A SURVEY OF ELITE STUDIES

By
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assisted by Jerry L. Weaver

Prepared under subcontract with the University of Pittsburgh

TASK ROLE
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FOREWORD

This survey was conducted, as a part of SORO's Basic Studies research program, under sub-contract to the University of Pittsburgh with Dr. Carl Beck of the Department of Political Science as principal investigator. The Basic Studies Division was formed to encourage, promote, and conduct research on fundamental social and behavioral processes that influence the U.S. Army's special warfare mission in developing nations and remote areas. One such fundamental area of interest is leadership structure, interaction, and processes.

Leadership in the emerging nations is widely recognized as a crucial factor in the insurgency situations that many of these countries face. It follows that success of the U.S. counterinsurgent mission is dependent upon knowledge that will be helpful in dealing with indigenous civilian and military leadership groups. An understanding of leadership structure and interaction is required. The knowledge needed is to be found in answers to the following types of questions:

What leadership techniques are common to most of the political systems found in emerging nations?

What techniques are unique to particular kinds of political systems?

Are there identifiable patterns of change for leadership groups in these contexts?

Do patterns vary according to different types of political systems?

Only with this kind of background knowledge is it possible to assess adequately the significance, to a counterinsurgent situation, of specific types of changes in leadership groups, or the use of particular kinds of leadership techniques. The problems presently being faced in Viet Nam are
a dramatic demonstration of this need.

In planning and developing research programs in new areas of interest to the U.S. Army, the essential first step is a survey of past literature and research to indicate gaps in existing knowledge as well as the need for future work. Dr. Beck's paper was designed to serve this purpose for both the military and academic communities. It was decided to assess current understanding of the role and functions of leadership groups in different types of political systems. In so doing, Dr. Beck supplies us with a conceptual essay on "the study of political elites" that considers the problems of identifying elites, describing elite structure, etiquette, and techniques of control, conceptualizes idealized elite systems, and analyzes political elite change. This essay should be of special interest to military users, since it provides a systematic approach to leadership groups and leadership interaction. It should also be of value to researchers who require a brief state-of-knowledge assessment as a basis for planning. Dr. Beck also includes a bibliography of over 290 references for those who wish to delve further into particular problems or examine special areas of the world in more detail.

In addition to the materials contained in this report, Dr. Beck prepared abstracts of the studies listed in the bibliography and an inventory of major propositions and statements about elite structure and interaction. These are available on loan from the SORO Library as source materials for researchers and military personnel who may wish to conduct further work in this important problem area.

Ritchie P. Lowry
Acting Chairman, Basic Studies Division
A major task of the social sciences is to find methods by which the myriad of data available can be grouped so that meaningful hypotheses regarding behavior can be developed, tested, and refined. Existing studies of political elites illustrate both the need for and the difficulties of such efforts.

Most contemporary students of politics assume that an elite exists in all political systems and that description and explanation of the style of politics of a given system must include a description and explanation of the behavior of that system's elite. Yet such a study faces certain problems: how to define the concept elite; how to identify the elite; and how to discover the relationships between a given elite and a particular political system.

This project began in the spring of 1963, following a discussion between Dr. William Lybrand of the Special Operations Research Office and myself on the need for a "stock taking" of the literature on political elites. We agreed that a report of such a stock taking endeavor should include a set of abstracts of a cross section of the literature, a collection of general statements regarding elite behavior in a variety of political systems in varying circumstances, and the construction of a typology within which these data could be ordered and meaningful behavioral relationships explored.

These goals were the organizing points for this project. At the outset a bibliography of theoretical and empirical elite studies, containing approximately 2,000 items, was collected. A representative and relevant cross section of this literature was then abstracted. In addition, general
Statements on the study of elites, eliteness, elites as social aggregates, groups constituting the elite, the behavior of elites in various types of political structures, and elite change were distilled from the literature.

This survey could not have been completed in the four months available without the assistance of many persons. Jerry L. Weaver spent two months on the project organizing materials to be abstracted and abstracting much of the literature on Africa and Latin America. Arleen Russell and J. T. McKechnie joined the project in August and helped us to fill in many gaps. Lawrence Moll spent most of August preparing the guide to abstracts and checking citations. We owe many other debts of gratitude. Mrs. Mosso of the University of Pittsburgh library was exceedingly helpful in tracing many of the items we sought. Barbara Werner, Dorothy Scalise, Virginia Baker, and Mrs. Ann Walko helped in the preliminary typing. Mrs. Fannie Gold typed the final report. Although he was not involved in the project, we owe a debt of gratitude to Holbert N. Carroll, chairman of the Department of Political Science. The presence of this project in already overcrowded quarters during a full teaching term was a cross he bore with equanimity and good grace. Finally, Jim Malloy and I owe a debt of gratitude to our families for their forbearance while this study was being completed.

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PART I
THE STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITE

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I. INTRODUCTION

In this essay we would like to suggest some factors that seem relevant to the study of political elites. It would be premature to title this section a research scheme, but it is the foundation upon which such a scheme could be developed. The assumption underlying the following presentation is: for many reasons, particularly because of the complexity of social organization, some individuals and groups are more influential in political decision making than others; these individuals and groups make up the political elite. The relationship of individuals and groups within the elite, as well as the relationship of the elite to the non-elite, vary from state to state and from situation to situation. Since the elite shapes the structure and decisions of a state or polity, an understanding of the structure and behavior of the elite is crucial to an understanding of the polity.

