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SECURITY
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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American Division Artillery
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-C3FOR-65)

1. (C) Section I: Operations: Significant Activities

a. Command:

(1) Division Artillery commands the following assigned or attached units:

- 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm): Assigned
- 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8"/175mmSP): Assigned
- 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (155T/8"SP): Assigned
- 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery (Hawk): Assigned
- Battery G, 55th Artillery (H): Assigned
- 3d Platoon, Battery G, 29th Artillery (Searchlight): Attached
- 251st Countermortar Radar Detachment: Assigned
- 252d Countermortar Radar Detachment: Assigned

(2) Division Artillery monitors the activities of the direct support battalions of the three infantry brigades.

- 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery: Assigned 11th Infantry Brigade
- 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery: Assigned 198th Infantry Brigade
- 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery: Assigned 196th Infantry Brigade

b. Operations:

(1) Supporting Artillery Fires

(a) Heavy artillery support continues to be available throughout the division area of operations. Typical targets for heavy artillery are: infiltration routes, heavy enemy concentrations, base areas, acquired targets, and lucrative close-in targets.

(b) Medium artillery is weighted toward the Chu Lai and Burlington Trail areas of operation. In order to provide medium artillery support throughout the division AO, two of the medium artillery batteries operate as split fire units. Quick fire channels to five units...
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have been established with direct support battalions. One battery continues to be in direct support of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment.

(c) Light artillery fire units made fifty-five moves during the period. Displacement by air was utilized as the primary method of moving light artillery units to otherwise inaccessible forward fire support bases. The provisional fourth firing battery of the direct support battalion again provided added coverage for the large brigade areas. In order to support maneuver battalions moving to high enemy threat areas, direct support artillery from other brigades was sometimes placed under operational control of the maneuvering brigade.

(d) Artillery ammunition expenditures and per cent of observed fires by calibers for the ammunition reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
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<td>17, 436</td>
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<tr>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>11, 210</td>
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(2) Division artillery provided supporting fires for the following major operations of the American Division:

- Operation Wheeler/Wallowa
- Operation Burlington Trail
- Operation Poohchota Forest
- Operation Champagne Grove
- Operation Dukas Glade
- Operation Logan Field
- Operation Dele Common
- Operation Vernon Lake I

(c) Wheeler/Wallowa

1. Operation Wheeler/Wallowa continued during the reporting period with the 196th Infantry Brigade with the 2 - 1st Inf, 4 - 21st Inf, and 3 - 21st Inf conducting operations with the 1st Squadron, 1st Cav. On the termination of Poohchota Forest on 4 Aug, the 4 - 31st Inf rejoined the operation.

2. Division artillery supported the operation as follows:

- C/6/11 moved from Fire Support Base Buck at LT 806320 to LZ Center (LT 050250) on 2 Aug and out of the Wheeler/Wallowa AO on 3 Sep. On 9 Aug C/3/82 moved out to LZ Gimlet (LT 858230) from LZ West (LT 990250). B/3/82 moved into LZ Center from the Chu Lei T.0. on 3 Sep. As a result of the arrival of 1/82d Arty in the Chu Lei T.0. on 3/82 was now able to r-tain all its batteries within the 196th EDC AO. C/3/82 moved back to LZ West on 18 Sep. On 1 Oct D/3/82 supported an operation at LZ Cesti (LT 060473) in an AO extension.
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in 2d ROK sect. A platoon of C/3/82 moved out to Polar Bear II (UT 939211) on 2 Oct from LZ West. On 9 Oct D/3/82 moved to LZ Baldy, the 196th sect. Hq., located at JT 130449.

b. Reinforcing artillery moved to support operations in the AO.

