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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN Reply Refer to

AGAM-P (M) (14 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684159 25 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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Commanding Officers
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US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Aviation Test Activity
52d Combat Aviation Battalion.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RG 35 FOR-65 (R-1) (U)

1. Section I, Operations: Significant Activities:

   a. (C) General: Report for period 1 August through 31 October 1968,
      submitted in compliance with USARPAC Reg 525-15, USAF Reg 525-15 and 17th
      C.G Reg 525-15.

      (1) Headquarters, 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, LTC William C.
      Chamberlain, Commanding, remains at Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN. Inclosure
      1 reflects Organizational Structure and Station List of subordinate units
      as of 31 October 1968.

      (2) There has been no change of mission during this period. The bat-
      talion continues to provide aviation support to Military Assistance Com-
      mand, Vietnam; Fourth Infantry Division; Fifth Special Forces Group; 52nd
      Artillery Group; Republic of Vietnam II Corps; and other Free World "Mil-
      itary Forces in the central highlands of Vietnam (see Inclosure 5). In
      addition, the 52nd CAB controls all activities and functions of Camp Hol-
      loway, Holloway Army Airfield and Kontum A.F.

   b. (C) Personnel:

      (1) Awards and Decorations: During this reporting period, 1,968
      awards were processed and 1,566 were approved and received. This included
      the receipt of six Silver Stars, forty-three Distinguished Flying Crosses
      and 1,338 Air Medals.

      (2) Command and Staff Changes: The following Command and Staff posi-
      tion changes took place during the quarter:

      | POSITION       | RANK, NAME, SVC NO (Incoming) | DATE               |
      |----------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|
      | BM XO          | LTC James Bart, 071159         | 1 Sep 68           |
      |                | LTC Thomas L. Williamson, 081560|                    |

   DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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AVGD-CC (5 November 1968)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, MACV CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

BN S-1
MAJ Glenn S. Morgan, 04031245
2nd Curtis L. Green, 05301686
7 Aug 68

BN S-2
ILT Robert A. DiPadova, 05343555
CPT Leo F. Welsh, Jr., 05325194
2 Sep 68

BN S-3
MAJ Larry B. Ricken, 074042
LTC George E. Burnison, 079206
21 Aug 68

BN S-4
CPT Robert E. McKown, 02211130
MAJ Kenneth R. Cary, OF 113571
24 Oct 68

DPC
MAJ Donald A. Roberts, 04063815
LTC James Burton, 071159
1 Sep 68

DPC
MAJ Fyne A. Cramly, 081645
MAJ Robert A. DiPadova, 04063815
24 Oct 68

BN SIG OFF
CPT Terry A. Gunter, 05536250
CPT George H. Gauger, OF 100692
27 Sep 68

BN SFTY OFF
ILT Glenn L. Spelis, 05339109
MAJ David L. Bolvan, 05512617
9 Oct 68

CO, HHD
CPT Daryl R. Cagle, 05406244
CPT Charles H. Rayl, OF 104242
8 Oct 68

CO, 52D SCTY DET
ILT Victor L. Coulter, 05344157
ILT Daniel A. Berry, 05338951
16 Oct 68

CO, 94TH MED DET
CPT Merill J. Hiiman, 05460680
CPT Fred G. Margolin, 05542726
27 Aug 68

CO, 57TH ANC
MAJ Robert R. Williams, 04009865
MAJ William D. Gess, Jr., OF 082600
27 Aug 68

CO, 615TH TC DET
CPT Silas L. Beck, 05331255
CPT Hubert G. Smith, 095757
26 Sep 68

CO, 822D SIG DET
CPT2 Bernard J. Leftault, W3431107
CPT2 Harvey Baker, Jr., W3431194
8 Oct 68

CO, 119TH AHC
MAJ Kenneth R. Cary, OF 113571
MAJ Warren R. Porter, 04422475
24 Oct 68

INCL 1

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AVGD-CC (5 November 1968)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RG5 059OR-65 (R-1) (U)

CO, 545TH TC DLT
1LT Ronald L. Dean, 05240428
Hlj Hugh H. Rhodes, OP 105523
10 Aug 68

CO, 170TH AHC
Maj Donald A. Roberts, 04063815
Maj Carl R. Jones, 02266308
24 Oct 68

CO, 179TH AHC
Maj Donald Z. Holroyd, 076235
Maj Robert W. Wetherbie, 04047425
10 Sep 68

CO, 189TH AHC
Maj Robert N. Morrison, 04063794
Maj William H. Fraker, OP 117169
3 Oct 68

CO, 604TH TC DLT
Capt Ronald L. Collins, 03156446
Capt Robert R. Stratiff, 04030843
25 Oct 68

CO, 361ST .0(6)
Maj Robert J. Rodgers, 078611
Maj Larry B. Nicken, 074042
6 Aug 68

(3) The anticipated input of personnel during the month of September was programmed to offset the large number of known losses in October and November. This anticipated input did not materialize. Therefore, this battalion, having received and continuing to receive large numbers of replacements in October and into November will exceed the present authorized losses per month in October and November 1969, creating additional infusion problems. These replacements have not offset losses. The present shortages, coupled with the known losses for November are of particular concern to this command. Personnel turnover for the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
<th>OFFICER/WARRANT OFFICER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOSS</td>
<td>GAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The battalion is at 80.3% authorized strength, short 307 enlisted men and 72 officers/warrant officers, as of 31 October 1968. Unit strengths are shown in Inclosure 2.
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WGD-CC (5 November 1968)

SUBJECT: Operational report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period ending 31 October 1968, 569 GSPO-65 (3-1) (U)

c. (C) Intelligence: The S-2 Section continues to publish a daily Intelligence Summary of significant activities in the Pleiku-Kontum area. Intelligence information is gathered from II Corps and 4th Infantry Division G-2 offices, intelligence briefings from other supported units and mission reports submitted by aviators and air mission commanders. The S-2 Section also controls access to and movement of 700 Vietnamese personnel and 143rd Country Nationals upon Camp Holloway and Kontum AAP. An improved personal pass monitoring system was placed in effect on 1 September 1968.

(1) Enemy activity: Attacks against allied installations during this quarter were primarily stand-off attacks by fire with 60mm and 82mm mortars, and 107mm, 122mm and B-40 rockets. Only one light ground attack at Kontum, best described as a perimeter probe, was made in conjunction with the mortar and rocket attacks. Following a slight increase in frequency in August and September, the number of attacks declined toward the end of the quarter. Significant activity during the period:

023100 Aug: 52nd Security Detachment patrol encountered and engaged 10 - 15 man NV. mortar team 1 mile NE of Camp Holloway. 52nd mortars and 361st Cobras fired on the NV in support of the patrol. 1 NV WIA and 1 NV. HIA were confirmed. One AK-47, Russian 3.30 binoculars and miscellaneous web gear were recovered.

230200 Aug: New Pleiku APB, 2 miles N of Camp Holloway, received 37 rounds of 122mm rocket fire, with 10 US WIA and four C-47 aircraft damaged.

230200 Aug: 57th AHC at Kontum City airfield, 21 miles N of Camp Holloway, received approximately 45 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar, B-40 and 122mm rockets. 10 US were WIA, one UH-1H received light damage and several buildings and tents were damaged.

230525 Aug: 57th AHC, again under 122mm rocket attack, received 12 rounds, one NVN was KIA, three US WIA, one bunker damaged and two UH-1H aircraft received light damage.

250115 Aug: N4 section of Camp Holloway, including the 88th S&S En POL storage area, and the 60th TC Co (US) was hit by 16 122mm rockets. Three US were WIA; one UH-1H lightly damaged; one 7 ton truck, one 3/4 ton truck, two fuel bladders and 15,000 gal. of JP-4 were destroyed.

101125 Sep: 57th AHC at Kontum received 12 122mm rockets during a 15 minute daylight rocket attacks. One US WIA, one UH-1H received minor damage, several tents, two trucks (one 3/4 ton, one 2 1/2 ton) and 50% of telephone communication lines were destroyed.

