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A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF PATTERNS AND TECHNIQUES OF INSURGENCY CONFLICTS IN POST-1900 LATIN AMERICA (ARPA PROJECT NO. 4860)

Cut-Off Date of Information: 15 January 1964

Submitted to: Advanced Research Projects Agency
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.

ARPA Contract No. SD-215

ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORPORATION

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This report is the product of a six-months research effort conducted by the Georgetown Research Project of the Atlantic Research Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia, under contract to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense.

The purpose of the report is to identify patterns of significant national and lower-scale insurgency activities in Latin America since 1900, thereby providing data of assistance to U.S. military planners in determining R&D requirements appropriate for counterinsurgency operations in the area.

In the process of carrying out the study assignment, it was found desirable to consider a wide range of insurgency and insurgency-related problems, not all of which may be of direct R&D interest and some of which may be more susceptible to civic action than military R&D-type solutions. This approach was adopted in the belief that the study could best serve the military R&D planner by presenting a balanced view of the total insurgency spectrum in 20th century Latin America, against which problems of specifically military R&D interest could be seen in perspective. An effort is made throughout the study to confine discussion of non-military R&D topics to essentials.

The study effort has been conducted on an unclassified basis. For the earlier historical period under review, 1900-1945, the discussion is based on the best secondary works currently available. For the more recent period, 1946-1963, the analysis is founded on a detailed collection of data on some 3,500 Latin American insurgency and insurgency-related events as reported in the New York Times, in selected Latin American
newspapers, and in the Hispanic American Report, a monthly analysis of developments in Latin America published since 1948 by Stanford University. This basic data has been indexed and incorporated into permanent country books for present and future reference.

* * *

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) or of any other Agency of the U. S. Government.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introductory

The purpose of the report is to identify patterns and techniques of national and lower-scale insurgency conflicts in Latin America since 1900 in order to derive data of assistance to U.S. planning for R&D requirements of military counterinsurgency operations in Latin America.

Specific features of insurgency in Latin America make it desirable that the report utilize the term "insurgency" in a broad sense and as inclusive of all types of violent actions against governmental authority short of civil war.

A. SUMMARY

1. The Latin American Insurgency Environment
   a. The Latin American insurgency environment, although outwardly "Western" in culture, exhibits patterns of violence for which no adequate parallels exist in U.S. society or in most societies of western Europe.
   b. The Latin American insurgency environment differs radically from the insurgency environments of Southeast Asia, notably Vietnam. In contrast to the dominant rural insurgency pattern of Vietnam, Latin American insurgency patterns are military, urban, and rural. In contrast to the tradition of collective action and clandestine organization which pervades Vietnamese insurgency, the problem in Latin American insurgency is to impose organization, discipline, and a sense of planned persistent action on insurgency in a society which is highly individualistic, weak in ties of social solidarity, and more prone to express its insurgency in sudden violent outbursts than in protracted struggle.
c. The Castro insurgency in Cuba incorporated many typically Latin American features but also developed in a rural environment that was probably more favorable for guerrilla warfare than elsewhere in Latin America.

2. Major Types of Latin American Insurgency
   a. Latin American insurgency can be divided into two major categories: social insurgency and political insurgency.
   b. Social insurgency in Latin America manifests itself in archaic types of social violence which have largely disappeared in other "Western" societies. Outbreaks of unstructured mass violence, chiefly in the larger cities, can escalate into social disorders of insurgency significance. Bandit traditions may assist the future development of guerrilla bands in some areas. Agrarian squatter movements are evidence of a peasant land-hunger which guerrillas can exploit; these movements also hold a potential for escalation into large-scale social disorders.
   c. Throughout most of the 20th century the principal types of political insurgency in Latin America have been urban demonstrations and riots, strikes, military barracks revolts (cuartelazos), and military coups. Guerrilla warfare and terrorist activity and sabotage were seldom employed as instruments of political insurgency in Latin America prior to Castro's insurrection in Cuba.

3. Historical Patterns of Insurgency Conflicts In 20th Century Latin America, 1900-1958
   a. Latin American insurgency patterns in the 19th century were dominated by the private armies of ambitious leaders known as caudillos.
The decisive factor in the decline of the caudillos as an insurgency force was the development of professional military forces in Latin America after 1886 under the aegis of European and U.S. training missions.

b. The professional military dominated the insurgency patterns of Latin America in the period between the decline of the caudillos and Castro's seizure of power in Cuba in 1959. The military functioned either as actual insurgents or as key power blocs without whose support almost no insurgency attempt succeeded. Urban political demonstrations, riots, and strikes had their greatest impact as insurgency weapons in the smaller Latin American countries. Rural insurgency was of minor importance until the advent of Castro, although two guerrilla episodes developed in the 1920's.

c. The Communist attempt to take over Guatemala (1944-1954) collapsed because the Communists could not penetrate significantly into the Guatemalan Army and failed to neutralize it as a counterinsurgency factor.

d. The successful Castro insurgency in Cuba (1956-1959) was unprecedented in Latin America in that it deliberately centered its attack on the professional military and combined guerrilla warfare with systematic terrorist activity and sabotage.


a. Military insurgency has remained an important insurgency factor in Latin America in the post-Castro era. Nine successful, and at least 19 unsuccessful, military coups or barracks revolts occurred in the 1959-1963 period.
b. Significant guerrilla activity on the Castro-Communist model appears to have been localized mainly in Venezuela and Peru. Scattered reports of guerrilla activity in other Latin American countries began to appear in late 1962 and throughout 1963.

c. Terrorist activity and sabotage were employed by insurgency elements on a systematic and sustained basis only in Venezuela.

d. Outbreaks of urban mass violence constituted important insurgency or insurgency-related phenomena during the period 1959-1963. The period was also marked by an increase in rural violence episodes associated with agrarian squatter movements.

5. Guerrilla Activity in Latin America, 1959-1963

a. Insights into the patterns and techniques of guerrilla activity in Latin America since 1959 must be gleaned largely from case studies of the minor guerrilla movements which developed in Venezuela and Peru in the early months of 1962. Available information on reputed guerrilla activities in other Latin American countries does not yield significant data for military R&D planning purposes.

b. Venezuela. Two time-phases are discernible in the pattern of guerrilla activity in Venezuela since January 1962. In the first time-phase, lasting roughly from January through April 1962, an amateurish and abortive attempt was made to launch a nationwide campaign of guerrilla insurrection. In the second time-phase, lasting from May 1962 to the end of December 1963, guerrilla activity assumed a more professional cast and was localized mainly in two widely separated areas in western Venezuela.
c. The Venezuelan guerrillas differed in at least two important operational respects from guerrillas in most other world areas. They used motor transport as an important aid to the initial formation of guerrilla camps, to the carrying out of guerrilla attacks, and to the development of supply lines from populated areas to remote guerrilla hideouts. The guerrillas also devised means (not fully discernible on the basis of currently available information) for maintaining corporate and sustained existence among a rural population which gave them almost no support, except under duress, and aided the Venezuelan authorities in counter-guerrilla operations.

d. Throughout most of their career the Venezuelan guerrillas have avoided contact with government forces, except for minor ambuscades. A departure from this pattern was observed in the autumn of 1963, when guerrillas in Falcón State attacked a government column of 80 men and otherwise gave signs of improved discipline and organization. Government counter-operations against the guerrillas in Falcón State were initially those of encirclement and aerial bombardment. Subsequently, a tactic of camouflaged troop infiltration toward, and mining of, suspected guerrilla areas was employed with apparently better result.

e. Peru. Guerrilla activity developed in Peru after March 1962 in two widely separated highland areas. One guerrilla base area in the Huampani-Satipo area of central Peru was overrun by government forces in March 1962 while the guerrillas were still in an initial organizational stage. No reports of guerrilla activity in this general area have been noted since June-August 1962. Another guerrilla band, led by Hugo Blanco,
operated in an isolated valley near Cuzco in southern Peru during most of 1962. This movement came to an end with the seizure of Blanco's base area in November 1962 and the capture of Blanco in May 1963.

f. The Hugo Blanco guerrillas generally avoided contact with government forces throughout their career. Government operations against the Hugo Blanco guerrillas did not begin until several months after the guerrillas were first reported active. The operations against Blanco were aided by prior helicopter reconnaissance of the guerrilla stronghold. Police dogs were used in later searches for Blanco and other fugitives from his guerrilla band.

6. Terrorist Activity in Latin America, 1959-1963

a. Terrorist activity (including sabotage) in Latin America during the period 1959-1963 reached proportions of immediate interest to military R&D counterinsurgency planning only in Venezuela. The Venezuelan experience, however, should be regarded as a case study in the type of terrorist tactics which the Castro-Communists are likely to employ in other Latin American countries, in conjunction with guerrilla warfare, whenever they judge that conditions so warrant.

b. Venezuela. Significant terrorist activity developed in Venezuela in January 1962 and continued on a sustained basis until almost the end of 1963. The terrorists operated widely throughout the country although their more dramatic exploits were usually localized in the Caracas and Lake Maracaibo areas. The wide diffusion of terrorist activities had the effect of blurring the demarcation lines in Venezuela between terrorist activities,
properly so called, and the activities of the rural guerrilla bands which were simultaneously in operation.

c. The exploits of the Venezuelan terrorists were not matched by those of the rural guerrillas who were mainly engaged in a struggle to maintain corporate existence. The terrorists emerged as the dominant element in the insurgent movement and laid plans for an ambitious "Operation Caracas" in November 1963 which called for the seizure and fortification of a slum area overlooking the center of the city. Venezuelan authorities prevented implementation of the plan by massive preventive arrests of known terrorists and their sympathizers. Thereafter terrorist activity continued in Venezuela but on an apparently much reduced scale.

d. Venezuelan terrorists made extensive use of motor transport in their operations and demonstrated considerable skill in their explosives and barricade techniques. The Venezuelan military and National Guard were used in both rural and urban areas to assist police in anti-terrorist operations.

7. Mass Violence in Latin America, 1959-1963

a. The significance of mass violence events in contemporary Latin America must be viewed against the background of the vast social changes which are occurring in the area under the pressure of rapid population growth and the permeation of broadening sectors of the population with desires for socio-economic betterment. Increased potentials for violence are evident in both the urban and rural sectors.

b. Major and usually unpredictable outbreaks of mass violence in the
national capitals and other large cities of Latin America occurred on an average of two or three each year during the 1959-1963 period. These events seldom exerted a significant insurgency effect in their own right but could have acquired insurgency significance if other insurgency factors, such as a weakening in military support for the established government, had also been operative.

c. The increased potential for mass violence in rural Latin America is associated mainly with mass agrarian squatter invasions of landowner properties which are occurring in such countries as Mexico, Brazil, and Peru. As many as 2,000 to 5,000 persons may be involved in these episodes, which are sometimes accompanied by violence.

d. Limited capabilities of police organizations in most Latin American countries, as well as political considerations, have led to frequent intervention by the Latin American military in episodes of mass urban and rural violence.

B. CONCLUSIONS

1. Latin America constitutes an insurgency environment which differs in important respects from insurgency environments in other major world areas.

2. Types of social and political insurgency characteristic of and in large measure peculiar to Latin America offer significant opportunities for Communist exploitation.

3. The Castro insurgency in Cuba has heightened potentials for increased levels of political insurgency violence in Latin America
by its demonstration that support of the professional military is not essential to civilian insurgents prepared and equipped to wage protracted insurgency warfare. This development may undermine the restraining and controlling influence which the Latin American military have hitherto exercised on much of the political insurgency violence in the area.

4. The Castro insurgency in Cuba demonstrated the effectiveness of a combined rural-urban insurgency strategy of guerrilla warfare and terrorist activity. This development heightens potentials for increased rural participation in future subversive insurgency struggles in Latin America but also heightens the potentials for urban-based insurgency in the area.

5. The Cuban government is currently engaged in a major effort to promote guerrilla warfare and terrorist activity as instruments of revolutionary struggle in Latin America. This development suggests the need for R&D exploration of means whereby surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of Latin American military forces can be improved to detect infiltration from Cuba and influx of weapons, propaganda, and agents into areas selected for guerrilla and terrorist activity.

6. Castro-Communist guerrillas operating in Venezuela since early 1962 have made extensive use of motor transport and have demonstrated an ability for sustained existence despite lack of rural population support. The military R&D implications of this type of guerrilla
campaign might be explored, as also the lessons to be learned from application by Venezuelan military of different counter-guerrilla strategies.

7. The Hugo Blanco guerrillas in the Cuzco area of southern Peru operated with impunity for several months before effective counter-guerrilla operations were launched. The delay in government response may have been attributable to problems of high-altitude operation which are susceptible to military R&D solutions. The use of helicopters and police dogs in the anti-Blanco operations might suggest lessons for future anti-guerrilla operations in the highland areas.

8. Terrorists in Venezuela, in deviation from the Guevara doctrine of terrorist subordination to rural guerrillas, planned a major insurrection in Caracas which called for fortification of a strategic populated area overlooking the center of the city. Failure of this plan in Caracas does not imply that insurgents will not attempt this type of warfare in the future in order to capitalize on insurgency potentials in national capitals and other large cities of Latin America. The military R&D implications of this type of urban-based warfare might be explored.

9. Activities of terrorists and guerrillas in Venezuela, as previously during the Castro insurgency in Cuba, tended to overlap and blur classic distinctions in counterinsurgency literature between "rural guerrilla warfare" and "urban terrorism." This development suggests that military counterinsurgency planning for Latin America cannot
be adequately structured in terms of rigid distinctions between "rural" and "urban" or "guerrilla" and "terrorist" types of insurgent struggle.

10. Latin American military forces are frequently called upon to counter mass demonstrations in urban and rural areas in initial stages of an insurgency build-up which can escalate to violence levels of insurgency significance. R&D exploration of non-lethal crowd control equipment for Latin American military might significantly improve military capability to counter urban mass violence with minimum loss of life. R&D exploration of mobility factors affecting the Latin American military's ability to counter mass rural violence outbreaks in remote areas, as in the highlands of Peru and the interior of Brazil, might lead to significant improvement in military response capabilities.
INTRODUCTION

The meaning which the authors of this report have attached to the key concept of "insurgency" requires clarification. For insurgency, as recent experience has amply demonstrated, can mean different things to different people. To some commentators and in some strategic contexts, insurgency appears to be synonymous with guerrilla warfare. Others find it feasible to consider "revolution" and "insurgency" as virtually identical terms. Still others equate insurgency with a whole series of violent actions against the State--rebellions, insurrections, uprisings, revolts--which are so named precisely because they do not achieve the stature or dimensions of a revolution.

Much of the confusion over the meaning of insurgency is attributable to the fact that the term can be used in either a political, military, or social context or, as often happens, in two or three contexts at once. In the discussion of a working definition which follows, as throughout the text of this report, the phenomenon of "insurgency" will be considered primarily from the viewpoint of the planner who wishes to judge the potential military significance of different types of insurgency in Latin America, regardless of whether this insurgency is of a social or political character.

Current Definitions of the Term "Insurgency"

The U. S. Government has recently approved an official definition of insurgency for interdepartmental use which, though not fully adequate, at
least serves to establish better ground for common understanding of the term than was previously available:

INSURGENCY -- A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war.

The most significant feature of the interdepartmental definition is clearly its emphasis on insurgency as a condition of conflict distinguished from other conditions of conflict by its level of violence. The way is thus opened for a use of the term "insurgency" freed of the special interpretations which are often placed on such related terms as uprising, insurrection, revolt, rebellion, and revolution.

The interdepartmental definition of insurgency does not specify at what violence level "insurgency" is to be distinguished from the higher levels of violence usually associated with "civil war" or from the lower levels of political and/or social violence usually associated with the terms "subversion" and "social violence." This problem may be viewed most advantageously by reference to Figure 1, which represents insurgency as one band in a spectrum of violent actions against civil or political authority.

The problem of distinguishing adequately for military purposes between insurgency and other forms of social and political violence appears

**Figure 1**

**SPECTRUM OF VIOLENT ACTIONS AGAINST CIVIL OR POLITICAL AUTHORITY**

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**Note:** Figure is adapted from a similar figure in Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: An Anthology. Publication No. R-226, October 1962.
to be least acute in the case of "civil war" and "insurgency." According
to good authority, there exists a working consensus among U.S. counter-
insurgency officials that the line between insurgency and higher levels
of violence can be drawn at about the point where guerrilla operations
give way to formal positional or mobile warfare. ¹

The real problem appears at the lower end of the violence spectrum
where it is desirable to draw some line between "insurgency," "subversion,"
and "social violence." At this point it appears that either of two con-
structions may legitimately be applied to the term "insurgency" for pur-
poses of U.S. military planning. The two constructions are illustrated
graphically in Figure 2.

A narrow construction of the term "insurgency" would relate insur-
gency only to anti-government actions which in level of violence fall
short of civil war but are above the level of subversion.

A broad construction of the term "insurgency" would relate insurgency
to all forms of violent action against civil or political authority short
of civil war.

Both constructions, narrow and broad, appear to have their parallels
in concepts of insurgency currently held in various parts of the U.S.
military establishment. The narrow construction would appear to coincide
with the COIN emphasis on insurgency as a condition in which irregular
forces form and engage in anti-government actions which may include guer-
illa warfare. The broad construction would appear to coincide in large

¹. Ibid., p. 1.
Figure 2

SPECTRUM OF INSURGENCY ACTIONS AGAINST CIVIL OR POLITICAL INSURGENCY

INSURGENCY (NARROWLY CONSTRUED)

RIOTS
SABOTAGE
DEMONSTRATIONS

TERRORISM
GUERRILLA WARFARE
MOBILE WARFARE

MASS UPRISING
COUP D'ETAT

ORGANIZED CRIME AND BANDITRY
STRIKES

INDIVIDUAL CRIME

INSURGENCY (BROADLY CONSTRUED)
measure with the JCS definition of insurgency as a condition of illegal opposition to an existing government which can include actions ranging from passive resistance to large-scale guerrilla-type operations.¹

**Use of the Term "Insurgency" in This Report**

Despite the fact that this report is oriented primarily toward the relatively narrow field of interest of the military R&D planner, it was considered desirable that the study effort should be oriented towards the broad construction of insurgency as embracing all types of violent actions against civil or political authority short of civil war.

Adoption of the broad construction of insurgency as a guide for the study effort was prompted by special features of the insurgency problem in Latin America which may be briefly noted as follows:

1. The insurgency history of 20th century Latin America, until the advent of Castro, was generally devoid of significant guerrilla actions.

2. At various times in the 20th century the internal stability of Latin American states has been disturbed by types of internal violence--e.g., military revolts, riots, mass squatter invasions of rural and urban properties--which clearly represent important forms of insurgency in the area but are not comprehended within the narrow construction of the term "insurgency." For this reason, and also to insure that certain types of non-political violence will be seen in proper perspective, it is considered desirable in this report to make at least some reference to all

---

significant types of violence in the area, short of civil war.  

3. Consideration of a broad range of violence actions will also facilitate an understanding of an important strategic problem in Latin America: the problem as to whether the underlying insurgency patterns in the area are such that subversive insurgency will be most likely to draw its strength from rural guerrilla bases in the manner prescribed by Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara. While no final answer to this problem is possible, it will at least be evidenced by the ensuing broad discussion that the military planner confronts a greatly different environment for insurgency in Latin America than has previously been experienced in other world areas.

Organization of This Report

A word now seems desirable with respect to the organization of this report.

Chapters 1 and 2, immediately following, consist of a broad analysis of the societal roots of violence and the various types of insurgency in Latin America. Although these chapters are devoid of recommendations specifically directed to the military R&D planner, the general considerations which they advance are almost essential to an understanding of what

1. Inasmuch as this report is intended primarily for the military R&D planner, considerably more emphasis will be placed on insurgency which may be susceptible to military-type solutions than on insurgency which must be considered mainly a problem for the police or the courts.
Chapter 3 sketches the historical development of the more important manifestations and patterns of insurgency in 20th century Latin America. The discussion is oriented toward the varying insurgent roles of the military, urban, and rural sectors.

Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 analyze the insurgency pattern in Latin America since, and under the impact of, Castro's successful seizure of power in Cuba in January 1959. Throughout this section of the report, an effort is made to develop information of specific interest to the military R&D planner and to develop valid generalizations applicable to the Latin American area. Case studies of individual Latin American countries are introduced.
CHAPTER 1

THE LATIN AMERICAN INSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT

The Problem

In the 15-day period 23 December 1963 - 7 January 1964 the following news items on Latin America, among others, appeared in the U.S. press:

COLOMBIA, 23 December - The Ministry of War announced today that since January 1963 bandits had killed 1,267 civilians and 125 soldiers and police, while government forces had killed 445 bandits.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 26 December - A government television station was damaged by a bomb explosion yesterday; another bomb exploded in a food store. Police blamed anti-government terrorists.

PERU, 27 December - A battle at a farm near the town of Cuzco resulted in the death of 8 Indians and the wounding of 22. The battle started when 1,500 Indians attacked the house of a farmer.

ARGENTINA, 1 January - The Argentine Defense Minister today accepted a challenge to duel the former Secretary of the Air Force. Argentine law forbids duelling.

BRAZIL, 1 January - Three men shot up the home of the former Finance Minister last night and wounded a private guard. Police reported that the men were drunk and that it was not an assassination attempt.

MEXICO, 6 January - More than 200 persons were under arrest today after an armed battle between police and peasants in which 3 persons were killed, 30 injured, and an entire village of 180 small dwellings destroyed. Cause of the disturbance was a dispute over land.

To the U.S. observer who glances through the above items, it will be
obvious that even at a fairly calm moment in its contemporary history the Latin American culture area, although outwardly "Western" in its social and political organization, exhibited violence patterns for which no adequate parallels can be found in U.S. society or in most societies of Western Europe. The observer will also note the difficulty, in every instance save that reported from the Dominican Republic, of classifying any of the reported violence under the familiar heading of "subversion," "insurgency," or "civil war." On the contrary, the bulk of the violence appeared to be a-political and to constitute more a transgression of public order than a challenge to the stability of any Latin American government.

The above reflections suggest that a different conceptual approach must be applied to a study of insurgency patterns in Latin America than might be suitable for other world areas. Latin America is no South Vietnam in which the insurgency situation can be viewed as a bi-polar struggle between the Saigon government on the one side and the Viet Cong on the other. The insurgency pattern in Latin America admits of no such tidy categorization: it is a more disorderly affair, in which insurgency on the Communist model is often overshadowed in importance by the much older violence mechanisms which Latin Americans have traditionally employed as a means of venting political, social, economic, and personal grievances against an established order.

Another comment must be made, with reference to a view of Latin America widely held in this country. There is a tendency among some commentators, particularly in the U.S. press, to identify outbreaks of social
or political violence in Latin America as proof of the area's instability and susceptibility to Communist subversion. The point is overlooked that the simple absence of violence is not always the best indicator of stability and that the venting of grievances in highly localized, piecemeal acts of violence, such as often occur in Latin America, may serve a constructive "safety valve" function to release frustrations that might otherwise accumulate into a larger explosion. It can even be argued that the demonstrated ability of many Latin American political systems to absorb and function amidst levels of internal violence which could not be tolerated in U.S. society is reflective of an underlying stability in the area to which few commentators have hitherto paid sufficient attention.

The U.S. military planner is thus confronted in Latin America with an insurgency environment of unusual complexity and challenge. He deals with nations which, although outwardly "Western," nonetheless tolerate internally levels of social and political violence for which no adequate parallels exist in U.S. society or in most societies of Western Europe. It will be clear from the later discussion in this report that much of the violence in Latin America springs from societal roots which are neither pro- nor anti-Communist in nature. Yet the danger remains, and the record proves, that in the contemporary world context the international Communist conspiracy will spare no effort to encourage and exploit the Latin American penchant for social and political violence, hoping thereby to weaken and discredit existing democratic institutions in the area and to create opportunities for ultimate Communist takeover.

Vietnam and Latin America

In a previous paragraph the point was made that insurgency in Latin America could not be satisfactorily analyzed with the same set of conceptual tools as could be applied to insurgency in Vietnam. The argument does not rule out the value of using Vietnam as an initial reference point in a discussion of the Latin American insurgency environment. On the contrary, and precisely because so much of recent U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine has been molded by experiences in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia generally, it would appear appropriate that the discussion should begin by emphasizing the contrasts that exist between the Latin American and Vietnamese insurgency environments.

The major features of the Vietnamese insurgency environment are by now so familiar to U.S. military planners that only the briefest citation should serve as sufficient reminder of the most important considerations.

Urban-rural relationship. Throughout its history Vietnam has been primarily an agglomeration of peasant villages sharing in a common Vietnamese cultural heritage. Urban populations are of recent origin and consist mainly of "Westernized" or "Westernizing" Vietnamese and Overseas Chinese.

Social organization. The typical Vietnamese village is at one and the same time an autonomous religious unit, social unit, and political unit. Collective solidarity among the villagers is based upon the fact that they were all born in the same place and all pay reverence to the same village tutelary spirit. Solidarity is further reinforced by a
patriarchal family system in which each extended family or clan is
governed by an all-powerful father.¹

An outstanding characteristic of the social life of Vietnamese
villages was, and is, their penchant for carrying on virtually every
type of workaday and leisure-time activity in terms of participation in
organized groups. These groups are organized mainly on an individual
village basis, but there are also many instances of inter-village groups
formed for purposes of recreation, economic enterprise, or mutual
defense.²

Life in the Vietnamese villages is also characterized by an almost
total supervisory control of public opinion over the private life of the
individual. So far is this control carried that, in the opinion of some
authorities, it is difficult for the average Vietnamese to conceive of
acting as an isolated individual or to undertake any action which is not
sanctioned by collective opinion.

Political organization. Vietnamese villages have traditionally at-
ttempted to function as autonomous units whose relations with the central
government were summed up in the ancient maxim: "the law of the emperor
yields to the customs of the village." Much of Vietnamese history can be
interpreted as the record of a continuous struggle between the villages

¹. For a good brief discussion of these aspects of Vietnamese village
life, see Bui Tuong Huan, "Traditional Values in Viet-Nam" in UNESCO,
Social Research and Problems of Rural Development in South-East Asia,

and the central government. The most characteristic and formidable weapon of village resistance to central authority, whether Vietnamese or French, was the secret society which perpetually formed and re-formed in the midst of the peasantry, carried on recurrent waves of insurrection, and proved impossible to exterminate.  

From the period of World War II on, the Vietnamese Communists adopted the doctrine of Mao Tse-tung that the road to successful seizure of power lay through the establishment of rural base areas. By process of patient organization at the village level, the Communist movement in Vietnam eventually reached the point where it could function as the logical extension of the ancient traditions of village and secret society resistance to the central government.

The tactic of village-based guerrilla struggle, coupled with aid from Communist China and the catalyst for insurgency provided by the presence of a French colonial administration, brought the Communists to victory in North Vietnam. In South Vietnam, the Communists continue to operate mainly from a base of village support.

Summary. Vietnamese society, traditionally and into the modern era, has been composed mainly of autonomous villages loosely held together by central authority. The initial penetration of outside Communist "fish" into the "water" of the autonomous Vietnamese villages was probably a difficult as well as a time-consuming task. Once fully in the "water", however, the "fish" have proven as difficult to exterminate as the secret societies of earlier eras.

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1. For an important but often neglected discussion of the Vietnamese secret societies, see Georges Coulet, Les Sociétés secrètes en Terre d'Annam, Saigon: Imprimerie commerciale C. Ardin, 1926.
The Latin American insurgency environment differs so radically from that of Vietnam as to constitute, for all practical purposes, a polar opposite on the environmental spectrum of counterinsurgency planning.¹

Urban-rural relationship. Throughout its recorded history Latin America has been a dual society: rural and urban. Urbanism existed in many parts of Mexico, Central America, and the Andes highland prior to the Spanish Conquest and often prior to the Christian era. Under Spanish and Portuguese rule, new cities were established as important centers of political administration, communication, and trade.² In the 20th century, urbanization in Latin America has accelerated to the point where it is now calculated that 46 percent of the total population in the area currently

1. The discussion which follows is oriented toward the dominant European and mestizo cultures of Latin America. Selected works referring to insurgency patterns and potentials among the Indian populations to the area are listed in the bibliography appended to this report. The consensus of all authorities is that the Indians have no sense of common unity above their individual village or parish life and, as a rule, are disinclined to physical violence among themselves or with mestizos and whites. Such Indian insurgency as has occurred in the 20th century has generally been along the lines described by Blanksten: "Indian uprisings are very infrequent. When they occur, they are sporadic, unorganized, restricted to a small number of isolated communities or villages, and readily put down by the armed forces of the 'whites.'" George I. Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America," p. 496, in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. The principal exception to the insurgency pattern as described by Blanksten is in contemporary Peru, where Indian insurgency has taken on a new significance which will be described in later chapters of this report.

resides in population centers designated as "urban" by national census-takers.  

The insurgency environment in Latin America is thus both urban and rural. Significant insurgency in the area cannot be interpreted, as in Vietnam, mainly in terms of rural-based insurrectionary movements. On the contrary, insurgency in Latin America must be considered in both the urban and rural contexts, with the major urban centers representing important foci of actual and potential insurgency.

Social organization. In almost total contrast to the collectivist spirit which permeates every phase of Vietnamese life, Latin American society is oriented toward a cult of the individual personality which probably has no adequate parallel in any other contemporary world area. It is of the utmost importance, however, to emphasize that the individual in Latin America is not valued on the same grounds which exist in U.S. society—viz., that the individual merits respect because he is "just as good as the next person" or because he has a right to "equal opportunity." In Latin America the individual is valued precisely because he is not like anyone else. He is considered the possessor of a unique inner personality, or "soul," which the central values of his culture demand that he protect vigorously against any outside encroachment or insult, real or imaginary.  


Elaborate rituals of social politeness have developed in Latin America precisely in order to avoid situations in which an affront, inadvertent or deliberate, is offered to the dignidad de la persona—a Spanish American phrase whose full meaning and force cannot be adequately rendered by the literal English translation, "dignity of the person." Notwithstanding these precautions, it is readily apparent to any observer than the tranquility of Latin American society is often shattered by acts of private and anarchic group violence which apparently have no other motivation than a desire to revenge or assert dignidad.

In keeping with a cultural tradition whose central values are centered on the uniqueness of the individual, Latin American society is notably deficient in many of the bonds of solidarity which characterize U.S. society, let alone the highly collectivist society of Vietnam. As a general rule, the only social groups in which the individual in Latin America is fully at ease and secure of his dignidad are his immediate family, his kinfolk, and the individuals who are bound to him in a form of ceremonial kinship (compadrazgo) which has emerged as an institutionalized means of solidifying patron-client and friendship ties. For the rest, there is little in Latin American society to correspond in importance to the voluntary associations so influential in U.S. life—e.g., the Rotary Club, the United Givers Fund, the P.T.A.—or to the easy processes whereby close friendships are formed in U.S. after a brief acquaintance. In public affairs, as has

been well said, "perhaps the most important Latin American characteristic is that of non-cooperating." A present-day Argentine author has added: "We behave as if each one of us were unique and as if he were alone." ¹

The would-be insurgent in Latin America thus operates in a social context quite different from other world areas. There is rather little problem in finding insurgent manpower since there are always people, particularly among the younger age groups, whose sense of inner uniqueness and dignidad is prone to seek an outlet in violence, and even death, in the prosecution of some heroic cause. The problem is rather to impose an organization, a discipline, and a sense of planned, persistent action on the insurgent spirit. It is probably no accident that the insurgency history of Latin America is full of the exploits of daring leaders and sudden outbursts of violence, while at the same time it reveals no counterpart to the secret societies of Vietnam nor to the decades-long insurgencies of the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists.

Political organization. Governing processes in the Latin American countries have always been highly centralized, notwithstanding the efforts of some 19th and 20th century constitutions to erect systems of federal government comparable to the U.S. system. This circumstance has helped to inhibit the development of effective mechanisms of self-government at the regional or village levels. At the same time, it has also served to emphasize the role of the national capital city as the effective center of political power.

The character of much Latin American insurgency has reflected the influence of the centralized political systems of the area. The political demonstration and the riot in the national capital city, and the swift military coup against the President and his cabinet, have always been favored instruments of Latin American insurgency precisely because this is where the power lies and this is where it can be seized or menaced. Rural-based insurgency in 20th century Latin America, until the advent of Castro, was seldom attempted on a significant scale.

Another circumstance which gives the Latin American insurgency environment a special character of its own is the absence in the area of the catalytic factors which have helped to stimulate and shape insurgency in other world areas, including Vietnam. For example, with minor exceptions in the Caribbean region, there have been no alien colonial governments in 20th century Latin America against whose physical presence indigenous insurgents might rebel. Until 1959 there was no Latin American Communist government to assist insurgents and provide them bases for training and indoctrination. Finally, it should be noted that even though most Latin American populations are richly varied with respect to race and place of ancestral origin, the dominant culture patterns of the area have successfully operated to eliminate either race or nationality as sources of internal political conflict. There is nothing in Latin America to correspond to the mutual antagonisms of Karens and Burmans, Kurds and Iraqi, Berbers and Arabs. There is nothing comparable even to the frictions between U.S. Whites and Negroes.

More might be said as to these and other factors which operate to
set Latin America apart from the insurgency environments in other world areas. Yet perhaps enough has already been advanced to establish the essential point that any attempt to structure the Latin American insurgency environment in terms of counterinsurgency concepts woodenly borrowed from experiences in other world areas may result in a serious misreading of the Latin American situation and in the application of erroneous counterinsurgency strategies. In insurgency, as in so much else, Latin Americans go their own way.

The Cuban Insurgency Environment of 1956

Were these observations made in 1956, instead of in the first days of 1964, the discussion might well have concluded rashly on the note that there was relatively little reason to apprehend that any Latin American government would fall prey to a protracted guerrilla struggle conducted on the style of Mao Tse-tung and/or Vo Nguyen Giap. The Latin American insurgency threat, it might have been said, lay mainly in urban and military insurgency. The landing of Fidel Castro on the coast of Oriente Province in December 1956 might have been dismissed as an attempt to apply a type of guerrilla warfare that was unsuited to the special conditions of the Latin American environment.¹

1. The New York Times commented editorially on 22 December 1956 with reference to Castro's landing in Oriente Province as follows: "There was not the slightest hope that a revolt could succeed in present circumstances. . . . Fidel Castro wants General Batista to resign and general elections held immediately after. The President, of course, has no intention of resigning, and we cannot possibly see how Fidel Castro or anyone else is going to make him do so."
Hindsight, however, has its value, and no one now could quarrel with Guevara's claim that one of the major accomplishments of the Castro insurrection "is to convince those who want to center the revolution on the urban masses not to overlook the tremendous role of rural people in underdeveloped America." Yet this much agreed upon, there is still a question as to what extent the factors which assisted Castro to assemble a successful guerrilla movement were specific to Cuba in the late 1950's and were not typical of Latin America generally. The question has a considerable significance, since it touches on the problem as to what extent the Castro insurgency can be regarded as a nonrecurring variable in the general Latin American insurgency pattern and to what extent it must be regarded as a possible prototype for other Latin American guerrilla movements.

The typically Latin American features of the Castro insurgency were many and important. Castro operated in the midst of a population which felt no great loyalty to the regime in power and had many reasons to be disaffected toward it: this factor, though probably present to unusual degree under the last Batista regime, is certainly not without its parallels in other Latin American countries. Cuba also had a long tradition of violent overthrow of constituted governments, but so have other Latin American nations, and sometimes with much greater frequency than Cuba.


2. One authority considers that "no country in the Western world has had a history of political corruption so universal and so corroding" as Cuba. Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962, p. 208.
Finally, Fidel Castro, with his beard, his cigar, his fatigues, his eloquence, and the aura of his many exploits in opposition to Batista, was the quintessence of the picturesque leader who by force of personality alone can attract a large following in most Latin American countries.  

Fidel Castro, however, was not a typical Latin American insurgent leader to the extent that he eschewed the familiar Latin American strategy of gaining power through urban insurgency or military coup and concentrated the major part of his resources on a sustained campaign of guerrilla warfare and attrition. It is in this last, strategic aspect of the Cuban Revolution that the Castro insurrection capitalized on an insurgency environment which was probably more unique to the Cuba of 1956 than typical of Latin America generally. The following arguments, among others, may be adduced to support this point:

1. Gillin and other commentators have noted that one of the factors in Latin American society which compensates for the general weakness of social organization above the kinship level is the tendency of people to rally behind a great politician or insurgency leader not so much because he represents a particular social, economic, or political program but simply because he embodies in his own personality, or dignidad, those inner qualities which they feel in themselves and which they would like to manifest in their own actions, had they but the same talent to do so. John P. Gillin, "Some Signposts for Policy," p. 31, in Richard P. Adams et al., Social Change in Latin America Today. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960. A newspaper correspondent has recently suggested that much of President Betancourt's success in countering Castro-Communism in Venezuela was due to his ability to construct a personal image of himself which rivalled that of Castro. "Mr. Betancourt, who knows his people and understands the value of appearances, never goes anywhere without a large pipe. This posture was adopted deliberately to provide a visual symbol to counteract Fidel Castro. 'Pipa si, chiva no' (pipe yes, beard no) is scrawled on countless village walls." New York Times, 8 December 1963.
Cuban insurgent traditions. The history of Cuba as a Spanish colony was in marked contrast to the rest of Spanish America, both with respect to the duration and to the character of Spanish rule. Cuba was one of the first American territories to be effectively settled by the Spanish (1514-1515); it and Puerto Rico were the last to win their independence (1898), fully seventy years after the Wars for Independence (1810-1826) in other parts of Spanish America. Cuba also functioned throughout its colonial history as a key Spanish military and supply base, with the result that the military and authoritarian orientation of Spanish rule was heavier in the island than elsewhere in America.1

From 1850 onwards Cuba was embroiled in a recurrent series of guerrilla struggles and at least one major civil war in its efforts to throw off Spanish rule. The final liberation in 1898 was achieved only with U.S. assistance, but this fact tended to be obscured in Cuban minds after anti-Yankee sentiment gained increasing force during the 20th century. From the 1920's onward, increasing emphasis was placed by Cuban nationalists on the hero-figure of José Martí (1853-1895), the "Apostle of Cuban Independence" who died as a guerrilla fighter against the Spaniards.2 There was thus present in Cuba, as of 1956, a historical and emotional context unusually favorable to the re-emergence of the guerrilla fighter.

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Cuban agrarian conditions. In contrast to other Latin American nations, the large estate or hacienda was relatively unimportant in colonial Cuba, where a fairly wide distribution of land developed. Once Cuba broke away from Spanish rule in 1898, a reverse process set in as large sugar companies began to corner the available agricultural land at the expense of small farmers and sugar planters. Within living memory, a large and dispossessed rural proletariat was created in one of the richest agricultural areas of the hemisphere.¹

The dislocating effects of modern plantation agriculture were also felt in other Latin American countries during the 20th century but nowhere with the same pulverizing effect on rural society as in the island of Cuba. Unlike the large South American countries and even the so-called "banana republics" of Central America, Cuba contained no appreciable surplus of land on which farmers dispossessed by the sugar companies could settle. Unlike Jamaica, there were no legal mechanisms to produce a land tenure system whereby small peasant proprietors could exist side-by-side with the large sugar plantations. Unlike Puerto Rico and the British West Indies, there were no easy opportunities for Cuban emigration.

The rural Cuban population thus came to be composed in large part of sharecroppers and laborers, all contributing to the prosperity of Havana and the sugar companies but not to the enrichment of their own life. Even

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¹. Federico G. Gil, "Antecedents of the Cuban Revolution." The Centennial Review, Summer 1962, pp. 389-392. According to Herring "the most serious blows to the Cuban farmer came during the post-World War I crisis of 1920, when sugar prices broke within six months from the all-time high of 22.5 cents a pound to 3.75 cents and, as a result, thousands of farmers lost their lands. The banks which held their mortgages then sold them to the great sugar corporations." Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America from the Beginnings to the Present. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962, pp. 419-420.
this population might not have proven so fertile a ground for guerrilla exploitation, were it not for the still vibrant memory of a recent era in which Cuba had been mainly a land of small- and middle-peasant proprietors.\textsuperscript{1} Almost from the first, Castro's insurgency was linked to the promise of radical agrarian reform, even though its leaders were mainly urban middle-class in origin. Almost from the first, it was the rural proletariat which provided the bulk of Castro's forces.\textsuperscript{2}

Apart from its Latin American and specifically Cuban features, the Castro insurgency also operated in a historical context which is not likely to be repeated for any future Latin American guerrilla movement. For example, it seems unlikely that the destruction of the Cuban military under Castro will soon be forgotten by the military in other Latin American countries. The United States itself is less likely to view future insurgency movements in Latin America in the same spirit of benevolent neutrality and popular sympathy as was extended to Castro in his guerrilla campaign.

In sum, although typically Latin American in some of its features, the success of the Castro insurgency appears to have been built mainly on

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. the judgment of a U.S. rural sociologist based on a field study in Cuba during 1945-1946. "Political unrest, arising from the frustration of the desire of peasants to obtain possession of and security on land, will be chronic in Cuba until more positive action is taken in this respect. Admittedly the problem is a difficult one, with the existing rights of large landholders to consider; but it is not a question that can be continually postponed. It is likely that continued delay...may result in serious political consequences." Lowry Nelson, Rural Cuba. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1950, p. 255.

the special environment for guerrilla action which existed in Cuba as of 1956. This conclusion by no means rules out the possibility, indeed the probability, that subversive elements in other parts of Latin America will endeavor to use guerrilla warfare as an important weapon in their insurgency efforts. What the conclusion does suggest, however, is that Castro's special brand of insurgency may function more as an inspiration than as a workable model for subversives in other Latin American countries.

Guevara and other Castro-Communist ideologists have not agreed with this conclusion. In his treatise on guerrilla warfare Guevara claimed that the success of Castro's guerrilla campaign had revealed three fundamental principles applicable to insurgency in the rest of Latin America:

1. Popular forces can win a war against an army.
2. One does not necessarily have to wait for a revolutionary situation to arise; it can be created.
3. In the underdeveloped countries of the Americas, rural areas are the best battlefields for revolution.

The foregoing analysis would suggest that only the first of Guevara's propositions need be regarded as proven. The second proposition is a deduction in neo-Marxist logic which has been disputed vigorously by important Communist leaders in other Latin American countries. The third proposition,

2. Ernst Halperin has noted that Guevara's second proposition is clearly in flat contradiction to the basic Leninist tenet that a revolution can be successful only if both the "objective" and the "subjective" conditions for it exist. Other Communist leaders consider that the objective conditions for revolution do not as yet exist in Latin America and therefore pursue moderate policies of collaboration and infiltration as opposed to armed uprising. For an excellent discussion of this controversy within the Communist parties of Latin America, see Halperin's article, "Castroism—Challenge to the Latin American Communists." Problems of Communism, September-October 1963, pp. 9-18.
which perhaps holds the greatest interest for readers of this report, must be regarded as essentially unproven except in the special social and historical context which assisted the development of rural guerrilla action in the Cuba of 1956-1959.
CHAPTER 2

MAJOR TYPES OF LATIN AMERICAN INSURGENCY

A U.S. professor, long a student of Latin American affairs, has recently suggested that the contemporary problems of the area are in many respects strikingly similar to the growing pains of the United States in the generation after the Civil War. He points out that this is a period in Latin America of vaulting ambitions, of dramatic economic achievements, of huge profits, of unscrupulous "robber barons," of corruption in governments and legislatures, of spectacular rises in urban populations, of inadequate housing and transport, and of seeming upper class indifference to lower class grievances. The fundamental difference between the U.S. and Latin American experience, he suggests, is in the timing. Latin America is not coming into adolescence in a period of laissez-faire and sauvé qui peut, but in a period in which the social conscience is awakened and in which there is an international Communist conspiracy. 1

Much the same set of reflections must accompany any analysis of Latin American insurgency patterns. What matters in the military point of view are not so much the predispositions to insurgency violence that

exist in Latin America—though it is important to know what these predispositions are—as the question of how far the types of insurgency characteristic of the area offer significant tactical opportunities for international Communism to exploit.

To resolve this question insofar as possible, this report incorporates two complementary lines of analysis. The present chapter contains a panoramic view of all major types of Latin American insurgency, so as better to assist an understanding of the total insurgency problems as well as of those manifestations which offer opportunities for Communist exploitation. The later chapters of the report are devoted to a historical analysis of the most important insurgency developments in 20th century Latin America with particular reference to those types of contemporary insurgency which appear susceptible to military solutions of an R&D nature.

Social Insurgency

The use of the term "social insurgency" may surprise those who think of insurgency as comprising only those acts of politically-motivated violence which are consciously directed toward the overthrow of an established government. Yet there can also be occasions in which violence of a purely social character can have an insurgency effect if the violence reaches proportions which threaten or cause a major breakdown in the system
of public order established by the state.  

In the United States and in most societies of Western Europe, social violence has long since ceased to contain a significant potential for escalation into disorders of a scale which threaten the stability of an established government. The case is otherwise in Latin America. Here one finds, side by side with modern political insurgency phenomena such as the military coup and guerrilla warfare, archaic types of unstructured mass social violence such as disappeared from most of Western Europe by the early 19th century. The destructive riots which occasionally rock a large Latin American city, the internecine rural violence in Colombia which has cost 200,000 to 300,000 lives since 1948, are clearly social phenomena of insurgency significance.

Latin America also exhibits lesser types of social insurgency which do not as of now pose a threat to the stability of any established government but which may exert a significant influence on the future development of insurgency patterns in the area. The most significant of such phenomena are banditry and agrarian squatter movements.

1. The principal in political science which underlies the argument in this sentence is well stated by Nieburg: "In all systems, the state, to deserve its name, must apply adequate force to control outbreaks of actual violence by private sources—or tolerate some more or less recognized 'off-limits' areas for outlawry. If the instrumentalities of state power are not equal to broad private threats, the government in power ceases to rule. Vigilantism or the private threat of violence has then in fact become the last resort of authority in the system. Why do governments sometimes fall when there is a general strike, or street demonstration? Why don't they ignore outbreaks with which they cannot cope? And say: 'All right, go ahead and strike, fight each other for control of the streets, snake-dance down the avenue. We will sit here in our offices anyway making decisions!' Governments fall when their capabilities for dealing with threatened violence fail." H.L. Nieburg, "The Threat of Violence and Social Change." American Political Science Review, December 1962, p. 868.
1. **Unstructured mass violence.** Nearly all forms of social violence possess some kind of "structure"—that is to say, some kind of patterned action directed toward the achievement of a defined goal. Banditry, for example, is a structured activity in the sense that the bandit acts toward the goal of personal gain or of "steal from the rich, give to the poor."

One of the more remarkable features of Latin American society, without adequate parallel elsewhere in Western society, is its capacity for a kind of explosive mass violence which is almost totally without structure or goal. In the language of the sociologist, Latin America is scene par excellence of the "non-realistic conflict"—i.e., those conflicts which can be ignited by almost any spark simply because their primary function is to provide a release for accumulated social tensions rather than the achievement of any specific object.

Actual outbreaks of unstructured mass violence are not common in Latin America, if only because no society can live under the perpetual threat of primordial anarchy. When the outbreaks do occur, however, they may take on the character of a kind of social vomiting which in scale of violence and destruction is totally unrelated to the initial pretext.

The most formidable urban outbreak of unstructured mass violence in recent Latin American history was the Colombian *bogotazo* of 1948, during which an estimated 1,200 persons were killed, 3,000 were injured, the center of Bogotá was reduced to a smoking ruin, and upwards of $500,000,000 property damage was caused.\(^1\) The *bogotazo* was touched off by the assassination of a popular Bogotá politician. Brazilian cities are liable to a type

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\(^1\) The *New York Times*, 22 April 1948.
of unpredictable social explosion known locally as **quebra-quebra**
(literally, "smash-smash"); one typical incident is for a throng of
suburban commuters in Rio to wait vain hours for their train, then pro-
ceed to level the waiting-station to the ground and tear up the nearby
tracks.\(^1\) Even normally staid Chile was subject in 1957 to a week of
destructive riots touched off by nothing more than an increase in bus
fares: before it was over, almost a score were dead, hundreds hurt and
wounded.\(^2\)

Unstructured mass violence in the rural areas of Latin America has
assumed ferocious dimensions in Colombia where, as mentioned earlier,
since 1948 an estimated 200,000-300,000 persons have lost their lives in
internecine violence which has defied adequate explanation even by psy-
chiatrists and pathologists.\(^3\) The Colombian case, however, is without
adequate precedent or parallel elsewhere in Latin America: so much so,
that there seems at least some ground for the supposition that outbreaks
of unstructured mass violence in Latin America are mainly urban phenomena.

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1. For a brief reference to quebra-quebra see the article by Andrew
Pearse in Philip M. Hauser (ed.), *Urbanization in Latin America.*

2. For a detailed description of these riots see Kalman H. Silvert,
"Requiem for a Number of Things." New York: American Universities
Field Staff, 1957. A similar riot over increases in bus fares at
São Paulo, Brazil, in August 1947 left 3 persons dead, 30 injured,
122 streetcars destroyed, and 45 buses destroyed or damaged. New

3. The rural violence in Colombia is extensively studied in Mons. Germán
Guzmán Campos et al., *La Violencia en Colombia: Estudio de un Proceso
figure of 200,000-300,000 deaths is cited in a *New York Times
The case of Colombia must also be regarded as exceptional in that the violence in its rural areas has been prolonged over a course of many years. Nearly always the pattern of unstructured mass violence in urban Latin America is one of sudden eruption, lasting at most two or three days in its most virulent form, followed by a fairly rapid return to normal conditions of order. It is usually only in the early stages of the violence that subversive elements, such as the Communists, can profit from the disturbance and turn the mob toward targets which suit the subversive purpose. This moment of tactical opportunity soon dissipates and may not even be capitalized upon since the subversives, no less than anyone else, may be taken unaware by the suddenness of the violence outbreak.¹

Outbreaks of unstructured mass violence in Latin America do not of themselves represent an insurmountable insurgency threat to any established government in the area. This has been proven repeatedly in Colombia, despite all the violence which has occurred in that country since 1948, and in other Latin American countries as well. The real insurgency threat posed by the potential for mass social violence which exists in some of the large cities of Latin America is the danger that an

¹ The efforts of the Communists to spur on the violence of the Colombian bogotazo of 1948 are detailed in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary. Communist Anti-American Riots: Mob Violence as an Instrument of Red Diplomacy, Bogotá-Caracas-La Paz-Tokyo. 86th Congress, 2d Session, 1960, pp. 1-10. Similar Communist efforts were observed during the Panama City-Canal Zone riot of early January 1964. On the other hand, the violence of the Chilean riots of 1957 over the increase in bus fares seems to have surprised everyone, including the Communists. Silvert, op. cit., p. 7.
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outbreak will some day occur at a time when the government is threatened by insurgency of other kinds, such as weakening in its base of military support or a sustained campaign of Communist guerrilla warfare and terrorist activity. ¹

2. Banditry. The incidence of banditry in any country has special significance for military counterinsurgency planning because the tactics employed by the bandits are often those which would have to be employed by guerrillas operating in the same area. At the same time, there is a real danger that the rigid lexicon of counterinsurgency planning, which does not now admit the word "bandit," will operate to destroy the very real distinctions which exist between bandits and guerrillas considered as insurgency actors.

Banditry, it is important to emphasize, is a type of social insurgency which flourishes only in backward rural societies which have not yet reached political consciousness or acquired more effective means of social agitation. Banditry does not ordinarily constitute a form of insurrection against an established government nor even against the established socioeconomic system which keeps the rural society backward: the real function of the bandit, considered as a social insurgent, is only to impose certain limits on the inequities of the social system by the familiar tactic of "taking from the rich to give to the poor." The bandit is thus essentially a pre-political phenomenon; his strength and the prevalence of banditry

¹ Major urban riots, in which an important element of anarchic social violence was present, have occurred since World War II in Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, Panama, Guatemala, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.
throughout history have been in inverse proportion to the development of modern agrarian reform movements, including those prompted by Socialism and Communism.

The guerrilla resembles the bandit only in the matter of occasional tactics; for the rest, there is a profound cleavage between the bandit who attempts piecemeal rectification of the existing socio-economic order and the Communist who turns to guerrilla warfare as a military means to accomplish the destruction of the existing order. It seems no accident that on those occasions when bandits and Communist guerrillas have existed side by side in underdeveloped countries, they have either been at each others' throats or at best have patched up an uneasy alliance.

Banditry was widespread in Latin America during the 19th century and has persisted in some areas until the present day, as in contemporary Colombia and Northeast Brazil. By its very nature it could not, and did

1. E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959, pp. 19-23. Hobsbawm points out that although a distinction can be drawn between the purely criminal bandit and the "social bandit" who strives to limit socio-economic oppression, the two types of banditry tend to merge into one composite type since no bandit can exist for very long in a rural milieu if he turns both rich and poor against him. Even the worst criminal bandits, therefore, find it to their advantage to pose in some measure as Robin Hoods who take from the rich to give to the poor.

2. This distinction between the bandit and the guerrilla is emphasized by Guevara, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

3. The history of Communists who have attempted to penetrate and remold bandit gangs in the Communist image has often been disastrous. For a reference to one Castroite leader who attempted this maneuver in Colombia and was murdered by the bandits, see Gilberto Vieira, "Growth of Militarism in Colombia and the Line of the Communist Party." World Marxist Review, April 1963, p. 19.
not escalate into major insurgency of the social type. But the tradition of banditry in any given geographic area can assist the later development of guerrilla movements in the same area by virtue of the circumstance that in nearly all societies where banditry once flourished, the United States and Great Britain not excluded, succeeding generations have tended to erect the great bandit leaders into folk heroes who take on the reputation of great guerrilla captains. This development is especially noticeable in Latin America, where the cult of the bandit hero is unusually strong.\(^1\) Quite possibly one of the most skillful injunctions of Guevara to the would-be Latin American guerrilla is the suggestion that at first he should not stress social reform to the rural population among which he settles. He should begin by winning the friendship of the poor farmers and then gradually emerge as their standard bearer, "taking from the rich and giving to the poor." Only when the people are thus psychologically prepared, should the guerrilla raise the issues of social and agrarian reform.\(^2\)

3. Agrarian squatter movements. In December 1962 a Brazilian sociologist published an article in which he called attention to an increase in the number of armed clashes in the Brazilian countryside stemming from

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1. For examples of the way in which the bandits of Northeast Brazil have been converted into folk heroes, see T. Lynn Smith, *Brazil: People and Institutions*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963, p. 386n.

quarrels over the possession of land. He instanced the following incidents for the period May-October, 1962 only:

**MAY** -- A clash between landowners and squatters in Maranhão State, Northeast Brazil, caused death and injuries among the squatters and among the police who tried to stop the fighting.

**MAY** -- A clash in Paraiba State, Northeast Brazil, ended in the death of a local Peasant League leader.

**MAY** -- A clash over the possession of land occurred in São Paulo State, Southern Brazil, between squatters and plantation employees. The clash occurred in a region in which 15 landowners possess 82 percent of the arable land.

**JUNE** -- In Goiás State, Central Brazil, about 200 rural people armed with primitive weapons fought for possession of the land against 80 armed assassins in the employ of local landowners. The fight lasted for 15 days and resulted in several deaths.

**OCT.** -- Another fight between squatters and landowners occurred in Goiás State, Central Brazil. This time the squatters were led by a local District Judge and Sub-Prefect.

The sociologist noted that the armed clashes were part of an upsurge in the number of agrarian squatter invasions of landowner property which had occurred in Brazil during 1960-1962. He attributed the upsurge to improved communications in the rural areas, improved transportation facilities, and the development of Peasant Leagues which had taught the rural people how to organize against the landowners.¹

Agrarian squatter invasions of landowner properties, similar to those in Brazil, are also being reported from other Latin American countries north of the Chile-Bolivia-Paraguay-Argentina-Uruguay line. In Colombia

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¹ José Pastore, "Conflito e Mudança Social no Brasil Rural." Socio-lógica, (São Paulo), December 1962.
the squatter problem has been a source of disturbance since the early 1930's. In Peru and Mexico the Indian populations are participating in mass land invasions, often with hundreds and sometimes with thousands of persons involved in a single invasion. Other recent incidents involving agrarian squatters are reported in Ecuador and Venezuela.

Many explanations have been offered for the contemporary disposition of peasant groups in many Latin American countries to shrug off age-old restraints and invade properties which in many cases have remained in the undisputed possession of great landowner families for generations. Landowner groups have often charged that the outside hand of Communist and Castro-Communist agitators is involved, as indeed appears to be the case in a number of instances. But as a general rule, the land invasions appear to be organized mainly by the peasants themselves and to reflect the influence of such purely social factors as local population pressures and the psychological alteration in the peasant mentality so often described as the "revolution of rising expectations."

Whatever the cause of the agrarian squatter movements, the fact remains that the violence with which landowner properties are seized, and


2. The full extent and dimensions of the agrarian squatter invasions of private land in Latin America during recent years are difficult to ascertain because of the absence of any systematic study of these phenomena. The lack of such a study is noted in Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development (OAS/IDB/FAO/ECLA/IIAS), Inventory of Information Basic to Agricultural Programs in Latin America: General Report. 1 February 1963, p. 55.
the violence with which the squatters often resist attempts to dislodge them, are manifestations of an insurgency which is primarily social rather than political in nature. The armed clashes which thus far have developed present no immediate security threat to any Latin American government since they have been highly localized and generally of brief duration. The aim of the peasant invader has not been to overthrow the established government but rather to win from it a title to the land which he has seized.¹

The significance of agrarian squatter movements as insurgency phenomena lies rather in the fact that these movements reflect a growing land-hunger among the Latin American peasantry and a disposition to use any necessary means, including violence, in order to satisfy it. So long as established governments, as in contemporary Venezuela, are prepared to deal sympathetically with the peasants there may be little prospect that the violence associated with the land invasions will escalate into large-scale social disorders or into insurgency of a genuinely political character. The case may be different in other Latin American countries if the government cannot interpose effectively to ward off repeated clashes between landowners and peasants. In these countries it may be the guerrilla, not the government, who can best accommodate "the desires of the great mass of poor farmers to possess their own land, animals, and all that makes up their life from cradle to grave."²

1. The dynamics of the agrarian land invasions in Latin America are briefly and well described in Hirschman, op. cit., p. 258.

Political Insurgency

To qualify as political, insurgency must be directed in at least some measure toward the overthrowing of an established government. Political insurgency thus differs significantly from social insurgency, which consists mainly in group transgressions of the public order.

The following discussion of the principal types of political insurgency in Latin America is arranged according to an arbitrary spectrum of "direct acts"—i.e., acts outside constitutional channels—proceeding from the lesser to the more serious types of insurgency. The discussion omits reference to certain types of political insurgency—e.g., peasant revolts, regional revolts, religious revolts—which no longer are part of the contemporary Latin American scene and are of historical interest only.

1. Urban Demonstrations and Riots. As in any other society which observes at least the outward forms of democracy, Latin Americans not uncommonly resort to urban manifestaciones—i.e., public demonstrations, rallies, parades, and the like—in order to dramatize their adherence to some political cause or to press for some kind of desired action by the government. It would appear that in the majority of instances such demonstrations pass off without further incident: people assemble peacefully, listen to speeches, shout slogans, and go quietly home.

In a considerable number of cases, however, and with a frequency unequalled in other "Western" societies, a political demonstration in Latin America may degenerate into isolated acts of violence against property and, less often, against persons. Buses and cars are stopped, overturned, smashed, burned; the houses and shops of members of opposing groups are stoned, broken into, looted. Police, special riot squads, and often the military are called in to restore order and make arrests.¹

Some demonstrations stop at about this point; some, however, gain new dimension when the word is spread that the government forces or opposing groups have fired upon and/or killed some of the demonstrators. From this point on, the manifestación may develop into a full-fledged riot capable of causing large property damage and taking several human lives. The rioters may now vent their wrath directly against the Presidential Palace or other principal government offices and installations.

A number of Latin American governments have experienced a decisive turning point in their fortunes because of the public indignation kindled by the death of participants in political demonstrations and riots on which the government security forces at some point opened fire. This sense of indignation is particularly strong if the persons killed are women, children, or students. Leaders of political opposition parties and subversive elements have sometimes sought to capitalize on this psychological reaction by placing students and children in the front ranks of

¹ Needler, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
manifestaciones that are likely to provoke forceful government counter-action.¹ The technique of concealed sniper fire was used in the January 1964 Canal Zone riots as a means of provoking counter-fire by the defensive U.S. forces.

A manifestación which escalates into a major riot may follow one of two courses. If it retains at least some semblance of consciously directed purpose, it may lead to the overthrow of an established government provided other insurgency factors are present, such as a weakening in the government’s base of military support.² On the other hand, if the manifestación degenerates into the kind of unstructured mass violence described earlier in this report, it may lose much of its insurgency significance as many of those who helped to launch it rally to the government side in order to stem the tide of anarchy.³ The recent history of Latin America provides only one isolated instance in which a manifestación led directly to the overthrow of an established government. On 21 July 1946, after three days of strikes and demonstrations in which scores of persons were killed, an armed mob stormed


². The dictatorial regime of General Rojas Pinilla in Colombia was overthrown in 1957 after 10 days of sustained manifestaciones; the same thing happened to the regime of Colonel Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela in 1958. In each case the manifestaciones did not directly overthrow the government but did lead to a weakening in the government’s military support.

³. Ecuadorean students who helped to launch a manifestación at Guayaquil in June 1959 later went over to the side of the government security forces when the manifestación degenerated into a wholesale looting. Washington Post, 5 June 1959. The students who led the Chilean bus fare riots of April 1957 also withdrew when the looting began. Silvert, op. cit., p. 7.
through the streets of La Paz, Bolivia, burst into the presidential palace, and lynched the President from a lamp post.¹

Manifestaciones of insurgency significance are usually localized in the capital cities of the Latin American republics but may be accompanied by sympathy demonstrations in other important cities as well. Ecuador is the principal exception to the capital city rule, since its manifestaciones may occur either in the capital city of Quito or the larger city of Guayaquil. The manifestación may last only a few hours or may be spread out into a series of demonstrations and riots which last a week or more.

2. Strikes. The strike in Latin America has a political significance unparalleled in the United States where strikes are normally employed only for limited economic ends. Strikes in Latin America are often called for essentially political purposes: for example, to demonstrate against an unpopular regime or to protest against some anticipated government program. Moreover, participation in Latin American strikes is by no means limited to trade unions and may include such groups as high school and university students, shopkeepers, bank employees, government employees, and professional men and women.

The general strike has proven especially effective as an insurgency instrument in Central America where it has been a major factor in the overthrow of governments, particularly in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.² A strike by an individual occupational group may also touch off a series of

1. New York Times, 22 July 1946; Christian Science Monitor, 22 July 1946. Even in this case an element of military support for the insurgents was present, since the military did not intervene to aid the President.

events which lead to the overthrow of a government, as in the strike of professional men and women which occasioned the downfall of a Chilean government in 1931 and the Port-au-Prince shopkeepers' strike which led to the ouster of President Magloire in 1956. As is the case with the manifestación, the strike is not of itself a sufficient insurgency weapon with which to overthrow an established government unless other insurgency factors, such as the weakening of military allegiance to the regime in power, are also present.

3. Terrorist Activity. Until the advent of Fidel Castro, the deliberate choice of terrorism and sabotage as insurgency weapons was seldom seen in Latin America, except for an occasional flurry of bomb-throwing or the assassination of some government leader. Terrorism was usually a counterinsurgency weapon which strong-arm governments employed in an effort to cow or crush the political opposition. Such terrorism as insurgency elements employed was primarily a kind of counter-terror to the government's tactics.

Castro's systematic employment of terrorist activity and sabotage against the Batista regime combined elements of both counter-terror and the deliberate use of terror as an insurgency weapon. The recent Castro-Communist campaign in Venezuela against the government of President Betancourt appears to be the first significant instance in Latin American insurgency history in which terrorist activity and sabotage were deliberately employed as insurgency weapons without prior provocation from the established regime.

Needler, op. cit., p. 79.
4. Guerrilla Warfare. For reasons to be explored more fully in the chapter on the historical patterns of Latin American insurgency which follows, guerrilla warfare was not a significant instrument of insurgency in Latin America prior to Castro's return to Cuba in December 1956. The success of Castro's guerrilla campaign gave an unprecedented impetus to this type of insurgency, the results of which are examined in Chapter 5 of this report.

5. Military Barracks Revolts. One of the most effective types of insurgency in Latin America is the cuartelazo or military barracks revolt. The name is derived from the Spanish word for barracks (cuartel) and signifies that the revolt usually begins with the rebellion of one or several military bases or encampments.

The successful cuartelazo follows a classic pattern which has been played out scores of times in 20th century Latin America. First, there is a period of conspiratorial preparation, during which those who will launch the cuartelazo consider problems of leadership, the attitudes of military leaders not involved in the cuartelazo, the attitudes of important civilian politicians, the equating of power factors, the technical problems of logistics, the drafting of a revolutionary manifesto, and the drafting of at least a temporary series of programs to meet the most pressing problems of government after power is obtained.

1. The term cuartelazo as used here and throughout this report is restricted to what may be called "major barracks revolts" which usually involve high-ranking military officers. The "minor barracks" revolts occasionally staged by a company commander or a group of junior officers are excluded.
Then comes the cuartelazo itself: a revolutionary manifesto is issued, an armed thrust is made towards government headquarters, communications centers, and sites of military supplies. Soon the capital is occupied; the people are informed that the government has changed hands, and the names of the ruling military junta are announced.¹

From the tactical point of view, the most common features of a successful cuartelazo are the absence of armed civilian participation, the display of overwhelming military force against any would-be resistance, the rapid execution of the pre-conceived plan of military takeover, and more usually than not, the absence of all but minor loss to life and property.

The cuartelazo is not a foolproof method for painless insurgency. In any given year Latin America may experience one, two, or three unsuccessful cuartelazos which often result in brief but hard fighting.² No Latin American cuartelazo has yet led to anything resembling the long and bloody Spanish civil war which followed the half-successful cuartelazo of Generals Mola and Franco in 1936.

6. Military Coups. The military coup d'état, or golpe de estado as it is known in Spanish, consists essentially in a direct seizure of the highest offices of power within a state. In Latin America, this means


² Stokes, op. cit., pp. 317-319, lists 39 unsuccessful cuartelazos which occurred during the 14-year period 1944-1957. In the 4-year period 1959-1963 at least 12 unsuccessful cuartelazos were reported in the New York Times.
primarily an assault on the person of the President and his removal from office by forced resignation, assassination, or exile. A parallel effort is usually made to immobilize the ousted President's cabinet and any other important civilian and military leaders who happen not to be among the coup conspirators.

The coup has no set tactical pattern: it may consist of nothing more than a group of trusted military officers suddenly compelling a President to resign his office at pistol point. The coup is usually engineered either by a group of military officers or by an alliance of military officers and civilian politicians. Occasionally an individual military officer will attempt a coup on his own initiative. Entirely civilian attempts at coups are extremely rare.

Most attempted coups in Latin America are either carried through or crushed so swiftly that neither the general public nor the bulk of the military have any knowledge of what has happened until after the actual events are over. More often than not, a successful coup is accepted as a fait accompli, particularly if the ousted President was unpopular and if respected military and civilian leaders rally to support the new government.

Some Latin American coups exert a profound destabilizing effect on the political life of an individual nation because the leaders of the coup do not engage in the careful sounding out of military and civilian opinion which ordinarily precedes the cuartelazo. In this event, the coup is likely to be followed by a chain of attempted counter-coups, cuartelazos, and civilian insurgency attempts which may continue indefinitely until some
new basis for stable government is found. A Latin American nation in this predicament has been compared to a man who suffers a series of mild coronaries: no one attack is fatal, but each new attack lowers the recuperative powers of the system. It is in this last respect that the military coup can represent the most dangerous of all insurgency phenomena in Latin America for those who wish to strengthen the democratic orientation of the area and to protect it against totalitarian conspiracies to the Left and Right.
"While we were in Montevideo," wrote Lord Bryce in 1912, "a revolution broke out. There was sharp fighting about forty miles from the city, and the railways were bringing in the wounded. It caused no great excitement, having been expected for some weeks, and the newspapers told their readers very little of what was happening... We were unfortunately unable to see anything and could learn little of the revolution, but its origin and especially the perfect sang-froid of the Montevideans, both natives and Englishmen, struck us as curious."

Few persons nowadays would be disposed to regard any new "revolution" in Latin America with equally cool detachment. The tendency has swung just the other way: the newspapers are filled with extended descriptions of each new Latin American insurgency movement, the fighting (if any), the causes of the insurgency, and speculation as to the impact of the insurgency on the strategic interests of the United States and international Communism. This upsurge of interest in Latin American insurgency phenomena is in some respects long overdue. At the same time, it also raises the danger that


2. The word "revolution", as is well known, has been grossly abused by its frequent application to successful insurrections in Latin America which in no way constitute an overturn of social and political institutions but revolt only in the substitution of a few individuals for a few others in the principal offices of power.
the role of insurgency will be exaggerated, to the corresponding neglect of factors which day in and day out operate to preserve the peace of the area and to promote its economic, social, and political development.

This chapter, and those that follow, make no pretense at providing the reader with a balanced appraisal of the role of insurgency in 20th century Latin American history. The mental framework adopted is that of the military R&D counterinsurgency planner, mainly concerned with developments in insurgency techniques and weaponry, less concerned with the broader societal and political contexts in which insurgency occurs. To the extent that this approach may place undue emphasis on the role of insurgency in modern Latin American history a corrective can be supplied by reference to any of the many general histories of Latin America now available to the English language reader.

The Initial Phase, 1900-1918

The starting point for this historical survey of insurgency patterns in 20th century Latin America is arbitrarily established at 1900: a professional historian might well prefer the date 1886. In that year a German military training mission arrived in Chile at the request of the Chilean government. It was the first such mission in Latin American history, and its arrival marked the beginning of the first serious attempt to transform a Latin American army into a professional fighting force.

The significance of this incident to the insurgency patterns of Latin America can be demonstrated by reference to the political conditions which had prevailed in the area since 1810-1826, when all but Cuba and Puerto
Rico gained independence from Spanish or Portuguese rule. Far from gaining new stability and strength from their liberative struggles, every one of the former Spanish American colonies plunged into a new era of prolonged internal strife. Even Brazil, which achieved an entirely peaceful separation from Portugal in 1822, was rocked by recurrent waves of internal revolt and violence.

This initial period in the independent life of Spanish America is generally known to history as the "Age of the Caudillos"—a term which summons up the picture of a turbulent era in which the tranquillity of the new republics was often shattered by the lawless violence engineered by ambitious caudillos ("leaders"), whether military or civilian, who tried to crush all rivals or at least carve out sections of the national territory in which they alone would be supreme. Historians have grown haggard in the task of counting up all the insurgencies and civil wars to which the "Age of the Caudillos" gave rise. Venezuela, for example, had suffered 52 important revolts by 1912. Bolivia had more than 60 "revolutions" by 1898 and had assassinated six presidents. Colombia had experienced 27 civil wars, one of which claimed 80,000 and another 100,000 lives. These are among the more extreme examples, but many of the other republics did not lag far behind.

The power of the caudillos lay in their private armies which were generally no more than makeshift bands of mounted peons and gauchos,

1. From 1822 to 1934 Brazil experienced a total of 38 major internal revolts, which tended to be clustered in the years 1823-1849, 1889-1897, and 1922-1932 when basic changes were introduced into the governmental system. Celeste A. de Sousa Andrade. Regional Revolts in Brazil (From 1824 to 1934). Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Radcliffe College, 1947.
barely distinguishable from the bandits who also prowled the countryside. In terms of political aspiration, the caudillo might be either a centralist or a provincialist. "When a caudillo was strong enough to impose his authority on a whole nation, he was a centralist, residing in the capital, and perhaps wearing a frock-coat; but if he lacked such strength, he contented himself with dominating a province, a horseman still, with a poncho over his shoulders. In either case he treated his domain as his personal estate, and its treasury as his private property."

Every Spanish American republic sooner or later churned up one great caudillo who succeeded in crushing most of the provincial caudillos and thus laid the foundation for national union under a central government. In the republics where this process was first achieved, as in Argentina and Mexico, the triumphant caudillo usually found it helpful to found a military academy as a means of transforming his personal army into the semblance of a national military establishment. But prior to 1886, when the German mission arrived in Chile, only the Chilean, Brazilian, and Argentine military academies had done much in the way of turning out trained and disciplined officers.

The German instructors in Chile took less than five years to convert their cadet-pupils at the Escuela Militar into efficient officers whose superior skills helped the smaller Congressionalist forces to crush the

1. Pendle, op. cit., p. 127. Brazil's parallel to the caudillo was the coronel ("colonel"), a local political boss who rarely achieved much prominence outside the immediate district in which his properties and retainers were concentrated.
old-style army of President Balmaceda in the Chilean Civil War of 1891. In the aftermath of victory the German influence over the Chilean officer corps was extended to the ranks. By the end of the century Chilean troops were trained, uniformed, and equipped along European lines and were quite ready for a war that threatened with Argentina.

Argentina, however, had already profited from Chile's example, as had many of the other Latin American republics. French military missions went to Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Guatemala in the late 1890's and to Bolivia in 1905. Argentina, Uruguay, and Bolivia received German military missions at the turn of the century; in the last years before World War I, some 30-60 Argentine officers went annually to Germany for training, as did smaller groups from Paraguay and Uruguay. In 1905 Chile began sending military training missions to Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, and El Salvador; officers from these nations, and also from Ecuador and Nicaragua, came to study at the Chilean military schools. The United States reorganized the Cuban Army in 1906-1908 and later undertook similar missions in Panama, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.

Chile in 1900 became the first Latin American country to introduce compulsory military service and thus do away with what had always been a powerful stimulant to military caudillismo: the practice of allowing senior officers to raise their own troops. Argentina followed Chile's lead in 1901. By World War I military conscription was established as law in

2. Lieuwen, op. cit., p. 32.
nearly all the Latin American countries.

The rise of modern armies equipped with costly armaments and backed by the financial resources of the national government had a major impact on the insurgency patterns of Latin America. It marked the approaching end of the old-style caudillo who had only his personal fortune with which to outfit his private army and keep it in fighting readiness. 1 The caudillos might conceivably have turned to guerrilla action to oppose the new-style military, but they showed little inclination for this kind of conflict. 2 Their insurgencies heretofore had always been geared to individual heroics, the open battle, and the sudden assault on an undefended town or supply train. When the opportunities for this kind of glory and plunder diminished, so also did the incidence of civil war and insurrection. 3

The professionalization of the military thus gave an important assist to the development of orderly government in Latin America. Yet the improvement was only partial, for better conditions of public order also helped to

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2. An 1896-1897 revolt in Brazil utilized tactics of guerrilla warfare against the Brazilian Army but was led by a religious fanatic, not a caudillo. The most celebrated account of this episode is a work which is both a literary and military classic: Euclides da Cunha, Rebellion in Backlands (Os Sertões). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944.

3. The most dramatic improvement in public order and tranquility was probably in Colombia which in the early 1920's held a Festival of Peace to celebrate the fact that for the first time in its history as an independent nation it had passed through a 20 years period in which no revolution occurred. F. García Calderon, "Dictatorship and Democracy in Latin America." Foreign Affairs, April 1925, p. 476.
accelerate broad processes of socio-economic change which the political
structures of Latin America were ill-prepared to accommodate. These
changes, which gave rise to an entirely different pattern of Latin
American insurgency than that of the "Age of the Caudillos," must now
be examined.

**Insurgency in an Era of Social Change, 1918-1958**

A Mexican author recently asserted that the political role of the
Latin American military since 1918 has been determined primarily by its
responses to Communism and Fascism.\(^1\) This assertion need not be accepted
as absolute historical truth, but it has a certain "shock" value as a
reminder that Latin America had learned how to deal with its half-feudal
caudillos in an age when the subcurrents of social change were already
propelling it into a 20th century in which words like Anarchism, Syndical-
ism, Socialism, Communism, and Fascism would take on increasing signifi-
cance in its political life.

1. **The Setting.** The first great change in Latin American life was
economic. Between 1875 and 1914 there occurred a threefold increase in
the area's international trade as Latin America began increasingly to
function in world society as a major exporter of raw materials and food-
stuff s. These were the years "when Argentina became the world's leading
exporter of wheat and beef, when Brazil began to supply the world with
most of its coffee, when Chile became the world's largest nitrate pro-
ducer, when Mexico's silver output skyrocketed, and when the Caribbean

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\(^1\) Victor Alba in Johnson, op. cit., p. 167.
republics (including Central America and Colombia) became exporters in large volume of sugar, coffee, and bananas. It was also a time which hastened the expansion of railroads, port facilities, packing houses, and other enterprises needed to serve the overseas traffic. It saw a rapid increase of total Latin American population from 30,000,000 in 1875, to 60,000,000 in 1900, to 80,000,000 in 1914, with large-scale immigration from Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

Cities of Latin America, hitherto significant as political and cultural centers, now began to emerge as important population, industrial, and commercial centers as well. To them the European immigrants flocked in greatest number, and in them the strike began to emerge as a weapon of social and political agitation. Violence also appeared, for the Spanish and Italian immigrants brought with them Anarcho-Syndicalist traditions of unionism which gave nearly every labor disturbance an incipient revolutionary character.

To this period also may be traced the rise of the urban middle-income groups in Latin America, comprising professionals, bureaucrats, white-collar workers, industrialists, technicians, shopowners, and the like. By 1918 these groups had already emerged in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and


2. Sidney Hook has pointed out that Marx exerted a profound influence on the direction of trade unionism in Northern Europe by turning it away from acts of terrorism and violence which only served to give employers and police an excuse for counter-violence against the labor movement. But in the Latin countries, like Italy and Spain, where Marx' ideas did not strike deep root, Anarcho-Syndicalist notions prevailed, and labor disturbances continued to have (as formerly in Northern Europe) an incipient revolutionary character. Sidney Hook, "Violence," pp. 264-267, in The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. Vol. 8.
Uruguay as important political forces. "They had grown economically strong. They had a vital interest in the issues brought to the surface by the transition from neo-feudal agriculture to semi-industrial capitalism. When the anxieties, frustrations, and discontents of emergent groups invited new political arrangements, the leaders of the middle sectors seized the opportunity to place themselves the head of the new political amalgams, whose popular bases lay in the lower levels of the social pyramid and more particularly in the urban industrial working groups."¹

National governments in Latin America as of 1918, with the exception of Uruguay and the partial exception of Argentina, were still dominated by small elites of great landowning and commercial families. These elites were by no means averse to the financial gains to be reaped by the developing international trade. Most of their leaders, however, were much less enthusiastic about the social changes which the expanding trade entailed, particularly when they saw the urban proletarians and urban middle sectors emerging as political rivals. Their misgivings were heightened into fears by the examples of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the Russian Revolution of 1918, both of which served not only to alarm the elites but also "called the attention of the middle class, including intellectuals and students and certain elements of organized labor, to the possibility of resolving its problems by revolutionary means."²

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Fortunately for the elites, as for all others who wished to preserve the traditional patterns of Latin American life, the radical influences generating in the urban centers did not penetrate significantly into the countryside. Rural Latin America in 1918 and for a full generation afterwards would be an area in which concentration of ownership in the great estates—whether known as latifundio, hacienda, estancia, fazenda, or finca—preserved vast and seemingly ineradicable social distances between owner and campesino.

In the "Age of the Caudillos" the campesino had sometimes been summoned to follow his master on military expeditions which might reach even into the national capital. Now that this era was ending, and the cities became bustling centers of international trade and European immigration, the gulf between city and countryside in Latin America widened with each passing year. The cities became vigorous islands of social, economic, and political development. The countryside lingered in a stagnation not yet touched with the capacity to progress. Only much later, as in the aftermath of the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 and the Castro insurrection of 1956-1959, did the rural areas emerge as important centers of socio-political agitation and insurgency.

The cities of Latin America thus formed the natural battleground for nearly all the significant political struggles and civilian insurgencies that occurred in the area from the end of the "Age of the Caudillos" with the victory of Fidel Castro in Cuba. The principal protagonists, as has been said, were the traditional elites, the rising urban middle sectors,

and the urban proletarians. To these were added ideological groups, such as neo-Fascists and Communists, whose appeals cut across urban-rural lines but were nonetheless narrowly restricted in significant impact to the major urban areas.

Finally, there was the new-style Latin American military, obviously a key factor in any insurgency situation since it alone held possession of the most powerful instruments of violence. Yet the military was also important in the insurgency calculus for another reason: it tended to mirror in itself many of the emergent socio-political conflicts of Latin American society. Its officers were overwhelmingly in favor of technological progress, even at the cost of major social change, since the link between such progress and national strength was readily received. On the other hand most of the officers were also drawn from elite and small-town families which feared the rising influence of radical elements in the cities and were especially alarmed by the political alliances that ambitious members of the urban middle sectors were forging with the urban workers.

These diverse influences playing on the military might not have been so important had Latin America previously established firm traditions of constitutional order and government in the first century of its independence. As it was, the military found itself in a situation in which civilian

1. Although the Communists have always championed "agrarian reform" in Latin America, their basic strength has always lain mostly among urban workers and intellectuals. Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957, p. 31.

institutions of government were ill-prepared to deal with the increasing social and political ferment. During the 1920's the military in most Latin American countries managed to keep to its professional duties. Not until the depression brought the social and political ferments in Latin America to the crisis point did the military throw off restraints and emerge thereafter as the most important insurgency element on the Latin American scene.

2. Military Insurgency. The insurgency history of the military in Latin America since 1918 has followed broadly common lines in most of the countries of the area. During the 1920's the bulk of the military was aligned with the conservative elites which then dominated Latin American governments. As such, the military functioned mainly as loyal upholders of established regimes and defenders of the status quo. Military enthusiasm for technological progress had not yet reached the point where, in the words of a U.S. historian, it could counterbalance the fact that "neither their family backgrounds nor the discipline of military life prepared them for the sudden appearance of anarchist-led mobs of urban laborers preaching the overthrow of established governments and demanding the end of regular armies and navies... Consequently, when the untried mobs, historically and economically ignored and politically voiceless, appeared to threaten the status quo, the armed forces retreated to their prepared positions beside the more conservative elements of society."¹

¹ Johnson, The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, p. 113.
The world depression of 1929-1932 introduced severe stresses into Latin American society as the sharp decline of demand for its products on the world markets resulted in sudden loss of government revenues, widespread unemployment, and labor unrest. Liberal and radical elements, among them the Fascists and the Communists, built up pressures for revolutionary reform and for an end to the dominance of conservative elites. The military now emerged as a major insurgency element. A rash of military coups and cuartelazos broke out all over Latin America, reaching ultimately to the point where in the early 1930's civilian-controlled governments existed only in Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Colombia.1

A few of the military insurgencies, successful and unsuccessful, were on the reformist side and represented defeats for the traditional elites as in Brazil (1930), Panama (1931), and Cuba (1933). More often, however, the military insurgencies of the 1930's meant little more than the ouster of conservative civilian governments who willingly vacated the presidential palaces in favor of conservative generals on whom they counted to preserve the traditional order by force. By the eve of World War II the political picture in Latin America presented an almost unbroken pattern of military-authoritarian rule, with high military officers either governing directly or playing key political roles in all countries except Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Mexico.2

1. Lieuwen, op. cit., p. 59. The ensuing discussion of military insurgency in the 1930-1958 period is based largely on this source.

2. In the latter two countries, military officers (Generals Alfredo Baldoimir and Lázaro Cardenas) were serving as popularly elected Presidents.
The net effect of World War II on Latin American politics was to freeze the military-authoritarian regimes in power as long as the security of the hemisphere appeared to be threatened. Yet the war also produced pressures that made the maintenance of the traditional order more difficult. Cut off from many of its international markets and sources of supply, Latin America entered a period of self-industrialization which served to increase the numbers and political power of its urban middle sectors and proletarians. With the fall of totalitarian dictatorship in Italy, and its impending destruction in Germany and Japan, the maintenance of authoritarian regimes in Latin America seemed increasingly anachronistic to many.

Civilian foes of the status quo now turned for support to a new generation of military officers, many of whom were either drawn from or had sympathetic links with the urban middle sectors. The first breakthrough was the seizure of power in Argentina by Colonel Juan Perón and his colleagues in 1943. Within the next decade, eleven Latin American nations experienced reformist military coups and cuartelazos which gave increased power to the urban groups and to the cause of social reform, even though the final result in some cases was a dictatorship such as Perón’s.

The military coups of Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela and of General Manuel Odría in Peru, both in 1948, marked the beginning of a military counter-trend back towards the political Right and Center which was marked by a slowing or halting of the pace of social reform. This third general trend in the military insurgencies of 20th century Latin America appeared to be still dominant as of 1963 and was evidenced
in the successful coups of that year in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. Only in the case of the 1963 coup in Ecuador did it appear that the military might press the cause of social reform more energetically than the regime of deposed President Arosemena.

The successful military insurgencies in post-1918 Latin America have usually, though not always, been carried through with an absence of significant violence and destruction. As a general rule, the military insurgents have refrained from action until they were assured that enough power was on their side as to make effective physical resistance impossible. Nearly always, the success of the military insurgents has hinged on gaining control of the garrisons in or near the capital. Only infrequently has a government overthrown by the defection of a key provincial garrison or the coalition of a number of provincial commanders.\(^1\)

No notable instance of military caudillismo—i.e., the attempt of a commander to recruit a private army for purposes of insurgency—has occurred in Latin America since 1938.\(^2\) Cross-border and sea invasions by exiled military leaders were no longer seriously attempted except in

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1. An analysis of 28 successful revolutions in Latin America during the period 1941-1950 in which the military were involved indicated that all but two were initiated and carried out in the immediate vicinity of the national capital. Lee Benson Valentine, A Comparative Study of Successful Revolutions in Latin America, 1941-1950. Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, September 1952.

2. The last of the military caudillos is said to have been General Saturnino Cedillo of Mexico who was killed while trying to launch a revolution in 1938. Frank Tannenbaum, "Personal Government in Mexico." Foreign Affairs, October 1948, p. 45.
the smaller countries of the Caribbean area and Paraguay.

Small military revolts, prompted more by the personal grievances of individual officers than by any settled plan of overthrowing the established government, were not unusual to Latin America during the period 1918-1958. Usually these episodes were ended quickly, without any resultant damage to public order except the occasional leakage of arms from the rebellious garrison to the civilian population.

Revolts and mutinies by noncommissioned officers and enlisted men were rare in Latin America prior to 1958, the sole major exception being the "Sergeants Revolt" in Cuba (1933) when the then-Sergeant Fulgencio Batista and some of his comrades overwhelmed their officers and took over the government.

Prior to 1959 the Communists were generally unsuccessful in their attempts to penetrate significantly into the Latin American military or to use it as an instrument of armed insurrection. Perhaps the most notable exception was a 1932 plot in El Salvador to launch a revolution led by Communist-inclined NCO's and soldiers; the dictator Martínez learned of it in time and had virtually all of the Communist leaders shot.¹ In November 1935 the Communists and their sympathizers also staged a brief military revolt in Brazil, with the aid of a portion of the Rio de Janeiro garrison and a military barracks in Pernambuco. The Vargas government suppressed the revolt without difficulty.²

2. Ibid., p. 111.
3. **Urban Insurgency.** From 1918 onward the large cities of Latin America became increasingly prominent in the insurgency history of the area, as the middle sectors, the proletarians, and conspiratorial groups such as the Communists resorted to demonstrations and strikes in their efforts to press political demands and to topple unpopular civilian and military governments. By the late 1940’s and 1950’s scarcely a year would pass without two or three Latin American cities experiencing a major riot in which several people might be killed, scores injured, and extensive damage caused.

The practical significance of the individual urban insurgency events varied enormously. A major riot might develop and burn itself out without any significant weakening of the established government. On the other hand, a minor political demonstration or strike might touch off a series of events which swiftly led to the downfall of a regime.\(^1\)

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1. The frequency with which urban riots, political demonstrations accompanied by violence, and political strikes accompanied by violence, are liable to occur in Latin America is partially illustrated by the following statistical compilation of the number of such events reported for each country in the *New York Times* for the 14-year period 1945-1958. The number reported for each country is probably only a fraction of the actual total number of such events which actually occur.

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Urban-based violence had its greatest strategic potential as an insurgency weapon in the smaller and less stable Latin American countries, where it could sometimes so undermine support for an established government that the military would supplant the existing regime with another of their own creation. As previously noted, Bolivia has been the only Latin American country in which urban insurgents have successfully overthrown an established government without military assistance.\footnote{1}

In the larger or more stable Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay—urban-based violence did not seriously undermine the stability of any established government during the 1918-1958 period. In these countries, more than elsewhere, the military were the preponderant security factor.

4. Rural Insurgency. With the exception of two isolated guerrilla episodes, the historical patterns of rural insurgency in 20th century Latin America prior to Castro’s landing in Cuba contain little to interest the contemporary military counterinsurgency planner. The Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) was the last major violence episode in Latin America in which the field of battle was still dominated by the private armies of rival caudillos.\footnote{2} The Chaco War (1932-1935) between Bolivia and Paraguay

\footnote{1}{See above, pp. 42-43.}

\footnote{2}{The Mexican Army by 1910 was exceptional among Latin American armed forces in that it had not received any European or U.S. military training missions and rarely sent officers abroad to study. Its officers were of fairly good caliber but its ranks were filled with Indian conscripts, vagabonds, criminals, and beggars. Once the revolution broke out, the Army disintegrated, and its place was taken by the rival private armies led by such caudillos as Carranza, Obregon, Pancho Villa, and Zapata. Lieuwen, Op. cit., pp. 105-107 and, for a description of the Mexican Army as of 1907, Percy F. Martin, Mexico of the Twentieth Century, New York: Dodd Mead & Co., 1907, Vol. I, pp. 41-44.}
was fought along conventional military lines without the significant use on either side of guerrilla auxiliaries. The violence which otherwise developed in the rural areas of Latin America during the period 1918-1958 was highly localized or of brief duration. In only one a-typical country, tiny Costa Rica, did a rural-based civilian insurrection constitute a serious and successful challenge to the national military.

The first of the two guerrilla episodes in Latin American insurgency history prior to 1956 was led by Luis Carlos Prestes who later became the head of the Communist Party of Brazil. In 1924 Prestes, then a captain in the Brazilian Army, seized control of the Santo Angelo fortress in Brazil's southernmost state, Rio Grande do Sul, and declared himself in revolt against the federal government. At the head of 1,500 men, Prestes then moved northwards to join another rebel military group from the São Paulo garrison.

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2. In 1948 José Figueres organized a rebel force on his isolated plantation which defeated the then Costa Rican Army of 2,000 men in a six-weeks uprising.

For the next two years the united rebel force, which came to be known as the Prestes Column, wandered back and forth across the interior of Brazil. The Column marched over 22,000 miles and fought literally hundreds of skirmishes and battles with government troops. At times it menaced some of the chief cities in the Northeast along the Atlantic coast. Early in 1927 Prestes abandoned the struggle and sought refuge with the remnants of his Column in Bolivia.

All available accounts suggest that Prestes was not a Communist in the 1920's and had no particular ideology behind his insurgency, beyond a vague desire to overturn the existing government in the hope of something better. He failed to arouse any significant support among the rural populations he encountered and at no time paused long enough in any one area to establish a permanent base of operations. His exploits thus fell into the category of "roving insurgency" so severely criticized by Mao Tse-tung as doomed to failure. The only lasting effect of Prestes'

1. "There have been in history many peasant wars of the roving insurgents type, but they all failed. In the present age of advanced communications and technology, it is more than ever an entirely groundless illusion to attempt to win victory after the fashion of the roving insurgents. However, the idea of roving insurgents still exists among the impoverished peasants, and this idea, when reflected in the minds of leaders of guerrilla warfare, becomes the view that base areas are neither necessary nor important. Therefore to rid the minds of leaders in the guerrilla war of such an idea is a prerequisite for formulating a definite policy of establishing base areas. The question whether to have or not to have base areas, to value or not to value them, or, in other words, the conflict between the idea of holding base areas and the idea of behaving like roving insurgents, arises in every guerrilla war and, to a certain extent, it has arisen in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war, which is no exception to the general rule. Only when the idea of roving insurgents is thoroughly eradicated and the policy of establishing base areas put forward and carried out can a long-sustained guerrilla war be facilitated." Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2, London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1954, pp. 135-136.
exploits was to build up for himself the mystique of a great caudillo, which later gave him a large following as a Communist leader, and to create a tradition of "guerrilla" resistance in Brazil which may yet be capitalized upon by a more skillful insurgent leader.

The only other significant guerrilla episode in 20th century Latin America prior to Fidel Castro occurred in Nicaragua. In 1925 a civil war broke out in the country as two rival governments, one Conservative, the other Liberal, contested for power. The United States supported the Conservative government and in 1927 sent a force of 2,000 U.S. Marines to its support. An agreement was reached whereby the Conservatives retained the presidency, and the Liberals agreed to accept lesser government offices. The United States undertook to train a new national constabulary, to be called the Guardia Civil, as a replacement for the existing Nicaraguan Army.

Only one of the Liberal military leaders, General Augusto Cesar Sandino, refused to accept the new arrangement. He retired with his followers, who ultimately numbered a total of 1,000 to 1,800 men, to a mountainous jungle area of northern Nicaragua near the Honduras border. From this base, Sandino carried on an intermittent seven years' campaign of guerrilla warfare, raiding local towns and plantations and occasionally ambushing small patrols of U.S. Marines and Guardia Civil.

Sandino maintained from the beginning that the purpose of his guerrilla campaign was to compel the withdrawal of the U.S. Marines from

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Nicaragua. This appeal won him considerable support in other Latin American countries, particularly Mexico, which sent in military and medical supplies through Honduras. Most U.S. observers and Marine commanders on the scene recognized that they were up against no ordinary bandit and that Sandino represented a genuinely patriotic figure.

In his tactical operations, Sandino exhibited a high degree of guerrilla skill and ingenuity. Most of his weapons and ammunition were derived from raids on the Marines and the Guardia Civil. Home-made weapons were also devised, including trench mortars made from sections of iron pipe, bombs of rawhide filled with stone, glass, and iron, and hand grenades constructed of empty sardine tins filled with stones.

The Marines and the Guardia Civil succeeded in limiting the effective area of Sandinista operations to Northern Nicaragua, but Sandino was still at large when the Marines withdrew from Nicaragua in 1933. Sandino, who always claimed to have no other object than the ouster of the Marines, then concluded a truce with the Nicaraguan government. In 1934, while returning from a banquet in his honor at the presidential palace in Managua, he was assassinated.

1. In June 1928 the U.S. Secretary of the Navy reported that naval forces ashore in Nicaragua "have encountered the most serious sustained guerrilla warfare that Central America records." One of the Marine forces in Nicaragua wrote that "Sandinistas are called bandits for lack of some other word. They are not at all bandits in the sense that they are in the field for the sole purpose of robbing people." Cummins, op. cit., pp. 69 and 139.

5. Recapitulation. A review of Latin American insurgency patterns during the years 1918-1958 suggests that insurgency in the area sustained Lenin's dictum that "no revolution of the masses can triumph without the help of a portion of the armed forces that sustained the old regime."

Only two exceptions to this rule were noted: the mob outburst in La Paz which overthrew a Bolivian government in 1946 and the 1948 insurrection led by José Figueres in Costa Rica.

The fact that the Latin American military figured so largely in the insurgencies and counterinsurgencies of the area also served to impose a certain discipline and restraint upon the insurgencies which did develop. Most of the military coups and cuartelazos which occurred during the period 1918-1958 were brief in duration and almost bloodless. Prolonged fighting, extensive bloodshed, and extensive damage were far more the exception than the rule in Latin American insurgencies since most military were unwilling to shed the blood of brother-military if it could be avoided.

Yet the skill with which the military generally controlled outbursts of internal political violence could not obscure the fact that each new coup and cuartelazo dangerously lowered popular respect for democratic institutions in Latin America. Insurgency, and the insurgency spirit, continued to prosper in an area where the chance for government power rested as much on violence as on the ballot box.

In the period following World War II two insurgency movements developed in Latin America which exhibited tactical aspects that deserve the special attention of the contemporary military counterinsurgency planner.
The first insurgency to be noted occurred in Guatemala during the years 1944-1954 when the Communists, for the first time, almost succeeded in capturing control of a Latin American country. The second insurgency example, the Castro insurrection in Cuba, is notable not only because it was a success but because it also violated almost every "rule of the game" in the formula for successful insurgency which had prevailed in the Latin America of 1918-1958.

Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954

On 1 July 1944, after a period of uninterrupted rule since his initial election as President in 1931, the Guatemalan dictator Jorge Ubico was overthrown in a familiar Latin American sequence of insurgency events. Inspired by the example of the general strike which overthrew the dictator Hernández Martínez in neighboring El Salvador in April 1944, university students in Guatemala City began a movement to gain an increased measure of civil rights. At noon on 24 June they organized the first of two huelgas de brazos caídos (literally, "strikes with fallen arms") in the streets; the second huelga in the evening was broken up by Ubico's forces. On the following day a protest march by middle-class women of Guatemala was fired upon by the government troops, resulting in the death of a young woman schoolteacher. The next day an effective general strike was launched. Unable to break it, and faced by Army unrest, Ubico resigned on 1 July and turned over power to a military junta.

General Federico Ponce Vaides emerged as the effective head of the

junta and found himself confronted with a situation in which political parties were rapidly re-forming so as to take advantage of Ubico's downfall. Prominent political leaders, including Juan José Arévalo, were returning from exile. Ponce had himself declared provisional President and announced his determination to run for election; to discourage the opposition, he resorted to terror and violence.

Opposition elements then decided to oust Ponce by an armed revolt but lacked sufficient means to make the attempt until they were joined in October 1944 by disgruntled Army elements. Shortly after midnight on 20 October 1944 a small group of military officers, students, workers seized control of the Guardia de Honor military fortress in Guatemala City. The rebels then bombarded the other two military fortresses in Guatemala City which were still in the control of pro-Ponce military. After a 12-hour fight, causing 800 to 1,000 casualties, the government collapsed. A new civilian-military junta was installed.¹

Arévalo was elected President in November 1945 and proved to be a moderate leftist who alienated the conservative economic, social, political and military elites. More than two dozen abortive attempts to overthrow his government occurred in the first four years of his term, and several more attempts were launched in 1949-1950.² The reaction of both Arévalo and of his successor as President, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, was to lean more heavily on the support of young military officers, organized

2. Schneider, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
labor, young professional and middle-class groups, and the Communists.

The Communists in Guatemala as of 1944 consisted of no more than a small nucleus of a few dozen labor leaders and intellectuals. During Arévalo's regime the Communists generally kept out of public view and concentrated on internal organization. These efforts paid off in the presidential election of 1950 when the Communists threw their support behind Arbenz and proved to be effective campaign agents. By the time Arbenz took over the Presidency in 1951, it was apparent that the Communists would be allowed considerable freedom of action by his regime.

Under Arbenz the Communists developed into a major political force in Guatemala. Their party strength grew to a total strength of nearly 4,000; they gained control of nearly 40,000 labor union members in and around Guatemala City; they also infiltrated significantly into almost all important government agencies, including the police. Some of the most important Communist infiltrative efforts were directed at the National Agrarian Department which had been established by Arbenz to carry out a program of agrarian reform and land redistribution.

The Communists met with one outstanding failure in their organizational efforts: they were unable to win supporters in the Guatemalan Army, with the exception of some of the younger officers. This failure had a double significance. It meant that the Communists had to move cautiously toward their goal of creating a large armed civilian militia to counterpoise the Army. It also meant that the political fortunes of the Communists were almost completely linked to the person of Arbenz.
whose position became increasingly that of mediator between the military and his Communist allies.

In the end both Arbenz and the Communists overreached themselves. In May 1954 the U.S. State Department announced that "an important shipment of arms" had been sent from behind the Iron Curtain to the Arbenz government and was being unloaded at a Guatemalan port.¹ A month later an invasion was launched from Honduras against Arbenz by a Guatemalan Army officer, Castillo Armas, who previously had led an abortive coup against the Arevalo regime.

At this point the Communists took a fatal gamble. They set about hastily to organize a militia, informed Arbenz that some of his military commanders were unreliable, and persuaded him to order the Army to hand over some of its weapons to the militia. The top Army leadership refused and demanded Arbenz' resignation. Arbenz resigned on 27 June; soon afterwards, the forces of Castillo Armas moved victoriously into Guatemala City. A stern anti-Communist campaign had already been initiated by the Army. The important Communist leaders fled abroad or were exiled; the small-fry were rounded up, given steep jail sentences or killed.²

The tactical lesson behind the collapse of Communist power in Guatemala was noted by the Guatemalan Communist Party leaders when they convened in 1955 to analyze the "mistakes" committed under the Arbenz' regime.³ Among other things, the Communists criticized their excessive dependence on Arbenz himself and their failure to devote more resources to the task

of infiltrating or neutralizing the Guatemalan Army as a political force. For the future, the Party leaders pledged to carry on the work of organizing the masses and to press their demands through legal channels until such time as the conditions in Guatemala became ripe for a "people's insurrection." The Party conference made no reference to the possibility of carrying on the revolutionary struggle by means of guerrilla warfare, nor does it appear that at any time under the Arbenz regime the Communists had seriously considered using this device.

The Castro Insurgency in Cuba, 1956-1959

A U.S. historian has suggested that Castro's victory over the Batista regime in Cuba deserves a place in Latin American history alongside Cortes' conquest of Mexico and Pizarro's conquest of Peru by reason of its "sheer audacity." Castro deliberately launched his insurgency in a rural area far removed from the capital city of Havana. Instead of seeking the support or at least the neutrality of the Cuban military, Castro and his guerrillas aimed their main attack directly against the Cuban Army for the precise purpose of destroying it utterly as an effective fighting force.

In its earliest weeks the Castro insurgency developed still another feature that was almost unprecedented in Latin American insurgency history. Government agents in Oriente Province, where Castro landed, launched a

2. "Final liberation comes only with the total systematic break-up of the enemy army and all institutions that supported the regime." Guevara, op. cit., p. 69.
campaign of official terror against the insurgents and their suspected sympathizers that was not only brutal but advertised its brutality in a manner seldom employed even by the worst Latin American governments.¹ One almost immediate repercussion was the initiation of a sustained campaign of counter-terror against the regime in Havana which continued until Castro's victory. This kind of rural-urban insurgency link-up had rarely developed in previous Latin American insurgencies and never on the same scale or with the same persistence as in the last years of the Batista regime.

From the purely tactical point of view, Castro's insurgency presented still other features new to Latin America. It chose protracted guerrilla conflict, rather than the sudden coup or the mass urban demonstration, as its avenue to power. It was composed of skilled civilian fighters who were more than a match for the professional Cuban military. It established a strong base area into which the opposing military never dared to penetrate. One of the most impressive features of the Castro insurgency was in fact its ability not only to use the Sierra Maestra as an impregnable base but to recoil safely into it after its forces had ventured too far out in April-May 1958 and suffered sharp defeats at the hands of Batista's troops. Hitherto, most Latin American insurgencies had

¹ "The terrorism began in Oriente Province following an unsuccessful rebellion [Castro's landing] early this month and has spread to other parts of the island . . . The finding of the bodies of 21 political oppositionists during the last 48 hours on the roads and streets of the towns around Holguin, Oriente Province, [near which Castro made his landing] has contributed to the mounting tension. Nineteen of the victims had been shot. The bodies of two others were found hanging from trees. No explanation has been offered by the Government concerning these outrages." New York Times, 29 Dec 1956.
staked almost everything on victory and had been ill-prepared for reverses.

The rural guerrilla strategy of the Castro insurrection conformed largely to the strategic concepts of Mao Tse-tung: its novelty lay in the fact that it constituted the first serious attempt to apply Mao's concepts to the Latin American scene. 1 A more original contribution of the Castro movement lay in the role assigned to urban insurgency. In contrast to the prevailing Latin American tendency to rely on mass demonstrations, riots, and strikes as means to weaken established governments, the Castro doctrine emphasized terrorist activity and sabotage as the most suitable weapons of small-town and city insurgency in the initial stages of the insurgency struggle. Organized mass action in the cities and the strike were considered instruments of insurgency more appropriate for the later stages of the struggle. 2

Urban terrorist activity and sabotage were conceived in the Castro insurgency synthesis not only as useful weapons of armed struggle but also as psychological weapons which could play upon the potentials for mass violence in the larger cities of Latin America. Guevara, for example, in his manual on guerrilla warfare in the Americas, implied that the psychological importance of what he called "suburban fighting" had not been sufficiently appreciated prior to the Castro insurrection. "When

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1. Castro, of course, gave the lie to Mao's assertion that guerrilla warfare is possible only "wherever one condition is present, namely, a big territory." Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2, p. 279.

done effectively and extended over a wide area, it completely paralyzes the everyday life of the sector. The population becomes restless, almost anxious for the development of violence, in order to bring the matter to an end. If, at the very start of the war, specialists are organized for suburban guerrilla work, quicker action can be obtained, more lives spared, and the nation's valuable time served. 1

The Castro insurgency in Cuba held still another, and larger, significance when considered as part of the general stream of Latin American insurgency events in the 20th century. Until Castro's time, and as previously noted in this chapter, the military had participated in virtually all the important insurgency movements of the area and by virtue of this fact, had exercised a certain controlling and restraining influence on the violence which developed. Castro's victory in Cuba marked a step toward what might be called the democratization of insurgency in Latin America. His success demonstrated that military support was not essential to insurgents in Latin America who were resolved to overthrow an existing regime at all costs and who did not shrink from the large destruction of human life and property that might be caused by resort to such insurgency techniques as protracted guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and sabotage.

The implications of Castro's successful insurgency must also be viewed against the background of the immense social revolution which is occurring in contemporary Latin America as the result of rapid population growth, even more rapid urban growth, the swelling out of urban-rural


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transportation networks, and the ever widening diffusion of such modern mass communications media as the cinema, radio, television, illustrated magazines, and the press. The time is fast approaching, or perhaps has already arrived, when insurgency in Latin America can be structured adequately for purposes of counterinsurgency planning into the separate categories of "rural" and "urban." As succeeding chapters will show, Castro's unprecedented blend of rural-urban elements in his insurgency attempt has since been duplicated in at least one country, Venezuela.
CHAPTER 4

CONTEMPORARY PATTERNS OF INSURGENCY CONFLICTS
IN LATIN AMERICA, 1959-1963:  AN OVERVIEW

1. **Principal Sources.** The analysis of post-Castro Latin American insurgency conflicts contained in this chapter, and in the three chapters which follow, is based largely on a systematic collection and manual indexing of all data on insurgency and insurgency-related events in Latin America as reported in the daily issues of the *New York Times* during the years 1959-1963. The types of events on which data was collected, as well as the relative numbers of such events reported for the individual Latin American countries, are noted in Figure 3.

An evaluation of the *New York Times'* reporting on insurgency in Latin America indicated that the news coverage was weighted heavily towards military and urban insurgency events. Developments of interest to the military counterinsurgency planner in rural Latin America were not as fully or as consistently reported. To correct this imbalance insofar as possible within the time allotted to the study effort, reference was made to leading newspapers in three Latin American countries in which guerrilla activity and other significant rural insurgency developments were known to have occurred during the period 1959-1963. The countries selected

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1. In addition to the *New York Times* as a basic source, detailed examination was made of the monthly issues of the *Hispanic American Report*, an analysis of contemporary events in Latin America published by Stanford University.
### Figure 3

**INCIDENCE OF INSURGENCY AND INSURGENCY-RELATED EVENTS IN LATIN AMERICA AS REPORTED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1959-1963**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Coup and Quartelazos (Successful)</th>
<th>Military Coup and Quartelazos (Unsuccessful)</th>
<th>Guerrilla Warfare</th>
<th>Terrorism and Sabotage</th>
<th>Urban Riots</th>
<th>Political Demonstrations</th>
<th>Agrarian Squatting Movements</th>
<th>Banditry</th>
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* Included in this total are three unsuccessful police quartelazos which occurred in Argentina, Honduras and Peru.
were Venezuela, Peru, and Brazil. The principal newspapers consulted were El Universal (Caracas), La Prensa (Lima), O Estado de Sao Paulo, and O Globo (Rio de Janeiro).

Secondary sources, such as books and scholarly articles, were generally of limited value in understanding the course of 1959-1963 insurgency events in Latin America largely because of the immediacy of the time frame. A major exception was the February-March 1963 hearings before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, later published under the title of Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere. This document, which contains the testimony of high officials of the U.S. Departments of State and Defense and the Director of CIA on contemporary insurgency events in Latin America, will be referred to frequently in the pages which follow.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a brief overview of the total insurgency pattern in Latin America during the years 1959-1963. Subsequent, detailed analysis of insurgency events in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 is restricted to the three types of contemporary Latin American insurgency phenomena considered of greatest relevance to military counterinsurgency planning: guerrilla warfare, terrorism and sabotage, and mass violence.

1. Venezuela and Peru were selected because of the known presence of Castro-Communist guerrillas in these two countries. The choice of Brazil was experimental and proved more valuable for the data gained on social insurgency in the Brazilian countryside (e.g., agrarian squatter movements) than for the limited evidence as to guerrilla activity in this country. Colombia was avoided as a country for local newspaper analysis because of the virtual impossibility of building up any adequate picture of the tangled rural violence in Colombia within the time allotted to the study effort.

2. These sources were supplemented by spot checks of other Venezuelan, Peruvian, and Brazilian newspapers in order to gain additional data on guerrilla events of unusual interest.
2. The Over-All Pattern. The over-all pattern of insurgency events in Latin America during the four-year period 1959-1963 is broadly suggested by the statistics compiled in Figure 3 and may be summarized as follows.

Military insurgency has remained an important phenomenon in contemporary Latin America and continues to represent the most potent insurgency force within the area. Nine successful military coups and cuartelazos occurred during the years 1959-1963, as did at least 22 unsuccessful coups and cuartelazos.¹

Only one revolt by military NCO’s was noted during the period under review. It occurred at Brasilia in September 1963 and was quickly put down by other military forces loyal to the government of President Goulart.²

Communist or Castro-Communist influence was instrumental in touching off two widely separated and unsuccessful revolts by Venezuelan marine and navy personnel at Carúpano and Puerto Cabello in May and June 1962.³ A small and unsuccessful military revolt in Guatemala during February 1962 was also ascribed to Castro-Communist or extreme Leftist inspiration.⁴ There were no indications that any of the other military insurgencies which occurred in Latin America during 1959-1963 were linked to Communism or Castro-Communism.

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¹ It is difficult to establish the precise number of unsuccessful military attempts at seizure of government powers because of the problems involved in trying to distinguish between abortive coups, as opposed to those which are rumored but never actually attempted, and because it appears from a partial survey of the Latin American press that small-scale military and police revolts in Latin America are not always reported in the New York Times or the Hispanic American Report.

² New York Times and Washington Post, 13 September 1963. It was estimated that 650 enlisted men participated in the brief revolt.

³ For summary descriptions of both revolts, see Hispanic American Report, July and August 1962.

Guerrilla activity assumed unprecedented dimensions as an insurgency instrument in Latin America after Castro's victory in Cuba and as the Castro government, from early 1959 onward, began to promote guerrilla warfare as an instrument of revolutionary struggle in the Americas.

Two time phases can be discerned in the guerrilla episodes which have developed in Latin America in the wake of the Castro experience. In the first eight or nine months of 1959, a hastily organized series of raids in which guerrilla veterans of the Sierra Maestra participated were launched against Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. These expeditions were a total failure, ending quickly in the surrender or massacre of the invaders.

No significant guerrilla activity thereafter developed in Latin America until the early months of 1962, when the fruits began to appear of what CIA director John A. McCone has termed a "far more sophisticated, more covert, and more deadly" Cuban effort to promote guerrilla warfare in the Americas. Guerrilla activity on the Castro-Communist model developed in Venezuela during January-March 1962 and in Peru in March 1962. Scattered reports of guerrilla activity in other Latin American countries began to appear in late 1962 and throughout 1963.

As of the end of 1963 the new wave of guerrilla activity in Latin America had at no time constituted more than a minor security threat in any country, including Venezuela and Peru. The CIA has estimated, however, that at least 1,000 to 1,500 persons went to Cuba in 1962 from all the other Latin American countries.

1. For a useful summary of these events, see the study prepared in 1960 for the Senate Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs by the School of Inter-American Affairs, University of New Mexico, "Post-World War II Political Developments in Latin America," pp. 75-77.

2. Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, p. 65.
countries with the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training or both. Thousands of copies of the texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung, Guevara, and Castro's guerrilla instructor, Alberto Bayo, have been distributed through Latin America; additional texts have been written to relate general precepts on guerrilla warfare to the specific conditions of individual countries.¹ In short, although actual guerrilla activities achieved only minor proportions in the Latin America of 1959-1963, there are strong indications that this mode of insurgency will continue to be employed in the area.

Terrorist activity and sabotage, as noted in the previous chapter, are considered by the Castro-Communists as an important adjunct to guerrilla warfare in an insurgent campaign. As of the end of 1963, the systematic and sustained employment of terrorism and sabotage by insurgent elements had been attempted only in Venezuela. Elsewhere in Latin America there were only brief and random flurries of terrorism and sabotage, without important result and without much significance for military counterinsurgency planning.

Mass violence remained an important insurgency or insurgency-related phenomenon in Latin America during the period 1959-1963. To choose only the outstanding examples, a three-day riot at Guayaquil, Ecuador, in June 1959 left 24 persons dead, 150 injured. A series of strikes and riots throughout Ecuador in August 1962 led to the resignation of the cabinet. Guatemala City was torn by a week of sustained rioting in March 1962 in which more than 50 persons were believed to have been killed and 500 wounded. Other

¹. Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, p. 65.
major riots occurred in Argentina and Panama, the latter sustaining two riots in Panama City in May 1958 and November 1959 before the even larger riot of early January 1964.

The post-1959 period has also been marked by an increase in the number of mass violence episodes in the rural areas of several Latin American countries, chiefly arising from peasant squatter invasions of large landowner properties. These phenomena merit special attention in view of the favorable habitats for guerrilla activity which may exist among restless, land-hungry rural populations which are disposed to seek violent solutions for outstanding socio-economic problems.
CHAPTER 5

GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA, 1959-1963

1. The General Pattern. As the previous survey of the over-all insurgency pattern in contemporary Latin America has indicated, no guerrilla movements have appeared in the area since January 1959 which in any way are comparable in strength or scope of operations to such major guerrilla movements as the Viet Cong, the Chinese Communists in Malaya, the Philippine Huks, or the Castro insurgency in Cuba. The information collected in the course of preparing this report would suggest also that whatever new insights can be gained into the tactical patterns and techniques of post-Castro guerrilla activities in Latin America must be gleaned largely from case studies of two minor guerrilla episodes in Peru and Venezuela. Guerrillas have also been active in other Latin American countries since January 1959, but in every case their insurgency career was too short, or the information on their activities too limited, to provide much data of value to the military R&D counterinsurgency planner.

Mere want of information, however, is no adequate guarantee that the only post-Castro guerrilla movements in Latin America of concern to the military planner are those in Venezuela and Peru. As is well known, it usually is in the best interest of guerrillas to avoid public attention until they themselves are strong enough to launch the first attacks. Moreover, given the conditions of socio-economic unrest which now prevail in much of rural Latin America, as well as the known efforts of Castro-Communism and its sympathizers to promote guerrilla warfare as an instrument of revolutionary struggle, it would probably be rash to
conclude that the only significant guerrilla activities in the area are those which, as in Venezuela and Peru, have previously attracted the detailed attention of the U.S. or Latin American Press.

In an effort to avoid undue concentration on the Venezuelan and Peruvian guerrillas, but at the same time to pass quickly over those reports of guerrilla activity which provide no significant data for the military R&D planner, it has been thought desirable to open this chapter with a brief review of the contemporary guerrilla picture in Latin America as it can be determined on the basis of available unclassified reporting. The review is limited to the years 1962-1963. The source for each report of guerrilla activity is indicated by the footnotes. Readers who customarily receive or have access to official intelligence reporting on Latin American insurgency may wish to bypass this section and proceed directly to the Peru and Venezuela case studies.

South America

Argentina. Police of the semi-tropical northwestern Province of Tucumán announced in November 1962 that they had captured three young guerrillas from an 11-man band operating in a rugged mountain area. The police were alerted to the existence of the band by a series of weapons-foraging raids on railway guardposts and police detachments. The guerrilla band was identified as a nationalist-Peronist movement.

1. Only sources of the greatest seeming reliability have been utilized. Unconfirmed accounts of guerrilla activity emanating from Radio Havana and other Castro-Communist sources have been deliberately passed over, since it is clearly in the interest of Castro-Communist propaganda to exaggerate both the prevalence and the success of guerrilla warfare as an instrument of revolutionary strategy.

2. New York Times, 10 November 1959. On 26 December 1959 the Times reported another guerrilla raid for weapons on a police station in the same region.
In January 1963 police announced discovery of a military training camp a few miles north of the city of Santa Fé, operated by the Neo-Nazi organization known as "Tacuara." The head of the camp and 16 youths were arrested.¹

Bolivia. Arms contraband from La Paz and Pando Departments in the remote jungle area of northwest Bolivia into southwest Peru was reported in early 1961 and continued until the decline of the Peruvian guerrilla movements.² The existence of this arms traffic was officially recognized when the Peruvian Minister of Government and Police announced that Bolivian authorities were cooperating in the suppression of the "Communist arms contraband." Some of the smuggled weapons bore the Bolivian coat of arms and were said to have been stolen from Bolivian garrisons.³

The border region referenced above was used by Castro-trained Peruvian guerrillas in May 1963 as a point of entry in an attempt to join the guerrilla movement in the Peruvian highlands.⁴ On at least one occasion the same area served as a place of refuge for fleeing Peruvian Castroite guerrillas.⁵

In August 1963, a Bolivian police raid in Riberalta yielded a "guerrilla arsenal" of sixteen rifles and five machine guns which were later identified as being of Czech manufacture. It was thought that the arms belonged to Peruvian infiltrators from Cuba who had previously been captured at Puerto Maldonado in Peru.⁶

Brazil. On 3 December 1962 Brazilian police discovered a "guerrilla nucleus" at Dianópolis, in the north of Goiás State. The group was armed with portable machine guns and other military weapons allegedly supplied from Cuba. In addition to the guerrillas, about 200 men were training in the use of arms and sabotage. Materials seized included Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare.⁷

5. Libertad, August 1963 (La Paz).
6. Ultima Hora, (La Paz) 10 August 1963; Libertad, August 1963. Libertad also reported that there was "evidence that other numerous contingents of these bandits are operating in Iturralde Province of the Department of La Paz."
On 13 December 1962 police in Rio de Janeiro seized a station wagon loaded with arms, ammunition, tents, and subversive literature en route to Dianópolis. Weapons seized included 1 machine gun, 5 rifles, 1 Luger pistol, and 2 revolvers.¹

On 27 December 1962 police in Southern Brazil discovered an arms cache about 100 miles south of São Paulo near a major highway. One box contained Browning 6.35 ammunition partially wrapped in issues of a Cuban newspaper dated 26 February 1962. Two other boxes contained a Czech machine gun and 6.35 caliber Czech automatic pistols.²

The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs asserted in February 1963 that documents found in a Brazilian airliner which crashed outside Lima in November 1962 "are said to contain detailed reports of activities in Brazil to give guerrilla training in connection with peasant violence. The documents reportedly reveal that these activities, although relatively small-scale and inefficiently executed, received the help and guidance of Cuba."³

Chile. No guerrilla activity noted.

Colombia. On 18 February 1963 the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs summed up the violence problem in Colombia as follows: "In Colombia we witness a continuation of the violence which has plagued that country for a decade. I mention this only to point out that this violence is not primarily Communist-inspired or directed, although there is reason to believe they are trying to take advantage of the situation. Violence in Colombia is basically banditry rather than insurgency."⁴


2. Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), 29 December 1962, which also contains a photograph of the machine gun. The director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) referred in February 1963 to a report that a cache of arms wrapped in Havana newspapers had been found in Northeast Brazil. Investigation showed that the report was of newspaper origin and that Brazilian government authorities had no knowledge of it. Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, p. 158.

3. Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, p. 15.

4. Ibid, p. 15.
In August 1962 the Federal Attorney General of Colombia asserted in his annual report that there were evidences of Communist guerrilla activity in the Llanos, Valle, Tolima, Cauca, Huila, and Caldas Departments.

A Communist source reported in April 1963 that the founder of the Colombian Castroite organization, Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Campesino (MOEC), had attempted to form a tactical alliance with "some bands posing as guerrillas and was killed by their ringleaders."\(^1\)

Another Castroite organization oriented towards guerrilla action, Frente Unida Acción Revolucionaria (FUAR), was founded in April 1962.

Ecuador. On 6 April 1962 a pro-Castro organization calling itself the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadoran Youth launched an insurrection in the jungle-clad Andean foothills some 45 miles west of Quito. The rebels reportedly had assembled a week earlier in a training camp. Government secret agents had infiltrated the movement, and the Ecuadoran Army suppressed the revolt within a few hours after it broke out. Some 48 of the rebels were seized; a few others reportedly escaped into the jungle. Equipment captured from the rebels included carbines, shotguns, rifles, knapsacks, canteens, and maps. Some of the arms were of Czech manufacture. The leaders of the group admitted having received training in Cuba and having received Cuban funds to support their activities.\(^2\)

Paraguay. No guerrilla activity noted.

Peru. From March 1962 onward, the Peruvian newspapers began to carry reports of small-scale guerrilla activities in two widely separated areas of the Andes highlands. These reports form the basis of the case study of 1962-1963 guerrilla activities in Peru which follows later in this chapter.

Uruguay. No guerrilla activity noted.

Venezuela. From January 1962 onward the Venezuelan newspapers began to carry reports of small-scale guerrilla activities in widely separated areas of the republic. These reports are analyzed in the case study of 1962-1963 guerrilla activities in Venezuela which follows later in this chapter.

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Central America and the Caribbean

Costa Rica. In September 1963 President Schick of Nicaragua announced that the governments of Costa Rica and Honduras had promised to help suppress anti-Nicaraguan guerrillas operating in the areas of their countries bordering on Nicaragua. The President said that Hondurans, Costa Ricans, Nicaraguans, and Cubans were among the guerrillas already captured on Nicaraguan soil.1

El Salvador. No guerrilla activity noted.

Guatemala. On 1 May 1963 a band of 20 guerrillas killed a soldier in a village of eastern Guatemala. The government reported on 7 May that 6 of the guerrillas had been killed and one captured.2

On 10 July 1963 the government reported that its troops had killed half of a band of 22 guerrillas that had been terrorizing the northern province of Izabal and attacking military patrols in the jungles of the Petén region.3

In September 1963 government forces from Puerto Barrios killed 11 guerrillas in a clash near Cerro Sinai. Arms (including a machine gun), ammunition, uniforms (olive green), and Communist propaganda were allegedly captured.4

In October 1963 the state of siege was prolonged in Guatemala. The reason given was the continued "banditry of the subversives" in the northeastern region of the republic.5

Honduras. In September 1963 President Schick of Nicaragua announced that the governments of Costa Rica and Honduras had promised to help suppress anti-Nicaraguan guerrillas operating in the areas of their countries bordering on Nicaragua. The President said that Hondurans, Costa Ricans, Nicaraguans, and Cubans were among the guerrillas already captured on Nicaraguan soil.6

Later in September 1963 Honduran forces clashed with guerrillas in the northeast. The guerrillas were alleged to number as many as 1,000 men. President Villeda Morales announced on 18 September that Honduran Air Force planes had bombed "various guerrilla encampments in the heavily wooded area of the Patuca River region." He also said that his government had known for some time about the presence of "Communist" guerrilla bands in the interior which were apparently waiting for an opportunity to invade Nicaragua.\(^1\)

Mexico. In April 1963 the Chief of Staff of the 32nd Military Zone claimed that two guerrilla groups sympathetic to Communism and Cuba had been established in the States of Chiapas and Yucatán. Superior military officers denied the report.\(^2\)

Nicaragua. In February 1963 Carlos Fonseca Amador, a leftist guerrilla leader and persistent but unsuccessful rebel, crossed from Honduras into Nicaragua. He and Iván González were leading a group of between 50 and 100 men and were reported active around Ocotal and Teotecacinte in the Segovia mountain area where the Nicaraguan guerrilla of the 1920's, Sandino, had fought against U.S. Marines. National Guard units pursued the guerrillas without making contact. The Honduran Air Force bombed some of the rebel encampments.\(^3\)

On 28 February 1963 the government announced that a clandestine organization known as the National Liberation Front had been discovered in the Department of Chinandega. Arrested members of the group were found to possess instructions on manufacturing Molotov cocktails and larger bombs, also manuals of guerrilla warfare.\(^4\)

As of April 1963 at least two guerrilla groups were active, one in Chinandega Department near the Cosegua volcano, the other along the Costa Rican border.\(^5\)

In May 1963 an armed guerrilla group from the National Liberation Front briefly seized the Radio Mundial broadcasting station in the capital city of Managua.\(^6\)

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On 2 July 1963 a French press agency reported that several armed bands made up of Nicaraguans, Cubans, and persons of other nationalities were conducting hit-and-run raids on Nicaraguan territory from hideouts in the mountainous Honduran border area of Mosquita. The bands were said to have been in Mosquita for several months.\footnote{Agence France Presse, Lima, 3 July 1963.}

In August 1963 troops were sent to the Honduran frontier to curb guerrilla activities headed by Klaus Kields Barbizón. Several clashes occurred. Nicaraguan Air Force planes strafed the banks of the Coco River so as to disperse guerrillas attempting to infiltrate from Honduras.\footnote{Hispanic American Report, August 1963.}

In September 1963 President Schick of Nicaragua announced that the governments of Costa Rica and Honduras had promised to help suppress anti-Nicaraguan guerrillas operating in the areas of their countries bordering on Nicaragua. The President said that Hondurans, Costa Ricans, Nicaraguans, and Cubans were among the guerrillas already captured on Nicaraguan soil.\footnote{Washington Post, 6 September 1963.}

Panama. No guerrilla activity noted.

Dominican Republic. On 6 December 1963 military authorities announced the capture of the leader of a week-old pro-Castro guerrilla movement which had broken out in at least four widely separated areas near the city of Santiago. The Dominican Army announced the liquidation of the last guerrilla band on 23 December. Estimates as to the total number of guerrillas involved ranged from 60 to 250 men.\footnote{Washington Post, 7, 8, and 24 December 1963; New York Times, 29 December 1963, (page E9-2); Time, 3 January 1964.}

Venezuela

Since the early months of 1962 Venezuela has been the scene of more widely extended guerrilla activity than any other Latin American country.1 The guerrillas, who appear to be entirely Castro-Communist in origin or sympathy, have at no time constituted a major security threat to the Betancourt regime. Their history has been one of repeated setbacks at the hands of Venezuelan military forces and the Venezuelan National Guard, balanced only by occasional guerrilla successes in minor forays and the seeming ability of the guerrillas to attract new recruits to replace those killed or captured in encounters with government forces.

The following discussion of 1962-1963 guerrilla activity in Venezuela has been pieced together mainly from the issues of one leading Caracas daily newspaper, El Universal. Spot checks of other Venezuelan newspapers, as well as of radio information releases, have indicated that much additional information on the guerrillas not reported in El Universal is available from these sources. The account of guerrilla activities which follows defines therefore the broad patterns of these operations but does not reflect the full dimensions of the data on the guerrillas that can be gleaned from the various Venezuelan public information media.

1. The actual pattern of guerrilla activity in Venezuela after 1 January 1962 is somewhat blurred by the fact that no less than three groups of insurgents were operating more or less simultaneously: urban terrorists in Caracas, Maracaibo, and other main cities; suburban and small-town terrorists whose activities occasionally took on guerrilla aspects; and rural guerrillas whose base areas lay in heavily forested or mountain areas. An attempt has been made to confine the present discussion, so far as possible, to the rural guerrillas.
1. The Pattern. The pattern of guerrilla activity in Venezuela since early 1962 may be conveniently divided for analytical purposes into two time-phases. In the first phase, lasting roughly from January to April 1962, an amateurish attempt was made to launch a nationwide insurrection from at least nine widely separated guerrilla base areas. In the second phase, lasting roughly from May 1962 through December 1963, guerrilla activity assumed a more professional cast and was localized mainly in western Venezuela.

a. The Initial Phase, January-April 1962. At the end of January 1962 the Venezuelan government announced that the Regional Army of Sucre State, in collaboration with the police and the National Armed Forces, had been directed by peasants to a guerrilla training camp at an isolated coffee plantation in the foothills of the Turumquire Sierra. The camp was said to be equipped with a shooting range, a helicopter strip, a large cache of FN projectiles of the type used by the Venezuelan Army, a small radio station, and provisions sufficient to last over a hundred men for several days. Further investigation by a mixed military commission indicated that the camp had also served as a school which nearby peasants were taught how to read and write and were instructed in Communist ideology.1

The Turumquire camp proved to be the first of nine guerrilla camps discovered by Venezuelan authorities during the months of January-April 1962 at widely separated points in the States of Sucre, Miranda, Carabobo, Yaracuy, Trujillo, Mérida, Lara, Portuguesa, and Falcón. Together, these States comprised or were located adjacent to every important center of Venezuelan population.

Contemporary accounts in the Venezuelan press suggest that the majority of the guerrilla camps discovered in January-April 1962 had been established by students from the Central University of Caracas and the University of the Andes at Mérida, the capital of Mérida State. The students were apparently directed in their guerrilla activities by a small group of older men, including two former members of the National Congress and two professors at the University of the Andes.

In nearly every case, the existence of the guerrillas and the approximate locations of their camps appears to have been reported to the authorities by peasants and other local residents. In most of the areas in which guerrillas appeared, groups of peasants armed with machetes and other weapons joined the Venezuelan military, National Guard, and police forces in the search for the guerrillas.

Good intelligence and peasant cooperation aided the Venezuelan armed forces to make short work of the student guerrillas and their camps. In May 1962 the Ministry of Defense announced that a total of 138 suspected guerrillas has been captured, 13 killed, and 8 wounded. The Ministry claimed that the only remaining area of guerrilla activity was Lara State, where

4. La Esfera, 4 May 1962.
small fugitive bands were being pursued by the Army and the National Guard.\textsuperscript{1} Newspaper reports, however, indicated that other guerrilla groups continued their activities in the Falcón and Yaracuy States.\textsuperscript{2}

b. The Second Phase, May 1962-December 1963. Guerrilla activity in Venezuela during the period May 1962-December 1963 appears to have been centered mainly in the three western States of Falcón, Lara, and Portuguesa. Guerrillas were reported active from time to time in other parts of the country, but the available reports either provide few details on the guerrillas or leave it uncertain whether the insurgents in question were actually guerrillas rather than urban or small-town terrorists.\textsuperscript{3}

The guerrillas in Falcón State appear to have had their hideouts in two low-lying mountain ranges separated by 20 miles or more of intervening lowland. One group operated in the Sierra de Coro in the northern part of the State, the other in a border area of Falcón and Lara States. The guerrillas were led by two well-publicized captains, Domingo Urbina and Douglas Bravo.\textsuperscript{4} The guerrilla personnel reportedly included a few deserters from

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{La Esfera}, 25 April 1962.
\item In September 1963 the Venezuelan government announced capture of an armed group operating in the Aroa mountains of Yaracuy State in western Venezuela. In October Army and police forces captured 23 guerrillas who had been operating from the mountainous zone of Aguas Calientes in Anzoátegui State in eastern Venezuela. \textit{El Universal}, 13 September and 23 October 1963; \textit{Washington Post}, 24 October 1963. For a report of another guerrilla camp discovered in Central Venezuela in February 1963, see below, page 100, Note 1.
\item Domingo Urbina escaped in 1962 from a Caracas prison where he had been serving a sentence for the assassination in 1950 of a member of the military junta then ruling Venezuela. On 14-18 March 1963 the Caracas newspaper \textit{Clarín} published a series of interviews with Bravo and other members of his band, complete with photographs of the bearded Bravo dressed in the style of Fidel Castro. A lengthy description of Bravo's band, allegedly based on an eyewitness interview, appeared in the Cuban newspaper \textit{Hoy} on 1 September 1963.
\end{enumerate}
the Venezuelan military. Among them may have been some marine and naval personnel who fled into the guerrilla zone after the bloody revolt at the Puerto Cabello naval base in June 1962.¹

Available press accounts do not provide any information as to significant insurgent actions by the Falcón guerrillas during the last six months of 1962, although their continued existence was noted in at least one newspaper report.² In January 1963 the press reported the opening of a large Army entrapment action against the guerrillas. On 12 February Radio Caracas reported that 40 guerrillas, originally recruited in Caracas, had surrendered to the military because of hunger and because of disillusionment over their failure to win peasant support.³ A few days later it was reported that another 16 guerrillas had been captured, most of them from the Central University of Caracas.⁴ As of mid-March 1963, however, the military had been unable to lure any of the remaining guerrillas into a fire-fight or to locate either Urbina or Bravo.⁵

¹. The New York Times reported on 5 June 1962 that many of the marine and navy rebels escaped into the mountains south of Puerto Cabello after the revolt was crushed. A Venezuelan newspaper reported that the rebels had freed about 80 "guerrillas" from military custody and later reported the discovery of a guerrilla camp in the border area between Cojedes and Guárico States which was stocked with arms thought to be stolen from Puerto Cabello at the time of the revolt. El Universal, 3 June 1962; 14 and 23 February 1963.

². El Universal, 15 September 1962.


⁵. The Ministry of Interior announced in March 1963 that the Army units in Falcón had not had any kind of armed encounter with the guerrillas. El Universal, 21 March 1963.
Armed clashes with the guerrillas occurred for the first time at the end of March 1963 after the guerrillas launched a night attack on a small group of Venezuelan Security Police (DIGEPOL) which was assisting in the anti-guerrilla operations. 1 The military then proceeded to launch more combing operations in the mountains and, for the first time, used Air Force planes to bomb known or suspected guerrilla base areas. 2 By June 1963, when President Betancourt visited the zone of anti-guerrilla operations, local officials were of the opinion that the guerrillas had disbanded. 3

The Falcón guerrillas returned to action during September 1963, this time displaying a more aggressive strategy. They operated again in the Sierra de Coro but also extended their operations into forested lowland areas to the east of the town of Coro. 4 From this latter vantage point they launched ambushes against police and military automobiles travelling on the Coro-Morón highway. 5 The guerrillas remained an active force throughout the autumn of 1963, and it was surmised that the renewal of their operations was coordinated with the efforts of urban terrorists in Caracas and elsewhere to disrupt the presidential elections scheduled for 1 December 1963. 6

1. El Universal, 1 April 1963.
4. The absence of any report of reversed guerrilla activity in the mountainous Falcón-Lara border area after June 1963 suggests that the guerrillas may have abandoned this area or have been cleaned out of it by Venezuelan government forces. The existence of guerrillas in the Hueque (Gueque) area was noted as early as April 1963. El Universal, 3 April 1963.
On 3 December 1963 the Ministry of Defense announced that the Army had located a guerrilla group of 50 men at a camp in the Hueque (Gueque) mountains southeast of Coro. In the encounter which followed, some 16 to 20 guerrillas were killed, reportedly including Douglas Bravo and a lieutenant who had deserted from the armed forces.¹ Further government successes against the guerrillas were reported in the latter part of December, including discovery of a small arsenal in the town of Coro.² By the end of 1963 the tempo of guerrilla activity in Falcón had noticeably decreased, although armed bands were reported in existence in at least three areas in the Sierra de Coro.³

The second area of guerrilla activity in western Venezuela during the period May 1962-December 1963 was in the mountainous border areas of Lara and Portuguesa States. The principal guerrilla base areas were reportedly located in the vicinity of a mountain known as "El Charal." The "El Charal" guerrillas, as they will here be called, were probably a much smaller group than the Falcón guerrillas.⁴

The "El Charal" guerrillas were first reported active in March 1962; in the following month, government forces captured 23 guerrillas and war materials near Biscucuy. In July 1962 a guerrilla training camp was discovered near

¹. El Universal, 4 and 5 December 1963. Press dispatches from the area said that Domingo Urbina was one of the guerrillas who escaped.


⁴. According to one newspaper report, there were two groups of guerrillas in Lara and Portuguesa States: one operating in the general area of "El Charal," the other in the Humocaros Mountains between Lara and Trujillo States. El Universal, 22 November 1963.
Biscucuy. A month later an unspecified number of insurgents reportedly came down from the "El Charal" area and turned themselves over to the National Guard at Biscucuy. One of the guerrillas, identified as a student, told the authorities that he preferred to turn himself in rather than starve up in the mountains. In October 1962 a group of four men, described in the press as "bearded and hungry," were captured by peasants and turned over to the military police. These men were also identified as members of the "El Charal" group.

No information is thus far available as to the actual operations of the "El Charal" guerrillas during the last part of 1962. It is clear, however, that they must have carried on some form of overt insurgency inasmuch as the press announced in January 1963 that a military drive would be made against the "El Charal" guerrillas in conjunction with the campaign against the Falcón guerrillas. On 28 February 1963 the guerrillas ambushed a small National Guard detachment to the east of "El Charal," in Portuguesa State.

In the period August-December 1963 the newspapers carried new reports testifying to the continued existence of the "El Charal" guerrillas. Police captured 13 guerrillas in an August 1963 raid and discovered six deserted guerrilla camps.

5. El Universal, 1 and 6 March 1963.
in October. As of the end of 1963, there was no information to suggest that the "El Charal" guerrillas had been eliminated.

2. Guerrilla Weapons and Equipment. The reports thus far scrutinized in the Venezuelan press with respect to guerrilla activity in the period 1962-1963 suggest that the insurgents were armed mainly with pistols, rifles, shotguns, submachine guns, dynamite sticks and homemade explosives, and regulation or homemade hand grenades. No references to any heavier guerrilla armaments were seen except for one report that a 30mm mortar had been discovered in December 1963 at a guerrilla arsenal in Coro, Falcón State. Most of the arms found in guerrilla possession were of a type which could have been gathered in the numerous raids staged by urban terrorists on Venezuelan military and police installations. In March 1963 the Army General Staff reported that all arms which had been captured from the guerrillas were either of Venezuelan manufacture or were of a type in common use among the various armed forces of the nation.

4. For example, it was reported by Army intelligence that terrorists had carried off 127 rifles after an attack on the Naval School at Catia del Mar. El Universal, 21 April 1962; La Esfera, 4 May 1962.
5. El Universal, 6 March 1963.
Descriptions of captured guerrilla camps appearing in the Venezuelan press suggest that many, if not all, of the guerrilla bands possessed radio transmitters and receivers. Hammocks, plasticized tents, field cooking equipment, field clothing, cartridge belts, and similar articles were apparently standard items of supply and seem to have been available in sufficient quantity. Ammunition was presumably a major supply problem, but no accounts thus far seen have suggested that any guerrilla bands were hampered by lack of sufficient ammunition.

As of late 1963 there was an indication that the Falcón guerrillas may have decided that their existing weaponry was insufficient and may have appealed to Cuba for additional and heavier armaments. On 3 November the National Guard discovered a three-ton cache of arms, allegedly of Cuban origin, on an ocean beach of Paraguana Península in Falcón State. The discovery was made less than six weeks after the first reports in the Venezuelan press that the Falcón guerrillas were extending their operations into a forested lowland area near the seacoast. The arms cache contained five 60mm mortars, nine 57mm recoilless rifles, twenty 3.5 in bazookas, two machine guns with tripods, in addition to larger quantities of Belgian automatic rifles and Luger machine guns. Ammunition packages of plastic explosives, and demolition charges were also found.

1. The New York Times reported on 18 July 1962 that guerrillas captured as of that date in rural areas had been well equipped with radios, field equipment, and in one case jars of imported marmalade. Additional references to guerrilla possession of radio equipment appear in El Universal, 13 September, 21 October, 27 October, and 23 December 1963. In a February 1963 statement CIA director, John A. McCone noted that so much radio equipment had been stolen during the autumn of 1962 that importation of additional equipment from Cuba would not have been required by the guerrillas. Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, p. 67.


3. **Guerrilla Techniques.** The Venezuelan guerrillas differed in at least two important operational respects from the guerrillas who have appeared in most other world areas. The Venezuelan guerrillas used motor transport as an important aid to the initial formation of guerrilla camps, to the carrying out of guerrilla attacks and ambushes, and to the creation of supply lines from populated areas to guerrillas operating from mountain hideouts. The guerrillas also operated among an agricultural population which gave almost no support to the insurgents, except under duress, and often turned against them whenever an opportunity presented itself.¹

The use of motor transport in the Venezuelan guerrilla operation was first noticed in March 1962 when students from the Universities of Caracas and Mérida moved out towards preassigned guerrilla base areas in the mountains of western and southwestern Venezuela. In March 1962 government forces intercepted seven men who were travelling in a jeep with arms, medicines, and ammunition towards a suspected guerrilla camp in the "El Charal" mountain area of Lara and Portuguesa States.² About the same time a police patrol intercepted an automobile on the Panamerican Highway in Mérida State and were answered by "heavy arms fire" from the occupants.³ A farmer in the Agua Viva area of western

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¹ The only incident thus far noted in the Venezuelan press in which peasants gave support to the guerrillas, under conditions other than duress, was the discovery of a group of 13 guerrillas in August 1963 who were being sheltered by peasants on a ranch in the "El Charal" guerrilla zone of Lara and Portuguesa States. The peasants claimed that the guerrillas had offered them money and "zinc sheets" in return for shelter. *El Universal*, 27 August 1963.

² *El Universal*, 5 March 1962.

Trujillo State reported to the police that for the last five months he had noted jeeps driving through the night toward a mountain area which had become a zone of guerrilla activity.1 A student guerrilla from the University of Caracas captured in the Humocaro Alto area of Lara State in April 1962 asserted that he and his companions had driven to the area in private cars, while their arms were being transported inside "cistern tanks."2

From April 1962 onward the Venezuelan newspapers began to carry several reports each month of terrorist attacks and raids on the small towns and along the highways of rural Venezuela which were carried out by armed men who arrived and left by truck, car, or jeep. It seems likely that most of these raids were staged by terrorists rather than guerrillas, although in most cases the assailants could not be identified.3 However, in the known areas of guerrilla activity in Falcon, Lara, and Portuguesa States, there are strong indications that the guerrillas from time to time utilized motor transport as a means of extending the geographic scope of their activities and assisting the execution of hit-and-run tactics.

1. El Universal, 29 March 1962. The farmer assumed that the jeeps belonged to patrolling government security forces and did not report this information to the police until after the guerrillas became active.

2. La Esfera, 3 April 1962. It is not clear from the account what "cistern tanks" meant.

3. To cite but one of the many instances of motorized attack in rural Venezuela, by unidentifiable insurgents who may have been guerrillas, it was reported in November 1963 from Guárico State in central Venezuela that National Guardsmen had clashed with a group of "armed civilians" who had been operating in the area. The attackers were presumed to have fled, obviously by some form of motor transport, along a highway leading toward Cojedes State. A guerrilla camp had previously been discovered in the same area in February 1963. El Universal, 14 and 23 February, 30 November 1963.
The technique of motorized guerrilla attack emerged most clearly in the autumn of 1963 when the Falcón guerrillas spread out from the Sierra de Coro into the Hueque (Gueque) lowlands west of the town of Coro. A newspaper reported that one of the reasons why the guerrillas were thought to have chosen this new zone was the fact that it had interior roads and tracks into the forest which could be used by jeeps or cars and because it also had access to the Coro-Morón coastal highway.\(^1\) In the months of September, October, and November 1963, isolated insurgent attacks were reported at widely separated points on or near the coastal road. Certain reported guerrilla actions, such as the "swooping down" on the town of Coro on 3 December, during which the guerrillas shot up the police station and clashed with Army patrols, are explicable only under the assumption that some form of motor transport was used.\(^2\)

No reports have thus far been noted which would suggest that the guerrillas actually maintained a pool of motor vehicles in any of their base areas. More likely, confederates drove their cars or trucks to pre-designated points where the guerrillas would be waiting. Movement on the highway, by day or night, was probably disguised as ordinary civilian traffic.\(^3\)

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3. Instances of insurgent activity in the "El Charal" guerrilla zone of Lara and Portuguesa States in which so-called guerrillas either stole or made their getaway by some form of motor transport are recorded in *El Universal*, 4 April 1962, 10 January, 19 January, 2 December 1963. It is perhaps useful to note that Castro's attack on the Moncada Barracks in July 1953 was mounted from a farm hideout by a caravan of 26 automobiles. "They left in two groups, one of sixteen cars and one of ten. It was not unusual for such caravans to be seen on the road or in the streets of Santiago de Cuba at that hour of the morning of July 26, 1953. The people of the city were ending the annual celebration of their patron saint, and many revelers still thronged the streets." Jules Dubois, *Fidel Castro*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., p. 33
The use of motor transport to supply guerrillas operating from mountain bases was noted most clearly in Falcón State. On 3 February 1963 Army units which were then engaged in an encirclement action against the guerrillas intercepted a jeep carrying provisions to the insurgents. In April 1963 peasants in the same general area reported the existence of a band of 25 guerrillas which received its supplies from accomplices in motor vehicles.

A group of guerrillas in the "El Charal" region who turned themselves in to the authorities in August 1962 asserted that the military and police blockade of access roads into the area had starved them out.

Peasant refusal to aid the guerrillas with food and other supplies, except under duress, was undoubtedly a major factor in forcing the guerrillas to depend to a large extent on supplies brought in by motor transport. Inevitably, the guerrillas in some areas, notably Falcón, were forced to raid nearby farms and towns in order to keep themselves alive. These actions increased peasant antagonism to the guerrillas and robbed them of their most potent base of support. In March 1963 an officer of the Army General Staff asserted that "the best ally of the Armed Forces of the Nation in the anti-guerrilla drive has been the campesino, who has performed valiant service as a guide and has collaborated with the rebels only under coercion, abandoning them at the first opportunity in order to betray their positions."


4. In February 1963 the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela testified that: "The peasants won't feed the guerrillas. The guerrillas starve to death in the hills." *Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere*, p. 53.


Lack of peasant support was clearly one of the most important reasons for the repeated setbacks suffered by the Venezuelan guerrillas during the years 1962-1963; it is also an explanation as to why the guerrillas, despite seemingly ample supplies of arms and equipment, were never able to develop into a major security threat. On the other hand, the guerrillas must be credited with the operational achievement of having sustained themselves in more or less continuous existence in three western States of Venezuela despite peasant antagonism and repeated setbacks at the hands of government forces.

In the process of mere clinging to existence, the guerrillas seem also to have eliminated incompetents and faint-at-hearts, and to have emerged as something of a disciplined fighting force. In mid-September 1963, and possibly for the first time in the guerrillas' history, a small force of Falcón guerrillas ambushed a government force as large as 80 men, applying the Guevara-recommended technique of concentrating their fire entirely on the vanguard. In the setback suffered by the Falcón guerrillas on 3 December 1963, when between 16 to 20 insurgents and two important leaders were killed, it was noted that the attacking Army troops were unable to bring back any of the killed or wounded guerrillas because their comrades had returned to the field of battle and carried them away.

1. In September 1963 it was reported that the Falcón guerrillas had sentenced one of their camp commanders to death on a charge of having left important documents in a camp which was later seized. He was saved only by the imminent approach of a government force to the place assigned for execution. El Universal, 24 September 1963. In August 1963 the "El Charal" guerrillas were reported to have executed four of their comrades on a charge of attempted desertion. Washington Post, 29 August 1963.


The full significance of the guerrilla episode in western Venezuela cannot therefore be assessed on the basis of the scattered record of guerrilla assaults, ambushes, and government counteroperations appearing in the files of one Caracas newspaper and in the foreign press. More study is required of the physical and human geography of the specific areas in which the guerrillas operated, as well as of the factors which assisted the guerrillas during 1963 to maintain corporate existence despite pressure from the military and the antagonistic attitude of the campesinos. Events in Venezuela during the first months of 1964 should also assist a determination as to what extent the Falcón and "El Charal" guerrillas were able to survive their defeats in autumn 1963 and to maintain themselves as an insurgent entity.

4. Counterguerrilla operations. In January 1963, as has been noted, the Venezuelan government launched a military operation against both the Falcón and "El Charal" guerrillas. The following brief sketch of the operations refers only to Falcón State, there being no information currently available as to the nature of the military operations against the "El Charal" guerrillas.

The first movement against the Falcón guerrillas consisted of a pincer operation by troops moving south from Coro and north from Barquisimeto.\(^1\) Air Force units were called in to conduct low-level reconnaissance over the areas of suspected guerrilla concentration.\(^2\) The armed forces captured at least 56 suspected insurgents but were unable to locate the main guerrilla leaders or to provoke a fire-fight of any kind.\(^3\) By early February it was reported that

the military forces had settled down to an operation of "inspection and waiting," amidst some uncertainty as to whether any armed bands were left in the mountains at all.¹

The guerrillas proved their existence in a few minor ambushes and clashes at the end of March 1963 and in early April. The government forces now launched "Operación Tenazas" in which heavy aerial bombardment of suspected guerrilla base areas was followed by a ground encirclement of each base area by forces moving in from several directions. The ground operations were hampered by rain and slow movement through the rugged mountain terrain, and it is not known whether this tactic was effective.² By June 1963, however, it was widely believed that the remaining guerrillas had disbanded.³

Military anti-guerrilla operations resumed in September 1963 after fresh outbreaks of insurgent activity in the Sierra de Coro and the Hueque (Gueque) lowlands. A new strategy seems to have been employed. Troops were stationed at strategic points surrounding the suspected areas of guerrilla concentration, and intensive patrolling was instituted along all access routes to the guerrilla zone. Entry into the zone was forbidden except by special pass. In a companion move, troops in camouflage clothing were infiltrated toward the guerrilla bases, in order to mine likely areas.

1. La Esfera, 4 February 1963.
2. El Universal, 3 and 6 April 1963.
of guerrilla passage and to prepare ambushes. These tactics presumably were responsible for the setbacks inflicted by the military on the guerrillas in December 1963, including the reported killing of Douglas Bravo and another guerrilla leader.2

**Peru**

1. **The Pattern.** The possibility that Peru might become a center of Castro-Communist guerrilla activity was officially noted by the Peruvian government on 1 September 1960 when the Minister of Government and Police asserted that persons who had received guerrilla training in Cuba were returning to Peru for the purpose of creating another "Sierra Maestra" in the Andean highlands.3 The first clear reports of guerrilla activity, however, did not emerge until March-April 1962 when at least two widely separated guerrilla organizations were identified in the highlands: one in the vicinity of Huampani-Satipo, in the central Department of Junín; the other led by Hugo Blanco in the southern Department of Cuzco.4

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1. These tactics are briefly described in *El Universal*, 23 and 24 September 1963.
4. In April 1962 copies of Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare were found at Arequipa, also in southern Peru. One newspaper reported the existence of a guerrilla training camp at Cerro Verde, about 25 kilometers outside Arequipa. *La Prensa*, 18 April 1962. Another guerrilla training camp was reported in a mountainous area of the northern Department of Cajamarca. *La Prensa*, 16 May 1962.
a. **Huampani-Satipo.** The existence of the Huampani-Satipo guerrillas came to light as the result of a March 1962 police raid on a suspected center of contraband arms and narcotics trade in the town of Satipo. Several suspects, among them a Cuban national and the Mayor of Satipo, were seized. Materials captured included rifles, revolvers, pistols, and machine gun ammunition.¹

Simultaneously, but without publicity for several months afterwards, the police also raided a guerrilla camp in a jungle area near Satipo known as "Capinchari." The police took the guerrillas by surprise and reported that they were equipped with automatic weapons, dynamite, and sufficient food to permit a long stay in the jungle. The guerrillas were led by Carlos Miranda García, who had previously been trained in guerrilla warfare at a Sierra Maestra site in Cuba. The mission of the guerrillas was reportedly to create agitation by assassinating government officials and conducting raids on haciendas.²

Further reports on the Huampani-Satipo guerrillas appearing in May-June 1962 suggested that three bands were then active in the nearby jungle areas. They were said to have arrived in the region several months previously and to be well-equipped with money and supplies. Unknown persons were said to be continually arriving in the area as other unknown persons left, presumably after receiving guerrilla training. The guerrillas reportedly included both Spanish-speaking and Quechua-speaking persons, as well as two bearded persons

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described by the local people as "gringos." As of June 1962 the guerrillas were said to be in regular contact with persons in Lima, the Cerro de Pasco mines at La Oroya in the central highlands, and with the separate guerrilla group operating in Cuzco.¹

In August 1962 a group of armed Communist guerrillas armed with Czech machine guns was reported to be "dominating" the peasants of the Department of Junín, which includes Satipo.² No further details were given. This is the last report thus far seen in the Peruvian press which might have any bearing on the existence or activities of the Huampani-Satipo guerrillas.

b. Hugo Blanco. The Hugo Blanco guerrilla episode in the southern Department of Cuzco was reported at length in the Peruvian press, possibly to the point of exaggerating its real dimensions and significance. The central figure, Hugo Blanco, was the son of a middle-class family in the city of Cuzco. He went to Argentina to study at the School of Agronomy Engineering in the University of La Plata and came under the influences of Prof. Silvio Frondizi, brother of former Argentine President Arturo Frondizi. Silvio Frondizi was then at the head of a radical leftist group of Trotskyite tendency known as "Praxis."

In 1959 or 1960 Blanco abandoned his studies in Argentina and returned to Cuzco, presumedly with the idea of launching a revolutionary career. In April 1960 he was arrested in the city of Cuzco but gained freedom by a hunger strike. The following year Blanco went to the semi-tropical valley of La Convención, north of Cuzco, and made contact with the Communist leaders of local peasant

1. *La Prensa*, 31 May and 5 June 1962. The 5 June edition of *La Prensa* includes a sketch map of the jungle area northwest of Satipo in which the guerrillas reportedly were operating.

unions. Some time later he launched a career of terrorism and guerrilla activity which was first reported in the Lima press in April 1962.¹

The area surrounding Cuzco was the heart of the Inca empire and still supports one of the densest Indian populations of the Americas. It is one of the most rugged mountain highland areas of Peru, dropping off to humid lowland jungles on the north and east. The Indians of the area are Quechua-speakers with a long history of antagonism to their Peruvian landlords. Cuzco had long been one of the principal centers of Communist strength in Peru, and after 1956 the Communists won control over the majority of unions in the area.²

Blanco's first activities in La Convención valley were apparently restricted to the organization of peasant unions among the Indians similar to those already under Communist control. Within a few months he emerged as General Secretary of an organization known as the Federation of Peasants of La Convención and Lares. He was credited with instigating a number of riots and quarrels over land, in which several Indians were killed, and with the authorship of a bizarre plan to poison the water supply of the town of Quillabamba.³ By April 1962 Blanco's activities had reached the point where landowners in the La Convención valley petitioned the government for military protection.⁴ Some

¹ The biographical details on Blanco are drawn from an article in El Comercio (Lima), 31 May 1963, and from an article on "Guerrillas in Peru" appearing in the Havana periodical Bohemia, 23 December 1962.


³ El Comercio, 31 May 1963; La Prensa, 3 May 1962.

⁴ La Prensa, 6 April 1962.
32 of the peasant unions in the Cuzco area, presumably including those dominated by old-line Communist leaders, also demanded his expulsion as a trouble-maker.¹

Blanco now withdrew with his followers to a large hacienda known as "Chauvimayo" in a heavily forested area of La Convención valley. The proprietor of the hacienda, Alfredo Romainville, was reportedly so hated by the Indians of the area that he had not dared to visit his property in five years.²

At "Chauvimayo" Blanco began to organize and train a guerrilla band in conscious imitation of Fidel Castro. He grew a beard and had photographs taken of himself standing in the midst of a forest with his "General Staff."³ Other photographs were taken of armed Indians, including women, holding machine guns. Copies of the photographs were sent to Cuzco and eventually to Lima, where persons reported to be supporters of Blanco had already staged a bank robbery in March 1962 which netted the equivalent of about $100,000 for the guerrilla cause.⁴

A correspondent of La Prensa who penetrated into La Convención valley in May 1962 reported that he entered along a tortuous path which ran over steep precipices overlooking the Vilcabamba River. The path was heavily guarded and had six control points. The correspondent was unable to see Blanco or to penetrate close to "Chauvimayo," which he described as a large and heavily forested hilly zone in the valley that was "excellent for hiding the Communist agents." The correspondent gained the impression that the Indians of the

¹. La Prensa, 1 and 3 May 1962.
². La Prensa, 5 May 1962.
³. The photograph is reproduced in El Comercio, 31 May 1963. Copies of it were in circulation in Cuzco as early as May 1962.
⁴. La Prensa, 3 May and 1 September 1962.
valley were not Communists but had been persuaded by Blanco and other Communist leaders to prepare for a possible attack on their lands by Romainville, the legal owner of "Chaupimayo."\(^1\)

Blanco continued his guerrilla training activities of the surrounding countryside without interference from government forces throughout the spring and summer of 1962. A news correspondent reported in May that the local Civil Guard were afraid to approach the "Chaupimayo" hacienda and were limiting themselves to watching the town of Chaullay which provided the only feasible exit from La Convención valley in the direction of Cuzco.\(^2\) Police who ventured too close to the guerrilla zone were sometimes robbed of their arms but not otherwise harmed.\(^3\)

By September 1962 Civil Guard authorities in the Cuzco area estimated that the strength of Blanco's guerrilla forces had grown to 2,000 men.\(^4\) The guerrillas and their Indian supporters had begun to move out from "Chaupimayo," attacking the police, neighboring towns and haciendas, and redistributing hacienda lands to the peasants. Indians who refused to join or pay their taxes to Blanco's movement were assaulted.\(^5\)

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1. *La Prensa*, 5 and 6 May 1962; a sketch map of the valley in which the guerrillas were located was included in the 5 May 1962 edition. The correspondent managed to penetrate the guerrilla zone mainly on the strength of his having been one of Blanco's schoolmates in Cuzco and having a photograph to prove it. The correspondent managed to see one of Blanco's chief associates, Andrés González, who had lived in La Convención for 16 years, and came to the conclusion that González, not Blanco, was the principal guerrilla leader.


In November 1962 an estimated 8,000 Indians, many of them from the area of Blanco's stronghold, staged a rally in the city of Cuzco which turned into a major riot. This action followed issuance of a communique by the Prefect of the Department of Cuzco which, apparently for the first time, officially recognized the existence of guerrillas in La Convención valley.1 On 17 November a body of 300 Indians attacked a newly-installed Civil Guard garrison at Pujyura, north of Cuzco, killing two policemen and seizing police rifles and uniforms.2 A policeman who survived the raid claimed that the attackers carried heavy and light machine guns, rifles, and radios.3

Until November 1962 no military action had been undertaken against Blanco's guerrillas, possibly because commanders were unwilling to divert forces to the area until the success of the military coup of 19 July 1962 which overthrew the civilian government of President Prado was assured. Early in November an Army engineer battalion was sent to Cuzco for the purpose of building penetration roads into La Convención valley.4 Two Air Force helicopters were sent to assist surveillance of the "Chaupimayo" area.5 On 20 November heavily armed police detachments under the command of General Humberto Quea, the director of the Civil Guard, moved directly against the guerrilla stronghold.6 No

3. La Prensa, 20 November 1962.
4. Ibid.
5. La Prensa, 20 November 1962; El Comercio, 5, 6 January 1963.
6. La Prensa, 21 November 1962. A bomb was exploded outside General Quea's Lima home on 24 November. La Prensa, 24 November 1962.
resistance was encountered, as Blanco and an estimated 40 of his followers fled towards the lowland jungle regions of Peru bordering on Brazil and Bolivia.¹

The capture of "Chaupimayo" brought an end to Blanco's effectiveness as a guerrilla leader, although attacks on Civil Guard personnel in the region continued for some weeks afterwards.² An Army infantry company was brought in from Lima to aid in the search for Blanco and the guerrillas who had escaped with him.³ Blanco was finally captured by the Civil Guard on 30 May 1963 in a mountain hideout previously reconnoitered by an Army helicopter.⁴

A new dimension to the Blanco episode was added on 14 May 1963 when police in the Peruvian jungle town of Puerto Maldonado found seven men, all strangers to the region, in a local guest house. The men opened fire and escaped into the nearby jungle. By 21 May all of the fugitives had been captured or killed by the police. Another man who arrived in Puerto Maldonado on 16 May from Bolivia was found to be carrying arms, ammunition, and a considerable amount of Peruvian, American, Brazilian, and Bolivian money.

According to an official communique subsequently released by the Peruvian government on the Puerto Maldonado episode, seven of the eight men involved were Peruvian university students who belonged to the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Lima. The students had travelled to Cuba on scholarships and had received guerrilla training in that country. They then went by air to Brazil and

¹. La Prensa, 22, 23, and 26 November 1962.
⁴. El Comercio, 31 May 1963, which provides a detailed account of the capture.
by road across Bolivia before reaching Puerto Maldonado by river. The purpose of their journey was to engage in revolutionary activities among the Peruvian peasantry, particularly in the Cuzco area. All of the men were armed with automatic pistols, had jungle clothing and uniforms, and large amounts of money.\(^1\)

2. **Guerrilla Weapons and Equipment.** The Peruvian newspaper accounts utilized in the preparation of this report provide little information as to the weapons and equipment of the Huampani-Satipo and Hugo Blanco guerrillas beyond the notation that the guerrillas were armed with explosives, machine guns, rifles, carbines, revolvers, and pistols. In testimony before the U.S. Congress in February 1963, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that the guerrilla trainees rounded up in the police raids on the Satipo area had been issued kits containing a Czech rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of Bloc origin.\(^2\) The Hugo Blanco guerrillas were reported by one Civil Guard observer to be in possession of "powerful radio transmitters."\(^3\) Presumably the reference was to some kind of walkie-talkie.

Most of the Indians who supported Blanco appear to have been armed only with machetes, clubs, and hoes. A member of the Blanco band captured in February 1963 was carrying a light machine gun which he said he did not know how to use.\(^4\)

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3. **Guerrilla Techniques.** The Huampani-Satipo guerrillas were still in the initial organizational stage at the time of the March 1962 police raids: the available reports do not indicate that they offered any resistance when discovered. One newspaper account suggested that the guerrillas discovered in the jungle area near Satipo had become careless and had no "vigilance" system in operation.¹

The Huampani-Satipo guerrillas were said to communicate freely with Lima, La Oroya, and Cuzco by using secondary routes in the highlands over which no police control was maintained.² A newspaper report of June 1962 that the guerrillas were in contact with La Oroya, the center of the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco mining properties, may be of some significance in view of the later strike violence at La Oroya in December 1962 during which some $4,000,000 worth of damage was done to the mine smelter.³

Available data provides no information on the guerrilla techniques employed by Hugo Blanco and his followers beyond the occasional reports that the guerrillas were training the Indians of La Convención valley in the use of arms and imposing fines on those who refused to attend weekly "guerrilla classes."⁴ Except for the one attack on the Pujyura police station in

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2. *La Prensa*, 5 June 1962. A brief description of the routes allegedly used by the guerrillas is included.

3. U.S. intelligence has established the fact that three Cuban nationals were involved in the strike, one of whom had also been active in directing armed invasions of haciendas in the highlands by land-hungry Indians. *Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere*, pp. 63, 66.

4. E.g., *La Prensa*, 1 and 2 September 1962.
November 1962 and occasional assaults on individual policemen, Blanco and his supporters appear to have avoided any clash with the Civil Guard or the Peruvian Army units in the La Convención area. Neither the guerrillas nor their Indian supporters offered any significant resistance to the Civil Guard thrust into La Convención valley which was launched in late November 1962.

4. Counterguerrilla Operations. Peruvian authorities apparently preferred to rely entirely upon police for operations against the Huampani-Satipo guerrillas. In the case of Hugo Blanco, as has been noted, an Army engineer battalion, an Army infantry company, and Army and Air Force helicopters were called in to assist the Civil Guard.

The use of helicopters appears to have greatly facilitated both the planning and the success of the Civil Guard's thrust into Blanco's valley stronghold during November 1962. Prior to launching the actual operation against Blanco, the Commanding General of the Civil Guard, General Quea, flew over the guerrilla zone in a helicopter which was also used to take photographs. According to a press account, the analysis of the photographs convinced the Civil Guard that an attack on 'Chaupimayo' was feasible and that an encircling operation could be undertaken so as to prevent the guerrillas from escaping the valley.¹

From the press accounts of the anti-Bianco operations, it also appears that the helicopters were of major assistance in maintaining communications in an area where overland movement was slow and difficult.² The capture of

1. La Prensa, 21 November 1962.

2. E.g., La Prensa, 18 November 1962. "A helicopter has been requested by officers of the Quillabamba Civil Guard for the removal of the two guards killed in Pujyura by the guerrillas. The region is difficult to reach overland. Thirty Civil Guards have left Quillabamba for Pujyura, and it is estimated that it will take them three days to arrive."
Blanco in May 1963 was facilitated by prior helicopter reconnaissance of his mountain hideout. The major part of his subsequent journey to prison in Cuzco was accomplished by helicopter, presumably in the interests of speed and in order to avoid the danger that a convoy travelling overland would be ambushed.

An important factor in the collapse of Blanco's guerrilla movement may have been the decision of the Peruvian authorities to allow him to continue his activities virtually unmolested for several months rather than attempt a hasty penetration by force into La Convención valley. This decision may have been forced on the authorities because of the limited capabilities of the Civil Guard organizations normally stationed in the Cuzco area, or it may have resulted from a prudent regard for the dangers of ambush along the trails leading to La Convención. In either case, the slow and seemingly cautious build-up of the November 1962 operation seems to have denied Blanco much opportunity to build up his supplies of arms and ammunition by predatory attacks on exposed police or military elements.

The Civil Guard move into La Convención valley in November 1962 appears to have been carefully planned with the aid of photographic reconnaissance obtained by helicopter. Information was also obtained from police agents who had previously penetrated incognito into the guerrilla area. Blanco's reasons for abandoning La Convención and the "Chaupimayo" stronghold are unknown, but his reported possession of radio communication equipment may have enabled his supporters in Cuzco and Quillabamba to warn him that a major encirclement move was impending.

2. La Prensa, 2 September 1962.
No reference was noted in the Peruvian press with respect to any operational difficulties which the Army and Air Force helicopters may have encountered in the steep defiles of La Convención valley or in the high altitudes of the Cuzco area. The part, if any, of the Army engineer battalion in assisting the anti-Blanco operations is unknown. It is not known whether the use of police dogs assisted to any material degree in the tracking down of Blanco and other fugitive members of his guerrilla band during the early months of 1963.
CHAPTER 6

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA, 1959-1963

1. The General Pattern. Terrorist activity (including sabotage) may be considered relevant to military counterinsurgency planning if some or all of the following conditions are present:

1. Terrorist activity is coordinated with other types of insurgency against an established government, including guerrilla warfare.

2. The terrorist activity is not confined to large urban areas only but occurs in small-town and rural areas as well.

3. The terrorists constitute a security threat beyond local capabilities to control.

4. The military are a target for terrorist attack.

5. The military are employed in counteractions against the terrorists.

A review of 306 incidents of terrorist activity reported in Latin America by the New York Times during the period 1959-1963 indicates that in only one country, Venezuela, did terrorist activity reach proportions of immediate interest to the military planner. Terrorist activity in other Latin American countries, notably Argentina, Colombia, and Guatemala, was restricted to brief flurries of bomb-throwing and to isolated acts of sabotage, bank robbery, and the like. In no case did the terrorist activities in the Latin American countries other than Venezuela exceed local police

1. The word "terrorist" is employed throughout this section to denote insurgents who normally operate on an individual or small-cell basis and are based in some kind of built-up area, whether village, small-town, or city.
capabilities to control or pose a significant internal security threat. ¹

The ensuing discussion of terrorist activity in Latin America during the years 1959-1963 must therefore be oriented toward an analysis of the Venezuelan experience. In view of the high priority assigned to terrorist activity in the Castro doctrine of insurgency struggle, it may be suggested that the outburst of terrorist activity which occurred in Venezuela after January 1962 should not be regarded as an isolated or atypical episode in Latin American insurgency history. On the contrary, it would seem more desirable to consider Venezuela as a case study in the type of terrorist tactics which the Castro-Communists are likely to employ in other Latin American countries, and in conjunction with guerrilla warfare, whenever they may consider that the objective conditions may again warrant the application of a combined rural-urban strategy of open insurrection.

VENEZUELA

1. The Pattern. Terrorist activity in Venezuela did not achieve dimensions of military significance until the month of January 1962. At

¹ The difference between the scales of terrorist activity practiced in Venezuela and another Latin American country in which terrorists were also active during the period 1959-1963 is indicated in the following newspaper dispatch. "Colombians are nervous and puzzled over the increase of terrorist incidents here in recent months. The most recent of these was the detonation of 36 small bombs Tuesday--19 in Bogota, 14 in Cali, and the rest in Manizales and Ibagué. Urban terrorism here, as contrasted with that in Venezuela and with Colombia's bloody but less political rural violence, has caused next to no injuries and only slight property damage. Although it shows signs of being organized by at least loosely coordinated left-wing groups, these have shown none of the deadly skill or clear purpose of Venezuela's Forces of National Liberation." New York Times, 27 September 1963.

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about this time the Communists and the Castroites began to implement a
long-planned effort to overthrow the regime of President Betancourt by a
joint campaign of guerrilla warfare and terrorist violence. Among the
indications of an intensification of terrorist activity were three attacks
on military installations in or near Caracas in the period 19–26 January
1962. Simultaneously, time-bombs were exploded in Caracas, bombs were
thrown against police stations, automobiles were burned, and persons in
the streets of metropolitan and suburban Caracas were wounded by shots
fired from passing automobiles.

The government struck back at the terrorists, announcing on 31 January
that 1,037 persons had been arrested in Caracas and elsewhere in con-
nection with terrorist activities and that great quantities of munitions
and subversive materials had been seized. This intervention, and many
others like it in the months which followed, failed to end or reduce the
trend toward increased terrorist violence. From January 1962 until almost
the end of 1963 Venezuela was the scene of a sustained terrorist campaign.

1. The Venezuelan Minister of Defense reported to the Venezuelan Senate
in May 1962 that "extremist" elements—whom he inferentially identi-
fied as the Communists and Castroites—had developed a five-stage
plan for the armed overthrow of the government of President Betancourt.
La Esfera, 4 May 1962. The historical record would suggest that the
third stage, calling for guerrilla activity, terrorism, and sabotage,
was put into effect about January 1962.


News reports of the Venezuelan terrorists which appeared in the U.S. press tended to give the impression that the activities of the terrorists were localized mainly in the Caracas area and in the vicinity of the Lake Maracaibo oilfields. A partial reading of the Venezuelan press suggests that the terrorists were spread much more widely through the country than is often realized. The following collection of newspaper reports on eastern Venezuela, a relatively minor area of terrorist activity, for the period 14 August-4 September 1963 is illustrative:

Aug. 14 - The headquarters of the Acción Democrática in Barcelona was sacked by three masked men armed with guns and knives.

Aug. 16 - A bomb was thrown at a stationwagon but did little damage. The perpetrators were two small boys aged 12 and 8, respectively.

Aug. 17 - Tear gas was thrown into a Barcelona meeting of the Acción Democrática.

Aug. 20 - A bomb was found on the gas line at Leones near El Tigre.

Aug. 21 - An incendiary bomb was thrown into the Acción Democrática meeting in El Tigre.

Aug. 22 - A Texas Oil Company pipeline near the Barcelona airport was sabotaged but did not catch fire. In Chuparin tires were burned and scattered shots fired.

Aug. 26 - Shots were fired from a car at a policeman on duty in Chuparín.

Aug. 27 - A bomb was thrown into a bank office in Chuparín but did not explode. In Paraguan a bomb was thrown at a passing vehicle but little damage was done.

Aug. 28 - A Mene Grande pipeline was bombed in Cantanre and subsequently caught fire. Police and a young Leftist exchanged fire in a Puerto La Cruz cemetery.

Aug. 28 - In Ciudad Bolívar a terrorist who had been injured by his own bomb was taken from a hospital by eight armed men. In the State of Sucre two attacks were made on Prefectures of Police.
Sept. 1 - Sabotage of the Puerto La Cruz gas line plunged the entire city into darkness for over an hour.

Sept. 3 - The Texas Oil Company and Mene Grande pipelines in Barcelona were bombed.

Sept. 4 - Shots were fired at the Chief of Security Police (DIGEPOL) for this area in Chuparín. Leftists distributed pamphlets proclaiming Chuparín as the "Free Territory of Puerto La Cruz." Groups of armed men in Pozuelos, apparently intending to sabotage the Sinclair pipelines, exchanged fire with a police patrol.

The diffusion of terrorist activity throughout Venezuela had the effect, already noted in the previous chapter, of blurring the demarcation lines between the activities of the terrorists, properly so called, and the rural guerrillas who were simultaneously active in western Venezuela and at scattered points elsewhere in the country.¹ It is possible that this was a deliberate tactic designed to increase the prestige of the guerrilla wing of the insurgent forces while, at the same time, disguising the operational difficulties which the guerrillas encountered because of military counter-actions and the lack of campesino support.² A purported interview with a Venezuelan insurgent leader broadcast over Radio Havana in August 1963 claimed that, in actual fact, no less than three types of insurgent forces were then in action: the urban guerrillas who basically operate in the main cities; the urban guerrillas "who operate in the fields;" and the actual guerrilla detachments.³

¹ See above, p. 107.
² Guevara had urged in his manual on guerrilla warfare that insurgent propaganda outside the actual guerrilla zone of operations should be of a broad educational nature, "stressing guerrilla victories." Guevara, Op. cit., p. 56.
³ Radio Havana Spanish Broadcast to the Americas, 17 August 1963.
Castro-Communist spokesmen for the insurgent forces claimed that the terrorist operations in the urban areas of Venezuela were intended primarily to support the activities of the rural guerrillas and were not conceived as an independent type of insurgent struggle. Nevertheless, as the months wore on after January 1962, it became clear that the success and frequency with which the terrorists launched attacks on police and military personnel and engaged in sabotage were in no sense matched by the exploits of the rural guerrillas, who were mainly engaged in an effort to evade government forces and to cling to some kind of corporate existence. Early in 1963 the president of the Cuban-Venezuelan Institute for Revolutionary Solidarity in Havana admitted that the Venezuelan hill country was not playing "the same specific role" in the Venezuelan Revolution as it had in the Cuban Revolution.\(^1\) In August 1963 Radio Havana broadcast a purported interview with a Venezuelan insurgent leader who implied that the special conditions for insurgency in Caracas and other cities had assisted the terrorists to expand much more rapidly than the guerrillas. He claimed that one of the reasons why the terrorists had so expanded their activities, while the guerrillas lagged behind, was "to send a message to our comrades in the mountains and, above all, to try to relieve their difficult situation."\(^2\)

Information collected in the preparation of this report does not permit an adequate determination as to the actual volume or full geographic

\(^1\) Hoy (Havana), 1 February 1963. The same statement virtually upgraded the terrorists to equal rank as an insurgency force with the guerrillas by saying that there were two "principal combat forces" in Venezuela--the terrorists and the guerrillas.

\(^2\) Radio Havana Spanish Broadcast to the Americas, 17 August 1963.
extent of the terrorist and saboteur activities conducted in Venezuela during 1962-1963 in support of the insurgent cause. The major types of terrorist operations, however, were probably as follows. The terrorists strove to undermine public confidence in the security forces of the Betancourt regime by frequent attacks on policemen, police stations, and police patrol cars. Attacks were also directed, though less frequently, against National Guard and military personnel, against military installations, and against the homes of military officers.\(^1\) Small military and National Guard patrols were targets of attack in urban areas and along rural highways. The terrorists strove to capitalize on anti-U.S. sentiment by directing their sabotage mainly at U.S.-owned properties in Caracas and in the oil areas of western and eastern Venezuela. They also engaged in publicity stunts such as the hijacking of an airliner, the kidnapping of a soccer star and a U.S. Army colonel, and the occasional and temporary seizure of radio stations in order to broadcast revolutionary messages.

In the closing months of 1963 the insurgent command in Venezuela seems to have reached the judgment that the rural guerrilla struggle could not be expected to yield significant results before the presidential elections scheduled for 1 December 1963, whereas the conditions in Caracas favored an escalation in urban terrorist violence which might even lead to a terrorist takeover of the central government.\(^2\) Later

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1. For a sample list of terrorist attacks on military installations and the homes of military officers, see La Esfera, 4 May 1962.

2. A hint that this strategy might be adopted appeared in a lengthy purported eyewitness interview with insurgent leaders in Venezuela which was published in the Havana newspaper, Hoy, on 1 September 1963. One of the insurgent leaders in Caracas was quoted as saying that the capture of Miraflores, the Presidential Palace in Caracas, might come very suddenly as the result of an intensification of the armed struggle in the cities and that one day the rural guerrillas might receive the message: "Come ahead, we already hold Miraflores in our hands."
discoveries by the Venezuelan authorities indicated that the terrorists had resolved on a strategic plan known as "Operation Caracas" which called for seizure and fortification of rooftops in Guarataro, a hillside slum area overlooking the center of the city. A 100-page mimeographed manual of instructions was prepared for "Operation Caracas" which was scheduled for launching on 15 November.

Good military intelligence and terrorist imprudence, or a combination of both, enabled the Venezuelan government to break up "Operation Caracas" almost before it was launched. After two days of terrorist sniping attacks in Caracas on 19-20 November 1963, during which between 14 and 21 persons were killed, the government was able to claim that it had broken the back of the terrorist plan by massive arrests of known terrorists and their sympathizers. This claim was subsequently substantiated by the record turnout of voters in Caracas for the presidential elections on 1 December 1963, despite the distribution of terrorist leaflets warning voters to stay indoors until after the election or face the prospect of rooftop sniper fire that would not respect women or children. Terrorist activity continued in Caracas and elsewhere in Venezuela after the presidential elections but on an apparently much reduced scale during the remainder of December 1963.

1. These details of "Operation Caracas" are from a press interview with the Venezuelan Minister of Interior. New York Times, 22 November 1963.

2. In the same interview the Minister noted that reports to the police by residents of the neighborhoods in which the terrorists operated had increased by 60 percent since July 1963. Inadequate intelligence as to the terrorists' movements had previously been one of the government's chief handicaps in countering their operations.

2. **Terrorist Weapons and Equipment.** The Venezuelan terrorists appear to have been well supplied with pistols, rifles, submachine guns, and appropriate ammunition. No heavier weapons were noted, although captured terrorist documents indicated that .50-caliber machine guns were scheduled for use in the abortive "Operation Caracas."¹

The terrorists made extensive use of homemade pipe bombs, noise bombs, and Molotov cocktails, supplemented by occasional supplies of grenades and tear gas stolen from Venezuelan security forces. Sabotage was often performed with considerable skill, probably because of the familiarity with time bombs and other advanced types of explosives gained by many Venezuelans working in the oil industries.²

As insurgency in Venezuela continued through 1962 and 1963, the terrorists probably passed on some of their special weapons skill to the guerrillas operating in the interior of the country. For example, the Venezuelan press reported on two occasions in September and October 1963 that Caracas terrorists had used "gelatin gasoline" in their raids.³ Some weeks later it was reported that guerrillas in the western State of Lara had set fire to election materials with a "jelly-like substance."⁴

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2. "I do not wish to minimize the violence in Venezuela. The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives." Statement of CIA Director John A. McCone in *Castro Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere*, p. 64.


3. **Terrorist Techniques.** The terrorists in the large urban centers and in the interior towns of Venezuela made extensive use of trucks, jeeps, and passenger automobiles in conducting their operations. A favorite tactic in heavily populated areas was submachine and/or bomb attack on individual policemen and police stations from moving vehicles. Getaway cars were widely employed both in the large urban centers and in the small towns and rural interior. The terrorists seem to have had no difficulty in commandeering several cars for a single operation, whenever this was judged desirable.

Sniper fire from rooftops and other vantage points was used in Caracas for attacks against police and military patrols and for purposes of intimidation. As previously noted, between 14 and 21 persons were killed, and 110 injured, in one two-day siege of sniper terror in Caracas in November 1963.²

A few references have been noted to barricade techniques employed by the terrorists in Caracas and other heavily built-up areas. One tactic was to erect a fire shield in the streets using automobile tires soaked with gasoline.³ A Communist source has claimed that upturned buses were also used as barricades—a statement which may be borne out by a report that as of April 1962 the terrorists had destroyed at least 50 buses in Caracas alone.⁴

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1. According to Time magazine, 27 September 1963, the terrorists had killed 49 Caracas policemen in that year alone.


A related tactic was the spreading of tacks, nails, and other tire-puncturing materials to hinder police pursuit or simply to paralyze traffic and create confusion. Television pictures shown in the United States in November 1963, when the terrorists were using this device in Caracas, indicated that military and police vehicles had mounted improvised brushes of twigs in front of their wheels in order to get through the streets.

About half the newspaper accounts of terrorist incidents identify the time of occurrence and indicate an almost even split between day and night operations. Daylight operations were presumably facilitated by the screen of ordinary civilian traffic in the urban areas and by the lack of sufficient motor transport for government security forces in the outlying towns and rural areas.

4. The Military Role in Counter-Terrorist Operations. The Venezuelan military and the National Guard were used throughout Venezuela as a supplement to the police in anti-terrorist operations. In October 1962 the Ministry of Defense ordered the institution of patrols in both urban and rural areas in order to provide greater security for persons and property in the face of a mounting wave of violence.


2. On 20 August 1963 the newspaper El Tiempo reported that in Puerto La Cruz, which lay in an area of terrorist activity, the police were making practically no patrols because of lack of transport. The newspaper published a photograph of eight patrol cars inoperative because of poor maintenance and need of repairs.

November 1963, as terrorist activity in Caracas increased in intensity, Army, Marine, and National Guard units were used to patrol the city streets and undertake anti-terrorist actions. No information has thus far been noted to indicate whether or not the Venezuelan armed forces encountered operational difficulties in anti-terrorist actions that would be susceptible to solutions of a military R&D character.

CHAPTER 7

MASS VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA, 1939-1963

The significance of mass violence events in contemporary Latin America must be viewed against the background of the vast social changes which are developing in the area under the pressure of rapid population growth and the permeation of broadening sectors of the Latin American masses with desires for socio-economic betterment. A distinguished U.S. anthropologist has recently warned that "the social revolution which is underway in Latin America has explosive potentialities beside which the usual political and military revolutions pale into insignificance."¹ A former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State has recently written that "social change, in the context of Latin America, involves the possibility, perhaps the probability, that new governments will be established by revolution."²

Urban mass violence, whether in the form of riot or organized mob action, has long represented a characteristic Latin American mode of venting social and political grievances to which the established infrastructures give no relief.³ Two circumstances in recent years have combined to give new substance to this explosive potential. One circumstance is the pouring into Latin American cities of thousands upon thousands of poverty-stricken migrants from the rural areas, who have added new dimensions to

3. See above, pp. 31-34, 65-66.
urban potentials for riot and disorder. The second circumstance is the fan-out of destabilizing urban influences into the countryside, creating growing discontents and new potentials for disorder among the once largely passive rural populations of Latin America.

The relevance of mass violence events and potentials in contemporary Latin America for military counterinsurgency planning is three-fold. First, it is clear from the historical record that there has long existed in the urban areas a high potential for riots and mob actions which on occasion can escalate into disorders of insurgency consequence. Under the

1. The following comment on Brazil is applicable in substance to most other Latin American countries. "The flood of migrants from the rural areas into the established towns and cities has given rise to a host of serious problems with which Brazilian society is sadly unprepared to deal. The bulk of the newcomers are from the segments of the population who are least prepared culturally, educationally, economically, and politically for life in great metropolitan centers, or even for that in smaller cities. . . . Daily their chief preoccupation is that of getting enough food to sustain themselves and the numerous members of their families. Completely unequipped by education and background to resist the blandishments of demagogues of every political hue, they join the more sophisticated segments of the urban proletariat in bitter and destructive outbursts and rioting of all types." T. Lynn Smith, Brazil: People and Institutions. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963, p. 614.

2. "The rapid urbanization of Latin America's population, and the spread of such modern mass communications media as the cinema, radio, television, illustrated magazines, and the press. . . . have had a direct and visual and emotional impact on nearly all sectors of the population. This has created new desires, new consumption goals, and new attitudes. Already there are large numbers who do not accept their wretched condition as part of the natural order of things, with the passivity that used to exist, and this psychological factor tends to strengthen considerably the implications of rapid population growth for the Latin American countries, and the challenge which it constitutes." United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Agriculture in Latin America: Problems and Prospects. E/CB.12/686, April 1953, p. 52.
pressure of rapid social change and heavy rural in-migration, this potential has increased. Second, the increased potentials for riot and mob violence which are currently developing in both the urban and rural sectors of Latin America provide an instrument for Castro-Communists and other subversive exploitation. Third, the limited capabilities of police organizations in most Latin American countries make it necessary that the military assume a more active role in riot and mob control in both urban and rural areas, than might otherwise be required.

Urban Mass Violence

The contemporary potential for mass violence in the urban areas of Latin America is suggested by the total of 293 urban riots, political demonstrations, and politically-inspired strikes reported in the area during the years 1959-1963 by the New York Times. The overwhelming majority of these incidents, considered individually, did not constitute important insurgency events. In a few cases, however, the initial disturbances or demonstrations escalated into major disorders of insurgency significance.

1. "One can hardly conceive of the velocity with which Caracas, Lima, Santiago, São Paulo, and many other Latin American cities are growing and expanding... When hundreds of thousands are living together within the limits of a single city, life cannot proceed with the listless abandon which has characterized thousands of small rural communities throughout Latin America. As we move through the twentieth century, the world press is sure to give more space to reports of food riots, political demonstrations, and other expressions of revolt on the part of the masses who live in the large Latin American cities." T. Lynn Smith, Current Social Trends and Problems in Latin America. Gainesville: The University of Florida Press, 1957, p. 4.

2. See above, Chapter 4, Figure 3.
In the pages which follow, some of the major episodes of urban mass violence in Latin America since 1959 will be described briefly. The importance of these episodes to military counterinsurgency planning lies not so much in the fact that these episodes happened in a particular country, at a particular date in the recent past, as in the fact that these episodes illustrate the types of mass violence outbreak to which large cities in Latin America are peculiarly subject. If historical experience is any guide, it can be predicted that at least one or two similar mass urban outbreaks will occur somewhere in Latin America before the year 1964 has run its course.

Argentina. On 3 April 1959 the center of Buenos Aires was the scene of a major riot which developed from a long-advertised protest strike organized by Peronist and Communist workers. Thousands of rioters burned and overturned scores of buses, streetcars, and automobiles, wrecked stores, and smashed out windows in the area of the disturbance. According to one eyewitness account, gangs of Peronist and Communist hoodlums systematically branched away from the main group of rioters to cause additional destruction.¹

The rioters were confronted with a total of 2,000 police armed with tear gas and supported by 25 assault cars, two armored cars, fire-fighting units, and a tank spraying colored water for later identification of rioters who engaged in criminal activities. Within four hours the riot was quelled.²

The Buenos Aires riot of April 1959 is evidence that an urban mass violence outbreak need not constitute a dangerous insurgency event if the possibility of violence is anticipated by government authorities and if adequate precautions are taken. Nevertheless the Buenos Aires riot is illustrative of the scale of violence which can sometimes develop from an initially peaceful political demonstration or strike. Had other insurgency factors been operative at the time of the Buenos Aires riot, such as the later weakening in Argentine military support for the Frondizi regime, the disturbances might have exercised a greater insurgency effect.

Ecuador. In June 1959 the largest city in Ecuador, Guayaquil, was torn by a major riot which developed from a trifling dispute in one of the city streets between an Army officer and some new recruits. Groups of students and civilians joined with the recruits to attack the officers' club at a nearby military post, setting fire to it and killing the base commander. Thereafter Guayaquil was torn by three days of looting and rioting in which at least 24 persons were killed and more than 150 persons wounded. At times, parts of the city were entirely controlled by the looters. Some 5,000 Army troops, including tanks, were called in to restore order.¹

The Guayaquil riot of June 1959, like the Chilean riots of April 1957 over a scheduled increase in bus fares, are examples of the type of explosive violence which can be triggered in many cities of Latin America by an unexpected and seemingly trivial incident. Had the riot

occurred at a more critical moment in Ecuador's history, as during the
abortive military revolt in Quito during November 1961, it might well
have posed a more serious threat to government stability.

Another Guayaquil riot in August 1962, this time a minor affair,
brought about the resignation of the entire Ecuadorean cabinet. The
significance of this riot lay in the fact that it was not an isolated
episode but one of a sustained series of anti-government riots and strikes
which had erupted in all parts of the country over a period of weeks.
This type of sustained riot and strike action, when it can be mounted,
is often the most effective of all civilian insurgent devices in Latin
America to weaken the position of unpopular ministers or governments. 1
The same device had been used previously to oust dictator Rojas Pinilla

Guatemala. In March 1962 Guatemala City was torn by a week of sus-
tained rioting in which at least 22 persons were killed and between 300
to 600 wounded. As so often happens in Latin America, the trouble began
with a small clash between students and police in which the police
allegedly opened fire. In order to put down the ensuing disturbances the
government poured all available troops into the streets and imported a
volunteer force of 2,000 peasants armed with machetes. 2

1. The actual resignation of the cabinet in Ecuador came after leaders
of the armed forces and the Congress had informed the President
that, in view of the Guayaquil and other disorders, they could no
longer have confidence in his cabinet. New York Times, 25 August

The fact that the government of President Ydígoras did not fall in the wake of the riots is indication that mass urban violence alone, even though on a major scale and localized in the national capital, may not be sufficient to bring down an established government provided the military and other security forces remain loyal. Had circumstances been different, as during the November 1962 revolt of the Guatemalan Air Force, the Guatemala City riots might have constituted a more important insurgency development.

Panama. Panama City has been the focal point for three major riots in seven years: the first in May 1958, the second in November 1959, and the third in January 1964. These episodes not only jeopardized the stability of the then Panamanian governments but also gave evidence of the degree to which Castro-Communists and other anti-U.S. groups are moving to exploit the propensities to urban mass violence which exist in Latin America.

The first of the Panama City disturbances, in May 1958, developed from a dispute between the government and university students over the government's refusal to improve university facilities during a vacation period. Three days of rioting followed, during which at least 8 persons were killed and more than 70 wounded. The riots occurred within sight of the Canal Zone, into which students had previously staged a peaceful raid to paint Panamanian flags in public places, but were at no time directed against the Canal Zone or U.S. property. 1

The second Panama City riot developed in November 1959 after demonstrators tried to carry a Panamanian flag symbolizing sovereignty into the Canal Zone. About 80 persons were injured in the disturbances which followed, selective attacks were made on U.S. property in the Canal Zone and Panama City, and the flag in front of the U.S. Embassy in Panama City was destroyed.¹

In the third Panama City riot of January 1964 touched off by the unauthorized raising of a U.S. flag in the Canal Zone, at least 20 persons were killed and 300 injured. Selective attacks on U.S. property in Panama City were once more employed.²

**Rural Mass Violence**

The increased potential for mass violence episodes in rural Latin America is associated mainly with the recent increase in agrarian squatter movements of the type described earlier in this report.³ As yet, and as previously noted, the armed clashes which have developed in connection with squatter invasions of landowner property have been highly localized and generally of brief duration. Examination of squatter incidents in the period 1959-1963 suggests, however, that there is a growing tendency for larger numbers of persons to be involved in the squatter episodes, as well as a corresponding tendency for some squatter movements to develop for land. If these tendencies are carried further, mass violence in rural Latin America...

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America may be channelized into explosions of insurgency consequence and no longer dissipate itself, as in contemporary Colombia, in scattered, local, and highly decentralized conflicts.

The countries in which agrarian squatter movements are currently most active, and in which they appear to have acquired greatest potential significance as insurgency phenomena, are Mexico, Brazil, and Peru.

**Mexico.** Agrarian squatter invasions of landowner property have been a continuing problem for many years. In March 1961 the Federal Attorney General's office announced that it was then considering some 2,000 complaints by landowners alleging illegal squatter invasions of their properties.¹

Available information suggests that in recent years the number of persons involved in squatter invasions in Mexico has tended to increase, as also the occasional violence associated with squatter episodes. In one episode in January 1963 some 5,000 peasants were involved; in another which occurred in November 1963 some 2,000 peasant members of the allegedly Communist-infiltrated Union of Laborers and Peasants launched a concerted invasion of large cotton farms which had been planned months in advance.² Early in January 1964 an armed battle between police and peasants seeking land titles in an area near Mexico City resulted in the deaths of three persons and the destruction of an entire village of 180 small dwellings.³

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State governments in Mexico have generally been unable or unwilling, because of political considerations, to deal effectively with mass squatter invasions. The Federal Mexican Government has resorted to frequent use of federal troops in order to quell the violence associated with the squatter invasions and, on occasion, to force the squatters off invaded properties.

Brazil. Agrarian squatter invasions in Brazil, as mentioned in an earlier section of this report, have been on the increase since 1960. The potentials for violence normally inherent in these invasions are increased, in the case of Brazil, by the uncertainties with respect to the legal title to land which prevail in many parts of the country. Not only squatters but landowners also have tended to resolve disputes over land by force of arms rather than seek the uncertain assistance of the courts.

The information after 1954 of Lígas Camponesas (Rural Leagues) among the peasantry of Northeast Brazil, followed by the growth of Associações de Lavradores (Associations of Farm Workers) in the south, has given new importance to many of the scattered incidence of violence in the Brazilian countryside inasmuch as these associations represent the first attempts at systematic and armed organization of farm laborers, sharecroppers, and

2. See above, pp. 36-37.
3. According to the 1950 census, more than half the farm establishments in some Brazilian states were occupied by persons who had no legal title to the land. Manuel Diegues, Jr. População e Propriedade da Terra no Brasil. Washington, D.C.: Panamerican Union, 1959, p. 63.
squatters against the landowners. Communist attempts to convert some of the peasant groups into guerrilla nuclei have been noted in the Northeast and elsewhere.2

Still another factor conducive to increased and heightened outbreaks of violence in rural Brazil is the character of the political system. Over the years the urban middle classes and workers in Brazil have won recognition of their right to press their socio-economic demands through strikes and other types of organized demonstrations. The Brazilian political system has not operated to give the same effective right to the peasant, with the result that peasant attempts at self-organization are widely viewed as dangerous, illegal, and/or subversive.3 The peasant is also denied legitimate channels for expression of socio-economic grievances at a moment when he, in common with other rural people in Latin America, is increasingly affected by the social ferments engendered by the destabilizing influences of the cities and the mass communications media.4

Most squatter invasions and associated violence episodes in Brazil have hitherto been dealt with by the police forces, both civil and military,

2. Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, p. 15.
4. "The decades in the middle of the twentieth century are ones of great social ferment among the rural masses who for centuries have constituted the bulk of Brazil's population. Once highly docile and tractable, and completely under the control of the large landowners and their representatives, these people are growing increasingly discontented with their lot and with the prospects of life for their children. They are becoming quick to follow any leader who promises an improvement." T. Lynn Smith, Brazil: People and Institutions, p. 152.
of the individual state governments. The escalation of violence associated with the formation of peasant leagues has resulted in an increasing use of the Brazilian Army to counteract rural violence.\(^1\) The employment of the military in rural land disputes has also been attributable to the effects of the Federal Government to implement modest programs of agrarian reform and land redistribution in opposition to landowner groups which exert a strong influence on the state police forces.

Peru. Rising population pressures in many Indian areas of highland Peru, coupled with known Communist penetration of Indian syndicates in the Cuzco area of southern Peru and elsewhere, have made mass Indian squatter invasions of large landowner properties in Peru a matter of frequent occurrence since 1961 or 1962. The sizes of the invading groups have ranged in recent years from 200-300 upwards to 5,000. The Indians are generally armed with stones, sling shots, and sharp sticks and have frequently clashed with police, military units, and other persons who seek to dislodge them from the lands which they invade. As many as 24 persons are known to have been killed in single encounters.\(^2\)

An attempt by guerrillas to capitalize on Indian land-hunger in the Cuzco area of southern Peru has already been noted in Chapter 5 of this report. Although this effort to establish a guerrilla base area collapsed in May 1963, the squatter invasions in Peru have continued unabated. The possibility that other guerrilla movements may attempt to capitalize on

\(^1\) E.g., *O Estado de São Paulo*, 12 October 1960; *New York Times*, 11 April 1962.

rural unrest cannot be ignored.

Peru has also been the scene in late 1962 and early 1963 of two major violence episodes in the rural mining and commercialized agriculture areas. In December 1962 Castro-Communist agitators helped turn a strike at the La Oroya mines in central Peru into a riot during which an estimated $4,000,000 damage was done to the mine installations, and the town of La Oroya was held for several hours by rioters who barricaded the approach roads and tore up railroad tracks. A force of 300 shock troops were sent into the area to assist local Civil Guard forces to restore order.¹

Early in January 1963 major violence broke out at two large sugar plantations near Chiclayo in northern Peru in which Communist agitators also took part and in which about $1,000,000 damage was caused to plantation installations and cane fields. Troops from the Seventh Light Division of the Peruvian Army were called in to assist the Civil Guard to restore order. The Peruvian government later alleged that the Chiclayo disorders were part of a larger Communist conspiracy in which the weapons already available to the rioters—rifles, revolvers, machine guns, handmade bombs, Molotov cocktails, and dynamite—were to have been supplemented by weapons captured in attacks on nearby police and military posts.²

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1. La Prensa, 18, 21, and 22 December 1963; Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, p. 14.

2. La Prensa, 2, 3, 5, and 6 January 1963; Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, p. 14.
The Military Role in Mass Violence

The reasons for frequent intervention by the Latin American military in the episodes of mass rural and urban violence are implicit in the preceding case reference to urban and squatter violence. In some cases, the violence exceeded the capabilities of local police to control. In other cases, as in Brazil and Mexico, the use of the military was partly attributable to political factors.

Military intervention in Latin American urban mass violence events presents unusual problems because of the tendency, noted earlier in this report, for these events to escalate sharply in level of violence when word is spread that persons have been killed by police or military fire. Available information does not indicate clearly why, and under what circumstances, the military opened fire in a number of recent urban riots. There seems at least the possibility that on some occasions the military were obliged to fire because of lack of non-lethal crowd control equipment. All accounts noted of recent military interventions in mass violence episodes in the rural areas of Latin America indicate that the military experienced no difficulty in quelling the disorders after it arrived at the scene of the disturbance. In some cases, however, and notably in the highland areas of Peru, the advent of the military to the scene of the disturbance was delayed by mobility problems which may be susceptible to military R&D solutions.

1. See above, pp. 40-43. In many Latin American countries effective military intervention in urban disorders is also hampered by the fact that the Army troops available for the counter-violence mission are composed largely of Indians or rural youths who, in the words of one commentator, can "easily be outwitted" and tricked into precipitate action by clever urban agitators and terrorists. José Cardenas, La Insurrección Popular en Venezuela. Caracas: Ediciones Catatumbo, 1961.
PREPATORY NOTE

The enclosed annotated bibliography corresponds generally to the chapter-by-chapter organization of the present report. Listing of individual titles under more than one subject heading has been avoided except in the few cases where it was felt that the convenience of the reader could best be served by duplicate entries.

The bibliography is designated as a Select Bibliography inasmuch as it represents a compilation only of those sources which were found to be most useful and pertinent in the course of preparing the present report.

The bulk of the titles listed in the bibliography are in the English language. Spanish and Portuguese language sources have been included only in those instances in which it was found that these sources added significantly to the analyses of Latin American insurgency phenomena available in the English language.
GENERAL REFERENCES ON INSURGENCY

A. Anthologies


Emphasizes nonmilitary aspects of counterinsurgency and examines guerrilla warfare mainly in its logistical and administrative, rather than its tactical, aspects. No articles specifically devoted to Latin America. Selected bibliography.


A wide-ranging anthology mainly devoted to discussions of guerrilla operations in world areas other than Latin America. Includes condensation of Guevara's treatise on guerrilla warfare and an excellent article by D. Chappelle on Castro's guerrilla tactics.


Constructed as a "comprehensive annotated anthology and bibliography of treatises, both philosophical and factual, on the many phases of world activity related to insurgency." Materials on Latin America are scanty.

B. General Studies


Includes analysis of Castro insurrection. Argues that whatever the country or the circumstances, insurrection tends to follow a sequence of three phases: terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and full-scale war.

Summary descriptive accounts of 23 revolutions that have occurred in various areas of the world, mostly since World War II. From standpoint of this report, value of casebook is limited because "insurgency" and "revolution" are treated as synonymous terms. Includes studies of the Argentine Revolution of June 1943, the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944, the Venezuelan Revolution of 1945, and the Cuban Revolution of 1953-1959.


Concise discussion.


Volume is addressed to the general reader, rather than the specialist. Especially valuable for its chapters on "Terror" and "Urban Guerrillas."

C. **Insurgency Strategies and Tactics**


Translations of *La Guerra de Guerrillas,* first published in July 1960. The Monthly Review Press translation is the more complete of the two, but nothing of significance is lost in the Praeger version.

*"La Guerra de Guerrillas."* Cuba Socialista (Havana), September 1963.

Restatement of strategic and tactical principles enunciated in original handbook on guerrilla war. Argues that the guerrilla struggle must assume a "continental" character because of the danger that U. S. will find ways to intervene if the struggle is concentrated in only one Latin American country.

Volume 2 contains Mao's three basic texts on guerrilla strategy and tactics. In Volume 3 Mao analyzes the character of Chinese society and the differences between Communist guerrilla warfare and pre-Communist insurgent movements in China.


Another important text on guerrilla warfare.


Two streams of historical development in unconventional warfare are discernible: guerrilla war and revolution utilizing violence as a principal tool for altering society. Union of these two streams is accomplished in the modern synthesis of Mao Tse-tung. Violence is used in a relatively open society in such a way as to demoralize the established governmental system and make Communism appear to shine by comparison; at the same time, the systematic use of violence is used as a means to train the members of the authoritarian administration to be established after victory.


Important French analysis.


In conventional warfare the order of procedure is: strategy, tactics, and weapons requirements. With guerrillas the procedure is practically reversed; upon the availability of weapons and the tactical possibilities rests the consideration of strategy.
D. Bibliographies


One of the most recent and complete English language bibliographies, compiled under contract to the Department of the Army. From standpoint of this report, bibliography is useful mainly for references to pre-World War II insurgent operations against U. S. forces in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.


Extensive bibliography (96 pages, double-column entries) on all aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Annotated.
THE LATIN AMERICAN INSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT

A. General


An important study by six U.S. social anthropologists. Includes valuable essay by John P. Gillin on cultural values of Latin Americans generally and case studies of social situation in Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, and Mexico.


A useful general survey, with case studies of Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, post-Castro Cuba, and Bolivia. Lead article by Silvert emphasizes tendency of Latin Americans to jump from loyalty to family and small group to transcendental identifications with some great cause or leader. Intermediate loyalty to community or voluntary association is weak.


One of the best general surveys. Includes important section marked "The Dynamics of Politics and Power" from which many useful generalizations can be drawn.


Probably the best single statement of the social factors most pertinent to a discussion of the "insurgency spirit" in Latin America. A revised version of this article appears in Adams, et al., Social Change in Latin America Today.


A valuable guide toward understanding and defining the differences between peasant society in Latin America and Asia.

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Study of important factor in Latin American social organization.


Useful general survey.


. Current Social Trends and Problems in Latin America.

U.S. rural sociologist describes changing patterns of rural and urban life in Latin America, with emphasis of impact of urban influences on once isolated rural communities.


One of the best introductions to the social and political dynamics of the area. Particularly good for its comments on the role of violence in Latin American life.

B. The Indians


Contains important discussion of the differences between Indian and mestizo culture as observed in Guatemalan village but generally applicable throughout Latin America. Indians' relations with each other are adjusive and permissive; out-group relations with mestizos are handled by avoidance and submission, within limits.

Provides the analysis of the Indian populations of Central America not included in Steward and Faron. Notes (pp. 38-39) that the Indians are disinclined to "open conflicts" of any kind although, when intoxicated, this inhibition may be removed.


Though Indian ceremonies suggest a covert hostility toward Whites, overt manifestations of hostility appear to be rare. Indians have no sense of common solidarity against Whites and no sense of unity above individual parish and sub-parish levels.


The best general survey of the Indian populations of South America.

C. Pre-Castro Cuba


Analysis of four "keys" which explain the rise and success of Castro's insurgency: the historic political instability of Cuba; the political contrast between Havana and the remainder of the island; the domestic, social, and economic changes in Cuba; and problems in the country's relations with the United States. Concludes that most, but not all, of the major elements of fidelismo are exportable to other Latin American countries.


Good brief survey of political and economic conditions which facilitated the rise and success of Castro's insurgency.

The best general survey of socio-economic and political conditions in pre-Castro Cuba.


Especially valuable because written without thought of Castro. Concludes (p. 255) that "political unrest, arising from the frustration of the desire of peasants to obtain possession of and security on the land, will be chronic in Cuba until more positive action is taken in this respect."


Two essays of major assistance toward understanding the differences between the Cuban peasant proletariat and the peasantry in other parts of Latin America.
MAJOR TYPES OF LATIN AMERICAN INSURGENCY

A. Social Insurgency


"The long-established pattern of squatting and nomadism has made a climate of violence and insecurity a commonplace aspect of rural life in Brazil."


The first book-length rural sociological analysis published in Latin America. Especially valuable for the chapter on "The Natural Conditions of the Northeast and Banditry."


The peasant leagues of Northeast Brazil have thus far devoted their efforts mainly to resisting landlord attempts to raise rents and to expel tenant farmers from the lands which they currently occupy; in isolated cases, league members have also taken possession of unused land. Thus far the leagues have never staged an armed uprising and have been involved in only a few minor skirmishes with the police. "Conceivably the mere possibility of the farmers' resisting has prevented some landowners from carrying their exploitation too far. . . . In turn, the farmers. . . . do not give the impression that they are bent upon a violent land reform."


Analysis (pp. 208-211, 241-244) of patterns of social and political violence in rural Colombian community by sociologist who later collaborated in the larger study of rural violence prepared under the direction of Monsignor Guzmán Campos.

Points out that the political system of Brazil has created opportunities for urban workers to organize and press their social claims within the rules of the democratic game. The peasants are not granted, in practice, any right to organize and hence peasant movements seeking essentially social ends are considered as politically "subversive."


A major study of the largely unstructured rural violence which has cost 200,000 lives in Colombia since 1948.


Proceedings of UN-sponsored seminar on urbanization problems in Latin America held at Santiago, Chile, in July 1959. Especially valuable for two chapters on the urban squatter shantytowns in Rio de Janeiro and Lima.


Especially valuable for the brief section on social insurgency (pp. 256-260) marked "Violence as an Ingredient of Reform."


A ground-breaking analysis of "primitive" and "archaic" movements of armed social protest such as rural banditry, rural secret societies, peasant revolutionary movements of a millenarian character, and pre-industrial urban mobs. Although area coverage is limited mainly to Italy and Spain, the analysis offers many valuable insights into contemporary patterns of anomie violence and insurgency potentials in Latin America.
Panamerican Union, Washington, D.C. Division of Economic Development.

Study of agrarian conditions in an area which has been an important center of agrarian squatter movements during last few years. Squatters come generally from long-established Indian highland communities which can mobilize a large number of squatters for the initial invasion of a hacienda.

Pastore, José. "Conflito e Mudança Social no Brasil Rural (Conflict and Social Change in Rural Brazil)". Sociologica (São Paulo), December 1962, pp.

Social insurgency conflicts have become more frequent in Brazil during the past two years but have not been adequately reported in the press. Gives examples.


Chapter marked "A Proposed Framework for Latin American Politics" includes discussion of several types of social insurgency.


A major sociological study containing useful insights into problems of banditry and rural and urban squatter movements.

B. Political Insurgency


The current political significance of organized labor in Latin America lies in large measure in the fact that the trade union movement "presents the Latin American republics... with a potential rival to the armed forces as the ultimate determinant of power in political life." Furthermore, as organized labor grows in numerical strength, "it tends to become an important pool of recruits, already accustomed to the discipline of factory life and trade union activities, for participation in armed rebellion."

The statement that "the strategy of most Latin American revolutions [i.e., coups d’état] follow a formal and almost standardized pattern" is illustrated by reference to episodes personally observed by the author in Bolivia.


Includes typology of the major types of political violence and insurgency in Latin America.


Scope of study is worldwide with numerous references to Latin America. Chapter 10, "The Modes of Intervention" (pp. 140-163) defines the "classic pattern" of the guerra do estadio, or barracks revolt, as seen in Latin America and elsewhere, and the golpe del estado or coup d'état.


Political violence in rural Brazil has hitherto consisted mainly of fights between local groups and strongmen seeking to dominate local area. Struggle has more often been one between rival clans than between rival ideologies. This situation is slowly changing as ideology assumes greater importance.


Includes a discussion and classification (pp. 76-82) of the principal types of political violence.

Description of large-scale street riots in Santiago in the first week of April 1957 in which the Chilean Federation of Students took a major role. Statement that "Chile has a long history of student street demonstrations and protests" is buttressed by references to student demonstrations prior to World War I and in 1919-1920, 1922, 1931, 1938, 1944, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1953, 1955, 1956, 1957, and 1958.


Especially valuable for the chapter on "Violence" (pp. 299-334) and for its discussions of urban and rural mass violence and machetismo—the latter defined as "a crude method of mobilizing violence for political purposes, which is used mainly in rural, local politics."


Tradition of active participation in politics by Latin American students is inherited from Europe, especially Spain, where for centuries students have played prominent roles in the fight for human rights. Political opposition groups in Venezuela exploit this productivity by placing students in the forefront of demonstrations that might provoke violence and then heap blame on the powers-that-be when students are hurt.


To carry out the typical Latin American coup d'état, the military forces involved must be strong enough to make any physical opposition impossible.
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF MAJOR INSURGENCY CONFLICTS

A. General


A mammoth historical work (845 pp.) and valuable reference guide to 20th century Latin American insurgency.


A useful and up-to-date brief survey.

B. The Initial Phase, 1900-1918


Comments by a famous British political scientist on Latin America at the end of the Age of the Caudillos.


A useful general survey and discussion.


Chapters on the Mexican Revolution provide perhaps the best summary account now available in English. No full-length scholarly study in English has yet appeared.


Classic and detailed study of 1896-1897 rebellion in Northeast Brazil led by religious fanatic whose supporters used guerrilla tactics against Brazilian Army.

An early and still valuable study of social and political conditions in 19th century Latin America.


Chapter marked "Democracy and Dictatorship" is a good brief survey of the Age of the Caudillos.


The best compendium source on the professionalization of the Latin American military after 1885.


Portraits of some of the great caudillos in Latin America prior to the era of military professionalization.

C. Insurgency in an Era of Social Change, 1918-1958


A basic source on Communist insurgency activities in pre-1957 Latin America. Second printing contains brief preface updating work to 1960.


Summary account (pp. 23-45) of insurgency events in Bolivia prior to seizure of power in 1952 by the Movimento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) which then proceeded to enact a social revolution.


Author surveys events in Latin America since World War I and concludes that increasing social progress and industrialization has not been accompanied by a decline in political violence or in the number of dictatoral regimes in the area.

Discussion of some of the individual revolutions in the wave of revolutionary violence which swept Latin America in 1930-1931. "In no case were elements of a social revolution involved, although as in this country, the word 'Communist' was frequently bandied about by the vested interests to disparage the violence of their adversaries."


A basic source on the urban middle groups. Analysis for the post-1915 period concentrates mainly on Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil.


Contains three chapters by Johnson, Edwin Lieuwen, and Victor Alba on the evolution of the Latin American military in the 20th century and their roles in insurgency and counterinsurgency.


A basic source, particularly good for its discussion of the military role in insurgency and counterinsurgency after 1930.


A popularized survey of insurgency and insurgency-related events in Central America, with special emphasis on the 1945-1958 period.


Analysis of 38 major internal revolts. Only four peasant revolts occurred, in each case under the influence of religious fanatics. All other revolts were aimed at effecting changes in the mechanisms or top personnel of the government and were in the nature of coups or cuartelazos directed by "only a few political leaders and military chiefs."

A study of 29 successful revolutions indicates that all but three were initiated in and carried out in the immediate vicinity of the national capital. Only eight involved considerable violence. The military gave active assistance to the rebel cause in 20 of the revolutions, remained neutral on eight occasions and thus assisted the revolution to succeed. Only in one instance, the 1948 insurrection staged by José Figueres in Costa Rica, were the military overcome in a straight fight with rebel forces.


This fullblown study of the only international war in 20th century Latin America, between Bolivia and Paraguay from 1932 to 1935, indicates that neither side made much use of guerrilla warfare in addition to conventional military operations. Paraguay, however, did make use of "unarmed raiders behind Bolivian lines to disrupt communications." (p. 224).

D. Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954.


Contains chapter (pp. 101-117) analyzing the events leading to the overthrows of President Ubico and General Ponce in 1944.


Easily the best and most carefully documented study.


Author visited Castro's forces in the winter of 1958. Argues that Castroite sieges of small isolated military barracks and blockhouses were the decisive actions of the insurgency because of the government's inability to mount effective relief actions.

Castro's insurgency broke with the traditional coup d'état pattern of Latin American insurgency in favor of protracted military warfare.


Good descriptions of conditions in Batista-held areas of Cuba during period of Castro's insurgency.
CONTEMPORARY PATTERNS OF INSURGENCY CONFLICTS

A. General References


General survey of contemporary problems. Includes excellent bibliography of recent publications.


Useful general survey by New York Times correspondent.


Important testimony by high U.S. government officials as to the scope and significance of guerrilla, terrorist, and mass violence activity in contemporary Latin America.

B. Guerrilla Activity


Venezuelan Communist leader, Simón Sáez Mérida, claims that four permanent centers of guerrilla activity have been established in the rural areas, dozens of armed detachments in the towns, and a broad patriotic sector in the army. "All this comprises the armed forces of the Front of National Liberation (FLAN)."


Survey of recent denunciations by old-line Communist leaders in Latin America of Castroite thesis that Communism will triumph in the area only by the use of violence and guerrilla warfare. In some cases, the anti-Castro denunciations provide valuable details on individual Castroite guerrilla movements.

Venezuelan Communist briefly describes guerrilla and urban resistance to Betancourt regime and the Marine uprisings at Carúpano and Puerto Cabello.


Article by old-line Communist Party leader denounces useless "Trotskyite provocations, adventurist and terrorist acts," which merely serve to provide reactionary forces in the Peruvian government with a new excuse for police repression of democratic and progressive forces. Specifically criticizes in this connection Hugo Blanco and his guerrillas, the raids on banks in order to gain funds for the guerrillas, and the destruction to mine properties caused during the La Oroya strike of December 1962.

Radio Havana. "Interview with Chief of Military District No. 3 of the Venezuelan FALN." Transcript of Spanish language broadcast to the Americas, 17 August 1963.

Interview is claimed to be based on tape taken clandestinely out of Venezuela. Informant describes how FALN is organized into three forces: urban guerrillas who basically operate in the main cities; urban guerrillas who operate in the fields; and the rural guerrillas.


C. Terrorist Activity


Brief survey of attitudes of major Venezuelan political parties toward terrorism and insurrection as a method of gaining political power. Asserts that during the anti-government manifestations of October-November 1960 in Caracas the National Guard proved to be the most effective security force. The Army was relatively ineffective because most of its soldiers were "farmers or raw youths who could be easily outwitted by a clever student terrorist."
D. Mass Violence


"In a very real sense, Castro's rise to power was the triumph of rural Cuba over Havana." The larger significance of this development lies in the fact that the materials exist for similar rural-urban conflicts in other Latin American countries, with or without Castro's assistance.


An important duality exists within the ongoing economic and social revolution in Brazil. The political system allows urban workers to organize themselves and press their claims within the rules of the democratic game. The situation of the peasants is altogether different: since they have no rights, they cannot have legal claims, and if they organize themselves, the inference is that they must do so for subversive purposes. "The necessary conclusion we must draw is that Brazilian society is rigid at least in that large sector composed of agricultural laborers. . . . If this sector maintains its present rigidity, every peasant movement will depend rapidly to adopt revolutionary techniques of the Marxist-Leninist type."


Points out that 46 percent of the total population of Latin America lives in cities and that the urban population is still growing rapidly. Argues that the greatest threat to democratic development in Latin America lies in the urban, and not the rural, sector. "The discontent of the urban masses, made less patient by the immediacy of a better life and more powerful by their concentration, holds the greater potential for plunging democratic governments into totalitarianisms of the right or of the left."


Eyewitness account of political riot in Bolivia.

Detailed description of large-scale street riots in Santiago in April 1957.


Descriptions of the anti-American rioting in Bogota on 9-10 April 1948, the demonstrations against Vice President Richard M. Nixon in Caracas in May 1958, and the rioting in La Paz on 2 March 1959. Report cites Communist participation in these manifestations and notes that the Communists' standard practice was to make use of nonmilitary weapons, easily accessible to the mob, such as stones, poster sticks, clubs, gasoline, kerosene, homemade bombs, etc. In the case of the Bogota rioting these weapons were supplemented by guns and ammunition looted from hardware stores.