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FUTURE NAVY SYSTEMS
VOLUME I
INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL-MILITARY ENVIRONMENT OF WARFARE
This Research Memorandum is essentially a working paper which may be changed or withdrawn at any time. It does not necessarily represent the opinions of the General Electric Company. It is put forward in this form in the interest of further research.
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Gentlemen:

At the request of the Office of Naval Research Code 493, we are enclosing 10 copies of TEMPO Report RM 61TMP-95 UNCLASSIFIED. We would appreciate being notified of the AD number as soon as it is available.

Very truly yours,

Kenneth W. Lawerdale
Technical Information

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Enclosures 10
FUTURE NAVY SYSTEMS
Volume I

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL-MILITARY
ENVIRONMENT OF WARFARE

RM C'TMP-95

31 December 1961

Reprinted January 1963

TEMPO
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA
FOREWORD

The TEMPO Future Navy Systems study is an across-the-board examination of sea warfare missions and seaborne weapon systems. Military missions and naval weapon systems have been studied in the context of the contribution of each system to the various missions, the competition between systems, and the impact of budgetary and other constraints.

The results of the work are published in two volumes:

Volume I  Future Navy Systems—Introduction to Political-Military Environment of Warfare (RM 61TMP-95 UNCLASSIFIED)

Volume II  Future Navy Systems—Perspectives in Combatant Force Structures (RM 61TMP-44 SECRET)

This first volume examines the broad political, military, and geographic background of war, in order to obtain an overview of the global environment that leads to military missions and military force requirements. Volume II applies the perspectives gained by the study to each of the major combatant elements of the Navy.

The Future Navy Systems study has been funded by the General Electric Company. The study was conducted in cooperation with the External Studies Division, Naval Analysis Group, of the Office of Naval Research under the terms of contract Nonr-2832(00). This is an information exchange contract entered into by the Office of Naval Research and the Technical Military Planning Operation of the General Electric Company.

This volume is basically the work of David B. Young, with contributions by Cecil Cody, John C. Damon, and Edward J. Foote of the TEMPO staff. The assistance of officers of the Department of State and the Political-Military Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in discussions and in providing source material is gratefully acknowledged.

Edward J. Foote, Project Leader
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SECTION I
THE CHANGING WORLD PATTERN*

We live in an era of unprecedented change and upheaval. The world of the next decade will witness further changes which in scope and implication will surpass any other period in history. The only predictable thing about it is that the velocity and the violence of the changes are likely to increase.

There are three major contributing factors: The drastically increasing world population; the diffusion of international power, resulting in the emergence of new power centers; and the critical plight of the underdeveloped areas of the world.

POPULATION PRESSURES

The world's population explosion will be a basic pressure for decades to come. Although it is usually overshadowed by the current threat of communism and the possibility of atomic war, it remains one of the gravest and most ominous forces operative in the world today. There has been an accelerated rate of increase per quarter century from 23 percent in the period 1900-1925 to an estimated 64 percent in the period 1975-2000. The world's population will increase by a factor of four, from 1.55 billion in 1900 to over 6.27 billion in 2000.

There may be more cause for concern with the distribution of this growth than with the absolute numbers. The Developed Countries such as the United States, Canada, Japan, Oceania, South Africa, and the industrialized nations of Europe including Finland but excluding those nations in the Communist Bloc, have a total population of 631.6 million people (estimated, 1960), or one-fifth of the world's population.

In the Communist Bloc--China, the USSR, and the Eastern European satellites--there are 1016 million people (estimated, 1960) or one-third of the world's population. China alone accounts for 22 percent of the people in the world.

* See References 4 and 23.
The remaining Underdeveloped Countries of Africa, South America, Asia, Middle East, and Europe (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Yugoslavia) represent 1.353 million people (estimated 1960) or 45 percent of the world's population.

The relative distribution of population among the three groups is shown in Figure 1.
If China is placed with the Underdeveloped Countries, then the underdeveloped group claims two-thirds of the world's population. It is somewhat alarming to note that if Red China's present annual percentage of growth continues unchecked her population in the year 2000 will approximate the 1950 population of the entire world.

Latin America is undergoing one of the most rapid annual growth rates in the world—about 2.5 percent per annum. The 1980 estimated population of the Latin countries of the Western Hemisphere will be about 400 million persons.

It is difficult to visualize all that these numbers imply. It is clear, however, that the Western world will remain a population minority which will shrink relative to the rest of the world; and it will face severe problems in maintaining its way of life or possibly in just surviving. Population pressure will engender stronger demands for improved economic conditions in underdeveloped nations while making them more difficult to achieve. It will also engender the sort of environment which the communists have always found conducive to political exploitation.

It appears reasonable, then, that population pressures can be expected to impact on the future political scene in the following ways:

1. More military uprisings derived from political and economic upheavals within nations, potentially spreading into local wars.

2. An increased and probably even more successful effort by Russia to exert ideological and economic influences upon those areas facing the material and spiritual deprivations attending overpopulation.

3. An increased opportunity for Russia to ignite "limited" wars when she feels they are to her advantage.

4. New threats to our acquisition of some raw materials which are essential to our industrial operations.
INTERNATIONAL POWER DISTRIBUTION

The world picture of international power is changing. From studies of the internal and external variables controlling the diffusion of international power, it seems clear that one or more centers of world power will be added to the existing bipolar power order (U.S.-USSR) in the next decade. For this period, the United States and the USSR probably will continue to hold first rank as super-powers and as focal points for groupings of minor states, whether the members of these entourages be called allies or satellites.

The countries foreseen as approaching the super-power status of the U.S. and the USSR most closely by 1975 are a united Western Europe and a Communist China, which will share roles as major powers by that date. Actually, a unified Western Europe may well be in a stage of transition from major-power to super-power status. Somewhat below these two centers in the major power ranking will be Japan and India. (See Figure 2 for the estimated 1975 world-power concentrations.)

Neither Latin America nor Southeast Asia appears to be approaching major-power status. Given the conditions apt to prevail during the next decade, probably Africa (considering this as the sub-Saharan portion of that continent) is more susceptible to inclusion in the company of rapidly growing power centers than is the Middle East. Accompanying these changes in the relative influence of the U.S. and USSR and the rise of additional power centers will be the emergence of several nations with the capability to produce nuclear weapons.

The decline of U.S.-USSR world influence will foster new alliances between rising power centers. Our present alliances will be strained by the pull of diverse interests as shifts of national power evolve. For limited periods, the capability and willingness of these alliances to mount effective military forces to counter political and military incursions will be undermined or weakened. We may also see radical changes in the structure and effectiveness of our present alliances, particularly with respect to NATO.

While nations and power centers are striving to consolidate their strength and gain political and economic stature and independence, emergency situations will probably arise which will threaten world
Figure 2. Estimated 1975 World-Power Concentrations
peace (witness recent Congo events). Border clashes, little wars, "palace revolts" might ignite fires that would spread. These struggles may not be identified openly with the fundamental U.S.-USSR conflict, but the U.S. will not be able to disregard them. In the long run, East-West differences inevitably will be involved. The U.S. will be wise to take the lead in maintaining mobile military police forces ready for deployment under international or unilateral direction to any "brush fire" area in the world.

We may prognosticate the following broad effects of the diffusion of world power over the next decade and a half:

1. The growth of new economic and political strength in nations other than the U.S. and the USSR will result in a shift in world political alignments to a distribution which includes Western Europe, Red China, and perhaps India and Japan as other focal points.

2. The basic causes of international conflict springing from economic and social aspirations will not be eliminated, but the conflict will be carried out in economic, political, and psychological terms, backed by deterrent military strength. Attempts to resolve issues facing particular nations will result in occasional armed conflicts.

3. Small-scale wars will become more likely.

4. Alliances made for economic purposes will become very strong and may in some cases result in de facto political unification while alliances made for strictly military purposes will grow progressively weaker.

UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS

The third factor is the problem of the underdeveloped nations. We witness now the surge of nationalism sweeping these nations and, along with this, a rising impatience for a better life. In these circumstances, expectations relative to the future of industrialization are often unrealistically high. The governments of these nations are acutely sensitive to these pressures and if for no other motive than survival, they seek a maximum of aid and the fastest road to industrialization. Their ideological perspective may thus be warped
by these immediate pressures, and Russian or Chinese aid may be quite as appealing as the Western. Furthermore, the communist road to industrialization, in view of the progress of Russia and China, appears to them to be the fastest available.

Many of the underdeveloped areas of the world unfortunately enjoy only a limited resource potential for industrialization. These areas, particularly those of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, are caught in a situation where there is:

1. Little probability for extensive emigration to relieve population pressures;
2. A deficiency in certain crucial raw materials;
3. A deficiency in energy potentials;
4. Relatively little new land which can easily be brought under cultivation; and
5. No foreseeable land utilization or synthetic food production which can relieve population pressures in the next 10-15 years.

Thus, granting the strong probability of a rapid population growth over much of the world, granting the difficulties in expanding food production at a rapid rate in many nations, and, finally, granting the great obstacles to industrialization and thus to controlled birth rates in many nations, there seems to be little hope in the near future for a meaningful increase in the standard of living for several areas of the world. Rather, the prospects indicate a continuation of poverty and deprivation with the likelihood of some extension beyond what exists today.

Political instability will partially characterize these underdeveloped areas in the next decade and will limit the rate at which industrialization can occur. An attack led by or supported by the communists becomes more probable when political stability is at a low ebb. It would seem probable that the U.S. must more and more aim its operations in the underdeveloped areas to the creation of political stability which will be able to induce and control social change; but in this, the U.S. need not necessarily be committed to the creation of democratic regimes.
The extreme population pressures which are mounting in Latin America have been noted previously. Increased industrialization, public facilities and programs, and educational opportunities must be marshaled to meet this ever-increasing tide of new inhabitants. It is unlikely that Latin America will be capable of continuing its current democratic trend without stronger support from the United States. To survive the critical problems of inflation, rapid population growth, and economic dependency upon single commodities, Latin America must obtain capital, technical aid, and foreign markets. The years ahead are critical. If the U.S. does not provide substantial aid, the forces of communism and totalitarianism will certainly take advantage of the economic and social consequences and may, indeed, reap substantial political influence, as in Cuba. Similar statements might be made about other underdeveloped areas.

In these crucial backward areas--Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East--many nations will remain seriously underdeveloped in the next decade, and political instability will increase. We can expect sharp encounters with the Communist world as it seeks to exploit for political gains such situations of privation. These areas offer great opportunity to the United States to demonstrate the advantages of private enterprise economy. The challenge here may be greater than many military challenges we have faced, and the results much more rewarding.

In the coming fifteen years, then, we may see unprecedented turmoil in global affairs--turbulence arising from degrees of economic, political, and population pressures, the magnitude of which we have not experienced before. We are adequately warned of these pressures; we are not adequately prepared or motivated yet to control them or mitigate their impact.
SECTION II
GENERAL IDEOLOGIES AND CONFLICTS*

For the next decade the nations of the world will continue to be divided into three broad groups which can be identified by ideologies of democracy, communism and nationalism.

The developed nations in Western Europe and North America, together with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan in the Far East, are committed to constitutional democracy.

The USSR, China and their satellites form the bloc committed to communism.

In the less developed non-Communist countries, sometimes referred to as uncommitted nations, are many states which have recently gained or are in the process of gaining independence. In these areas, the dominant political force is nationalism.

Despite the geographic clustering of nations devoted to each of these ideologies, all three ideologies have common roots in Western culture and thought.

DEMOCRACY

Democracy by its nature cannot be a precise creed. However, its tradition does rest on a common body of premises and political principles. The basic elements of democracy include the following:

1. Individual liberty and dignity is the basis of democracy. The human being is looked upon as an end in himself and not as a tool of the state.

2. The government derives its powers from the consent of the governed.

* See Reference 3.
3. The constitutional order must assure the rule of law and the safeguarding of individual rights.

4. The individual is entitled to the opportunity for a decent economic and social life. Democracy is compatible with many ways of organizing economic life, and with various mixtures of private and public activity. Public measures to protect working conditions and social security have come to be accepted as normal state functions.

5. Democracy presupposes tolerance of different views, attitudes, and values. Individuals and minorities have the right to foster unorthodox views and policies as long as they do not threaten the constitutional order or change the system by violence or unconstitutional means. Many centers of social, political, and economic power are considered essential to the health and vitality of a democratic order.

6. The democratic system will continue to develop and adapt to new needs and changing conditions. The changes should be evolutionary and nonviolent. The system accepts the fact that society includes conflicting interests and purposes and places high value on accommodating differences by compromise and adjustment.

7. The rule of law and basic features of democracy are considered as universal rights which should be available to all human beings who desire to enjoy them.

