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WHERE WE STAND
A STUDY OF INTEGRATION
IN THE U. S. ARMED FORCES

Bruce E. Prum
1964

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IN THE U. S. ARMED FORCES

Bruce E. Prum
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A STUDY OF INTEGRATION
IN THE U. S. ARMED FORCES

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

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IN
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A STUDY OF INTEGRATION

OF THE U. S. ARMED FORCES

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Bruce E. Prum

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ABSTRACT

In the past decade the eye of the Nation has been focused on the issue of racial equality as in no other time in our national history. All of our social institutions have felt the impact of the Negroes' struggle for equality and acceptance. The Armed Forces have been profoundly affected by this struggle, in fact, have been thrust into a position of leadership in the movement to erase social barriers based on race. This paper is dedicated to an exploration of the roots of racial discrimination and prejudice to arrive at a better understanding of the myth of racial inequality. It examines the role the Negro has played in our Armed Forces in the past, discusses the integration breakthrough following World War II, and the extent of Negro participation in the Armed Forces today. The paper concludes with several recommendations to ameliorate the effect of discrimination, where it still exists, and to enrich in-service opportunity for the Negro serviceman.
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INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, the eye of the Nation has been focused on the issue of racial equality as in no other time in our national history. In these ten years, the conscience of the American people has been awakened to an awareness of the place of the Negro in American society as in no other period since the "Emancipation Proclamation". All of our social institutions have felt the impact of the Negroes' fight for equality and acceptance - a fight which has left its imprint on the minds of men and women everywhere.

The Armed Forces have been profoundly affected by this struggle. In fact, the Armed Forces have been - and are still - leaders in the movement to erase social barriers based on racial differences.

Over fifteen years ago, the President of the United States, as Commander-in-Chief, decreed an end to racial segregation in the Armed Forces\(^1\), and thus the responsibility for leading the nation to complete racial integration passed to our military leaders. Ordinarily, from an official standpoint, whatever views a military officer may hold on social, political, and religious as well as racial matters are considered irrelevant to the conduct of his duties. But this unique Executive Order of July, 1948, quickly made the purity of every officer's conscience and motives a matter of professional military concern.

Whether or not the individual officer may like the role he must play in the cause, he is officially responsible for examining his own views, and for ensuring that he never officially practices, permits or

CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING RACIAL PREJUDICE

The mind of man is the home of prejudice. Prejudice, bias and hostility are as natural and normal to the human personality as the desire to succeed or the desire to be liked. When under the control of the mind they inhabit, normal biases or attitudes, and ordinary prejudices and hostilities are mechanisms that assist men to adjust to their environment. When under the impact of unusual frustration, normal biases and ordinary prejudices are distorted into excesses that lead to primitive reasoning and irrational behavior. It is these irrational emotions of normal predilections that this chapter will endeavor to explain.

The word "prejudice" has a variety of meanings. To one writer, prejudice is a "rigid, inflexible exaggerated attitude in a closed mind". Gordon W. Allport explains that the word, like most words in our language, has changed meaning with the times. He explains that to the ancient the word meant a judgment based on previous experience. Later, the word acquired a meaning of a judgment formed before due examination and consideration of facts. Finally, the word acquired an emotional overtone of favorableness or unfavorableness which accompanies an unsupported value judgment. The final meaning of the word admits to both a favorable or positive prejudice and an unfavorable or negative


prejudice. We are concerned here with the more accepted use of the word in the negative or anti-sense. The word, as used in this paper, means, as Allport defines it: "a pattern of hostility which is directed against an entire group, or against an individual member of a group".  

Most authorities on race relations and racial prejudice agree that prejudice unexpressed, kept to oneself, not acted out, does no particular social harm, except perhaps to the mind of the individual beset with the prejudice. However, it is not difficult to imagine that when prejudice exists in a mind, somehow and somewhere it will be manifested in hostile action. The hostility may be expressed verbally or may be demonstrated in a more violent way. It is widely recognized that there is a hierarchy of prejudice stemming from idle chatter to violence of the most brutal nature.

We have all been guilty at one time or another of expressing our prejudices to friends or even occasionally to a stranger. Many of us never move beyond this stage of prejudice, but it is the bottom rung of the ladder. The more intense the prejudice, or the greater the frustration experienced, the more likely open discrimination will be found. Discrimination is an act of exclusion; in effect, segregation. Finally, if there is the right combination of ignorance, frustration and public acceptance, then full-fledged persecution can erupt. As a responsible, democratic nation, we can ill afford the social tensions created by racial prejudice.

3Ibid. p.12


5ABC's of Scapegoating op. cit. p.125
Our next step might logically be to ask how racial prejudice forms in the individual. First, we must accept the premise that prejudice — racial prejudice or any other kind — is not an inherited characteristic. There is sufficient genetic proof of this. Attitudes, beliefs and prejudices are rather the products of the culture in which the individual is reared. A white child recognizes that he is different from a Negro child only because of the color of his skin. He has no reason to fear, to resent or reject the Negro child. More than likely, he will be attracted to the Negro child because of the difference in the color of his skin. Racial prejudice, then, is a learned process, communicated, transmitted, consciously or unconsciously, from one individual to another, and/or from parent to child.

Herbert Blumer suggests that racial prejudice always exists as a group prejudice. In other words, racial prejudice is a shared attitude, an attitude held by people who reinforce one another in expressing it. Attitudes concerning racial differences may be transmitted and reinforced in the adult or in the child in a variety of ways, some crude, others more subtle and seemingly innocent. It is obvious that a child exposed to language vilifying the Negro will form an impression of the Negro as an individual who is undesirable, or at the very least untrustworthy. The same impression may be formed in the mind of a child who overhears his parents discussing their fear that real estate values will fall if Negroes move into their neighborhood. The parents' fear is transmitted to the child; he senses the appearance of a threat to

his parents' property and perhaps to their financial stability. The result is an impression of the Negro as a threat, therefore, to the child himself. The Negro thus becomes a being to be feared, to be scorned, to be avoided. In both cases, we have a young mind, otherwise innocent, prepared for accepting the basest kind of racist propaganda.

Olive Westbrook Quinn writes directly to this point in an article that appeared in Social Forces in 1954. In exhaustive interviews with young white college students in the South she recognized a pattern of communication of racial attitudes common to the respectable, educated middle class society of the South.

The Quinn study reveals that racial attitudes are most typically transmitted indirectly rather than directly from parent to child. Parents permit children to overhear adult conversation which aids in the formation of a stereotype of the Negro in the mind of the child.

One young woman interviewed for the study, for instance, reported in reference to a Negro cook that had been employed in her home:

I always knew Alma lived with men. It's funny, I never heard much talk about the morals of white people; it came as a decided shock that white people are often sexually immoral, but I have always known - or nearly always - that colored people are not hampered by morals. I never heard any tales of sexual immorality involving white people until I was considered grown.

Another indirect means by which a racial attitude may be transmitted to children is, surprisingly enough, through prohibitions against making disparaging remarks about Negroes or abusing them as servants.

Such instructions make the myth of Negro inferiority a fact in the mind of a child. Another interviewee reported that his mother told him:

Servants should be well cared for, and they should be treated with consideration. We should always be considerate of their feelings; they are human beings. I was always expected to obey my nurse, and I was not allowed to abuse her.

