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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD395964</td>
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**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LIMITATION CHANGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FROM:**


**AUTHORITY**

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980
SECURITY
MARKING

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

COACSFOR

SUBJECT: Operational Report/Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 14th Combat Aviation Battalion

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-13. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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Major General, USA
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14th Combat Aviation Battalion

USAF Air Ground Operations School. ATTN: Senior Army Officer
CONFFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 14TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96325

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities
   a. General:

   (1) The mission of the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion is to provide timely, direct and general aviation support to the Americal Division (23rd Infantry Division) and selected units within the I Corps Tactical Zone. There were no significant changes or additions to the battalion's mission. Tactical relationship with the Americal Division was directed by General Order 951, Headquarters, USARV, 1 March 1968 and General Order 1357, Headquarters, USARV, 27 March 1968, which changed the status of the battalion from attached to OPCON to the division.

   (2) The key personnel changes during this reporting period are as follows:

   (a) The 14th Combat Aviation Battalion was commanded by LTC Charles A. Klopp, 071 820, Infantry.

   (b) The Executive Officer was LTC Dale H. Hurst, 096 989, TC.

   (c) The S1 was Major Stanley L. Sorenson, 04 030 842, Infantry.

   (d) The Former S2 was 1LT Robert F. Bertrand, 05 314 378, Infantry. Major Stuart K. Purka served in this position from 5 October till 28 October 1968. 1LT James R. Hipp, 05 243 879, CE, assumed duties on 29 October 1968.

   (e) The former S3 was Major John R. Burden, 090 687, Artillery. Major John M. Gramseder, OF 113 661 assumed duties on 29 August 1968.

   (f) The S4 was Major James R. Kemmer, 082 703, TC.

   (g) The commanding officers for the companies of the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion are:

Inclosure 1
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 142nd Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R) (U)

15 November 1968

15th

SCHINDLER, Marvin F., CPT
05 322 177 Inf
15 Apr 68

71st

McGINNIS, Dehne W., MAJ
05 702 914 Arty
5 June 68

174th

GIBSON, Glen D., MAJ
04 010 454 Arty
2 Feb 68

176th

TUTTLE, Jerry N., MAJ
05 301 564 Inf
16 May 68

132nd

JOINER, Jack D., LTC
04 226 624 CE
14 Dec 67

178th

JESSUP, Morris R., MAJ
073 506 TC
28 June 68

b. S1

(1) The consolidated battalion strength, to include a breakdown by rated and non-rated personnel, as of 31 Oct 68 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>OVER/SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WD</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>1,283</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>+57</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATED</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WD</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>179</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The individual unit strengths are as shown below:
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF Auth/OH</th>
<th>MD Auth/OH</th>
<th>EM Auth/OH</th>
<th>TOT Auth/C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQD &amp; Br Staff</td>
<td>15/18</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>69/94</td>
<td>87/116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th City Plat</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>60/56</td>
<td>60/66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>534th Med Det</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>8/6</td>
<td>9/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71st AHG</td>
<td>15/15</td>
<td>52/46</td>
<td>152/156</td>
<td>219/217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th Sig Det</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>8/5</td>
<td>9/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151st TC Det</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>74/67</td>
<td>72/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174th AHG</td>
<td>15/17</td>
<td>52/45</td>
<td>152/144</td>
<td>219/206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176th AHG</td>
<td>15/18</td>
<td>52/47</td>
<td>152/159</td>
<td>219/224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411th TC Det</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>70/69</td>
<td>72/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>454th Sig Det</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>8/8</td>
<td>9/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132nd ASHC</td>
<td>13/6</td>
<td>25/18</td>
<td>143/143</td>
<td>181/167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th TC Det</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>80/93</td>
<td>82/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178th ASHC</td>
<td>13/7</td>
<td>25/18</td>
<td>149/137</td>
<td>187/152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400th TC Det</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>80/86</td>
<td>82/88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th CAB</td>
<td>93/88</td>
<td>220/186</td>
<td>1283/1341</td>
<td>1599/1515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Civilian strengths as of 31 Oct 68 are as follows:
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

UNIT | DAC Auth/OH | VI Auth/OH | 3rd NAT Auth/OH | CONTRACTOR Auth/OH
---|---|---|---|---
HED | 0/0 | 7/7 | 0/0 | 1/1 *
71st AHG | 0/0 | 11/11 | 0/0 | 2/2 **
174th AHG | 0/0 | 11/11 | 0/0 | 2/2 **
176th AHG | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 3/2 **
132nd ASHC | 0/0 | 10/10 | 0/0 | 3/3 **
178th ASHC | 0/0 | 50/49 | 0/0 | 13/12
14th CAB | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0

* Bell Helicopter Technical Representative
** Sheet metal personnel from "LSI" under control of 34th General Support Group.