In practice, of course, the democratic states have fallen short of the ideals and principles stated above, particularly with regard to the privileges of domestic minority groups and the rights of colonials.

COMMUNISM

The Marxist-Leninist ideology is the basis for all policies and decisions in the communist states. It subordinates the individual completely to the state. It differs fundamentally from democracy in that it is dedicated to imposing its philosophy on others by any means rather than considering that others have a free choice in the selection of their form of government and way of life.
There are a number of concepts and tenets which guide the communist leaders in their relations with other nations:

1. History is a continuous conflict in which "progressive" forces contend with "reactionary" forces and defeat them. Communism is a superior, more advanced form of society. The communist dictatorship and state ownership and operation of the means of production provides the most efficient use of productive facilities.

2. The conflict between the two systems is inherently irreconcilable. It can be resolved only by the ultimate "victory of the Communist Order". The conflict covers the spectrum of psychological, economic, political, and armed or open warfare and there is no essential difference between any of these means of conducting warfare.

3. In conformity with Marx's class concepts, moving to the more advanced stage of communism requires the "dictatorship of the proletariat". The Communist Party represents the proletariat for this purpose. The Party is sanctified as the agent of history and is elevated into an absolute good in its own right. Each member must be disciplined to accept the Party as the spokesman of history and the only true interpreter of the doctrine. Since the Party enjoys the exclusive title to this role, any effort to contest the course or control of the Party identifies the individual or group as a class enemy. This doctrine provides for justification for the monopoly of power by the Party.

4. Communist ideology makes power central in its analysis of society and history in its own methods and goals. The principle writings of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung, as well as Khrushchev's speeches, have been preoccupied with the strategy and tactics of acquiring and consolidating power. Communist leaders are usually driven by an intense urge for political power and dedicated to the use of any and all means to achieve the goals of the Party.

5. The communist creed in itself allows for great tactical flexibility. The leaders of their party, in their practical decisions, enjoy a wide range of choice since the ultimate goals are both vague and remote. Against non-Communists who
oppose the ultimate Communist triumph, any methods are legitimate to achieve the historically inevitable outcome.

6. The ideology contemplates that Communist strategy will vary with the stage and circumstances. In its effort to influence and manipulate mass opinion, it casts its appeal not in ideological terms but in those best calculated to cater to local discontents or aspirations. Thus, at times the policy may appear to run counter to basic tenets of the creed.

NATIONALISM

Nationalism is the assertion by a people of its claim to a distinctive national identity, entitling it to live its own life in its own fashion. This finds its most characteristic political expression in the demand for a sovereign state whose prime purpose is to protect and promote the identity and interest of the nation in whose name it is brought into being. Nationalism has a peculiarly significant role to play in the development of peoples undergoing the kinds of physical, social, and psychological transformation which the West has thrust upon the rest of the world. The major immediate contributions of nationalism are a sense of independent worth and self-assertion, frequently accompanied by local violence, to replace the traditional bonds which have been shattered.

In the new countries, the nation constitutes a great potential widening of the social and political horizons of most of the people. In many spheres of vital concern to the new countries, nationalism either offers no answer or answers so ambiguous as to be useless. Nationalism rarely, if ever, represents a coherent and positive body of doctrine and belief reaching significantly beyond insistence on the establishment of an independent state as the political embodiment of a previously subservient group. Nehru has written that "nationalism is essentially an antifeeling".

Neither the political institutions nor economic systems of the new countries can be said to be determined by nationalism. Nationalism normally demands full sovereign self-government and decisions by instrumentalities derived from the nation itself. Nationalism is always the champion of self-government in the sense of national as opposed to alien rule; it is only accidentally self-government in the sense of rule by the many as opposed to rule by the few.
What is inherently democratic in nationalism is its mass character. The heart of nationalism is insistence upon the centrality of the national community and upon the latter's right to make the state the origin of its identity and will. Despite the inherent links between nationalism and democracy it is open to grave doubt that many of the new countries will be able to make a success of the democratic constitution which they have almost without exception adopted on attaining independence. Already several of them have fallen at least temporarily by the wayside, turning to military rule or to authoritarian one-party rule centering about a single dominant leader.

Nationalism itself contains ingredients which can with ease be turned to undemocratic or antidemocratic directions. Wherever it is the main driving force, the temptation exists to give priority to the claims of national solidarity and strength over those of individual rights and democratic participation. In such circumstances, the liberalism which is one of the faces of a democratic nationalism is likely to be forced to yield to the demand for unity put forward in the name of the nation.

To the basic questions as to whether development should be pursued within the framework of communism, socialism, capitalism, or some type of mixed economy, nationalism can by itself give no clear answer. In the realm of foreign affairs, where nationalism most evidently comes into play, it is likely to give no conclusive answers to questions concerning entry into this alliance or that, acceptance of a given treaty or of the proffer of foreign aid, or the adoption of a policy of neutralism or commitment. There is a danger that real nationalism may even serve as an impediment to advance, as for example, in curtailing access to allied goods, skill, and capital, and more generally, in inhibiting useful international contacts because of fear of alien intrusion.

Despite these negative aspects, the fact remains that nationalism has much to contribute to the new countries. The new nationalistic countries are generally unstable, politically and economically, but in most cases are reluctant to hazard their newly gained independence by firm alignments with either of the other groups. It is to their current economic advantage to accept the aid and courtship of the rival major groups until they can evaluate the political and security benefits that may derive from identification with either of these groups.
IDEOLOGY INTERACTION

In reality, all three ideologies—democratic, communist, and nationalist—are steadily interacting in all three areas. This competition and conflict among them take different forms according to the varied settings. The interplay is most apparent in the advanced democratic nations of the world. In these open societies, Communist parties and propaganda are able, by manipulating popular discontent, illusions and aspirations, to attract mass electoral support in some areas and to confuse or divide public opinion in more. In the West, nationalism is still the potent symbol which can be exploited by Communist or non-Communists for their own purpose. There are signs that the Atlantic nations may now be working their way through nationalism to come out on the other side with a certain measure of maturity. There is reason to believe that they have come to enough awareness of the danger and inadequacies of nationalism to lead them to seek greater regional and international integration in cooperation rather than to re-emphasize their national separateness.

In the newer nations the contest is more complex. In the struggle for independence, the nationalist torrent is fed by many streams of discontent. The people of those countries which have recently gained independence tend to focus excessive hopes and expectations on the overthrow of colonialism and the creation of a sovereign state. There is no set formula for their manifold political, economical, and social problems. The leader must look elsewhere for more explicit programs to meet the expectations aroused, but not answered by the creation of the nation's state.

In general, the newer nations have inherited from the colonial past political institutions patterned on Western models. Their leaders, usually trained in the West, often times share much of the democratic creed, while sometimes rejecting the West for past imperialism. However, these Western-style governments are likely to be too weak or too ineffective to achieve the social cohesion and discipline necessary to modernize their societies at a rapid rate. Many, viewing the economic systems of the West in terms of exploitation and colonialism, are attracted by the idea of socialism. Communism exploits all these attitudes and dilemmas, holding up the Soviet Union as a model for rapid industrial progress.
There are fundamental tensions between nationalism and communism. These are based on the communist doctrine of subordinating associated states and individuals to the seat of communism, namely the Soviet Union, and the communist concept that national independence is but a temporary step to international communism.

Nationalism creates tensions and conflicts in both the Democratic and Soviet Blocs. These tensions have been manifested among the NATO nations. Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and China are examples of nationalism expressing itself with the Communist Bloc.

Until now the contest of ideologies has been bipolar with the United States and the Soviet Union being the power centers, each attempting to "woo" the new and uncommitted nations to their orbit. As pointed out earlier, the powers and influences of these two powers will diminish with the emergence of perhaps four new power centers. Two of these potential power centers, United Europe and Japan, will emerge from the Democratic group. China will emerge from the communist group and India from the nationalist or uncommitted group. The impact of this diffusion of power will be reflected in the future objectives and strategies of the individual power centers.
SECTION III
U.S. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES

With the preceding review of the ideologies influencing world powers, we may now examine the fundamental national objectives and policies of the U.S. Later these will be used as a basis for postulating certain specific U.S. national policies and strategies for the next decade.

In popular usage, national policy is often synonymous with objectives and even strategy. For purposes of clarity in this discussion, some distinction is made between the words "objectives," "policies" and "strategies".

**National Objectives** are the aims or goals which are in the national interest to achieve and toward which the efforts of governmental agencies are directed.

**National Policies** are courses of action which are pursued by a government in order to achieve national objectives.

**National Strategies** are the specific means of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces during peace and war, to carry out national policy.

**FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES**

The fundamental principles under which the United States is governed are expressed in:

*The Preamble to the Constitution* "... establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity;"
The Bill of Rights "... Congress shall make no law... abridging freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble... No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law..."

The American's Creed "The United States as a government of the people, by the people, for the people; whose powers are derived from the consent of the governed; a democracy in a republic; a sovereign nation of many sovereign states, a perfect union, one and inseparable; established upon the principles of freedom, equality, justice and humility..."

These fundamentals will continue as the foundation of our objective and strategies. However, the means of implementation of these principles are subject to controversy, and will change from time to time to meet the dynamics of world environment.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The objectives of the United States in the nineteenth century were directed to ensuring domestic growth, by isolation and avoidance of direct involvement in the affairs of the rest of the world. Its foreign policies were largely expressions of the principles of freedom of the seas, free exchange of ideas and trade, respect of international obligations, the promotion of peace through negotiation and arbitration.

Early in the twentieth century, the domestic development was essentially complete and the influence of the United States in world affairs was demonstrated in its participation in and its effect on the outcome of World War I. The place of the United States as a world power was established and was realized by the Executive Branch of the Government but not by the people. President Wilson attempted to exercise this newly developed influence by a program directed toward a peace settlement based upon self-determination and a world organization for collective security. Although his program was consistent with basic American concepts, it was not accepted by the people and the nation essentially relapsed into a period of relative isolation.

The involvement of the United States in World War II forced the people to face up to the fact that the United States must play a leading role in world affairs. In the immediate postwar period we supported
more seriously the basic program proposed originally by President Wilson by joining the United Nations, negotiating alliances for mutual security to protect the principles of democracy, and entered trade and aid agreements to foster the growth of democratic nations with the hope for a peaceful, orderly, and prosperous new world order.

This hope has been dimmed and complicated in recent years by the expansionist activities of the Soviet Bloc, the loss of our atomic monopoly, the Cold War, conflicts within the Western Alliance, the revolution in the former colonial and underdeveloped areas of Asia and Africa, the political and economic instability of Latin America, and the explosive growth of science with its concurrent application to weapon technology. These conditions have brought new and unprecedented challenges in exercising our accepted responsibilities for furthering world freedom. These challenges, together with a generally complacent public attitude, has complicated the setting of U.S. objectives and the formulation of long-range U.S. strategies.

Recognition of the complexity of formulating long-range objectives and strategies to meet the changing world conditions is evidenced by the formation during the Eisenhower administration of a President's Commission on National Goals to develop a broad outline of national objectives and programs for the next decade and longer and by the activities of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in initiating numerous studies by academic and research institutions to develop fresh ideas and approaches to the foreign policy of the Nation.

The requirements affecting the establishment of national objectives and the administration of our national affairs are exacting. Some of these are:

1. Vision to determine ultimate goals that will retain their basic value and appeal in a changing world for which the past is by no means a complete guide; and foresight to anticipate difficulties not now readily seen.

2. Alertness and flexibility to pick the limited objectives that will lead to the ultimate goals and to revise them as needed.

3. Multiple coordination of objectives, programs, and operations that otherwise might conflict and neutralize each other or leave embarrassing gaps.
4. Timing—to act at the opportune moment, phasing into each other activities that may be sequentially dependent.

5. Conduct of technically advanced and complex operations on a large scale at low cost and with normal efficiency.

6. Contraction and expansion of enterprises which in their nature are not easily adaptable to this accordion movement.

7. Awareness of the aspirations, feelings, and reactions of people steeped in cultures foreign to ours, living amidst conditions it is difficult for us to comprehend and with traditions that may be beyond our understanding.

8. Bringing to this process a personal enthusiasm and dedication which go far beyond the kind of commitment that one would expect in a land where the success of what the government attempted did not seem very important to very many people not very long ago.

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

U.S. national objectives are difficult to summarize in words that would be agreeable to all persons. The present broad U.S. national objectives insofar as they relate to international affairs might be stated as follows:

1. Maintain the peace and security of the American people.

2. Maintain the position and influence of the U.S. as a world power.

3. Promote and foster the U.S. policy of free peoples, free government, and justice under law.

4. Seek limitations of world armaments.

5. Promote sound national and free world economic, cultural and political growth.

6. Counter and nullify internal and world wide Communist subversion and aggression.
7. Foster and strengthen the common bonds among the free nations of the world.

These objectives are relatively unchanging with time and may be expected to continue in this form as long as communism exists as a threat to the free world.

NATIONAL POLICIES

The policies employed by the U.S. in support of its national objectives must be flexible to meet the changing economic, political and social conditions.

U.S. national policies will be discussed briefly with respect to the major U.S. national objectives enumerated above.

Maintain the Peace and Security of the American People. The objective of peace will be pursued by continued efforts to reduce world tensions and to negotiate disputes through the United Nations and diplomatic channels, while at the same time maintaining a strong military posture to assure the physical security of the United States against direct attack by missiles, bombers or invasion. A sound civil defense program must be included.

In the pursuit of peace and security we must, however, heed the warning of Theodore Roosevelt who said: 11

"The things that will destroy America are posterity at any price, peace at any price, safety first instead of duty first, and love of soft living and the get-rich-quick theory of life."

Senator Barry Goldwater 10 has criticized the U.S. peace strategy by stating:

"Our avowed national objective is peace. We have, with great sincerity, waged peace while the Communists wage war. We have sought settlements while the Communists seek victories. We have tried to pacify the world. The Communists mean to own it.

"Here is why the contest has been an unequal one and why, substantially, we are losing it."
The American public must be brought to increased awareness that peace and security are not automatic and that interests other than domestic are involved in its achievement. Franklin Roosevelt in 1945 stated:

"We have learned that we cannot live alone, at peace; that our own well-being is dependent upon the well-being of other nations far away."

**Maintain the Position and Influence of the U.S. as a World Power.**

Our policy in achieving this objective must include: demonstration of political integrity; dynamic diplomacy with a demonstrated willingness to negotiate in all matters; respect for and tolerance of the cultures, religions and customs of our allies and of the uncommitted nations; maintaining leadership in scientific fields; maintaining credible and balanced military forces which are capable of applying graduated force across the spectrum of warfare conditions.

There are, however, limitations and constraints to maintaining our position and influence. The principle of these is the fragmented policy-making structure in a democratic form of government in which the integration and agreement of many segments of the government are required before firm policies can be established. The changes in administration normal to the democratic process do not affect favorably the reactions of foreign nations. Another constraint is the suspicion of U.S. intentions by nonwhite populations of colonies or former colonies of some of our strongest allies. Further constraints are imposed by the economic limitations of our defense and aid budgets.

We have tended to rely on a strategy of threatening massive nuclear retaliation in response to aggression as a means of demonstrating our power position. This strategy has not restrained indirect aggressions and Soviet expansion by other means. Our strategy must be one of integration of the social, economic, psychological and military factors which influence the exercise of power.

While influence in promoting peace and relaxing tensions can be enhanced by a strategy of encouraging negotiation, it is mandatory that we negotiate only from a position of strength. We must avoid being pressured by our allies and some of our own citizens into unfruitful negotiations that are based on hopeful declarations of the Soviets.
Our approach to negotiations must be such as to leave no doubt in the minds of the non-Communist world where the responsibility for conflict lies. The public and our allies must be educated in the fundamental aspects of the conflict and the fact that only limited results can be expected and that successful negotiations can be conducted only from a position of strength and only after detailed preparation, if embarrassing situations such as the failure of the 1960 Summit Meeting are to be avoided.

**Promote and Foster the U.S. Policy of Free Peoples, Free Government and Justice Under Law.** The U.S. is not dedicated to the creation of a world modeled upon itself, nor to one dominated by itself. The U.S. desires a world environment in which there will be a growth of political freedom and economic progress, taking a variety of forms according to preferences of people involved. The U.S. policy is to seek, and provide where possible, the means to support the right of every nation to freely determine its own system of government and to help in the establishment of equal justice under law. The basis for this policy of self-determination was expressed on 17 February 1960 by then Secretary of State Herter:

"We believe in the right of all peoples and nations freely to choose their own ways of life, we believe in cooperation, based on respect, with other nations; we believe in the dignity, rights, liberties and importance of the individual man, the subordination of the state to the interests and will of its citizens, we believe in decision by discussion and dissent, in tolerance, in governments of laws not of men, and in peace with justice. These are the beliefs on which our nation was founded, on which it grew strong and great, and on which its future strength and greatness depend. It is these beliefs which motivate us to join with others in the defense of them. It is because we believe in these concepts that we wish to assure that other men may have the opportunity to enjoy the blessings of life in a free society."

And by former President Eisenhower in his State of the Union Message to the 86th Congress:

"Certainly it is not necessary to repeat that the United States has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of any nation; by the same token we reject any attempt to impose its (Soviet) system on us or on other peoples by force or subversion. This concern for the freedom of other peoples is the intellectual
and spiritual cement which has allied us with more than 40 other nations in a common defense effort. Not for a moment do we forget that our own fate is firmly fastened to that of these countries; we will not act in any way which would jeopardize our solemn commitments to them."

The basis of our policy with respect to justice under law was expressed by the late Secretary Dulles:20

"We in the United States have from the very beginning of our history insisted that there is a rule of law which is above the rule of man. That concept we derived from our English forebears, but we, as well as they, played a part in its acceptance.

"Thus, since its inception, our nation has been dedicated to the principle that man, in his relationship with other men, should be governed by moral, or natural law.

"We now carry those concepts into the international field. We believe that the results thus obtainable, though not perfect, are nevertheless generally fair, and that they are preferable to any other human order that can be devised.

"A most significant development of our time is the fact that, for the first time, under the Charter of the United Nations, there has been a determined effort to establish law and justice as the decisive and essential substitutes for force."

Former President Eisenhower writing to Senator Humphrey on November 17, 1959 on the same subject stated: 20

"One of the great purposes of this Administration has been to advance the rule of law in the world, through actions directly by the United States Government and in concert with the governments of other countries. It is open to us to further this great purpose both through the adoption of changes and improvements in those institutions."

The U.S. policy of promoting and fostering free peoples and free governments must necessarily be flexible. Towards its western friends, the U.S. maintains a straightforward and relatively unchanging policy of mutual support of democratic nations. With the newer countries, however, foreign policy must be carefully tailored
to the culture of the people, the geographical environment, and the
degree of political maturity that the country has attained.

Our policy with respect to the Asian countries bordering the Sino-
Soviet Bloc is complex because of the great diversities between
these countries. Despite their difference, there are certain im-
portant common factors and relationships, which include:

Mass poverty and lack of opportunity for advancement;

The significance of progress as a vital political issue with the
realization that economic and social betterment can be achieved;

Accelerated pace of social change with concurrent complex
political and administrative problems;

Strong nationalism that is reflected in antiminority and anti-
foreign sentiment;

Economic dependence on the outside world; and

A tendency to experiment with authoritarian political systems
in an effort to find solutions to their economic, social and
administrative problems.

Communism offers these underdeveloped countries a political and
social method which promises:

A tight, unified organization for modernization;

A domestic base of power capable of defeating the opponents
of progress;

A technique for mobilising human and physical resources re-
quired for industrial growth; and

A psychological setting which gives a framework of security,
discipline and order.

The foreign policy employed towards these countries, whose peoples
are caught in cross currents of transition, must by democratic
example and assistance, provide an appeal that is stronger than
that of communism.
In Eastern Europe our policy remains confused as a result of the conflict between the theories of containment and liberation immediately after World War II. Although in principle we support the right of the satellite countries to revolt against Soviet domination, a U.S. policy of actively encouraging revolutionary activity is questionable due to the demonstrated ruthlessness of the Soviets in suppressing opposition. The drastic reprisals against the Hungarians serve as grim testimony of Soviet reaction to demonstrations of self-assertion by the people of the satellite countries. Our best long-range policy to foster free government and free peoples among the European satellites appears to be one of skillful diplomatic exposures of Soviet abuses and by contact with the people through cultural, educational, and technical exchanges.

Our foreign policy must be one that assists the forces of change in finding constructive expression. It is necessary that we support rather than oppose nationalism. We should not force new nations to choose between our system or the Soviet system. In some cases, it may be advantageous to support neutralism. With respect to all countries in which there is political instability, we must consider the long-range aspects of our objectives by being prepared to anticipate the policies of and to deal with the "next government". It must be one in which we keep in touch with every element of real power across the spectrum of noncommunist politics. We must concentrate our aid and assistance in programs that will assure survival in a changing political environment that will be oriented to the West. We must assure that the regimes with which we may deal are dedicated to improving the economic, political and social conditions of the country.

Our best policy appears to be one in which international organizations such as NATO and OAS are utilized in advancing our objectives. Bilateral, and some cases purely military approaches such as SEATO, may at times offend the sensitivity of a country and may be misconstrued as interference.

Seek Limitation of World Armaments. The U.S. has had a deep commitment to a policy of arms limitations of long standing. Our policy will be to continue to press for arms limitations under reliable control conditions. Our efforts to negotiate with the Soviets for the purpose of controlling nuclear arms have so far been unsuccessful. In 1946, when we had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, the Soviets turned down our proposal for full international control of

26
atomic energy. In 1953, as a result of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace proposal, an International Atomic Energy Agency was created. The Soviets have refused to fulfill the original intent of this proposal as a means of reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles. In 1955, the Soviets turned down our proposal for aerial inspection. In 1956, the Soviets showed no interest in our proposal for an inspected cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the gradual contribution of weapon stockpile materials to international control. In 1957, negotiations in London on the following aspects of arms control failed: partial arms limitations including safeguards against surprise attacks; cessation of production of fissionable weapons materials; restraints on transfer of nuclear weapons to other states; reduction of conventional forces; and steps to assure peaceful use of outer space. Since 1957, several attempts have been made without success to discuss specific areas such as the suspension of nuclear tests and safeguards against surprise attack.

The urgency for pursuing a policy of promoting arms reductions is dictated by the technical advances in delivery systems which could lead to a war of miscalculation and the proliferation of production of nuclear weapons which could make it possible for irresponsible countries to obtain these weapons.
SECTION IV
FREE WORLD AND COMMUNIST BLOC TREATY SYSTEMS

The previous sections have discussed the conflicting ideologies that segment the peoples of the world, and have reviewed the unilateral aims and policies that the U.S. has formulated to guide its efforts in the international field. Obviously, each sovereign nation establishes for itself a set of national objectives and policies in the same manner as the U.S. Where these goals are compatible with those of other nations, an opportunity exists for international cooperation and mutual fulfillment of common aims. Where national objectives or policies of two countries clash, then friction, conflict and the threat of war may follow. These two motivating forces—hope of unified effort to achieve common goals and fear of war with a country of opposing objectives—are the basis of formal international agreements.

DEVELOPMENT OF RIVAL TREATY SYSTEMS

The free-world—communist-bloc polarization of power in the Cold War era is formalized in extensive rival treaty systems. After remaining aloof from military alliances since 1800, the United States from 1947 to 1954 completed eight formal alliances involving 42 nations—21 in the Americas, 13 in Europe, and eight in Asia. Acceptance of the major role in the free world's resistance to communist expansion motivated this about face in policy. Bilateral treaties bind us to South Korea, Nationalist China, Japan, the Philippines, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan; NATO, SEATO, the Rio Treaty and Anzus commit us to 38 nations. We have concluded agreements with other nations for the use of military bases and for the extension of military and defensive aid designed to increase the security of those nations.

These alliances form the backbone of our Mutual Security Program which seeks "to help develop and strengthen the nations of the free world in a common effort to maintain peace and achieve progress."
Mutual security activities cover much ground. Many activities are positive—promoting such programs as economic development and technical cooperation; other activities are essentially protective—preventing the loss of security by member nations, seeking to prevent war but preparing to win if war becomes necessary. Basic in the rationale of the U.S. alliance system is the Communist menace: Soviet Russia—on a global scale through overt and covert expansion of control and influence, and Red China—to neighbors along or within easy reach of its national perimeter extending from Korea and Japan in the northeast, over Nationalist China, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the other small noncommunist nations of South east Asia, Pakistan and India.

The communist system of alliances covers Eastern Europe and much of Asia. The communist bloc, after depending primarily upon a series of bilateral treaties, has charged that its treaties are of friendship and mutual assistance, and thereby quite different in rationale from the free world system. Only a slight measure of realism is necessary to expose this fallacy. Certainly from the vantage point of political and military commitments, the communist network is a power alignment with cumulative effects probably more binding than the multilateral treaties which the U.S. favors. Soviet dominance over the East European satellites indicates as much. Moreover, the free world treaties generally provide for the reporting to the Security Council of actions taken to counter an armed attack and the cessation of actions once the Security Council has taken appropriate measures, whereas the communist treaty formula contains no such clause. Most communist bloc treaties do pledge to implement the treaties "in the spirit of the United Nations Charter," but several lack even this general provision.

From the standpoint of time, the Communists constructed the main lines of their system from 1943 to 1950; the U.S. since 1947.

Proceeding from area to area, this section of the report considers commitments of the U.S. to other nations of the free world together with the communist bloc alliances and threats which we seek to counter. An analysis follows of the essential meaning and effectiveness of each alliance. The communist bloc treaties are then approached in similar manner. Those aspects which are found in all or most of a treaty system, for example, the care given by the U.S. to keep within the framework of the UN Charter, will not be discussed for each alliance. Membership in Free World and in Communist Treaty Systems is shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1. Membership in Contemporary Free World Treaty Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Bio Pact</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>SEATO 1</th>
<th>ANZUS</th>
<th>CENTO 2</th>
<th>Bilateral 2 with U.S.</th>
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</table>

1Under a protocol of the SEATO treaty the states of Laos, Cambodia, and the free territory of the state of Vietnam are under the protection of the treaty. Cambodia and Laos rejected the protection.

2Ratified treaties indicated here are those of a mutual defense assistance nature. (See Treaties in Force, January 1959, Department of State).

3The military security provisions of NATO apply to the French Department of Algeria.

4U.S. is a member of the Economic and Countersubversive Committees of CENTO and assists with the military planning of CENTO.
Table 2. Membership in Contemporary Communist Treaty Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Bilateral Treaty with USSR</th>
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<td>USSR</td>
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</table>
U.S. AGREEMENTS IN EUROPE

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Foremost in the evaluation of the U.S. alliance system is the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington April 4, 1949 and entered into force for the U.S. on August 24, 1949. Present members include the following:

- Belgium
- Canada
- Denmark
- France
- Germany (joined 5 May 1955)
- Greece (joined 15 February 1952)
- Iceland
- Italy
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Portugal
- Turkey (joined 15 February 1952)
- United Kingdom
- United States

NATO Commitments

Under the terms of the alliance, members "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." (Article 3) They will consult when any member considers the "political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened." (Article 4)

Because Article 5 contains the strongest terms found in the mutual security agreements for action in case of armed attack, we quote the first paragraph verbatim:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area."

NATO extends over the territory of all members in Europe and North America plus the Algerian departments of France, the occupation forces of any member in Europe, the islands in the North Atlantic under members' jurisdiction north of the Tropic of Cancer, and the vessels and aircraft in this area of members. (Article 6)

Article 9 provides for the establishment of a council to implement the treaty. In Article 13, on denunciation, any member may withdraw after the treaty has been in force twenty years after giving one year's notice.

NATO Meaning and Effectiveness

The mutual obligation to deter and counter armed attack is specifically stated and would almost certainly bring all members promptly into action. The extent of such action would, of course, vary from member to member and with the nature of the attack. The system of bases and national forces are equipped with the latest in conventional weapons and since 1954 NATO military planning has been based upon the use of atomic weapons, a vital step in view of communist superiority in manpower and conventional arms.

The effectiveness of NATO is not yet what current needs require. Among NATO members the will to sacrifice in order to create deterrent forces fluctuates with the mounting and relaxing of Soviet pressure. Ground garrisons have never measured up in numbers and quality with the goals set in 1952. Less than a third of 96 divisions projected have come into being. The French have diverted a substantial portion of their military forces to North Africa; West Germans have been slow to contribute; the U.S. and England have placed much reliance on strategic air might and missiles. In short, too few members are willing to sacrifice a modicum of national authority to give NATO needed strength.

Nor is NATO likely to become one big happy family. In this regard, strains are somewhat indicative of the complexities perhaps inevitable in a peacetime coalition. The U.S. openly defied two NATO partners, France and England, in the Suez situation. In Asia, particularly in
Indochina, and in North Africa we have yielded to the vestiges of French imperialism, although many Americans believed that the resulting setback to our Asian policy might, in the long run, prove catastrophic. Traditional rivalries such as that between Greece and Turkey persist.

These deficiencies notwithstanding, NATO is the most ambitious alliance in which the U.S. has ever participated and has the greatest potential military strength. The contribution by the U.S. of a major share of military equipment, highly trained manpower, and a continuing will to leadership is the prerequisite, however, which dwarfs all others.

U.S. - Spanish Bilateral Treaty

In order to provide more effectively for the defense of vital sea lanes in the western Mediterranean and Atlantic Ocean, the U.S. concluded a mutual defense pact and an assistance agreement with Spain on September 26, 1953. Its terms permit the joint use of Spanish bases by U.S. and Spanish naval and air forces.

COMMUNIST AGREEMENTS IN EUROPE

Bilateral Treaties

For the European alignment of the communist bloc a listing of the bilateral treaties demonstrates the "multilateral" effect achieved prior to the signing of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. With the exception of the treaty with Czechoslovakia (1943), all others were completed from March 1945 to April 1949. (Seven treaties completed during the same period with Yugoslavia were denounced by the Soviet bloc in October 1949).

The Soviet Union signed bilateral treaties with the following:

Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Finland

Hungary
Poland
Rumania
Bilateral treaties linked the satellites as follows:

- Albania - Bulgaria
- Bulgaria - Hungary
- Bulgaria - Poland
- Bulgaria - Rumania
- Czechoslovakia - Bulgaria
- Czechoslovakia - Hungary
- Czechoslovakia - Poland
- Czechoslovakia - Rumania
- Hungary - Poland
- Hungary - Rumania
- Poland - Rumania

Thus, by 1949 there were 17 treaties linking Soviet Russia and the Eastern European satellites.

Bilateral Treaty Commitments

All of these treaties provide for immediate military and other assistance if either party becomes involved in hostilities with Germany or a third party considered to have joined with Germany in aggression. Article 2 of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian treaty will illustrate:

"Should either of the High Contracting Parties become involved in hostilities with a Germany trying to revive her aggressive policy or with any other country joining Germany's aggressive policy directly or in any other way, the other High Contracting Party will without delay and by every available means render military and all other assistance to the Contracting Party attacked."

The usual period for a communist bloc treaty is twenty years with no provision for denunciation. We have the example, however, of the Soviet bloc's denunciation of its treaties with Yugoslavia in 1949. Apparently, the treaties can be assumed to be effective as long as Soviet Russia wishes.

Bilateral Treaty Meaning and Effectiveness

The provision for immediate military and other aid is significant. So, too, is the practical procedures involved in the communist bloc's spelling out of the aggression of Germany together with the relationship of a third party. Under these terms, virtually any country might be named as an aggressor together with Germany. Ten of the treaties signed during the 1943 to 1949 period contain this formula; other would require the communist governments to offer a bit more explanation. Frequently since the war, the
SECTION IV

The communist bloc has accused the West of seeking to revive an aggressive Germany, and clearly West Germany's relations with NATO are inimical to Communist objectives. The "aggressive policy" phrasing which appears in the treaties gives ample latitude to Communist imagination. Precedents include North Korea's invasion of South Korea while simultaneously denouncing the invaded party as the aggressor.

Western military planners must assume that the communist bloc treaties are completely effective. The possibility that a nationalist Poland and Hungary might not live up to commitments forced upon them in the above treaties is no more than an outside chance as long as Soviet might predominates.

Warsaw Pact

On May 14, 1955 Soviet Russia superimposed upon their interlocking system of treaties with Eastern Europe its own NATO when it created the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The agreement provides for a unified military command for the following countries:

- Albania
- Czechoslovakia
- Hungary
- Rumania
- Bulgaria
- East Germany
- Poland
- Soviet Russia

Headquarters were established in Moscow with a Soviet Marshal in command. These military provisions were part of a twenty-year mutual security and friendship treaty.

U.S. AGREEMENTS IN NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Included in the Near East and South Asia area are 17 countries extending from Greece and Turkey on the west through India and Pakistan on the east. Racial and religious differences have plagued the Near East for centuries. Economic and military aid from the Soviet bloc has gone to seven countries in the last few years. It has become increasingly important for the free world to restrain Soviet Russia from extending her influence into this area, which provides both sea and land routes to the mineral and oil deposits of Africa and Asia. More than one-fifth of the world's population live in the Near East and South Asia. The Soviet bloc has with some

*Albania was publicly castigated at the recent Soviet Congress and is currently in disfavor with the USSR, but it is questionable whether Albania will actually be dissociated from the Warsaw Pact Organization.
success penetrated Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. To counter, we have taken a leading role in the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, we have promulgated the Eisenhower doctrine, and we have helped build up indigenous national defenses in the area.

The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)

The Central Treaty Organization, formerly the Baghdad Pact, came into being in October 1955 and consisted of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. The treaty was conceived as a link in the free world alliance system between NATO and SEATO. Turkey and the United Kingdom were also members of NATO, Pakistan a member of SEATO. The alliance was temporarily challenged by the Iraqi revolution of mid-1958 and by the subsequent withdrawal of Iraq from the Pact.

Although not a party to the pact, the United States belongs to the Economic and Countersubversion committees and assists in the military planning for the defense of the Pact area. The name of the Pact was changed to Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in mid-1959. As a result of increasing communist pressures in Syria and Egypt, the U.S. in January of 1957 promulgated the Eisenhower doctrine. By this doctrine, the U.S. pledged military action at the request of any Near East country against armed aggression, from any country controlled by international communism. The U.S. military aid program for the Near East and South Asia encompasses Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. The U.S. also grants economic aid to India because it is the only large noncommunist nation in the area, and an increase in its economic and political stability will help its leaders resist pressure from the communist bloc.

U.S. Bilateral Agreements in Near East

The United States signed bilateral pacts with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan on March 5, 1959 in an attempt to plug the security gap created by the diminished effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact.

U.S. AGREEMENTS IN FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

The Far East and Pacific area extends from Japan, Korea and China south through southeast Asia to Australia and New Zealand. More
than one-third of the world's population is included, and two out of three persons are under Communist rule.

Australia - New Zealand - U.S. (ANZUS)

This Security Treaty was signed by Australia and New Zealand on 1 September 1951 and by the United States on 29 April 1952. Under Article 3, "each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." Included is the territory of each party, island territories under jurisdiction in the Pacific, and the armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft in the Pacific. Article 7 provides for the establishment of a Council to implement the treaty. The duration of the treaty is indefinite, and one year's notice is necessary for denunciation.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed at Manila on September 8, 1954 by the following eight nations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By protocol signed concurrently the parties extended the treaty area to include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>South Viet Nam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since then, Cambodia and Laos have rejected the protection afforded by the treaty.

The formation of SEATO followed closely upon the defeat of French troops in Indochina and was an attempt to stem what might have become a general collapse of anticomunist resistance in South-east Asia.

Article 4, Clause 1, provides that "aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area...would endanger its own peace and safety"
and each party will "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." The clause also stipulates that SEATO members may agree unanimously to assist a nonmember under armed attack in the treaty area if so requested by that country. Through the protocol discussed above, Cambodia, Laos, and South Viet Nam are so designated.

Against covert aggression, Clause 2 states that if a party is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

Article 5 provides for the establishment of a Council to implement the treaty.

The treaty area, as spelled out in Article 8, is "the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties (Pakistan), and the general area of the Southwest Pacific" including the Philippines but stopping short on the north of Taiwan.

The treaty is to remain in force indefinitely. A one-year notice of denunciation is necessary.

U.S. - Philippine Bilateral Treaty

The Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Philippine Republic was signed on August 30, 1951. Article 4 states that "each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Under Article 5, the territorial application includes the metropolitan territory of each party plus Pacific island territories under jurisdiction and the armed forces, public vessels and aircraft in the Pacific. The duration of the treaty is indefinite; denunciation must follow one year's notice.

U.S. - Japan Bilateral Treaty

The U.S. - Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and an Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty were signed on 19 January 1960.
These documents provide the basis for a joint defense agreement between the United States and Japan for the coming decade and replace the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty signed in September 1951 and the U.S.-Japan Administrative Agreement signed in February 1952.

Article I reaffirms the principles laid down in Article 2 of the U.N. Charter calling for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the prohibition in principle of armed force. This article also provides for Japan and U.S. efforts to build up the U.N.

Article IV states that consultations should be conducted wherever necessary with respect to the implementation of the treaty and in case of armed attack. A threat of armed attack covers the threat of direct attack as well as the threat of indirect attack and the menace posed by armed attack on a neighboring country or countries.

Article V provides for measures to be taken against armed attacks. This provision contains Japan's promise to counter armed attack against each party in the territories under Japan's administration. Such attacks, according to the article are regarded as common danger. Bonin, Okinawa, and the Kurile Islands are not included in the territories but they will be subject to the provision when they revert to Japanese control.

Article VI pertains to the use of facilities in Japan by U.S. forces and the conditions for their use.

U.S. - South Korea Bilateral Treaty

This treaty was signed on 10 October 1953. The military commitments of this treaty are the same as those of other U.S. bilateral treaties for the area. In event of attack, each party "will act to meet the common danger in accordance with constitutional processes." Measures are to be terminated when the U.N. Security Council has taken necessary action.

U.S. - Nationalist China Bilateral Treaty

The Mutual Defense Treaty signed between the United States and the Republic of China on December 2, 1954 is motivated in part by the need to make certain that "no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area ...."
Under Article 4

"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with constitutional processes."

The wording of Article 6 omits the offshore islands. The area of the treaty "shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan, and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction." Article 6 does state, however, that "such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement" can be added to the treaty area.

The right to base U.S. land, air and sea forces in and around Taiwan and the Pescadores is granted in Article 7. The treaty remains in force indefinitely; denunciation must follow one year's prior notice.

COMMUNIST AGREEMENTS IN FAR EAST

In the Far East the military obligations of the Communist bloc must be assumed to exceed what is shown in the structure of published treaties. The Soviet treaty with Outer Mongolia dates from 1936, the key one with Red China from 1950.

The Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was signed on February 14, 1950. A formal military partnership came into being.

In Article 1 the parties undertake to prevent

"any repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which directly or indirectly would unite with Japan in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the contracting parties being subjected to attack by Japan or any state allied with her... the other High Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other aid with all means at its disposal."

In practical terms, each country is obligated to assist the other by effective military means if it is alleged that a third power allied to Japan has attacked.
Although Red China has no published military commitments to North Korea and North Viet Nam, if we recall the precedent established in the Korean War, we must assume that important military support will be extended in the event of military conflict between a noncommunist country and one of these communist areas.

U.S. AGREEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

Rio Treaty

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947 links the following twenty-one nations for mutual defense.

- Argentina
- Bolivia
- Brazil
- Chile
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Cuba
- Dominican Republic
- Ecuador
- El Salvador
- Guatemala
- Haiti
- Honduras
- Mexico
- Nicaragua
- Panama
- Paraguay
- Peru
- United States
- Uruguay
- Venezuela

In Article 3, the parties "agree that an armed attack by a State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack, . . ."

In order to expedite action, upon request from the attacked party, "each of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation. . . ." Thus, the U.S. can dispatch Marines, air support, or whatever is required while waiting for the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System to decide upon proper collective action. As in NATO, provision is made for referring the incident to the Security Council of the UN.

Article 6 provides that aggression which is not an armed attack "or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of
America" shall be discussed immediately in the Organ of Consultation. Under Article 7 the parties undertake to halt any conflict between American nations and "restore matters to the status quo ante bellum."

The duration of the treaty is indefinite. A nation's notification of denunciation becomes effective two years after receipt, but the withdrawal does not affect the other parties to the treaty.

At this writing, Cuba is under revolutionary turmoil and the direction of the forces of unrest cannot be determined. Cuba has embraced a measure of Soviet backing and Castro has announced his Communist affiliation. We may presume that she may denounce the obligations and the privileges embraced by the Rio Pact.

AFRICA—NOT YET INTEGRATED INTO RIVAL TREATY SYSTEMS

Africa is the last great continent to rouse to the dynamic attraction of nationalism. At this writing, the efforts of the Congo to reach political stability in an atmosphere of rebellion in Katanga—the efforts of the United Nations notwithstanding—are thoroughly confused. Up to this time, no formal military alliances have been concluded by either the free world or the communist bloc with the sub-Saharan African countries.

The communist emphasis continues to be upon the tactics of economic and political penetration. The French department of Algeria is covered by NATO. The U. S. has major air and naval air bases in Morocco and Libya and communication facilities in Ethiopia. U. S. military assistance goes to Ethiopia, Libya, Ghana, and Liberia to assist them in maintaining armed forces sufficient to guarantee their security against subversion and local aggression.
SECTION V
THE TENSION AREA, BREEDING GROUND OF CONFLICT

We have examined in the previous section the potential lineup of opposing teams in the game of war. It remains to inspect the playing field on which the contest will be waged. In the geopolitical as well as the physical sense, the earth presents an inhomogeneous surface. Both the terrain and the political circumstances combine to make certain areas into focal points of the causes of armed conflict. An assessment of the role of these tension areas in international politics offers an excellent general and a specific setting for a projection of the exercise of military and other power capabilities of a nation. Each tension area poses to United States strategy a challenge, which is both different from and similar to challenges posed by other tension areas. To a point, those concerned with strategy must be concerned with the differing aspects of each area; beyond this point, a realization of similarities will permit the conception of military capabilities applicable to a type of tension area, as contrasted with a single area.

Many forces interact in a complex and varying pattern to make up the tension area. These forces include historic antipathies, racial and ethnic bitterness, nationalist and sometimes chauvinist motivations, ideological differences, domestic political rivalries, struggles for international power, alignments with rival blocs, population pressures, religious and other cultural differences, economic competition, imperialism and others. An attempt is made below to single out the most important criteria, the presence of which may serve to identify and allot priorities to the challenges posed by specific tension areas to U.S. strategy.

Tension exists, to some extent, in any area. The use of the term "tension area" in this report suggests an area in which, or over which, the incidence of armed conflict is highly probable. The tension area is thus a geographical area in which the complex of domestic and international frictions are fundamental and not subject to the reasonable compromise possible when quarreling countries
have an underlying community of national interests. For example, the frictions which recurrently appear in relations between the United States and her NATO allies hold promise of compromise solution because of the community of interest offered by the requirement of collective defense, and to a lesser extent by economic cooperation. No such community of interest is operative in the areas identified in this report as tension areas where the situation is judged to be highly conducive to armed conflict. The tension area compounds both fundamental frictions of a national or regional character with the projected identification of interests by powers.

INDICATORS FOR PROJECTING POTENTIAL TENSION AREAS

Although many forces interact to create any one tension area, the present analysis attempts to select those of paramount importance for assessing the potential tension areas for the forthcoming decade. Thus, some five "indicators" are treated as paramount, and the presence of any three or four of these indicators is considered evidence of the existence of a tension area. These indicators are:

1. geographical location along the perimeter between the Communist and Free Worlds;
2. the existence of strong nationalist sentiments;
3. an underdeveloped country;
4. history of earlier tension; and
5. an area of exceptional strategic importance to the World Powers.

These indicators may also be viewed as the first step in providing an answer to the questions, "Where are the tension areas?" and "Why are they here and not somewhere else?"

COMMUNIST-FREE WORLD PERIMETER

Rivalry between the powers is axiomatic here where a long-range easing of tension is possible only through the relinquishment of
expansionist aims by the Communists. Despite a better than even chance for a lessening of Communist pressures for the short-run--through 1964--we must anticipate from 1965 to 1975 a revival and further intensification by Communist countries of efforts to expand the area under their control.

Tension areas tend to follow along the Communist-Free World perimeter because rival military forces must confront each other here. Since V-J Day the Free World has learned that the struggle against Communist expansion cannot be successful without the ability to offer military resistance. Korea, Indochina, Formosa, the Sino-Indian border clashes offer cases in point. It should be stressed that the use of military force has figured prominently in every Communist seizure of control.

The Communists seek actively to penetrate all continents, but it is along the perimeter where their pressure can be greatest through programs of political propaganda, economic lures, and cultural exchange supplemented by the threat of military invasion or support for a Communist-inspired revolution.

NATIONALISTIC ATTITUDES

Fervent nationalism is generally present in the tension areas of the twentieth century. The range of expression has included the nationalist movements for political independence from control by Western imperialist powers, in struggles between feared neighbors, in attempts by Communist satellite nations to secure great control over their own destinies, and by politically independent governments to secure for their own nationals increased control over their economies. The charismatic leader has often found his opportunity amidst this national fervor.

More common during the years since 1945 has been the movement in Asian and African colonies for political independence. These movements almost inevitably create tension as a result of the struggle for authority, and with the achievement of political independence, the problems of creating an efficient government and developing a stable economy contribute to the perpetuation of tension.
The Arab-Israeli conflict offers an example of the importance of fervent nationalist attitudes abetting international tension. Rival nationalisms do much to make negotiation and compromise extremely difficult, and thus suggest the inconceivability of a lasting solution being reached by 1975.

Fervent nationalist attitudes persist, and are probably intensified, in satellites dominated by other communist countries. Russia's experience with Yugoslavia together with the Hungarian and Tibetan revolts support this position. These strong nationalist attitudes pose a barrier against the creation of a communist world in the future. They will help to make of the Eastern European satellites an important tension area, if and when one or any of these countries attempts to secure greater control over its political, economic, and cultural development.

The use of nationalist attitudes to increase the degree of ownership and control of an economy by nationals can most easily create serious tension when the interests being excluded are protected by a power. Thus, Indonesian attempts to oust Chinese from their domination of retail trade can be exploited by the Communist China, playing the role of protector of the "overseas Chinese."

The charismatic leader in an unstable country may seize power through a nationalist revolution--as Castro has in Cuba--and pose a serious challenge to U.S. strategy. Inherent in the instability are political, economic, and social problems, which the leader, having exploited in his seizure of power, will often find insolvable. These problems, and the nationalist attitudes which he utilized, may in time serve a new aspirant to leadership; therefore, the probability remains for recurrent unrest and uprisings.

UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Identification as an underdeveloped country will serve as a third indicator for assessing tension areas. A scanning of the list in the latter part of this section will show the majority to fall within this category. For the economist, the underdeveloped country is one in which "capital investment is small, per capita productivity is low, and the standard of living of a large part of the people is at or near the subsistence level." Often population pressure retards economic progress. In the latter half of the twentieth century
these conditions almost inevitably mean that national leaders are confronted with persistent economic problems.

Politically, the underdeveloped country offers promise of a low order of political stability and therein may offer a tempting target for subversion from within, invasion from without, or the communist pattern of combining the two tactics. Lacking an efficient political organization, the underdeveloped country will lack an effective national will to resist. To put the matter differently, from the international perspective an economically underdeveloped country ordinarily constitutes a political and military vacuum. Although it can be assumed that aid programs extended by the powers will assist the efforts of these countries to develop, the developmental process will require a considerable period of time.

HISTORY OF TENSIONS

On the face of it, selection of a history or record of earlier tensions as an indicator is a common-sense decision. Its usefulness in supplementing the other indicators stems from the nature of the tension process where important tensions can be traced to developments of long duration and to deeply rooted national and international problems.

An area with a history of conflict is an area in which it has been impossible to keep tensions under control. Before World War II the U.S. was not deeply concerned with many of these areas. The extension of U.S. interests into all the world necessitates a look from this vantage point at what may be "old" tension areas, but which could be slighted by American strategists of twenty years ago. For example, much of Southeast Asia becomes tension areas in the sense that the more widely-discussed Balkans were thought of earlier.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

An area may have strategic significance to one or more world powers. American interest in the Pacific Island group, for example, may require the identification of these islands as an important potential area of conflict almost solely because of their strategic importance as bases for the projection of U.S. military power in the Far East.

It may be useful to suggest at this point that the relevant policies of the powers be viewed as important variable within each tension area,
and an awareness maintained that policies and area interact. That is to say, the policies of the powers often serve to increase or decrease tension and therein affect the probability of armed conflict.

Expansionist policies of Soviet Russia and Communist China will serve as a case in point. As stated above, despite some evidence of short-range improvement in relations between the Free World and Communist Bloc, little evidence points toward lasting solutions to the basic conflicts between the two systems. Central in these basic conflicts is the expansionist compulsion inherent in communism. Over the long haul, communist leaders must expand their area of control or change their system radically. If they would be able to expand by nonmilitary means, a period of decades of adherence on their part to peaceful coexistence could be logically projected. There is, however, little reason to anticipate success for their nonmilitary efforts inasmuch as they, too, have difficulties with aid programs, and a major share of the elites in the newly independent nations have become aware of the communist threat to their national objectives. With support by the U.S. or other noncommunist nations, resistance to communist takeover by nonmilitary means will be generally effective. Nor do communist leaders make decisions in which the logic is always clear as past tactical reverses indicate. Certainly the Chinese assault on the Indian border appears as a current example.

It would be hazardous to single out mainland China as the only communist country from which to anticipate military aggression from 1965 to 1975. It will be premature to write off the Soviet Union on this score as long as communism remains the ideology. The methods of military aggression followed by the communists may be expected to include aggression by proxy as in Korea.

TENSION AREAS AND LIMITED WAR

Any of the selected tension areas could conceivably explode into armed conflict, limited or total, but a factor in their selection is the probability of limiting the conflict. Thus, the emphasis rests upon these tension areas as highly probable locales requiring the consideration of a limited involvement by United States military strength. In this line of thought, Robert E. Osgood refers to the Eurasian rimlands from Iran to Korea, where several tension areas lay, as the "gray areas" for Americans who tend to regard Europe as the main show and the gray areas as, strategically speaking, a relatively small side.
show.  "26 So long as the United States retains this view, communist aggressors in a sector of Southeast Asia, for example, can be less fearful of inciting total war.  And, of course, communist penetration may take varied forms in which aggression is not so clearly identifiable as in Korea.  Moreover, American strategists may elect to avoid commitment in an area which holds high threat of becoming a total war, and may not move any more rapidly to aid a rebelling Hungary in the future which could mean freedom for Soviet Russia to wage a small war to put down resistance.

Not even the most ardent proponent of massive deterrence can be certain that a small-scale aggression of the Korean or Indo-Chinese variety will in the future be met with major atomic weapons.  Beyond this conclusion the debate has been--and will be--an extensive one.  The pressures upon the United States and other major powers against the use of major atomic weapons in small wars can be anticipated to increase with time.

Important fuel for these pressures would come from the diffusion of international power and the spread of atomic capabilities.  The initiator of the use of major atomic weapons would be confronted with the threat of retaliation in kind from any one of the other major powers to say nothing of any one of some eight to twelve lesser powers which can also be expected to achieve atomic capabilities by 1975.

One paramount conclusion suggested by the above discussion is the wide spectrum of potential combat situations to be anticipated by military planners with obligations to protect American interests in tension areas.  With the variety of combat situations to be anticipated and with the strong possibility that major atomic weapons would not be employed, military planners must consider a varied arsenal of systems offering maximum flexibility and adaptability.  Inasmuch as it will almost certainly be to the interest of the people of the United States and other peoples of the world to limit any conflict, the American military may be required to play this sort of important supporting role for foreign policy.

TWO BASIC TYPES OF CHALLENGES

Planners responsible for the conception of military systems may find it desirable to further subdivide the challenges posed by tension
areas. In particular, naval planners are concerned with the accessibility of each tension area to seaborne forces. A first step here, then, is an identification of two basic types of challenges from the standpoint of physical geography.

The first type is the challenge posed by the conflict area which is readily accessible to seaborne forces. Geographically, these areas are insular, peninsular, or adjacent to the sea, so that access is physically straightforward; moreover, because of access through nonsovereign areas the probability of political difficulties is minimized. These areas we describe as "primarily maritime".

The second type is the interior conflict area that is likely to involve movements across the sovereign territory of a third party. Such areas may be within range of seaborne aircraft, but overflight rights must be arranged. Areas of this type we describe as "primarily landlocked".

A listing of tension areas, grouped geographically and designated as one of the two types above, appears in Table 3.

Table 3 results from an attempt to apply the five "indicators" discussed in the beginning of this chapter to potential tension areas of the next decade. Questions may be raised as to why this area is included or that area omitted. It may only be stated in reply that any selections of a list of tension areas is a subjective process. Table 3 represents, in the opinion of a group of TEMPO analysts, the more likely foci of potential future armed conflict.
### Table 3. A Grouping of Tension Areas by Geographic Area and by Means of Access

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Accessibility Identifier</th>
<th>Primarily Maritime</th>
<th>Primarily Landlocked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Near and Middle East</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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SECTION VI
THE NATURE OF WAR

Webster defines war as "The state or fact of exerting violence or force against another, now only against a state or other politically organized body; especially a contest by force between two or more nations or states." War as a "contest by force between two or more nations," employing modern nuclear weapon systems, could be a situation of unprecedented violence and destruction. Paradoxically, the wars of the nuclear age have taken the form of relatively small, confined and ambiguous manifestations of force against a state.

The key to understanding the constraints on modern warfare lies in an appreciation of the least constrained act of war--the strategic nuclear strike. Fundamental to strategic nuclear warfare is the fact that offensive technology has, at least for the foreseeable future, outstripped defensive technology. A nuclear power can be confident that the strategic strike he launches will destroy a large portion of his enemy's population and means of production--even though the enemy may have allotted significant resources to defending against the strike. Conversely, he must expect a similar level of destruction if he should become the victim of a nuclear attack. Aside from the highly questionable pre-emptive attack on enemy strategic bases, active defenses appear capable only of "blunting" a determined strategic strike.

The inherent vulnerability of all nations to strategic nuclear attack is the basic restraining force on the scale of warfare. To minimize the risk of provoking an enemy to strategic nuclear warfare, a belligerent will be anxious to guard against two situations:

1. he will want to avoid giving his enemy cause to believe that strategic nuclear warfare is about to be initiated, and

2. he will want to avoid threatening his enemy to the degree that the enemy believes himself unable to survive without initiating a nuclear strike.
To achieve these safeguards against strategic nuclear warfare, each combatant may voluntarily impose certain constraints on the level of warfare he chooses to wage.

**GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS**

A belligerent may attempt to minimize the risk of strategic nuclear warfare by demonstrating his willingness to bound the geographic area of hostilities. Acceptance of apreferred battle zone boundary by the opponent denotes a geographically limited war. For example, in the Korean conflict, all combatants tacitly accepted the limits of the area of hostilities to be the boundaries of Korea itself—undeclared but accepted sanctuaries existed in Manchuria, Japan, and beyond coast artillery range on the seas surrounding Korea. The boundaries of the arena of conflict in future wars may be defined quite differently from the Korean example. They may include rear airfields and the sea operating areas from which a ground conflict receives tactical or logistic support. The boundaries may enlarge or shrink in the course of the war in accordance with the mutual wishes of the antagonists. But the continued observance of some geographical boundary short of the homeland of countries possessing a strategic nuclear capability offers evidence of the intent of a belligerent to refrain from strategic nuclear warfare.

**LIMITED APPLICATION OF FORCE**

The level of warfare may be limited with regard to the extent of destructiveness of the agents used and the discrimination with which they are applied. On one end of the scale of violence is the thermonuclear explosive with its wide radius of indiscriminate destruction. Beneath this level are nuclear weapons of varying yields, applied at the battlefront or elsewhere. A nation choosing to fight a war at less than the all-out level could reasonably demonstrate such intent by employing only conventional explosives—"iron bomb" air strikes and artillery battles with HE projectiles. Further self-imposed restrictions might limit the caliber of the ordnance used. At the low end of the application of force scale is the hand weapon engagement of the skirmish or guerrilla type, where constraints may be placed not only on the size of the weapons but also on the nationality of the troops using them.
POLITICAL LIMITATIONS

The political entity of the warring factions is a critical factor in the role the U.S. may play in future armed conflict. A war may manifest itself in any of the following forms:

- rioting or insurrection against an established government
- harassment of the established government by armed guerrillas
- armed revolutionaries physically occupying all or part of a country
- covert participation by one country in the revolutionary activity of another country
- overt warfare between two or more sovereign countries.

The action that the U.S. is permitted to take to assist an offended party in war centers about the U.S. support of the principle of sovereignty. Where a clear-cut act of invasion has occurred against a country, the country is free to appeal to the United States or to the world (e.g., the United Nations) for assistance. The U.S. may, in consonance with its principles, assist in the defense of the transgressed nation. Conversely, under a situation of internal strife within a country, the U.S. by its own policy is obligated to keep hands off and to allow the country to determine its own destiny. Within these two extremes lies a gray area of uncertainly defined situations--alleged border violations, externally sponsored revolutionary activity, and isolated skirmishes--in which the U.S. may or may not with propriety participate. The U.S. properly may intervene in a military situation if:

1. the sovereignty of a country has been unambiguously violated,
2. a government representing the will of its people requests U.S. intervention to assist in quelling an internal or external threat to its security,
3. it acts as a member of a legitimate international organization (e.g., the United Nations) performing constabulary-type military operations to preserve international law and order.
SPECTRUM OF WARFARE

The ordering of the potential forms of war along a general scale of violence is sometimes referred to as "the spectrum of warfare". In this discussion, we have described levels of war in terms of three more or less independent variables. The "spectrum of warfare", adapted to these descriptors, is shown as a three-dimensional graphic in Figure 3. Along the three axes of constraint—geographic, weapon violence and political—are positioned the major conflicts that have occurred in the 20th century.

Figure 3. Three Dimensional Spectrum of Warfare
SECTION VII
POSSIBLE U.S. STRATEGIES

The preceding sections have outlined world ideological conflicts, U.S. objectives, treaty commitments, tension areas and constraints on the level of warfare. In these discussions considerable thought has emerged concerning national interests, policies and purposes of various countries of the world vis-a-vis the U.S.

It will be recalled in describing the future world pattern of international power that the U.S. and the USSR were classed as super powers; followed by Western Europe, Communist China, Japan and India. This section will postulate possible future U.S. strategies toward these five power centers.

As stated previously, strategy is concerned with the application of the political, economic, psychological and military powers of a nation to carry out national policy. Obviously, a full treatment of strategy, even with respect to one of the power centers, is not within the scope of this report. In consideration of the intent of the report to delineate the environment of future weapons systems, the principal emphasis will be given to policies, programs and strategies which affect the military posture of the U.S. Again they do not lend themselves to neat, clean-cut classifications. The most effective strategies have implications to all facets of a nation's power. It is hoped, however, that the principal implications have been taken into consideration and that the broad postulations will be valid.

USSR

Our fundamental purposes toward the USSR are easy to enunciate but difficult to carry out.

We want to prevent the spread of international communism. We want to settle our differences without resorting to military conflict. We want to encourage in every way possible the liberation of the
peoples enslaved by communism. Finally, we want to induce the Soviet Union to alter its objective of world domination.

How does military force fit into this picture? One might naively wish for an overwhelming military superiority on the part of the U.S. that would force the USSR to acquiesce to our will or at least to conform to proper standards of conduct in international affairs. Unfortunately, the resources and the technical know-how that are our sources of military strength are also available to and are being ably exploited by the Soviets. The USSR faces the world amply armed with intercontinental thermonuclear weapon systems, plus a massive ground and air organization for tactical warfare.

All of the major powers seem to agree that arms control or disarmament is desirable. The yet unresolved prerequisite to disarmament, however, is how to insure that any arms agreement is kept. Our strategy towards arms limitation agreements with Russia will be conditioned by two cautions relative to arms control. First, an effective disarmament program must be based on effective and enforceable controls, rather than on "trust" or "good faith". Second, even a workable disarmament agreement does not in itself end the cold war—-in fact, a "deweaponizing" process may make the communist manpower advantage decisive in future conflict.

In the interim, the U.S. military strategy to deter intercontinental nuclear attack is based upon a "balance of terror" philosophy. Under this concept, nuclear parity between the U.S. and the USSR has led to at least a partial impasse in nuclear strategic warfare. The "stalemate" concept supporters claim that the "absolute weapon" can no longer be used to win national objectives. Whichever side strikes first, the other will hit back, and the result will be mutual suicide. Existing defenses are feeble against rockets, Polaris submarines and even manned bombers. The warning time is so short that the victim of aggression cannot escape. But the aggressor cannot escape either because (in the case of the U.S. and its allies) our retaliatory forces are so widely dispersed, at North American and overseas bases, we would still be able to strike a devastating counterblow even with the U.S. in ruins.  

Opponents of the "nuclear stalemate" theory point out that the strategic nuclear exchange is still a real and grim possibility, for the following reasons:
1. Nuclear warfare need not mean "saturation" attacks. An enemy might hit only a few U.S. cities, or several allied cities, and then try to "blackmail" us into surrender or negotiated peace. (In the meantime, of course, the enemy might evacuate all his own cities and overrun huge areas of Europe with his conventional forces, thus making it difficult for us to pick targets on which to "retaliate.")

2. A technological "breakthrough" might give one side or the other a sudden, overwhelming advantage. A secret saturation attack on the U.S. with bacteriological or psychological weapons for example, might prevent us from ever striking a retaliatory blow.

3. Desperation or miscalculation might, at some point in the future, cause the enemy to strike even if he knew he would be hit back. (Many observers believe that U.S. intervention in the Hungarian revolution of 1956 would have triggered Soviet military action against the West, even though we were poised to retaliate on the Soviet Union.) Thus, thermonuclear war is still a possibility we must be prepared to meet.

One of the most controversial aspects of defense strategy is the manner in which deterrence of the strategic nuclear exchange is to be achieved. In one camp are the counterforce advocates, who assert that "Forces that cannot win will not deter". They demand "Military forces capable of victory under all circumstances... a carefully prepared, maintained, modernized and controlled blend of strategic weapons... sufficient, prepared and able to destroy any aggressor as a military power to the extent that he no longer has the will or ability to wage war".

In the opposing camp are the supporters of the strategy of finite deterrence. Advocates of this concept claim that our deterrent force need be neither overwhelming nor instantaneously responsive. It should be "only what it takes to wreak sufficient damage upon the enemy, as to make unprofitable for him to initiate an all-out nuclear attack upon us, or any of our free world allies". The proponents of finite deterrence favor a relatively small retaliatory force, sufficiently invulnerable to insure that our retaliatory capability remains even after an enemy surprise attack. According to one authority, invulnerable strategic forces are necessary for the Soviets as well as the U.S., in order to preserve the peace. A nation with invulnerable retaliatory forces will not panic into initiating the nuclear
exchange under the fear that it is about to be attacked. Hence, both sides need an invulnerable force to stabilize the nuclear stalemate.

If, as we hope, the nuclear stalemate prevents either side from initiating the strategic nuclear exchange, how can we deter or defeat the USSR in wars fought at a less than all-out scale of violence? This calls for another type of military power—a "shield" force. Our shield forces include U.S. and allied troops in Europe (NATO) and the armed forces of friendly nations on the communist borders of the Middle East and Far East. These forces are intended to stop local aggression, and would give us time to prepare to forestall or defeat a subsequent major communist assault.

A critical question in any limited war situation is related to the containment of the war. How can we prevent the possibility that a small war will explode, by accident or by gradual degeneration, into all-out war? The limited war strategists advocate that we must meet force only with like force. The enemy must not be allowed to win his limited objectives, but neither must he be forced to lose severely enough to drive him to "raise the ante" to a higher level of war. Our military forces must be capable of applying graduated response to meet any level of Soviet inspired warfare we may encounter.

WESTERN EUROPE

Our purposes with respect to Europe are also relatively simple. We want the nations of Western Europe to cooperate among themselves and with us. We want them to be strong enough to defend themselves against communist economic, political, and military pressures and strong enough to assist us in setting up free world effective defenses and countermeasures in those areas. Finally, we want them to assist us on the international front to promote strength and unity of the free world against communism.

The core of the Western European military problem is the formidable array of armed forces that face each other across the Iron Curtain. In Germany alone, one-half million Soviet and East German troops are poised against a similar number of NATO personnel in West Germany. There is widespread concern that the mere presence of this massive confrontation of military power is, in itself, a danger to peace. For this reason, a number of proposals have been made for "disengagement," or a pulling back or a thinning out of NATO and
Warsaw Pact forces from Central Europe. Our future strategy and that of our European friends is intimately connected with the question of disengagement in Europe. Some of the controversial facets of the disengagement problem that will help shape future U.S. military strategy towards Western Europe are outlined below:

## PROS

1. The situation in Central Europe is explosive because of the concentration of NATO and communist forces. Accidental war could always break out—over Berlin or some border incident. Therefore, a mutual pullback of allied and Soviet military forces would reduce these dangers.

2. The situation in satellite East Europe is unstable, as has been proved by the 1953 workers' riot in East Germany and the 1956 upheaval in Poland and revolution in Hungary. If Eastern Europe is ever to win any independence from Moscow, it will do so only after Soviet troops are withdrawn. It might thus hasten liberation of the area if NATO agree to pull back in exchange for a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe.

## CONS

1. The concentration of military power in Central Europe is not the cause of tensions, but the result of them. Moreover, mutual withdrawal would be strategically advantageous to the Soviet bloc, would upset the military balance, and might invite communist aggression.

2. The Soviet armies are unlikely to pull back unless they are confident that local Communist governments (with the Red Army no more than 500 miles away) can stay in power. Furthermore, any rash of satellite revolts would only create new dangers and tensions, would probably lead to Soviet intervention in defiance of any disengagement agreement, and might thus trigger the very war we are trying to prevent.
3. The Soviets will never permit German reunification unless united Germany is prohibited from joining NATO, and NATO troops are banned from German soil. A "package" agreement, therefore, might bring about German reunification in exchange for neutralization and a mutual pullback of NATO and Soviet forces.

4. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have suffered in the past from German aggression, and are probably genuinely afraid of a unified, rearmed German state. A neutralized zone in Central Europe, including Germany, would thus contribute to a relaxation of cold war tensions.

5. NATO is not really an effective barrier to Soviet aggression anyhow. At best it is a trip wire to give us some warning of aggression, and to trigger U.S. retaliatory forces into action. Thus, we would lose very little by pulling NATO out of Central Europe but we might gain a great deal by getting Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe.

TEMPO studies predict that alliances such as NATO, made for strictly military purposes, will progressively become weaker. In their place economic alliances will grow in significance and may, in some cases, result in de facto political unification. Whether through military ties or through economic integration or both, U.S. strategists will encourage the formation of a United Western Europe, capable of controlling its own destiny and providing its own defense against the communist threat.
COMMUNIST CHINA

It has been said that no other question in the U.S. diplomatic history has so divided the American people as the question of our China policy. Up until the present time, the U.S. has denied diplomatic recognition to Communist China essentially on moral grounds. Opponents of this policy claim it is completely unrealistic and prejudicial to the best interest of the U.S. and the free world. Regardless of what is done or not done with regard to recognition, it seems imperative that the U.S. and the free world maintain the lines of communication to China because plainly she cannot be ignored in certain questions in international concern, such as world disarmament. Basically then, our future strategy toward China will, to a considerable degree, be determined by the diplomatic patterns we choose to erect between ourselves and China.

Some possible policies and programs on which a future strategy toward Communist China may be based are as follows:

Containment—political nonrecognition and economic and social embargo.

because:

1. China is guilty of grossly immoral actions toward the U.S. and is dedicated to the establishment of world communism.

2. Communist China stands condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations.

3. Communist China may capitulate from within.

4. We must bolster the resolution of the free nations of Asia to resist Communist China's policies.


because:

1. It is essential to establish a realistic policy as a final step in promoting economic and political competition with communism.
2. It would give us closer access to the Chinese people.

3. The United Nations cannot function as a world forum unless both free and communist nations are members of that organization.

Negotiation—exploration of possible areas of agreement leading to the gradual impressment of free world policies on Communist China.

because:

1. This policy would be designed to test the willingness of Communist China to coexist with the free world; would present a more positive approach and make possible a firmer basis for collective action.

JAPAN

Students of Southeast Asia claim that Japan represents the most rapidly changing noncommunist society in Asia today. These transitions are motivated primarily by a tremendous economic growth. The U.S. is the principal recipient of Japanese exports which are disturbingly competitive with American products. In short, any U.S. strategies toward Japan must necessarily be considered in the light of Japan's trade life line. The other major factor in the formulation of U.S. strategy toward Japan is the strong political sentiment against militarism and rearmament which pervades the entire nation and finds formal expression in the Japanese constitution. It is clearly evident that U.S. pressure for the rapid development of a military structure in Japan would merely create increased political tensions. In light of the above, some possible U.S. future strategies in Japan may be summarized as follows:

The United States should continue to support a stable, strong, friendly, anticommunist, democratic Japan without interfering in Japanese internal political and social affairs.

The United States should continue to foster a Japanese military establishment which can maintain internal order and become increasingly capable, with the assistance of U.S. forces, of resisting external aggressors.
SECTION VII

The United States should be prepared to reduce her armed forces in Japan as rapidly as the commercial, political, and military ties with Japan insure her strong alignment with the free world.

The United States should continue to sponsor Japan's admission to the U.N.

INDIA

Indian nationalism, like that of colonial areas in Asia and Africa, represents both a response to and a reaction against Western cultural and philosophic penetration. It has been said that "India is the hinge of fate in Asia...because of her special importance, representing as she does some 40% of the population in the uncommitted world, representing the one great counter to the ideological and economic forces of Red China, and symbolizing for all Asia the testing ground for Democracy under pressure." In recent years, the U.S. policy toward India has been criticized because it appears to be molded in terms of U.S. objectives in the cold war. Many Americans feel that the U.S. should have more positive objectives with respect to India's development.

In consideration of U.S. objectives implicit and implied in the SEATO organization and the nature and scope of U.S. aid programs in South and Southeast Asia, U.S. strategy toward India may be structured around some of the following principles:

1. Conduct relations with India in such a manner as to minimize fear of U.S. domination and to foster mutual understanding and friendship.

2. Continue to foster and promote a stable noncommunist government within the framework of the Indian constitution.

3. Strive to convince India's leaders that both Soviet and Chinese communism are expansionist.

4. Promote awareness of Indian nationalism at all levels of society through the use of semi-official or private endowed institutes and funds.
5. Encourage on the part of India a military posture of minimum proportions consistent with direct communist threats to her territorial integrity and to continue to encourage the entry of India into the South East Asia Treaty Organization.

6. Assist India to make a success of her own economic development plans within the cooperative program for the entire South and Southeast Asia areas.

Specifically:

1. grant low interest, long term loans

2. offer technical and other economic assistance

3. foster conditions conducive to the investment of private, foreign capital

4. encourage increased trade, particularly with the Free World.

DEFENSE STRATEGIES IN EUROPE AND ASIA

A presentation of possible U.S. strategies toward specific countries or power centers is necessarily somewhat misleading. It is usually more meaningful, in the broad context of this discussion, to associate national strategies to geographical areas. Accordingly, in the final portion of this section, an effort will be made to summarize by postulating possible U.S. strategies in Europe and in Southeast Asia.

EUROPE

Two principal defense strategies with respect to Western Europe emerged from World War II. The United Nations was to have the primary responsibility for maintaining the peace; and a U.S. - European coalition was to extend a defensive posture to the continent of Europe. The logic of the latter efforts could not be refuted. M. Paul Henri Spaak expressed this thought as follows:

"Twice within less than 25 years the democracies of Western Europe, the U.S., and Canada have faced terrible dangers.... Twice it has required military miracles to save them."
SECTION VII

It would be unpardonable to ignore the repeated lessons of history. Tremendous strides have been made in constructing a defense of Europe under the aegis of NATO; tremendous work remains to be done.

In the beginning, NATO strategists sought to counterbalance Soviet manpower by capitalizing on atomic weapons and other modern weapons. This strategem is under serious challenge today when the Soviets appear to have nuclear weapons in similar numbers.

As we enter into the IRBM-ICBM era of deterrence, the strategy of NATO will undergo transitions. With regard to the formulation of future military plans, one thing seems certain. Western Europe will continue to be the forward proximate testing ground for future strategies of force vis-a-vis the communist world.

ASIA

In Asia, the situation is entirely different. Cultural and ethnic ties are tenuous or nonexistent. The communist propaganda mill can grind relatively unhampered. Cries of "Yankee imperialism" have a more resounding ring of conviction and are re-echoed in the ruling bodies of Asian countries.

Here, the U.S. military strategy is less ambitious. Here, the defense of the free nations is based on the concept of maintaining local forces with sufficient strength to resist indirect aggression and to withstand an overt enemy attack until the power of the Western allies can be brought to bear. Large ground forces are not stationed in Asia. Reliance is placed upon air, land, and sea mobile forces to strike aggression rapidly and decisively. Basic to this defense strategy is the nuclear capability of air, land, and sea forces.

Scientific and technological advances have created a balance of terror between the communist world and the free world. More efforts will be focused on modernizing and developing the backward countries of Southeast Asia. Military aid is probably not the answer in itself. More intimate and imaginative nation-building action programs are required. The countries of Southeast Asia must be conditioned to weather internal communist subversion as well as external aggression. U.S. military power, as personified in SEATO will continue to be required; but the U.S. cannot depend upon the threat of force alone to hold Asia against the many-face efforts of communism.
SECTION VIII
NATIONAL STRATEGY AND NAVY MISSIONS

In the foregoing examination of national strategy, the authors have attempted to avoid an exclusively military (and in particular a service-oriented) viewpoint. It has been their aim in this report to supply the bases from which the reader can logically derive for himself the missions of the military services. As a final step of this report by the Future Navy Systems project team, the national objectives and strategies that have evolved will be briefly related to the role of the Navy in future warfare.

The discussion of the total war in the preceding section pointed out that the United States hopes to forestall strategic nuclear attack primarily through the deterrent effect of a United States nuclear strike force that stands ready to retaliate in kind. The strategic strike forces of the enemy similarly deter the United States from initiating the nuclear exchange and a stalemate is generated. These opposing strike forces, each occupied in deterring the other from its plan for destruction, play only a secondary role in deterring aggression on a lesser scale.

The examination of the nature of warfare in Section VI showed how the United States must be prepared to wage war under differing political and geographic constraints and under varying levels of violence. The ground rules of warfare may be chosen to some extent by the United States, but they will be determined at least in part by the choice of the enemy. Earlier (in Section IV) it was related how the United States, in its efforts to prevent low scale Communist aggression, has agreed to assist nearly all non-Communist nations in defending themselves against military attack. These commitments dictate that the United States have the means of supporting tactical warfare on any continent. This in turn requires that the lines of communications to our overseas allies be maintained secure.
In a study such as this, it is impossible to determine whether the tools of the Navy can more economically or more efficiently implement a national strategy than can those of another service. It should not be inferred that the naval missions described below are the exclusive province of the U.S. Navy. The scope of "Navy missions" as discussed herein encompasses any method where a national strategy can reasonably be implemented by a seaborne military force; and any method of fulfilling a defensive strategy against an enemy seaborne force.

NAVAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARFARE

Strategic Strike

The sea is in many aspects a favorable environment from which to operate retaliatory strike elements. The pros and cons of seaborne strategic strike force are discussed in brief below:

Reduced vulnerability through mobility. The oceans form a largely homogeneous operating medium, covering 70 percent of the surface of the earth. The seaborne weapon platforms whose domain is the wide ocean are by nature mobile. This inherent mobility permits seaborne retaliatory elements to deploy over a vast area of potential launch sites, and to redeploy with ease should the situation warrant. To oppose the threat of seaborne strike elements, the enemy is forced to spread his defensive forces thin in attempting to cover all potential launch areas simultaneously. In addition to the strategic advantage of employing mobility for dispersion and relocation, tactical mobility also tends to reduce vulnerability. Even if the position of a strike element should be known to the enemy, the normal movement of a naval unit during the period of flight of a weapon launched at it can cause the weapon to miss.

Strike elements separated from U.S. civilian and industrial base. If strategic nuclear warfare commences with a surprise attack on the United States, the U.S. retaliatory elements will undoubtedly be prime targets. Thermonuclear attacks on retaliatory bases must be expected incidentally to destroy nearby non-military targets by blast damage, with the subsequent fall-out damaging a much larger area. Seaborne retaliatory units, by contrast, can be located thousands of miles away from the United States population and industrial complex. Weapons allocated by the enemy to attack these seaborne strike bases will yield no dividend to the enemy in the form of incidental damage to adjacent areas of value. Conversely,
Concealment. In the case of submersible strategic strike platforms, the sea offers an additional advantage in the form of concealment. Enemy aircraft or satellites employing electromagnetic energy propagation search systems may detect surface or airborne targets at hundreds of miles range; nonetheless, the submerged submarine is virtually invisible to this type of search. The means available for searching for submerged submarines (principally acoustic energy transmission) are not analogous to high altitude electromagnetic search for two reasons. First, discrimination between submarine and non-submarine targets is most difficult; and second, the range of effectiveness of acoustic search is limited by undesired refraction of the energy ray path. An additional facet of concealment of strategic strike units has been demonstrated by the successful recent operations of U.S. nuclear submarines beneath the protective cover of the Arctic ice cap.

Other advantages vis-a-vis ICBM or intercontinental bomber. Relative to the alternative of basing strategic strike systems within the U.S., the sea-launched strategic weapon has the fundamental advantage of being closer to its target. The shorter weapon range yields two dividends; first the delivery agent necessary to transport a given amount of warhead to its target may be smaller in the seaborne case; and second, the flight time and hence the possible warning time available to the enemy is shorter.

Other advantages vis-a-vis IRBM or land-based tactical aircraft. The IRBM and the deployed tactical aircraft share with the sea-launched system the advantage of short weapon range. However, the seaborne weapon platform is free from the political encumbrances and uncertainties inherent in setting up and operating a U.S. strategic strike base on the soil of a foreign nation.

Podded missiles. In addition to submarine and ship launch platforms, a further exploitation of the sea for strategic strike warfare may come about through the development of a buoyant missile pod. Such a device would provide the ultimate in dispersion, concealment and mobility of U.S. retaliatory power. Podded missiles designed to be only slightly buoyant would be nearly invisible to detection from or above the sea surface. They would thus possess some of
the concealment advantage of the submarine with the added advantage of eliminating the concentration of missiles within one submarine platform.

Disadvantages of seaborne strike elements vis-à-vis land-based. The features of the ocean that make it advantageous in certain respects for basing of strategic strike units also introduce certain difficulties. First, the non-sovereign nature of the oceans that allows us to roam at will upon the high seas also permits the enemy to operate naval forces in proximity to ours. U.S. seaborne strike elements must be prepared to contend with enemy naval activity, including shadowing, harassment, attack in the opening moments of a general war, or possibly even pre-emptive attack. Second, communications with the deployed seaborne strike elements will be more complicated than with those elements located on a contiguous land mass that also contains the seat of government. Units deliberately dispersed and deployed far from the continental U.S. must rely generally upon radio communications, and must accept the uncertainties of radio propagation, its susceptibility to enemy countermeasures, and its inability to penetrate the ocean for communication with deep submarines. Third, seaborne launchers are less amenable to hardening than land launch bases. Although a land launch point can feasibly be surrounded with the mass necessary to harden it to hundreds of pounds overpressure, a ship is comparatively weight limited, and can be disabled or seriously damaged by relatively light overpressures. Submarines are built with high hull strength to withstand the hydrostatic pressures incident to diving to deep depths, but they are nonetheless vulnerable to underwater atomic shock damage.

Defense Against Strategic Strike

In defending the U.S. against strategic strike, the Navy logically is expected to provide the platforms for systems that will warn of (and perhaps counter) enemy strike elements or weapons approaching the U.S. from a seaward direction. These defensive functions include detection and tracking of intercontinental missiles and bombers, detection and tracking of sea-launched strategic weapons and their launch platforms; and possibly active systems to counter these weapons in flight. Paradoxically, the approach of low altitude strategic strike vehicles is more readily detected from high altitude sensor platforms than from shipboard detection systems. Land-
based warning aircraft can and do operate (currently under the jurisdiction of the Navy) to provide early warning of strategic attack on the U.S. through the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

In defending against sea-launched missile attack on the U.S., there are certain methods of defense in addition to those available for ICBM defense. First, naval units may be able to observe the movement of the launch platforms, and so be able to attack the platform and its remaining missiles when an overt act is committed. Second, the sea-launched missile is most susceptible to detection and interception while in the boost phase of its trajectory. Defensive units in the launch area may take advantage of this opportunity to destroy the missile in its vulnerable boost phase.

NAVAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO OVERT WARFARE OTHER THAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARFARE

In warfare following the strategic nuclear exchange, or in limited warfare short of the nuclear exchange, the Navy operates in its classical role. The Navy traditionally exercises a form of international power known as "control of the seas." This employment of the Navy is perhaps best described in the framework of the sea power concepts of the military philosopher Mahan. Under the Mahan concept, the oceans of the world are a series of highways. Along these highways, and outside the jurisdiction of any one nation, moves nearly all of the intercontinental commerce of the world. The magnitude of these ocean highways precludes a country from occupying the sea in the sense that a populated land area may be occupied by military forces. Sea warfare forces attempt only to dominate portions of these ship highways and so control the flow of ship-transported materials.

The separate missions that derive from the over-all objective of command of the sea fall into two basic categories—those concerned with control of shipping, and those relating to the interface between sea warfare and land warfare. Control of sea transportation includes denying the enemy the use of the sea for movement of men or goods; and conversely, insuring that one's own shipping (including seaborne movement of military forces) arrives safely at its destination despite enemy opposition. In the area of the land-sea interface, naval forces may be called upon to deliver ground forces ashore in enemy territory, to support coastal ground warfare, and to defend the U.S. and its allies from seaborne invasion.
Denying the Use of the Sea to Enemy Shipping

The land-locked nature of the Soviet and satellite land mass has inhibited the development of the USSR as a maritime power. Soviet oceanic trade, although increasing, is relatively small, and destroying the Soviet merchant fleet would not cripple the war-making potential of the Soviet Union. The mission of denying the use of the sea to Soviet shipping will be largely a preventive operation, to keep the Soviets from expanding their seaborne transportation system in order to relieve pressure on their overland communications lines.

Protection of Friendly Shipping

In contrast to the USSR, the United States is dependent upon overseas lines of communication to insure a supply of raw materials for its industrial complex. As the "arsenal of democracy," the U.S. must be prepared to sustain its allies with a outgoing flow of supplies and war materiel. This essential two-way flow takes place largely upon the surface of the sea. In time of war, this flow would be threatened by the sizeable Soviet submarine fleet. Although submarine warfare has never in itself been decisive in bringing an enemy to terms, innovations in undersea warfare make the modern submarine an order of magnitude more potent than previously in anti-shipping warfare. First, to defend against submarine-launched tactical nuclear weapons, surface forces will operate in widely dispersed formations, thereby reducing the density of coverage provided by integral close-defense units. Second, the nuclear power package now available for submarine propulsion frees the submarine from the necessity to expose any part of itself above the surface; hence it is less detectible to surface or airborne search. Additionally, the nuclear submarine has equal or greater speed than its target; it may overtake its quarry and attack at will, where its World War II predecessor could only lie in wait for a target to pass within range. The solutions to the problem of protecting shipping against the nuclear submarine threat are not clear at this time.

Amphibious Assault and Support of Ground Warfare

Sea transport of armies is as old as Western civilization. However the technological advances of the twentieth century have brought into being a new form of military sea-ground operation—the assault delivery of troops ashore in the face of enemy resistance and in the absence of port facilities in the objective area. The means
for such an operation are the ground forces themselves; the trans-
ports for overseas movement of the force; the craft for delivering
the troops and their equipment across the sea-ground interface; and
the seaborne ordnance delivery systems to provide fire support to
the advancing troops.

Support of land warfare by naval platforms may continue after the
ship-to-shore movement is completed. In addition, seaborne sup-
port may be supplied to troops engaged in coastal ground warfare,
whether or not assault landing operations are involved. Such sup-
port may be logistic—maintaining a pipeline of supplies to the field
forces—or it may take the form of tactical support of ground com-
bat. The extent to which tactical support is possible depends pri-
marily upon the maximum range of the seaborne ordnance delivery
systems.

Defense Against Amphibious Assault

As a corollary to the amphibious assault mission, the naval element
must be prepared to defend the U.S. and its allies from enemy
amphibious attack. Sea warfare forces to deny an enemy success
in amphibious operations need not be uniquely configured elements.
In fact, naval units capable of destruction of enemy shipping and
those capable of defending friendly shipping from attack will prob-
able be potent instruments for repelling amphibious attack. The
mission of defending against amphibious assault is therefore not
likely to engender requirements for specialized naval forces, as
was the case with the offensive amphibious mission.

The prospect of an amphibious attack on the continental United States
is remote. However, the threat is real to some of our allies. In
particular, the Chinese Nationalist holdings are susceptible to in-
vansion from the mainland. Although the Chinese Communists lack
modern amphibious forces, the prospect of a massive movement of
troops across a short body of water poses a serious threat to the
security of the off-shore islands.

COLD WAR NAVAL MISSIONS

In this era of the cold war, the line between diplomacy and military
action has blurred. As was discussed in the previous section on
political limitations on warfare, the occasion for legitimate military
activity of the "shooting war" type is no longer unambiguously
presented. For this reason, it has become popular to ascribe to the military forces of the U.S. certain cold war missions separate from their functions in overt warfare.

The concept of cold war missions separate from hot war missions is unnecessary. The purpose of the military forces during the absence of war is to be prepared for war. Preparedness involves: (1) correctly anticipating the outbreak of warfare, (2) having forces in being, trained and deployed so as to act decisively when the overt military operation is required. This preparedness can have a deterrent affect upon the outbreak of war. In fact, it is generally the hope of the U.S. that demonstrations of preparedness will deter the enemy, and so make the execution of the operation unnecessary. It is therefore sometimes easy to confuse a military movement that has implications of a threatening gesture with the mission of readiness to carry out the threat should such action become necessary. The use of military forces for "bluffing" operations is unlikely, and, if employed, would probably not remain long unchallenged.

Demonstrations of real strength, on the other hand, have an essential place in the peacetime operations of the fleet. Such action can vary from purely good will visits and other cruises to demonstrate American cordiality and friendship, to "saber rattling" operations such as the appearance of a naval force off the shore of a country in need of help or in need of admonition. If such demonstration of power is to help forestall an undesirable political action, the presence of the force and its capability must be known to the potential offender. Hence, visible demonstrations for deterrent purposes will generally be applicable only in limited war situations. Deterrence of the all-out nuclear exchange must be achieved by more subtle means.

MISSION SUMMARY

The future missions of the sea warfare element of the U.S. Armed Forces can be summarized in briefest terms as follows:

1. Participate in the strategic nuclear strike by delivering strategic weapons from seaborne launch platforms.

2. Assist in defending against enemy strategic nuclear strike elements that approach the U.S. from seaward.
3. Deny the enemy the use of sea transport.
5. Conduct amphibious assault landings and support coastal ground warfare.
6. Defend the U.S. and allies from amphibious attack.
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