<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD395925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
Best Available Copy
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (24 Jan 69) FOR OT UT 684108 31 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACGFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 6TH BATTALION 27TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96490

AVGE-YC

11 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: W1SA
Period Ending 31 October 1966; RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (4)

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. Personnel.

(1) The 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery remained assigned to the 23d Artillery Group. The organic batteries of the battalion were not detached during this period. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was attached by GO 4477, Headquarters, USARV, 23 September 1966 for all purposes to include transfer, promotion and requisitioning of personnel.

(2) The S-1 section continued to conduct extensive inter and intra-battalion infusion program during this reporting period.

(3) During this reporting period, the assigned personnel strength of the Battalion was slightly under the authorized strength.

(4) The only major personnel shortages existing throughout the reporting period were: Captains, Artillery Branch - 2.

(5) During this period there was one (1) casualty due to hostile action. (WIA)

(6) Awards and decorations presented to members of this command include three (3) Bronze Star Medals (Valor), one (1) Bronze Star Medal (Achievement), forty-seven (47) Bronze Star Medals (Service), four (4) Air Medals, four (4) Army Commendation Medals (Valor), thirty-two (32) Army Commendation Medals (Service) and three (3) Purple Hearts.

(7) The R & R program continues to be the biggest morale booster in the Battalion. During the reporting period the Battalion fulfilled 98% of the assigned quotas.

(8) There were no significant morale or disciplinary problems.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

FOR OTU: 684108
DOD DR 5200.10
CONFIDENTIAL
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFDR-65 (RI)

(9) The Medical Section of the Battalion has continued to conduct
an extremely effective program of instruction relative to sanitation and
personal hygiene. The health of the command continued to be excellent
during this reporting period.

(10) There were no vehicle or aircraft accidents significantly
affecting operations.

(11) There were no significant changes in educational opportunities.

(12) There were no significant religious services or problems.

b. Operations.

(1) During this period the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery participated
in numerous operations and displaced units as indicated below:

(a) The Battalion tactical operations center that was located at
Phuoc Vinh, RVN, at the end of the last reporting period remained at
Phuoc Vinh until 23 October 1968, when it returned to Quan Loi. During
this period, the Battalion was given the mission to assume the duties of
the Fire Support Coordination Center and Aircraft Warning Control Center,
and artillery responsibility for Phuoc Vinh base camp. This Battalion
then assumed the duties of the 2d Battalion, 319th Artillery which had
been located at Phuoc Vinh. Since the 2d Battalion, 319th Artillery was
in direct support of the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, it became
necessary for the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery to fulfill this direct
support role for the maneuver battalion remaining in the Phuoc Vinh area
and conducting operations in the Brigade area of operations. This
Battalion then became responsible to clear all fires in the 3d Brigade area
of operations. Concurrent with this unique role, the fires of the organic
and attached batteries were planned and controlled from Phuoc Vinh. Upon
return to Quan Loi, sufficient officers and men were left at Phuoc Vinh
to provide continued operation of the FSCC/AWCC facilities.

(b) Operation China Boy II, 26 July - 9 August 1968. The platoon
from A Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, that was located at Bu Dop,
RVN, in support of Co, A, 5th Special Forces Group was returned to Phuoc
Vinh on 11 August 1968. The personnel and the light equipment were trans-
ported by C-123 aircraft. The two 155mm howitzers were transported from
Bu Dop to Phuoc Binh, RVN, by CH-54 aircraft, and then lifted to Phuoc
Vinh by C-130 aircraft.

(c) Operation China Boy IV, 10 August - 20 August 1968. On 13 August
1968 one platoon of Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was trans-
ported from Phuoc Vinh to Tong Le Chon, RVN, by C-130 aircraft. The platoon
established a firing position outside the Special Forces Camp at Tong Le
CONFIDENTIAL

11 November 1968

Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFCR-65 (RI) (4)

Chon, and provided direct support to Detachments A-334 and B-36, Company A, 5th Special Forces Group. One Liaison Officer was provided by this Battalion to perform duties of fire support coordinator for the maneuver elements. The Battalion established a two-man radio relay team atop Mount Nui Ba Den, who provided continuous communications between the firing unit and the maneuver forces. On 20 August the platoon was transported to Phuoc Vinh by C-123 and C-130 type aircraft where it rejoined its battery.