You know, I think from the fact that I was told so often that I must treat colored people with consideration, I got the idea that I could mistreat them if I wanted to.

The indirect transmission of racial attitudes is no less effective a device for forming the mind of child than are direct verbal instructions. It matters not whether a child is told that Negro men are not to be addressed as "mister", or that Negro women are not referred to as "ladies", or whether we allow the child to overhear an opinion about the Negro's right to vote or hold public office. In either case the bias is communicated to the child. In his eagerness to please the parent, the bias is adopted as his own. A racial attitude has been formed, wholly irrationally, which may be held throughout a lifetime. If racial prejudice is a group attitude, then the group will reinforce the attitude of the child through adolescence into adulthood. The result may well be an otherwise well-educated, intelligent individual plagued by a cancerous racial prejudice.

How can we explain racial prejudice among people who have relatively little or no contact with Negroes? Gordon Allport has developed an all-embracing sixfold approach to this problem. He has synthesized the work of many theorists in the field and has concluded that racial prejudice must be viewed as a function of history; in terms of social,
psychological and phenomenological forces in our society; and within the framework of situational emphasis, and the earned reputation of the subordinated race.\footnote{Allport, op. cit. p.200}

The United States has a long history of racial prejudice the roots of which are found in the institution of slavery. The Civil War and the dismal failure of the Reconstruction Period intensified that prejudice. British Imperialism in the 19th Century created the myth of "the white man's burden" providing the rationalization for continuing discrimination against the Negro even after the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to our own Constitution. Persecution of minority groups is an historical fact in this country; Quakers, Mormons, Jews, Italians, Irishmen, Eastern Europeans -- all in their turn have been targets for unreasoned prejudice.

Dr. Allport's work also reveals the ways in which modern American culture has imposed upon us certain values which inevitably breed prejudice and conflict. In this country we are experiencing a growing need to conform. Conformity in many instances is our ticket of admission to the group of which we wish to become a member. If racial prejudice is the shared attitude of that in-group, too often we embrace, unthinking, the group attitude as a personal attitude. This is an oversimplification of a complex psychic phenomenon, but it will serve to illustrate one psychodynamic factor at work in our society today which fosters racial prejudice.

The rapid urbanization of America in the past thirty years has contributed its full share to continuing racial prejudice. Urbanization
has led to greater insecurity among city dwellers and ever-increasing competition for jobs, for better housing, for personal status. One of the concomittants of this competition is contempt for those who may be less successful. Regardless of where an individual is placed in this stratified society, there is generally someone below him on the scale. At the bottom, is the American Negro. His existence threatens the economic life of those just above him, therefore he is detested and feared by this group. His existence embarrasses the well-to-do because they know they should be acting to alleviate his miserable condition; yet they dare not because it is not the conventional thing to do. Therefore, the Negro is detested and feared by this group, too, because he makes it feel guilty and, what is even worse, frustrated.

Urbanization, economic competition, fear, conformity, anxiety, guilt and frustration are the sociological, psychological and phenomenological streets in which racial prejudice walks. Every honest adult will acknowledge experiencing one or more of these forces at work in him at some time in his life and of having subsequently projected his fear, his guilt, or his insecurity on an innocent party. This projection may take numerous forms: blaming "the Jewish bankers" for a stock market loss; reviling all of the Negroes in New York City after being jostled in a subway by an innocent Negro, equally fatigued after a full day's work; or cursing all Puerto Ricans because of clumsy service received from a single Puerto Rican waiter. Eventually, the

\[10\] Allport, op. cit., p. 212
projection of our irrational emotions in a scattered pattern will lead to focusing on an individual or group we can safely detest. What group may be most safely detested? A minority group. And what minority group may be most safely detested? The Jews have had their innings. The Negro, then. And racial prejudice is away at a gallop.

It is time to turn to the image of the Negro which has been created by racial prejudice. It is this image which is responsible for continuing discrimination and segregation. And it is this image that is responsible for so much of the present racial unrest. The distinguished Negro journalist Louis Lomax says: "Few white people have more than a headline acquaintance with the Negro, and even white liberals share the general white population's total ignorance of Negro history." 11

For the most part, the American Negro as he exists in the minds of too many Americans is a work of fiction.

There are so few whites who have daily or even frequent contact with Negroes it is only natural that the majority form an impression of the Negro from outside stimuli. The mass news media provide the greatest source of information; but fiction, films, and television all contribute to the popular Negro image. As a result of the combined energies of these media, the great majority of people in the nation accept a false stereotype as the real Negro. Distinguished Negroes who have contributed something of value to the arts, or science or the humanities are too frequently dismissed as freakish exceptions to the

rule. The white majority wants to believe in the stereotype and the distinguished or accomplished Negro disturbs this illusion.

The white majority has been willing to accept this image of the Negro because it justifies prejudice and provides a rationalization for it. Thirty years ago, Kimball Young surveyed popular beliefs concerning the Negro, which are arrayed here: 12

inferior mentality
primitive morality
emotional instability
over-assertiveness
lazy and bolisterous
religious fanaticism
fondness for gambling
gaudy and flashy in dress
close to anthropoid ancestors
given to crimes of violence
occupationally unstable

One can recognize in this list beliefs widely held among the white majority concerning the American Negro today.

A regrettable and ironic aspect of the existence of these beliefs is that they are sustained, and continually revived and presented anew by our media of mass communication. The press, radio, television, contemporary fiction and the theatre frequently project the image of the Negro as an inferior being. Recently, we have begun to see a change in attitude toward the treatment of the Negro in films and in television. This has largely been the result of political, social and economic pressure upon these media by civil rights groups. The Government has been loathe to interfere in the freedom of expression allowed the media, but supports the more honest treatment of the Negro which is the goal of

civil rights groups. However, our media of mass communications are, in
general, guilty of depicting the Negro as most whites imagine him to be
and not as he actually is.

The Negro, to many minds, is a character out of a movie, or perhaps
a character in a novel or play, he is not real. Textbooks ignore the
Negro's contribution to American society, while perpetuating a negative
 stereotype of the Negro. 13 There is a common tendency among newspapers
to concentrate on race-labeling crime news and overlooking achievement.
Newspapers may argue that saying, "William Smith, a Negro, was sentenced
to five years in jail for burglary," can be justified on the grounds
that it helps the reader form a mental image, and gives a considerable
amount of information in a small space. Yet to associate the Negro with
crime, which is so frequently done, is bound to have a lasting effect
upon the reader. The negative stereotype is reinforced, and racial
prejudice is reinforced.

While all Negroes do not resemble "Amos 'n' Andy" or the character
of Uncle Tom, neither do they all have the stature or potential bril-
liance of a Marian Anderson, Ralph Bunche or Thurgood Marshall. But it
is every Negro's basic right to be thought of as an individual, a feel-
ing, thinking human being possessed of all the dignity and frailty of
other men of lighter color. The Negro's search for self-identity is no
less a reality than the white man's. In truth, the Negro has a far

13 American Council on Education; Committee on the Study of Teach-
ing Materials in Intergroup Relations (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1949).
more difficult struggle to recognize self. And in a large measure, he has been denied self-identification through the white majority's ready acceptance of the Negro stereotype as a substitute for the real picture.

The American Negro today lives in a chronic state of frustrated outrage. Daily, he faces economic, social and psychological insecurity. The Negro enjoys more freedom, more legally ensured civil rights, but has less security than at any time in history. The Negro lives in a society where the most menial jobs are reserved to him, where he is the first man to be laid off in bad times. He is constantly being rejected by the white majority. If by virtue of ability or special aptitude he achieves some measure of acceptability by whites he is rejected by his fellow Negroes. Economic insecurity and the impotent fury brought on by social rejection leave the Negro psychologically bankrupt.

If the Negro's position in our society is to be improved, then the white majority must first recognize that the Negro has a right to be outraged. As America's social and economic underling, the Negro can glean no evidence from past history which will provide hope for greater security in the future. Neither does the past yield him any glimmer of hope for greater social acceptance in the future. Robbed of economic and social security for himself and his family, the Negro will inevitably seek some outlet for his anxiety. If he attempts self-assertion through participation in civil rights demonstrations, such as those which have occurred recently throughout the nation, then his behavior is interpreted by the white majority as rebellion. Yet, this self-asserting behavior has purpose for the individual Negro, since it provides him with a political and social identity which he would not otherwise have and an avenue through which he can direct understandable outrage.
The Negro, at the same time, must learn that his greatest opportunity for equality is based in working in concert with society at large. He cannot hope to seek advancement of his welfare and growth at the expense of his fellow men. The Negro must be willing and ready to accept the proposition that while democracy demands that he be allowed to develop his personality and well being without artificial barriers, this development must not violate the safety and reasonable rights of others. Moral conflicts, and surely our racial problem is such, must be solved through patience and understanding, not through violence. Action, tempered with patience and understanding, on the part of both Negroes and whites holds forth the greatest hope for racial equality and individual dignity.

The Armed Forces of the United States will play a leading role in gaining equality and dignity for the American Negro. Without dramatic pronouncements and without disturbing the social order, the services have already made significant strides toward equality of opportunity for all regardless of race. The following chapters will discuss the progress the Negro has made as a member of the Armed Forces.
CHAPTER II
THE SEGREGATED SERVICEMAN
1775-1945

In the preface to his excellent history of the Negro in the American Revolution, Benjamin Quarles writes:

In the Revolutionary War the American Negro was a participant and a symbol. --- On the American side the Negro saw only limited service until the war dragged on into its third year. This negative attitude toward enlisting the colored man sprang from a reluctance to deprive a master of his apprenticed servant or chattel slave, and from the fear of putting guns in the hands of a class of people most of whom were not free. In the main, the Negro was thought of as a servile laborer rather than as a potential warrior. But when manpower need became acute, hesitancies and fears were put into the background and the Negro was mustered in.

Ironically this procedure typified an attitude toward the enlistment of Negroes that prevailed in all our subsequent wars and through the years until mid-Twentieth Century. The Negro has been bypassed in the early stages of any conflict, but as the war placed an ever heavier strain on resources military commanders and civil authorities have turned to the one remaining manpower source, the Negro. When the nation has been in extremes, the status of the Negro has changed from that of a rejected inferior to one of comrade-in-arms. This irrational procedure has resulted in an enormous waste of manpower.

There is clear evidence that Negroes served widely in the nation's earliest fighting forces. They served in the French and Indian Wars, and when General Washington took command of the Continental Army,

Negroes were already in the ranks of the state militias which constituted that Army. The Revolutionary Navy had even a larger proportion of Negroes than the Army, moreover, "Negro pilots because of their intimate knowledge of coastal waters were much in demand - - ." 2

The evidence is just as clear that although the Negro has served in our Armed Services since Colonial days, he has had to struggle for the right to serve. Our Colonial forefathers were practical men; the general policy in Colonial America was to exclude the Negro from militia service, but the reluctance to give the Negro a gun was often overcome by the practical consideration of manpower requirements. Despite the policy of exclusion, therefore, Negroes were in the ranks as early as 1755. 3

Crispus Attucks, an obscure mulatto, was the first person to die in the Boston Massacre of March, 1770. As the crisis with the British deepened in the spring of 1775, many Negroes presented themselves for service with the militias and were accepted. Negroes fought at Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill. A freedman named Salem Poor so distinguished himself at Bunker Hill that his officers wrote "that a Negro called Salem Poor, of Col. Frye's regiment, Cap't Ames' company, in the late Battle at Charlestown, behaved like an experience officer, as well as an excellent soldier. We beg leave to say, in the person of


3Quarles, op. cit., p.9
this said negro centers a brave and gallant soldier. The reward due
to so great and distinguished a character, we submit to Congress. 4

Yet, despite such a record, a pattern of excluding Negroes from
the Continental Army developed within months after Lexington and Concord.
By the end of the year 1775, only free Negroes already serving in the
Continental Army were allowed to reenlist. The Continental Congress in
eyearly 1776 prohibited the further enlistment of Negroes, and slaves
were expressly excluded from military service. Individual states soon
adopted similar exclusion policies. 5

The employment of Negroes in the ships of the Continental Navy and
the state navies were inevitable. The presence of Negro sailors was
easily accepted because there was nothing novel about it, American
ships having carried Negro crewmen for many years. The ships of the
infant navy were chronically short of seamen, so American naval officers
showed no reluctance to make use of Negro sailors. The tradition of
employing Negro seamen in the Navy was carried over from the Revolution-
aly War to the War of 1812, at which time Negroes comprised approximately
one-sixth of the naval personnel and were to be found aboard American
naval vessels in all ratings. 6

A remarkable fact in history is that Negroes were well integrated
in ships' companies during the years the fledgling U. S. Navy defied

4 Ibid. p.11
5 Ibid. p.16-18
6 Dennis Nelson, Integration of the Negro in the United States
the mighty Royal Navy. Nelson quotes from Alexander MacKenzie's "Life of Perry":

In 1816, I was surgeon of the Java under Commodore Perry. The white and Negro seamen messed together. About one in six or eight were Negroes.

In 1819 I was surgeon of the Guerriere under Commodore MacDonough, and the proportion of blacks was about the same in her crew. There seemed to have been an entire absence of prejudice against the blacks as shipmates among the crew. What I have said applies to the crews of the other ships that sailed in squadrons upon this Lake.

Commodore Perry was hard pressed for officers and men in the battles on Lake Erie. He complained bitterly to his superiors that a group of replacements were, "a motley set - blacks, soldiers and boys".

Commodore Isaac Chauncey, his superior, replied in a sharply worded letter that expressed the attitude of the Navy toward the use of Negroes. Chauncey wrote:

I regret that you are not pleased with the men sent you, for to my knowledge a part of them are not surpassed by any men we have in the Fleet; and I have yet to learn that the color of the skin, or the cut and trimmings of the coat, can affect a man's qualifications or usefulness.

In the land phase of the war this attitude did not necessarily prevail. Andrew Jackson in 1814, in the defense of New Orleans, appealed to the free Negroes of the city to help defend against the British. Jackson wrote in an appeal to the "Free Coloured Inhabitants of Louisiana, through a mistaken policy you have heretofore been deprived


of participation in the glorious struggle for national rights in which our country is engaged. This no longer exists."

To the Governor of Louisiana, Jackson wrote that the Negroes "must be either for us or against us: mistrust them and you make them your enemies; place confidence in them and you engage them by every dear and honorable tie to the interest of the country."

More than six hundred free Negroes responded to Jackson's plea and volunteered to fight the British.

During the Civil War, the same reluctance to employ Negroes as fighting men was encountered; Negro volunteers in the North were turned away. As the rebellion continued on into 1862, and enlistments began to expire in the hastily assembled regiments of the Union Forces, the official view changed. Despite the objections of white soldiers from the cities and from border states, Congress authorized the enlistment of slaves of Rebel owners in July, 1862. The disillusioning performance of the Union Armies in the field had almost dried up regular enlistments to the services. Opposition to the Conscription Act of 1863, which erupted in violent riots, contributed to the military expediency of enlisting Negroes.

The Emancipation Proclamation in January, 1863, opened the floodgates for the Negro and they were recruited in both the North and South. The Negro journalist Frederick Douglass appealed to his fellows:

9 Henry C. Baird, George Washington and Andrew Jackson on Negro Soldiers, (Philadelphia, 1863)

Men of Color, to Arms! This is our golden opportunity. Let us accept it and forever wipe out the dark reproaches hurled against us by our enemies.

In a letter to President Lincoln, General Grant wrote: "By arming the Negro we have added a powerful ally. They make good fighters, and taking them from the enemy weakens him in the same proportion they strengthen us. I am therefore in favor of pushing this policy to the enlistment of a force sufficient to hold all the South falling into our hands and to aid in capturing more."12

Thus, despite bitter sentiment against the use of Negroes in the North and South, more than 180,000 such Americans enlisted in the Union Armies.

A large number of Negroes served as well in the U. S. Navy during the Civil War. The Navy Department as early as September, 1861, authorized flag officers commanding the various naval squadrons to enlist "contrabands when their services can be made useful under the same forms and regulations applying to other enlistments, and that they should be entitled as Boys at a compensation of ten dollars per month and one ration per day."13

A Negro seaman, Robert Smalls, is credited with having delivered the Confederate transport "Planter", of which he was the pilot, into the hands of the Union fleet blockading the port of Charleston. At the

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11 Ibid. p.25


13 Nelson, op. cit., p.18
time the "Kearsage" engaged the Confederate raider "Alabama", there were at least 15 Negro enlisted men in various ratings in the crew.  

Negroes served the Navy well during and after the Civil War, many with conspicuous gallantry and zeal. The Navy had no defined policy of segregation and throughout the post-Civil War period enlisted Negroes to the ranks on a fully integrated basis. On the other hand, the Army was reorganized after the Civil War. The Congress provided for four permanent all-Negro regiments which became the 9th and 10th Cavalry organized in 1866, and the 24th and 25th Infantry organized in 1868 and 1869 respectively. These regiments, with few exceptions, were staffed with white officers, some of whom, like General John J. Pershing, were later to become famous.

Between wars, the 9th and 10th Cavalry fought extensive Indian campaign along our expanding Western frontiers. The four Negro regiments saw duty alongside white regiments in Cuba during the Spanish-American War in 1898. General Pershing, then a lieutenant with the 10th Cavalry, wrote that the 10th, "charged up the hill, opened a disastrous enfilading fire upon the Spanish right, thus relieving ---" Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders. The correspondent for the Washington Post filed his story, "that if it had not been for the Negro cavalry, the Rough Riders would have been exterminated."  


15 Nichols, *op. cit.*, p.29
During the Spanish-American War the Navy continued to enlist Negroes on an integrated basis, although they were confined to enlisted status. Negro enlisted men served in ships of the Navy before Santiago, Cuba, and in Dewey’s squadron that defeated the Spanish at Manila. John Henry Turpin, a Negro mess attendant, was a survivor of the U.S.S. Maine disaster at Havana in 1898. Turpin served for many years in many ships of the Navy. Turpin entered the naval service as an Apprentice Boy in 1883 and retired, for the first time, as a first class gunner’s mate in 1915. He was recalled in 1917 and served in the USS Marblehead as a Chief Gunner’s Mate. He finally retired in 1938, a legend in his time among the officers and men who served with him.  

The history of the Negro serviceman fell to its nadir during the first two decades of the Twentieth Century. By the time of World War I, racial tensions in the nation had become more acute. There was widespread bitterness toward Negro troops. In 1906 Negro infantrymen of the 25th Infantry Regiment were responsible for a wild shooting spree in Brownsville, Texas, killing several innocent people. President Theodore Roosevelt ordered three entire companies of the regiment dishonorably discharged after a two-year investigation failed to disclose the identity of the rioters. In mid-1917 Negro soldiers embittered by the insults of white citizens of Houston, Texas, shot up the city, killing seventeen people. Thirteen Negroes who were implicated were hanged, and forty-one others were sentenced to life imprisonment.  

16 Nelson, op. cit., p.24  
17 Nichols, op. cit., p.31-32
In World War I nearly 400,000 Negroes were in the U.S. Army. About half of them were sent to France; most served in labor battalions or were employed in menial jobs. Gunnar Myrdal in his masterful work on the tragedy of racial discrimination, "An American Dilemma", writes, "Negroes wanted to fight in this war too! And they were sorely needed! Eventually four hundred thousand were drafted, but they soon found themselves segregated in labor camps or employed in servile capacities. They met discrimination and segregation everywhere."¹⁸

No more than forty thousand of the two hundred thousand Negro troops in France saw combat service.

The combat record of the Negro in World War I is very spotty. The records of the all-Negro 92nd and 93rd Infantry Divisions were bad. Some units of these divisions were demoralized and fled to the rear in the Meuse-Argonne offensive in September, 1918. Ironically, the New York 15th National Guard Negro Regiment fought gallantly under French command. This regiment on arrival in France became the 369th Infantry Regiment and served in French units directly under French officers who called them "Les Enfants Perdus" ("The Lost Children"). The French welcomed them to the ranks. As a consequence, this regiment had an enviable combat record of which they could be justifiably proud.

But the record of the U.S. Armed Forces in World War I was not a proud one. Emmett J. Scott, a Negro, special assistant to the Secretary of War, Newton R. Baker, uncovered organized efforts to humiliate Negro officers and men. Negro troops were ordered not to speak to

French women, and military police arrested Negro soldiers who were found talking to women in French cities. An order emanating from AEF Headquarters, Scott reported, asked French officers not to permit familiarity and indulgence toward American Negro officers; not to eat with them or speak with them beyond military necessity. It referred to Negroes as a "menace of degeneracy which had to be prevented by maintaining the gulf between the two races."\(^{19}\)

Until World War I, the U. S. Navy had, in contrast to the Army, treated the Negro with relative equality. The Negro was confined to the ranks, but as an individual a Negro sailor was well integrated in the rate structure, and not segregated in the ships of the Fleet. In World War I, the U. S. Navy brought into existence for the first time specific policies and practices of segregation and limitation of Negro personnel to one rating - messman. Merle Espee writes:

Approximately 10,000 Negroes volunteered to serve in the U. S. Navy during World War I. There for the most part were assigned to messmen duties. There were few hold-overs (pre-WWI enlistees) in below-decks forces. Some became petty officers. Two thousand served in the American Transport Service. A few Negro women served as Yeomen.\(^{20}\)

In contrast to our earlier wars, no Negro who served in the U. S. Navy during World War I was cited for bravery or heroism in action. The limited opportunity to serve in general service ratings deprived the Negro of demonstrating his ability and willingness to fight. This period of time was witness to the U. S. Navy's adoption of the attitudes

\(^{19}\) Nichols, op. cit., p. 35

\(^{20}\) Espee, op. cit., p. 310 (underlining provided)
and prejudices of the nation. The people had developed a racial consciousness that bent toward completely subordinating Negroes and relegating them to a position of inferiority. Despite the patriotic service of Negroes in all our wars he was not given the opportunity to serve as a fighting man in our fighting ships.

The established pattern of separate Negro units, under white officers, with all its inherent limitations, existed for decades after World War I in the U. S. Army. The U. S. Navy followed a similar pattern of limiting Negroes to the most menial jobs and severely restricted their enlistment. No wonder then that Gunnar Myrdal wrote in 1943,

When the United States entered World War II in December, 1941, Negroes were not optimistic as to what its significance for them would be. They knew that the democratic war aims were not for them. The memories of the riots that followed the first World War rankled in their minds. Their difficulties in getting into the armed forces and into war industries in the preparation period for war convinced them that an increase of activities would only mean more fields in which Negroes would be discriminated against.

The enormity of World War II, however, and the barbarities indulged in by the Axis Powers gave a tremendous impetus to the cause of integration. The exigencies and necessities of war provided an opportunity for service as never before in our history. The Negro shared this opportunity, and it made possible the participation of the Negro in the war effort on an unparalleled scale. Although many mistakes were made by the Armed Forces, the barriers erected to segregate and humiliate Negro servicemen were breached once and for all time. The progress made toward integration of Negro soldiers and sailors in the Armed Forces since World War II is the subject of the material on the following pages.


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CHAPTER III
THE INTEGRATION BREAKTHROUGH

The gradual evolution toward racial integration of the Armed Forces was not at first dictated by the social aspects of the race problem. The principal objective was more effective and efficient utilization of manpower. Significant progress was made toward achieving this goal during World War II. Opportunities for training and advancement of Negroes were greatly broadened. Negroes entered the officer corps of the Navy for the first time; the Army Air Corps recruited Negroes for pilot training; the Army experimented with using Negro platoons in white companies. Despite the progress that was made, however, segregation was still a fact in the Armed Forces in 1945.

At the end of World War II political and social pressures exerted by Negro civil rights organizations and outspoken white civil rights advocates forced the Armed Services to take positive action to end segregation. In February, 1946, James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, ordered the end of racial segregation in the U. S. Navy. To implement this new policy, the Chief of Naval Operations issued his Circular Letter No. 48-46 which reads in part:

--- Effective immediately all restrictions governing types of assignments for which Negro naval personnel are eligible are hereby lifted. Henceforth, they shall be eligible for all types of assignments in all ratings in all activities and in all ships of the naval service.

In the utilization of housing, messing and other facilities no special or unusual provisions will be made for the accommodation of Negroes.

The Army was less forthright but did at the same time take action to drop the traditional color bar which had been its official policy since Colonial days.

In the fall of 1945, the War Department created a special board under Lt. General Alvan C. Gillem to study the problem of Negro troops. The Gillem Board's report entitled, "The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army", was based on experiences of the war. It provided ample evidence that small composite infantry companies, such as Negro platoons in white companies, were eminently successful when ably led. The report led to an announcement of a War Department policy designed to assure the Negro a continuing place in the Army; established a ratio for Negro troops based on that of the civilian population; abolished for good the all-Negro division; authorized the composite organization. The Gillem Board recommended that the ultimate objective of the Army should be use of manpower without regard to antecedents or race. While the Board did not offer any specific proposals for ending segregation it led to a re-evaluation of all Army policy positions concerning the utilization of Negro manpower during peace as well as war.2

The heightening of postwar racial tension, and certainly political considerations, prompted President Truman to issue Executive Order 9981 in July, 1948, designed to end racial segregation in the Armed Forces.

The President's order directed that,

It is essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity of all those who serve in our

country's defense. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Armed Services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale. 3

The order also established the "President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services". This committee is better known as the "Fahy Committee" named for the first chairman of the group.

The Fahy Committee was charged with the responsibility of examining all existing Armed Forces regulations and practices to determine in what respects the regulations, procedures and practices could be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the President's declared policy. The Fahy Committee conducted exhaustive hearings inquiring into the position held by many military leaders, that, first, Negroes do not have the education or skills required to perform technical military occupations; and second, that Negroes must be utilized with few exceptions in segregated units. 4 After extended studies the committee concluded that the argument that equality of treatment and opportunity would impair military efficiency was without validity and that, in fact, inequality contributed to inefficiency. The committee's report published in 1950 under the title "Freedom to Serve", provides the philosophical and working basis for the program of racial integration followed today by the Armed Forces. 5


4President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, (Washington Government Printing Officer, 1950), p.11

5Evans and Lane, op. cit., p.81

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The committee found that in general the Navy had made progress toward equality of opportunity. In five years the Navy had moved from a position of excluding Negroes in the general service ratings to almost complete integration in general service. At this time, however, the Navy had no Negro officers on active duty, Negro messmen and stewards mates furthermore, while drawing the pay of petty officers, did not hold the grade of petty officers. The committee recommended that they the Navy call Negro reserve officers to active duty and confer petty officer grade to stewards mates. All recommendations of the Fahy Committee were accepted by the Navy, but it made little headway in increasing the number of Negro sailors and officers.

The Committee agreed to allow the Air Force, just emerging as an independent service, to formulate and implement its own policy of integration and equality of treatment. The Air Force had already made significant strides toward integration. The Negro air base at Lochbourne, Ohio, was broken up in 1949, and the men sent to Air Force bases throughout the world. A planning staff had been established to implement integration in the Air Force. The staff study concluded that continuing a policy of segregation would mean, "continuing and increasing monetary waste and loss of tactical efficiency as well as providing various pressure groups and agitators with continual and justifiable reasons for criticism. - - - Fears of social and morale difficulties are largely imaginary." The committee acted wisely in the case of the Air Force for by the end of 1952 the Air Force had no all Negro com-

6 Nichols, op. cit., p.80
ponents of any size. General Vandenberg speaking of the Air Force integration program said that it was not undertaken for reasons of military efficiency alone but, "it was a bold attempt to tackle a broad-gauged national problem", racial integration itself.7

The Army, on the other hand, resisted racial integration and had made little progress toward desegregation since the publication of the Gillem Report in 1946. The Army opposed enactment of H.R. #279, a bill proposed by Adam Clayton Powell (D. N.Y.) to abolish segregation and discrimination in the Armed Forces. The then Secretary of War Patterson stated that:

The War Department believes that progressive experimentation pursuant to the recommendations of the Gillem Report will in time accomplish the purpose of the proposed legislation.8

The Navy offered no objection to enactment of the proposed legislation. The Fahy Committee encountered strong opposition to its hearings and studies on the part of the Army. The then Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, in a statement before the committee in March, 1949, said the Army was not an "instrument of social evolution" and gave testimony to the effect that the experience of two wars proved the Negro soldier was less qualified than whites for combat duty. Gordon Gray, who replaced Royall as Secretary of the Army in mid-1949, discovered much misleading evidence had been given to the Fahy Committee. In January, 1950, Gray issued a policy statement that Negroes would be assigned to any unit without regard to race or color. The inter-

7 Ibid. p.81
8 Nelson, op. cit., p.63
pretation of this policy statement by field commanders led to the eventual acceptance of racial integration in the Army.

The Korean conflict gave the coups de grace to segregation and provided graphic proof that segregated units were less effective than integrated organizations. In 1949 and 1950 Negro infantry trainees were placed in integrated platoons with whites which resulted in vastly more efficient and less costly training. Negro units were integrated with white troops in the 2nd Infantry Division that landed in Korea in July, 1950. By late July, 1951, the Army announced that it was disbanding the all-Negro 24th Infantry Regiment and integrating Negroes and whites throughout the Far East Command. Under General Mathew B. Ridgeway, who succeeded General MacArthur as Far East Commander, integration of Negroes increased from less than 10 per cent to 30 per cent of the troops in the field. Action to integrate troops in Europe paralleled the efforts in the Far East in such a way that by May, 1953, Time asserted that, the "biggest blow against segregation in the U. S. has been struck by the Armed Forces."  

Racial integration has today become a fact in the armed forces. There are no longer any racially segregated units with the exception of some ROTC elements in a number of Negro schools and colleges. Integration has given Negro personnel the opportunity to demonstrate skill and ability without limitations imposed by race. Negroes are in responsible line and staff assignments on a fully integrated basis. No unusual difficulties have followed the assumption of the command function.

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by Negro officers and noncommissioned officers. The fighting forces of
the country were sufficiently strengthened by integration for the Secre-
tary of Defense to report, in 1955:

Combat effectiveness is increased as individual capabilities
rather than racial designations determine assignments and pro-
motions. Economies in manpower and funds are achieved by the
elimination of racially duplicated facilities and operations.
Above all, our national security is improved by the more effective
utilization of military personnel regardless of race.

While integration is accepted in the armed forces, and enormous
progress has been made in the last decade, more remains to be done.
The rate of progress has varied from service to service and instances
of discrimination still arise. In our ships enlisted men, white and
Negro alike, share the same messing and berthing facilities and the same
watches without incident. White enlisted men work in harmony under Negro
petty officers, yet Negro officers are in woefully short supply, and
there are few wardrooms afloat with Negro members. On base facilities
are equally shared, including schools, clubs, housing and medical clinics.
But when the Negro serviceman leaves the main gate of a military estab-
lishment he is forced to wander in the vast wasteland of segregation.
Too few military commanders have been willing to exert their influence
beyond the main gate to ensure the Negro the same equality of treatment
and opportunity in town that he finds on the post. This is the great
area of inaction and reluctant compliance with directives from Wash-
ington that deserves the immediate attention of military commanders in
our modern armed forces.

The following, concluding chapter of this paper will discuss the status of the Negro in the Armed Forces today, the treatment accorded Negro personnel and their families on military installations and the communities where installations are located. The material presented is largely drawn from the 1963 Report of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights.
CHAPTER IV
WHERE WE STAND

The extent of Negro participation in the Armed Forces today is encouraging. The principle of integration has been established. However, the Report on the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights presents a picture reflecting both achievement and failure in implementing integration. Progress has varied from service to service; instances of discrimination still arise: but that the Armed Forces are moving in the direction of equity is an undeniable fact.

Solid achievement and progress has been made in changing and improving the occupational status of the Negro serviceman. In 1948 the Armed Forces lagged far behind the rest of the country in the utilization of Negroes in occupational specialities. Today there is sufficient evidence to prove that Negroes in the several services have a greater opportunity than in the civilian economy to acquire skills and make effective use of those skills. The proportion of Negro officers has consistently risen in the last fifteen years. This proportion is small (1.6 percent) but it represents a one hundred per cent increase since 1949. The reenlistment rate of Negro servicemen is higher than for whites, which suggests that the Negro believes the Armed Forces offer them greater career opportunities than they can find in civilian life.¹

Despite a record of real progress in the process of desegregation of the Armed Forces, the individual services present diverse patterns

¹See Table VII, supra p.46
of Negro employment. The Army, which resisted integration more vigori-
ously than the other services, today relies on Negro manpower to a much
greater extent than the Air Force and the Navy. Negroes comprise more
than 3 per cent of the officer corps of the Army, compared to approx-
imately 1 per cent in the Air Force, and a miniscule 0.3 and 0.2 per-
cent in the Navy and Marine Corps respectively. The enlisted ranks
show the same pattern of diversity; Negroes represent more than 11 per-
cent of the total Army personnel; in the Air Force and Marine Corps,
they comprise about 7 or 8 percent, while in the Navy Negroes constitute
slightly more than 5 percent of the total enlisted personnel.\(^2\)

This difference may be attributed to the recruiting methods used by
the individual services. That is to say, the Army largely relies upon
draftees under the Universal Military Training Act, for the bulk of its
fresh manpower input. The Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, on the
other hand, depend upon volunteers to replenish the ranks. The result
of these various recruitment policies, then, is that the Army draws on
proportionately greater numbers of Negroes than the other services,
since its recruits represent a more realistic sampling of the civilian
population. Further, each service relies upon a battery of written
aptitude, or mental, tests, as well as a psychiatric evaluation and
an assessment of moral behavior for the selection of enlisted men.
These tests cannot possibly take into account diverse cultural and
background factors. The Negro, whose typical level of education is far
lower than the white, would then be at a disadvantage in competing with
whites for enlistment in the services which depend wholly upon volunteers.

\(^2\)See Table I supra p.46
In the selection of officer candidates the Army, again, works from a much broader base. The Army operates some 250 ROTC programs in schools and colleges throughout the nation, 12 of which are attended predominantly by Negroes. The Air Force has 190 ROTC units, of which 5 are in predominantly Negro schools. The Navy, on the other hand, administers ROTC programs in 52 colleges and universities, none of which has a large Negro student body. All of the services have Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) to supplement the input from service academy and ROTC programs. Only the Air Force and Navy, however, require a college degree as a prerequisite for selection to OCS. The Navy's "Seaman to Admiral" and Naval Aviation Cadet plan have broadened its officer selection base in recent years, but in 1962, of the 5,000 men in the Navy's ROTC and OCS programs, only 5 were Negroes.3

The greater reliance upon Negro manpower by the Army - and, to a lesser extent, by the Air Force - pressures the Navy to explain its policy regarding Negroes to the public and the press. An inspection of Table VII, indicates that the Navy and Marine Corps do in fact rely less upon Negroes in the fields of electronics and auto mechanics than do the Army, the Air Force or the civilian economy. Nor does the Navy's utilization of Negroes compare well with the Army, Air Force or civilian economy in several other technical and administrative fields.4 The issue of Navy Times for April 22, 1964, reports that both the Gesell Committee and Civil Rights Commission had taken the Navy to task for lack of


4See Table VII, supra p.51 and note 1 above.
progress in providing equal treatment and opportunity to Negroes. The
Civil Rights Commission is quoted as having said:

While the other services were improving their utilization of Negro
personnel, the position of the Navy, in this respect, continued to
deteriorate - - - . Today Navy ranks last of all the services in
its reliance on Negro enlisted men. 5

The Navy has rarely answered its critics in the press, preferring
to justify its position before Congress. Principally, the Navy's prob-
lem has been that few Negroes enlist, and the percentage of Negro offi-
cers is insignificant; therefore, the Negro is underrepresented in
the broad range of occupational specialties in the Navy. The Navy still
has 23 percent of its Negro enlisted personnel in the food service
field; this is an historical pattern that is being phased out. It
nevertheless has had a lasting deterrent effect upon Negro enlistees
who, it seems, prefer the greater opportunity offered to the Negro in
the other services. Navy progress has undoubtedly been slower than its
sister services, but the Civil Rights Commission did recognize that,
"There is no evidence that those few Negroes who do enlist in the Navy
receive unequal treatment with respect to rank in comparison to whites
with similar test scores and length of service." 6

Today the Negro enjoys, as never before, the opportunity to enlist
in any service he chooses and for which he is qualified. Within that
service he has the opportunity to train in any skill or occupation com-
mensurate with his ability. The Negro can expect promotion opportu-
nities equal to all other servicemen. He can look forward to assign-

6 Rights Report op. cit., p.179
ments to duty in all parts of the world on a nondiscriminatory basis. He can hope for a career in the Armed Forces that will be rewarding to him personally, and at the same time, serve the country. The professional opportunity now extended to the Negro by the Armed Forces, however, may mean nothing. If in the course of that career he must accept substandard, segregated off-base housing, or segregated off-base education for his children, or segregated off-base facilities which force him to confine his social life to a military installation, he is not much better off than his civilian counterpart.

The great debates today no longer concern the Negroes' right to serve in and have equal opportunity to train and advance in the Armed Forces. Rather, they concern the Armed Forces' responsibility for ensuring equal opportunity and treatment for all its members in civilian communities surrounding military installations which so greatly enrich them economically. Discriminatory practices on military installations have all but disappeared, except for isolated instances in the South. However, the Civil Rights Commission reports that, "From a review of the incidents occurring at installations throughout the country, a clear pattern emerges of military accommodation to the discriminatory practices of local communities."

Innumerable incidents of discriminatory practices are reported by the Commission. A few, which may have been prevented by determined military leadership, are cited here. Segregated organizations, athletic teams, Boy Scout and Girl Scout troops have been permitted the use of facilities not otherwise available in the community. Segregated public

\[7^{\text{Ibid. p.187}}\]
transportation, buses and taxicabs have been given access to routes within military reservations. Negro servicemen have been excluded from athletic teams, choral groups, military bands and drill teams when they appear in public before segregated audiences. When wives' clubs and other social organizations meet in town, Negroes and their dependents are excluded. Local commanders have not sought redress when Negro troops have been abused by local civil police authorities. "Command-Community Relations Committees" have been established in areas where close cooperation between military and civilian populations is required, yet few if any have representation from among the Negro community leaders. 8

One may be sympathetic to the position of the local commander whose performance of duty is judged, in part, by his ability to establish harmonious relations with the neighboring community. It is easy to understand that the local commander may, under the circumstances, be willing to accommodate the community when a Negro serviceman's participation in public activities violates local customs. High-ranking military officers are prominent members of the community where they are located, and naturally desire the approval and acceptance of their civilian peers; therefore, they hesitate to disturb the status quo. Where no clear-cut directives from the Department of Defense or the individual service exist, local commanders have acted according to their personal views and local pressures.

Where there has been no action to end or mitigate the indignities suffered by Negro servicemen as a result of accommodating local segre-

8 Ibid. pp.188-191.
gation policies, military commanders have violated the basic tenet of good leadership. A military officer's first responsibility is the welfare of the men he leads. If the officer permits part of his men to suffer the insult of discrimination and does not take corrective action he has morally forfeited his right to lead. Too often, base commanders plead they are helpless to do anything about local segregation. Cour-

courageous and determined leadership in the community as well as on the base can overcome the negative attitude of these commanders.

Certainly segregated off-base housing and segregated off-base educational facilities cannot be fought by local military commanders alone. Other government agencies -- the Justice Department; the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Federal Housing Authority -- must share this responsibility. In localities where there is a heavy concentration of military personnel, military officials have been given the responsibility for corrective action in these areas without having the authority to make changes other than by cooperative action with community leaders. In general, this is no solution, and as a result the military has been severely criticized in the press. This criticism is unfair and uncalled for. Yet where military officials can effect a change in local custom, and do not take action, their right to command may be questioned.

The intent of the Department of Defense is clear. The policy of equal treatment for all members of the Armed Forces without regard to race, color, religion or national origin is firmly established. The implementation of this policy is less clear. In certain areas direction

\[9\text{Ibid. p.191.}\]
is plain. For example, Secretary of the Navy, Instruction 5350.2A, which is quoted in part:

1. Local Commanders are expected, through command-community relations committees, to make continuing efforts toward obtaining unsegregated facilities off base for members of the Armed Forces. -- Membership on the command-community relations committee should include local leaders from all ethnic groups.

2. Off-base facilities shall not be used for military functions or field exercises unless full access is available to all military personnel on a nondiscriminatory basis.

3. -- The shore patrol may not be employed on behalf of local authorities to support enforcement of racial segregation or other forms of racial discrimination.

4. -- If it appears that the civil rights of members of the Armed Forces may be infringed upon -- the matter shall be promptly reported to the Chief of Naval Personnel or Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Judge Advocate General of the Navy for possible reference to the Department of Justice. 10

The great grey area where implementation of policy becomes fuzzy and indistinct is in housing and education. The Civil Rights Commission has accused the Department of Defense of having no affirmative policy or program of encouraging the community to open housing opportunities. 11 Recently the Defense Department has insisted on nondiscriminatory clauses in leased facilities to be used by servicemen and has conducted several surveys in discriminatory housing practices. The New York Times in late March of this year reported the results of one such survey begun in October, 1963. The survey indicated that there is just as much housing discrimination against Negro servicemen near military bases in the North as in the South. The Times quotes Alfred Fitts, Deputy

10 Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5350.2A (Washington: Navy Department, 6 March 1963).

11 Rights Report, op. cit., p.195
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Rights, as saying that, "Housing was the most unyielding discrimination affecting Negroes in uniform."

The problem that faces the Department of Defense in implementing its established policy of equal treatment and opportunity for all members of the Armed Forces remains enormous. There is no simple solution. There are, however, courses of action under the purview of the Secretary of Defense, requiring no legislative action, which would ameliorate the effect of off-base discrimination and enrich in-service opportunity. Recommended courses of action are:

1. That all officers exercising command be made aware that the issue of equal treatment and opportunity for all is an integral part of the military mission of the command, in so far as it affects the morale and welfare of the members of the command.

2. That all officers exercising command give their personal attention to ensuring that all members of the command receive equal protection of the law; that the Constitutional Rights of all members of the command are protected; and that charges of police maltreatment be investigated and redress sought when the evidence indicates maltreatment has occurred.

3. That all officers exercising command remove all vestiges of segregated facilities on military reservation, including: officers and enlisted men's clubs, post exchanges and cafeterias, USO club houses and other recreational facilities.

4. That all officers exercising command refuse to make available military facilities to civilian groups and organizations that practice

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segregation; refuse on-base access to public transportation systems that practice segregation by exclusion or methods of seating.

5. That **all** officers exercising command refuse to participate, or allow members of the command to participate, in any civic function where segregation or exclusion of racial minorities is practiced.