4
UUNHVLN1IAL
[Image 0x0 to 714x937]

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period ending 31 October 1968, HO CHI MINH CITY (U)

120057 Sep: 937th Engineer compound, NE of Pleiku City, had 29 US WIA by an unknown number of 122mm rockets.

142400 Sep: 57th AHC and 1-2/1st Cav were attacked by 82mm mortars and a ground probe of the 2/1st perimeter. Forty rounds of mortar fire inflicted light damage to three UH-1C and two UH-1H aircraft, destroyed six perimeter lights and two US WIA.

210205 Sep: New Pleiku AFB had three US WIA and seven buildings and three C-47 aircraft heavily damaged by 20 rounds of 107mm rocket fire.

211400 Sep: 149th AHC UH-1H was hit by NVN B-40 rocket fired from the edge of a landing zone at 24 027719, 20 miles NW of Pleiku City. Aircraft crashed and burned, one US KIA and two WIA.

211700 Sep: Another 149th UH-1H hit by B-40 rocket in the same LZ, crashed from 30 feet and burned. Three US were WIA.

242255 Sep: 57th AHC received nine 122mm rockets which destroyed one tent, inflicted light damage to eight UH-1H and heavy damage to two UH-1H aircraft. Four trucks, two radios and various equipment were damaged and one US WIA.

292220 Sep: Connel Quarry, 1½ miles NE of Camp Holloway, was mortared with approximately 40 rounds of 82mm. Minor damage was incurred during the attack, which ceased as counter-mortar and gunships were employed.

252235 Oct: 937th Engineer compound again attacked by mortar fire, receiving 47 rounds of 82mm. 17 US WIA; one building and 27 vehicles were damaged.

311300 Oct: Enemy cache at AR 902720, 18 miles NE of Camp Holloway, was captured by RVN units supported by 32nd C.B aircraft which evacuated 2,000 blasting caps; 100 lbs TNT; 6 recoilless rifle rounds, 20 rds 107mm, 73 B-40 and 15 rds B-41 rockets; 175 rds 60mm mortar; 35 assorted US and Chi Com mines; 60 hand and 70 rifle grenades; 107 boxes AR-47 ammunition and other enemy equipment.

(2) Movement: During the months of September and October, the 24th NVN. Regt moved west to the Tri-border area from its former position east of H'Vey 14 and north of Pleiku City. It was presumed that the Regt was forced to move to the border due to severe losses from B-52 strikes. During the reporting period there was a general movement to the west of all major NVN units. It is believed that these units are now in Cambodia and Laos refitting and recuperating.
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AOGD-CC (5 November 1968)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, CSFOR-69 (R-1) (U)

(3) New Units: There have been no confirmed reports of new units in the Kontum/Pleiku provinces in the last 3 months. There were several unconfirmed reports of a suspected armor unit 35-40 miles WSW of Pleiku, near the Cambodian border.

(4) New Weapons: During the reporting period there have been sightings of unidentified rotary wing aircraft. The first sighting was made in late September. The sightings were made by radar and all occurred near the Tri-Border area. No actual visual sightings have been made though unidentified red rotating beacons have been observed. It is believed that these aircraft are being used to ferry high ranking NVN officers. Toward the end of October these reported sightings have increased. Armor, though suspected to be near the border, has not been confirmed.

(5) Situation:

(a) Kontum: The 40th Art. Gr is still located in the Tri-Border area approximately 50 km NW of Kontum City. The K-30 Bn/40th Regt is north of Polei Klaung, 20km W of Kontum. The K-32 Bn/40th Regt is SW of Ben Hai, operating in conjunction with the 101st RVN Regt located W of Dak Seang. The 406th Sapper Bn is presumed to be NE of Kontum City and the 28th Sapper Bn 20km SW of Kontum City.

(b) Pleiku: The 407th and 408th Sapper Bn's are located approximately 15-20 km NE of Pleiku City. The 24th NVA Regt previously located east of Hwy 14 and north of Pleiku City appears to have moved west into Cambodia. The 304th IF Bn is approximately 25km west of Plei Mrong and 8km north of Plei Djeryong. The K-31 Bn/40th Regt is along Hwy 14, 29km north of Pleiku and the H-15 IF Bn is along Hwy 19, approximately 10km east of Duc Co.

(6) Capabilities:

(a) Kontum Province: The enemy has the capability to conduct ground attacks against US/Allied bases in the vicinity of Dak Seang, Ben Hai, and Dak To with up to multi-battalion strength, supported by RR, mortar, rocket and artillery fire, with the possible use of armor. He can also conduct stand-off and sapper attacks against Kontum City and interdict highways QL 14W, 512 and other major friendly lines of communications.

(b) Pleiku Province: The enemy has the capability to selectively attack Duc Co, Plei Djeryong, Plei Mrong or Plei Ma CIDC Camps and Sdap Enang, Thanh Un and Le Trung villages. He can conduct stand-off and sapper attacks against Pleiku City and allied installations along highways L 192 and QL 14W and interdict highways 509, TL 6C, 437, TL 7C and LTL 7B.
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VGD-CC (5 November 1968)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, Co. C PAVN-65 (K-1) (0)

with a company size VC elements, employing small arms, automatic weapons, recoilless rifle, rocket and mortar fire, as well as mines and anti-tank grenades.

d. (C) Operations: The priority mission of the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion during this quarter was to provide aviation support to the 4th Infantry Division. This support was provided by the assets of two helicopter companies (UH-1) and one assault support helicopter company (CH-47) daily for 92 days. Operations Prairie Fire and Omega were supported by one assault helicopter company for 92 days, and by an Escort Helicopter Company (AH-1G Cobras) for 61 days. The Highway 19 Coordinator was supported by one UH-1H and four gunships (UH-1G/A/H-16) for 92 days. Task Force Spoiler was supported by the 170th AHC (CPCON 10th C/B) for a period of 42 days, and by other 52nd C/B units for 25 days. The 355th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) provided CH-54 support on a mission basis until it was reassigned to the 268th C/B on 15 September. One platoon of the 355th continues CH-54 support under Operational Control of 52nd C/B.

Though hampered by monsoon weather that grounded all operations for three days early in the quarter, the battalion flew over 30,000 hours during the period, including 8,616 hours of Combat assaults. Battalion aircraft also performed Chemical, Fire Support, Med-Evac, Combat Re-supply, Command and Control, Reconnaissance, Liaison and Administrative missions throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone, from Dak Tek south to Phnom Penh and from the South China Sea west to the Cambodian and Laotian borders. Of particular interest are the Chemical Missions being flown in the 4th Div. 

Terrain does not permit effective employment of C-123 "Rhinehands" for aerial spraying operations, particularly in the 1st Brigade area of operations. Both UH-1H and CH-47 assets have been used extensively for defoliation, crop destruction and CS agent drops under the supervision of 4th Division Chemical Officers on board the dispensing aircraft. A UH-1H with the Airborne Personnel Detector (AFPD) "People Sniffer", escorted by UH-1H gunships, is used to search out concentrations of VC/NVA on known infiltration and resupply routes. Other missions have been hampered, however, by inadequate planning and false assumptions. Ground commanders exhibited an apparent lack of knowledge of the capabilities, limitations and maintenance support requirements of Army aviation. The continued selection of small (single ship) landing zones, lack of constant improvement of Fire Support Base helipads, and troops apparently not aware of basic safety procedures for heliborne operations have created undesired hazards. Combined with the low experience factor of most aviators assigned in September and October, these situations produced unacceptable hazards to aircraft, crews, passengers and troops on the ground. Command and staff liaison visits have overcome most problem areas, however, a shortage of qualified personnel has not allowed full-time liaison officers to assist supported brigades in air movement planning and efficient
scheduling of aviation assets. Coordination has been affected by assigning a liaison officer to the 4th Infantry Division and frequent visits with the Division C-3 and brigade commanders by the Commanding Officer, 52nd C.S. Continuity in support of a particular brigade has been increased by tasking the same aviation company to provide this support for a 30 to 60 day period. This permits the aviation company commander to become knowledgeable of the ground situation and to provide more efficient and effective support. The brigade commanders were able to capitalize upon the experience and recommendations of the company commanders specifically when the brigade aviation Officers lack experience. IFFV directed missions, special request allocations and 52nd Battalion area Movement Control Center scheduling have provided additional aviation support to the U.S. Air Force, II Corps, 23rd A.W.N Div, Capital ROK, Inf Div (CIN), 173rd Airborne Brigade, 5th Special Forces Group, 52nd Artillery Group, 24th Special Tactical Zone, Iwo Jima Sub Base Command, Iwo Jima Sector, Kanto Sector, 937th Engineers, 43rd Signal Bn, 25th TC Bn, and the IFFV Iwo Jima. Technical representatives (Tech reps) of Bell Helicopters, Lycoming Division, Dynaclectron Corporation and the Federal Aviation Administration, as well as American Red Cross, USO and Special Services personnel were transported by the 52nd C.S. Statistical results of operations are shown in enclosure 3.

