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CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

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LIMITATION CHANGES

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<table>
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<tr>
<td>AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

24 February 1969

AGAM-P (M) (10 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684104

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

In reply refer to AGAM-P (M) (10 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684104

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 3b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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US Army Aviation Test Activity
145th Combat Aviation Battalion
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 145TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96227

AVOC-CC

11 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat Aviation Battalion for period ending 31 October (FOCS CERP-65) (R1) (U) (UIC: WYNAA)

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1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

a. The mission of this battalion has not changed during this reporting period.

b. Organization

(1) The 324th Airfield Support Detachment was attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 August 1968.

(2) The Organization of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion during this reporting period included the following units, located as indicated, (See Incl 1)

c. Significant personnel changes during the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Commanding Officer, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion
   No Change

(2) Battalion Executive Officer 11 Aug 68
   Outgoing: Major Edmund L Fuchs 01936032
   Incoming: Major James I Ransbotham 04033560

(3) Battalion S-1/Adjutant 17 Sep 68
   Outgoing: Cpt William E Bannister 05320641
   Incoming: Cpt Michael J Jett 05326214

(4) Battalion S-1/Adjutant 8 Oct 68
   Outgoing: Cpt Michael J Jett 05326214
   Incoming: Cpt John D Hoakinson 05320166

(4) Battalion S-2 1 Sep 68
   Outgoing: Major Boyce C McKinney 091928
   Incoming: Cpt Larry R Page 05318557
(5) Battalion S-3 1 Sep 68
Outgoing: Major David E Hagler 04010457
Incoming: Major Giffon A Herr 0F105749

(6) Battalion S-4 11 Aug 68
Outgoing: Major Charles R Mix 04005918
Incoming: Major Emmett R Corrow 02291837

(7) Commanding Officer, 68th Assault Helicopter Company 24 Sep 68
Outgoing: LTC Billy G Sims 089607
Incoming: Major Richard S Daum 090745

(8) Executive Officer, 68th Assault Helicopter Company 1 Nov 68
Outgoing: Major Richard S Daum 090745
Incoming: CPT Geoffrey R Webster 05233880

(9) Executive Officer, 118th Assault Helicopter Company 6 Sep 68
Outgoing: Major Robert G Shain 087369
Incoming: Major Bobby L Moore 0F103880

(10) Commanding Officer, 135th Assault Helicopter Company 14 Oct 68
Outgoing: LTC Robert E L Osbourn 04011624
Incoming: Major Paul E Neutz 095008

(11) Executive Officer, 135th Assault Helicopter Company 1 Oct 68
Outgoing: LCDR Neil Ralph RAN 0949
Incoming: LCDR Graham R Rohrshiem RAN 01516

(12) Commanding Officer, 190th Assault Helicopter Company 2 Aug 68
Outgoing: Major Charles U Vaughn 082202
Incoming: Major Charles R Byrd 085962

(13) Executive Officer, 190th Assault Helicopter Company 2 Aug 68
Outgoing: Major James R Boyd 085917
Incoming: Major John L Lesch III 0F105731

(14) Commanding Officer, 334th Armed Helicopter Company 28 Sep 68
Outgoing: Major Joel J Mikuta 074394
Incoming: Major Charles A Edwards 085158

(15) Executive Officer, 334th Armed Helicopter Company 28 Sep 68
Outgoing: Major Russell A Bronson 074394
Incoming: CPT Stanley C Slusarsz 05420497
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Executive Officer, 334th Armed Helicopter Company 10 Oct 68

Outgoing: CPT Stanley C Sluxer 05/20/47
Incoming: Major Sammy L Childs 01/07/47

d. Unit Strengths as of 31 Oct 68

(1) Military:

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<td>17</td>
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<td>26 38</td>
<td>217 194</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>11 9</td>
<td>151 171</td>
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PERSONNEL (ENLISTED) GAINS AND LOSSES FOR AUGUST, SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER

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<td>17</td>
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e. Aircraft Status as of 31 October 1968 (Incl 2)

f. Operational Results as of 31 October 1968 (Incl 3)

g. Awards and Decorations: The following awards were received by members of the battalion during the period 1 August 1968 through 31 October 1968.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARDS</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>PH</td>
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h. (C) Intelligence Situation