6. That **all** officers exercising command give personal attention to establishing an information and education program to instruct all members of the command in the purpose and intent of the President’s policy of equal treatment and opportunity for all members of the Armed Forces regardless of antecedents or race.

7. That **all** officers exercising command ensure that assignment to duty where contact with the public is involved is made without regard to race.

8. That **all** officers exercising command take personal and positive action by direct negotiation with community leaders, to improve housing opportunities and educational opportunities for all regardless of race.

9. That the individual services pursue vigorous recruiting policies throughout country to attract qualified young men regardless of race.

10. That the individual services ensure that all occupational specialities are open to qualified men regardless of race; that this policy is publicized and carefully explained to all recruits on entering the service.

11. That the individual services adopt a policy to ensure qualified career personnel equal opportunity for promotion, advanced education and training, and assignment to duty without regard to race.

12. That the individual services broaden the opportunity for Negroes to serve as officers.
Total integration of the Negro in the Armed Forces can be achieved by legislation and regulation, but its success will depend upon the conscience of every man and woman in uniform. The individual must search his conscience and erase prejudice from it. Segregation is costly in terms of manpower and money; in terms of wasted energy and creativity. A country dedicated to leading free men in a free world can ill afford the folly of segregation. The progress our military establishment has made in the past fifteen years has proved that integration works in the Armed Forces. The progress we make in the future may demonstrate that integration is workable on a national scale. This is the obligation we owe our country. Let us hope we meet that obligation.
APPENDIX
TABLES

Table 1—Natives in the Services, by Grade and as a Percent of Total Personnel in Each Grade for Each Service (1962)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number reported</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>3,190</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant officer</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>109,603</td>
<td>46,514</td>
<td>30,408</td>
<td>13,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>109,024</td>
<td>47,822</td>
<td>30,589</td>
<td>13,387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a percent of total reported in grade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant officer</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>-11.2</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-11.2</td>
<td>-7.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Represents approximately 75 percent of total personnel strength.
Source: Based on data supplied by the Department of Defense.
Table II.—Total and Negro Personnel by Grade, and Negro Personnel as a Percent of Total Personnel in Each Grade, for Each Service (1962)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay grade</th>
<th>Army Total personnel</th>
<th>Army Negro personnel</th>
<th>Army Percent Negro</th>
<th>Air Force Total personnel</th>
<th>Air Force Negro personnel</th>
<th>Air Force Percent Negro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant general</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major general</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant colonel</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st lieutenant</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d lieutenant</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57,965</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>104,531</td>
<td>2,307</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant officers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief (W-1)</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief (W-2)</td>
<td>4,954</td>
<td>1,343</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>14,619</td>
<td>3,616</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief (W-3)</td>
<td>4,974</td>
<td>1,343</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>14,619</td>
<td>3,616</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant officer</td>
<td>4,170</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,750</td>
<td>1,343</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant major</td>
<td>5,149</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3,181</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master or 1st sergeant</td>
<td>10,139</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>8,358</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoons or sergeants or 2d class</td>
<td>41,107</td>
<td>3,143</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>14,619</td>
<td>3,616</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff sergeant</td>
<td>84,951</td>
<td>10,496</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>16,496</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>134,452</td>
<td>12,852</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>16,496</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>172,188</td>
<td>11,313</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>16,496</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private first class</td>
<td>126,397</td>
<td>12,945</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16,496</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>102,333</td>
<td>10,676</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>16,496</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruits</td>
<td>75,770</td>
<td>6,416</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>16,496</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>489,106</td>
<td>103,603</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>309,549</td>
<td>46,564</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>426,453</td>
<td>103,004</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>264,454</td>
<td>47,804</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Represents 75 percent of total strength.

Source: Based on data supplied by the Department of Defense.
Table II.—Total and Negro Personnel by Grade, and Negro Personnel as a Percent of Total Personnel in Each Grade, for Each Service (1962)—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Navy 8</th>
<th>Marine Corps 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Negro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice admiral</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear admiral (upper)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear admiral (lower)</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>3,978</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>7,384</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant commander</td>
<td>12,616</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>39,319</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant (j.g.)</td>
<td>16,384</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>11,690</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70,179</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned (W-1)</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned (W-2)</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned (W-3)</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant officer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master chief</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior chief</td>
<td>7,347</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>42,518</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sep class</td>
<td>65,089</td>
<td>1,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nd class</td>
<td>86,182</td>
<td>3,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yd class</td>
<td>105,684</td>
<td>6,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman</td>
<td>146,655</td>
<td>7,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman apprentice</td>
<td>109,367</td>
<td>4,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman recruit</td>
<td>159,972</td>
<td>4,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>385,357</td>
<td>39,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>635,089</td>
<td>30,188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The indicated grades for the Navy are the equivalent to those presented for the Army and Air Force on the previous page. The Marines use the same grade titles as the Army and Air Force.

* Less than .05 percent.
### Table III.—Negroes as a Percent of Officers and Enlisted Personnel for Each Service, for Selected Dates (1945, 1949, 1954, and 1962)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Less than 0.05 percent.

N.A.—Not available.

Source: Based on data supplied by the Department of Defense.

### Table IV.—Nonwhites Personnel as a Percent of Total Inductions and Enlistments in Each Service (1953-62)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data supplied by the Department of Defense. Only data on nonwhites, rather than Negroes, was available.
Table V.—Negroes as a Percent of Total Enlisted Personnel in Each Occupational Area for Each Service (1962)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational area</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground combat</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other technical</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration and clerical</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics and repairmen</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crafts</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total service</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data supplied by the Department of Defense.

Table VI.—Occupational Distribution of All Enlisted Personnel and Negro Enlisted Personnel, for Each Service (1962)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Negroes</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Negroes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground combat</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other technical</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration and clerical</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics and repairmen</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crafts</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data supplied by the Department of Defense.
Table VII.—Negroes as a Percent of Total in Selected Fields for Civilian Employment Compared to Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional and managerial versus military officers</th>
<th>Male civilian employment, 1960</th>
<th>Armed Forces, 1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Legal</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Chemical and scientific</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Electrical engineers, signal, electronics, etc.</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Civil, aeronautical, and other engineers</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Finance, accountants, auditors, etc.</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Supply, transportation, and miscellaneous managers</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Physicians, medical corps</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Dentists</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Nurses</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Clergy, chaplains</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Air pilots and navigators</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Policemen, etc.; officers in military police, etc.</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technicians, craftsmen, clerical, and service, versus enlisted men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Electronic technicians including television repair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Other technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Medical and dental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Draftsmen and related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Clerical and related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mechanics and repairmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Aircraft and engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Electricians, linemen, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Automotive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Miscellaneous craftsmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Construction and related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Printing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Service occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Food service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Footnotes on page 896.

51
1 Most figures for civilian occupations include males only; noted figures include females on the assumption that a significant number of the Armed Forces personnel in the field are female.

2 The civilian figure includes all policemen, sheriffs, and marshals and would undoubtedly be much smaller if it included only those in grades of lieutenant and above, or equivalent, as do the military figures.

N.A.—Not available or not applicable.

Blanks indicate no Negroes in these occupational fields.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


* * * * *