(4) As of 31 October 1968, significant MOS shortages of the 14th CAB were as follows:

OFFICER/AD

MOS | Authorized/Assumed
---|---
941A Food Service Technician | 1/0

ENLISTED MEN

| MOS | Description | Authorized/Assumed |
---|---|---|
05C20 | Radio TT Operator | 14/13 |
05C040 | Radio TT Team Chief | 4/3 |
11B10 | Security Guard | 4/1/1 |
31B20 | Field Radio Repairman | 4/2 |
31G040 | Comm Chief | 6/2 |
31Q20 | Avn Electronics Eqpt Mech. | 1/0 |
31K20 | Avn Elec Eqpt Rpm | 13/11 |
31P40 | Avn Flt Team Chief | 3/0 |
45J20 | Acft Armorment Rpm | 16/10 |
63A10 | Wheel Veh Mech Apprentice | 8/1 |
63G40 | Motor Sergeant | 4/2 |
67H40 | Flat Sgt/Maint Sup/Shop Foreman | 30/22 |
67U30 | Rotary Tech Instr | 6/3 |
67H20 | Helicopter Tech Instr | 21/11 |
68A10 | Airframe Mech Apprentice | 16/0 |
68B20 | Acft Eng Rpm | 25/18 |
68G20 | Airframe Rpm | 28/19 |
71H20 | Personnel Sp/Company Ck | 21/6 |
71F20 | Flt Opsn Spec | 15/5 |
71T20 | Maint Data Spec | 5/0 |
76A10 | Supply Clerk | 12/7 |
76T20 | Acft Supply Parts Spec | 21/16 |
76L20 | Acft Real Handling Spec | 28/19 |
76X40 | Supply Sgt | 12/8 |
93B20 | Senior Control Tower Operator | 12/9 |
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

c. S2

(1) During this reporting period the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion had 178 aircraft hit by enemy fire. This figure represents an increase of 17% from the preceding quarter.

(2) An analysis of these hits by altitude is reflected below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALTITUDE</th>
<th>O.G.</th>
<th>T.O.</th>
<th>LANDING</th>
<th>ENROUTE</th>
<th>TARGET ATTACK</th>
<th>TOTAL HIT ALT.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1000</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1200</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNK</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The weather had a great effect on aircraft operations during the month of October. Due to the N3 monsoon, which had penetrated into RVN in late September, weather conditions were characterised by heavy precipitation (an average of 6-18" per month) and ground fog, resulting in poor visibility and low ceilings. The poor weather and increased enemy activity in the area of operations accounted for this increase in aircraft hits.

d. S3 Operations

(1) During this reporting period the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion provided continuous support for the Americal Division. This period's operational highlights involving two or more assault helicopter companies are shown below:

5 CONFIDENTIAL
15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, MACV CPFOR-65 (R1) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE OF CA</th>
<th>UNIT INVOLVED</th>
<th>NO. OF SORTIES</th>
<th>1ST. AIR SUPPORT ORDER</th>
<th>NO.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug 68</td>
<td>D/3</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>68-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Aug 68</td>
<td>5/46</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>68-17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Aug 68</td>
<td>3/1</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>68-18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug 68</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>68-19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Aug 68</td>
<td>5th ARVN Regt</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>68-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Aug 68</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>68-21</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Aug 68</td>
<td>D/4/21</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>68-22</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Sep 68</td>
<td>A&amp;I 4/3</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>68-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sep 68</td>
<td>LAB 3/1</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>68-25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sep 68</td>
<td>4/3</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>68-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sep 68</td>
<td>1/6 Bn 6th ARVN Regt</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>68-27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sep 68</td>
<td>3/1</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>68-28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sep 68</td>
<td>4/3</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>68-29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sep 68</td>
<td>4/3</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>68-30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Sep 68</td>
<td>1/6 ARVN Regt</td>
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<td>68-32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Sep 68</td>
<td>4th ARVN Regt</td>
<td>1369</td>
<td>68-33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3/1</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>68-34</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Sep 68</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>68-35</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Sep 68</td>
<td>1/46</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>68-36</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Sep 68</td>
<td>4/31</td>
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<td>68-37</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>4/21</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>68-38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Oct 68</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>68-39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Oct 68</td>
<td>4/21</td>
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<td>68-40</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>4/21</td>
<td>247</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Oct 68</td>
<td>5/46</td>
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<td>68-42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Oct 68</td>
<td>4/21</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>68-43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Oct 68</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>5/46</td>
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<td>249</td>
<td>68-46</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4/3 &amp; 3/1</td>
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<td>68-47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct 68</td>
<td>3/1 &amp; 4/3</td>
<td>675</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Oct 68</td>
<td>4/3 &amp; 6/11</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>68-49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Units other than the Americal Division were supported as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OTHER UNITS</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT COMMITTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct</td>
<td>5th Special Forces</td>
<td>2 UH-1H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct</td>
<td>III MAF (FOB 1 &amp; 4)</td>
<td>2 UH-1H &amp; 1 UH-1H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sep - 7 Oct</td>
<td>MACVTHAI</td>
<td>1G-47 (see Incl 4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, ROG CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

In addition to the operations listed above the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion supported the Amorical Division with from 27 to 35 HL-11 and from 4 to 12 CH-47D aircraft daily. Normally, the 14th CAB provides one HL-11 command and control and one HL-11 utility aircraft for each infantry battalion each day.

(3) The following operations in the Americal Division Area of Operations were supported by the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion during this reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>DATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weaver/Wallowa</td>
<td>198th LIB and 1/1 Cav</td>
<td>Began 11 Nov 67, continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burlington Trail</td>
<td>198th LIB and 1/1 Cav</td>
<td>8 Apr 68, continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk Victory II</td>
<td>11th LIB</td>
<td>Terminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dale Common</td>
<td>11th LIB</td>
<td>Began 10 Oct 68, terminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19 Oct 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Grove</td>
<td>11th LIB</td>
<td>Began 4 Sep 68, terminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23 Sep 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logan Field</td>
<td>11th LIB</td>
<td>Began 7 Oct, terminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 Oct 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vernon Lake</td>
<td>11th LIB</td>
<td>Began 15 Oct, continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pocahontas Forest</td>
<td>196th LIB</td>
<td>Began 6 Jul, terminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Aug 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jukes Glade</td>
<td>196th LIB</td>
<td>Began 2 Oct, terminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 Oct 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) This period's operational results are reflected in Inclosure 3.

(5) The 14th Combat Aviation Battalion aircraft status is reflected in Inclosure 2.

(6) The 14th Combat Aviation Battalion sustained a total of 5 rocket and/or mortar attacks during this reporting period.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

15 November 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE    UNIT    RESULTS

23 Aug 68  178th ASHC  5 UH-47B Light damage

24 Aug 68  174th ARDC  2 UH-47B Moderate damage

22 Sep 68  174th ARDC  1 UH-1D Moderate damage

22 Sep 68  176th ARDC  3 UH-1H Moderate damage

22 Sep 68  176th ARDC  3 UH-1H Light damage

26 Oct 68  174th ARDC  1 UH-1E Moderate damage

26 Oct 68  176th ARDC  3 Vehicles Light damage

e. Training

It is always difficult for units operating in a combat environment to adhere to rigid training schedules. Therefore, the majority of the 14th CAB is OJT or skill type training. It is also recognized, however, that a certain amount of classroom or non-skill type training is necessary to make each unit completely combat effective. During this reporting period revisions were made to the 14th CAB training program in order to re-emphasize this classroom training and specifically to provide for periodic review of the annual training requirements. Training schedules are submitted on a monthly basis, affording the units flexibility necessary to conduct this type of training.

Aircrew proficiency training is conducted as OJT during all operations. Next flight training subjects are integrated into the everyday missions. Emphasis has been placed on instrument subjects with the beginning of the monsoon season. The 14th CAB's continued practice of assigning the most experienced aircraft commanders with the newly arrived aviators has been quite effective. During this reporting period, a program has been instituted whereby each company is assigned one aircraft per day as a training aircraft, when required. This enables each company to keep its flight training current.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RO/ COR-65 (R1) (U)

f. Logistics and Maintenance

(1) Class I - A critical shortage of rations developed at the 174th AHC which is stationed at Due Pho. Substitute items were not issued when the required food items were not in stock. Condiments, flour, milk, fresh vegetables were extremely limited. The principal cause of the problem was lack of transportation from Da Nang and Dalat. The ration problem exists in all units that are stationed at Due Pho. The situation is improving slowly.

(2) Class II and IV - Issue of NOMEX flight suits has been completed to the three assault helicopter companies assigned to the 14th CAB. NOMEX flight suits are still not available for crew members assigned to the two assault support helicopter companies. NOMEX flight gloves have not been issued to this battalion. A critical shortage of leather flying gloves exists in all units at the present time. All efforts to obtain flying gloves have been unsuccessful. Critical shortages still exist in firefighting equipment and ballistic helmets.

(3) Class III - Ten (10) Forward Area Refueling Equipment (FARE) kits have been issued to the battalion. However, due to a shortage of collapsible fuel containers, organic refueling facilities would be inadequate to service all companies if the 14th CAB was required to displace to a forward location. Collapsible fuel containers have been on requisition since February 1966. Current availability of refueling equipment is adequate to meet mission commitments in a fixed base operation.

(4) Class V - No significant events.

(5) Base Development - The 176th AHC is currently located in the danger zone of a recently completed ASP. The unit has been directed to move to a new location which is approximately 500 meters north of its present area. The aircraft parking and troop containment areas are currently in the planning stages at the Base Development Office of the Americal Division.

(6) Maintenance

(a) Aircraft availability during the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UH-1D/H</th>
<th>UH-1C</th>
<th>CH-47B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1966, HC3 CSFUX-65 (R1) (U)

(b) Aircraft mission ready availability during the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UL-1D/H</th>
<th>UI-1C</th>
<th>CH-47B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Repair parts for CH-47's remained critical during this period. The rebuild facility of the FAMF ship provided outstanding support and spare parts to complete the majority of 3rd PS's on the assigned CH-47D helicopters by accomplishing the vertical hinge pin and bearing rotation inspection on the front and aft heads. Cracked formers in three CH-47 helicopters of the 178th ABHC and one in the 122nd ASHC were finally repaired by a factory modification. Sheetmetal assistance for the repair and installation of the formers was provided by LSI contract personnel on duty with the 335th Transportation Company (ADS).

(d) The transition from UL-1D to UL-1H helicopters was completed in October with the turn-in for retrograde of the last two UL-1D helicopters. On hand at the close of this reporting period are fifty-seven UL-1H helicopters and twenty-one UL-1C helicopters.

(e) The availability of repair parts for UL-1 aircraft has increased. Special efforts have been made to deliver T-53-L-11 and L-13 engines within five days. With few exceptions this deadline has been met. However, other items, such as Main Rotor Hubs, Tail Rotor Hubs and Tail Booms for UL-1C and UL-1H helicopters, are causing lengthy MORS time loss.

(f) Vehicle spare parts supply remained at a low level during August and September. Command emphasis both on the 388th Maintenance Company and on the Unit Motor Pools to properly requisition parts resulted in an increase of spare parts during the month of October. Other than excess vehicles which have been authorised, all excess vehicles have been turned in or transferred out of the battalion. The overall vehicle availability for the battalion is now more realistic with approximately 65% availability. The majority of vehicles deadlined are in Direct Support Maintenance.

(g) Personnel problems concerning maintenance qualified personnel remained stable in all areas except for aircraft armament repairmen, MOS 45J20. This battalion is authorised 13 repairmen. At the close of this period, we are short 6. Of the remaining 7 repairmen, two DEMOS in November, two DEMOS in December and one departs in April 1969. In addition to submitting an emergency requisition for these personnel, we have requested additional quotas for the in-country armament subsystem repair course. This should provide temporary relief of this shortage of personnel.

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15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOX-65 (R) (U)

g. Other: (To include Civil Affairs, Commo, and Chaplain's Comments)

(1) Chaplain's Comments

Religious coverage for personnel in the 14th CAB is provided in three ways: Voluntary worship services, counselling-pastoral contacts, and character guidance.

(a) Worship Services. Each Sunday the battalion chaplain, CPT Thomas N. Warna conducts five Protestant Worship Services. Four of these are morning services held at the battalion chapel, 132nd ASIC area, 71st AHC flight line, and the American Combat Training Center Chapel. Masses are conducted at the battalion chapel every Sunday morning and on Holy days of Obligation by the American Division Chaplain. Jewish personnel are encouraged to attend the Jewish service at the American Chapel every Friday evening. One Roman Catholic and one Protestant service are conducted every Sunday at the 174th AHC at Da Nang by chaplains of the 11th Brigade, American Division.

(b) The Battalion Chaplain is consulted for counseling and makes frequent pastoral visits to all the company work areas, mess halls and clubs.

(c) The 14th CAB has adopted the American Division's Character Guidance Program by distributing the Division's monthly topic summary hand-out to all companies. The companies supplement the hand-out with brief amplifications by commander or chaplain.

(2) The 14th Combat Aviation Battalion Civil Affairs Program, under the direction of the Battalion Chaplain (Warna, Thomas N., CPT, 02 332 781, CHC) and Flight Surgeon (Murgler, James N., CPT, 05 718 995, MC) continues to provide the bulk of financial and guidance support for the eighty five children at the Tabitha Protestant Orphanage at An-Tan. Each month, voluntary contributions from 14th CAB personnel are received, converted to piasters, and then presented to the orphanage supervisors. Combined with occasional financial support from congregations in the US and regular support from the 12th HAC chaplain's office, the 14th CAB contributes from 60,000 to 95,000 piasters to the orphanage each month. Other contributions, such as medical care, clothing, sewing machines, building materials, and eating utensils are coordinated through the 14th CAB chaplain. The company not supporting this orphanage is the 174th AHC which supports another orphanage at Da Nang.

(3) Battalion Communications

(a) During the period 1 August to 31 October 1968, the battalion communications center, supervised by 1LT Garbow, Christopher, SIG C, 05 339 163, has installed a radio-teletype in the communications center. In addition, the communications center has continued to operate: landline teletype, high frequency radio, and the backup radio-teletype, mounted in a 3 ton truck (AN/VEC-2).
15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, NS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

(b) At the present time 90% of the battalion aircraft have been retrofitted to accept the TSEC/XI-26. The battalion communications section will receive 100 XY-28's within the next 2 weeks and begin installing them in aircraft. Before installation is complete, the aircraft wiring must be modified to return volume control to the AN/ARC-54 control head. This modification is presently being made to all battalion aircraft.

2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Mal-assignment of experienced aviators

(a) Observation: This unit continues to lose experienced CI-47 aviators to assignments not in accord with their capabilities.

(b) Evaluation: This unit continues to lose experienced CI-47 aviators to duties not involving the CI-47. Replacements are arriving at a slow rate and are, for the most part, right out of flight training. This required an extensive training program before they become operationally qualified.

(c) Recommendation: That experienced CI-47 aviators not be reassigned to duties not connected with CI-47 operations.

(2) MOS Shortage

(a) Observation: There is a critical shortage of personnel within the battalion school trained in the 71B and 71P MOS's.

(b) Evaluation: This shortage of qualified personnel imposes a hardship on the battalion. It requires extensive training and working personnel outside their MOS.

(c) Recommendation: That all units in USARV be screened for excess personnel in these MOS's and if available, that they be reassigned to fill shortages existing in other units.

b. Operations:

(1) Lost Time in Pick-up Zone

(a) Observation: On occasion, during assault operations, there are a few disoriented troops in the pick-up zone who are unable to locate an available seat in one of the lift aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: We have found that time is sometimes lost unnecessarily in the PA due to the last few infantry personnel crossing from aircraft to aircraft for a space. To alleviate the problem we have any ship, not loaded to the ACL, turn on its rotating beacon. The ground troops are briefed as to the meaning of the light prior to the operation. This system has worked quite effectively and reduced PA times considerably.

(c) Recommendation: That other units adopt this technique as part of their PA SOP. That ground units continue to place emphasis on correct troop count, and distribution of troops into planned ACL's.

(2) Multiple Landing Zones

(a) Observation: Ground commanders, when planning operations with multiple landing zones, do not always provide sufficient separation for effective pre-strikes and suppressive fires on all landing zones.

(b) Evaluation: When ground commanders select multiple landing zones with inadequate separation between the landing zones, they restrict the supporting aviation unit on the use of suppressive fires without providing landing zone security. On several occasions, combat assaults have been made into an insecure landing zone without suppressive fire. This was necessitated by the close proximity of friendly troops in a previous landing zone.

(c) Recommendation: That ground commanders be encouraged to select landing zones with adequate separation to allow suppressive fires.

(3) Dropped Loads and Sling Load Techniques

(a) Observation: The battalion has experienced an excessive number of dropped loads due to faulty rigging equipment and improperly rigged loads.

(b) Evaluation: The use of damaged or old rigging equipment and faulty rigging techniques is becoming a major problem to this battalion. Loads dropped during the quarter numbered 14. Ten were caused by rigging equipment failure. One was dropped due to improper rigging, two were dropped intentionally by aircraft receiving hits from heavy enemy fire, and one was dropped intentionally when an aircraft inadvertently entered IFR conditions at slow airspeed. The primary problem appears to be the lack of adherence to sling time use restrictions and/or lack of replacement equipment when straps and nets become old and unserviceable. In some instances, the lack of training in proper rigging procedures and hook up procedures was readily apparent and were corrected prior to hook up. This does not permit the aircraft crew to land and inspect all loads prior to picking them up, however. This battalion has formed a mobile training team for the purpose of instructing the proper rigging and hook up techniques. The team also instructs on its maintenance, service life and replacement of rigging equipment. At the present
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1966, ACS OCPAR-65 (R1) (U)

The mobile training team is in the process of instructing all the supported units within the American Division. In addition, the American Division Combat Center is presenting a class on rigging techniques to all replacements coming into the division.

(c) Recommendation: That all supported units be required to adhere to the service life of all rigging equipment and that requisitions for rigging equipment be filled on a priority basis.

(4) Frequency Coordination Problems

(a) Observation: Units in the field are continually using alternate radio frequencies without notifying the aviation units.

(b) Evaluation: There have been many instances where the pilots would attempt to contact a unit on their assigned frequency without notifying the aviation units. In most cases, the supported unit had changed to an alternate frequency which was not listed in the pilot's SOI. As a result, many flying hours are wasted when the pilot has to call the next higher headquarters to obtain correct frequencies.

(c) Recommendation: All units should notify the Division Aviation Officer immediately upon implementation of alternate call signs or frequencies. The DAO should, in turn, notify this battalion of the change to facilitate resupply operations.

(5) Air Mission Commanders

(a) Observation: Some ground units have had difficulty in controlling their aviation assets and thus increase their reaction time to changes in the tactical situation.

(b) Evaluation: With the increased number of spontaneous operations by the American Division during this reporting period, the Brigade Aviation Officers have experienced difficulty in locating, organizing, and controlling their aviation assets. To alleviate this problem, the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion assigns an Air Mission Commander (AMC) to each of the supported brigades each day. The AMC identifies himself to the Brigade Aviation Officer each morning and is available to take charge of the planning and organization of any quick-notice missions.

(c) Recommendation: Other units with a similar support mission should consider a specific program to insure qualified personnel are always available as Air Mission Commanders.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 November 1968


6. Training

Helicopter Mechanic Training Deficiency

(a) Observation: That newly assigned CH-47 aircraft mechanics are not properly trained before assignment to Vietnam.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel with NOS's of 67020 (Helicopter Mechanic) and 67A10 (Helicopter Mechanic's Helper) coming directly from maintenance school (CONUS) were found to be, on the whole, lacking in the desired skill level required of a technician performing maintenance on a complex aircraft such as the CH-47D helicopter. It has been found that the average new mechanic has received a "broad brush" introduction to maintenance which has done little more than familiarise him with his tool box. In order to overcome this deficiency, this battalion has established a program designed to provide the replacement with on-the-job training and maximum supervision by qualified NCO's. With this program, it takes approximately 3 months in country to qualify an individual to perform the duties of the NOS awarded him in CONUS.

(c) Recommendation: That in the aircraft mechanics school more emphasis be placed in the following areas:

1. Major component removal
3. TM 30-750

7. Intelligence: None

8. Logistics:

(1) ENSURE Items of Equipment

(a) Observation: ENSURE items of equipment are issued without proper documentation.

(b) Evaluation: Recent issues of ENSURE equipment without proper documentation have caused an additional workload at the unit level. In most cases, authorization for issue of the items cannot be found. In one case, the equipment arrived in October 1968. After a thorough search of files, the message authorizing the equipment was found. The message was dated in May 1967. Complete entries in the property book cannot be made until all information is available.

CONFIDENTIAL

15
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15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, MSG CSFOR-63 (R1) (U)

(c) Recommendation: All issues of EHSRE equipment should be accompanied by documentation giving the letter or message which authorizes the item and the quantity authorized to be on hand during the evaluation period.

(2) Replacement Parts for Flight Helmets

(a) Observation: A shortage of replacement flight helmets and repair parts exists in this unit.

(b) Evaluation: Repair parts have been ordered to repair old helmets to extend their life. Repair parts do not seem to be available in country. Requisitions have been passed to major depots but to date have not been filled. Clear visors have been placed on routine and priority requisitions. These have also not been filled.

(c) Recommendation: That continued attention be given to filling requisitions of items involving aviation safety.

(3) Excess Equipment Turn-in

(a) Observation: The procedures for turn-in of serviceable, excess repair parts creates a backlog and a storage problem.

(b) Evaluation: Under the present turn-in system, the time span is too great between the listing of the parts and the final disposition instructions.

(c) Recommendation: Excess serviceable aircraft parts should be turned in on a specific day to the local Direct Support unit without having to await disposition instructions from AQM.

f. Organization: None

g. Other: None

3. (U) Section III: Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information

Escape, Evasion and Survival
The 14th Combat Aviation Battalion has not had any experience in the areas of escape, evasion and survival during this reporting period. However, training in those areas is being conducted with emphasis on the use of the URC/10 survival radio and other survival equipment.

CHARLES A. KLOPP
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

3 copies THRU: 16th Cbt Avn Op
THRU: 1st Avn Bde
THRU: USARV
THRU: USARPAC
TO: ACSROR, DA
2 copies to: USARPAC
3 copies to: USARV
2 copies to: 1st Avn Bde (Info)
1 copy to: 16th Cbt Avn Op
10 copies to: Americal Division
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGM-SC (19 Nov 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Operational Report Lessons Learned (ORLL)

DA, Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96337

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96384

1. (U) Transmitted herewith is one (1) copy of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion letter, Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (Report Control Symbol CSFOR - 65).

2. (C) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the basic report with the following exception.

   Page 12 para 2(a) Personnel: Mal-assignment of CH-47 aviators appears to be an internal problem within the 14th CAB. There has been only one case of a CH-47 aviator, during the period of this report, being transferred out of this unit. This aviator is now the 16th Cbt Avn Cp Standardization Officer and as such, is still involved in the operation of CH-47 helicopters.

WILLIAM C. TYRELL
COLONEL, CE
Commanding
1. This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as issued, except for the following:

a. Paragraph 2a(2), page 12. Nonconcur. The battalion reflects an overage of 26 enlisted personnel in paragraph 1b(2) of this report and reveals that the lift and lift staff exceeds its enlisted authorized strength by 25 personnel. This headquarters distributes personnel to group level, where further assignments are made to battalions within the group. As of 31 October 1968, the 16th CAG reported the following status on MOS listed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASG</th>
<th>Over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7LB</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7LA</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7LP</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corrective action can and should be taken by the 16th CAG to resolve this problem. 16th CAG will be requested to take appropriate action by this headquarters.

b. Paragraph 2b(1), page 12. Nonconcur with this technique being adopted as SOP. The practice of indicating spaces on a lift helicopter by displaying the rotating beacon indicates a lack of adequate planning and organization in the PZ by the lifted unit and lack of coordination between the lift and lifted units. Men who must search for a helicopter with space on it will in most cases be separated from their squads or platoons destroying the tactical integrity of the lifted unit. In cases where helicopter icons are not established in advance, it is not known if all personnel are accounted for when the lift departs the PZ.
AVFA-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1966, RG CSFOR-65 (K1) (U)

delays caused by men being required to run possibly the length of the PZ are unacceptable in a secure area and during an extraction could result in the entire flight being placed in jeopardy. The PZ should be organized so that the helicopters spend the minimum time on the ground.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 1f(1), page 9. Findings have been relayed to Gt J C Gather, Director of Food, 1st Log Command, on problem areas from the 174th AHC at Hue Pho. Further the Food Advisor from the 16th CAG was instructed to devote particular attention to the problem area. Brigade Food Service Supervisor will personally visit Da Nang Support Command, to determine why items are not available for issue and corrective action taken by the Support Command.

b. Paragraph 1f(2), page 9. Shortage of Nomex Flight Gloves and ballistic helmets exists Vietnam wide. All combat aviation groups have been notified to requisition required quantities. The current status of these items is as follows:

(1) Nomex Flight gloves have been requisitioned by USAICOV and should start arriving in mid December 1966.

(2) Ballistic helmets, both small and medium helmets have been requested by USAICOV and are programmed to arrive in SVN sometime in Jan 69. All Brigade units have been notified to requisition AH-1 helicopters to meet requirements until ballistic helmets become available.

(3) Nomex Flight Uniform. Requisitions for Nomex Flight Uniform were submitted by the Groups by sizes to Brigade Headquarters. Issues were made to the Groups in accordance with requisitions submitted. There are sufficient quantities of Nomex Flight uniforms in all sizes currently in country. Units have been instructed to submit requisitions, by sizes, in a timely manner through normal supply channels.

c. Paragraph 1f(3), page 9. Units sent to a forward area for operations would be issued fuel in 500 gallon collapsible drums which is compatible with the forward area refueling equipment (FAE).

d. Paragraph 1f(6)(e), page 10. Lack of parts in question is due to lack of production capability in CONUS.

ea. Paragraph 2e(1), page 15. At present there is only one ENSPLE item in the 1st Aviation Brigade, the Clark Hanger Forklift. 1st Aviation Brigade letter, AVFA-D, Subject: Commercial Forklifts, dated 2 March 1968 provided authorization. AC
CONFIDENTIAL

AWA-6

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period ending 31 October 1966, MSG GMR-65 (11) (I)

1. Paragraph 2e(2), page 16. The lack of replacement parts for flight helos is largely due to lack of actual demand on the supply depots. This concern has emphasized proper maintenance of HIL's.

g. Paragraph 2e(3), page 16. MSC Supply and Services advises this headquarters that it is their policy to allow turn in of excess repair parts at any time units can make delivery.

3. (a) 1 Inclosure as shown on the 1st endorsement is incorrect and should be 4 Inclosures.

10. THE CONFIDENTIAL

LEE S. PETERSON
MGT, AGC
ASST ADJ GEN
AVHCC-DST (15 Nov 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, REG CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VILCTNA, APO San Francisco 96375 6 DEC 1968

TC: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CORP-DT, APO 96558

6 DEC 1968

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 14th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. Reference item concerning helicopter mechanic training deficiency, page 15, paragraph 2c. Concur. The 1st Aviation Brigade has forwarded a letter to the USAAMC and USATC CH advising the need for additional training of personnel in the 67U20 courses. No further action by higher headquarters is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNITZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96258 9 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Short
CPT, AGC
Ann AG
### 14th Combat Aviation Battalion

**Aircraft Status (Authorized - 0/6)**

31 October 1968

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Incl. 2, Aircraft Status, Operational Report of 14th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, REV CSXAR-55 (M) (U)
**DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D**

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<th>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
<th>12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY</th>
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**ABSTRACT**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1968
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE

** FOR OT UT #

***PAGE #

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT UT #

PAGE #

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT UT #

PAGE #

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT UT #

PAGE #

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT UT #

PAGE #

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT UT #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.