(U) Training: On the job training in all MOS fields has been employed by battalion units and sections throughout the quarter. Classes required by Training Directive 350-1 have been conducted and an active replacement training program continues. Additional gunship pilots have been qualified with the XM-629 proximity fused 2.75 rocket and with the AM-229 171b warhead. Other aviator training and standardization is included in paragraph 11 of this report.

(1) 2.75" FWAU-4/1 (Flechette) training for elements of the 52nd C.S., 7/17th Cav, 4th Inf Div, 17th C.G and 16th C.G was conducted by the Flechette New Equipment Test Team. With the 52nd C.S. providing classroom and briefing facilities, a firing range, transportation and coordination, the 361st Avn Co and METT instructors qualified over 30 gunship pilots and instructor pilots in the techniques required for Flechette employment. Over 200 personnel received ground instruction on storage, handling, characteristics and effects of the warhead. This qualification period, from 18 through 25 October 1968, was the training highlight of the quarter.

(2) Personnel from the 355th Avn Co presented a rigging class and briefed members of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division on proper methods and equipment used to prepare sling loads for heavy helicopters. Approximately 30 individuals attended this briefing on 9 October 1968.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, CCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

(3) The CH-47C NITT arrived at the 179th Assault Support Helicopter Company on 2 October 1968. During periods of ground and flight training, the team qualified unit aviators in the improved Chinook and familiarized maintenance crews with the general characteristics and field maintenance procedures required. Major points stressed in both training programs were the increased speed and greater cargo capability of the CH-47C over the "H" model currently assigned to the 179th Assault Support Helicopter Company.

(4) The 361st Aviation Company (Escort) completed in-country qualification in the AH-1G Cobra at Bien Ho during August. During the initial qualification period, one pilot was qualified as an Instructor Pilot and later as a Standardization Instructor Pilot by the NET Team. Ground support personnel were qualified in rearming procedures, ground safety, and aircraft, armament and Stability Augmentation System maintenance for the AH-1G.

f. (c) Logistics:

(1) Supply: Staff supervision realignment during the reporting period has brought several additional activities into S-4 channels.

(a) The motor maintenance officer was placed under the S-4 to streamline reports and procedures required by AR 711-5. An increase in accuracy of Material Readiness reports has already been realized. The motor officer has also initiated prescribed load list (PLL) inspections throughout the battalion supply system. This inspection has allowed many requests to be consolidated, cancelled or reordered as required by new equipment arriving in the units.

(b) Due to a shortage of company Quartermaster Property Book Officers, (QMPBO) a battalion QMPBO has been assigned to the S-4 Section to assist units with property book problems. He assists units in maintenance of supply records, advises on procedures, keeps the commander informed of battalion assets, shortages, and problem areas. The Bn PBO has established systems for units to reduce the time required to fill unit requisitions by hand carrying consolidated requests forward during liaison visits to supply depots.

(c) The S-4 Section now includes a Battalion Ammunition Warrant Officer. The Bn ammunition Officer maintains consolidated records of ammunition availability, expenditure and lot numbers of condemned or restricted ammunition. Other units have experienced accidental firing of restricted lots of ammunition that should have been removed from the
supply system. This battalion deemed it necessary to create this position to preclude similar type accidents. The Ammunition Officer inspects the unit's Class V records, storage areas, and visits the pre-stock points throughout the area of operation. The quantity of ammunition required by the 52nd CAB for basic loads, combat operations, base camp defense, and training is comparable to that required by a medium artillery battalion.

(2) Vehicle Maintenance: A vehicle maintenance standdown program was initiated in October to improve ground transportation availability. Each wheeled motor vehicle within the battalion is scheduled for concentrated operator maintenance one day per week. Trailers are scheduled for monthly intensive maintenance under this program, which is supervised by section chiefs and unit maintenance personnel. A printed checklist for operator maintenance is used for each type of equipment. Roadside spot inspections, reports and RHI's help to add command emphasis to this program.

(3) Class III: 52nd CAB dispensed a total of 1,351,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel during the reporting period, including 496,000 gallons dispensed by the 57th Assault Helicopter Company at Kontum City Airfield.

(4) Class V: Aircraft ammunition expenditure for the quarter is listed below:

- .275" FFAR: 6,767 rds
- 40mm Grenades: 9,395 rds
- 7.62mm (Mini-gun): 1,428,600 rds

(U) Aircraft Maintenance:

(1) During the reporting period, the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion and the 604th Transportation Company (DSU) established a monthly maintenance and supply seminar. The objective of the seminar is to establish liaison and coordination between all maintenance units located in the Pleiku area; improve working relations between the direct support unit and units of the 52nd CAB; project maintenance work loads and requirements of battalion units; discuss problem areas and ways to increase aircraft availability; and establish and maintain a rigid tech supply reconciliation program with the DSU tech supply in order to expedite EDP's and normal requisitions. The 604th Transportation Company (DSU) acts as the host unit each month and requires the supported units to submit data for discussion. Each unit of the battalion participates and requires the Maintenance Officer, Tech Supply Officer, and key maintenance NCO's to attend. This program has been in effect for two months and is considered to be a key step in improving maintenance operations by all maintenance personnel.
The seminar provides the opportunity for the maintenance personnel to exchange ideas on procedures and thereby aiding in the dissemination of the latest maintenance information.

(2) Maintenance Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Authorized</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>CH-47b</th>
<th>UH-1G</th>
<th>UH-ND</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>U-6A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Aircraft Assigned</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Aircraft Per Co</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avr Liability Rate (%)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDM Rate (%)</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Inclosure 4 for Aircraft Status and Flying Hours.

h. (U) Accident Prevention:

(1) The battalion compiled a record 101 days of accident-free flying which terminated on 23 September 1968. During the 101 day period, which was in conjunction with monsoon season, 47,679 flying hours were recorded with approximately 189,840 landings. In the final portion of this reporting period there were four aircraft accidents, three major and one minor. The following is a summary of the occurrences during this period:

(a) 1-31 August 1968: Accident Free.

(b) 1-22 September 1968: Accident Free.

(c) 23 September 1968: UH-1H, #67-17265, 119th AHC used a FZ with marginal rotor clearance to attempt to pick up the 5 remaining members of a recon team. The aircraft was required to hover due to the slope of the terrain and stumps. While 4 of the team landed on one side of the aircraft, the fifth one unexpectedly jumped on the opposite side causing an abrupt change in CG and accompanying control problems. The aircraft struck several trees with the main rotor before hitting the ground which resulted in a major accident.

(d) 23 September 1968: UH-1G, #66-14140, 170th AHC was over unfavorable terrain when the engine began to lose power. On short final to a vacated FZ, while executing a precautionary landing, the engine failed at
VGDCC (5 November 1968)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, CGP COSAM-65 (A-1) (U)

About 20 feet altitude and 20 knots air speed. The aircraft hit the ground hard with a forward speed of 10 knots. A combination of a hard landing and soft ground resulted in a minor accident. Post accident inspection of the engine revealed that the engine had failed due to ingestion of dust fasteners from the inlet screen.