Contemporary elite analysis ranges from specific studies of an elite in "Small Town U.S.A." (Hunter, III-12)* to highly generalized analyses of the changing composition of national elites over broad time spans. (Pareto). In some studies various social aggregates such as the military, (Huntington, III-14) members of legislatures, (Matthews, III-19) bureaucrats, (Bendix III-6) and businessmen (Mills, III-23) are singled out for specific analysis. These studies often assume that these social aggregates will have similar political profiles. Some studies seek to discover the real elite, (Hunter, III-13); some emphasize the social

*These citations refer to bibliographic entries in Part II of this report. In each case the most relevant study is cited. No attempt is made to include all relevant research.
characteristics of a segment of the elite, assuming that these characteristics determine political behavior. (Matthews, III-20). Other studies center on social stratification, using elite-mass relationship as an index of the character of the elite. (Janowitz, 1-15).

There are three dimensions to elite studies: the descriptive dimension, the structure-function dimension, and the genetic or stage analysis dimension. The descriptive dimension is aimed at identifying the elite, including its socio-economic and political characteristics, in any given situation. In this form of analysis, unfortunately, elites are often defined in terms of social aggregates, but the assumptions made in the selection of these individuals or groups as members of the elite are not spelled out. Usually these individuals and groups are described in endogenous terms alone. Harold D. Lasswell has suggested that, in addition to such endogenous factors as origins and skills, other factors such as the accountability of the elite are important. (Lasswell, 1-25).

The second dimension of elite studies is the structure of elites and the relationships of this structure to the way elites perform governmental functions. Relevant questions include: What is the elite-elite structural and behavioral relationship? What is the elite-mass structural and behavioral relationship? How do elites maintain their position? How do potential elites transform their power into political control? What is the impact of a given situation on all of these factors?

The third dimension is the genetic aspect of elite studies, one of the most neglected areas of analysis. According to Lasswell, the genetic aspect of elites can be studied by utilizing certain indices, including
personnel circulation, social circulation, representativeness, flexibility, and interlockingness. (Lasswell, I-24). Genetic analysis also requires the answers to a broad range of change-oriented questions. These include: How permanent is the elite? What non-elite groups have potential for entering the elite? Under what conditions? In what types of political systems? What impact will entering the elite have on these groups? What roles do social, economic, and political factors play in shaping elite composition, elite structure, elite etiquette, and the mechanisms of control within a society?

A variety of questions can be organized around the three dimensions suggested above. Indeed, most of the studies abstracted, both theoretical and empirical, touch on these questions. These questions must be ordered around meaningful concepts and classifications to generate hypotheses.

We will suggest that fruitful results can be obtained by analyzing elite composition, elite structure, elite etiquette, and elite techniques and mechanisms of control. We will use elite structure and elite etiquette as bases for the construction of four types of elite systems. In conclusion we will suggest ways in which these models can be used to deal with change both within the four systems and from one system to another.
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ELITE

Despite the wide divergencies in the specific definitions and identification techniques in modern elite studies, there is basic agreement that the phenomenon of power is central to the notion of a political elite and to the utility of that notion. A general theme in almost all of the elite studies considered by this report is that the term political elite can be used synonymously with the "influential," the "powerful," the "governors," or the "decision makers." Yet no concept in political analysis is quite as vague and perplexing as the concept of power, particularly when that concept is expanded into a general theory. Who has power? What is power? These questions plague almost all political inquiry.

Robert Dahl, one of the most penetrating students of elites, has defined power as the ability of A to move B to do something which B had not previously intended to do. Central to this conception of power is the idea that power is an ability, often expressed as a potentiality, that may or may not be realized. In his critique of those who search for the power elite, Dahl points out that, because power is basically a potentiality, it is fallacious to equate the political elite directly with the powerful. For those with power to be considered as the political elite, it must first be demonstrated that this power was brought to bear in a decision-making situation and that the outcome of the situation was a direct result of the injection of that specific increment of power. (Dahl, I-8).

The view that political power is a potentiality is also held by E. Abramson, (Abramson, et al, I-1) who defines power as a measure of the number of open lines of action an individual or group has to achieve a
specific goal and objective. Abramson notes that further measurement of the power potential of various groups in a particular social field can only be made in terms of the variable lines of action each group has in relation to a specific common goal.

For purposes of elite analysis, it is useful to think of political power as a statement of potentiality in relation to a specific goal. We can then think of eliteness as a measure of an actuality in relation to the goal, rather than as a potential. This is to say that the political elite are those who have actualized their power potential into the phenomenon we can then identify as control. Control is the ability to determine some aspect or aspects of the results of the authoritative decision-making process. Control can vary both in scope and in intensity. The scope of control is the range of results a group or individual has control over. The intensity of control is the degree to which the individual or group exercises control over those elements that fall within its scope. (Schattschneider, III-30).

The political elite have power and control insofar as they are able to affect the authoritative decision-making and value-allocating processes of a society. In any political system there are both political elites and potential political elites.

A. Political Elite

Eliteness is a measure of control that can vary both in scope and intensity. This concept of political elite does not assume the existence of a ruling class. In some situations, the political elite may form a coherent self-conscious group with shared class characteristics and become
a ruling class. The elite may, however, be made up of a diversity of
groups which move in and out of the decision-making process at any point
in time. The elite in this situation may be a series of policy elites
rather than a single elite.

Elite analysis must first identify as clearly as possible the
individuals and groups who actively exercise control in various decision-
making areas. Such identification can be made in terms of social
aggregates or in terms of functional and skill categories. Then these
aggregates and categories can be further classified by social, economic,
and political characteristics. *(Matthews, III-20)*. This form of analysis
should distinguish functional groupings as well as aggregates and indicate
those with a high measure of coherence. There is some indication that the
coherence of such groups fluctuates with the issues under consideration.
(Barth and Johnson, I-5). Farmers, businessmen, and the military, for
example, may act as coherent units where there is a perceived threat to
a common interest. But the same groups might break rapidly into factions
when the question concerns the allocation of values among groups within
a specific area of interest. *(Almond, III-3)*.

To identify elite groups one must ultimately demonstrate, as Dahl
has pointed out, the direct relationship of a group in question to a
specific outcome. *(Dahl, I-8)*. The criterion is success. Lasswell has
noted that such success can be measured in two dimensions. First is the
identification of the group that initiated an action; second is the group
that played a pivotal role in the final outcome. *(Lasswell, I-18)*. The

*An excellent example of this type of analysis centered upon a social aggregate is Donald Matthews, *Social Background of Decision Makers*. 
initiator and the pivot may be different and the outcome may represent a compromise. In such a case each group would be defined as having control in that area, but control of a limited intensity. The problems inherent in this form of analysis are obvious. Open systems present difficulties in measurement, and in closed systems the data are not available.

Attempting to develop classifications of groups according to social aggregates may be too confused an approach. Such groups as the military are easily identifiable; others are, however, the products of specific types of systems and designations from other political systems are not suitable. Analysts such as Lasswell have recognized this problem and suggested that focusing on functional and skill designations is a more fruitful approach. (Lasswell, I-24). The functional categories include managers of violence, technicians, economic managers, leaders of the masses. Such functional designations may be highly useful in distinguishing between skill categories at varying levels of socio-economic and political development. But they are not particularly useful in identifying elites in qualitatively different political systems at the same socio-economic level. In both the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, primacy is given to such skill aggregates as technicians, leaders of the masses, and administrators. (Hacker, III-10; Brzenzinski, V-8). Between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., however, the social aggregates that perform these functions differ in composition, structure, behavior, norms, and values.

Elite analysis should be able to discuss both social aggregates and functional and skill categories within the framework of a set of hypotheses.
about the behavioral patterns that develop when function A is performed by structure A rather than structure B, or by more than one structure. All of these dimensions must be taken into consideration in order to determine the composition of the elite.

Once the elite is identified, the scope and intensity of its control must be analyzed. One elite may, for example, have a wide scope but a relatively low intensity of control. Another may have a narrow scope but high intensity. Some groups may have a comparatively wide scope but with maximum intensity in one specific area, such as economic policy. (Key, III-16). By measuring scope and intensity of control, differentiation among elites can be established vertically as well as horizontally. Thus one can distinguish between top elites, mid-elites, and sub-elites by gauging fluctuations in scope and intensity of control.

The criterion of control as a measure of eliteness is limited only to establishing a definite relationship between an individual or group and a policy outcome. But this relationship can and does vary with political structures and with situations. The relationship can be the immediate relationship of the government official or it can be the less direct relationship of a group bringing influence or pressure to bear on decision making. Ralf Dahrendorf has argued that the political elite in modern industrial society consists of governmental administrators, other governmental elites, and those interested parties who are represented by the governmental elite. (Dahrendorf, II-7). Yet there is no basis for assuming that those directly in government, even in modern industrial society, will have maximum scope or intensity of control. The scope and intensity of a governmental decision-making group may be blocked completely.
It is generally held, for example, that in totalitarian systems the governmental elite is of less importance than the party apparatus. (Armstrong, V-1). Many have noticed that in constitutional systems the scope and intensity of control exercised by parliamentary groups is dwindling rapidly. (Herring, III-11). At the same time the scope and intensity of control of the executive and the bureaucracy are increasing rapidly. With these developments, the involvement of non-official interest groups has increased. France, Great Britain, and Germany are examples of systems experiencing these developments. (Eckstein, IV-11).

B. Potential Political Elite.

We think it useful to consider, as part of elite studies, not only actual elites, but potential elites, who are of crucial significance in understanding the process of change.

Theoretically, all individuals and groups in a society are potential elites. Obviously, however, some have more power potential than others; that is they have more open lines of action to the goal--the decision-making process. It is imperative in elite analysis to describe the relative power positions of groups and individuals, indicating those that have the highest potential at any given time, those of declining potential, and those of rising potential. Thus the power configuration in a given situation may be identified.

The proposition that underlies almost all contemporary writings about elite change can be stated as follows: The power potential of any group or individual is mainly a function of that group's or individual's relationship to the major needs of the system of which it is a part. (Lasswell, et al., I-24). This proposition flows from a view of society as a coherent
and interrelated set of sub-systems with certain functional requisites which must be met if the existing social order is to survive. Certain individuals and groups are more salient to those needs than others. Those groups that hold the functionally relevant skills tend to be more powerful than those who hold less relevant skills. The functional needs of any system will be influenced by four major factors: (1) the level of socio-economic development, (2) the type of political system, (3) the political position and development of the system, and (4) the techniques and mechanisms by which relationships around a given decision-making process are controlled. As situations change so do functional needs and therefore so does the power potential of any social aggregate and any functional group.

Other factors also intervene to affect the power potential of any individual or group. One such important element is the existing configuration of power. A potential elite group may be blocked by a group with a higher potential. A basic distinction must be made between functional groups and social aggregates; they do not necessarily coincide. A political system that is under siege or relies on terror as a control technique will have a functional need for managers of violence. (Lasswell, I-20). The specific social aggregate that actually employs violence, however, could be a military, police, para-police, or synthetic organization, which develops for the purpose of managing violence. In the Soviet Union in the 1930's, for example, managers of violence were at a premium, but the military did not perform this function. Para-police organizations, created on a synthetic basis, capitalized on this need to the detriment of the military.
The importance of potential elites is that a potential may, at any time, be realized. But we need to know when a potential elite is apt to intervene. At what level will it intervene? What techniques and mechanisms will it employ in its intervention?

In a fascinating study of the military, S. E. Finer has raised the above questions and has cited the following variable factors. (Finer, II-12).

The disposition to intervene. Motive and mood are two basic factors in the disposition of a group to intervene. Motive may be linked to a concrete interest or to an ideological commitment. Mood takes into account the more vague psychological elements that pervade a group, primarily its consciousness of self and the particular view it holds of itself as a potential political elite.

The second major variable is the individual's or group's opportunity to intervene. Here the individual's or group's power potential and relation to the situation vis-à-vis others in the social field must be considered. Opportunity to intervene is also related to the structure and norms of the existing elite groups. In some systems intervention is a norm, and regulated channels are made available for intervention; in other systems intervention is deemed inappropriate and channels are blocked. The structure and norms of the existing elite, as well as the character of the potential elite, must be considered in assessing the opportunity to intervene.

The third variable cited by Professor Finer is the mode of intervention. The mode of intervention of an individual or a group includes the techniques and mechanisms employed to convert its potentiality into actuality. In one situation the mode of intervention may be violence
through the mechanism of a revolutionary organization. In another situation it may be peaceful penetration of the existing apparatus through the mechanism of an interest group. Whatever the factors that bring about intervention, whatever the forms of intervention, successful intervention marks the distinction between political power and political control, and hence, in our analysis, the distinction between a potential political elite and an actual elite.

In concluding a discussion of potential elites it is important to recognize that the same structure-functional problems that exist in identifying political elites exist in identifying potential elites.
III. ELITE STRUCTURE, ELITE ETIQUETTE, AND TECHNIQUES
AND MECHANISMS OF CONTROL

A. Elite Structure.

The pattern of elite structure has two dimensions: elite-elite relationships (relationships among those individuals and groups that exercise control), and elite-constituency relationships (relationships between the controlling individuals and groups and the others). In any political system, the relationships among controlling elements will tend to form a persistent pattern, distinctive to that political system. In the next section, where we construct four models of elite structure, we will demonstrate the different characteristics of elite structure along these two dimensions.

B. Elite Etiquette.

Elite etiquette is the behavioral dimension of elite-elite relationships and elite-constituency relationships.

The term elite etiquette is borrowed from V.O. Key, (Key, III-16); it refers specifically to the rules by which elites regulate their behavior. Two aspects of the behavioral pattern of elites must be noted: the rules by which elite-elite interaction is patterned, and the rules by which elite-constituency interaction is patterned. Such rules are, by and large, informal and are learned by the elite through the process of elite socialization. Although these rules are informal, they can be observed in all political systems.
To a large extent, the character of these rules is shaped by the views or perspectives of the elite; these views may be the result of experience, ideology, psychological orientations, or a variety of other factors. Two dimensions of elite perspectives seem most important. First is the way in which the elite views eliteness and, second, the way in which it views the constituency. Elite perspective, as indicated earlier, is also important to the analysis of potential elites.* In the case of elites, perspectives will determine not only the direction the elite will take, but will also contribute to the kinds of structural and behavioral patterns the elite will adopt in both elite-elite relations and elite-constituency relations. The views of the constituency as well will in turn affect the norms regarding elite-constituency relationship. The pattern of perspectives is most worthy of analysis in any elite research, because of its impact upon elite etiquette.

C. Techniques of Control.

Techniques of control are the basic methods by which an individual or group asserts its eliteness. All techniques of control require channels, institutions, and structures by which the techniques are implemented.

*In the case of potential elites, perspectives become an important consideration in discussing both the predisposition to intervene and the modes of intervention.
Techniques of control are the methods by which a power potential is actualized or, once actualized, is maintained. An established elite will presumably seek to maintain the pattern of structural and behavioral relations that has developed in the system. Such pattern maintenance demands control devices. While no elite will in reality adopt one technique or be restricted to a basic technique interminably, certain sets of techniques tend to be favored in particular types of systems. A great deal of material has already been collated about particular techniques. The particular technique adopted by an elite will react on the system and ramify throughout it. One major impact will be on the aggregate composition of elites. For example, if terror or violence is a preferred technique, managers of violence will increase in importance and hence in power potential. In such a situation, one can expect that some concrete group of managers, i.e., the police, the army, or para-police agencies, will increase their scope and intensity of control. By the same token, a system can change its techniques and mechanisms of control without changing the basic structure and behavioral patterns in elite-elite relationships and elite-mass relationships. An elite might, in another case, switch from terror to mass manipulation as its preferred technique. As a result, those skilled in manipulatory techniques would rise in importance and power potential at the expense of managers of violence. It is probable that managers of violence would then lose their elite position or move to a lower level while mass manipulators (party organizers, mass organization leaders, propagandists) would appear in the elite upper echelon.
Existing political systems vary widely in the composition of the elite, elite structure, elite etiquette, and techniques and mechanisms of control; no pure system exists in reality.
IV. FOUR ELITE TYPES

A. The Constitutional Democratic Type.

1. Elite Structure.

A major characteristic of elites in constitutional systems of government, according to V. O. Key, is the "absence of sufficient cohesion among the activists to unite them into a single group dedicated to the management of public affairs and public opinion." (Key, III-16, p. 540). In much the same vein, Raymond Aron categorizes elites in constitutional systems as divided elites. (Aron, I-2). Ralf Dahrendorf, examining the basic characteristics of modern constitutional societies, notes that it is impossible to identify a ruling class. (Dahrendorf, II-7). Those who operate government and make the actual decisions are less rulers than switchboards for the processing of interests pressed on government by a variety of outside interest or veto groups. Elites act not as a class of rulers but as groups who, because they are autonomous, exercise authority which they bring to bear on the selection of governmental personnel and upon the decision-making process when issues relevant to their interests are in question. Summing up his view, Dahrendorf notes that "thus the ruling class consists of two constants, bureaucracy and government; and one variable, the veto group whose claims are, in particular situations, incorporated in government policy." (Dahrendorf, II-7, p.305). The subject group, or constituency are those who "in a given situation do not associate with government."