On 2 Aug C/3/16 moved south to LZ Ross (UT 028341), and on to LZ O'Connor (UT 935243) on 8 Aug. Three howitzers moved into LZ Ross (UT 028341) from Fat City (UT 440077) and LZ O'Connor on 12 Aug from C/3/16. On 2 Aug, 3 howitzers of A/3/16 moved to LZ West on 21 Sep from LZ O'Connor. C/3/16 (-) moved to LZ Baldy from LZ Ross on 1 Oct, returning to LZ Ross on 14 Oct.

g. GS artillery from 3/18 arty was employed in the western portion of the AO and withdrew closer to Tan Ky as the monsoon season started. B/3/18 moved out to LZ Lurch (UT 926238) from LZ Karen on 4 Aug. On 19 Aug the battery returned to LZ hoss to remain there for the balance of the reporting period.

d. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (+)(105T) - DS 196th Infantry Brigade

3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-)(155T) - DS 1/1 Cav and GS /3/82d Arty

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-)(8"/175G) - GS

(b) Burlington Trail

1. Operation Burlington Trail continued during the period with the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry and 196th Infantry Brigade conducting the operation.

2. On 6 Aug D/1/14 moved to LZ Professional (UT 173076) and 4/6/11 moved to LZ Pleasantville from LZ Young and Tien Phuoc, respectively. D/1/14 moved to LZ Pleasantville on 13 Aug. On 19 Aug B/1/14 moved to LZ Bowan (UT 238140) from Hill 54. 4/6/11 moved from LZ Pleasantville (UT 051049) to LZ Bowan (UT 238140) on 21 Aug. During the four day contact with the 1st NF VC Regiment, 2d NVI Division at UT 2221 the unit contributed fires which resulted in a total of 510 NVI KIA and 17 VC KIA. On 4 Sep, Pit 1/4/3/16 returned from LZ Baldy to Hawk Hill (UT 224311) as DS 1/1 Cav. B/1/14 moved to LZ Young from LZ Bowman on 19 Sep. After three days of fighting results were: 402 NVI KIA and 23 VC KIA. On 28 Sep 4/1/14 moved to Tien Phuoc from LZ Chippewa (UT 485 967). C/1/14 moved to LZ Bowan (UT 238140) from LZ Gator (UT 51963) on 9 Oct, and moved to LZ Sheryl (UT 302192) on 17 Oct to support a combined US - AHVN operation.

3. Reinforcing artillery of A/3/18 (2-175mmG) on Hill 54 supported Burlington Trail operations. On 4 Aug this platoon moved to

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LZ Young and returned to hill 54 on 7 Sep. Flt/1/3/16 joined the battery at Tien Phuoc on 9 Aug. Flt 6/3/18 moved to hawk hill from Fat City (ST 436076) on 20 Sep.

4. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

1st battalion, 14th artillery (+)(105T) - DS 198th infantry brigade

3d battalion, 16th artillery (-)(155T) - DS 1/1 Cav

3d battalion, 18th artillery (-)(8"/175G) - GS

(c) Reckon Forest terminated on 4 Aug. Units returned to the Wheeler/Hallow. D.U.

(d) Dakus Glade was initiated on 7 Oct by 4-21st Inf to destroy enemy forces in vicinity AT 9948. It was terminated on 9 Oct.

1. D/3/82 moved to LZ Coit (ST 060473) and 6/3/16(-) moved to LZ Baldy (ST 132438) from LZ Baldy and LZ Ross, respectively on 1 Oct.

2. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

3d battalion, 82d artillery (-)(105T) - DS 196th infantry brigade

3d battalion, 16th Artillery (-)(155T) - Reinforce

3d battalion, 18th artillery (-)(8"/175G) - GS

(c) Chu Lai Task

1. Operations in the Chu Lai Task were conducted by 198th Infantry Brigade and by the 11th Infantry Brigade when they assumed responsibility for the southern portion.

2. Division artillery provided support as follows:

5. Direct support artillery moves frequently between several fire support bases in the T.O.R in order to provide sufficient coverage and mutual support, and permit flexibility in offensive operations. On 8 Aug, B/3/82 moved from LZ O'Connor to LZ Chippewa (BS 485967) and then returned to LZ Center on 3 Sep. D/1/14, on 22 Aug, moved from Ha Duc (ST 048973) to Fat City (ST 490750). A/6/11 moved from LZ Bowman to Hill 54 (ST 396443) on 29 Aug and then to LZ Buff (BS 539824) on 7 Sep. B/1/14 moved to Hill 54 from Fat City on 20 Aug. On 2 Sep J/1/14 moved to LZ Chippewa from LZ Buff. On 16 Sep Flt C/1/14 moved to LZ Gator (BS 571963) from LZ Jano (BS 660758). B/6/11 moved to LZ Buff from Fsal Cork (BS 450612) on 23 Sep. D/6/11 also
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2. 1/82 arty became operational in early August, 1/1/82 at Hill 54 on 5 Aug., after sending a Plt to Fort City on 12 Aug, returning to Hill 54 on 20 Sep. 6/1/82 moved into LZ Gator on 8 Aug, fully operational. 6/1/82 1/82 became operational at LZ Dottie on 4 Aug. Plt C/3/18 (2-8") moved to Fort City on 7 Aug from LZ Dottie. On 7 Sep, Plt C/3/18 (2-175G) moved to Hill 54 from LZ Young. On 23 Sep, B/1/82 returned to LZ Gator from an operation in 11th Inf Bdc w/o. On 13 Oct, Plt B/1/82 moved to LZ Dottie from LZ Gator to provide illumination.

2. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

- 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (+)(105T) - DS 198th Infantry Brigade
- 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (-)(155T/8"SP) - GSR 1/14 Art
- 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-)(105T) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade
- 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-)(8"/175G) - GS

(f) Logan Field

1. Operation Logan Field was conducted from 7 - 12 Oct as the 1-20th Inf moved to the katang peninsula.

2. B/6/11 moved to LZ Uptight (US 726857) from LZ Dottie to provide direct support for the 1-20th Inf.

(g) Champagne Grove

1. From 3 - 24 Sep the 11th Inf Bdc deployed its forces for operation Champagne Grove with three US battalions and three RVN battalions to take pressure off the Mr. Thanh Special Forces Camp.

2. 0/6/11 moved to Lung Ngdi Air Field (US 605719) on 4 Sep from LZ Gator. On 11 Sep B/1/82 (-) moved to LZ Chey (US 428714) from LZ Gator. On 20 Sep, B/6/11 moved to LZ Cork (US 450612) from LZ Arnone (US 450612).

2. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

- 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-)(105T) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade

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Battery A (-), 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (155T)
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (9"/75G) - GS

(h) Dac Pho . . .

1. Operations in the Dac Pho area continued throughout the reporting period.

2. Several moves were made in order to support several other smaller scale operations. On 7 Aug, C/6/11 moved to Long Son Special Forces Camp (BS 458466) from LZ Dora (BS 553325). On 8 Aug, C/1/82 opened operations with four guns on LZ Liz (BS 757432) and two guns on LZ Thunder (BS 869318). On 9 Aug 5/6/11 moved to LZ Dragon (BS 730529) from Long Son (BS 548466). 5/6/11 moved to LZ Dragon (BS 581326) on 14 Aug from LZ Thunder. 5/6/11 moved to LZ Dragon on 30 Aug from hill 54 and D/6/11 moved to Ha Than (BS 428716) from LZ Dragon. C/6/11 moved to LZ Dragon on 10 Sep from Quang Ngai airfield. C/1/14 moved down to LZ Jane (BS 660758) on 13 Sep. On 16 Sep, 6/11 moved to LZ Dragon, C/6/11 moved to LZ Thunder, and 6/6/11 moved to LZ Dragon from LZ Buff, LZ Dragon, and LZ Thunder, respectively.

3. On 28 Aug, Flt C/3/18 (2-175G) moved to LZ Bettie from LZ Dragon. They moved back to LZ Dragon on 23 Sep. Flt C/3/18 moved from Phat City to LZ Dragon to LZ Dragon with 2-8" guns. From 14-15 Oct C/1/82 (4-155) moved from LZ Liz to LZ Scoopy and back to LZ Liz.

4. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) (105T) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade

OPON
Battery C, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (155T)
1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (-) (105T) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-) (8"/75G) - GS

(i) Dau Cong

1. Operation Dau Cong was a short operation from 18-19 Oct with the 3-1st Infantry working in the Song Ve Valley (BS 6050).

2. 6/6/11 moved to LZ bulldog (BS 730528) from LZ Dragon on 18 Oct and returned on 19 Oct.

(j) Vernon Lake I

1. Vernon Lake I commenced on 25 Oct with 4-3d Inf and 3-1st Inf in the Song Ve Valley. On 28 Oct friendly units moved north between Ha Than and Quang Ngai Airfield. 1st Cav moved to the AO.
2. On 25 Oct B/6/11 and A/6/11 moved to LZ Dancer (US 682402) and LZ Bulldog (US 637552) from LZ Dottie and LZ Stiff, respectively. On 28 Oct, A/1/82 (-), 4 guns, moved to Hill 10 (US 583722) from LZ Dottie and LZ Gator. On 29 Oct, B/6/11 moved to LZ Pepper (US 496716) from LZ Bulldog. D/6/11 then moved to LZ Pepper from LZ Dancer on 30 Oct.

3. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-)(105T) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade OPCON

Battery A (-), 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (155T)

c. The 251st and 252d Counter mortar and Artillery Detachments are positioned on LZ East (US 13102025) and Artillery Hill (US 51580399), respectively. The 251st's primary sector is south down the valley toward the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp. The 252d's primary sector is northwest into the Chu Lai rocket belt.

d. The 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery became operational on 6 August 1968. The battalion is employed along Highway 1 in the Chu Lai AO Operations, except for Battery C which is OPCON to the 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery in the 11th Infantry Brigade AO.

e. The 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery (Hawk) became operational in the Chu Lai AO on 2 Oct 1968. The battalion (-) is employed to defend Chu Lai Base. Battery C is located at Tan Son Nhut FB, RVN. The battalion is OPCON to the 7th Air Force.

f. 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery: See Inclosure 1.

g. 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery: Secret, Forwarded Separately
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2. SECTION 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel

Shortage of Artillery Chiefs of Section and Gunners

(a) OBSERVATION: Not enough qualified replacements for 85 Gunners and 66 Section Chiefs, 405 13340, are forthcoming from the replacement stream.

(b) EVALUATION: The lack of qualified replacement personnel in the grade of 85 Gunners and 66 Section Chiefs forces the Battery Commanders to assign personnel in the grade of Specialist Four E4, or lower, to those responsible positions without the depth of experience necessary to fully accomplish the job. This lack of experience requires the Chief of Firing Battery and the Executive Officer to supervise firing battery operations more closely than normal. This closer supervision detracts from the responsiveness of artillery fire support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an adequate flow of qualified personnel in the grades of 85 and 66 13340 be maintained.

b. Operations

(1) Development of an azimuth template containing indices at 0200 mil increments throughout 6400.

(a) OBSERVATION: Considerable time is consumed in constructing new firing charts with a 6400 mil capability. This is especially true when a battery displaces and survey data is initially unavailable.

(b) EVALUATION: Accuracy and time would be gained by utilizing a permanent, transparent, plastic, machined template which would contain accurate azimuth markers at 0200 mil increments around the battery center. Once data is received for a new battery position this template is placed under the current plastic grid sheet, and azimuth markers are traced on the grid sheet. The template is then removed and the grid sheet is ready for firing. One battery is currently utilizing a prefabricated template which has increased the accuracy and speed in constructing new firing charts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A machined or prefabricated azimuth template be manufactured for issue to all units to insure accuracy and reduce time when preparing new firing charts.

(2) Additional aiming circles for split battery operation.

(c) OBSERVATION: MTOR 6-41 allows additional aiming circles for each 8"/175mm battery. A common practice in a 175mm/8 inch composite battalion is to split batteries into two platoons for operations in two separate locations.
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(b) EVALUATION: Two aiming circles are required in each firing location to insure accurate timely fire with a 6400 ml capability.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Two additional aiming circles be authorized each 8"/175mm battalion. This unit is initiating fire action at this time.

(3) 81mm mortars for self-illumination of fire bases.

(a) OBSERVATION: Heavy artillery does not have the capability of self illumination in defense of the fire base. The 3d Battalion, 18th artillery received permission, under TOL 6-447G to use 81mm for self illumination. Under new TOL 6-439G, firing batteries are not authorized 81mm mortars.

(b) EVALUATION: 81mm mortars are critically needed for self illumination of fire bases since they provide immediate illumination in the event of a ground attack.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Heavy battalions be authorized one 81mm mortar for each firing battery.

(4) Occupation of position during air-mobile operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: When an artillery battery displaces to a new position by helicopter, the unit commander has little time in which to plan and prepare for the occupation of the position. In a recent operation, a battery began arriving at a landing zone within five minutes of a combat assault by the infantry.

(b) EVALUATION: During operations into remote areas, it is essential that a firing battery be prepared to fire in support of infantry units conducting combat assaults as soon as possible. To accomplish this a firing battery advance party can go in with the infantry combat assault. In this manner the advance party can quickly organize the position. The battery can begin occupying the new position within 10 minutes of the combat assault.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The battery advance party should accompany the infantry during a combat assault to facilitate occupation of the position by the firing battery.

(5) Artillery Air Warning

(a) OBSERVATION: Artillery maintains an air warning not to advise aircraft of artillery fires. Many times aircraft do not check for artillery advisories. At other times aircraft entering the area will ask for a check fire of artillery so that the aircraft can proceed.

(b) EVALUATION: Air advisory service is useful only if pilots are aware of it. Whenever an artillery unit enters a new area of operations, it notifies the local aviation unit of the procedures used to obtain
artillery air advisories. Requests for check fires by aircraft must be monitored carefully by the artillery battalion to prevent indiscriminate use. In most cases aircraft can be rerouted, or only one mission need be check fired. There is no requirement to check fire units which will not endanger the aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Artillery units should maintain close liaison with aviation units to explain the operation and use of artillery air warning advisories.

(6) Clearing of Registration Grids.

(c) OBSERVATION: When a firing unit first occupies a new position during air-mobile operations, difficulty is often encountered in clearing registration points.

(b) EVALUATION: Artillery should register as soon as possible after occupying a new position. However, the fluid situation encountered in air-mobile operations often makes it difficult to clear grids. Artillery units have been successful in having its Liaison Officers clear tentative registration grids with the maneuver battalion prior to the conduct of an operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Registration grids should be cleared before an operation commences.

(7) Displacement of Battalion Fire Direction Center (FDC).

(c) OBSERVATION: When an artillery battalion FDC is required to displace, it should be non-operational for the shortest possible time. Battery FDCs do not have sufficient personnel or equipment to operate as alternate battalion FDC for any length of time.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to minimize non-operational time "Jump" FDCs have been constructed from 2 COMEX containers. A side wall of each COMEX was removed and the two COMEX were welded together. Equipment and radios were pre-positioned in the "Jump" FDC. As a result, the "Jump" FDC was ready to begin operation within minutes of arrival at a landing zone. This system also precludes having to construct bunker frames as sandbags can be stacked about the COMEX.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: "Jump" FDCs should be constructed by each artillery battalion and battery for use in air-mobile operations.

(8) Lack of Man Pack Radios in Artillery Firing Batteries.

(a) OBSERVATION: Firing batteries are not authorized any portable FM radios for use within the battery. Only vehicle mounted FM radios are available.
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(b) **EVALUATION:** When a battery moves by helicopter, it must be capable of communicating with the helicopters by radio. To do so, the advance party must have a portable radio available. At times it is possible to borrow a radio from infantry elements. However, this is not a dependable method of insuring communications.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Each firing battery should be authorized and issued an All/Heli-25 radio for use in air-mobile operations.

(9) F.D.C. data for shell, Illuminating, M485.

(c) **OBSERVATION:** Sizeable differences exist in firing data for shell, Illuminating M485, between F.D.C. computed data and manual data using the FT 155-Q-4.

(b) **EVALUATION:** F.D.C. data produces consistently lower quadrant elevations. Experience shows that observers consistently call for up corrections to FADAC fired illuminating rounds. Examples are indicated below. Manual data conversely results in minimum corrections from observers.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That FADAC tapes be reviewed in order to reconcile them with manual data.

**ILLUMINATION DATA - MANUAL VS FADAC**

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(10) F.D.C. data for selected ammunition.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Significant differences exist in firing data for Shells, Selected M49, 449E1, 449E2, and 449E2 between FADAC computed data and manual data using the FT 155-ADD-I-1 with Charges 2, 4, and 5 or FT 155-ADD-C-1 (provisional).

(b) **EVALUATION:** The examples show the differences in data for three different shell types. Data was developed using current GFT settings and met corrections. Past experience gathered during demonstration and combat firing shows that FADAC data is the better of the two, producing fewer duds.
### Statutory Data

Statistical data is being compiled on the 105mm and 8 inch howitzer. None is available at this time.

(a) **Recommendation:** That differences be reviewed in order to develop manual data producing desired results. In this regard it should be noted that manual data computed using FT 155-A-D-D-B-1, designed for the M109 self-propelled howitzer, does check with FADAC data for M114 howitzer.

(b) **Evaluation:** In order for artillery supervisory personnel to have ready access to safety data, a pocket SOP has been prepared and distributed down to Chief of Section level. The SOP, which is attached as Inclusion 2, provides guidance to Commanders, Staff Officers, Fire Direction Officers, Liaison Officers, Forward Observers, and Section Chiefs. Areas covered include FDC checks, Firing Battery checks, and safety criteria to be followed by FOs and LNOs.

(c) **Recommendation:** None

c. Training: Omitted
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d. Intelligence: Omitted.

e. Logistics:

(1) Repair parts for M110 and M107 artillery weapons.

(a) OBSERVATION: The M110 and M107 are frequently inoperable as a result of an inadequate supply of a few critical repair parts. Examples of these parts are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>FSN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carrier, Traversing Mechanism</td>
<td>2520-733-8163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differential Assembly</td>
<td>2520-937-3133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valve, Solenoid</td>
<td>2520-736-0242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switch, Oil Pressure</td>
<td>2520-736-0233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valve, Safety Relief</td>
<td>4820-719-6348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tube, Assembly, Metal</td>
<td>2500-955-5498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydraulic Elevating Motor</td>
<td>2520-733-8144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cylinder</td>
<td>2520-730-6645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cylinder Assembly</td>
<td>1025-863-7786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screw, Cap Hex Head</td>
<td>5305-655-9279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switch, Sensitive</td>
<td>5930-699-9085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump, Actuator</td>
<td>4320-745-7865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor, DC</td>
<td>6105-513-9631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump, Actuator, Power Driven</td>
<td>2520-860-0557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drive Assembly, Torque Lock</td>
<td>2520-909-2460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) EVALUATION: A shortage of repair parts has resulted in several battalion weapons being inoperative for periods of 3 days to 3 weeks.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continuing emphasis be placed on bringing repair part stock level at direct support and general support units up to the authorized level of stockage.

(2) N-578 for each firing battery of heavy SP battalions.

(a) OBSERVATION: A mobile heavy lifting capability combined with a recovery capability is vital to a heavy SP artillery battalion in combat. The lift capability is required to assist in the frequent tube changes of the 175mm Gun, for two vehicles with a lifting capability are required for each tube change. An N-578 is required to recover M110/M107 vehicles which become disabled during road marches. At the present time the flak batteries in the battalion are separated by approximately 120 km. This considerable separation distance, periodic adverse road conditions, and virtual isolation of these batteries has required an N-578 to be assigned to each battery. The remaining firing battery is located a short distance from battalion headquarters, and therefore, this unit is supported by service battery's N-578 or by the 526th DS Company. A recent change in the battalion's TOE (MTOS 6-4325, dated 1 July 1966) authorizes only the N-578 in service battery. This one N-578 has proven to be inadequate to support the continuing requirements for 175mm Gun tube changes and the recovery of disabled guns. An MTOS is being prepared.
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(b) LV,W.A.T.ION: an M-578 is needed in each firing battery to assist in the 175mm gun tube changes and recovery of disabled vehicles.

(c) rCOMMENTS: That one M-578 be authorized each firing battery.

f. Organization: omitted

g. Other: omitted

3. SECTION 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Date: Negative input.

2-Eng w/d, Hq, DA

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4 - 5

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

6 - 7 - 8

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96307

9 - 10

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12

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery

13

1st Battalion, 14th Artillery

14

3d Battalion, 16th Artillery

15

3d Battalion, 82d Artillery

16

1st Battalion, 82d Artillery

17

3d Battalion, 82d Artillery

18

6th Battalion, 56th Artillery

19

3d Platoon, Battery G, 29th Artillery

20

Battery G, 55th Artillery

21 - 25

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AVDP-GC (15 Nov 68)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (American Division Artillery)

DA, Headquarters, American Division APO SF 96374

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1 DEC 69

1. Forwarded herewith is the subject report of the American Division Artillery for the period ending 31 October 1968.

2. This Headquarters concurs with the observations and recommendations contained in the basic communication except as noted below:

   a. Par 2b (3), Section 2. Nonconcur with the recommendation. This capability is normally provided by a mutually supporting artillery unit or by a defending infantry unit.

   b. Par 2b (8) (c), Section 2. In addition to the recommendation cited, this radio would be used as a backup radio in the battery Fire Direction Center, and as the primary means of communication for the jump FDC when the battery moves.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

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AVNDC-ST (15 Nov 68) 2d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (HCS-CSFOR-68)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375. 2 JAN 1969

TC: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: SPCP-LT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, America Division Artillery.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning shortage of artillery chiefs of section and runners, page 8, paragraph 2a. The input of artillerymen is expected to increase in January, 1969, and most will be Field Artillery Basics (MOS 13A10). However, personnel rotation losses in the America Division will preclude any significant improvement in the strength posture in MOS 13B40 during January, 1969.

b. (U) Reference item concerning lack of man pack radios in artillery firing batteries, page 10, paragraph 2b(8) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b. No MTOR action to incorporate an AN/PRC-25 radio in each firing battery has been received by this headquarters. Upon receipt of a request for tabular authority, proper justification, and staffing with units organized under the same MTOR to insure a like requirement exists, this headquarters will take action to include the AN/PRC-25 radio in the authorization document as part of the Phase I standardization update.

c. (C) Reference item concerning FADAC data for shell, illuminating, M485, page 11, paragraph 2b(9). Concur. FADAC is presently programmed to compute firing data for the old illuminating projectile, M18, and although usable data for the M485 projectile can be obtained, it is less accurate than the manual data obtained from tabular firing tables published for the M485 projectile.

d. (C) Reference item concerning FADAC data for selected ammunition, page 11, paragraph 2b(10). Concur. Since FADAC is programmed to compute data for the M449, M449E1, and M449A1 projectiles, the manual solution and the FADAC solution, using standard conditions, should be nearly the same. In the FADAC solutions reported by the America Division Artillery, however, current met, VE, and registration corrections were included. Further experiments are being conducted to determine if the differences in manual and FADAC solutions still exist when current met and VE are set to standard and registration corrections ignored.

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e. (U) Reference item concerning repair parts for M110 and M107 artillery weapons, page 13, paragraph 2e(11). Concur. All items except tube assembly, metal, FSN 2590-955-4598, are listed on the new PLL-ASL-DX list recently published by this headquarters. If the tube assembly, metal requires additional stockage, the authority to stock should be requested through maintenance channels. The unit will be so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ALLEN
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (15 Nov 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Americal Div for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHOFF
CPT, AGC
AG
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