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Research Memorandum

LEADERSHIP AT HIGHER LEVELS OF COMMAND
AS VIEWED BY SENIOR AND EXPERIENCED COMBAT COMMANDERS

by

Major General Edmund B. Sebree, USA (Ret.)

December 1961

Approved:

[Signature]

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Establishment of a research project by the Human Resources Research Office to examine leadership at division and higher levels of command was requested by the Commandant, Command and General Staff College, in a letter dated 28 May 1959 to the Commanding General, USCONARC. The project was to obtain information on the following:

1. The respects in which higher-level leadership varies from leadership below division level.
2. The knowledge of psychology or sociology required by higher commanders.
3. The importance of traits of the leader in the exercise of high-level leadership.
4. The impact of the group being led, and of the situation, upon the exercise of high-level leadership.

Although establishment of a regular research task was not feasible, a special project for exploration on these questions was approved. Dr. Richard Snyder and Major General Edmund B. Sebree, USA (Ret.) of the Leadership Human Research Unit conferred with the Commandant, Command and General Staff College, and members of his staff having primary interest in the subject, to obtain insight into the problem and select a method of attack. It was pointed out at the conference that not very much has been done in the way of relating the high-level leader's qualities to actual practice, in part because those who are most knowledgeable about high-level leadership—the senior commanders—have not yet really worked on this type of analysis. There was general agreement that an approach limited to identifying and recapitulating the traits or attributes that have characterized successful and unsuccessful leaders was not likely to be profitable for a high-level command study.

The method of attack selected for preliminary inquiry into the subject was to write personal letters to more than 100 "senior and experienced combat officers," both those with command and those with staff experience. Questions were posed in several aspects of high-level leadership, and the officers were asked to give detailed information based on their actual experience. (A list of the officers who contributed information and a copy of the letter used for the initial contact are reproduced in Appendices A and B of this paper.)

Replies were received from more than 90 per cent of the officers to whom the request was sent. Attempts to codify the information received generated additional questions, which led to further inquiries and further contributions.

This paper is a compilation of information obtained from this correspondence, supplemented by other source material such as official records and military biographies. The text includes profiles of six leaders successful at high levels of command. Each account is based on the personal recollections of one or more officers who had worked closely with the subject, and has been reviewed by others thoroughly familiar with his career. These descriptions—all dealing with men strong of character and vigorous of personality—are presented to illustrate the diversity in personality and techniques characterizing successful leaders facing a diversity of command problems.
In the main, the author has summarized, in his own words, the principal ideas and opinions of the contributing group. In many instances, however, the material is most effective when presented in the words of the original writer, so considerable use has been made of direct quotation from the correspondence, both in the text and in supplementary appendices. Where it seemed appropriate, from the viewpoint either of the officer contributing the information or of the subject of the anecdote, every effort has been made to preserve anonymity, by paraphrasing or editing to retain the essentials of an episode without individual attribution.

The differences between higher-level leadership and leadership below division level (the first of the C&GSC points listed above) are discussed with general material in Chapter 1. Material bearing on the second point, a leader's use of knowledge on psychology and sociology, is contained in Chapter 5, and also in Chapter 2 and by implication in other sections as well. The importance of the traits of the high-level leader is the subject in Chapter 4, and impact on high-level leadership of the group being led and of the situation is discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The author's summary discussion is presented in Chapter 6.
FOREWORD

There is little in the technical literature of psychology which is concerned with the problems of mediated leadership. Although the literature on group behavior has grown to tremendous proportions since World War II, most of the papers have dealt with small, usually face-to-face groups in which leadership is based directly on interpersonal relationships and is, therefore, immediate. Few, if any, writers have considered the special case of the large organized group in which leadership is mediated by various echelons of staff and command which, as in the Army, separate the leader from the followers. Modern management science with its fast-growing literature may help in solving some of the problems of military leadership at higher levels; it is not, however, a panacea. As General Sebree points out, the military leader who can exercise leadership at higher levels is a good deal more than just a skilled manager.

General Sebree, himself a distinguished soldier and commander of many years' experience, has since his retirement become the military adviser to the U.S. Army Leadership Human Research Unit. He has taken on the task of making a beginning in this complex field of leadership at higher levels. To do this he has turned to a number of men who have exercised high-level leadership in the American Army in recent years. From them he has gathered opinions about various aspects of high-level leadership and recollections of outstanding leaders. These he has compiled into the present report—informal and anecdotal, yes, but a rich source for a wide variety of ideas, which are thought-provoking and some of which are transformable into hypotheses to be used as a basis for later and more formal research.

Howard H. McFann
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LEADERSHIP AT HIGHER LEVELS OF COMMAND
AS VIEWED BY SENIOR AND
EXPERIENCED COMBAT COMMANDERS
Chapter 1

THE NATURE AND APPLICATION OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Introduction

Leadership is the product of multiple talents and effort. Both personality and environment, and these two elements in interaction, are involved. To understand leadership and apply it, we must first understand ourselves. In its application we must develop to the fullest extent qualities which are possessed in some degree by every soldier. Leadership is developed not by aping others, but by cultivating those positive leadership characteristics present in our own personalities and by minimizing, through self-discipline, faults which even great leaders have exhibited at some time and to some degree.

Leadership is learned, not taught. How it is best learned, however, is a question that may be answered in many ways. Napoleon gave the following advice for acquiring a knowledge of leadership:

"Read and re-read the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene of Savoy, and Frederick the Great. Model yourself on them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain and discovering the secrets of the art. Evolutions, the science of the engineer and the artillerist may be learned from treatises, as geometry is learned, but leadership can only be acquired by experience and by the study of the histories of the wars of the great captains."

Differing sharply from Napoleon, on the other hand, is our own General U.S. Grant, who in his memoirs says that he knew virtually nothing about military history and in fact was not interested in the subject. Napoleon himself seemed to be of two minds about the value of experience, for he considered his first Italian Campaign to be his masterpiece.

Although definitions of leadership may be found in the field service regulations and many other publications, for this study it seems more useful to quote experienced military leaders writing about the nature of leadership. Colonel Bernard Lentz, for example, defined leadership as

"...the name for that combination of qualities by the possession of which one is able to get something done by others chiefly because through his influence, they are willing to do it."

General Christian Bach, a distinguished soldier of World War I, has written:

"Military leadership is a very special type of leadership. It is within the military service, where men freely sacrifice their lives for a cause, that we can hope to realize leadership in its most exalted form. Men must and will follow into battle the
officers who are not leaders but the driving power there is simply discipline—not enthusiasm. The letter of the order is obeyed—no more. Great results cannot be achieved by cold, passive, irresponsive soldiers. Leadership not only demands but receives the willing, unrelenting, unhesitating, unflagging obedience and loyalty of other men; and a devotion that will cause them to follow their uncrowned king to Hell and back."

General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr. has stated:

"Effective leadership is the practical application to a specific situation of a resource, derived from the judicious melding of knowledge and experience."

General Alexander M. Patch believed:

"Strong and resolute leadership is not difficult to obtain but can be acquired by all who have the determination to be honest in thought, words, and deeds; who have vowed to be impartial in their dealings with others; who have developed self-control, and who have a full appreciation of the responsibilities of their rank."

Application of Leadership at Various Levels

At any level of command, leaders must be rocks of confidence or at least seem so to their subordinates. There are, however, differences in the application of leadership at the various command levels. Comments of the contributors to this study suggested that type of subordinates and operational responsibilities are two important factors that affect application of higher-level leadership, as contrasted with leadership below the division level. The major unit commander deals with subordinates who are professionals or other highly motivated individuals; the lesser unit commander more often than not deals with nonprofessionals (either by their status at the time or by their lack of professional motivation). The complexities of high-level operations require broader professional knowledge and more intelligence than is needed at the lower levels.

On these matters, General Hobart R. Gay, General George S. Patton's chief of staff and later a corps commander in Korea, states:

"I believe there is considerable difference in applied leadership at the various levels of command and I further think the following essentials increase in importance with maturity and responsibility: the habit of being efficient; the ability to think clearly; the ability to express your thoughts and decisions in a concise and exact manner, both verbally and in writing and with a minimum use of superlatives; and probably above all, moral courage—the ability and the will to do what you know is right regardless of friendships and personal feelings. Moral courage is too often a rarity and should not be confused with the defense of a 'lost cause,' which is merely stubbornness compounded by stupidity."

Viewpoints of other contributors to this study include the following:

"Personal contact and example, particularly as to physical and/or technical skills, endurance, determination, bravery, confidence, resourcefulness and the like, are of no importance at the lower command levels. As rank increases, mental qualifications assume greater importance. I have in mind thoroughness of knowledge, breadth of learning and experience, decisiveness, and the ability to express thoughts, orally or in writing, concisely and clearly. As the size of a command increases, it becomes more and more difficult to do it all yourself and you must learn to delegate your responsibility. If you delegate, you must have a system of control—a 'follow-up'—to insure that you..."
policies and decisions are correctly interpreted. If you have the right kind of subordinate commanders you may be sure that they need no further incentive to do their full duty than a knowledge of what is expected of them." (General Wayland B. Augur)

"While in my opinion there is little difference in applied leadership at the various levels, there are two basic essentials that increase in importance with broader responsibility: (a) a mental storehouse of current problems and how they were handled successfully or otherwise in the past; (b) an ever increasing ability to assign a task to a subordinate and then let him alone. Any officer with common sense, professional knowledge, and the desire to be useful—the desire to keep on learning—who does not become contaminated by overweening ambition, can lead at any level. Many division commanders who had never had command at a lower level were so unsure of themselves that they simply could not avoid meddling with subordinate commanders." (Colonel Charles R. Johnson, Jr.)

"It has been my observation that a command reflects the commander to a high degree; that the leadership of a commander penetrates to levels where he is seldom seen. This is brought about by intelligent planning and the clear expression of his ideas in writing or in formal orders. I have been impressed by the effect of personal contacts between the commander and his command; in the divisions in which I served, I thought the division commander did a great deal to impress his leadership on the division through his personal appearances. However, when I served in Japan, under General MacArthur, I thought he exerted tremendous personal influence, yet, so far as I know, he never went anywhere outside his office and residence except for a few brief visits to the high command in Korea. When Ridgway [became commander in Korea after Walker's death, he] ... made his presence felt through orders and through the chain of command. With these two higher commanders, it was what they had in their mind that was conveyed to the troops and it was their intelligent thinking and proper delegation of authority that made the impression. Smaller unit commanders are required to react with quick reflexes, much as a football player or prize fighter does, and intelligence (intellect) is less important than training and technique." (General Richard P. Ovenshine)

"I do not take much stock in the saying, 'Leaders are born,' etc. Leadership is acquired through many factors, such as education, practice, observation, hard knocks, results, and the like. There is, of course, leadership at all levels.

"General George Marshall was a leader when I knew him as a senior first lieutenant. He was a leader as he progressed through the grades to General. He was a leader because he possessed great knowledge; because he understood people; because he inspired confidence; because he was practical; because those with whom he had dealings knew that they would be treated fairly; and lastly, because he had a good mind and continued to acquire knowledge and wisdom as the years unfolded.

"I knew a sergeant who as a sergeant was a leader at that level. He was a 'bull in a china shop' when he became an officer. He was a walking Army Regulations and knew the technique of command in small units but had neither the depth nor the vision to succeed in field grade." (General Troy H. Middleton)

"An excellent company commander may be a failure as a division commander because he will not relinquish details to his subordinates and will not accept the higher responsibility. It is also probable that he may not have the intelligence and education required for movement of large bodies of troops and therefore may be dominated by his better-educated staff." (General John B. Murphy)

"Intelligence increases in importance as responsibilities broaden. This may be natural or acquired. A successful squad leader or even a division commander might be one whom others will follow through devotion, or through fear; the one who is not necessarily a brain. As the complexities of strategy, tactics, coordination, and logistics multiply, the egghead increases in importance. I think that the success of American arms is due mostly to the type of leaders that have emerged. They have all been unalike and have emerged to full effectiveness because we have not attempted to stereotype their development." (General John R. Deane)
Years ago at a large post in the Far East a contemporary of mine was considered an outstanding company commander, not only by his superiors but by his fellow captains. Most of his contemporaries knew that he spent practically all of his waking hours at his company where he apparently personally performed most of the duties of the supply sergeant, mess sergeant, and company clerk. Even at that relatively early age, many of us felt instinctively that there was something wrong with his methods, although we were forced to admire his effectiveness. In World War II this officer performed well at minor staff assignments but failed as a regimental commander. I suspect that he was never able to avoid immersing himself in detail to the detriment of broader and more important responsibilities.

(General George L. Eberle)

There is obviously a difference in leadership at different levels of command. We have both known good company commanders who were wash-outs as regimental commanders. I believe the main reason was that they tried to deal with officers in the same manner they had dealt with enlisted men. They simply could not divorce themselves from details and spread responsibility on others. A senior officer whom I held in high regard once told me that he made it a policy never to do anything personally that could be done with propriety by a member of the staff or a subordinate. The accent here is on propriety. Staff officers should be permitted to say 'Yes' to any commander but only the CO himself can say 'No.' I knew one colossal ass who even delegated his disciplinary responsibility to his executive officer.

(Colonel Donald A. Fay)

War, to a degree, is a map problem for the higher commanders. It is the guts of the individual on the front line, and not the approved solution, which decides the issue. It doesn't take too much work to solve a map problem with a competent staff.

(Colonel Isaac Gill)

Moral courage, knowledge, intelligence, executive ability, and stamina are the basic essentials which increase in importance with maturity and broader responsibilities. As for stamina, it is only logical to expect the senior commander to have less physical endurance and he must learn to conserve his energy. While I do not agree with all of the axioms stated by General Patton, there is much food for thought in his statement that he did not have any tired divisions—only tired division commanders. . . . [His] statement to the effect that they sometimes fire a commander who would be better off dead than alive is often misunderstood, but if interpreted correctly it brought out dramatically the necessity for all commanders to inspire their troops. I believe Patton stated it in another way when he said that no officer, unless dead or seriously wounded, had fulfilled his full responsibility in the event of a failure, which is something to think about.

(Colonel Robert E. O'Brien)

There is little difference in applied leadership at the various levels. Two basic essentials that increase with broader responsibilities are: (1) a mental storehouse of current problems, and how they were handled successfully and unsuccessfully in the past and (2) an ever increasing ability to assign a task to a subordinate and then let him alone. The last is the ability to refrain from breathing down the subordinate's neck. When he fails, relieve him unmercifully but give him a chance to succeed. Gratuitous advice is too often plain meddling.

(Colonel Charles R. Johnson, Jr.)

Leadership and Command

It is the command function of the military leader that sets him off from the leader in civilian life. Command is what adds the authoritative note to the persuasive leadership of the military officer. General Bruce C. Clarke, CG, USAEUR has written: "The line separating
leadership and command is much too close to define where one leaves off and the other commences." General Ben Lear, who commanded Army Ground Forces in World War II, feels strongly that we should place greater emphasis upon command. He has written: "Command is most important in all elements from the squad to the Army.... And just what is leadership? Is it not largely EXAMPLE and a function of command in the American concept?"

In any event, military leadership is facilitated by the authority vested in command. An incident which took place in the hedgerows of Normandy illustrates the dual nature of military leadership. A young lieutenant gave an order to his platoon to advance and then jumped over the hedgerow ordering: "Follow me." When no one followed he returned and re-issued the order with considerably more emphasis—but with the same results. When he returned the second time he said: "This time I'm going to order you to move when I say 'Go,' and I'll shoot any man who fails to obey." It worked.

The term "management" is a relatively new addition to military terminology, at least in the sense of use as a synonym for "command," as sometimes happens. Command in a general sense involves, and has always involved, financial and training management, but the plain fact is that the military commander is just that—a commander, and his position and duties should not be belittled by terming him a manager for any purpose whatever. In the complexities of our current administrative organization the term management may well be necessary to define a specific function, but to view the commander as merely a manager is to discount the basic nature of his responsibilities and powers.