(f) 5 October 1968: CH-47, 966-19067, 179th AHC was hovering for takeoff on runway 23 at Holloway AAF when a rear blade separated from the aircraft. The transmission mounts severed, and the remaining blades struck the fuselage rupturing the fuel cells. The fuel ignited and the burning aircraft crashed on the runway coming to rest on its left side. The aircraft was a total loss. The cause of this accident was a blade socket failure.

(f) 30 October 1968: UH-1C, 966-15140, 170th AHC was flying straight and level when it experienced anti-torque failure. Immediately the aircraft yawed to the right 30-40 degrees and banked to the right about 15 degrees. The aircraft commander was unable to level the aircraft with cyclic and he began a descent to about 150 feet absolute altitude and entered into autorotation. The aircraft commander was unable to maintain adequate ground reference during the turning descent and pulled pitch too late to prevent an extremely hard landing. The aircraft incurred major damage.

(2) A dust prevention program has been implemented which will decrease engine erosion and non-scheduled maintenance. This program should reduce incidents due to loss of visual reference in blowing dust. All aviators have been advised of the hazards that may be encountered in dusty environments. Also the units of the 4th Div supported by this battalion have a program which is coordinated with our efforts in the area of dust suppression.

1. (U) Flight Standardization:

(1) The Battalion standardization officer flew 88 hours qualifying new instructor pilots, administering 90 day standardization checks of unit instructors, and conducting aircraft commander check rides for battalion aviators. Lack of available training aircraft, especially UH-1C models, and a 30 day emergency leave reduced the amount of training conducted by the standardization pilot.

(2) Approximately 40% of the unit instructor pilots have rotated during the reporting period. Some 90 day standardization rides have been delayed by lack of unit instructor pilots during the quarter.
(3) Assistance by the 17th CAG Standardization Section and increased training aircraft availability in October has allowed new instructor pilots to be trained to replace the DROS losses. At the end of the reporting period, the battalion has 24 instructor pilots, including standardization pilots, and the backlog of quarterly standardization rides experienced earlier in the reporting period has been eliminated.

J. (U) Organization:

(1) Post Headquarters, under the direction of the Deputy Post Commander, continues to supervise and manage the non-tactical activities of Camp Holloway and Holloway Army Airfield. Projects completed during this period were:

(a) Improvement of a new billeting area for the 170th Assault Helicopter Company.

(b) Construction of a new control tower and installation of improved, expanded Air Traffic Control communications for the 344th Aviation Support Detachment.

(c) The perimeter access road was improved so that a vehicle may travel the entire perimeter, thereby providing means to move bunker and construction material to the intended point of use.

(d) All major roads, aircraft parking areas and FOL areas have been oiled or penprimed to help control dust.

(e) After six months, a 3 inch submersible pump was received and installed in a deep well at Camp Holloway. This provided a noticeable increase in the water supply which enabled the previous restrictions on water utilization to be suspended. Additional pumps have been obtained and are awaiting installation.

(f) The generators providing post lighting have been relocated throughout the post area in order to reduce the voltage drop due to extremely long wires. This also reduced the probability of having more than one generator damaged at any one time from hostile action.

(2) The 170th AHC (-) was ORCON 10th CAB at Dong Ba Thin, RVN, from 24 August 1968 until 4 October 1968 to support Task Force spoiler in the Xam Ne Thuot area.

(3) The 355th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) was reassigned to the 268th CAB by 17th C.G CO 74, effective 15 September 1968. One platoon
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of the 355th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) consisting of three CH-54 aircraft remained at Camp Holloway, C.O.N. 52nd C.B.

(4) The 52nd Security Detachment and 68th Infantry Radar Detachment were attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment with C.O.N. to the Deputy Post Commander on 13 October 1968.

k. (U) Other:

(1) Chaplain:

(a) During the quarter, Protestant Services were conducted by the Battalion Chaplain both in the Chapel and in the 604th Trans Co Theater. Catholic Services were conducted by the Pleiku Subarea Command Catholic Chaplain. Religious services for the 57th A.C. in Khe Sanh were conducted by the 14th Protestant Chaplain and the 206th Catholic Chaplain stationed in that area. Physical improvements included a new tile floor and a new Hammond Organ for the 52nd C.B. Chapel at Camp Holloway.

(b) Civic Action programs consisted of the distribution of excess produce and packaged foods, and salvage lumber to the Christain and Missionary Alliance and the Catholic Orphanage, both in Pleiku. A total of $52,025 in special offerings was received and distributed to various agencies. Individual donations to specific causes totaled $225.50.

(2) Surgeon:

(a) A permanent dispensary has been built and stocked with improved medical equipment and supplies to provide better medical facilities to the 57th A.C. at Khe Sanh.

(b) A secondary emergency aid station has been established to support units on the north side of Camp Holloway. The aid station has various medical supplies, an ambulance, and is manned by two medical aid men during alerts.

(c) Over 90% of the troops at Camp Holloway received an influenza immunization during the month of October.

(d) The diarrhea rate has decreased significantly during this quarter. This is attributed to better control of water supply, increased flow rate of wells and the reduced amount of terrestrial water being used.

(e) Although no specific MEdCap program is in effect, medical personnel have actively supported the Pleiku Leprosarium, the Christian
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Missionary alliance Clinic, the Kontum Catholic Hospital and the Pleiku Catholic Orphanage.

(3) Signal: During October 1968, the 52nd CAB Communications Section added the KYB-6 cipher system to the Area Movement Control Center radio. The battalion can now operate its Frequency Modulation Communications Net with secure voice transmission capability.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

   a. (U) Personnel: Unit Strength Deficiencies

      (1) OBSERVATION: DEROS rotations and infusion losses without replacement on a 1:1 ratio will reduce the effectiveness of combat units.

      (2) EVALUATION: Reduction in the number of personnel in a unit requires a higher percentage of available troops to perform administrative details, guard duty and other related tasks which are not reduced. Personnel required to perform double duty cannot work efficiently over a long period of time. This is particularly true in the case of crewchiefs, gunners and aircraft maintenance personnel who must perform perimeter guard duty at night and, out of necessity, return to full duty the following day.

      (3) RECOMMENDATION: Program and assign replacements on a 1:1 ratio to known losses at all levels of command. Insure sufficient input into the 67N MOS program to fill these critical jobs. Provide infantry units to assist in the security of aviation units at isolated posts.

   b. (C) Operations:

      (1) Inadequate briefing for airmobile operations.

      (a) OBSERVATION: Injuries, fatalities and aircraft accidents have been caused by the improper and unsafe method used by troops to board and off-load helicopters, particularly in single ship landing zones.

      (b) EVALUATION: Ground troops have walked into rotor blades while approaching or departing helicopters during airmobile operations. They fail to recognize the dangers of sloped landing zones, departing the helicopter up-slope, against the directions of the aircrew. Troops attempting to board hovering aircraft in single ship landing zones have
caused loss of control and crashes due to the unexpected changes in the center of gravity of the aircraft. Crew directions have been ignored or disobeyed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All units engaged in helicopter troop movements provide adequate safety briefings prior to actual operations. Instruct troops to approach or depart helicopters from the down-slope side, preferably from the front, and only upon direction of an aircrew member. Brief troops to remain seated until directed to off-load by crewmembers.

(2) LRRF Insertions and Extractions

(a) OBSERVATION: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) operations are put into effect with little coordination or planning between the supported unit staff and aviation elements.

(b) EVALUATION: Frequently, LRRP insertions are planned by a unit's S-2 without staff coordination to establish priorities for maximum utilization of available assets. Aviation elements are not included in mission planning. Aircraft are scheduled for the insertion or Class I and Class V resupply after normal missions are completed. Fatigued aircrews are required to accomplish these exacting flights, which may require 100 foot vertical descents and take-offs, in near darkness. Late release times from these missions denies valuable daylight maintenance time to the aviation unit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Employ the "Backward Planning" sequence for LRRP missions at all levels of command. Establish priorities for aviation and logistics support early to permit daylight insertions and resupply of LRRP's. Include air mission commanders or aviation unit liaison officers in all phases of airborne planning.