(d) On 26 August 1968, one forward observer party was provided to the RVN 36th Ranger Battalion. This forward observer assisted in fire planning and adjusting artillery rounds when needed. The forward observer party returned on 21 September 1968.

(e) Operation China Boy VII. On 2 October 1968 one platoon from Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, was transported from Phuoc Vinh to Tay Ninh, RVN by C-130 type aircraft. They were then transported by CH-54 and CH-47 aircraft to Thien Nyon, RVN, to be in direct support of Company A, 5th Special Forces Group. One liaison officer was provided at the maneuver forces headquarters in Tay Ninh. On 4 October 1968 the platoon displaced to Trang Sup, RVN, by CH-54 and CH-47 aircraft. The platoon prepared and occupied a firing position to provide continued fire support for Company A, 5th Special Forces Group. On 9 October 1968 the platoon displaced by surface convoy to Tay Ninh, and departed Tay Ninh on 10 October 1968 for Di An by convoy. At Di An the platoon was given the mission of GSR 1st Infantry Division Artillery. Throughout the entire operation, a two-man radio relay team was maintained atop Mount Nui Ba Den to provide continuous communications among all elements.

(f) On 13 October 1968, the remainder of Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, was transported from Phuoc Vinh to Phu Loi by C-130 aircraft. They then moved by motor convoy to Di An, where they occupied a firing position with the platoon that arrived on 10 October. The mission of the battery at this time was GSR 1st Infantry Division Artillery.

(2) The following number of missions were fired with total amounts of ammunition expended as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MISSIONS FIRED</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>175mm</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battery A, 6/27 Arty</td>
<td>3292</td>
<td>4,601</td>
<td>4,154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B, 6/27 Arty</td>
<td>3639</td>
<td>3,817</td>
<td>5,650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C, 6/27 Arty</td>
<td>3440</td>
<td>3,535</td>
<td>5,071</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A, 2/11 Arty</td>
<td>2705</td>
<td>12,167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS:</td>
<td>13,076</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,953</td>
<td>14,875</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 2
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)(u)

1. Training.

(1) Continuing emphasis has been placed upon Vietnam peculiar training for all new in-country arrivals. Many new men are sent to the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Jungle Devil School. This training contributes greatly to the individual soldiers ability to perform the varied tasks required in Vietnam.

(2) Fire direction tests are administered to all newly assigned officers, and periodic evaluations are made of fire direction procedures and personnel within the battalion.

(3) Three enlisted men were sent to a nuclear weapon refresher training school during this period.

2. Intelligence.

(1) During this period the battalion was able to utilize a visual reconnaissance aircraft assigned to the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to supplement its VR program. This aircraft was flown during the time period 1400 hours to 2200 hours. The battalion was able to average two or three hours of evening VR a day using this aircraft. By having this aircraft available, the battalion was able to support US troops in contact missions and to control counter-mortar fires from base camps under attack. The battalion was also able to conduct numerous observed fire missions during the early evening hours along a major infiltration route by the Song Be River west of Phuoc Vinh. The utilization of this aircraft contributed greatly to the battalion's VR program.

(2) The battalion has continued its program of attacking hard targets and is continuously revising its active target list based on current intelligence.

3. Logistics.

(1) During this reporting period resupply of this organization was accomplished in the following manner:

(a) Battery "A" was resupplied by convoy.
(b) Battery "B" was resupplied by aircraft.
(c) Battery "C" was resupplied by convoy four times during the reporting period. The remainder of the resupply was accomplished by aircraft.
(d) Battery "A", 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was resupplied by convoy on four occasions with the remainder of all resupply accomplished by aircraft. While elements of the battery were occupying isolated fire support bases, resupply was accomplished by aircraft.
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)(4)

(2) Five M-107 and two M-110 howitzer chasis were replaced within the battalion. All replacement chasis were either new or rebuilt.

(3) Service Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, has continued to be responsible for the operation of 23d Group Rear. During this period there has been an increased demand upon Service Battery to assist in the resupply of ammunition to critically short areas within the Group during periods of conflict. From 20 August to 20 September 1968, Service Battery moved by airlift 2,925,916 lbs of ammunition to various battery locations within the Group.

(f) Organization. During this period, the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery was organized in compliance with General Order 311, Headquarters, United States Army Pacific, dated 20 June 1968.

(g) Other.

(1) During this period the Battalion underwent the Annual General Inspection administered by the Inspector General, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam. The Battalion was awarded a satisfactory rating, based on ratings of satisfactory and unsatisfactory only.

(2) The following civic action projects have been accomplished during this reporting period by this organization:

(a) The An Loc, RVN Montagnard Boarding School has received extensive help in the form of medical aid, food, and construction material for renovation and repair. The number of boys enrolled has grown from 28 to over 300 in the past several months.

(b) The Tan Loi Kindergarten on Quan Loi base camp has received considerable assistance from the battalion. The battalion has provided labor and material aid to paint the school, maintain the playground areas, and has donated books for the students.

(c) The Battalion continued to sponsor the An Loc Boy Scout program. The troop has increased in size from seventy-five to one hundred fifty boys. The Battalion also provided uniforms for the boys during this period.

2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.

b. Operations.

(1) Survey of battery locations.

(a) OBSERVATION. Survey control points should be placed in a permanently protected area.

(b) EVALUATION. Experience indicates that the frequent exchange of firing batteries into and out of base camps often results in the survey control points being damaged beyond use. Quite often the control points are located on top of bunkers, which are subsequently destroyed. During the past reporting period, it was necessary for this Battalion to run survey control into two firing positions in a permanent base camp, since the existing control was destroyed when the unit departed. To facilitate the most rapid occupation possible, accurate survey data must be present upon initial occupation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That survey control points be established in areas free from frequent traffic, and the data kept current on file in the base camp fire support coordination center.

(2) Survey control in remote areas.

(a) OBSERVATION. The sun shot method of establishing accurate survey directional control becomes very critical when employing artillery in remote areas.

(b) EVALUATION. Experience indicates that survey control can be readily obtained by taking a sun shot. Quite often this battalion has been required to move firing elements into remote US Special Forces Camps to provide direct support artillery for their operations. Transportation facilities are limited, and often there is insufficient security to conduct an extensive survey operation. This Battalion has found that two men, taken forward in a light aircraft, can easily and rapidly establish accurate survey control.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That increased emphasis be placed upon the sun shot method of determining direction in CONUS training centers prior to assignment to Vietnam, and that all survey crews in Vietnam become proficient in this method of survey control.

c. Training.

Troubleshooting Procedures.

(1) OBSERVATION. Newly received maintenance personnel are not trained sufficiently in troubleshooting procedures.

(2) EVALUATION. Experience indicates that newly assigned maintenance personnel are not sufficiently proficient in troubleshooting procedures, a deficiency that causes considerable delay in vehicle/weapon repair. These personnel must be given further training in this specific area by qualified maintenance supervisors before they are fully qualified to do this job. The unique situation of the artillery units, often isolated from their direct support maintenance units requires
that proper diagnosis be made quickly to facilitate repair parts resupply.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That maintenance school programs be reevaluated and possibly changed to reflect increased training hours in troubleshooting procedures.

d. Intelligence

Target Intelligence Sources.

(1) OBSERVATION. Intelligence agencies that emplace sensor devices should establish and maintain direct liaison and communications with all artillery units who will be responding to calls for fire from the sensor monitoring station.

(2) EVALUATION. Experience indicates that initial response to calls for fire on newly emplaced sensor devices in areas unknown to the firing unit may be too slow to be of any military significance. Firing units should be made aware of the locations of sensor devices so that prior target clearances can be obtained, and firing data can be kept current at all times. Needless delays can thus be avoided.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That all intelligence agencies disseminate the locations of sensor devices to the firing units as soon as possible after emplacement.

e. Logistics. None.

f. Organization. None.

g. Other. None
AVGE-C (11 November 1968) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period ending 31 October 1968, RGS-CSFOR-65 (RL) (c)

Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, APO 96289, 21 November 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, ATTN: AVFP-AMC, APO 96266

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report for the period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2b(2): Concur. Frequently units are displaced to remote areas where no survey control is available. It is imperative that position area survey be established as rapidly as possible. Experience has shown that the most rapid means of establishing directional control is by means of a sun observation. It is felt that increased emphasis should be placed in this area for personnel receiving survey training in CONUS.

   b. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2c: Concur. Maintenance personnel in Vietnam are required to be thoroughly proficient in trouble shooting procedures. Firing units are frequently separated from their parent headquarters by great distances and hence are required to be able to determine the nature of any mechanical problems that arise such that replacement parts or necessary technical assistance as required can be provided. Quite often these units are isolated in remote areas and when maintenance problems arise, the unit mechanic is relied upon to troubleshoot and isolate the problem area without the availability of any outside assistance. Increased emphasis should be placed on this important area in CONUS Training Schools so as to develop the required proficiency.

   c. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2d: Concur. Rapid response to sensor device surveillance so as to utilise the capabilities and advantages provided by these devices to the maximum extent possible is mandatory. This can only be accomplished if the locations of the sensor devices are disseminated to all firing units within range. This is generally being accomplished, however, isolated cases have arisen where devices were emplaced and firing units were not aware of their existence until called upon to fire on a sensor location. Positive measures must be established to ensure complete dissemination of sensor locations to the Artillery Control Headquarters for further dissemination to all firing units.

   [Signature]

   HAROLD G. DE ARMENT
   Colonel, Artillery
   Commanding

Copy Furnished
HQ, 6th Bn, 27th Arty

DA, HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC-RE, APO 96266

1. The quarterly report of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

2. Reference Section 2, para 2b(1), Survey of battery locations. Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion (TAB), 25th Artillery, which has the responsibility for survey control in III Corps Tactical Zone, has been apprised of this problem and now strives to insure that survey control points are not placed on temporary structures or in heavily traveled areas.

3. Reference Section 2, para 2b(2), Survey control in remote areas. Concur with para 2a of 1st Indorsement.

4. Reference Section 2, para 2c, Troubleshooting Procedures. Concur with para 2b of 1st Indorsement.

5. Reference Section 2, para 2b, Target Intelligence Sources. Concur with para 2c of 1st Indorsement. While the recommendation is sound, a better solution to the problem is for the agency controlling the sensors to preplan and preclear concentrations in the areas covered. When artillery is requested, clearances can then be simultaneously relayed by the requesting agency. A message calling attention to this problem and proposing the above solution has been dispatched to appropriate commands in II Field Force Vietnam.

6. Errors in the report have been corrected with pen and ink.

SCHROEDER JR
Colonel, FA
Commanding
AVFBC-BB-B (11 Nov 68) 3rd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery
(UIC: WALSAA) Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65
(RI) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 13 DEC 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
    Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GCOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
    Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-
   Lessons Learned of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, for the period ending
   31 October 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

O. B. FORT
1LT, AGC
Assy AG
AVHC-DST (11 Nov 68) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery
(UIC: WAISAA) Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65
(RL) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 3 DEC 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 6th
Battalion, 27th Artillery.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning survey control in remote areas, page
   6, paragraph 2b(2); 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a; and 2d Indorsement,
   paragraph 3. Concur. This is a matter of concern for higher headquarters.

   b. Reference item concerning trouble shooting procedures, page 6,
   paragraph 2c(1); 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b; and 2d Indorsement, para-
   graph 4. Concur. This is a matter of concern for higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
HQ II FORCESV
HQ 6th Bn, 27th Arty

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 6th Bn, 27th Arty for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORT[10]
CPT, AGC
Adj AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 1968

CO, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery

11 Nov 1968

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

**ITEM 1**
* SUBJECT TITLE
** FOR OT RD #
***PAGE #

**ITEM 2**
SUBJECT TITLE
FOR OT RD #
PAGE #

**ITEM 3**
SUBJECT TITLE
FOR OT RD #
PAGE #

**ITEM 4**
SUBJECT TITLE
FOR OT RD #
PAGE #

**ITEM 5**
SUBJECT TITLE
FOR OT RD #
PAGE #

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310