During early August the enemy forces in the III Corps Tactical Zone generally avoided contact and attempted to resupply and reorganize his assets for a new offensive which was eventually to begin approximately 25 August. It was obvious almost from the beginning that there was going to be a major change in the VC/NVA strategy in this offensive. In previous offensives the enemy drives were characterized by attempts to move major forces directly against the capital and other major population centers. In this offensive the enemy struck at the outlying provinces, concentrating his efforts in the Tay Ninh, Kien, and Loc Ninh areas. It is believed that his reason for doing this was to draw forces away from the capital military district (CMD) so that forces positioned in the Angel's Wing and Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia could have relatively free movement into Saigon through the southern approaches to the city. Captured documents and POW's also pointed to a secondary mission for the enemy forces operating in the Tay Ninh area and that was to cause as much damage to the 25th US Division's combat effectiveness.
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as possible while practicing for the first time large scale economy of force measures. The VC/NVA forces launched three multi-battalion sized attacks against two major cities, two of which succeeded in occupying portions of the city for short periods of time without accomplishing their objective of sufficiently weakening the forces in the CM to assure a successful offensive. As a result of his failure, he again pulled back into his base areas to reorganize and resupply his forces.

Since early September the enemy has continued to avoid contact and is believed to be preparing for yet another offensive which is to be initiated at some future date. In the meantime the enemy is expected to continue with increased emphasis on terrorist, sabotage, and small-scale attacks against major targets while conducting heavy attacks against lightly defended targets to provide his recent replacements with a source of excellent combat training.

1. Operations

(1) Combat Operations

This battalion continues to be committed daily to tasks varying from combat support missions to battalion sized combat assault operations, with the emphasis being placed on company sized combat assault operations. The battalion is normally committed daily for three combat assault companies, one general support helicopter company, and a variety of armed helicopter missions, including three firefly teams from the 334th Armed Helicopter Company. The normal mission profile for the combat assault helicopter is ten UH-1D lift helicopters, one command and control helicopter, one maintenance helicopter, one smoke helicopter, and four armed helicopters from the unit's assets. In addition spare aircraft are taken if they are available.

(2) Counter Mortar:

(a) The Bien Hoa Air Base was subject to enemy rocket/mortar attacks on nine occasions on five dates during this reporting period. These attacks occurred as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME/DATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF ROCKETS</th>
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<td>12 Rds 122mm Rkt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>063022 Aug</td>
<td>4 Rds 122mm Rkt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230025 Aug</td>
<td>17 Rds 122mm Rkt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>225830 Aug</td>
<td>11 Rds 122mm Rkt</td>
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<tr>
<td>030008 Sep</td>
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<tr>
<td>060008 Sep</td>
<td>4 Rds 107mm Rkt</td>
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<td>062508 Sep</td>
<td>3 Rds 107mm Rkt</td>
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<tr>
<td>085008 Sep</td>
<td>2 Rds 107mm Rkt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232526 Oct</td>
<td>10 Rds 107mm Rkt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) During this reporting period the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion retained the responsibility of primary command and control.
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of all armed helicopter light fireteams utilised in support of OPLAN Checkmate. A Command & Control helicopter has been flown nightly by members of this battalion and the hours have been expanded from 2300-0400 to 2100-0600 in support of this operation.

j. Training

(1) Mandatory Training

(a) Mandatory Training as outlined in US. RV Regulation 350-1 and 12th Combat Aviation Group Regulation 350-1 is being conducted by all units in this battalion. During this reporting period a replacement program was set up to utilize the facilities of the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School of the 101st Airborne Division. The program of instruction in use by the 101st Airborne Division has been modified to reduce the loss of operations manhours incurred. Their six day training schedule has been reduced to two and one-half days per man by rescheduling classes to avoid blocks of instruction that are required only by 101st Division regulations. This program seems to be beneficial in that it gives both the division troops and the aviation troops a chance to learn mutual respect for the others job. A supplementary training program being developed to provide the required training when the division training load is too great to permit the school to accommodate non-divisional replacements.

(b) The lack of a suitable CBR training site in the Bien Hoa/Long Binh area continues to preclude effective CBR training.

(2) Assigned Training Tasks

(a) During this reporting period six VMF aviators (three Staff Officers and three VMF pilots) were awarded a certificate of graduation upon completion of transition training in the UH-1D. In addition, two staff officer aviators and four operational aviators are presently undergoing this type of training with the assault helicopter companies of this battalion. The staff officers are trained for a period of approximately three weeks while the operational aviators remain with the battalion for a period of approximately three months. Upon completion of the transition phase of their training they remain with the units that trained them and fly the daily missions with them.