(3) Employment of WDU-4A/A Flechettes:

(a) OBSERVATION: The WDU-4A/A Flechette rocket is a highly effective area fire weapon, but is not suited for use close to friendly personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: Following initial qualification by the USAV Flechette NET Team, the 361st aviation Company has been employing Flechette rockets. The tremendous area of coverage and penetration power of this weapon is ideal for landing zone preparation, post-extraction suppression and interdiction of enemy movement, but does not allow its use in close proximity to friendly elements. The UH-1C Cobra in the Hog configuration offers weapons selectivity from the cockpit, and can employ either Flechette or high explosive rockets as required by the ground situation. UH-1C armament systems do not offer this selectivity and must be armed with appropriate rockets prior to take off. Flechette employment by UH-1C is
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limited to pre-planned targets such as "people sniffer" escort and interdiction missions. Employment of the Flechette warhead by the 52nd CAB is governed by the following policy letter:

"QUOTE"

1. (C) The Flechette 2.75" M67-A1/A warhead is released for operational employment, subject to the following restrictions:

   a. The flechette is not a close support weapon and will not be fired within 500 meters of friendly troops.

   b. Each aviator must be qualified in firing the Flechette by the N2T Team or a qualified gunnery IP prior to tactical employment of the weapon.

   c. Aviators must insure proper loading and weapons selection to preclude accidental firing of Flechettes when HE is desired.

(1) Flechette and HE rounds will not be loaded on the same UH-1C.

(2) The use of a heavy fire team with one UH-1G armed with only Flechette rockets will allow proper control and selection of munitions by the Fire Team Leader.

(3) AH-1G Cobras in the Hog configuration may be loaded with both HE and Flechettes, however all Flechettes will be on the same firing circuit (either inboard or outboard). Aviators will exercise extreme caution in the selection and employment of proper wing stores.

(4) AH-1G Cobras in the Scout configuration will not carry mixed HE and Flechette warheads.

2. (C) Friendly positions and the characteristic dispersion pattern of the Flechette must be given special consideration to determine the proper direction of attack. Firing runs will not be made over or toward the positions of friendly troops.

3. (C) Flechette employment will be limited to the following:

   a. Preparation of unsecure landing zones.

   b. After final extractions are complete.

   c. Neutralization of enemy base camps.

   d. Interdiction of known enemy movement.

"UNQUOTE"
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Provide a selective weapon system capability for the UH-1C gunship. Increase the supply of WDU-40/A (20 grain) warheads to units equipped with AH-1G helicopters. Arm the AH-1G in the "Mini-Hog" configuration, with 7.62 rockets in XM-159 pods inboard, and XM-157 pods loaded with Flechettes outboard, for general support or reinforcing type missions.

(4) Area Movement Control Center (AMCC):

(a) OBSERVATION: AMCC concept is hampered by units misutilizing sole-user aircraft allocations.

(b) EVALUATION: These units are employing aircraft without regard to conservation of engines, consolidation of missions, or adequate mission planning. A large number of previously AMCC missions have reverted to daily sole-user allocations. These can no longer be termed AMCC missions as AMCC has in fact no control over their utilization. These aircraft belong to the supported unit and are under their complete control. In the event an aircraft is not allocated to this AMCC daily commitment for a full day, regardless of need, the supported units submit a report of unsatisfactory aviation support to the higher headquarters who then directs these requests to be filled. Sole-user aircraft are frequently extended beyond normal release time. Examples of misutilization of allocated aircraft are using UH-1H helicopters for cross-country flights from fixed wing to fixed wing airfields over a distance of 78 miles, and using UH-1H helicopters to provide convoy cover which should have required armed helicopters and/or other smaller observation aircraft. Through the efficient use of AMCC assets, the 5th Special Forces at Pleiku has moved over 535 tons of cargo per month without a daily aircraft allocation. This was accomplished by the unit having prepared loads prepositioned and requesting support on a mission basis.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Eliminate sole-user aircraft allocations, except for General Officers. Require mission schedules or itineraries to be submitted with daily aircraft requests. Encourage use of "mass transportation" instead of an "aerial taxi" concept for aviation support.

c. (U) Training:

(1) UH-1 Emergency Procedures in Flight Training:

(a) OBSERVATION: USAPHS and USAVNS flight training stresses power-off procedures but does not adequately emphasize loss of directional control as an inflight emergency.
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(b) EVALUATION: During the last 90 days, this battalion has experienced four power failures and three tail rotor drive (directional control) failures. Relatively inexperienced aviators successfully executed power-off landings, but even more experienced pilots were unable to cope with loss of directional control. These tail rotor failures subsequently caused the loss of two UH-1 helicopters and injuries to three crew members. Following increased emphasis on directional control failure during standardization flights, unit aviators can cope with the various types of tail rotor failures as evidenced by two out of three successful landings after failure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Increased emphasis should be placed on directional control emergency procedures in initial rotary wing training. Pilots should be trained to recognize and overcome each separate type of tail rotor failure.

(2) New Equipment Qualification:

(a) OBSERVATION: AH-1G, CH-47C and WDU-4A/A New Equipment Test Teams are currently training combat units in Vietnam.

(b) EVALUATION: Members of the 52nd CAB have received training at their home station from the CH-47C NETT and the WDU-4A/A NETT. Aviators and ground personnel were adequately trained, using local flights and facilities, while maintaining uninterrupted mission response and combat effectiveness. The AH-1G NET Team conducted training only at Bien Hoa and required aviators to travel TDY to receive initial qualifications. This reduced the aviator strength of the armed helicopter company by approximately 25% for a 60 day period. Unit training at home station is preferred.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Deploy New Equipment Test Teams to unit locations when entire units must be qualified with new equipment. NETT Standardization Pilots should visit units in the field to administer IP standardization and check rides in new aircraft.

d. (U) INTELLIGENCE:

(1) OBSERVATION: Control and accountability of Vietnamese civilians who do not display USARV passes on military installations is difficult.

(2) EVALUATION: USARV Regulation 190-20 requires indigenous personnel entering or working upon US military installations to properly display identification passes on their person at all times. In the past, violation of this regulation has made identification and location of
Vietnamese civilians difficult while on post. After being cleared on post, local employees would remove their US. RV passes and wander away from assigned work areas. The battalion 5-2 has initiated a program to suspend employment of local nationals who do not display passes prominently while on post. First time violators are suspended for five days, second offenders are suspended for 10 days and automatic dismissal is mandatory for personnel with three violations of this regulation. Also units employing Vietnamese are required to submit monthly civilian personnel rosters which list employees name, occupation, GVN identification number, US. RV pass number and Camp Holloway gate pass number to the S-1. This permits control of the number, location and occupation of all Vietnamese civilians on post, and provides accurate data on civilian employment information.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Collect and disseminate similar procedures which allow units to improve internal security and counter-espionage measures on military installations in foreign nations.

6. (C) Logistics:

(1) Team Concept Maintenance of AH-1G Helicopters:

(a) OBSERVATION: Assigning crewchief (who doesn't fly) to each AH-1G helicopter does not provide best possible utilization of assigned personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: As AH-1G Cobras replaced UH-1C gunships, unit crewchiefs were assigned responsibility for organizational maintenance on one aircraft as a non-crew member. Service Platoon and TC Detachment mechanics provided scheduled and non-scheduled maintenance support. The shortage of personnel and existing outside commitments made this system inefficient and unacceptable. All personnel from the company and TC Detachment in MOS 67N were organized into two similar work crews supervised by two platoon sergeants acting as shop foremen. Each work crew is on duty for a 12 hour shift, thus the company retains 24 hours maintenance capability for daily inspection, cleaning, scheduled and non-scheduled maintenance. Work priorities are established by the TC Detachment Commander and supervised by the shop foreman on duty. This improved maintenance system has increased aircraft availability, allowed better utilization of maintenance assets and permitted more scheduled rest for crewchiefs and helicopter repairmen.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Units assigned aircraft with non-flying crewchiefs (AH-1G, OV-1, etc) should implement and evaluate the team concept of aircraft maintenance.

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(2) Forward Area Aircraft Maintenance:

(a) OBSERVATION: Non-scheduled aircraft maintenance should be accomplished with minimum delay to assigned missions.

(b) EVALUATION: During the course of a day, a significant number of aircraft working out of forward bases develop maintenance problems. Returning to base for repair causes excessive delay in the accomplishment of assigned missions. A technical inspector, avionics repairman, armament specialist and several helicopter repairmen can be carried to the forward staging area aboard aircraft assigned to support an operation. Most minor maintenance problems can then be corrected on the spot without returning to the base airfield. Non-productive flight time is minimized and aircraft availability is increased by this procedure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Assault helicopter companies should establish mobile maintenance teams to accompany platoon size missions which stage out of forward bases without maintenance facilities.

(3) AH-1G Fluxuating Oil Pressure:

(a) OBSERVATION: The AH-1G has had numerous instances of fluctuating engine oil pressure.

(b) EVALUATION: After 15 to 50 hours of operation, the AH-1G engine oil pressure drops approximately 15 PSI and fluctuates 10 to 20 PSI. Contamination has caused the oil to foam, but the source of contamination is not yet identified by the Quartermaster oil analysis laboratory. Changing the engine oil eliminates the immediate problem and returns the Cobra to service, but this is not a complete solution. Both Bell Helicopter and AVCO Lycoming are investigating this problem.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Continue investigations to determine cause of the oil contamination and foaming. Change oil at every intermission and periodic inspection as an interim measure.

(4) AH-1G Vibrations:

(a) OBSERVATION: Cobra aviators report excessive vibration levels during high speed maneuvers.

(b) EVALUATION: Extensive vibration analysis and adjustment of rotor blades, rotor head, friction collect and rotating controls has reduced the vibration level slightly. Primary cause of the vibration was found to be harmonic vibration of XM 159C rocket pods which have failed internally.
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The internal metal bands holding the individual tubes together are breaking and the rockets and pods vibrate in harmony with the main rotor. The XM 159C pods which fail can be used on UH-1G gunships which operate at reduced airspeeds and impose less stress on the pods.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Equipment improvement recommendations (EIR) have been submitted to strengthen the rocket pod internally. Inspect and replace rocket pods as required. Disseminate this information to all AH-1G units and activities.

(5) AH-1G/XM-159C Swaybrace Breakage:

(a) OBSERVATION: Cobra unit armament personnel report numerous broken swaybraces on AH-1G Cobras equipped with XM-159C rocket pods.

(b) EVALUATION: Swaybraces usually break at the forward inboard side of the rocket pod. These swaybraces, which are not aligned with the radius of the rocket pod, are broken by the side loads imposed on them by the pod. The swaybrace attaching lug on the bomb rack appears to be too thin to adequately support the swaybrace at the proper angle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Modify the swaybrace attaching lug with thicker stock. Drill and tap swaybrace holes in line with the radius of installed XM-159C rocket pod.

(6) AH-1G Hydraulic Accumulator:

(a) OBSERVATION: Hydraulic accumulator failure is caused by incomplete shutdown procedures.

(b) EVALUATION: Hydraulic accumulator internal failures occur when the hydraulic system is bled only by pumping the collective pitch after shutdown. Seals deteriorate when the system is static if the hydraulic access panel is not removed and the accumulator bled through the connections provided inside the aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Advise AH-1G units and activities of the complete hydraulic bleeding procedure required by the Cobra. Units provide appropriate tools and training to allow aviators to perform this post flight procedure when maintenance personnel are not available.

(7) Aircraft Parts:

(a) OBSERVATION: Requisitioned EDP parts frequently require more than 30 days to arrive at the requesting unit from USAAMC and lst Logistical Command.
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(b) EVALUATION: Aircraft have been grounded EDP due to excessive periods of time required to deliver EDP parts after the release date from USAAMC or lst Logistical Command. Aircraft engines, transmissions and rotorblades have arrived at Direct Support Units (DSU) unaccompanied by necessary historical records and forms. This delays issue and/or installation of components until the paperwork is located and reunited with the proper replacement part.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Initiate a final pre-shipping inspection of aircraft components to ensure all required historical records are included for shipment from AMC and Log Comd. Re-emphasize the urgency of EDP requisitions to Technical Supply support activities personnel, transportation command agencies and logistics unit commanders.

f. (c) Organization:

(1) Post Headquarters - Camp Holloway:

(a) OBSERVATION: Supervision of non-tactical administrative activities on Camp Holloway now requires a Post Headquarters Section of three officers, two NCO and one civilian clerk.

(b) EVALUATION: The Post Headquarters Section is presently responsible for non-tactical services and logistical support for 23 tenant units or activities at Camp Holloway, including 16 units with a total of over 500 men, which are assigned to the 52nd CAB. These responsibilities include supervision of Officers, NCO and EM open mess, allocation of real estate, coordination of billeting, monitoring PX and concessionaire operations, supervision and coordination of base development, establishment and supervision of animal control, coordination of Engineer, Repair and Utilities activities, such as: electrical power supply and distribution, water supply and purification, fire prevention and control, post sanitation, work order requests, preventive maintenance, maintenance service orders and coordination of Pacific Architects and Engineers projects, maintenance of road nets, coordination of camp defense efforts, maintenance of perimeter security and lighting, supervision of library, craftshop, and other Special Services activities, maintenance of law and order, supervision of health and dental activities, maintenance and police of the airfield, and the hiring and controlling of civilian employees. Repeated attempts to obtain MTOS or TDA authorizing a Post Headquarters Section to an installation where a combat aviation battalion is the senior occupant operating post, camp and station facilities have been unsuccessful. These administrative functions continue to be vital to the health, comfort, morale, discipline and security of over 2,300 tenants of this camp. The officers required to manage post activities must be drawn from aviation
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units, thus further aggravating the shortage of pilots available for cockpit duty. Enlisted personnel likewise hold TOE positions in units which are denied either productive work from the individual or a replacement for him. The following positions are considered essential:

- DEPUTY POST COMMANDER  O-4
- POST ENGINEER  O-3
- CIVILIAN RECON/SECURITY/SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER  O-3
- ADMINISTRATIVE NCO  E-7
- CLERK TYPIST/DRAFTSMAN  E-5

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Solicit and submit MTOEs, TDA or augmentation authority for a Post Headquarters Section to operate military posts such as Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN. Assign non-rated officers and qualified EK to these required positions now, pending approval of Post Headquarters authorization by competent authority.

(2) Unit Supply Officer:

(a) OBSERVATION: The Assault Support Helicopter Company MTOE 1-256F is not authorized a unit supply officer.

(b) EVALUATION: The Assault Support Helicopter Company, with 252 personnel 16 CH-47 and supporting ground equipment worth over $18,000,000, is authorized only a Unit Commander and an Operations Officer in the Company Headquarters and Operations Sections. With neither Executive Officer nor Supply Technician authorized, a rated aviator must be taken out of the cockpit to perform supply and property book duties. The Assault Helicopter Company is authorized a trained warrant officer supply technician, MOS 761A, for these duties.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Modify the TOE of Assault Support Helicopter Companies to authorize a Supply Technician, MOS 761A.

(3) Combat Aviation Battalion Ammunition Officer:

(a) OBSERVATION: The Combat Aviation Battalion, which is not authorized an ammunition officer, handles as much ammunition as a 8"/175mm artillery Battalion.

(b) EVALUATION: Requisition, accountability, distribution and control of the amount of ammunition necessary for basic load, base camp defense and combat operations by a Combat Aviation Battalion requires a full-time Battalion Ammunition Officer to assist the S-4. The following comparison of ammunition expenditures during August, September and October 1968 is cited:

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Modify Combat Aviation Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment MTOS 1-76E to include a Battalion Ammunition Officer, O-3, MOS 4510.

g. (C) OTHER: "Nestor Key Lists".

(1) OBSERVATION: The 4th Infantry Division and the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion operate from different "Nestor" key lists to obtain secure voice transmission capability.

(2) EVALUATION: 52nd CAB aircraft supporting 4th Division units must operate with the supported unit's key. Aviators are then unable to communicate with their parent unit in the secure mode.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Division Signal Officers should distribute necessary key lists to non-divisional units operating in division nets, thus allowing uninterrupted secure voice capability on both supported unit and supporting unit Frequency Modulated radio nets.

3. Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information:

   a. (U) General: The Evasion, Escape and Survival Program of the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion has been updated by a new Evasion, Escape and Survival annex to the Battalion Tactical SOP. This annex emphasizes unit responsibilities and procedures for the selecting and training of Evasion, Escape and Survival personnel, dissemination of survival information, use of E&E codes and maintenance of unit survival equipment at the company level.

   b. (U) Evasion and Escape:
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(1) Case Histories: None.

(2) School: The 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion has filled 15 allocations this period. All assigned companies have school trained Evasion and Escape Officers appointed on unit orders. Each company has been encouraged to appoint an E&E NCO to assist the E&E Officer in the training of air crews. Debriefing of students returning from both the Navy and Air Force courses has produced favorable comments and results in the Battalion's Evasion and Escape Program. This has manifested itself in the increased training at unit level. The consensus of opinion among returnees favors the Air Force program and all students have suggested that it be lengthened. It is the policy of the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion to participate in those courses whenever possible and that they enhance the E&E program throughout this battalion.

c. (U) Survival: There have been no survival situations within this battalion for this period.

WILLIAM C. CHAMBERLAIN
LTC AT
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPFD, APO 96558
3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHG-DC, APO 96375
2 - CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBA-MN, APO 96384
7 - CO, 17th CAG, ATTN: AVGD-SC, APO 96240
AVGD-SC (5 Nov 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, HCS CSROR-65 (RL) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96240 25 November 1968

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT, APO 96350

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the basic letter from the 52d Combat
Aviation Battalion. Pen and ink corrections of minor errors have been
inserted.

2. (C) This headquarters submits the following comments.

   a. Section I. Operations, pages 1 through 15: CONCUR.

   b. Section II. Lessons Learned.

   (1) Paragraph 2a, Unit Strength Deficiencies, page 15:

   (a) CONCUR with the recommendation to program and assign replacements
   against known losses at all levels. Replacements lagged behind scheduled
   losses during the quarter, and the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion received
   its prorata share.

   (b) CONCUR with the recommendation to provide infantry units to assist
   in security of isolated aviation units. The 52d Security Platoon, an
   assigned group unit, currently covers the 30 square kilometer area of
   operation adjacent to Camp Holloway. This headquarters is preparing a
   letter requesting relief from the responsibility for that area of operation.
   Upon approval of the request, this headquarters will redeploy segments of
   the platoon to provide internal and perimeter security for group units at
   Kontum, Holloway, and Ban Me Thuan.

   (2) Paragraph 2b(1), Briefings for Airmobile Operations, pages 15 and
   16: CONCUR. Proper briefings should be SCP for all ground units. The
   1st Aviation Brigade Operations Manual, dated 1 February 1967, discusses
   the briefing requirement in paragraph 110(1), Chapter 12. Further recommend:

   (a) Revising the Brigade Operations Manual to include this briefing
   requirement in Appendix II, Airmobile Task Force Commander Checklist.

   (b) Placing increased emphasis on proper training and briefing
   of troops by supported ground commanders.

   (c) Paragraph 2b(2), Insertions and Extractions, page 16: CONCUR.
   Backward planning should be SOP for ground units in all airmobile operations.
   The 1st Aviation Brigade Operations Manual discusses planning in paragraph 4,
   Section II, Chapter 3.
(4) Paragraph 2b(3), Flechette Employment, pages 16 through 18:

(a) CONCUR with the recommendation to provide a selective weapons system for the armed UH-1G aircraft.

(b) CONCUR with the recommendation to increase the supply of flechette warheads. Message AVGD-SC 4801-68 (C), dated 20 October 1968, subject: 2.75 Flechette Warhead (U), to lst Aviation Brigade, recommended a resupply rate of 1350 flechette rounds per month for this group. Message AVGD-SC 5182-68 (C), dated 17 November 1968, subject: Issue of VUFA/A Warhead (U), to your headquarters, requested issue of 600 flechette rounds from USAF stocks for immediate use.

(5) Paragraph 2b(4), AMCC, page 18: NONCONCUR. There are insufficient available fixed wing aircraft to conduct all missions required between fixed wing airfields. Neither the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion nor this headquarters has the capability to properly analyze misuse of helicopter assets, since flying hours are the only available criteria upon which these echelons can base judgement. Recommend your headquarters conduct a continuing overall evaluation of employment of helicopter assets.

(6) Paragraph 2c(1), UH-1 Emergency Procedures, pages 18 and 19: CONCUR.

(7) Paragraph 2c(2), New Equipment Qualification, page 19: CONCUR.

(8) Paragraph 2d, Vietnamese Civilian Control, pages 19 and 20: CONCUR, although the problem outlined has not been reported by other group units.

(9) Paragraph 2e(1), Team Maintenance for AH-1G Aircraft, page 20: CONCUR.

(10) Paragraph 2e(2), Forward Area Aircraft Maintenance, page 21: CONCUR.

(11) Paragraph 2e(3), AH-1G Fluctuating Oil Pressure, page 21: CONCUR. Oil change at 25-hour intervals is recommended practice on all group AH-1G and UH-1 aircraft.

(12) Paragraph 2e(3), AH-1G Vibrations, pages 21 and 22: NONCONCUR, without further investigation. Other group units equipped with AH-1G aircraft report no vibration problems with K-1590 pods when armed is maintained within limits specified for the aircraft gross weight. The bulk of the pod mass extending forward from the wing appears to contribute to vibrations.
CONCUR. Unit has been instructed to submit an EIR on the problem.

(14) Paragraph 2e(6), AH-1G Hydraulic Accumulator, page 22: CONCUR. However, TM 55-1520-221-20 outlines the hydraulic system bleeding procedure. Unit has been instructed to follow procedure in the manual or submit DA Form 2028 recommending a change thereto.

(15) Paragraph 2e(7), Aircraft Parts, pages 22 and 23: CONCUR. The stated procedure is in effect at A11C. Investigation indicates that delivery of large EDP parts may be delayed because of the lack of USAF shipping priority. Group units have been instructed to maintain records on all shipping delays of EDP parts.

(16) Paragraph 2f(1), Holloway Post Headquarters, pages 23 and 24:

(a) CONCUR with the recommendation to solicit TDA authority. Unit will be directed by letter to submit request for TDA for Camp Holloway Post Headquarters under the provisions of USAV Circular 310-44 and USARV Regulation 310-49.

(b) NONCONCUR with the recommendation to assign personnel against positions which, although required, are not authorized. Personnel can not be assigned against positions for which there are no TOE or TDA authorizations.

(17) Paragraph 2f(2), Unit Supply Officer, page 24: CONCUR. Recommend no action pending DA publication of standard MTOE for the Assault Support Helicopter Company, which is expected to be in the near future.

(18) Paragraph 2f(3), Ammunition Officer, pages 24 and 25: CONCUR. Recommend no action pending DA publication of standard MTOE for the Combat Aviation Battalion.

(19) Paragraph 2g, Key Lists, page 25: CONCUR. This subject was discussed during a signal meeting at your headquarters on 19 June 1968. The USAV representative stated that a single key list had been considered for all units in the Republic of Vietnam, but the proposal was disapproved because of the ramifications of possible compromise. However, an agreement was reached whereby supported units would provide supporting units with key lists. The 4th Infantry Division has sufficient copies of key lists to implement the stated recommendation.
TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and indorsement and makes the following comments.

2. (C) Reference paragraph 2b(4), page 18, Area Movement Control Center. Nonconcur for reasons stated by the 17th Combat Aviation Group lst Indorsement. This headquarters makes a daily review or evaluation of the employment of helicopter assets in the II CTZ.

3. (C) Reference paragraph 2a(4), pages 21 and 22, AH-1G Vibrations. Nonconcur for reasons stated by the 17th Combat Aviation Group lst Indorsement.

4. (C) Reference paragraph 2f(1), pages 23 and 24, Post Headquarters Camp Holloway. Nonconcur for reasons stated by the 17th Combat Aviation Group lst Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Robert Criswell
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Gy坛:
17th Cbt Avn Gp
CONFIDENTIAL

AVRA-C (5 Nov 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65,(R-1) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 17 DEC 1968

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. (C) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed, except for the following:

a. Paragraph 2b(3) (c), page 16. Nonconcur with recommendation to provide selective weapon system capability for the UH-1G armed helicopter. The total rocket load must remain the same due to weight limitations. The advantages to be gained with a selective system would be offset by the reduction in useable rockets available for close support if loaded with both types of rockets. Loading the UH-1G prior to take off gives those units equipped with the UH-1G the capability to use the flechette round.

b. Paragraph 2c(2), page 19. Nonconcur. New Equipment Training Teams (NETT) are normally employed at unit locations to train a nucleus of instructor pilots who will subsequently train the remaining unit aviators. Current DA policy limits in-country AH-1G pilot transition training to that conducted at the USARV AH-1G School by the training team. The complexity of the AH-1G weapons systems and the requirements for conducting extensive ground school classes make it desirable to have the AH-1G training team permanently stationed at one central location. The current AH-1G aviator transition training, and the limited number of instructor pilots assigned to the USARV AH-1G training team, preclude field visits by the training team SIPs. Unit AH-1G SIPs and IPs are authorized to conduct IP standardization and check rides for aviators qualified in the AH-1G aircraft.

c. Paragraph 2e(6), page 22. Nonconcur pending further investigation. TM 55-1500-221-20 prescribes bleeding the AH-1G emergency collective hydraulic accumulator system by use of the drain valve whenever it is necessary to check accumulator gas pressure and/or when pilot report or ground operational check reveals that emergency hydraulic power is not sufficient for four full strokes of the collective control stick.

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AVBAC-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65, (R-1) (U)

The Bell Technical Field Representative assigned to 34th General Support Group (Mr James Ferguson) and 34th GS Group Maintenance Office personnel know of no internal damage problem occurring as a result of bleeding the system only by pumping the collective after shutdown and coastdown; however, this observation will be investigated and if justification can be determined, the proper procedures will be published in the 34th GS Group Newsletter pending TM change publication.

d. Paragraph 2f(2), page 24. Nonconcur. The standardized MTOE 1-256G for the Assault Support Helicopter Company will authorize a Company Executive Officer, O3, who could assume the duties as unit supply officer. The standardized MTOE 1-256G was submitted to DA proposing a Warrant Officer Unit Supply Technician, MOS 761A. This position was deleted from the advance copies of the MTOE received from DA. The unit supply technician position, MOS 761A, proposed for the Assault Helicopter Company standardized MTOE 1-77G was also deleted from the advance copies.

e. Paragraph 2f(3), page 24. Nonconcur. An E5 Ammunition Sergeant, MOS 55B40, has been added to the Battalion S-4 section in the standardized MTOE 1-256G. This NCO position is considered adequate to assist the Battalion S-4 in the requisitioning, accountability, distribution and control of necessary ammunition used by a Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 2c, page 18. Standardization/training rides conducted in USARV include anti-torque control failure training. In most cases, this training is the first of this type that the aviators receive. Training must, however, be limited to the anti-torque control failure since other types of failure cannot be simulated.

b. Paragraph 2e(5), page 22. This headquarters and USARV are aware of the problems with sway braces. EIRs have been submitted by the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

c. Paragraph 2f(1), page 23 and 24. Concur with basic letter. Unit has been advised to submit a proposed TDA.

d. Paragraph 2b(2)(a), page 27, 1st Indorsement. The 1st Aviation Brigade Operations Manual is currently under revision. Safety briefings for personnel boarding or departing helicopters will be included in the AMTF Commander's Checklist.

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e. Paragraph 2b(4)(b), page 28, 1st Indorsement. Recommended supply rates from subordinate units are consolidated at this headquarters and forwarded to Headquarters, USARV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LEE S. PETERSON
LT, AGC
ASST ADJ GEN
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (5 Nov 68) 4th Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65, (R-l) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning employment of WDU-4 A/A flechettes, page 16, paragraph 2b(3); and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 1a: Concur with 3d Indorsement, paragraph 1a.

   b. Reference item concerning new equipment qualification, page 19, paragraph 2c(2); and 1st Indorsement, para 2b(7); and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 1b: Concur with 3d Indorsement, paragraph 1b.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 52d CAB
SPO#: (3 Nov 68) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 52d Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96358

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

T. L. Short
CP, AGC
Am AG
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th AHC</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>11</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th AHC</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>179th ASHC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th AHC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>355th AG (HH) (IPIT)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361st AG (E)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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| 52D CAB               | 0    | 0    | 85   | 75  | 0    | 0      | 0    |

Incl 2

39

CONFIDENTIAL
OPERATIONAL RESULTS AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1968

1. (c) Results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SORTIES FLOWN</th>
<th>TROOPS LIFTED</th>
<th>CARGO LIFTED (TONS)</th>
<th>ENEMY KBA</th>
<th>STRUCTURES DAM DEST</th>
<th>SAMPANS DAM DEST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57 AHC</td>
<td>26,136</td>
<td>27,889</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td>18,894</td>
<td>621</td>
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<td>170 AHC</td>
<td>6,721</td>
<td>8,278</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>179 ASHC</td>
<td>7,758</td>
<td>16,665</td>
<td>12,119</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>189 AHC</td>
<td>25,717</td>
<td>27,134</td>
<td>598</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>52 CAB</td>
<td>88,107</td>
<td>98,942</td>
<td>14,917</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
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2. (c) Losses:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT LOST TYPE</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT DAMAGED TYPE</th>
<th>NR</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57 AHC</td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170 AHC</td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179 ASHC</td>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189 AHC</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361 AO(E)</td>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>52 CAB</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
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Incl 3

CONFIDENTIAL
AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Auth/On</th>
<th>Auth/On</th>
<th>Auth/On</th>
<th>Auth/On</th>
<th>Auth/On</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'57 AHC</td>
<td>8/3</td>
<td></td>
<td>23/19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119 AHC</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td></td>
<td>23/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179 AHC</td>
<td>8/6</td>
<td></td>
<td>23/19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189 AHC</td>
<td>16/14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361 AC (E)</td>
<td>12/12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HHD</th>
<th>2/1</th>
<th>1/1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52 CAB</td>
<td>12/12</td>
<td>16/14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE, MISSION READY, EDI AND EDF (DAILY AVERAGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard (%)</th>
<th>Avg</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Ready</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Ready</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>75.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mission Ready</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>75.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Ready</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>69.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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Confidential
### Recapitulation of Flying Hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>AVG. NR. ON HAND</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
<th>AVG. HRS. PER ACFT</th>
<th>AVAILABILITY</th>
<th>PERCENT.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>111%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1G</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>71.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>86%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep</td>
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<td>652</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>140%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>104%</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>103%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>1658</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>1687</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all</td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>1602</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
<th>AVAILABILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>Aug Sep Oct</td>
<td>100% 55% 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1G</td>
<td>Aug Sep Oct</td>
<td>92 96 80 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-6A</td>
<td>Aug Sep Oct</td>
<td>92 96 80 6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Incl. 4
Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Hq, 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

CO, 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion

<table>
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<th>No. of Refs</th>
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<td>46</td>
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Originating Activity: HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

Abstract:

N/A

Sponsoring Military Activity:

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310