The elite structure of the constitutional type can be described as a series of elites rather than an elite or ruling class. In terms of
elite-elite structure these groups are divided, each being autonomous and each exercising authority. The groups are both official governmental bodies and non-official interest groups who seek to shape decisions. The various groups of elite are not class or caste entities, but a loose aggregation formed around the proliferation of interests in a complex society. (Key, III-16).

Although the elite are not a class or caste, there is a measurable distinction between elites and non-elites. Elites are those who, because they have an independent basis of power potential, exercise control over policy. The elite groups differ from each other both in basis of power and in degree of scope and intensity of control. To study such a system, one must identify the relevant groups, their bases of power, and the scope and intensity of control they exercise.

In the constitutional democratic system, the boundary between elites and non-elites is extremely difficult to establish (Dahl, III-8) and varies from issues to issue. (Almond, III-3). Thus in the constitutional type, eliteness is not an abrupt phenomenon but one that shades off over a wide area.

Another characteristic of the elite-constituency structure is that the elite is highly permeable, that is, it is susceptible to penetration by new elite groups. Kornhauser has said that the elite is highly accessible; (Kornhauser, I-16), there is a high measure of vertical mobility from non-elite to elite. This is not to suggest that any individual or group can move into the elite at will. In modern complex systems, the power of individuals and groups is highly circumscribed, but, in constitutional systems, penetration by non-elites is structurally and normatively supported. Those individuals and groups with the necessary power potential
can penetrate peacefully.

2. **Elite Etiquette.**

The hallmark of elite-elite etiquette in the constitutional type is open competition. Society sanctions open competition, although both implied and formal rules regulate the nature of conflict. (Dahl, 1-9). Conflict is never total. The winner does not take all; the loser is not pushed from the field; he may enter the fray another day. While an individual or group may lose the legislative struggle, the impact of the loss may be attenuated by skillful penetration of the rule-applying apparatus. (Schattschneider, 111-30).

Conflict here is basically non-violent. Its intensity is regulated and mitigated through bargaining and accommodation. Decisions are invariably the product not only of the efforts of initiating groups but of the efforts of pivotal groups as well, who bring their power to bear so as to shape the decisions into a form that they can at least tolerate.

Elite-constituency etiquette is regulated, to a large extent, by the elite view of the constituency. In the constitutional type, the elite views the constituency as subject rather than object. As Key points out, it is crucial that the elite consider that the will of the constituency should ultimately be heard and that the elite consider itself responsible to the constituency. (Key, 111-16).

This conception of the constituency as subject is made viable by the elite structure itself. In the constitutional type, the possibility of counterorganization is quite real and most organizations are open. As a result, a large part of the constituency is already organized in autonomous units. Through the leadership of these units, the constituency
continually exercises some measure of influence over decisions. Although the members of the constituency are, for the most part, spectators of the conflict between elites, the balance of power among elites often shifts with the movements that the constituency makes. (Schattschneider, III-30).

Thus in the constitutional type both normatively sanctioned behavioral patterns and structural patterns work to render the elite-constituency relationship a responsible one. Legitimacy of and for leadership is reinforced and basic patterns maintained through the meeting of demands articulated and pressed by organizations representing sectors of the society. The constituency presses its demands on the system through the leaders of the organizations to which they belong. A key element in stability and control therefore is the proliferation of organizations. A major source of potential strain in the constitutional system is the existence of large numbers who are not organized or who are otherwise unable effectively to press their demands on the decision-making apparatus. (Kornhauser, I-16).

Demand-satisfaction is obviously not the only technique of control. Andrew Hacker has argued, for example, that mass manipulation is becoming more important in the elite-constituency relationship. (Hacker, III-10). Deference always plays a role in maintaining order and legitimacy. (Eckstein, IV-11). What seems most important in the constitutional type is that demand satisfaction is the most prominent control technique.

B. The Totalitarian Type.

1. Elite Structure.

The structural pattern of the totalitarian type differs significantly from that of the constitutional type. In the elite-elite dimension,
the hallmark of the totalitarian type is highly unified elite. As Raymond Bauer has pointed out, the elite of the Soviet Union are the Communist Party elite. (Bauer, et al., V-20). Not only does the Communist Party control all elements of the elite, it also acts as the pool from which all members of the elite are recruited. As a result, only one substantive interest has continual access to the authoritative control structure. Other interests, of course, exist within society and even anti-party factions develop within the Communist Party, but, unlike the divided elite of autonomous segments that is found in the constitutional type, the elite structure of the totalitarian system is united, closed, and coherent. (Aron, 1-2).* This coherence does not exclude elite competition. But when elite competition takes place it is best characterized as factionalism. (Rush, V-30). The strength of such factions is tied to their control over various parts of the institutions of the regime. In internal elite struggles, these institutional parts are used as levers. The factions exist as semi-distinct aggregates which form around basic functional tasks within the system, the police, the party apparatus, the government, the economic directors, etc. Although some of these factions are semi-autonomous, full autonomy is arrested by the fact that the Communist Party ultimately penetrates and envelops all such entities.

The totalitarian elite evolves into a corps of professionals who are distinct from the society at large. The elite-constituency relation is marked by a clear line between elites and non-elites; this boundary is basically impenetrable. Upward mobility from non-elite status to elite

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*Some critics have called this elite a ruling class. (Djilas, V-14). This is a highly debatable position if one uses ruling class in the traditional sense of that term. (Sereno, I-37).
status is highly circumscribed and is consciously controlled by the elite. Such mobility is restricted to individuals who can qualify. There is no movement in and out of the authority structure through the agency of organized and autonomous power groups, but achievement standards set by the elite admit the mobility of certain functional groups, and others penetrate as a result.

2. Elite Etiquette.

Conflict among elites takes place behind the scenes in the totalitarian model. Because factional competition for control is not legitimized, there are no formal mechanisms for the regulation of such conflict. (Rush, V-31). Many analysts of totalitarian regimes feel that factional conflict is endemic to totalitarian systems. The dominant rule of inter-factional struggle is winner take all. In most cases the loser of the struggle finds himself not only effectively pushed from the field of combat but under it as well.

Totalitarian models are pushed toward ossification because they lack the means for ameliorating factional conflict and because of their isolated structure. Conflicts are resolved and the system reinvigorated through purges.

Although their quality and quantity may change, purges, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has pointed out, are a necessary feature of the totalitarian elite structure. Conflict among elite factions may not always lead to violence, but it inevitably leads to the unregulated turnover of personnel and the elimination from control of elite factions. The short history of Nazi Germany and the history of the Soviet Union have demonstrated that no individual or group, no matter how powerful at any particular moment,
is totally free from the possibility of being forced to undergo a rite of purification. (Lerner, IV-18).

Behavioral relations between the elite and the constituency are shaped by the elite's view of the constituency as object rather than subject. Behavioral relations also reflect the elite's desire not only to maintain the existing structural pattern but to mobilize all available societal energies to attain its goals. The elite, as a result, set themselves above the mass. In totalitarian systems, the elite maximizes its control over the decision-making process, and, further, works to increase the areas of life under the direct control of authoritative decision making. The relationship of the elite to the constituency in the pure totalitarian system is total, arbitrary, and unresponsive. (Kecskemeti, V-21).

3. Techniques of Control.

Techniques of control vary in the totalitarian type. Elite-elite behavior is controlled to a large extent through the purge. The favored techniques of control over the constituency are systematic terror and mass manipulation (Fainsod, V-15) through secret police organizations, mass constituency organizations tied firmly to the ruling party, and control and manipulation of mass media.

The range of available techniques and mechanisms seems to be limited because of the elite structure itself and because the totalitarian elite seeks to maximize the scope and intensity of control of its constituency. It is also limited because the totalitarian elite seeks total mobilization of all available energy to convert its utopian dreams into reality.
C. The Authoritarian Type.

1. Elite Structure.

In contrast to the totalitarian type, the authoritarian type has a divided elite-elite structure. No coherent unified group exerts pervasive control over the governmental apparatus. We find within the elite, rather, a number of definite centers with autonomous power potential. In contrast to the constitutional type, these autonomous centers tend to reflect institutionalized groups such as the aristocracy, the church, the landowners, or the military. (Eisenstadt, II-9). Although members of the elite are arranged in different autonomous centers, they tend to come from the same socio-economic caste or class, and thus have a degree of community of background. As a result, the elite in the authoritarian type is more homogeneous than in the constitutional type.

In the dimension of elite-constituency structure, the authoritarian type bears a marked similarity to the totalitarian type. In the authoritarian case, although class and caste lines are substituted for the line of party membership, the result is basically the same: a clear line of demarcation between the elite and the constituency with a high degree of impermeability and a definite lack of mobility from the constituency into the elite. In the totalitarian type the elite recruitment pool is the party; in the authoritarian type it is the dominant class or caste. Thus the line of demarcation is in many respects more rigid in the authoritarian type, largely because position is ascribed and hereditary. The authoritarian elite system approximates most clearly the ruling class model developed by traditional elite theorists.
2. **Elite Etiquette.**

The behavioral norms of elite-elite relationships in the authoritarian type also bear some similarity to the totalitarian elite type. In neither instance is there a normative principle of open and peaceful interest competition. As a result, in authoritarian regimes there is a tendency toward intense intra-elite conflict, which in many cases erupts into forms of violence more open than the totalitarian purge. The early battles between church and state and between king and nobility are classic examples. In modern authoritarian regimes, the characteristic mode of conflict resolution has been the coup d'état, in which the personnel of government change but the basic elite structure and behavior remain constant. In many cases, delicate balances between autonomous units have resulted in relatively long periods of stability.

The existence of relatively autonomous elites places limitations on the scope and intensity of control one group can achieve. The most absolute of European monarchs and the most ruthless of South American dictators cannot compare with the totalitarian elite party in scope and intensity of control. Such theoretically absolute rulers have had to contend with power centers, which guard their prerogatives closely. Bringing a group to heel in an authoritarian regime requires alliances with other groups. This necessity limits the scope and intensity of control. The same may be said of the extent of penetration of the society by the authoritarian apparatus.

In the authoritarian type, the elite views the constituency as object rather than subject. The authoritarian view differs from the totalitarian view in that the aim of the elite is to preserve a status quo. The maintenance of the elite depends upon keeping the constituency in its place.
There is no attempt to mobilize, in a systematic fashion, all available social energy. The authoritarian elite seeks to control in a static sense; it is not mobilization minded.

3. **Techniques of Control.**

Two types of control techniques seem basic to an authoritarian regime: deference and suppression. Each is an appropriate technique for an elite seeking to maintain a status quo. In any real authoritarian regime, one technique may be favored. Deference seems to be a basic technique in authoritarian structures rooted in traditional societies. Suppression, as opposed to terror, is most characteristic of regimes dominated by military elements.* The mechanisms for reinforcing these control techniques and the concomitant concrete groups vary widely.

D. **Non-Crystallized Societies.**

In the three ideal types above, we are dealing with relatively coherent phenomena, in which structural and behavioral relationships have formed into a more or less durable pattern. There are at present a number of polities in which no definite pattern has emerged. Most of those polities usually referred to as developing nations fall into this category. For purposes of analysis, we can designate these as states possessing a non-crystallized elite structure and elite etiquette.

Although there is little agreement on general trends within these non-crystallized societies, there does seem to be a definite movement away from the authoritarian model. Two major factors are responsible. The socio-economic situation in most developing societies is changing.

*Benevolent despotism is a form of demand satisfaction, but one in which the legitimate demands of the constituency are defined by the elite rather than raised by autonomous constituent representation.
rapidly. With the introduction of complex industrial systems and systems of mass communication, more and more elements of society are becoming politically articulate and hence can no longer be controlled effectively by the techniques and mechanisms of authoritarianism. At the same time, elites have appeared whose goals call for the mass mobilization of social energy rather than the maintenance of the status quo.

A survey of the literature on developing nations indicates that a clear understanding of elite perspectives will be crucial to a projection of trends. There seems to be general agreement that most of the new elites in these states hold modernizing values and are committed to the rapid social and economic advancement of their countries. (Lerner, VII-15). Whether the elites are more committed to constitutional political norms or to the goal of rapid industrialization and modernization, even if these goals conflict with their political norms, is a matter of debate. Some analysts see the elite as holding a view of the mass as an object that must be led to the millennium. (Brzezinski, II-5). Others argue that while the elite values strong leadership, it is committed to an ultimate relationship of reciprocal responsibility between the elite and the constituency. (Schachter, XI-17).

Those who hold the first view project a trend toward the totalitarian model. The existence of a growing number of states with single mass parties, for example, would indicate movement toward a unified impenetrable elite structure. (Tucker, II-34). The obvious gaps in socio-economic background between elites and constituencies point toward the creation of hard and fast lines of demarcation. (Saythe and Saythe, XI-19). In many areas, elite etiquette, both between elites and with the mass, has tended toward
violence. The favored techniques of control in many non-crystallized states have become suppression of opposition elites and manipulation of the mass through such emotionally filled behaviors as nationalism and xenophobia. (Emerson, II-11).

There is also evidence to indicate that the trend, postulated by many, toward some form of totalitarianism is not the entire story. Three factors tend to work against a march toward the totalitarian model. First, while the degree of commitment of the elite to constitutional values may waver, the existence of these values, as a residue of colonial and Western education and experience, is still real. Second, the kinds of mass-based parties developing in many of these states are quite different from those of the totalitarian model. (Scott, VI-17). These parties attempt to embrace all elements of society. As a result, there is no rigidly controlled set of standards within the dominant party, as there is in the totalitarian party. (Safran, VII-20). Party membership tends to be open and, in many instances, mobility within the party is based on technical competence. Third, the gap between elites and non-elites is less a fact of imposition than it is a fact of uneven development. (Schachter, XI-17). While this gap may develop into a rigid, impermeable boundary, it may also shatter off as educational, economic, and social standards rise.

What form elites will take in these countries is still an open question. Most analysts have stressed the downgrading of intellectuals in the face of the rise of more purely political, bureaucratic, and technical aggregates. (Schils, II-29). Harry Benda argues that the intellectuals can control the elite structure only in disintegrative situations

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when more solid bases of power are undermined. As stability returns, so do these more solid bases. The result is the reemergence of other aggregates and the relegation of the intellectuals to ancillary roles. (Benda, II-4). Many also see a growing possibility of the intellectuals being shunted aside by the military. (Pauker, IX-13). But at the same time, other analysts of the military see the decline of militarism (Alba, VI-1), and the ultimate replacement of the military by other, more politically oriented, forces.

It is extremely difficult to predict the ultimate structure of the non-crystallized systems. Models other than the three crystallized models may well be formed. Indeed, the non-crystallized model may be more patterned and durable than the evidence now indicates.
V. SUMMARY REMARKS ON UTILITY OF TYPOLOGIES

We hasten to add that the above construction of ideal types of elite structure and elite etiquette has many pitfalls. No system in reality will possess all the features of one type. Real systems, as many have pointed out, are usually mixed in nature. The closest real approximation of the constitutional type seems to be the United States. The closest real approximations of the totalitarian type are Nazi Germany, Stalin's Russia, and Communist China. The closest real approximations of the authoritarian type are the medieval states of Europe, contemporary Spain, and a number of South American states. Even in these relatively pure cases there are, of course, deviations from the model. In the United States, for example, some have seen a more homogenous and coherent elite (Mills, III-23), and a greater emphasis on mass manipulation (Hacker, III-10) than the type describes. In the Soviet Union, many observers have seen cracks in the facade of the unified elite beyond factionalism, (Dallin, V-11), less reliance on terror and mass manipulation, and more emphasis on demand satisfaction. Harry Eckstein has pointed out that, in Britain, the system is held together by a mixture of traditional authoritarianism and modern democratic constitutionalism. (Eckstein, IV-11). Peron's Argentina was a case of hybrid totalitarian-authoritarian structure in which the elite was seemingly unified in a single party but in which autonomous units such as the army and labor organizations, also existed. The persistent strife between these autonomous units was a basic source of instability in the system. (Blanksten, VI-4).

The types suggested are useful in the study of political elites for a variety of reasons. They help to order the myriad of data that are now available.
They suggest what factors are significant in bringing about change within systems and change from one system to another. They help in identifying stresses and strains endemic to each type of system. And finally, they are criteria for ordering systems now going through the process of change.

It remains for scholarship to determine the sets of hypotheses which each model of elite systems suggests.
VI. A SCHEMA FOR ANALYZING POLITICAL ELITE CHANGE

The utility of concepts lies not only in their ability to classify and describe but in their ability to assist in understanding and explaining the dynamics of the political process. In elite studies one must: (1) describe the composition, structure, etiquette, and techniques and mechanisms of control; (2) explain how a particular pattern hangs together and maintains itself; and (3) explain how patterns change and new patterns emerge. After analyzing the literature on political elites in terms of these variables, we feel that the above four types of relationships emerge.

There are two types of social changes: changes within systems and changes of systems. In the first instance, there is a quantitative change of variables, but a definite continuity of basic relationships among variables. In the second instance, there is a definite discontinuity in that a fundamental change of relationships among variables takes place.

The major analytical problem in dealing with change, therefore, is to pin-point fundamental variables and indicate basic relationships. When this has been accomplished, the state of the system can be described. Once the state of the system can be described, those factors that intrude upon the system to force both quantitative and qualitative changes can be isolated.

In analyzing types of political elites, we argue that changes in elite structure and elite etiquette are change in types, while changes in the composition of the elite and the mechanisms of control, without changes in elite structure and elite etiquette, are changes within types.

If we discuss change within types in these terms, a number of examples come to mind. The traditional coup d'etat pattern of South
American authoritarian regimes is a case in point. Any coup may push a given elite aggregate out and put another in its place. At the same time, techniques and mechanisms of control may change from deference to more active forms of suppression. The authoritarian elite structure and elite etiquette often remain. The elite is still disunited and intensely competitive; the gap between elite and mass is still rigid and impermeable; the elite still attempts to maintain the status quo in which the mass is viewed as object. Many analysts of change in authoritarian regimes have noted these phenomena.

Change in, opposed to change of, elite types is also evident in the other kinds of elite types that we have described. In the constitutional type, many new functional groups and aggregates have risen to prominence. Many of the studies abstracted on Western Europe and the United States have noted the rise of experts in human relations, technocrats, and managers of mass manipulation. (Hacker, III-10). Others have pointed out a general trend of a decline in the power of parliamentary bodies and a concomitant rise in the power of the executive branch. An adjunct of this change is the increasing role of the bureaucratic apparatus, which almost all analysts have noted. (LaPalombara, II-18). Pressure groups who attempt to penetrate the bureaucracy have proliferated. (Eckstein, IV-II). These we would classify as changes within types rather than changes of types. Elites have remained divided, autonomous, non-institutionalized groupings who resolve conflict primarily through bargaining and compromise. The line between the elite and the mass remains blurred; vertical mobility remains a reality.
Similar types of changes in the composition and techniques of control without basic changes in the elite type can be noted in totalitarian societies. Many studies of the Soviet Union have shown a shift in control techniques from emphasis on terror to emphasis on mass manipulation. At the same time, there has been definite evidence of the decline in elite status of the police and a rise in the status of party bureaucrats and the leaders of official mass organizations. Individuals skilled in interpersonal manipulation seem to be of increasing importance in the composition of the elite. Technocrats and managerial experts also seem to be increasing their influence. While techniques and mechanisms of control and aggregate elite compositions have changed, the basic structural and behavioral patterns outlined above as totalitarian seem to have remained constant.

It is also possible to point to structural changes in elite types which constitute a basic change of type. In many cases these changes have been brought about by revolution. But revolution is not the only way such changes come about. Changes within types may accumulate and build up over time to a point where fundamental changes take place peacefully and at times almost imperceptibly. The shift from an authoritarian system of government in Great Britain to a democratic constitutional system of government is a case in point. The revolution certainly influenced this process but it did not determine it. Each of the non-crystallized systems and many of the authoritarian systems also give indication of undergoing this process of change by degrees.

One of the major roots of change, whether change within types or change of types, seems to be "situational conflict between those who at
Given point of time are excluded from authority and those who are 'in.' (Dahrendorf, II-7, p. 307). The actual dynamics of this process have yet to be explained adequately. If the types that we have constructed are to be utilized for this purpose these types must be related to three distinct sets of factors. The first set of factors are situational factors including the socio-economic environment, the political situation, and the distribution of potential elites in the social field. The second set of factors includes the structural and behavioral patterns that develop between a given elite and its constituency. The third set of factors may be called perceptual factors and include all elements that shape the manner in which both elites and potential elites view their overall situations.

Change in any one set of factors may set off changes in the others. The connections between the three sets cannot be reduced easily to simple cause and effect analysis; all factors act and react on each other. Thus fruitful analysis lies in seeking functional correlations rather than causes.

The task that lies ahead is discerning the relationships that hold between the sets of variables that have been identified. We feel that connecting links can be established by studying elite composition, elite structure, elite etiquette, and techniques and mechanisms of control as components of the elite type, recognizing that elite structure and elite etiquette are dimensions that define the type, whereas elite composition and techniques and mechanisms of control are characteristics within the type.
PART II

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