(b) The battalion has received six allocations to the Navy's Jungle Environmental Survival Training School and three allocations to the Air Force Jungle Survival School. All assigned quotas have been filled and distributed among the units with the emphasis on giving each unit as many school qualified personnel in this field as possible. The battalion favors slightly the crews that are assigned to firefly duty because it is felt that they are the ones most likely to be faced with a survival situation.

(c) In-Country training and orientation for newly assigned senior officers continues to be done in this battalion. These officers normally

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stay from two to three days. During that period, they are afforded the opportunity to participate in the various types of missions flown by this battalion.

(3) Physical Security

The physical security plan has been revised during this reporting period to incorporate numerous changes that were made to the original plan. The plan remains under constant review and changes are made as necessary to improve the overall security of the battalion. During this reporting period a lighting system has been installed around the aircraft revetment area. Some of the units have also installed one or two lights in each aircraft revetment to help detect the presence of sappers during the hours of darkness and this has also proved to be useful to crews performing night maintenance on aircraft. The aircraft revetment area has also been surrounded with a system of eighteen two-man bunkers which are manned during any increased threat to this battalion and are the battalion's primary defense against sappers who may have managed to penetrate the airbase perimeter under the cover of darkness and/or rocket/mortar attack. It has also proven beneficial to equip the five bunkers which are utilized in the defense of the battalion's sector of the Bien Hoa Air Base perimeter with AN/PRC-25 radios to allow them to communicate with the battalion commander when he is mobile and also to provide the bunkers with a means to contact the firefly aircraft that check the perimeter as required.

k. Signal

(1) During the period the subordinate units of company level completed the necessary transactions to establish their own COMMSEC (Crypto) accounts - including the provision of the CRYPTO facility. COMMSEC equipment was requisitioned and received by each account, and FM Voice Secure (FM) was established in the battalion, to include a 24-hour FM Secure/Command Net.

(2) Telephone service to all units and sections of the battalion was improved with the installation of a more versatile switchboard system (employing two SB-688s), with primary problem areas being in the disruption of the lines themselves by heavy earth moving equipment brought in by engineers for area improvement. This heavy equipment also destroyed a 25-pair Air Force cable, and knocked out many class "A" or "C" Subscribers in the battalion area. Due to a reduced repair force which lacked sufficient teams of repairmen to provide quicker service for priority designator subscribers, there was a serious interruption of phone service to the battalion.

(3) Battalion perimeter security was improved by employing a primary wire system to the battalion S-2, backed up by AN/PRC-25 radios in contact with the Battalion Operations Center (BOC). The system was reversed after some experimentation, and the AN/PRC-25s were employed as the primary means of communication, and were backed up by the wire lines to S-2.
1. Logistics

(1) Class III: Fuel consumption rate of the AAI refueling point at Ham Tan increased from 3000 gallons to 4000 gallons of JP-4 per week during this reporting period. This 25% increase is due to an increase of airmobile operations being conducted in the Ham Tan area. A weekly flight has been coordinated with the 528th Quartermaster Company to resupply fuel to the AAI as necessary. An operational load of 10,000 gallons of JP-4 is currently maintained at this location.

(2) Class V: Additional guide-line figures have been received from Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group to be used in computing battalion basic load and storage levels and are being maintained accordingly. This change incorporates the basic load of each unit with the currently authorized operational load and allows for better management of the amount of ammunition at the battalion ammunition point. The new weapons XM-229 (17.5 lbs) and the proximity fuse (XM-429) are now authorized for operational use, and are being stocked at the ammunition point. Beginning next quarter, ammunition will be requisitioned and distributed on the basis of 40% XM-229 and 60% XM-151. It is anticipated that 10 to 12% of the XM-151's will be equipped with the XM-429 proximity fuse.

(3) Construction: New vertical construction completed during this reporting period consisted of two wooden buildings 20' x 100'. These buildings will be used as flight platoon standby and equipment storage buildings.

(a) The engineers have programmed the replacement of 33 aircraft revetments which were originally constructed utilizing CBU containers and sandbags. Estimated completion date at this time is unknown.

(b) During this period two dayrooms and an orderly room were completed under this self-help program. The ammunition supply point has been graded and the ammunition storage point has been relocated.

m. Safety

(1) During the period 1 August 1968 through 31 October 1968, the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion experienced four major accidents and four incidents in 43,635 flying hours. This was for a rate of 9.1 per 100,000 flying hours.

(2) The air traffic control, with its full complement of radios is now in operation twenty-four hours a day. Also, to further aid pilots a large wind sock was placed in the southwest portion of the airfield.

