seasons. US Army personnel should be detailed to assist in these projects considered to be of emergency nature only.

3. **Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.**

   The Squadron has had no related experiences on escape and evasion or on survival. Whenever an aircraft is shot down there are generally at least 3 other aircraft present and the reaction force of the AIP is immediately launched. The downed crew rarely remains on the ground longer than an hour. Overhead gun cover is furnished by organic gunships.

   

   

   **Major H. Reuter**
   LTC, AR
   Commanding

2 Inc1: wd, Hq, DA

Intelligence for the period ending 31 October 1966

Organisation Structure, 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry

**DISTRIBUTION:**

2 CG, USAFR, ATTH: APO-96558
3 CG, USAFR, ATTH: APO-96375
2 CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTH: APO-96380
7 CG, 17th USGO, ATTH: AVGD-EC, APO-96280
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGD-SC (10 Nov 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, HCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96240 25 November 1968

TO: Commanding General, 1st Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVGA-GC-OT, APO 96350

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the basic letter from the 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry. Pen and ink corrections of minor errors have been inserted.

2. (C) This headquarters submits the following comments:

   a. Section 1, Operations, pages 1 through 13: CONCUR.

   b. Section 2, Lessons Learned:

      (1) Paragraph 2a(1), Rotational Hump, pages 13 and 14: CONCUR. This headquarters is infusing incoming personnel on a continuing basis into the squadron, and is transferring personnel with DEROS in hump months out of the squadron into other group units.

      (2) Paragraph 2a(2), Critical MOS Shortage, page 14: CONCUR. Brigade overassigned 11B MOS personnel to this group as OJT fill for 11D MOS shortages.

      (3) Paragraph 2b(1), Cordon and Search Operations, pages 14 and 15: CONCUR.

      (4) Paragraph 2b(2), CS Gas Employment, pages 15 and 16: CONCUR.

      (5) Paragraph 2b(3), OH-6A Rocket System, page 16: CONCUR.

      (6) Paragraph 2b(4), M151 Protection, pages 16 and 17: CONCUR. Recommend consideration by 1st Aviation Brigade in development of standardized Air Cavalry Squadron MTOE.

      (7) Paragraph 2b(5), NVA Unit Tactics, page 17: CONCUR.

      (8) Paragraph 2b(6), NVA Small Unit Tactics, pages 17 and 18: CONCUR.

      (9) Paragraph 2c, DA Form 759, page 18: CONCUR. Only DA Forms 759-1 have been distributed to group units by the pinpoint system.

      (10) Paragraph 2d, Indigenous Intelligence Sources, pages 18 and 19: CONCUR.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGD-SC (10 Nov 68) 1st Ind  25 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for
Period Ending 31 October 1968, ACS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(11) Paragraph 2o, Central Issue Facilities, page 19: CONCUR. Other group units have reported similar discrepancies concerning action by central issue facilities.

(12) Paragraph 2g, UH-1H Cooling Fans, page 19: CONCUR. Paragraph 52, TB 750-992-3, Equipment Improvement Report and Maintenance Digest, dated 1 August 1968, contains this recommendation.


(14) Paragraph 2i, Civic Affairs, page 20: CONCUR.

c. Section 3, Survey Information, page 20: CONCUR.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOSEPH C. FLORE
1LT, AGC
Adjutant

CF:
2 ACSFOR, Da, Washington, DC 20310
8 CO, 7/17th ACS
AVFA-GC-OT (10 Nov 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384

(U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Robert [Signature]
CPT, ASC
1st AD
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFDR-65 (R1) (U)

This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 1(c), page 12 and Accident Rate Statistics, page 13. Accident rate for the three months should be 20.2 instead of 19.81. Computation is based on a total of 14,870 flying hours and 3 accidents rather than an average of the rates for August, September and October.

   b. Paragraph 2(b), page 16. Substitution of armored personnel carriers for wheeled vehicles in the ground cavalry troop merits further investigation. This headquarters is currently conducting a MTOE study of air cavalry units and the subject of track vehicles for those units is being thoroughly evaluated. This study will include other vehicles that could be replaced by APC as well as the M151 ¾ ton truck.

   c. Paragraph 2(g), page 19 and paragraph 2b(12), 1st Indorsement. Aircraft Maintenance Officer, HQ 34th General Support Group, states that his organization and AVCOM are studying the problem. No action as yet has been taken.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN D. MISELL

Assistant Adjutant General
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (10 Nov 68) 4th Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning 2.75" rocket system for OH-6A reconnaissance scout helicopter, page 16, paragraph 2b(3): Concur with the results of the evaluation. An add-on evaluation is in progress at this time to determine an appropriate basis of issue for the system.

   b. Reference item concerning conversion from old DA Form 759 to new DA Form 759 and 759-1, page 18, paragraph 2c; and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b(9): Concur. This headquarters requested on 30 October 1968 that DA take immediate action to alleviate this problem. DA Forms 759-1 are now being received by USARV units, but DA Forms 759 are still not available. The first shipment of these forms were due to arrive at USARV Publications Center in December 1968 and be forwarded to USARV.

   c. Reference item concerning CIF operations, page 19, paragraph 2e; and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b(11): Concur. This headquarters is taking action to improve Central Issue Facility (CIF) operations.

   d. Reference item concerning failure of starter/generator cooling fans, page 19, paragraph 2g; 1st Indorsement, para 2b(12); and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2c: Concur with recommendation and the 1st Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

25

CONFIDENTIAL
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference page 18, paragraph 2c; 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b(9); and 4th Indorsement, paragraph 2b, concerning DA Forms 759 and 759-1. The shortage of forms is recognized by this headquarters. During the period 18 September 1968 to 27 December 1968, the Printing and Publications Center, Kawasaki, Japan, shipped to USARV a total of 6,900 pads consisting of 345,000 sets of DA Form 759. During the period 4 September 1968 to 27 December 1968, the center shipped 5,000 pads consisting of 250,000 sets of DA Form 759-1. The current stock level of DA Form 759 is none, but the current stock level of DA Form 759-1 is 3,027 pads or 151,350 sets. All due-outs for DA Form 759 established as of 23 December 1968 have been released. However, subsequent requisitions received from USARV supply accounts exhausted stocks on hand and due-outs for DA Form 759 as of 27 December 1968 totaled 287 pads. These due-outs will be filled as soon as additional stocks are received from CONUS.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SMITH
C. T. AOC
T. AOC
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1968.

CO, 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry