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<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.</td>
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<td>FROM:</td>
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<th>AUTHORITY</th>
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<td>AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980 AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field
Force Vietnam Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the
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1 Incl

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Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Air Force Air Ground Operations School
15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

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1. Section 1 (C) Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

   a. (C) General. During the reporting period, I FFORCEV Arty continued support of US, FWMAF, ARVN, RF/FF and USSF/CIDG forces in the II CTZ. The I FFORCEV Arty organization remained unchanged from that reported on 31 Jul 68. Two group headquarters with four attached battalions each, three separate battalions, three separate batteries and ten detachments supported operations conducted in II CTZ. Continuing operations were conducted in the BINH TAY-MAC ARTHUR, DAN SINH-COCHISE, DAN HOA-BOLLING, DAN THANG-MCLAIN and WALKER area of operations. ROK forces in CRID AO and 9th ROK Inf Div AO were also supported. The 9th ROK Inf Div Operation BAK MA 9 was supported by Arty TF Strike in Oct 68. The 5th Bn, 27th Arty (105 T) continued support of US and ARVN maneuver elements in the four southern provinces of the II CTZ while the 6th BN, 32d Arty (175mm/8") supported US, ROK and ARVN maneuver forces in the central coastal area. The 4th BN (AW) (SP) 60th Arty continued its support of FWMAF throughout the II CTZ.

   b. (C) Intelligence.

      (1) Counterbattery Intelligence Operations.

      (a) Analysis. During the ORLL period, the counterbattery intelligence section of I FFORCEV Arty developed, analysed and disseminated to subordinate units, major maneuver headquarters and other selected headquarters statistical data pertaining to the enemy artillery activity and threat in II CTZ.

      (b) Hostile artillery fire throughout the month of August reached its high point on 23 Aug 68 when the enemy expended 316 artillery rounds in the early stages of his "Third Offensive." The enemy's artillery attacks continued through Sep 68, but declined in intensity each succeeding week. From the artillery viewpoint, the "Third Offensive" lacked the intensity of the
"Second Offensive" as evidenced by an enemy artillery expenditure of 92 rounds per day during Sep 68 as compared to 116 rounds per day during May '68. The majority of enemy initiated attacks during May and Sep 68 occurred in the western highlands. It is estimated that 53% of the total enemy artillery capability is located in this area. An extremely low level of enemy artillery activity was noted throughout the II CTZ during Oct 68. The basic enemy artillery weapons employed during Oct 68 were mortars and recoilless rifles. One 122mm Rocket attack and one 120mm Mortar attack were reported during Oct 68.

(2) Counter-mortar Radar Operations.

(a) To assist the I FORCESV Arty radar officer measure the proficiency and effectiveness of counter-mortar radar detachments within II CTZ, information collected by the counterbattery intelligence section was analyzed monthly.

(b) Analysis of enemy attacks on installations/positions where counter-mortar radars are located has assisted in determining if proper sectors of scan have been assigned. Similar analysis of enemy artillery activity in areas where counter-mortar radars are not located has provided guidance for relocation of detachments. Each month the degree of operational effectiveness is measured by comparing the number of hostile firing positions located with the total number of attacks received.

(c) Since July there has been a notable increase (July 12.9% - August 55.5% - September 61% - October 57%) in the effectiveness of detecting enemy positions. This progress is attributed to the use of accurate pattern analysis of past enemy firing positions by type weapon; scheduling the operational period of each radar with the times the enemy usually attacks; and continued use of the strobing technique for detecting flat trajectory weapons.

(d) A number of conclusions have been drawn from recent analyses. The effectiveness of any target acquisition means, to include counter-mortar radar, cannot be accurately determined unless a ground sweep is conducted of the suspect enemy area as soon as possible after counterbattery fire. Of the 206 enemy artillery attacks received in II CTZ during September 1968, ground sweeps of the suspect enemy location were conducted less than 20% of the time. It appears that the presence of counter-mortar radars at installations/FSBs has not appreciably deterred the enemy from attacking these positions. Although the effectiveness of CBR's has increased over the past three months, there has not been a corresponding decrease in the intensity of artillery attacks at these locations. However, it can be reasonably assumed that with the accuracy of CBR's and responsiveness of friendly counterfire, the effectiveness and duration of the enemy's attacks have been reduced. While the cause and
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I
Field Force Vietnam Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1968

RCS CSF-65 (U)

effects which influence the accuracy of his fires cannot be fully measured,
it has been noted that during recent months the majority of his attacks have
been restricted to ten rounds or less.

(3) Improvement of Counterbattery Programs.

(a) The success of any counterbattery program depends on detailed prior
planning and rapid, aggressive execution. An effective counterbattery program
depends on a coordinated effort between the maneuver unit and its supporting
artillery. Target acquisition coupled with timely counterfires are essential in any counterbattery plan.

(b) Some techniques for improving the acquisition of many mortar, rocket
and recoilless rifle locations within II CTZ, have been tested, evaluated
and reviewed by this headquarters. Those techniques as well as suggested
fires were published in a letter distributed to various commands in II CTZ.

(4) Meteorological Quality Control Team (MQCT).

(a) During the ORR period, the Metro Quality Control Team of this
headquarters, continued analysis of weather data provided to firing units by
nine electronic sections and three visual teams deployed throughout II CTZ.
The team checked 77% of 901 weather soundings taken during the month of
September and rated only 0.36% of these soundings unsatisfactory. This
unprecedented low percentage of unsatisfactory soundings has contributed to
the reduction of ammunition expenditures and increased the probability
of first round hits.

(b) In September, the Metro Quality Control Team developed a prescribed
load list (PLL) of expendable supplies peculiar to artillery metro sections
within II CTZ. This PLL was forwarded to US units and depots for approval
and for their use in developing demand information to establish authorized
stockage lists. The recommended PLL has been approved and adopted by all
metro sections within the II CTZ.

c. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Operations.

(a) On 23 Aug 68, the enemy staged a multi-battalion attack on the Dúc
Lao SF Camp. To counter this action, which was the major threat in the XI
CTZ during the reporting period, one US 105mm battery was deployed to support
the ARVN operation. Later when US forces were introduced into the area, a
total of 8 US artillery batteries were deployed in the Dúc Lao - Bến Mạch-Th mortal
area.

2. See Inclosure 2

INCL 1
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1. FFORCE Artillery
   
   Btry P, 5th Bn, 22d Arty (175mm/84) (SP)
   
   Btry C, 1st Bn, 92d Arty (155mm T)

2. 4th Inf Div Artillery

   4th Bn, 42d Arty (105mm T)
   
   Btry B, 2d Bn, 9th Arty (105mm T)
   
   Btry B, 5th Bn, 16th Arty (155mm T)

3. 173d Abn Bde (SE)

   Btry D, 3d Bn, 319th Arty (105mm T)

At the end of the reporting period seven batteries remained in the Dac Lap-Ban Me Thuot area. Btry D, 3d Bn, 319th Arty returned to the GID AO and assumed its direct support mission of 173d Abn Bde.

(b) Btry C, 5th Bn, 22d Arty (175mm/84 SP) was deployed to AO DAN THANH-MCLAIN on 10 Aug 69 to provide heavy artillery support for TF South. The battery is positioned in Binh Thuan Province to support operations in the Phan Thiet area.

(c) In mid-Aug 68, a collocated ARVN/US Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) was established in Binh Thuan Province of the TF SOUTH AO. Fire support normally available to maneuver forces in the province includes ARVN artillery and TAC air, US artillery, a destructor, gunships and tactical air support. The FSCC organization includes an ARVN and US artillery element, a targeting element, MGLO element and US ALO element. The FSCC has direct communications with ARVN and US liaison officers at Province CO, ARVN and US liaison officers with ARVN and US maneuver elements and all fire support elements. The collocated FSCC has ensured the efficient coordination and utilization of available fire support. Military and political clearance is obtained in two or three minutes and mass ARVN/US artillery is coordinated effectively.

(d) Task Force Strike. This artillery Task Force was organized in response to the request from the 9th ROY Inf Div for artillery support of Operation BANG MU 9. TF Strike, commanded by CO, 6th Bn, 84th Arty included the following units:

   3. See Inclosure 3

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RCS GSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Btry A, 7th Bn, 13th Arty (105mm T)

Btry C, 6th Bn, 84th Arty (155mm T)

1st Plt, Btry B, 6th Bn, 32d Arty (8 inch SP)

1 - MET Section (visual), HB, 8th Bn, 26th Arty (TAB)

1 - SLT Section, Btry D, 29th Arty

The artillery task force was employed during the period 13-17 Oct 68 in support of the operation which took place 8km southwest of Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa Province. CO, TF Strike coordinated fires of the US Artillery. Ammunition expenditures were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>1451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 inch</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The total number of artillery pieces available in the II CTZ during this quarter was 558. The total number of rounds fired by all calibers was 441,582.

(f) Personnel of Hq and Hq Btry, I FFORCEV Arty were engaged in 92 days of mission oriented operations during this period.

(g) Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE).

1 Continued emphasis was placed on naval gunfire support, primarily in the DAN THANG-MCLAIN AO. Of particular interest was the stationing of the USS New Jersey in waters off II CTZ for a six-day period in late October. Considerable fire support coordination preceded the arrival of this unique addition to fire support resources in II CTZ. Firing by the main battery was limited to 70 rounds of observed fire each day. These fires were integrated with other fire support means and coordinated schemes of maneuvers. Targets in DAN SINH-COCHISE, DAN HOA-BOLLING, and DAN THANG-MCLAIN AO's were scheduled for attack on separate days during the period. A total of 176 rounds (16 inch) were expended on 20, 22 and 23 October. A preliminary report from one target area indicated several bunkers destroyed and numerous caves sealed. A naval gunfire spotter reported an estimated 12 enemy KIA. An average of three ships were on station each day in the coastal waters of II CTZ to provide

4. See Inclosure 4

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The following is a resume of naval gunfire for the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>TOTAL ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1505</td>
<td>38,823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 During the period 1 August - 31 October, an average of 1985 Immediate Reaction/Hangfire targets were processed each month, compared to a monthly average of over 2400 for the previous period. The term, Immediate Reaction, is associated with those targets located within the AO of US units; the term, Hangfire, is given to targets within the AO of FWMAF. A total of 1118 Hangfire and 4838 Immediate Reaction targets were developed by FSCE. At the request of units subordinate to I FFORCEV Arty, targets were developed to support artillery hip-shoots/raids. In most cases these special missions lasted between 24 and 72 hours. At the direction of CG, I FFORCEV Arty, a preliminary study has been initiated which will recommend ammunition expenditures on acquired targets.

3 I FFORCEV Regulation 95-4, 16 May 1968, subject: Aviation Artillery Warning System, established standard, unclassified procedures for providing warning of artillery fire to aircraft in II CTZ. A recent change requires Artillery Warning Control Centers (AWCC) to report to the nearest Control and Reporting Post (CRP) all artillery fire with a maximum ordinate of fire of 5,000 ft or higher above ground level. Whenever possible, the reporting altitude should be progressively reduced to achieve an end objective of reporting all fires over 3,000 ft. The present requirement includes reporting 4.2 inch mortar firings. HQ, I FFORCEV Arty recently granted authority to 17th CBT AVN Gp to publish all unclassified AWCC frequencies in that organization's monthly fact sheet to airmen. In connection with its AWCC responsibility, FSCE closely monitors all NOTAMS.

4 During the quarter, FSCE issued a daily average of 11 ARC Light suppressions of 175mm firing. Each suppression of firing higher than 28,000 ft above mean sea level concerned only those units near the aircraft flight path. During the quarter, commanders were requested to keep an informal record of the number of 175mm gun fire missions that could not be fired because of these suppressions. Results will be reported in the ORLL for the period ending 31 Jan 69.

5 A policy study has been initiated which is directed at placing information in the hands of small unit ARVN, RP/FF forces and ROK forces. The study will outline methods and procedures to request all types of fire support e.g., Spooky, gunships, Tac Air, naval gunfire and artillery. The purpose of such a program is to decrease dependence on US Advisor/Liaison personnel.
and increase initiative on the part of allies.

(2) Training

(a) The I FFORCEV Arty Forward Observer Training School (An Khe) and the
Fire Direction Officer Training School (Pleiku) continued training of Artillery
lieutenants and other US personnel plus RVNAF personnel during the reporting
period.

1. A total of 130 US personnel and 26 RVNAF personnel completed the one
week program of instruction at the FO School during the reporting period.
The School's faculty also presented an abbreviated course of instruction in
basic forward observer procedures for an additional 180 RVNAF personnel.

2. A total of 118 US personnel and 5 ARVN personnel attended the FDO
School during the reporting period. A FADAC Assistance Team from the school
conducted 4 days training for 27 personnel of the 101st Abn Div and 1st Cav
Div (AM) at Camp Eagle during Oct 68.

(b) A two day training session was conducted by a New Equipment Training
Team on the Chronograph, M36, in preparation for receipt of this equipment.
Two men each from the 41st Arty Gp and 52d Arty Gp attended the training
in Long Binh, 9 - 10 Oct 68.

(c) US Artillery Assistance and Support to RVNAF. The three programs
established previously to assist in improving artillery support of RVNAF
continued during the reporting period.

1. Assistance rendered ARVN artillery units through the Associate Battery
Program enabled increased coordination between ARVN/US batteries for mutual
defense and joint artillery missions in support of allied maneuver forces.

2. Training assistance was provided to CIDG artillerymen upon receipt
of a 105mm howitzer at each of the USSF CIDG Camps at Tieu Ater and Trang
Phuc. The 52d Arty Gp provided a contact team which conducted the training
and assisted in emplacing the howitzers. Of the 31 USSF/CIDG Camps in II CTZ,
27 Camps are sponsored by US Artillery units and seventeen now have organic
artillery.

3. US Artillery units completed the survey of RF/PF elements in respec-
tive areas of responsibility. Consolidation of the reports showed that over
90% of the RF/PF positions in II CTZ fall within the range fans of allied
artillery units. In addition to the training assistance in forward observer
procedures, US units are now working to improve the fire support for RF/PF
elements. Through US Advisors, the artillery units assist in communications
and fire support coordination. Emphasis in the program is being applied to maintaining the proficiency of RF/PF forward observers by conducting reaction tests and firing into defensive targets for RF/PF positions.

During the period, US artillery units began training Revolutionary Development Group personnel in forward observer procedures. A total of 135 RD personnel were given 10 - 14 hours of training by the I FFORCEV Artillery Forward Observer School.

(3) Other.

(a) Artillery Seminar. The second quarterly artillery seminar was hosted by 60, II Corps (US) on 8 Oct 68. Artillery commanders of RVN, AR and US forces at corps, division and group level with associated US artillery advisors attended the one-day conference. Among the topics presented and discussed were assistance and training provided for RF/PF, Collected Fire Support Coordination Center, Targeting Techniques and Ammunition Expenditure Trends. The topics presented stimulated discussion and subsequent action by the allied artillery organizations.

(b) Ammunition Expenditure Analysis. In Sep 68, an ammunition analysis section consisting of one officer, one NCO and two computer operators was established. The personnel perform all operations inherent in the ammunition analysis and ammunition programs. Basically, the section's functions include computer operations, general and detailed analysis of expenditures and expenditure trends, collection of ammunition and expenditure data, analysis of ammunition and expenditure data, since full implementation of the I FFORCEV Artillery ammunition analysis system in Jul 68, several favorable expenditure trends have developed. Analysis of overall expenditures viewed objectively in relation to enemy and friendly activity revealed a general reduction in total expenditures. At the same time, the percentage of expenditures in the confirmed and acquired target categories increased steadily and accounted for 55.3% of the total expenditures (91,226 tons) for Sep 68. The trends noted indicate that I FFORCEV artillery units are utilizing their artillery more effectively by emphasizing target acquisition, target analysis, and fire planning.

(c) In Oct 68, an artillery safety section was established consisting of one Major and one Captain. The section is responsible for investigation of artillery firing accidents involving all I FFORCEV artillery units. The section is also responsible for analyzing artillery accidents, defining trends in causes and publishing and disseminating lessons learned to US artillery units in II CTZ.

(d) The radar chronograph, N36, was issued to I FFORCEV artillery units on the basis of two per artillery group. During Oct 68, the chronograph's

5. See Incl no. 5
6. See Incl no. 6
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associated generator will not be received until Mar 69. The FADAC associated generator is being used during the interim period. The receipt of the chronograph will expedite calibration of artillery tubes throughout the II CTZ. Presently, USARV provides a contact team for this purpose.

(e) During the month of August the USARV calibration team visited I FFORCEV and 4th Inf Div artillery units. The number of tubes calibrated in each major unit was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>tubes calibrated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I FFORCEV Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div Arty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The team returned on 24 Oct to start calibration of the 22d ARVN Arty, with calibration of all ROK Artillery to follow. Highest priority for US Artillery are the new 8" howitzers of the 6th Bn, 32d Arty.

(f) The I FFORCEV Arty Command Inspection program continued during the reporting period. Units evaluated were: HHB, 41st Arty Gp (12 Aug 68); HHB 52d Arty Gp (26 Aug 68); 2d Bn 17th Arty (9 Aug 68); 4th Bn 60th Arty, Btry B 29th Arty (SLT), Btry E 41st Arty (MG) and BB 8th Bn 26th Arty (TAB) (7 Oct 68); 5th Bn 27th Arty (14 Oct 68); 6th Bn 32d Arty (28 Oct 68). All units inspected received a SATISFACTORY rating. I FFORCEV Arty was inspected by HQ, I FFORCEV on 11 Oct 68 and received a SATISFACTORY rating.

d. (U) Personnel

(1) Personnel strength of HQ & HQ Btry, I FFORCEV Arty on 31 October 68 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auth</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assg</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Currently, I FFORCEV Arty units are short artillery captains. In an attempt to offset this shortage, excess lieutenants have been assigned. Status of battery grade artillery officers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPTs (Arty)</th>
<th>LTs (Arty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auth - 157</td>
<td>Auth - 228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assg - 132</td>
<td>Assg - 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-23</td>
<td>+22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The shortage of Artillery captains has remained a problem for the past 6 months. By necessity, Artillery lieutenants are filling and will continue to fill captain's positions. The lack of tube artillery firing battery experience of newly assigned captains compounds this problem. Of the 115 replacement Artillery captains assigned since 1 Sep 67, 68% lacked tube artillery experience. The percentage of lieutenants lacking tube artillery experience is approximately the same. Consequently, extensive in-country training is required before those officers can be considered fully effective in a firing battery.

(3) Unlisted personnel status during this period indicates no improvement in several critical areas. The overall input did not offset the losses during this period. As of this date, overall strength for the command is 97% with seven battalions below 95% strength. The primary shortage is in 13B and 13E MOS, indicated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE/MOS</th>
<th>SHORTAGE</th>
<th>60 DAY PROJECTED SHORTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery NCO - 13B40</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery Operations and Intellignece NCO - 13E40</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery Crewman - 13A10</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) During the reporting period the following graduates from the NCO Academy, Fort Sill, have been assigned to units of I FFORCOT Arty.

13B40 21  
13E40 3  
17E40 6

(5) The following accidents were recorded during this period for I FFORCOT Arty units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-fatal</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following awards and decorations were processed for I FORCENV arty Units. The number of awards increased substantially over the last reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF AWARD</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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Morale and discipline continued to be excellent throughout the period.

2. (b) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.
   a. Personnel: NONE
   b. Operations.
(1) Collocated Fire Coordination Centers (FSCC)

(a) OBSERVATION. Collocation of representatives from allied nations with forces operating in a common area enables more efficient coordination of available fire support, targeting and obtaining tactical and political clearances for all maneuver forces.

(b) EVALUATION. Throughout the II CTZ, ARVN/US or ARVN/ROK/US forces operate in common areas. Usually each force has organic fire support which can be utilized by the other nation. Collocation of representatives from each of the nations enables all fire support within the area to be efficiently coordinated and effectively employed for the benefit of all forces. Clearances for fire are expedited and all friendly locations are kept current. In addition, intelligence reported by friendly forces, can be consolidated for utilization for target development.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That, where feasible, collocated FSCC be established for efficient fire support coordination.

(2) Targeting.

(a) OBSERVATION. The Fire Support Coordination Element’s targeting capability is enhanced greatly by the inclusion of G2 section personnel.

(b) EVALUATION. The inclusion of G2 section personnel in the FSCE provides qualified personnel to perform an important task associated with target development. In order to pass targets to the artillery, a considerable amount of intelligence information must be screened, posted and updated continuously. Acquired targets, in particular, require careful terrain analysis. ARC Light target recommendations are based primarily upon an evaluation of current intelligence. G2 personnel are familiar with intelligence procedures, the G2 data gathering system and intelligence data files. This knowledge enables these personnel to efficiently prepare target data, therefore expediting the development of targets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That G2 personnel be assigned directly to the FSCE.

(3) Artillery Warning Control Centers.

(a) OBSERVATION. The proper dissemination of artillery warnings to all aircraft is a matter of command interest.

(b) EVALUATION. Many aircraft of all services and nationalities may become involved in Vietnam-type conflicts. An extremely undesirable safety condition exists where the responsibility for the dissemination of information
and control of warnings is not coordinated by a single agency. A single agency can be established within a local area with the responsibility of providing artillery firing information to all aircraft. This responsibility must cross service and national chains of command if it is to be effective. Mutual agreement for establishment of air corridors and terminals must take place between local airfield commanders and ground force commanders in proximity to airfields. The establishing and coordinating authority for all warning agencies should be the ground commanders in the respective areas. In addition, all radio frequencies and call signs used must be unclassified and widely disseminated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That commanders establish, within their respective AOs, a single agency to provide artillery firing warnings to all aircraft.

c. Training. NONE
d. Intelligence. NONE
e. Logistics. NONE
f. Organization. NONE
g. Other. NONE

3. Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.


b. This Headquarters renders a negative report on escape, evasion and survival information or lessons learned not previously reported.

Richard Edward

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2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
3-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHAG-C-DST
4-CG, I FFORCEV, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT
1-File

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHC-DST, APO 96375

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy tires:
2 - AOGFOR, Da, Wash, D.C. 20310
1 - I FFORCEV Artillery
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery and concurs with the report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPTAGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ I FFV
HQ I FFV Arty
GPOP-DT (15 Nov 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 DEC 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Adj AG
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96350

AVFA-AT-C

SUBJECT: Improvement of Counterbattery Programs

30 August 1968

See Distribution

1. The success of any counterbattery program depends on detailed prior planning and rapid, aggressive execution. In order to achieve the goal of a timely and effective counterbattery program, a coordinated effort must exist between the maneuver unit and supporting artillery element. Without this association, the two basic ingredients of target acquisition and supporting fires cannot and will not be integrated to formulate a sound, workable counterbattery plan.

2. Some techniques for improving the acquisition of enemy mortar, rocket and recoilless rifle locations within the CTZ, have been tested, evaluated and reviewed by this headquarters. These techniques as well as suggested fires are contained herein.

3. Comments and/or recommendations to improve the production of counterbattery information and the effectiveness of counterbattery fires are encouraged and should be submitted to the S2, I FFORCEN Artillery, APO San Francisco 96350.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ Arthur B. Bushey Jr.

/\ Arthur B. BUSHEY JR.

Annex A - Counterbattery Target Acquisition

Annex B - Responsiveness and Effectiveness of CB Fires

A TRUE COPY

ROBERT J. LANDER
maj, Artillery
Asst S3, Tng

17
ANNEX A

COUNTERBATTERY TARGET ACQUISITION

Section I. General

1. This annex proffers methods to improve the quality, quantity and timeliness of Counterbattery Target Acquisition. It is pointed with equal emphasis to both the maneuver and supporting artillery elements. These methods should not be construed as all inclusive nor should they be deemed adequate or appropriate in all areas of operation.

Section II. Coordination of Target Acquisition

2. A tactical fire direction center (FDC) should be assigned responsibility for coordinating target acquisition and counterbattery fires for each base camp, Landing Zone (LZ), Fire Support Base (FSB), or Forward Operating Base (FOB). This tactical FDC may be at the installation defense center for large base camp complexes, or may be an artillery battery FDC for a small FSB. Regardless of the level at which found, a tactical FDC should be established and have the responsibility for the overall planning and execution of the counterbattery program. It should be the center of all counterbattery target acquisition information and have direct communications with all target acquisition and fire support means.

3. An installation defense wire and/or radio net should be established which ties observation posts with tactical fire control centers to reduce response times of target acquisition and fire support means to a minimum.

4. There should be coordination with maneuver units to periodically position patrols, ambushes and LRP's in the vicinity of likely firing positions. Aggressive offensive action keeps the enemy off balance and unable to make maximum use of his weapons.

5. There should be continuous coordination with the maneuver unit S2 to obtain any intelligence indications of stand-off attacks. Questions on mortar, rocket, cannon and recoilless rifle firing positions should be inserted into the maneuver units' EMR.
Annex A: Counterbattery Target Acquisition (Cont'd)

Section III. Target and Pattern Analysis

6. A daily analysis of the enemy stand-off attack threat should be made. This analysis should include likely mortar positions, rocket positions and areas from which flat trajectory weapons can be employed. The enemy often uses the same firing positions. Consequently, old firing positions should be included in this analysis. Along with possible firing positions, routes of withdrawal, likely assembly areas, and patterns from previous stand-off attacks should be analyzed. Since the enemy frequently takes refuge in friendly villages along routes of withdrawal, these possible sanctuaries should be pinpointed.

7. Based on a daily analysis of the threat, the counterbattery plan should be reevaluated. Locations of OP's and employment of countermortar radars (CMR) should be refined as appropriate.

8. An aggressive VR program in the area of likely firing positions is necessary. VR is probably most productive in locating firing positions if done at last light.

9. A crater analysis and fragment identification (Shellrep) should be made as soon as possible after all enemy artillery attacks.

10. All OP's should be equipped with a workable azimuth measuring device. Personnel manning OP's should be trained in the use of these devices and should have the communications to transmit measured azimuth directly to the tactical FDC. The tactical FDC should strive to get a three raw intersection on firing positions to improve the accuracy of these locations. When located adjacent to other units which have suitable OP's, artillery units should take the initiative to see that these OP's are furnished with azimuth measuring devices and assist as necessary in training personnel in their use.

Section IV. Countermortar Radar

11. The daily analysis of the stand-off threat should be used to refine the primary and secondary sectors of the CMR. Information on other likely firing areas should also be given the CMR.

12. The CMR should be free to scan these likely firing areas if scanning the primary and secondary sectors proves unproductive during a mortar attack.
Annex A: Counterbattery Target Acquisition (Cont'd)

13. CMR crews must use initiative in obtaining the direction of incoming mortar rounds. A man outside the command bunker could aid in spotting the mortar position by orienting on the flash.

14. If incoming mortar rounds do not impact relatively close to the unit, the crew will probably not know that the area is under mortar attack due to generator noise and sound/distance factors. Therefore, the technical FDC must notify the CMR immediately when an attack begins. In addition, the FDC, if possible, should plot the location of enemy weapons, determine an azimuth from the Radar site to these weapons and pass this azimuth to the radar section so it may refine its sector of scan. This is particularly critical with the Q-10 CMR which cannot stay in a scanning mode for over 20 minutes at a time without damage to the azimuth drive motors. The Q-10 CMR should stay at full power when not scanning so they can begin scanning immediately when notified by the tactical FDC that an attack is underway.

Section V. Counterrocket

15. Since the 122mm rocket has normally been employed at or near its maximum range (8000-11000 meters), possible rocket firing positions fall into a belt around the defended area. A detailed terrain analysis of this belt should be made with assistance from appropriate engineer elements to isolate staging areas, likely infiltration and withdrawal routes, and likely firing positions. This analysis should be updated to reflect physical changes in the area and the tactical situation. OP's should have this information on likely firing positions so that they can search these areas in the event of a rocket attack.

16. Aerial observers should be especially alert for "I" shaped trenches and AA positions in this rocket belt. Both are good indications of rocket firing positions. The last light VR should produce the best results.

17. Previously used rocket positions are frequently used again and should be included in last-light VR and night patrolling and ambushes.
Annex B: Responsiveness and Effectiveness of Counterbattery Fires (Cont'd)

and Spooky should be integrated with artillery into a coverage of the target area and routes of withdrawal from that area. Caution should be exercised in any arbitrary plan of blocking fires since VC/NVA forces have been known to have often sought sanctuary in friendly villages along withdrawal routes until blocking fires are completed. Direct observation or a plan of random blocking fires will help to defeat this tactic.

9. Sweeps of the target area should be conducted as soon as practical to determine the accuracy and effectiveness of counterbattery fires.
ANNEX B

RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTERBATTERY FIRES

Section I. General

1. Based in the daily analysis of the threat, counterbattery fires and groups of fires should be planned on likely firing positions, routes of withdrawal and possible assembly areas. This target information should be disseminated to all fire support means. These fires must be planned in detail and rehearsed thoroughly down to the lowest level. Practice reaction tests using suitable indicators to simulate the enemy position should be conducted. When ever possible, prior clearance to fire into these areas should be obtained as soon as possible. Once the counterbattery plan has been made, available fire support means must be allocated for the execution of the plan. Fire support means from other LZ's, FSB's or base camps that are within range should be integrated into the plan.

2. In order to make the enemy cease firing and cover up, a prearranged counterbattery program should be planned for immediate execution in the event of an attack. Guns should be laid on the firing data for these targets when not engaged in other missions and the ammunition prepared, so that firing can begin immediately upon a prearranged signal. One method of allocating fire support is to divide the area into several sectors. A firing element (size depending on the fire support available) is then given primary responsibility for a sector and secondary responsibility for the two sectors adjacent to their primary sector. Technical FSC's should prepare firing data for all counterbattery targets in their primary and secondary sectors: this data should be updated with each metro message, and pieces should be laid on primary counterbattery targets if not engaged in other missions. If sectors are used and the direction to the enemy weapons is known, only fire into one or two sectors can be called for. The method of fire will normally be zone fire so that a large area can be covered. Fuse action depends upon the actual or contemplated disposition of enemy personnel. Against personnel standing in the open, level terrain, point-detonating (PD) fuses are more effective than VT fuses. However, against personnel prone in the open, level terrain, VT fuses are more effective than DD fuses. In both cases, "Firecracker" ammunition is more effective. If enough artillery is available, some batteries can be held out of this prearranged program so that they are ready to fire on acquired targets.

3. When the enemy is located, fire support means should be shifted to this area, using prearranged counterbattery targets if possible. Gunships
Annex B: Responsiveness and Effectiveness of Counterbattery Fires (Cont'd)

and Spooky should be integrated with artillery into a coverage of the target area and routes of withdrawal from that area. Caution should be exercised in any arbitrary plan of blocking fires since VC/NVA forces have been known to have often sought sanctuary in friendly villages along withdrawal routes until blocking fires are completed. Direct observation or a plan of random blocking fires will help to defeat this tactic.

9. Sweeps of the target area should be conducted as soon as practical to determine the accuracy and effectiveness of counterbattery fires.
1. (U) This program is not established throughout the II CF at this time. The concept of Collocated FSCC was presented to Senior Allied Artillery Commanders during the second Artillery Seminar on 8 October 1968. CG, IFFORDEV Artillery presented the concept during the Seventh Senior Allied Commander's Conference on 15 October 1968.

2. (C) A Collocated ARVN/US FSCC was established at LZ Betty (N800065) near Phan Thiet, Binh Thuan Province in late August 1968 for the purpose of coordinating all available fire support means with ARVN/US maneuver units operating in the area.

   a. Free World maneuver elements located in Binh Thuan Province include three battalions of the 44th ARVN Regiment, the US 3d Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry, and the following paramilitary forces: 41 Regional Force (RF) companies, 177 Popular Force (PF) platoons, and 17 Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre elements.

   b. Free World fire support means available in Binh Thuan Province area was as follows:

      1. US Artillery
         B 5/27th Arty (6-105mm How)
         D 2/320th Arty (5-105mm How)
         C 5/22d Arty (2-8" How, 2-175mm Gun)

      2. ARVN Artillery
         2-231 Arty (2-105mm How) normally controlled by Province.
         3-231 Arty (2-105mm How) sometimes released to 44th ARVN Rgt.
         1-B-39 Arty (2-105mm How) 23d ARVN Div control.

      3. US Destroyer - usually one.
      4. US Gunships - usually four.

      5. Tactical Air - as allocated by II DASC (ARVN) and DASC-A (US).

3. Prior to mid-Aug 68, coordination of the available fire support in this area was not effective. There was little or no coordination between US and
ARVN Artillery during fire missions and massing fires was not conducted. Several fire support agencies in different locations did not have communications with each other. There was little coordination of the intelligence effort in developing targets. In order to efficiently coordinate the available fire support, a collocated ARVN/US FSCC was formed.

a. Staff Organization of Collocated FSCC.

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b. The ARVN and US Artillery units listed in paragraph 2b were under the operational control of the Collocated ARVN/US Artillery Element. The FSCC had direct communications with ARVN and US liaison officers at Province Headquarters; ARVN and US liaison officers at the 44th ARVN Regt and a US liaison officer at the US 3d Bn, 506th Inf. The FSCC coordinated the fires of gunsites, TAG air and the destroyer.

4. Although the procedures established in this FSCC are not new, the significant aspect is the formation of a FSCC with ARVN and US representation. The collocated FSCC has expedited tactical and political clearance of fire, increased the efficiency of massing ARVN and US Artillery fires, facilitated support for RF/FP, and greatly improved the development and processing of targets.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS I FIELD FORCE VIETNAMESE ARMY
APO San Francisco 96350

AVFA-AT-D

SUBJECT: Artillery Accident - Lessons Learned

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. Contained herein is a case summary of an artillery accident which occurred in the II Corps Tactical Zone. There were several factors which contributed to this accident. Several factors are included:

   a. The accident occurred when rounds fired by the battery impacted on an intermediate crest that was occupied by friendly troops. One US soldier was killed and another was wounded.

   b. The firing battery involved in the accident had been in the area of operations (AO) approximately three days. Upon entering the AO, responsible personnel from the battery were given an orientation; however, they were not provided with overlays, unit locations, locations of occupied villages or a countermortar/defensive target list. Situational maps were made "available" but were not issued to the unit.

   c. The battery had been in position for three days and had registered with only one charge. Registrations required social shares and were dependent upon favorable weather and the availability of aircraft. The fire mission causing the casualties was fired with one registration.

   d. The battery's fires were not directed at the support battalion in the area. All unit locations, firing grid references, and fire missions were passed from the direct support battalion to an intermediate heavy battalion to the parent medium battalion and subsequently to the medium battery. This method of passing the necessary information and fire requests was unwieldy and was one of two principal causes of the accident.

   e. Another principal cause of the accident was the failure of the battery Fire Direction Officer, as well as others, to comply with existing orders, SOPs and doctrine concerning this type of mission. Of particular importance, the FDO failed to consider the intermediate crest and failed to use the appropriate charge that would hit the target.

   f. There were friendly troops located within 30 meters of the gun target line along the last one third of the trajectory of the missile causing the casualties. This was in direct contravention to the existing SOP governing artillery fire for the area and was not questioned by any of several elements involved in clearance and processing of fire requests.
SUBJECT: Artillery Accident - Lessons Learned

2. To preclude similar occurrences in the future, the following actions are recommended:

a. The organisation for combat should provide simple and direct lines of fire control with a minimum number of intervening headquarters.

b. That increased emphasis be placed on adherence to applicable SOPs.

c. That all units be thoroughly indoctrinated upon entering unfamiliar AOs. Indoctrination should include checklists of pertinent information, SOPs, copies of situation maps, packets of overlays, unit locations, locations of occupied fire bases and villages, and current target lists to assist the unit in becoming fully operational without undue loss of time. These items should be available in sufficient copies to provide each element with necessary data. If possible, a representative of the controlling artillery unit should remain with the newly arrived unit a sufficient period of time to ensure a complete understanding of artillery procedures peculiar to the AO.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

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CC, 3/506 Inf
CC, 5/27 Arty
CC, 6/32 Arty
CC, 4/60 Arty
G3, IFORCEV
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

CG, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery

15 November 1968

29

684156

N/A

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT UT # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.
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