Command involves responsibility and authority vested in one individual for the accomplishment of assigned missions. Command cannot be exercised by a committee, a board of directors, or a council of war.

The United States Military Academy defines "leadership" as the art of influencing human behavior so as to accomplish a mission in the manner desired by the leaders; "management" as the science of employing men and material in the economical and effective accomplishment of a mission; and "command" as the lawful authority which an officer exerts over troops by virtue of his rank and assignment.

These are excellent semantic distinctions but we must keep in mind that managers, like councils of war, do not fight.
Chapter 2
THE HIGH-LEVEL LEADER AND THE GROUP

Leadership at any level is affected by three general factors: (1) the traits of the leader as an individual, (2) the situation he is facing, and (3) the kind of group he is leading. Among the senior and experienced combat commanders who were interviewed as a basis for this paper, a majority believe that, at division level and above, the group being led is the factor which has the greatest effect on leadership. In this chapter we will examine this factor, in terms of how high-level leadership affects the American soldier. The situation and individual factors will be discussed in succeeding chapters.

Characteristics of the American Soldier and Military Group

Racially and culturally, Americans are not a homogeneous people. Where other nations have emphasized the ties of a common racial group or culture—the Germans, for example, have submitted themselves to a high degree of regimentation and discipline as being essential to survival—we have instead deliberately cultivated individuality of thought and action. We are prone to be freely critical of everything for which we are not responsible, and we regard autocracy as repugnant even though accepting it in time of emergency as a military necessity.

These characteristics can be explosive in a military organization, especially in critical situations, unless leadership is wise and determined. Examples of leadership furnished by some of the great leaders of the past must be evaluated in terms of the change which has taken place in social relations between leader and led—from master and serf to the present social equality among soldiers of a republic such as ours.

The leader of American soldiers must first of all realize that he is charged with the control and direction of fellow citizens—equal with him before the law and in opportunity; self-respecting, responsible individuals, capable of making important decisions in a civil capacity and acting on them; responsive to military leadership only if their leaders have gained their confidence and respect. In battle, Americans must and will follow officers who are not leaders but the motivation there is pure discipline. Great results are not achieved by cold, passive, unresponsive soldiers.

Military groups (established units in being), as distinguished from aggregates (groups of soldiers undergoing individual training), develop personalities of their own. An informal network of unofficial relations develops among the individuals within the organization. While military groups have a high degree of formal organization necessitated by their
size, complexities, and mission, this formal organization works best when it tacitly recognizes the unofficial relationships.

The social motivation of not letting a comrade down is an outstanding factor in keeping men going in difficult situations, and it is only through informal organization that this feeling develops. The effectiveness of dependence on informal organization as the complete recipe for field success is of course arguable. For our purposes, it is enough to say that the goal in this case is reached when existing customs and beliefs are perceived by all members of a military group as coinciding with the primary aims and methods of the military service.

To belong to a group is psychologically important to a soldier who at times requires exceptional strength (almost irrational impetus) to face the stresses unique to his calling. It is a source of comfort and strength to share deprivations and dangers with comrades in a common cause, as well as to share the blessings of good fortune. It is largely through this phenomenon that military groups are spiritually united and identified.

A soldier feels most closely identified with his company—an officer with his regiment or battle group. Both may feel strong secondary identifications with higher units, particularly if those units have acquired an outstanding reputation, or have other attributes which stimulate pride and affection. The fact that this kind of identification with a group reinforces motivation is too often disregarded in staff personnel policies. This may seem a small matter to those not directly concerned but it is very far from being small to those affected in the field. General Leonard Wood told a Congressional Committee after World War I:

"There is nothing which kills so quickly the spirit of troops as breaking them up and scattering them into other organizations. The fact that this was done shows a lack of knowledge of a basic military principle and it did irreparable harm. A division is exactly like a living body. You can't assemble a group of arms and legs and eyes and say 'that is a body.' They have to work together and be coordinated and know each other; that can come only from association and when you violate that basic principle, you commit the most serious military blunder of all."

In similar vein, Napoleon said of his troops at Waterloo: "They had not eaten soup together long enough."

The Contribution of the High-Level Leader

Commanders of intelligence and experience have learned that the effects an individual leader can have on the dynamics of a sizable military organization are smaller than is generally thought. Speaking in the abstract, it might be said that one of the functions of a leader is to fight for the legitimate needs and aspirations of the men in his command. To do this effectively in practice, he must adjust himself to the local ground rules and traditions of the command before demanding that everything be done exactly according to his own ideas.

Obviously when a military unit is ineffective or low in morale, it is the leader's duty to take immediate and aggressive corrective action, the position in this case being that any change is for the better.
However, when a military unit has solidarity and high morale, "the better is often the enemy of the good." Regardless of a leader's rank, self-esteem, or prestige, he can do little to change a standing operating procedure which has proved effective, without losing more than he gains. The saying "It is not your division—but the division you command" is a clear expression of the principle under discussion.

The higher commander contributes toward the development of group identification in his command by a sensible delegation of his authority and by a show of moral courage—not by coddling but by defending and protecting his subordinates, not by being overly solicitous but by being obviously mindful of the welfare of his command.

High-level commanders need to face the fact that in combat the actions of subordinate leaders, from top to bottom, are the governing factors in success or failure. The primary goals of the higher commander for his group are attained largely in training and indoctrination, long before the battlefield is reached. It is during this formative phase that the higher commander has the best opportunity to develop confidence and initiative at every level in the chain of command. An illustration:

"I can think of three officers who successfully commanded divisions in World War II who did not impress me favorably as captains. . . . [Each man] began to mature after becoming associated with an aggressive and forceful commander, who felt that it was his duty to train and motivate his subordinates. Too many senior commanders find it more to their liking to take their younger and more immature subordinates as they find them and shirk the important duty of correcting those faults which are correctable. . . . [I saw] an efficiency report with these remarks: 'This officer can do many things well. In fact he can do practically anything well, but he lacks the ambition to put forth his best effort.' In this case I happened to know the rating officer and the remarks were typical of his general attitude. It apparently never occurred to him that he had any responsibility in the matter other than the turning of a pretty phrase in his remarks." (Colonel Charles P. Jones)

He cannot hope to achieve his goals unless, throughout training, he delegates his authority and responsibilities sensibly and curbs any desire to "over-inspect and over-supervise." During the hectic Stateside training of divisions in World War II we often heard it said that so much time was devoted to inspections that troops had little time to train. There was an element of truth in this complaint. When command inspections were conducted with large staffs armed with check lists and incapable, by temperament or inexperience, of making a constructive contribution, they did more harm than good.

For the higher commander, war is in fact largely a map exercise with the emphasis on his technical skills. If the mission succeeds, his reputation is enhanced; if it fails, alibis and recriminations are of no help to him. When battle is joined, the commanders—from platoon to battalion—of troops in actual ground contact with the enemy have more to do in deciding the issue than do the planners and co-ordinators. Therefore, it is vital that these subordinate leaders be given full opportunity to impress their personalities on their units during training. In the final analysis, the outcome of combat depends on how the soldier performs under fire, and in this he is most strongly influenced by the quality of his "face to face" leadership.

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Chapter 3
THE IMPACT OF THE SITUATION ON HIGH-LEVEL LEADERSHIP

Meeting the Situation

When the time comes, a commander must act promptly and decisively. To prepare for prompt and decisive action, he must be able to anticipate what can occur in a given situation. Only a careful examination of the probabilities, possibilities, and means available will enable the commander to make plans and alternate plans. To meet a developing situation, he must be able to interpret intelligence information correctly and to plan and deploy accordingly.

When we speak of "the situation," we are visualizing environmental conditions and, to a degree, the personalities and qualifications of subordinates. Both elements pose a requirement for versatility on the commander. Success as a peacetime commander does not insure that a man will be effective in combat where confusion, urgency, responsibility, and increased tempo replace routine. The reverse is of course true, but errors in leadership during training can often be determined and corrected before great or irreparable damage has been done.

Decisiveness is a major trait of the successful commander. Irresolution on his part may do his command great harm. When a commander temporizes or defers a decision until one is forced on him, events get out of hand and he is compelled to cope with problems that might have been foreseen and prevented. He then becomes an improviser, driven to action by expediency or weakness.

A command entering battle always faces the possibility of disastrous developments—a surprise maneuver by the enemy, failure in a crucial supply line, a misadventure in any one of a dozen elements in a given situation. One way in which a commander can prepare to meet such unpredictable happenings is by a constant preoccupation with the possibilities and probabilities that may adversely affect his mission. The alert officer continually asks himself, "What is the worst thing that could happen to my command?" Having determined this, at least to his own satisfaction, he checks to see if he has made plans to meet these contingencies or has done everything possible within the means available. To cite an example:

Task Force 6814, consisting of some 25,000 troops, left the United States in January 1942, bound for Australia where it was to

"The Art of War is quite simple in its conceptions—all depends upon their execution. Mistakes and even disobedience are better than inertia. . . . better a faulty plan which shows boldness and decision than a perfect plan enmeshed in uncertainty." (Truppenführung, quoted by General Walter J. Muller.)
"unit load" and proceed to New Caledonia, assuming that the island had not been occupied by the Japanese in the interim. The commander of this Task Force, General Alexander M. Patch, was to travel by air and meet the command on its arrival in Australia, arrange for local shore accommodations during the changes in loading, and contact the Free French representatives to arrange for the occupation of New Caledonia. The staff of this force had already completed its planning to meet the situation as visualized when two points were raised:

1. What if General Patch is delayed en route and is not in Australia when the force arrives?
2. What if the American Headquarters, so recently established—not to say improvised—in Melbourne, are not aware of our mission and requirements?

Even though these two possibilities seemed highly remote, planning was initiated toward meeting either or both contingencies. As it happened, (1) General Patch was delayed en route and did not join his command until after their arrival in New Caledonia, and (2) the American Headquarters had not been informed of the mission of Task Force 6814 and had made plans to deploy the force in their own theater. The difficulties in carrying out the War Department directive in this situation would have been multiplied had these two "remote" contingencies not been foreseen and planned for.

The advantages of foresight in planning are of course not confined to combat operations. For example:

"In dealing with Civilian Components, the high-level commander often fails to understand the basic difference between National Guard and Reserve Organizations until he has been brought face to face with a problem. Essentially the National Guard, when not federalized, is serving two masters, the State authorities and the Army. Primary allegiance is to the State and the Army's role is largely one of logistics. Prior to operation of a National Guard training camp, agreement in detail should be reached on the type of ration, the sharing of training facilities, and other administrative matters wherein a possible conflict of interest may appear. To ignore these preliminary understandings and wait until something occurs often results in improvisation, satisfactory to neither party, and recriminations which can be exaggerated out of all proportion to their importance." (General Butler B. Miltonberger)

Minor decisions with little at stake are easier to make than those decisions at high level which often grimly affect the lives of thousands of men and the success or failure of a combat operation, but this does not mean that the major decisions should take longer to make. An example: On 7 August 1942, the 1st Marine Division, reinforced, made amphibious landings in the Southern Solomons, achieving complete tactical surprise and encountering little resistance except at Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tonambago where the Japanese, having no place to run, made a suicidal stand. On the night of 9 August, a Japanese cruiser force slipped through the outpost line and sank four heavy cruisers (3 American, 1 Australian) without a loss and almost without a hostile shot. Unloading of supplies continued during the next day but when, in mid afternoon, another Japanese force was reported approaching the convoy's location, it was decided to save the ships and let the Marines shift for themselves as best they could. At the time of the convoy's departure for
New Caledonia, some 600 miles to the south, less than 30 per cent of the unloading had been accomplished and the departure was so hasty that some 1,000 combat troops scheduled for debarkation when unloading was finished remained aboard ship. Those Marines left high and dry on Guadalcanal and the other small islands were able to subsist on captured Japanese stores and the trickle of supplies and ammunition that came in by air and other improvised means, while further plans were made.

During the months of August and September, the American forces resisted two attacks in force on Guadalcanal, but the situation was becoming desperate and a decision to hold or attempt evacuation was essential. When Admiral William F. Halsey assumed command of the South Pacific theater, he assembled on board his flagship Generals Vandegrift, Harmon, and Patch (and their Chiefs of Staff), plus the key Navy commanders afloat, to discuss the situation on Guadalcanal. Perhaps an hour was consumed in presentation of the facts as seen by the several individuals. Some advocated writing the Solomons off as a tough but necessary loss and recommended evacuation. The other line of action worthy of consideration was to reinforce the 1st Marine Division by troops of the Americal Division then deployed on New Caledonia.

After gaining possession of the information on the situation, Halsey asked Vandegrift if he could hold, IF REINFORCED and kept supplied. He received an affirmative answer. He then asked Patch if he could make a regimental combat team available with little or no delay. He again received assurance, though somewhat reluctantly because General Patch was not confident that the Navy and Air Force could furnish adequate logistical support. Controlling the Navy forces himself, Halsey without further ado said: “Thank you, gentlemen—we will hold what we have and reinforce the Marines. I will send a regimental combat team to reinforce General Vandegrift as soon as General Patch can have them here for embarkation.”

The whole meeting took perhaps 1 1/2 hours. It involved the complete success or failure of the operation, and sincere and studied opinions as to the best course of action were varied. The risk was great, but once Halsey had the facts, he made his decision and never wavered in it. The operation succeeded.

Military history is largely a compilation of situations and how they were met. A classic example of meeting a situation by adopting tactics suitable to the forces at hand is found in the Revolutionary War battle of Cowpens. Morgan, the American commander, realized that the militia component of his forces was going to flee once combat was joined. He put them in the front ranks with explicit instructions to fire one volley, then run to the rear and assemble in a certain area. They followed orders—and were so encouraged by what they had done that they reloaded and came back to materially assist in winning the fight. Another situation, with a different ending:

“For energy, Stonewall Jackson had no peer in the conduct of his campaigns but a fatigue. Jackson failed Lee in closing the trap on McClellan in the seven days’ battle for Richmond, which demonstrates that even the most energetic must husband his strength for the crises. Knowledge is still power, but in combat operations there is no substitute for energy in a military commander.” (Colonel John D. Frederick)
Removals From Command

In the course of this study, correspondents furnished several examples of general officers who had been removed from command in combat under circumstances prejudicial to their reputations. Since these officers had passed the test of training, it would appear that they failed when confronted with a situation beyond their capacity to meet under the stress of combat.

No common pattern emerges to point directly at the causes for these removals. However, we may find it profitable to read a few opinions, solicited from individuals having a knowledge of the facts; in the cases presented the "why" in the situation is often more instructive than the "what." In some removals it would appear that personal prejudice played a major part, not only in the action but in the manner of administrative accomplishment; since there is little to be learned when the only "why" is a clash of personalities, only one such example is included in the cases cited (one officer has observed that judicial notice can be taken of the Jehovah complex as a not uncommon trait amongst the elite). Editing of the remarks which follow and some interpolation have been necessary to preserve anonymity.

Case No. 1: "General distinguished himself in World War I and on several occasions in the interim between World Wars. He has a leader's physique and bearing, aggressiveness, professional knowledge, and command experience at every grade. . . . He strongly resented serving as a division commander under officers to whom he was senior in the regular service and did little to conceal this resentment. He was fond of delivering lectures on strategy and tactics, expressing himself with a freedom that, whatever the justification, exceeded the bounds of discretion, and directing caustic comments impartially against the higher staffs, both Allied and American. As might have been foreseen his remarks filtered back to the ears of the officers to whom he referred, and caused them to judge him with equal severity."

Case No. 2: "had seen little service with troops and made his reputation as an instructor and in several high staff positions. His keen critical faculty (when he used it objectively) and his lucid analysis of military problems commanded the admiration of juniors and seniors alike. His self-confidence had accustomed him to speak with pontifical authority and it irked him to have his observations brushed aside. Coming down to brass tacks, he did not understand soldiers or 'soldiering' and did not know when a man was doing right or wrong. He had the professional knowledge but had never applied it in a command position below general officer grade."

Case No. 3: "General's relief might have been called for because there is no doubt that the pressure got strong for him; he was tired mentally and physically and becoming indecisive. But to reduce him to his permanent rank and return him to the States with the stigma of having been relieved in combat was atrocious. He should have been given an extended leave of absence, commended, and eased into a training billet."

Case No. 4: "had every quality usually attributed to a great leader but permitted his staff to dominate him. At situation briefings given in the field for higher commanders, he permitted his chief of staff to interrupt him and develop a point which he pretended needed further clarification, the end result being that the chief of staff continued to the conclusion of the briefing. This led to the impression that the chief of staff was in fact running the division. General was well-liked and generally respected in the division, but it was not a particularly effective outfit, and morale was low, especially amongst the senior subordinate commanders. Many officers learn early in their service that a regiment commanded by the adjutant rapidly becomes a poor regiment, and the same is true of a division when the chief of staff or any other individual is permitted to usurp command prerogatives."
Case No. 5: "General _______ organized, trained, and commanded the _______ Infantry Division in its initial combat action. The division left the States before it had been hit for replacements and it arrived in the combat theater with almost 100 per cent unit integrity after 18 months of Stateside training. _______ did two things just before entering combat that ruined him. (1) He permitted any officer who could better himself by transfer to do so, which cost him three experienced staff officers and one regimental commander. (2) He accepted "x" days as the time required to execute a limited objective mission, which he was unable to fulfill. As a matter of fact, the intelligence in this situation was faulty and it is always difficult to predict how even the best-trained division will perform when first under fire. As regards (1) above, he was overly generous. Another officer in a similar situation refused to consent to the transfer of any efficient officer until after his division's first campaign; then he not only permitted but encouraged transfer when he was helpless to promote within his command. As to (2), it is not an uncommon occurrence for the higher command to put pressure on the lower, even to the extent of getting a prognosis which, once made, becomes a fixed or absolute figure with the planners of the senior echelon. No commander should accept such a condition and no senior commander should demand it."

In these instances where commanders seemed unable to meet the demands of a situation, the key elements may be summarized as follows:

In Case No. 3 the officer was described as "becoming indecisive," and it is implied that a deterioration in mental and physical strength contributed to this weakness. The writer who cited the case comments on what would appear to be unduly harsh administrative action, a viewpoint concurred in by many of those who knew this man. (General Patton often said that he had no tired divisions—only tired division commanders.) Case No. 1 indicates a loss of balance coupled with a tactlessness bordering on lack of common sense. The lesson to be learned from Case No. 2 is that practical experience is required to apply professional knowledge. Turenne's statement that leadership is learned more from books than battlefields is a half-truth only. Some command experience in the lower grades is most desirable if not essential. Lack of such experience can sometimes be compensated for by an experienced staff or deputy commander. The statement in Case No. 4 could have been limited to the first sentence, "He permitted his staff to dominate him." Subordinate commanders resent staff command. They may accept it with some grumbling if they have affection for their commander, but in the grim business of war there is a limit to the tolerance afforded popularity. The officer in Case No. 5 was a man of wide professional knowledge and integrity, and appeared to have all the traits of a strong and respected leader. Perhaps his self-confidence became over-confidence which led to undue generosity. The next higher commander, no matter how long-suffering, is likely to lose patience when a subordinate places him in a situation which might be prejudicial to the success of his own mission.

On Guadalcanal, General Patch estimated that he could put an end to ground resistance within 30 days after Mt. Austen was cleared of the enemy; the Commanding General of the South Pacific protested that it should not take more than two weeks. Although feeling that it might be done in a lesser time, Patch refused to make a commitment to this effect and could not be budged from his position. The fighting ended in less than 30 days. Had General Patch agreed to the lower figure, when he made good it would have been taken for granted; if he had run into unforeseen difficulties they would have been discounted by the higher headquarters, and every day beyond the "agreed period" would have jeopardized not only his reputation but his job.
Chapter 4

INDIVIDUAL TRAITS AND THE EXERCISE
OF HIGH-LEVEL LEADERSHIP

Listings, definitions, and dissections of personality traits are to be found in texts on leadership. Except for some introductory discussion on the topic, this approach will not be attempted here. Rather, an effort will be made to further our understanding of high-level leadership qualities by illustrating and contrasting the personalities and leadership techniques of specific high-level military leaders. This will be done primarily through use of quotations and profiles supplied by officers who worked with these leaders.

Attributes of the Leader

In an address at the Opening Exercises, Command and General Staff College, 3 September 1935, Major General H.J. Brees, the commandant, said:

"I desire particularly to invite your attention to the name of this school—the Command and General Staff School. The command, the staff, and the troops form a team. No one element can function properly without the others. We emphasize these three elements and draw clear distinctions between the provinces in which each operates. The powers and limitations of each must be known to enable you to function properly and efficiently in any position in this team. We stress command. We maintain that the ability to command is the greatest of military attributes. We hold that the ability to make clear-cut, definite decisions and to carry those decisions through to fulfillment requires fortitude and character of the highest degree. We believe that commanders and staff officers should be trained in the same school. We hold that the commander, no matter how able, is that much better commander if he knows and is thoroughly familiar with the duties of his general staff and how it functions. Conversely, the general staff officer is that much better general staff officer if he is trained to look upon his problems from the viewpoint of the commander."

Few officers on active duty today had the privilege of knowing and serving with General Brees, but no less an authority than General George S. Patton stated on several occasions that no one had more to do with the preparing, for high command, of most of the senior commanders in World War II than did this great soldier and teacher.

In discussing leadership at a later date, General Brees listed eight attributes as the essentials of leadership for division and corps commanders. He considered it difficult, if not impossible, to arrange the list in order of priority, but presented it as follows:

1. Force of character
2. Physical fitness
(3) Knowledge of one's profession, of men, and of self
(4) Courage, both physical and moral
(5) Common sense and judgment
(6) Tenacity of purpose
(7) Executive ability
(8) Last but not least, that intangible something known as personality

This list of attributes could be expanded, but in essence it covers the field of leadership traits. "Common sense and judgment" suggests the gift of simplicity, while "executive ability" implies the ability to properly delegate authority and responsibility. "Personality" is important because there is no such thing as a typical leadership personality—a fact which should encourage those who aspire to become leaders, for leadership of high order can be developed within the scope of any intelligent and ambitious individual.

We should note here that the individual traits of the leader, no matter how outstanding, are not the only determinants of his career pattern. General Harlan N. Hartness has written:

"We too often ignore the fact that an officer has reached high position because (1) he has had, by chance or design, special opportunity to be associated with the 'right people'; (2) he has demonstrated a facility of language; (3) he has been surrounded, either by choice or accident, by most capable assistants. These are among the 'whys' which I believe to be of major importance in the analysis of an officer. The 'whats' are not as important. I have often thought that any one of our high commanders could have been adequately replaced by at least ten contemporaries."

W.E. Woodward, biographer of George Washington, says of him:

"He possessed the superb self-confidence that comes only to men whose inner life is faint, for the inner life is full of nameless doubts. He had the great qualities of confidence, courage, perseverance, fortitude—and even more, he had good luck without which these qualities would have been unavailing."

These two quotations are pertinent because in the personal correspondence from which most of the source material for this text was obtained, about 25 per cent of the contributors refer to luck in the career pattern. For example:

"Regardless of one's personal traits generally accredited and known, the turning points in a military career are not the great moments. The real crises are often concealed in occurrences so trivial in appearance that they pass unobserved or are long forgotten. Sometimes it is the chance meeting and the development of a useful friendship." (Colonel Milo V. Buchanan)

To depend on luck is to build on sand, and it would be absurd to over-emphasize the part luck plays in a career. Nevertheless, to deny its effects would be unrealistic. Disraeli observed that the man who succeeds is the one who is ready to answer the door when Opportunity knocks.

"It is of interest to note that Napoleon lacked a trait which most senior commanders regard as vital for high-level command: He could not decentralize. He did not see that one who trusts human beings will make fewer mistakes than one who distrusts them. In reflection, at St. Helena, he said: "Nothing is well done that one does not do oneself. When I was not present, things went wrong."


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One more comment is appropriate. The best-obeyed commanders are not necessarily the best instructed, the most intelligent, the most paternal, nor the most severe. They are those with prestige. It might even be said prestige, innate or acquired, is the most conspicuous mark of a leader of men. If the military leader has prestige, his ideas are likely to be accepted without discussion or controversy, and his orders partake of a peculiar force. No military leader will achieve true prestige unless he has a profound understanding of the sentiments that animate troops, and unless he can arouse in his subordinates a belief in his deep interest in their welfare, a confidence in his professional knowledge and objectivity, and a complete reliance on his judgment.

Here are a few quotations typical of comments made by contributors to the study:

"The successful high-level leaders should have a commander’s presence—a great part of which is a fine personal appearance—plus enthusiasm and an impelling inner nature. These last two qualities are bound to be contagious in that they tend to rub off on those around him. Even though mentally average, a leader with such qualities will be a success." (General W.D. Brown)

"Leadership is both a gift and a developed talent. It involves the ability to recognize and accept responsibility and take appropriate action. Full comprehension of that statement will do more to develop leadership than chest beating and oratory." (General Frank L. Collin)

"Knowledge of his profession—decisiveness—force and aggressiveness—knowledge of his men—tact—energy—loyalty—initiative and enthusiasm—humanity and courage are the attributes of the successful commander." (Colonel Carlisle V. Allan)

"Unlike as were Devers, Patton, and John C.H. Lee (classmates, USMA), they were professionally competent and self-confident. Confident men in turn infect their juniors with degrees of confidence. They permit the junior to do his job, giving him guidance only when necessary. They understood men, liked them, and forbidding though they may at times have appeared to the uninitiated, they were warm and sympathetic individuals." (General Joseph A. Holly)

"Discipline is the keystone of the arch of leadership. It is the activator of the channels of command; the foundation on which the morale, the skill and the effectiveness of the unit are built and exploited. The hallmark of the command trade, the outstanding characteristic of every great leader rests in his ability to impose his will on others in such a manner as to produce an intense and cheerful desire to obey." (General W.H. Wood)

Contrasts in Leadership

Morris Janowitz in The Professional Soldier attempts to classify some of our successful professional soldiers. To Janowitz, General George S. Patton is the “prototype of the heroic leader” while General Lesley J. McNair appears as “primarily an administrative and management expert.”

While the merit of these broad classifications is questionable, Patton and McNair did stand at opposite poles in their technique of

leadership. To emphasize that there is no such thing as a “typical leadership personality,” we present descriptions of these widely differing leaders.

“General Patton, a born showman, is an example of the type of commander who exploits the ‘gimmick.’ (Like Al Smith and his brown derby, he had to ‘have a handle.’) He carried pearl-handled revolvers and riding breeches and shiny boots; his insignia or rank was copiously displayed on cars, jeeps, flags, and tanks. His ‘Green Hornet’ uniform with golden crash helmet, which he personally designed and wore at all public ceremonies when the 2nd Armored Division (his first major command) was organized, became symbolic of Patton throughout the Armored Force. When challenged... as to its authenticity, Patton brushed the question aside by saying that few knew or cared about regulations and the variation identified him to his command.

“His first tank was painted white with red, white, and blue turret stripes. It furnished a perfect target—which of course he knew. He subsequently modified the unsuitable markings to conform to others of the command, but it was during this period that he won the colorful title of ‘Old Blood and Guts’ which followed him to his death. He gained the especial notoriety he desired at this formative phase—the ‘purpose of the exercise.’

“These showmanlike expedients were carefully planned to stimulate the imagination of all ranks. They were originated by a great offensive commander to inculcate in the mind of the group a desire to follow his leadership, and to aid him in building morale and the offensive spirit. Imitations of his methods would have been ridiculed. These were ‘Pattonisms’ pure and simple.

“In all conferences with officers and enlisted men, General Patton stressed that a leader, regardless of rank must set the standard in courage, knowledge, and integrity. The leader must lead, and to do so he must be in front mentally as well as physically. ‘You can’t push spaghetti—it must be pulled,’ he said on many occasions.

“General Douglas MacArthur was another great leader who believed that histrionics of a high order can be traded for victories. He had a bag of tricks similar in nature to Patton’s, peculiar to MacArthur’s personality and designed for the same end. His plain cob pipe, his battered cap worn always at a cocky angle, became symbolic of ‘Old Doug,’ the crafty officer and Jap conqueror. His ‘I shall return’ has been quoted for years by soldiers and civilians as an example of high hope and determination. By the same token England’s Montgomery in jaunty beret is associated with success attained by the British Armies in Africa. Monty was the British answer to Rommel, ‘The Desert Fox.’” (General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.)

Let it be emphasized that these were gadgets designed to catch the eye and were characteristic of these men—not someone else. In applying them, they were, as individuals, “being in character.” Behind this front of showmanship was professional knowledge of a high order, intuition, intelligence, and great moral courage.

A successful leader of a different type was General McNair, who organized and commanded Ground Forces during the mobilization and was killed in action in Normandy 25 July 1944 while observing front line units.

“McNair was utterly selfless—would not even have a public relations officer (a fine way to modern success). Patton flouted Patton while McNair based all of his actions on a few deeply thought-out principles; issued equally profound but brief directives based on these principles; followed them up with a monumental grasp of detail; spent the major portion of his time in the field to insure that his directives were understood and being carried out. Patton was no detail man but substituted for McNair’s methodism an equally monumental knowledge of soldiers, with an occasional distortion of facts which, since he thought they served his purpose, bothered him not in the least.
"McNair combined unequalled professional knowledge, intelligence, and great courage, moral as well as physical, with tolerance, consistency, warmth, dignity, and a sense of duty. Those who on occasion interpreted his graciousness for weakness were enlightened in a manner that left little doubt. Both of these great soldiers had a fine sense of humor and the ability to delegate authority intelligently. Both excelled in handling officers and men." (General John M. Lentz)

Profiles of Six High-Level Leaders

The profiles which follow are presented to illustrate varieties both in personality and in technique of high-level command. Authorship of some profiles is indicated; others are composite essays, based on contributions from several knowledgeable individuals, and edited only to preserve anonymity where necessary.

It should be emphasized that these contributions are personal, rather than historical, documents—anecdotal rather than definitive in nature. They reflect men and events as they were perceived and are remembered by the officers who contributed to this study.
General Alexander M. Patch commanded a battalion of the 1st Division in combat in World War I. In the second World War he successively commanded a task force sent to the South Pacific shortly after Pearl Harbor to occupy and defend New Caledonia; a division and an Army corps on Guadalcanal; the Seventh U.S. Army in its amphibious landings in southern France, and subsequent campaigns until the end of the war. He died at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, on 21 November 1945, being at the time the Commanding General of the Fourth Army.

In temperament and personality, he is difficult to compare with contemporaries and opposite numbers. Soldierly in appearance and deportment, modest to the point of shyness, dignified, quiet, even secretive, he was the equal of any in professional knowledge, human understanding, and decisiveness. He was a man of extremely strong emotions but had developed an almost fanatical self-control. He had the ability to think logically and arrive at sound decision, great power of decision with the moral courage to back it up, and when occasion demanded could express himself with clarity and conciseness, orally or in writing.

His philosophy as a leader was: “Be more than you seem to be,” and the few who, on quick appraisal, thought he could be influenced against his principles had a rude awakening. He had a keen sense of humor; he loved a joke, but would not tolerate profanity or obscenity in his presence when he had the power to prevent it. On the few occasions when he used strong language the effect was electric, and I recall clearly one incident when, after considerable quiet thought, he observed to me privately that a certain individual was a “cold, frigid, S-O-B.” While this expressed a long-held opinion of my own, it was almost dramatic in its import. I think it worthwhile to record his feeling in the matter of strong language which was: “It is trite to say that profanity limits the vocabulary. The simple truth is that it is offensive to self-respecting people, is undignified on the part of an officer, and accomplishes nothing good. Bad language on the part of a junior is impertinence; on the part of a senior it is insulting.”

He had strong opinions on character and leadership, one being that leadership could be acquired by all who have the determination to be honest in thought, words, and deeds; who have vowed to be impartial in their dealings with others; who have developed self-control and pride, and who have a full appreciation of the responsibilities of their rank. He argued convincingly that an officer possessing professional knowledge, intelligence, health, and integrity could be evaluated with contemporaries to a mathematical exactness by the degree in which he possessed pride and self-control. Pride, not vainglory, he felt was inherent, but he regarded self-control as anything but an inherent quality. While he did not elaborate on the latter, I got the impression that in his early career no one had caused him as much trouble as he had caused himself.

Possessing physical courage, he regarded it as a fixed characteristic, or invariable constant, in his evaluation of others. An officer whom he had highly regarded on Guadalcanal dropped in his estimation, because on one occasion he thought he had detected a lack of courage. When it was remarked that the individual had been under physical and mental strain for a prolonged period, he was singularly unimpressed, and the officer never regained his confidence and respect. His personal attitude toward danger was stoical and, while he seldom needlessly exposed himself under fire, he implicitly believed that you were safest where your duty called.

As a regimental commander (and perhaps earlier), he was a “staff biter” and this attitude remained with him as he rose in rank. He had but two policies: (1) Any member of the staff could say “Yes” to the request of a commander—only he could say “No.” (2) He required every member of his staff (including his chief of staff), when visiting lower
headquarters, to introduce himself with the opening statement: "I am Colonel _________.

What can I do to help you?" By his rigid insistence on this requirement, the idea gradually seeped through to the densest and most presumptuous of staff officers that his primary duty was to find ways and means to help—not usurp.

He was a good judge of character, but not a particularly good choosier of men, being blinded somewhat by a "halo" complex. If a man impressed by exhibiting soldierly qualities and graciousness in certain fields, General Patch was prone to accept this as prima-facie evidence that the individual was good at everything. He found it almost impossible to withdraw an intense loyalty once extended, even when it had been demonstrably misplaced. Any criticism, however valid, of an individual he had accepted tended to enhance rather than lower General Patch's opinion.

On one occasion, the removal of a general staff officer, who had served on previous occasions with General Patch, was recommended because he was doing more harm than good. Boiled down, the recommendation was based on a belief that the individual lacked common sense. Patch refused the request saying: "Of course he hasn't got any sense—I thought you knew that. However, he is not incompetent and your job is to keep him out of situations requiring judgment. Do that and you'll find him very useful." To this day I am not sure as to his seriousness—he had a wonderful sense of humor and loved fun on appropriate occasions. In fairness, his suggestion was followed and worked out pretty well for a while. Later the officer concerned got completely out of hand, at which time General Patch removed him on the spot without batting an eye, and with a minimum of fanfare.

No officer was more self-effacing and did more to shun publicity than General Patch. Only on very rare and special occasions did he wear his many decorations and campaign ribbons. He seldom read press appraisals, either in commendation or censure. When Time magazine, in 1945, featured an article with his picture on the cover, he did not bother to read it. He was not playing a part—he simply was completely indifferent. His ambition was to achieve, and the only recognition that interested him was recognition of the accomplishments of his command.

In September 1945, I accompanied him on a visit to the awards and decorations board in the Pentagon, the purpose being to obtain a battle star for the Seventh Army units repelling the German counterattack in the Vosges which coincided with the Ardennes breakthrough in December 1944. After he "presented his case, a general officer member of the board remarked that General C监听s also wanted battle stars for Cherbourg, and intimated rather lightly that there were others, etc. Patch minced no words in replying that he was not interested in anything but the problem he had presented; that captured documents bore him out on the contention made at the time, that the Seventh Army had participated equally with those Armies to the north in the identical campaign, and for which the northern armies had received recognition. The board, somewhat taken aback and out of alibis, admitted the correctness of his position but stated that since the demobilization was based on a point system which had been carefully computed and published, a change at the time would cause administrative chaos. In cold anger General Patch replied: "You admit the correctness of my position but are more concerned with your bookkeeping," and departed. Later, accompanied by General Devers, he presented the matter to the Chief of Staff and it was approved. Had it not been done at that level, I have no doubt that he would have insisted on presenting the matter to the President.
It is my considered opinion, based on more than 40 years of service in all parts of the world, that successful leadership in a democratic army involves factors which are unique and singularly applicable to such type organization.

The loosely woven framework of discipline which characterizes the American Army places a high premium on the personal characteristics and qualifications of a commander. The impact of his personality is direct, and is apparent in the state of training, discipline, and morale of the unit.

We see leadership best reflected, for example, when firmness is substituted for harshness, understanding for intolerance, humanness for bigotry, and when pride replaces egotism. General Simpson's every action exemplified the best of these traits of character. His integrity inspired a high degree of loyalty. His conduct on all occasions was scrupulous, and his associates of all ranks found him to be patient, impartial, courageous, sympathetic, and confident. They also found him equally loyal to seniors and juniors alike. He was an able, respected commander for whom all were willing to give their best endeavors.

Decisions must be based on principles either of war or conduct, for it is not practicable to foresee with accuracy the situation, event, or forces which may be confronted, guided, or controlled by the commander of an American unit, task force, or field army. Therefore, general rules of action or conduct that have stood the test of time are the tools available for use by any commander.

It has been my observation that the pattern of success on the field of battle, if scanned closely, would disclose the fact that rarely are principles violated. The adherence to tactical or war principles obviously is indicative of knowledge. The degree or extent of success is usually predicated on service with its associated and complementary adjuncts of experience and responsibility. Allied closely to this same success pattern are the personal qualities of the commander, though cases can be made for battle leaders whose personal qualities were not on a par with their military qualifications. Regardless of other qualities possessed, no commander of American troops should be lacking in knowledge, personal courage, and determination. All these, plus a high degree of moral courage, were possessed by General Simpson.

The above is background, presented because in my evaluation of General Simpson I have considered the varied aspects which go into the make-up of a superior battle leader, of which he is a good example.

An examination of the official history of the Battle of Europe reveals beyond a doubt the following:

The Ninth U.S. Army executed all assigned missions with minimum fanfare and almost maximum effectiveness.

In Crusade in Europe\(^1\) and A Soldier's Story\(^2\), Generals Eisenhower and Bradley indicate that the Ninth was handled in a masterly manner and performed without strategical errors.

With the Ninth located on the left of the American line, and thus flanked by an allied force, the possibility was present constantly for a tactical, logistical, or administrative failure that could have jeopardized the joint effort of the major ground forces engaging the German Army. No such event transpired, though many experiences were encountered which at times tried the patience and soul of the American commander of the Ninth Army as well as his associates.

The Ninth Army, from its initial major engagement on 10 November 1944 to its conclusive engagements in the vicinity of the west bank of the Elbe River on or about 28 April 1945, advanced a distance of some 500 miles. During the forward progress it pierced the Siegfried line, executed five assault river crossings, captured in excess of a half million prisoners and war materials and territory of extreme importance to the overall allied effort. No reverse was suffered by the Ninth Army in six months of combat.

From the above, I conclude that the Commanding General of this magnificent fighting force possessed that key essential to successful command, i.e., knowledge of his profession. This is the one priceless permanent possession that a commander gains from study and experience. It is probably the most powerful tool available to one charged with the responsibilities of command for, lacking this vital characteristic, no commander can inspire the confidence or retain the loyalty of his seniors or subordinates.

One corps commander whose unit was charged with the heavy responsibility of protecting the left flank of the Ninth Army and was thus in close contact with the British Army on its immediate left, throughout the advance across Germany, had this to say with reference to his service with General Simpson:

"The Army Commander's detailed knowledge of tactics and weapons permitted plans prepared by the Corps to be quickly and comprehensively evaluated and recommendations approved in a minimum of time. In all conferences involving tactical or logistical projects, the Army Commander likewise demonstrated that he possessed two other absolutely essential characteristics without which no leader can gain the full and willing support of a subordinate. It was crystal clear that the Army Commander had cultivated assiduously the worthy traits of Understanding and Loyalty. Before he decided upon a course of action, which involved a major unit (Corps) and its operational cooperation with the British, he habitually consulted the Corps Commander concerned and threshed out all aspects including troop and other requirements. Based upon the recommendations presented he adopted a definite line of action or made his decision. By such practice it was discovered that many problems which initially appeared to be complex, lost their complexity and became less difficult when viewed in the light of understanding and essential team play which was necessary to attain objectives of allied forces."

A few cases in point might be mentioned.

In November 1944, an offensive was launched to breach the Siegfried line and reduce German defensive works securing the approaches to the Roer River near Gelsenkirchen, Germany, which was a key point in the projected zone of advance of the allied forces. In order that the principle of unity of command could be preserved, it was deemed necessary to allocate combat elements to either the British or the American corps, depending upon which was to be given operational control for the attack.

The 43rd British Division and the 84th American Division were selected for the assault with a tactical boundary between them which, when projected forward, divided the town. The XXX British Corps and the XIII American Corps were the parent units involved. The important question arose immediately as to which of the two corps commanders would control the critical operation, for this actually was the first major action of the Ninth Army. The British promptly recommended that the CG XXX Corps be given operational control in view of the fact that he had seen considerable service against the Germans, not only in North Africa, but on the continent of Europe. It was a somewhat difficult decision for the Army Commander to make as it would, of course, temporarily reduce the forces available to the corps which did not direct the action, and as a consequence reduce the status of the corps commander so deprived to that of an interested spectator.
The Army Commander realized fully the implications, and before he made his decision he and the American corps commander discussed fully all aspects of the situation. As a result of these considerate and clarifying conferences, the American corps commander acquiesced in favor of the British. By so doing he too was demonstrating a desire to facilitate the solution of the knotty problem faced by the Army Commander. Likewise, both were endeavoring to insure a maximum of team play between Allied Forces and preserve the cordial relations which the Supreme Commander had indicated were essential to success.

General Simpson was grateful for this cooperation, and demonstrated this fact in many ways during the campaign.

A related incident which occurred in the subsequent course of this action should be mentioned, for it illustrates the characteristics of loyalty and firmness. In the case in question, the 333rd Infantry Regiment of the 84th Division with a zone of action which passed through the main portion of the town of Gelsenkirchen had attacked vigorously, captured initial objectives, and overcome stubborn resistance. Losses were heavy and the attack, though generally succeeding, had after several days of conflict been temporarily halted. Late one afternoon, the exact date I cannot recall, the time about 1400 hours, the British commander requested very strongly that the 84th Division make a night attack that same evening. The attack was to be a limited objective assault and the unit involved was of about battalion strength.

It is sound procedure to execute such type operations only after detailed planning and reconnaissance. The unit to be utilized was several miles from the area and the amount of daylight available precluded anything but a most sketchy reconnaissance. Finally, the objective was not vital at the moment, nor did its possession by the Germans jeopardize the situation.

The division commander very properly objected to such a haphazard utilization of his forces, for he was personally aware of the detailed tactical disposition of his troops. His estimate of the situation warranted the estimate that an attack under such disadvantageous circumstances should not be made and he so informed his corps commander (American) who was present at the CP 84th Division.

The matter was presented to the British staff who were reluctant to change. However, the situation and conditions were outlined to the Army Commander with strong recommendations to defer the attack. General Simpson very firmly and yet with due tact and understanding delayed the execution of this phase of the operation until it could be made after proper reconnaissance by daylight.

Shortly after this and several other tactical misadventures, the Army Commander announced that the situation had progressed to the point where elements of both allied forces would revert to normal command and the boundary between the American and British corps was made the boundary between respective responsibilities. Never again was this experience repeated in the Ninth Army. The XXX British Corps was shortly thereafter replaced by the XII Corps (British).

It is my considered opinion that negative information of value was gained by this experiment in inter-allied cooperations and tactics. Certainly it formed the basis for discussions that were enlightening and beneficial to commanders of elements that were posted near the Army’s left flank.

"Operation Grenade" offered probably the best picture of the Army Commander in action and tested his varied qualifications under difficult conditions. Originally scheduled for 10 February 1945, "Operation Grenade" involved first an assault crossing of the Roer River by the Ninth Army and subsequently a push to the Rhine about 100 miles to the northeast. The British Army in turn was to execute a wide envelopment and join up with
the Ninth near the Ruhr area. Orders were delayed and plans changed daily for a period of several weeks. The Roer along the front of the Ninth Army was in flood due to a combination of circumstances partly natural and partly controlled. Melting snow, rain, and controlled water from the dam area near Schmidt which emptied into the Roer had caused the river to flood its banks. The Roer valley thus formed a major obstacle to the progress of the military ground force.

The Roer River bank in the zone of the Ninth Army and the Army's line of departure were contiguous and so front line troops were able to make tests to determine the depth and rate of the stream. The excessive volume of water caused a speed of flow which exceeded rates deemed normally safe for an assault crossing. However, boat and bridge training was executed in rear areas, on the River Maas, until proficiency was attained by the assaulting ground troops and combat engineers. These tactical rehearsals paid off in dividends of team play. Complete understanding obtained of the part each element was to perform in the over-all plan. Ground and air efforts were coordinated and missions were definitely prescribed.

Meanwhile, the repeated delays were exasperating, and the nerves and tempers of all units were somewhat on edge. The Army Commander was completely composed and proved beyond doubt that he could readjust plans and retain flexibility of mind in step with the ever-changing tactical situation. His calm demeanor had a stimulating effect on seniors and juniors alike and confidence and esprit were high. The subsequent actions of all echelons of the Ninth Army in this important operation reflected fully the state of training and morale that was typical of the Ninth. One other feature of the Ninth Army's plan of action in "Operation Grenade" was so outstanding as to warrant special mention. In fact it was a tactical maneuver which received favorable comment from the high command and likely formed the basis for the quotation mentioned earlier from *Crusade in Europe*. The plan required the center corps to execute first a left turn after it crossed the Roer and then a second change of direction to the right. The initial movement permitted an advance in rear of the main defense of the Siegfried line and thus mopped up reserve positions from a flanking direction. The second change was thus simplified and made easy, for reserves had lost their effectiveness. The detailed plans of these maneuvers by the corps involved were worked out most carefully with the Army Commander in a series of man-to-man discussions at which time a variety of variants covering all likely reactions and counter measures by the Germans were considered.

The Army Commander announced himself as satisfied that adequate foresight had been shown that contingencies would be met in accordance with a fluid situation. It is a matter of record that no interference was made by the Army during the ensuing ten days of battle. The only change occurred when the Rhine was reached and this temporary adjustment was caused in the opinion of the corps commander by an inaccurate staff report. In this major engagement the Army Commander demonstrated a high degree of professional skill and preserved all the attributes of a qualified leader of men.

In subsequent actions involving the Ninth Army the speed of advance precluded too close touch with all combat elements by the Army Commander. The morale of the German Army had been seriously impaired and full advantage was taken to press home the knockout. However, the Army Commander with full regard for the consequences of his action permitted his corps and other commanders great latitude, for his confidence in their ability had been won. He was prepared to permit them maximum freedom of action and to support them when and if needed. This was well illustrated in the actions near Klotze, Germany, when German infiltration apparently jeopardized installations in the forward zone. At the request of the corps commander concerned he refrained from interference and was rewarded by the corps' annihilation of the last formal German Armored Division.
A final comment is one designed to show the Army Commander's unselfish and human side. It also illustrates his loyalty to a junior. Early in March 1945, he informed one of his corps commanders that he had repeated his recommendation for promotion of the corps commander. This resulted shortly in the corps commander's promotion, although the Army Commander himself never was so rewarded. Certainly his splendid record warranted such recognition and a position vacancy existed in the T of O which called for four stars.

Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USA (Ret.)
Simon B. Buckner, Jr. was one of the greatest combat leaders produced in World War II—the equal of Bradley though not as intelligent; Patton with greater self-control; Clark without any flair for publicity; Hodges though more flamboyant and less meticulous. He was much above average but did not have the brilliant and quick reaction of Marshall, Gruenther, Bradley, Patch, and Simpson.

General Buckner had great physical strength and endurance although he made no pretense of "keeping in shape" in the accepted sense. During our first year in Alaska he got absolutely no exercise, so involved was he with a staff of limited experience, in a strange and rugged territory. He smoked as many as four packages of cigarettes a day and could drink with the best of them although never in excess. By all accepted measures of physical fitness he should have been flabby but here is what he did in mid-August 1941. For years, on every Fourth of July on Kodiak Island there was a contest to see who could climb to the top of Pyramid Mountain in the shortest length of time. The record was held by a 25-year-old Indian who had trained carefully for the event for several months. One day in August, the general and I had finished a tour of inspection and I was exhausted. General Buckner, on the other hand, said he needed a little exercise and was going to climb to the top of the contest mountain just to see how tough it was. Of course he did not beat the young Indian's record but he came within four minutes of the record time—at the age of 56 and supposedly in poor physical shape. Word rapidly spread throughout the command about the general who could do such a feat.

By reputation the young Buckner was a tremendous company commander. He must have been, with his great physical capacity, his bubbling enthusiasm for everything he tackled, his warmth and love of people.

Perhaps it is because many superior company commanders can never trust subordinates to do a job the way they think it should be done that they do not succeed at higher levels of command, but Buckner had the ability to delegate and decentralize, placing implicit trust and confidence in his subordinates.

If he had a fault in his position of high command, it was [perhaps too much] implicit faith in his subordinates, and yet this same radiating faith seemed in some way to transcend even the lowest levels. If a rascal in whom I had no confidence whatever had any character at all, he usually got the job done.

Two other qualities contributed to General Buckner's success as a leader: tolerance and patience. As an example of his tolerance, on Okinawa each evening we had a staff meeting after the day's fighting to discuss results and go over future plans. I would touch on the highlights and call on other members of the staff for details. One staff member always rambled on and on in his presentations, frequently covering the same ground again and again. When I would seek to cut him short Buckner would have none of it, and each evening he would tolerate from 15 minutes to over an hour of repetition simply because he respected the officer's integrity and did not want to hurt his feelings.

While he was extremely tolerant and patient, you could not by any stretch of the imagination consider him one to be pushed around or bluffed. When an individual or a "sister service" displeased him, he expressed himself in strong and unmistakable terms that soon got around the command and usually eliminated the necessity for an administrative follow-up.

Another anecdote illustrating patience, tact, and a degree of practical human understanding: During the late spring of 1942 a sizable Navy Task Force was sent to Alaska in preparation for countering the Japanese Midway thrust. After Midway, this force remained in Alaskan waters with headquarters some 2000 miles from Attu and Kiska where the Japanese were established ashore. For weeks—months—Buckner implored the Navy
commander to do something, as an offensive gesture at least, but was told that such was impossible because the U.S. forces were on the strategic defensive in the Pacific. After months of fruitless effort to obtain at least a bombardment, Buckner decided on an action which he knew would place his career in jeopardy. He wrote a poem—a bit of doggerel in the Robert W. Service style—something to the effect that the cold northern waters were not for our Navy, etc. Armed with this six-verse gem (from his point of view) he called again on the naval commander and once again made proposals for co-operative action along the Aleutians. After an hour or so of negative discussion Buckner said in effect that we were getting nowhere; that the matter was serious in the extreme, but to add a little levity to an otherwise dull session he would like to read a poem he considered appropriate to the occasion. This he did with the full knowledge that it would soon reach Washington and something would have to give. Not long thereafter Buckner received his third star.

The above incident is not told to criminate the Navy; many times the shoe has been on the other foot. It is intended to show that where matters of principle are involved they can not be compromised. Buckner could have sat back and enjoyed the Strategic Defense and would never have been criticized, but it was that noncompromising-with-principle trait that made him a tremendously successful leader.

Another great personal asset of General Buckner’s was his fine sense of humor. He had an inexhaustible fund of homely stories—always appropriate for the occasion—never off-color—never profane. Many tough staff meetings were smoothed by his warmth and humility.

Shortly before we shoved off from Oahu, General Buckner dispatched a letter to Admiral Nimitz, through our Army Administrative Commander, General Richardson, suggesting that in the unlikely event of his being killed on Okinawa, he thought it appropriate that General Geiger, a Marine, should succeed him as the expedition commander. The recommendation was logical in that Geiger was senior to Hodge and "Spec" Wallace was in doubtful health. When the letter reached Army headquarters it caused such a furor that at first the Commander refused to forward it. However the letter, completely honest in its purpose, had the effect of letting the Marines know that he had great confidence in them, that they were a full partner in the team and not a poor relation. Ironically the letter had to be implemented.

In conclusion, I think the qualities which made General Buckner so successful in his application of high-level leadership were great enthusiasm, unfailing interest in people and their problems, tolerance (he did not expect his juniors to have his professional knowledge and experience and always made kindly allowances for even gross mistakes if he thought they were honest), patience, a sense of humor, and almost superhuman physical energy and endurance. He had all these qualities in the proper proportion—never one to the subordination of the others. These qualities were all characteristic of this man—not someone else. He never patterned himself after another in any respect, and I doubt that at any time in his great career it ever occurred to him that he was applying any of the so-called principles of military leadership. He simply went about his job as he conceived it to be, getting it done by using above-average intelligence and great professional knowledge—fortified with enthusiasm, tempered with tolerance and patience, and facilitated by humility, a fine sense of humor, and the blessing of a splendid body.

However, no matter how strong the body—no matter how well it could take the punishment imposed on it by its owner, it could not withstand the shock of a Japanese shell while leading the Tenth Army to a victory which was completed three days hence. He received his fatal wound during a company action in a most advanced position. I am sure that if he had the script of his life to write over, he would never have changed a word.

E.D. Post
Major General, USA (Ret.)
No leader is, or ever has been, a compendium of all those qualities our text books list as the essentials of leadership. I think the proof of that lies in our review of past and present military leaders. Some have been cruel, some compassionate, many sympathetic, some idealistic, and some (many) completely materialistic and selfish. Since leadership is the product, not the sum, of many integers, undesirable traits are just that; when evaluated and weighed, they may count for little in considering the whole. It seems to me that of those leaders I’ve studied or known, a few common qualities did exist in varying measure. These are in part, individualism, mastery of their craft, an innate sense in recognition of opportunity, and perception in recognition of the real goal.

There can be no blueprint for leadership at any level. Caesar, Napoleon, John Paul Jones, Washington, and all the others were cut on such different patterns that to diagram their behavior embracing their characteristics into a common design, would be impossible. Fortune, chance, the right moment, or if you will, destiny, are all factors that no one has ever been able to control. However, these men knew their job, had an intuitive sense of their objective, and an understanding of the principal tool of their trade—MAN.

John E. Dahlquist, who ranks with the best of military leaders, did not pattern his life and actions after some other person. His naturalness, humility, charm, warmth, courage, and innate sense of justice would have become warped into a distorted deficiency had he made such an attempt. He did have traits common to successful leaders, but they were not cultivated traits of personality. He had them when I first knew him in 1919, and retained them throughout a career which encompassed command and staff assignments at the highest level. One such trait was his insatiable quest for fact and reason—his intellectual curiosity.

During the many years of our association he was always himself. He thought, spoke, and acted from the premise of his own thinking. His mind was as logical as mathematics; for every action there had to be a reason. His mind catalogued and filed everything that passed into it. This was as natural to him as was the warmth and confidence that he engendered in all who came in contact with him.

On a cold winter day in the Vosges, one of his battalions was having a rough time, cut off and out of contact, with the resulting confusion spreading to other units. Dahlquist, with an aide, appeared in a front line platoon when suddenly a “burp gun” opened up from a few feet away, hitting the aide who fell mortally wounded. Despite exposure, Dahlquist held this officer in his arms and remained with him until he died. His courage and selflessness were so evident that many a trembling waverer was restored to sanity and found strength to renew the fight. The end result was the orderly return of the battalion, a steadying of front line units and, most of all, the establishing of a unit’s implicit faith in a general officer who demanded no more than he personally was willing to endure. His action was as natural to him as was his concern for the lowest private.

The formative years of a leader are linked by a chain of circumstances, some of which he controls, others completely beyond his control. Dahlquist controlled a great part of his chain. He courted difficult and tedious jobs. His approach to an assignment was characterized by his search for what the job could do for the service more than what it could do for him. As Deputy G-1, WDGS (at a time when he might well have been G-1), he set out to shape a career personnel policy, not for his group, but for the younger officers of the army. He made as good a deputy as he would have made a chief. Loyalty and teamwork came naturally to him for in his mind it never occurred that there could be another course. He was the principal architect of the promotion and pay legislation enacted by Congress between 1947 and 1949.

Courage is shown in many ways. I have given one incident of his physical courage. There is a greater courage and that is the moral courage to do something that you know
will bring criticism and perhaps prejudicial misunderstanding. An example: The 36th Division, after a struggle through the Vosges Mountains, reached the Rhine plain in late December, 1944, where intense and often fanatical resistance in the form of repeated counterattacks depleted an already greatly reduced unit. When things had become stabilized and the situation under control—not before—Dahlquist went to Corps and Army with a request for relief for the purposes of reorganization and indoctrination of replacements. His studied consideration for the soldier in the line, plus reduced combat capability, replaced the hard determination he had shown in securing his objective, now that the objective had been attained. It took great moral courage for him to make this request in an atmosphere where it was fashionable to bleat that there were no tired divisions—only tired division commanders, and it might well have resulted in his relief from command, a fact of which he was well aware. Physical courage begets audible commendation; moral courage, more often than not, begets censure, second guessing, and the loss of prestige. Dahlquist had no hesitation, other than during the long hours of studying the problem, in arriving at his decision and acting on it. While it is true that the division was soon back in action, it is also true that the week’s respite enabled him to reorganize, train, and refresh his badly worn unit. When forced by an emergency to re-enter combat, the division under his command assisted materially in preventing a German breakthrough near Biche. His actions in this case were based on a thorough knowledge of his mission and an understanding of men.

In reviewing General Dahlquist’s career from the viewpoint of friend, critic, and companion soldier, I repeat that he could not have been a real leader had he tried to emulate or pattern his life on someone else. He would not have been successful because those traits that were essentially his would have been materially changed. It would be nice if all military leaders were gifted with courage, tolerance, integrity, understanding, loyalty, and so on down the list of virtues. Unfortunately, such is not true, as witness one who in our time mastered the greatest world conflict ever witnessed by man. The fact that he did it by being Hitler, not Hindenburg, is one of the few characteristics worthy of some consideration.

In the matter of ambition, Dahlquist was the best-balanced officer I have known. He was broad and reasonably objective in his thinking; honest in thought and deed; more inclined to bully his seniors than his subordinates; never jealous of either juniors or contemporaries or, for that matter, anyone else.

He never played a part. His leadership exemplified broad professional knowledge, intelligence, moral courage, enthusiasm, warmth, integrity, and the ambition to give his best effort, regardless of time or place. He had great physical and mental endurance and an ability to relax which permitted him to cat-nap at any time of the day or night, or in practically any bodily position, sitting or reclining. He had a fine sense of humor, was fun loving, and loved people more than material things.

Dahlquist was a born leader in the sense that he was born with qualities that bring leadership in spite of handicaps. However, he sharpened every natural talent by an intense and absorbing application of hard work applied toward professional betterment.

Charles H. Owens
Colonel, USA (Ret.)
My association with General Swing dates from 1940 when, as a lieutenant colonel, he took command of the 82nd Horse Artillery Regiment in which I was a battery commander. I left Fort Bliss with him as his aide shortly after Pearl Harbor to join the newly formed 82nd Infantry Division at Camp Claiborne, La. (six months later it became the first airborne division in the U.S. Army). General Omar Bradley was the division commander, General Ridgway the assistant division commander, and Colonel Maxwell D. Taylor the chief of staff. To this day, I have maintained close association with General Swing in and out of combat.

The general has many attributes which contribute to his ability as a leader and commander of men, and some traits, which might well be called faults, which undoubtedly work in combination with the attributes to produce the over-all effective man.

He has great personal and moral courage as well as the humility to admit, after the fact, that positive self-discipline was necessary at times to ward off or conceal doubts or fears. For example, during the battle of his division for Nichols Field, while the division was dependent on a 70-mile line of communications back to its landing beach, he suffered great mental anguish knowing as he did how vulnerable that line and the division would continue to be until he could establish contact with General Krueger's Sixth Army, attacking toward him from the north. No slightest indication of this anguish was apparent and, indeed, it was at this very time that he strongly bolstered the determination and confidence of his subordinate commanders and their units: at times with a deliberate show of temper which, to this day, can be awesome; frequently by exposing himself to physical danger; and, on one occasion, by ordering a somewhat jittery regimental commander to the division command post for dinner, a stiff shot of bourbon, and an overnight bed (he went on to become a major general).

In combat, General Swing's quick, incisive mind enabled him to reach decisions rapidly, and he never hesitated to make them. He thinks big, and has amazing perspective which, to a large extent, is derived from a great respect for, and an encyclopedic knowledge of, the traditions, precedents, and accomplishments of the service, as well as from a remarkably accurate and infallible memory. In the inexperienced world of the early airborne, he accurately foresaw its problems as well as its possibilities and he became an outspoken advocate of division and corps assaults, as opposed to those of regimental and smaller size; the joint training and stationing of airborne and troop carrier units; the transfer from the airborne to the air force of the responsibility for accurate placement of the paratroopers on the ground; and the softening of the strenuous qualification course in order to attract senior officers who, though past the weight lifting age, would add the sagacity and experience which new units so badly need. These were not popular views at the time but they have long since been accepted and adopted. In the Sicily assault, he foresaw and foretold the grave danger inherent in the combination of low-flying, slow-moving aircraft, unlighted and unarmed, with navy and ground units teased to repel hostile air attacks.

Probably the best expression of his ingenuity is found in the Los Banos raid, in which his division rescued 2,147 internees from a prison camp deep in Japanese territory, with but
one casualty to itself and none to the internees. He used AMTRACS for a battalion amphibious assault across the large lake on whose shores the camp was located; coupled this with a company parachute envelopment behind the camp, and a guerrilla attack on sentries by the division reconnaissance platoon, which had been smuggled in bancas to the area two nights previously; and prevented reinforcement of the camp garrison by a deep diversionary penetration and blocking attack (by a reinforced regimental combat team) against Japanese reserves. Piloting the AMTRACS on a dogleg course under blackout conditions is a feat that probably has no duplicate elsewhere in war stories.

In the Leyte campaign, the division was given the mission of crossing the jungle-covered central mountain range to cut the Japanese defending force in two. There were no roads and no vehicle could proceed beyond the narrow littoral of the Leyte Gulf. The general organized carabao trains to supply the advance units which initially penetrated the jungle. Then he established an advanced command post and airhead midway across the island and deep in the jungle. Using one C-47 (an Air-Sea Rescue plane he borrowed) and the division light aircraft—no others were available to him—he parachuted into the airhead a company of infantry and a battery of artillery, for security; a platoon of engineers to clear a light craft airstrip; and a mobile surgical hospital to handle future casualties. With this done, he moved the combat elements of the division into the mountains in force. To supply them, he used the division light planes which flew without halt during daylight hours. To increase quantities delivered, he ordered such sturdy loads as canned food and small arms ammunition dropped without parachutes. As the attack moved beyond the forward airhead, the terrain became too rugged, muddy, and steep for additional airstrips, and so he dropped another surgical hospital well forward, again by light plane, one jumper to a plane. Here the wounded could be held until they could withstand the painful litter trip back to the airhead where they were evacuated by light planes converted into makeshift ambulances.

I like to think of his farsightedness in connection with his part in the occupation of Japan. Although none had pursued the Japanese enemy more relentlessly than he during the war, he shed his antagonism with the surrender and reoriented his military sensitivities toward the new threat, communism. From the day of the surrender, his attitude toward the Japanese was one of polite, even friendly, correctness. Only on the few occasions when communist minorities threatened occupation objectives with demonstrations or strikes did his wartime toughness reappear. He was in complete accord with the occupational concept of General MacArthur and supported it to the hilt with his division.

General Swing is impatient with mediocrity and with denseness, and this is putting it mildly. Moreover, he has a temper which complements this impatience and does it full justice, though its displays are of the flash-flood type: brief and devastating. He is blunt where a contradiction of his principles is concerned and the compromise of these principles is not in him, no matter what the cost. He can be tactful and charming—no one more so—but when he considers the cost of being so excessive he will not bother to display either trait.

Douglass P. Quandt
Colonel, USA
Graduating from Virginia Military Institute in 1914, General Burress entered the
regular army in the fall of 1916 in the famous “1st Leavenworth Class,” which included
in its membership Handy, Huebner, Eddy, and many other distinguished soldiers. He
commanded a company in the 23rd Infantry, 2nd Division, in combat in World War I and was
decorated for gallantry in action. In the years which followed he had the assignments
which usually accompany one who is predestined to high command. These included reg-
imental duty, ROTC, War Department General Staff, and many assignments at the Infantry
School including that of Assistant Commandant.

During World War II he organized and fought the 100th Infantry Division in all of
its engagements in the European Theater. His principal assignments after cessation of hos-
tilities were in command positions and included the U.S. Constabulary in Germany; Com-
mandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning; Commanding General, VII Corps; and
Commanding General, First Army, Governors Island, New York, which included the respons-
ible position of military delegate to the United Nations.

A professional soldier of the best type, General Burress was aristocratic, dignified,
soldierly in appearance and deportment. He resembled General Alexander M. Patch in
the respect that he was revolted by speciousness and believed in “being more than you
seem to be.” He was sensitive and had strong likes and dislikes although he seldom
expressed them. While the greater part of his experience was in command positions, he
had great versatility and could have filled any position in World War II with distinction.
Those who knew Burress best felt that no officer had a better mind nor excelled him in
effective problem solving and professional knowledge.

An outstanding personal characteristic was his gift of simplicity and his ability to
capsule sound military principles, giving them profound and lasting meaning. Among
these were: (1) Never hide the body, (2) always follow due process of law, and (3) never
answer a hypothetical question.

As an example of “not hiding the body,” an incident of food poisoning occurred at
Camp Kilmer, N.J., involving several hundred men who were assembled for shipment to
Europe. While there were no fatalities, the transport schedule was interrupted and harm-
ful rumors were being circulated. A reporter from the New York Daily Mirror checked with
the post for information and received a categorical denial of the incident. When General
Burress, CG, First Army, learned of this, he directed the Camp Kilmer commander to call
the reporter, apologize for the misinformation “unwittingly given,” explain the situation
and what was being done to correct it, and invite him to view the situation on the ground
if he so desired. Denial of the incident would only have tended to emphasize it when the
facts became known.

In similar vein, an incident wherein a general officer was alleged to have spent
some $1,500 of public money constructing living quarters for his dogs aroused Congres-
sional interest and criticism. When General Burress was queried by the press, he told
them frankly that an investigation was in progress and when the facts were disclosed due
process of law would be invoked. He refused to be stampeded into intemperate state-
ment, and thus retained not only the respect and affection of the officer involved, but of
the press as well. As might have been foreseen, the incident had been exaggerated and
disciplinary action was unwarranted.

Few people know the important part played by General Burress in the McCarthy
hearings concerning communist infiltration at Fort Monmouth, N.J. and the later incident
involving General Ralph W. Zwicker and a dental officer named Peress. The facts in the
case were that Peress had been drafted into the service, given AUS rank commensurate
with his age and experience, and stationed at Camp Kilmer for compassionate reasons.
After taking the oath of office and being commissioned, he refused to answer questions incident to a routine security clearance. As prescribed by law, a background investigation was begun which required several months to complete. Meanwhile Peress remained on active duty and was promoted from captain to major. The promotion was a routine action involving Peress and some 400 others who should have been commissioned in that grade originally, but were denied this by an incorrect interpretation of the law and regulations.

Just prior to Peress' first appearance before the McCarthy committee, the field investigation was completed and orders issued directing Peress' discharge. He was given the option of selecting his own date of separation within a 60-day period. Peress asked for and was granted 30 days to get his affairs in order but, after appearing before the McCarthy committee and refusing to testify, he requested discharge at the earliest practicable date on advice of counsel. His discharge was accomplished routinely and by no conception was this action prejudicial to the Government.

Senator McCarthy, for reasons best known to himself, summoned Zwicker and in public hearing berated and insulted him. Prior to this occasion, Senator McCarthy had been held in some esteem by the Army who had credited him with sincerity in his investigations. The best that can be said of his action toward General Zwicker is that it was ill-advised, and politically motivated by some obscure reasoning.

When this matter was reported to General Burress, he directed Zwicker to ignore an existing Senatorial subpoena from McCarthy and immediately advised the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, of his action. What followed is well known but General Burress was never summoned to appear, although Senator McCarthy was aware of the facts.

One of General Burress' outstanding characteristics was his ability to delegate authority in varying degrees depending on his opinion of an individual's capabilities. He knew his people and got the maximum results out of them without expecting miracles or involving them beyond their depth; he faced major problems himself or insured by an effective supervision that his policies were understood and being carried out.

If he had a fault, it lay in supporting an incompetent subordinate whom he liked personally, well beyond the point of reasonable tolerance. On one such occasion he carried this to the point where he jeopardized his own professional reputation. He did this because, through introspection, he blamed himself for a failure in guidance which, incidentally, was apparent to no one but him. He never bullied anyone nor did he permit himself to be bullied. He believed that when one subdues men by force, they do not submit in heart but because they are not strong enough to resist.

While holding that the ability to command is the greatest of military attributes, he recognized that the command, the staff, and the troops form a team and the first duty of a commander is to insure that a proper relationship or attitude is established and maintained.

It has been said that he had the gift of simplicity which, stated in a different manner, means that he believed in doing things the easy, rather than the hard way, and he was eminently successful in all his undertakings.
Chapter 5

SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF COMBAT BEHAVIOR

Individual and Group Reactions to Combat

To discuss the “Psychology of War” or the psychological aspects of combat is beyond the scope of this paper although, judging from the correspondence incident to the study, there is a cogent need for such a text. Few reference materials point directly toward the topic, “why soldiers behave like soldiers.” This is not to imply a dearth of treatises on psychology and sociology—quite the contrary. But the field of “combat psychology,” as contrasted with other branches of psychology, appears to have been neglected by those most capable of presenting the subject in usable form.

Sociology is concerned with the behavior of groups, psychology with the behavior of the individual in varying environments and under varying stimuli. Every leader of troops necessarily acquires some knowledge of both sciences at the practical level. Command experience, particularly in the lower grades, gives the observant officer considerable insight into the behavior of soldiers, their response to military orders, and their almost instinctive reaction to certain environments. Increasing experience and maturity add to this knowledge on the part of the higher-level commander.

Fear and courage may be assumed to be the principal emotions aroused in men in combat. Mortal fear is a strong emotion and strong measures are necessary to hold it in control when a man sees his life imperiled. Courage is manifested by the pride and self-control which a man can bring to bear when called on to face possible death in support of a cause, personal or national.

Individual behavior under fire is difficult to predict in training for the simple reason that combat cannot be simulated. HumRRO’s scientific attempts to distinguish the fighter from the nonfighter have produced guidelines and patterns that will have application in the

1The Eltinge lectures and an essay by Burns are recommended reading: LeRoy Eltinge, Psychology of War, Press of the Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1915 (out of print but available in military reference libraries); John H. Burns, Psychology and Leadership, The Command and General Staff School Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1934 (reprinted in Selected Readings on Leadership in Higher Commands, RB 22-1, USAGSC, Chapter 12).

assignment of personnel, but only when a soldier is exposed to the violence of war can we know how he will react to combat.

A distinguished infantry regimental commander has written:

"It has been my experience that you cannot classify officers or men for combat effectiveness until they have been exposed to combat. Some heroic-looking individual will fold at the first shot and some insignificant-looking runt will turn out to be a hero. My operations officer was a college graduate, a football hero, a successful businessman, and a graduate of the Command and General Staff College. When the first artillery concentration came in, in Normandy, he had hysterics and had to be evacuated. One of my battalion communications officers was a dandified-looking Greek who earned my initial prejudice by wearing a neat little mustache and sporting an inch-long little fingernail. He spent the war cruising around the front repairing wires that had been cut by tanks and artillery fire; had crew after crew that accompanied him killed or wounded, but earned the outstanding admiration of everybody in the outfit. If he had anything in him resembling fear, it was not apparent."

Other examples of behavior under the stresses of combat:

"I was pleased when Major...was assigned my division. I had known him for several years and had respect for his ability. He excelled during the training period and was at the point of being promoted when we first entered combat. About 10 days after the fighting began,...'s regimental commander came to me and asked that this officer be relieved, stating that he was a coward. This being difficult to believe, I visited...at his CP and found him at the point of physical and mental collapse. When informed that he was to be relieved and sent home, he offered no protest or apology for his conduct but seemed pleased."

"Colonel...had a record of 24 years of superior peacetime service, being a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and one of the first in his group to be given a regiment. He trained his regiment to near perfection and was highly regarded by his superiors as well as his peers. Within 24 hours after entering combat he broke completely and had to be evacuated through medical channels."

There is nothing to indicate that courage is a constant factor and a great deal which points to the contrary, and this is applicable both to the individual and the group. Its sudden failure in a combat situation, fortunately not a common event, can produce the dramatic and peculiarly catastrophic state known as panic. On the evening of the battle of Wagram, Napoleon's right wing, possessed of a panic-like fright, fled; these were the same troops who earlier that day had, by their heroic fighting, won the battle. At Winchester during the Civil War, the surprised Union troops fled in the morning, but returned and won a victory before night.

A mass of troops, like all crowds, is more easily swayed and more impressionable than are individuals. They are as easily infected with panic as with heroism. (It has been said that anyone taken as an individual is reasonable and tolerably sensible, but that as a member of a herd he is a blockhead.) On one day the wrong influence sways the crowd. On that day some man says "We are surrounded" or "the enemy is in our rear," and the whole crowd runs. No one looks to see if the report is true—most of the men have not even heard the report, but they somehow realize that the crowd is running away, and they run also. They do not know why they run, where they are running, and some are even unconscious of the fact that they are running. On the next day the right man puts in the right suggestion and exactly the same kind of
blind rush, which yesterday they made to the rear, is made today—but to the front. In one instance, panic developed in the following manner:

"During the Battle of the Bulge, my regiment was in the front line near _______. One battalion occupied a forward salient which in my opinion could not be defended. The ground occupied had open flanks and was of no special tactical importance. Feeling that this battalion would be cut off in case of a German attack, I requested permission to straighten out my line by withdrawing the battalion. Permission was refused and I was assured of heavy supporting fires both from a tank destroyer group and a friendly unit located to the left and rear of the exposed position. My regiment itself was low in combat effectiveness due to losses and green replacements and we were only in the line because of the emergency. The battalion commander was new to the unit which in itself had not been trained to the point where the replacements had become identified with their units. The isolation of the battalion was evident to its members and the difficulties of maintaining even the short line of communications caused great anxiety, resulting in careless talk and speculation.

"The German attack, when it came, was preceded by a shelling of the position. When friendly units on the flank and rear opened fire, the rumor spread that the battalion was surrounded, causing it to break and flee en masse. In their headlong flight to the rear, a large group got out of their sector and ran pell-mell into a town occupied by Germans who, thinking they were being attacked, promptly threw down their arms and offered to surrender, but there was no time for this. Actually a few German soldiers joined the 'big run' and became prisoners after passing through our lines."

An army unit is a crowd with common training. As the sentiments and ideas of all persons in a group are molded in the same direction, the conscious individual personalities tend to 'lose' and their motivating forces become directed toward the goals of the group; in effect, the group develops a "personality" and is relatively easy to move to unanimous action. This development is, of course, facilitated by military discipline. The spirit which the commanders may impart to their troops during this process can have either a positive or a negative effect in their later performance.

FM 22-100\(^1\) has this to say:

"Panic develops when a soldier is overcome with fear. It may be evidenced by flight or by freezing in place. . . . The critical situations responsible for the mass emotion of fear may be real . . . or imaginary, such as those created by terror, enemy propaganda, and malicious gossip. The seeds of panic are always present in troops as long as they believe that physical danger is near."

According to DuPicq: "In ancient battles panic was the inevitable issue and he was winner who could resist it longer." The ancient Greeks believed that the soldier must be made to fear his commander more than the enemy. In the Rome of Caesar's time, where military morale was high, extreme measures were taken against skulkers and fugitives; soldiers who fled from combat were beaten to death and units exhibiting cowardice were decimated. According to General Grant and others, success in battle depends mostly on stubbornness, but this stubbornness must be general. The panic of a few men can often destroy the tenacity of the greatest number.

\(^1\)Department of the Army, Military Leadership, Field Manual 22-100, Washington, December 1958.
In examining historical incidents of panic, both in peace and war, we find that the real cause of panic is attributable to an unexpected modification in physical or moral conditions, which diminishes or destroys resistance to harmful rumor or suggestion. A crowd of men who are tired are much more susceptible to suggestion than the same men when in normal health and comfort. With a crowd of men who are worn out, sick, or exhausted, the slightest suggestion is liable to produce a quick and most profound effect. What the effect will be depends on the suggestion. This is the basis for Marshal Soult's statement: "The soldier before dinner and the soldier after dinner are two entirely different beings."

Generally speaking, panic seems to spring most frequently from some kind of illusion. Illusion is essentially misconception. For example, the sentry who sees a bush move and believes it is an enemy sneaking up on him is the victim of illusion. He has actually seen something, but his state of mind is such that he "takes counsel of his fears." In Normandy, a noncommissioned officer of a reconnaissance troop apprehended and brought to his commander, a French farmer whom he had seen "crawling from our lines to a thicket where he conversed excitedly with a group of Germans, giving them information of the unit's disposition." He had indeed seen the Frenchman crawling, or running low, across a small field. The people with whom he made contact were the women of his own family, en route to milk cows, and his purpose was to warn them to return to their "dug-out" and forget the milking, until the enemy shelling lessened.

Command Responsibility

FM 22-100 states:
"The presence of fear and a tendency to panic fluctuate with changes in condition of the troops, in degree of tactical success, and physical conditions on the battlefield. Normally, it is the commander of the small unit who must sense the development of situations interpreted by the troops as critical and who must take personal action to eliminate conditions conducive to fear and panic. However, it is largely the commander of the large unit who trains and indoctrinates the small unit commander and who initiates policies that help him to counteract fear and panic."

Military history is full of deeds where the attitude of a commander, a happy word, or a gesture have changed in an instant the sentiment of troops. General Patton was an expert in this form of applied psychology. On one occasion near the banks of the Rhine, he was in the midst of a group of soldiers who had just undergone a heavy shelling and were badly shaken. To the entreaty of one: "Get down, General, don't get yourself hit," Patton replied: "The Germans won't shoot at me. They are afraid if they killed me, the Third Army would get a good commander." This broke the tension and the story spread throughout the command.

In Korea, when the Chinese Reds were attacking, a division commander appeared at a forward battalion CP and, while conversing with

\(^1\)Panic, incidentally, is not confined to men. Animals are subject to it, and in the days of horse cavalry panics were frequent among the horses themselves, both at maneuvers and in combat.
the battalion commander, deliberately stood up, walked forward, sat
down in full view of the enemy, took off his helmet and mopped his old
bald head. After the gesture (which was not unduly prolonged), he
strode leisurely to the rear, stopping to converse informally with
several soldiers, all in the artillery and mortar impact zone. When
this incident was later reported to General Gay, the corps commander,
Gay asked him: "Weren't you scared?", to which he gave the simple
reply: "Jesus."

These are but random and small examples, but it is not the words
which few hear, nor the gestures which few see, that bring men to
their senses. It is the words or gestures that influence a few; then con-
tagion spreads the effect through the mass, for better or for worse.

"Troops overcome by fright are totally deprived of the critical sense and become
possessed with extraordinary credulity. It is thus that a rumor, known at once to be
false if one would stop and think, will frequently turn a retreat into a demoralized rout,
where traits of primitive man (violence, egotism, ferocity, and fear) appear and pre-
dominate. Sentiments such as devotion, pity, military honor, pride, and self-reliance,
aquired through culture and civilization, are completely annihilated. The absence
of a sense of responsibility imparts a feeling that there is no authority with power to
punish. Let it again be emphasized that it is not the courage of the individual which
changes to imbecility, but the change which takes place in the mind of the crowd. Indi-
vidual minds have ceased to exist—the crowd has a single mind of its own, separate
and distinct from the minds of the individuals composing it. This annihilation of the
intellectual faculties shows what little importance, from the special viewpoint of
panic, is the coefficient of intelligence, sometimes smugly spoken of as one of the
great advantages of the American army. The army that can longest resist panic is the
victor. Crowds under strong excitement are the same, no matter what the grade of
intelligence of the individuals composing the crowd. From this it would seem that
the value of intelligence in war, except in leaders, has been exaggerated. It might
even be said that in the fight itself, stubbornness or fanatical enthusiasm is far
more likely to exercise an influence or the action than intelligence, even among
the officers." (Eltinge, op. cit.)

What are the practical means of rendering the causes of panic
less frequent, of lessening their effects, or of checking them once
they have begun?

Primarily the answer lies in proper training, effective leadership,
and maintaining unit integrity. More than individual training and capa-
ibilities, more than leaders who have demonstrated their effectiveness,
unit integrity must be recognized as essential to full combat effective-
ness. Troops need to fight in familiar surroundings. Here is the
cogent argument for those who propose making the battle group or the
battalion, the package unit of replacement. One thousand men are just
that, when filtered in bits and pieces into a unit as replacements. One
thousand men trained together as a unit are something altogether dif-
f erent. A properly trained unit, of any size, can defeat and put to rout
many times its weight in aggregate numbers.

Another all-important point is that there must be mutual support
between the different arms and all troops should know that it exists.
The artillery in combat, because of the grouping of the men around
immobile objects (cannon) and because of the widely separated pieces,
each with its little squad under the eyes of its chief, is least subject to
panic of all arms. For that reason, artillery in action forms a strong supporting and rallying point.

A particular warning must be given on maintaining an adequate ammunition supply. "Days of fire" are convenient units in planning, but combat conditions cannot be depended on to conform to convenience. For example, generally speaking, the less experienced the troops, the greater will be the consumption of ammunition. The commander whose planning has been detailed enough to embrace his more psychological responsibilities—"to eliminate conditions conducive to fear and panic"—will find that at the same time he has increased manyfold the chances that his mission will succeed.

"The most difficult problem faced by the commander of a combat unit is to inculcate in troops the sentiment of joint responsibility based on mutual confidence. It can exist only in soldiers who have gone to war together, for the soldier is revealed only in crises, and characters are verified only in suffering and danger. If no one knows himself until he has suffered, still less does he know others until he has suffered with them." (Eltinge, op. cit.)
Chapter 6

SUMMARY DISCUSSION

To the casual reader, and perhaps to the critical reader as well, portions of this paper may appear contradictory and inconclusive. The objective has been, not to present coordinated and definitive "results," but to present a consensus, or a selection, of serious opinions in readable form. Each chapter could have been much longer if the several points had been developed in detail, but the purpose has been to present material on which an instructor or writer on the general subject can base lectures, lessons, or papers by amplification. In this sense it is primarily a reference document. The author claims little or no originality in the presentation; he does not necessarily agree with the relative weights assigned certain traits, nor even with all that has appeared to be the consensus.

Summary Comments on the Basic Questions of the Study

For what it may be worth, summary comments which largely express the author's personal opinions are now submitted to the questions posed by the Command and General Staff College, in the order in which they appear in the Introductory Note.

(1) The respects in which higher-level leadership varies from leadership below division level

A difference in the technique of applied leadership begins at the stage where the commander's will must be imposed largely through subordinate officers. This begins at regimental level or combat team level, the primary difference between the two levels being in size and, at division level, the first appearance of a general staff element.

Just what does the general staff do? Simply stated, it does what the general tells it to do. While it exists primarily to plan and coordinate, it must operate in certain situations, and this applies to the general staff at every level including the Department of the Army. It should be regarded as superior in importance to the special staff in name only. Both are essential at the higher levels.

Intelligence, desire to achieve, the ability to think logically and arrive at sound conclusions, diligence, consistency, and experience are essential to a general officer in far greater degree than in the lower grades of the line. Obviously these are desirable qualities at the lower levels as well, although it is not too difficult to weld four companies into one good battalion. At company level where the problems that occur are more readily visible, the platoon leaders and the first
sergeant can pick up a certain amount of slack. When an officer reaches a level where, perforce, he must exercise command almost entirely through subordinate officers, the requirements are greater.

Military leadership is anomalous in being both simple and complex. The "face to face" leader is in effect an apprentice who, if given the opportunity to develop initiative, can capitalize on his intelligence as he gains experience. With experience, intelligence becomes the determinant factor. With intelligence and experience, the ability to delegate and supervise is developed. Without the desire to excel you can not expect much at any level.

It has been stated earlier that successful leadership is dependent on the product of the essential traits, not the sum. The following example is offered:

Consider if you will, a three dimensional object—one having length, breadth, and thickness. Consider length to be experience, breadth to be intelligence, and thickness to be motivation. If we assign arbitrary weights to these three components and multiply them, we arrive at a figure which more nearly represents the weight of the individual than if we simply add. A leader with an arbitrary rating of 100 (the maximum) in experience, 80 in intelligence, and let us say 10 in motivation, weighs 80,000 as a product and 190 as a sum. Another individual with 100 in motivation, 100 in experience, and zero in intelligence has a higher rating (200 vs. 190) if we add but zero if we multiply, which is closer to the true evaluation.

High-level leaders can be evaluated with almost mathematical exactness by their ability to command officers. At the higher level it is of utmost importance for the commander to recognize his responsibilities to his subordinates and to the subordinates of his subordinates. These include a responsibility to appraise, to discipline, to instruct, and to guide. In the matter of efficiency reports, it is useful to assume that all subordinates are superior until proven otherwise. General H.J. Brees, generally considered a "low rater," followed this principle explicitly, but he made it a point to know or appraise those on whom he was required to render or indorse efficiency reports. The individual who approaches this important function of command by placing the burden of proof on subordinates (they are mediocre until they prove otherwise) is giving an indication of a basic lack of trust in others.

In the profile of General Patch, his intense, not to say stubborn, loyalty was a point of comment. Regardless of personalities, loyalty is the one common trait of most, if not all, great leaders. The distinction here is between great and successful leaders. Unfortunately some men who have risen to general officer rank have done so by concealing a self-absorption more real than apparent. Loyalty is an essential trait of every member of a hierarchy, but it is something that seeps down from the top—it does not bubble up from the bottom. It follows that the more exalted the rank, the more important this quality becomes.
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An expert when asked to evaluate the importance of a good pony to the polo player said: "I would estimate the value of the mount as being 85 per cent of the total requirement. Competitive spirit and a thorough knowledge of the essentials constitute the remaining 15 per cent. A man who can't ride and hit the ball doesn't belong on the field in the first place."

By the same token, loyalty, intelligence, and experience are essential to the success of the high-level leader. If he does not have motivation, integrity, professional knowledge, and the other traits, at least to an acceptable degree, he does not belong in a position of great responsibility.

(2) The knowledge of psychology or sociology required by higher commanders

This is impossible to answer categorically. (How wide is wide?) Perhaps it can be said that a profound knowledge is desirable as long as the individual does not become overbalanced by fancying himself a professional in either field. It is not necessary to be able to shoe a horse to know when it has been properly shod, nor does the civil engineer whose only duty is to operate a transit require a college degree. The army officer who in the normal course of duty aspires to be a professional psychologist or sociologist as well as a leader, must neglect essential and important knowledge peculiar to his own profession, to acquire these equally complex talents. The amateur who attempts to emulate the professional reminds one of a Johnstown flood sufferer comparing experiences with Noah.

(3) The importance of traits of the leader in the exercise of high-level leadership

This has been shown rather fully in the text through the use of the profiles. There is no prototype for a leader. The theory of leadership which assumes that there is only one leader in a group is basically sound but we should be mindful that multiple leadership is sometimes found in organizations of moderate size, where a subordinate occasionally has more leadership influence than the commander. If we accept this, we must also realize that the practicability of multiple leadership diminishes as the level of leadership rises.

Leadership is not only dependent on the traits (and actions) of the leader, but the ways in which these traits (and actions) are perceived by the followers. One of the greatest combat leaders in both of the World Wars was not held in great esteem by his command until entering combat. Superficially he did not look the part, and had little opportunity to demonstrate his greatness in training assignments.

The purpose of introducing the six profiles in the test was to describe in detail the technique of leadership demonstrated by six successful (and great) men. While they perhaps had many traits in common, they had many differences as well, many of these factors being compensating.

Napoleon was "The Little Corporal"; Hitler, despite provincialism, limited education, and low birth appeared as a Messiah to the Germans; Zachary Taylor and Nathan Bedford Forrest, according to their biographers, had little, if any, formal education; Patton and
MacArthur were gifted orators, while Pershing did not have this quality—nor did it bother him much, as far as could be determined; General Swing had a commander's presence plus enthusiasm and an impelling inner nature but he never endeared himself to the press (he could hardly have cared less); Ben Lear never ran a popularity contest, and Preston Brown never gave much of a damn about anything or anybody. Yet, despite these individual variations they all were successful leaders.

As a final observation, may it be said that the self-absorbed leader is doomed from the moment his self-absorption becomes apparent. (4)

The impact of the group being led and of the situation on the exercise of high level leadership

General Burress conceived his primary objective as being to develop a proper attitude within his command. The Navy's expression of a "happy ship" is a meaningful one. Some have referred to this intangible as being a "climate of leadership." Call it what you will—it has been attained when the command exhibits complete effectiveness coupled with an intense and cheerful desire to obey.

The impact of the situation has been recognized to the point that we have developed within the Army (and in other fields as well) a group who may be referred to as "situationalists." These are the people who give themselves an out, when posed a difficult hypothetical question, by falling back on the trite saying: "It all depends on the situation." Some of them actually believe this. It can not be denied that much depends on the situation, but leadership involves both personality and environment, in interaction. To define where one ends and the other begins is like defining a reasonable doubt as being a doubt for which you can give a reason. It becomes an exercise in semantics.

All situations pose problems peculiar unto themselves. Most situations can be handled by perception, stability of character, and decisiveness. Some can only be handled by the Apostle Paul.

Concluding Remarks

In Task OFFTRAN II, the U.S. Army Leadership Human Research Unit conducted a study of 42 Infantry platoon leaders to isolate job behaviors which discriminated between good and poor leaders.¹ Both superiors and subordinates of the platoon leaders were interviewed to determine acts which each leader actually performed on the job. It was found that platoon leaders who were consistently rated high were differentiated from those rated low in that they

1) Stressed high standards of performance.
2) Showed personal involvement in good performance by the platoon.
3) Showed personal competence in the performance of their own jobs.

(4) Frequently promised rewards and infrequently threatened punishment when assigning work.
(5) Rewarded good performance.
(6) Obtained information and suggestions from subordinates and demonstrated good judgment in accepting and rejecting suggestions.
(7) Punished poor performance resulting from a motivation failure and used punishment instructively.
(8) Took action to reduce the effects of disrupting influences.

In summarizing, it appeared that the effective leader (1) clearly and consistently emphasizes performance as the basis of reward and punishment, (2) uses punishment instructively for motivational failure, and (3) communicates clearly about standards desired.

If these conclusions are valid, it appears that even at the lowest level of command exercised by a commissioned officer, subordinates are primarily concerned with a leader knowing his trade and applying it with fairness to all. Popularity beyond that which is engendered by professional respect is of little or no consequence; to a certain degree, and unfortunately, this fact is not always fully appreciated. It is natural for a man to crave friendship and affection, but it is essential for him to earn the respect of the people with whom he serves, who are judging him as a commander and not as a good fellow.

While it is hoped that the study reported in this paper has, in itself, contributed something toward a better understanding of the application of leadership at the higher levels, it also suggests further exploration along the guidelines suggested by the source material. For example, by applying the method of investigation employed in OFFTRAIN II to a larger number of general officers, we might add to our knowledge of "why" some have succeeded and some have failed, thus coming closer to a pattern of sorts.

Leadership has been the subject of an extraordinary amount of writing. It seems out of keeping with accepted notions of fitness and order, that some of the best treatises have been written by people who have had little or no experience in command, while men of experience, occasionally with reputations as leaders, have often confined themselves to writing dogmatic nonsense. The explanation may lie in the fact that leadership is learned, not taught. Intelligence coupled with experience leads to a form of understanding of the problem which is superior to that which can be gained by book knowledge.

It has been said that if, in reading a book, one retains a single useful idea, the effort was worthwhile. In this sense it is believed that, with the guidance obtained from what we may term a pilot study, further exploitation of the knowledge of the "senior and experienced commanders" will be profitable.

One last thought: Never underestimate a subordinate's intelligence; never overestimate his knowledge.
Appendix A

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Appendix B
SAMPLE COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN TO CONTRIBUTORS

Dear______:

The Command and General Staff College have requested HumRRO to examine and critically analyze the practical application of leadership at division and higher levels and I have been given the job of exploring the subject to determine if it is in itself researchable. Frankly, I don't know.

From biographies and monographs on the subject, it appears that leadership study is generally confined to the bare listing of qualities exhibited by successful leaders and that little has been done in the so-called "high-level" field to relate these qualities to actual practice. My first thought on the matter was that leadership is leadership at every level; that with experience and increased rank a successful "face to face" type leader acquires the personality and technique required to direct more complicated activities and assume greater and broader responsibilities. On the other hand we have both known personally outstanding company and/or battalion commanders who simply could not progress effectively above this level. Why?

It is obvious that at regimental level and above a commander is dealing largely with commissioned personnel and from the division on, he has available to him a general staff, but what is required of a leader at these levels that apparently was of lesser importance in the lower grades?

Those who are most knowledgeable of high-level leadership are obviously the senior commanders and staff officers of our recent wars. You being a member of that category can assist me greatly in my effort to dig out something useful or come quickly to a dead end, if you will give any thoughts you have in the matter. Specifically:

(1) Is there any difference in applied leadership at various levels of command? What basic essentials increase in importance with maturity and broader responsibility?

(2) We acquire "tricks of the trade" and "rules of thumb" as we gain experience. Many of these come from observation and some are a result of trial and error. Can any of these techniques be stated axiomatically?

(3) Why can we often identify a truly outstanding or highly successful company commander and predict at the same time (and correctly) that he could never be a successful division commander? What does he lack? If an early diagnosis is made, is there anything we can do to
apply corrective measures? Conversely, can the man who is only moderately effective as a relatively small unit commander be identified as having a potential for higher command? (I suppose this to a degree to be a matter of intelligence.)

If you have the time and inclination, I will appreciate anything and everything you can tell me, coupled with personal experiences or historical incidents of which you have knowledge and which have impressed you because of some salient feature.

With kind personal regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,

E.B. Sebree
Major General, USA (Ret.)
Four categories of people make up a conscript army. They are (1) those to whom military service is the breath of life itself, (2) those who accept military service as a sacred duty, (3) those who serve because they are forced to do so—it is the lesser of two evils, and (4) those who will not fight, accept responsibility, or make the slightest effort to become soldiers.

As to (1), we have no worries. The group described in (4) should be eliminated by any means consistent with due process of law. They are not only worthless as individuals but they also have a bad influence. They are seldom, if ever, redeemable.

Group (2) requires only training—not motivation, while group (3) requires both motivation and training, and in my experience constitutes a sizable percentage of drafted personnel. Most soldiers in this group can be motivated by effective leadership. Their initial attitude can be attributed to previous environment where military service is pictured as something to be endured and performed with the least expenditure of effort instead of a sacred responsibility to one's country.

A good soldier's morale is something like a lady's virtue—you don't talk about it; but there has been so much said about it recently that I want to add my bit. Above all we must rid ourselves of the notion that morale is achieved by giving somebody something. Real morale is more readily achieved by depriving soldiers of something rather than giving them something. Hostesses, movies, soda fountains, and what have you, have their place, but endurance of hardship, sacrifice, competition, ability to outdo another unit, the feeling of inner strength—in short, the knowledge that he is tough, hardbitten, and able to take and inflict stiff blows, gives the soldier morale, and the more he has to put up with things and overcome obstacles, the more it develops.

You may recall that Major General Osborne was appointed to head the WD Special Service morale setup in 1941. Periodically he got out questionnaires—simple questions, one subject at a time—training, food, recreation, housing, etc. The three major commands (Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Supply) were required to send a list of 20 per cent of their units to Osborne who in turn sent in teams to these units, interrogating 25 per cent of the personnel, thereby getting a 5 per cent poll.

We routinely submitted mathematically every fifth of our units. Personally I was not interested until a set of questions having to do with integration came over. The questions were simple: Should colored troops be in separate divisions—or a colored regiment in a white division—or a colored battalion in a white regiment—or a colored platoon in a white company—or should the integration be complete, as it is today. This time we picked our units after great study—G-1 and myself—both extremely busy. We took a full day to do it. No one can say what a cross-section of America is, but we did our best with that list. I then took the question to about 15 generals, saying to them that as a leader of soldiers, they should be able to predict closely what percentage would say "Yes" to the last question—complete integration. The largest percentage submitted to me was 35 per cent. I myself put down 25 per cent. The poll returned 83 per cent. Moral: Leaders should know their people. We didn't.

There is a type of officer who, in the lower grades, is regarded as worthless by his contemporaries but who has the ability, by doing as little as he can, of never doing anything wrong. While not appearing so, he can be just as ambitious as the fine, hard-working man. His spare
time he devotes to playing polo or some such thing. When not playing polo or riding the horse show circuit, he cultivates those who can help him, and when his ambition becomes overweening, he learns to cut throats. Later with the passage of time he becomes a division staff officer where he is in a position to feed misleading information to his division commander in the hope that he, and not one of the people who are really carrying the load, will be the one to get a star. In some cases this character, who has ducked command at the working level, suddenly fancies himself as ripe for a regiment and manages to swing this. While I do not consider myself vindictive and certainly have no axe to grind on my own account, I admit to a momentarily pleasurable feeling when some bird in this group comes a cropper. The Army is doing itself a disservice in not making actual command duty (not command duty 'for the record') a prerequisite to promotion in the combat arms. In those rare cases where a line officer reaches field grade without having ever commanded troops because of an honest lack of opportunity, the individual will be doing himself a favor by transferring to a noncombat service."

"Colonel Claude Miller, then executive officer of the National Guard Bureau in Washington gave me a very solid lesson in leadership one day. I do not know what I had done but I must have done something, or maybe he just thought it well to produce this idea, 'just in case,' and as a part of his duty to a subordinate. He took me to a window in the old Munitions Building, pointed across the Potomac toward Arlington and said softly: 'Frank, probably most of the people who lie there, at one time or another thought they were indispensable. A sobering and leveling thought.'" (General Frank L. Culin)

"During the Bulge, the weather, the casualties, and the general situation were depressing. On this occasion, I had been visiting front line units and was returning to my CP when a friendly plane opened fire on the road just ahead of my jeep and killed two members of a small engineer detachment—and this, mind you, at least three miles behind the front lines. When I arrived at my CP in a schoolhouse, I noticed several people present but proceeded immediately to the corner without speaking to anyone. Suddenly I was aware of someone approaching and looking up, recognized the Army Commander, General Patton. He greeted me informally and asked 'How goes the battle?' I told him what had happened and must have displayed the very dim view I had of the war at the moment. When I had finished, he put his hand on my shoulder and said: 'The thing that concerns me mostly, is that they almost got you. We can't afford to lose people like you.' It is unnecessary to elaborate on the restoration of my morale and the disappearance of momentary self-pity." (Name withheld by request)

"As to the moot question: 'Are leaders born or can they be developed,' I ran across a book, years ago, where the author, after examining the families of some fifty eminent commanders, concluded that for military leaders, 'a peculiar type of ability is largely transmitted or inherited.' Citing, among others, the Lee family of Virginia as being noted for its contribution of a number of outstanding leaders, it was suggested that leadership in military life is basically a matter of heredity. I was not at the time, nor am I now, impressed with this line of reasoning. Napoleon was the only member of his family to distinguish himself as a soldier and the same applies to George Washington. There was only one Lincoln and according to his biographer, one Kitchener. The two Jacksons in American military history were not related.

"Both heredity and environment are involved in the molding of our lives, but men are born with different capacities to learn and profit by experience. In the case of the mentally retarded, this capacity is small, whereas with the genius, it is great. Marshal Foch states: 'There are natural gifts in a man of genius, and in a born general; in the average man such advantages may be secured by means of work and reflections.'" (Colonel John R. Vance)
Appendix D

COMMAND
by
Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr., USA (Ret.)

Leadership, or command, is not an end in itself—only the means to an end. The end is for the commander to make his organization a tool of the best quality, organized, armed, equipped, supplied, physically competent, skillful in the use of arms and equipment, and in combat skills, all knit together in a team determined to carry out the will of the commander regardless of the situation. The basis of successful leadership is confidence and loyalty.

Within the limits of the material means given him, effectiveness depends to a maximum degree on the leadership ability and practice of the commander. The military system of discipline is an essential foundation, but the extent to which it succeeds depends on the commander's own personality.

Because of needs and national policy a man finds himself in the military forces. At this point patriotism, ideology, some understanding of the war or national situation is necessary to satisfy him that the cause is just, or at least necessary. But once in the service, he immediately finds himself in situations he would avoid if he could; restrictions, discomfort, hardship, danger. He is no longer his own master. All of these troubles are imposed on him by the orders of his military superiors. Therefore, it follows that a commander's first problem is to win and maintain the maximum confidence of his subordinates in himself, so that they accept as necessary the troubles resulting from his orders because they have positive faith in his superior competence. When members of a command exhibit an intense and cheerful desire to obey, it may be said that a proper command attitude has been developed. Every great commander has won the confidence of his subordinates, even to the extent that it has survived grave military defeats.

The greatest determination to carry out the will of the commander requires that beyond confidence, there be a personal loyalty to the commander. When this loyalty exists there is an inspiration that achieves great results. Napoleon and Lee, as well as General MacArthur, received this kind of loyalty and strangely enough, in modern times, it was accorded Hitler. The point here is that the commander must inspire confidence by his own acts. No one can do this for him. While he may do certain things with the deliberate intent of gaining maximum control over his unit, and the maximum efforts from it, his acts must not be a mere front; they must represent the real man under his rank insignia. General Summerall regarded loyalty as something which "seeps down from the top—it does not bubble up from the bottom." We can fool our superiors from time to time, our contemporaries rarely, but our subordinates never.

To inspire confidence, the commander must himself be confident. He must tackle his job with a sure hand, seeing obstacles as challenges rather than causes for apprehension. He must know in his heart that he can understand and analyze his problems, make firm decisions, give clear orders, and forcefully carry out his will in spite of difficulties. One of the best examples in history of a confident commander who had an immediate tremendous effect on the morale and combat proficiency of his forces was General Montgomery when he assumed command of the British Eighth Army in the desert. His first order to his troops read: "We will fight the enemy where we now stand; there will be no withdrawal and no surrender." He also ordered all plans for retreat to be burned. The new commander was something the British troops had not before experienced, and the effect was thrilling. From that moment on the Eighth Army never looked back.

Self-confidence may or may not be justified. Only that confidence which results from real achievement is of value. Sometimes fools in their ignorance rush in where angels fear to tread.
Only failure can eventuate when there is no real basis for self-confidence. On the other hand, one who lacks confidence, even though well instructed, is doomed to failure. In his crushing defeat at Chancellorsville, General Hooker was reported to have been drunk. Hooker denied this when questioned and said: "All that happened was that Hooker lost confidence in Hooker."

The man who lacks, or loses, confidence, mistrusts his ability to meet the situation; he doubts his own conclusions; he takes counsel of his fears. Every obstacle becomes a dangerous risk. He tends to retreat at the first sign of real danger. Such an attitude is infectious, and pretty soon his entire unit will be like him.

It is clear that a commander should have that character which is willing to accept responsibility, to reason out his problems, make decisions, and then push them through to success, but even the best equipped man, as far as basic character is concerned, cannot succeed unless he knows his profession. He must possess the intelligence to learn, and the perseverance to "burn the midnight oil," to perfect himself in knowledge of the military art. Good examples of this determination to acquire military knowledge and skill are Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, and again, Field Marshal Montgomery.

It has been observed that loyalty starts at the top and not at the bottom, which is another way of saying that the commander who desires loyalty of his men, must be loyal to them first. Perhaps we should analyze this a little. Every soldier is primarily concerned with his own self and his own problems. The commander must see that he is treated fairly, and to the extent that the man who locks confidence, can not do much about. It should never be forgotten that even the newest recruit is a personality and his own problems. The commander must see that he is treated fairly, and to the extent that he is to be pampered, for his training should be arduous and perfection in everything demanded. Deliberate disobedience or neglect should be punished by appropriate action. While praise should not be exaggerated, it is important to recognize publicly whatever is praiseworthy. Progress should be encouraged and the commander should seek to combine in himself the functions of coach and quarterback in order to perfect his team. Make your subordinates successful in their jobs, and then give them credit for it. If they do well, the commander also does well, and gets credit. Why not spread it around to those who did so much of the work?

As to some practical methods in command technique:

a. It is better to assume that people are trying to do their best or think they are. This is of course not always true but it has the advantage of restraining suspicion and criticism before there is anything to be critical about. From this, people soon learn that you are there to help—not find fault.

b. Insist on full obedience. Never overlook deliberate disobedience or neglect of duty. Get the full facts before acting and be sure that the offense is not the result of ignorance, inexperience, or misunderstanding. If you do this and make the penalty fit the offense, the culprit will know that he is getting his just deserts. He won't like it but there will be little or no resentment because of a sense of injustice.

c. Avoid public humiliation of an individual unless that is the only thing that will influence him. Never speak harshly or critically to an individual in the presence of others if it can be avoided. Sometimes a commander will discover that his own orders are faulty or that he has made a mistake. For a senior to accept the responsibility and admit his mistake, never lowers his authority or influence—rather the reverse.

d. An unusual and little thought of way to lose the confidence and support of subordinates is for a commander to insist on retaining someone who can improve his assignment and get a promotion by leaving the organization. A better policy is to assist a better assignment and promotion anyone who deserves it. This causes people to feel that if they do a good job for you, you will try to push them up the ladder. Of course, there may be a vital need for retaining an officer, but he should not be held longer than the situation really requires. No one is indispensable.

e. It is essential to make a clear distinction between matters of rule and those of judgment. Infraction of rules must be hit hard and quick. Errors in judgment need correctional instruction. When joining a command look for something to praise before looking for mistakes or weaknesses. Try adjusting yourself to the new organization before demanding that everything be done the way you are used to. When you have discovered a mistake or weak—ness and know in your own mind how to correct it, contact the responsible individual and ask him simple questions about the matter, so framed that he may discover the weak point and apply corrective action without
having to wound his ego by telling him he was wrong. In this way it would appear that by his own thinking, he had seen a better way to do the job and had done it on his own. He then learns by his own thinking and not just because you point out the error and indicate its correction. This approach develops initiative—ability to act without feeling dependent on someone else, and a feeling of belonging on the same team. It emphasizes mutual confidence.

f. A senior commander should spend as much time as he can with his lowest ranks. That is where most of the work and fighting are done. If people at the bottom are functioning as desired, there is no great need to worry about intermediate levels. If the lowest are doing wrongly, then by tracing back up the chain of command, it is easy to locate the trouble. It is very easy for a commander to conjure up cogent reasons why he should not leave his CP, but on analysis, the reasons usually do not hold up. The higher the command, the more difficult it is to do even necessary supervision, but the commander must make the effort and actually get around.

g. Every activity of a unit is important and must be done right. Training in purely military subjects and combat techniques requires constant supervision. The division or corps commander who concentrates on personal supervision of training and combat activities and neglects or by-passes administrative functions or attempts to supervise them by casual visits, is not effectively supervising. One way to plug this gap is to organize inspection teams in every general and special staff section, and keep them on the move. When practicable, every administrative activity should be visited every month, with records of inspections transmitted to unit commanders. Unsatisfactory or superior conditions should be reported immediately to the commander for personal action. In the case of superior reports, try to get around and see it yourself, thus giving public recognition to an achievement. Unsatisfactory activities should be re-inspected by the staff team. If on re-inspection the work is still unsatisfactory, the commander should look over the matter in person. Nobody likes to have the (division) commander look at something that is unsatisfactory. You only have to do it once.

There is a real difference in applied leadership at various levels. Tactical and strategic principles are the same, men are basically the same; proper personal attitudes and objectives do not differ. It is the circumstances which are different and therefore require different application of the same basic principles. At the company and battalion level the problems are tangible and immediate. The commander and his men together are face to face with them. The commander has a high degree of personal contact with his men. Physical courage has its greatest leadership impact. The problems are relatively simple, covering small areas, few people, few types of situations, most of which are very tangible. At the higher levels of command it is quite different. Physical courage has fewer opportunities to be displayed; moral courage is a constant requirement. It is impossible to spend the desired time with the men at the fighting level and the commander must find other ways of making his influence felt. The problems are greater, more complex, and see farther into the future and into space—into the unknown. Often the governing factors are relatively intangible. Much greater professional knowledge is essential and the purely intellectual element assumes prominence.

The successful commander at company or battalion level, who lacks the urge to prepare himself for advancement, or who lacks the basic intelligence or the high degree of courage to deal decisively with intangibles, will fail in higher grades. Military schools may help such a person but he will never be more than just ordinary.

I think it quite possible that an officer lacking the leadership qualities essential to command, might do good work as a staff officer. Here he does not have to command men—to get the most out of them. Neither does he have to make the decisions and accept responsibility for them. His schooling and native intelligence may enable him to do a fine staff job. I noted many years ago that it was much easier for a regimental adjutant or other staff officer to get a good efficiency report, than for the best company commander to get an equally good report. This often led to undue preferment and in some cases brought high command which could not be handled and resulted in the officer’s removal under humiliating circumstances. Those who aspire to high command should make every effort to obtain practical experience in handling officers and men at every level of rank, not just command assignments "for the record.”