(3) Helicopter revetment areas are no longer referred to by individual company names. Instead, every lane has a number painted on each end and pilots request takeoffs and landings to end from a particular lane. This was necessary for two reasons: (a) It is the only method which allows the tower to positively control traffic on the heliport, and (b) pilots, who are not familiar with the field,
can easily be directed to any given area.

n. Flight Standardization

(1) During this reporting period the primary training and standardization has been focused toward the initial in-country orientation and the making of new IP/SIP. This training is accomplished as much as possible at unit level. A training program is in progress at this time to give each unit a minimum of one SIP and three IP's. This should prove beneficial in keeping their training and standardization up to date.

(2) Problems still exist in the availability of qualified, experienced pilots capable of performing instructor and standardization pilot duties. The majority of the replacement aviators are recent flight-school graduates and require in excess of six months to gain sufficient experience to perform these duties. The assignment of more experienced aviators would greatly enhance the effectiveness of a sound flight standardization program.
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2. (c) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation Evaluation and Recommendations

a. Personnel: Rotation procedure of Royal Australian Navy Element

(1) OBSERVATION: The Australian personnel rotation was broken into two stages, fifty percent of the change occurred on 10 Sep 68, and the final stage was completed on 15 Oct 68.

(2) EVALUATION: The two-phase method of change over was very satisfactory and no decrease in unit capability was observed.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That this method of rotation continue to be employed by the Australian contingent in the future.

b. Operations:

(1) AH-1G Support at Night

(a) OBSERVATION: When flown at night either in support of ground elements or on the firefly mission, the AH-1G offers many advantages over the older and slower UH-1C gunship.

(b) EVALUATION: As a replacement for the UH-1D (high ship) on firefly the increased visibility from the front seat enables the mission commander to better observe the other members of his team. It also offers a better station for navigation and target acquisition. When used in the low ship mode of the fire team, it is again flown in a similar manner as the UH-1G gunship. It is flown at airspeeds which vary from 20 knots to 100 knots with altitudes ranging from tree top to 400 feet absolute. With its ability to carry a combination of different weapons it is a far more versatile aircraft. In the mini-hog or heavy-hog configuration it has the added capability of carrying both the 17 lb rockets for reinforced structures or swamps and 10 lbs rockets with the proximity fuses for personnel in the open. Its increased power available to the pilot makes the Cobra more maneuverable at lower speeds. The only problems encountered when using the Cobra at night are the unreliability of the attitude indicator and the reflections on the canopy from the gunner's instrument panel. It has been found that turning the gunner's instrument lights off and the pilots lights down to the lowest possible level will reduce the glare to a satisfactory level.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the AH-1G Cobra be used more in night operations, both in support of ground forces and on the firefly mission. That all pilots be advised of the problems encountered when flying the Cobra at night and the steps discussed above for eliminating them.

(2) In-Between Post Flights

(a) OBSERVATION: Post flight inspections during the day will aid in detection of potential hazards.
(b) EVALUATION: During an operational day, assault helicopter companies shutdown several times between insertions, extractions, and repositioning of ground troops. During these shutdown periods a thorough "in-between" post flight should be conducted. When carried out properly they can detect potential hazards such as clogged barrier filters, loose bearings of control sleeves, low or empty oil levels. One or more transmission inspection panels should be pulled, and with the crew observing in the hell hole and through the inspection port, the aircraft should be run to flight idle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units carry out post flight inspections during the day when the situation permits.

(3) Jettison Devices for 2.75" FFAR Pods

(a) OBSERVATION: During this wet season, units of this battalion have experienced numerous rocket pod jettison failures, both electrical and mechanical.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the unusually wet and humid seasons here, a thorough and daily inspection of the rocket pod jettison is necessary to insure proper operation of these devices under emergency conditions. A thorough inspection can detect binding in the mechanical devices and frayed or worn wires on the electrical devices.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units have their armed platoon pilots conduct thorough and daily inspections of rocket pod jettison equipment.

(4) Crew Chief and Gunner Seat Placement in UH-1C

(a) OBSERVATION: The standard seating arrangement in the UH-1C gunship can be improved by relocating the crew chief's and gunner's seats.

(b) EVALUATION: The crew chief and gunner on a UH-1C gunship have a very limited field of vision from the present seat location. They cannot observe to the front clearly due to the pilots seat location and their view to the rear is obstructed by the firewall. They cannot shoot to the front unless they lean outside of the aircraft. The seats can be moved forward approximately 12 inches and turned at an angle so that the crew members are facing approximately 45 degrees from the front of the aircraft. There are ample tie-down points to secure the seats. From this position they can easily perform effective fire anywhere from the front of the aircraft to the rear. They have better observation capabilities and do not have to lean out of the aircraft as far to see to the rear.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units using UH-1C gunships give consideration to this method of placement of the gunner's and crew chief's seats.

(5) Increased Firepower For the Smoke Helicopter

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(a) OBSERVATION: Standard smoke ship configuration does not provide adequate suppressive firepower.

(b) EVALUATION: To be effective, the smoke dispensing ship must fly low-level in close proximity to the area that presents the greatest threat to the flight and as a result be more subject to the effects of enemy groundfire than are the lift ships that are being screened. The M-60's presently utilized provide a small amount of coverage to the sides and rear of the aircraft. Twin mounted M-60 door guns mounted on each side of the aircraft supplemented by a free gun manned by a third gunner equipped with a monkey strap will provide the additional firepower to suppress close to the aircraft. The free gun can move to the door that needs the additional firepower.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units adopt this method of increasing the firepower available to the smoke dispensing helicopters.

(6) Use of VT Fused Rockets

(a) OBSERVATION: Rockets with the proximity fuse are very effective for LZ preparation, but the restrictions on their use near friendly forces dictates the need for special planning for their use.

(b) EVALUATION: VT fused rockets cannot be employed close to LZ's while the lift ships are landing. The UH-1C gunship cannot fire its rocket load. This means that if VT rockets are loaded they must normally be employed prior to landing. When the VT is used it should be used as close to touch down as possible in order to achieve maximum shock action. One method of achieving maximum utilization of the VT warhead is to use one rocket ship with XM-159 pods loaded with VT fuzes and three XM-21 equipped aircraft loaded with HE rockets with the super quick fuzes. A LFT with the XM-21 system recons the landing zone and does a limited recon by fire. The second fire team with the rocket ship escorts the lift ships. The L2 is marked initially by the LFT and subsequently by the C2C from altitude. The LFT on the L2 recon pulls out early to join the formation. On long final, the rocket ship moves in front of the formation, salvoing his rockets several pair at a time. With this technique he can cover the LZ. After expending on this rocket run, the rocket ship immediately departs to rapidly rearm at the closest point. This is normally at the P2, where rockets are prepositioned. In the mean time the flight is covered by the heavy fireteam loaded with HE rockets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This method of employment of rockets has proven highly effective in nightly operations and it is recommended that other units give it consideration.

(7) Break-Up of Flights Upon Mission Termination

(a) OBSERVATION: Upon completion of a combat assault mission, the flights have been separating into individual aircraft for return flights to their home station.
(b) EVALUATION: All aviators assigned to the 143rd Combat Aviation Battalion are required to maintain a minimum of four (4) hours per month of "hood" time or instrument training. One of the most opportune times to obtain a part of this required training is on the return flight from an operational area to the home station. By following this method of returning, it allows the aviator an opportunity to maintain his proficiency of instrument flying as well as giving him a break from the strain of formation flying. It is felt that this practice provides an increased safety margin by not requiring fatigued aviators to conduct unnecessary formation flight.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Due to the valuable instrument training obtained and the added safety margin gained, it is recommended that all companies practice this method of returning from an operational area. It is further recommended that an interval of at least 2-4 minutes be taken between aircraft, as an added safety precaution while participating in instrument training.

(8) Utilization of Pathfinders

(a) OBSERVATION: Smooth operation of the PZ's has reaffirmed continued use of our Pathfinders in Airmobile Operations.

(b) EVALUATION: The air mission commander in an airmobile operation should be fully aware that he has the responsibility to the ground commander to deliver and/or extract his troops to and from the designated LZ's in the least amount of time according to the tactical situation. Any delay in a rapid buildup of troops in the LZ or any delay in the extractions can result in unnecessary loss of personnel, or aviation assets. This can only be accomplished if the ground commander has set up the PZ according to procedures used by the aviation unit. Employment of the pathfinder team minimizes any delay encountered in the PZ.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Pathfinders be used more extensively in airmobile operations. In doing so, the aviation commander is assured the combat operation will be conducted in an efficient manner without the loss of time and unnecessary confusion.

(9) KY-28/TSEC Equipment

(a) OBSERVATION: When the KY-28 is installed in the UH-1 under the primary MWO which facilitates the employment of the KY-28, there is no provision for F.M. volume control.

(b) EVALUATION: It is necessary to install some means of controlling the F.M. volume of the KY-28, otherwise the volume will be maximum at all times. Thus, at this time, the only possible way to control the volume is with the use of the C-1611. This should be changed so that the potentiometer on the F.M. control head could be utilized for volume control.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that all US-1 aircraft having the K-29 installed be modified in accordance with the interim MO as noted in enclosure #4.

   c. Maintenance: None
   d. Safety: None

Gerald L. Waldron
LTC, J.T.
Commanding
AVOC—SC (11 Nov 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat Aviation Battalion for
Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96266 20 November 1968

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBG-RH, APO 96266

1. In compliance with AR 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15, two
   copies of subject report are forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and the following
   comment is made: Reference paragraph 1 i (2) (a): Date time groups
   are reversed.

3. Concur with all other comments and recommendations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ARTHUR W. MUPPENSTahl
Captain, Infantry
Asst Adjutant
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1966 (REG SFOR - 65) (EI) (V)
(VIG: WOIMA)

Mr, HQ II PPORDIV, APO San Francisco 96266 4 DEC 66

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVRA-C, APO 96507
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVBC-IN, APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOR-OP, APO 96550

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report
Lessons Learned of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, for the period
ending 31 October 1966, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

O. R. FORY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG
1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 2b(5), page 11. Concur except for the free gun for additional fire power. A free gun which can be moved from door to door becomes a potential hazard in itself, particularly in the heat of battle when the gunner would probably move the loaded weapon through the cockpit. The twin mounted M-60 machine guns should be sufficient for suppressive fire with additional protection provided by an armed helicopter.

   b. Paragraph 2b(9), page 13. An interim MWO to provide for FM volume control at the C-3835 (FM) Control Head was established. This MWO resulted from the ECOM study and re-design, and subsequent prototype installation in two 145th CAB aircraft.

3. (U) 1 Inclosure, as stated on 2d Indorsement, is in error and should be 4 Inclosures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JOHN D. MINSELL
MAJ, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning AH-1G support at night, page 10, paragraph 2b(1). Nonconcur. The frequency and technique of employment of the AH-1G in night operations is a tactical decision to be determined by the commander's analysis of the factors of METT. Imposition of a command wide policy would interfere with a commander's flexibility in responding to mission requirements. The current problems of unreliable attitude indicators and reflections on the canopy from bright instrument lights are recognized, and must be emphasized in aviator training at all echelons.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning crewchief and gunner seat placement in UH-1C, page 11, paragraph 2b(4). Nonconcur. For safety reasons, all four legs of the seat must be securely inserted into the positive lock studs of the tie down position. This is not possible in the seat placement described in the above evaluation.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning firepower for the smoke helicopter, page 11, paragraph 2b(5) and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2a. Concur with the 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2a. The free gun is considered unsafe to move between stations. Twin gun mounts for each side of the aircraft are not presently in stock, nor have they been flight tested or approved by AMC for use. The XM-39 subsystem (.50 cal) is presently under development for this type fire suppression and should be available in theater by 4th quarter FY 69.

   d. (C) Reference item concerning break up of flight upon mission termination, page 12, paragraph 2b(7). Concur. This method of maintaining instrument proficiency while returning from operational areas is compatible with the provisions of USARV Reg 95-25, dated 3 February 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNIZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 145th Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Army AG
CONFIDENTIAL

INTERIM KY - 28 MODIFICATION

With the combined efforts of the LSI Team at Bien Hoa, the ECOM personnel at Long Bien, and Signal and Avionics personnel of the 145th Combat Avi-
ation Battalion, the following interim MHO was designed and tested with more than satisfactory results.

1. Check behind pedestal and locate wire RF 451A22 going to TB 20, terminal #2. Cut wire.

2. Locate wire RF 404B22 coming from P2107, Pin JJ. Cut wire.

3. Disconnect wire RF 451B22 from Pin N, P 2107

4. Run end of wire RF 451A22 coming from TB 20, Terminal #2, to P2107, Pin N.

5. Splice other end of wire RF 451A22 going to P2202, Pin F, onto end of RF 451B22 going to P 2107, Pin JJ.

6. Splice end of RF 404B22 coming from J2201, Pin G, to end of RF 451B22 going to J2202, Pin F.

7. Find RF 450B22 coming from P 2107, Pin KK. Cut wire.


9. Insulate and tie off other end of RF 450B22.

Inclosure 4

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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 68

CO, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion