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### AD NUMBER

| AD395863  |

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
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| AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 |

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AGAM-P (M) (27 Jan 69) FOR OT UT 684211 31 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 13th Combat Aviation (Guardian) Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

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US Army Aviation Test Activity
11th Combat Aviation (Guardian) Battalion
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 13th Combat Aviation (Guardian) Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, MCS GSFH-65(1) (U)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. Unit Mission. There was no change to the unit mission during this period.

   b. Organization. At the close of the reporting period the organization of the 13th Combat Aviation (Guardian) Battalion was as follows:

      (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.

      (2) The 114th Assault Helicopter Company (UH-1) with the 544th Transportation Detachment (KD) and the 96th Signal Detachment (KL) attached.

      (3) The 121st Assault Helicopter Company (UH-1) with the 80th Transportation Detachment (KD) and the 28th Signal Detachment (RL) attached.

      (4) The 175th Assault Helicopter Company (UH-1) with the 150th Transportation Detachment (KD) and the 28th Signal Detachment (RL) attached.

      (5) The 271st Assault Support Helicopter Company (CH-47) with the 361st Transportation Detachment (KD) attached.

      (6) The 336th Assault Helicopter Company (UH-1) with the 167th Transportation Detachment (KD) and the 277th Signal Detachment (RL) attached.

   c. Changes in Command and Staff

      (1) LTC Richard A. Keilman, 01932219, was assigned as Commanding Officer on 1 August 1968, LTC James L. Tow, was reassigned to COMUS.

      (2) MAJ William Jugel Jr., 01938874, was assigned as S-2 on 25 September 1968. There was no S-2 assigned at the time Major Jugel assumed the position.

      (3) MAJ Clifford H. Burns, OL100635, was assigned as Assistant S-3 on 10 August 1968. Major Roger K. Régisette was reassigned to the 121st Assault Helicopter Company.

      (4) MAJ Richard S. Freeze, 087746, was assigned as Battalion Maintenance Officer on 11 August 1968. Major Nicolas P. Stein was reassigned to USNFR.

      (5) CPT Max E. Reddick, 02332460, was assigned as Medical Officer on 2 November 1968. Major Gary B. Robnett was Medevaced.
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(6) CW3 Marvin C. Albrecht, W200521, was assigned as administrative assistant on 5 September 1968.  1LT David G. Fipes was reassigned to UC AHU.

(7) C'3 James T. Brady Jr., W201750, was assigned as Personnel Officer on 24 October 1968.  C'3 David W. Nichols was reassigned to COKUS.

(8) CW2 Russell E. Johnson, W313076, was assigned as Motor Maintenance Officer 1 August 1968.  C'2 Bernard J. Buons was reassigned to COKUS.

(9) C'2 Otis Smith, W3152095, was assigned as Assistant S-4 on 12 August 1968.

d. Unit Strength as of 31 October 1968.

(1) Military

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(2) Non-Military

UNIT DaC VN 3RD MTL CONTRACTOR

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<td>148</td>
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(3) The battalion continues to experience a shortage in the following MOSs.

(a) 26M20 Air Borne Radar Repairman
(b) 45J20 Aircraft Armament Repairman
(c) 51440 Fire-Fighter
(d) 67141 Helicopter Repairman

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Airmobile Operations. The battalion supported 172 airmobile operations during the period. Two of the more significant operations were conducted on 15 and 31 August 1968.

(a) Intelligence reports received on 14 August indicated that two (2) VC companies and an ammo cache were located along a canal 9-13 kilometers northeast of Kach Soi. The 336th Assault Helicopter Company was notified of the impending operation on the evening of 14 August 1968. Plans were formulated, overlays were made, and all supporting elements were notified. Planned air strikes commenced promptly at 0730 and continued until 0900 LZ time. As the strikes progressed, a heavy fire team conducted a visual reconnaissance of the landing zone 10 minutes prior to LZ time. The troop transports departed Kach Soi at 0345 and proceeded to an LZ 15 kilometers northeast of Kach Soi. Three additional lifts were inserted in this LZ. Four hundred more troops were then inserted into an LZ 900 meters NNW of the initial LZ. The ground elements then proceeded southwest along both sides of the canal which was the alleged location of the enemy. An additional ground element had been prepositioned approximately 9 kilometers to the southwest of the maneuver elements in a blocking position. A light fire team reconnoitering ahead of the maneuver elements spotted some tents and other equipment and also received sporadic small arms fire. The ground commander decided to insert a recon company to exploit this sighting. The recon company was repositioned twice more during the conduct of this operation to block escape routes as the enemy attempted to avoid the major maneuver elements. As the maneuver elements proceeded toward their final objective they uncovered numerous weapons, ammo caches and other assorted equipment. All aviation
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Assets were released at 1945 hours.

Result of the operation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 WIA</td>
<td>8 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Boxes K-2 ammo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Rds 75mm NR ammo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 Rds 60mm Mort ammo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86 Rds B-40 rocket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Russian Rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 K-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 K-2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Bk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 MG K-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The success of this operation was enhanced by the ground commanders' capability of rapidly redeploying his mobile reserve force through the employment of his aviation assets.

(b) On 28 August 1968, 2 ARVN POW's escaped from a Viet Cong prison camp located approximately 10 kilometers southwest of Vi Thanh. During the afternoon of 28 August, the 121st Assault Helicopter Company was assigned the mission of conducting a raid on the camp in support of the 21st ARVN Division. On the evening of 29 August, 12 members of a Provincial Reconnaissance Unit were inserted 300 meters south of the camp with the mission of infiltrating and acquainting themselves with the lay out of the prison camp, so that they would be able to assist in the release and/or defense of the prisoners should the VC attempt to take their lives before the ARVN's could move in the next morning and free them. At 0635 the next morning a heavy fire team conducted a hasty visual reconnaissance of the LZ just moments before the troop transports inserted 50 troops into the LZ. The troops immediately moved into the prison camp and established a defensive perimeter. As this was being done a Viet Cong force was moving into an assault position 100 meters north of the camp. As the VC advanced on the camp, they encountered devastating fire from the 12 PRU's who had infiltrated the previous night. The gunships joined in the attack on the VC and they were repulsed. With this threat eliminated the ARVN's had complete control of the prison camp and the extraction was complete by 0930.

Results of the operation were as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 VC Suspect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2 Rifles  Numerous Documents
Numerous Medical Supplies  4 Sampans Destroyed
6 - Structures Destroyed  Camp Destroyed

This operation illustrated again the versatility of an air mobile force in the
conduct of a well planned and aggressively executed air mobile operation.

b. Training. The seven VNAF helicopter pilots enrolled in the battalion
UH-1D transition training program completed their training on 11 October, 1968.
The VNAF aviators compiled over 300 hours of flying time as they participated
in command and liaison, resupply and combat assault missions. The students were
presented their certificates of achievement by the Commanding General of the
1st Aviation Brigade and the Commanding Officer of the 74th VNAF Wing during
a graduation ceremony held at Soc Trang Army Airfield on 11 October 1968.

1. Morale and Discipline

(1) The number of approved recommendations for awards received during this
period are shown by type and totals awarded:

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<th>Award Type</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Warrant Officer</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
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(2) During this reporting period the number of approved disciplinary
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<tr>
<td>L3</td>
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<td>36</td>
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(3) The following number of personnel were reported as casualties during
this period:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA 6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(4) Number of personnel that took leave to various countries is
reported below:

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<th>Enlisted Men</th>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

3. Safety:

(1) During the reporting period the Battalion experienced eight (8)

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SPECIAL CT: Operational Support of 1st Combat Aviation (Ground) Battalion
Pertaining to 31 October 1968

The reportable accidents for a rate of 21.3 accidents per 100,000 flying hours. This represents a decrease of approximately twenty-seven percent from the previous reporting period. Five of these accidents resulted from engine failures, two from loss of anti-torque control, and one was attributed to pilot error.

The incidence of in-flight engine failures reflected a sharp increase over the last reporting period. From 1 August through 31 October 1968, units of the Battalion experienced a total of fourteen in-flight engine failures. One of these failures was attributed to foreign object damage, the remaining十三 fell for internal reasons. Of the thirteen internal failures, twelve were resulted to.

The average amount of hours flown from time of rebuild to time of failure of these engines was approximately 327 hours.

Historical Summary: On 1 October 1968 the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment of the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion bid a sad farewell to Saigon, Vietnam, on 13 July 1968. The Battalion was assigned to Con Tho, Vietnam which was the 13th CAV's home since 3 July 1968. The Battalion was ordered to Soc Trang which is located 41 miles south of Dan The, in the heart of two sister companies the 336th AHC and the 13th AHC. Movement orders required the Detachment to be operational by 1 December 1968. The Headquarters Detachment completed the move in three days (28 - 30 Oct 68). Most of the property and personnel were lifted by CH-47 Helicopters. The move was accomplished by road convoy of the organic vehicles and the remaining non-motor equipment. Personal at the Detachment again demonstrated their ability to perform successful operations in a timely and professional manner.

Personnel. None.

Operations

(1) Insufficient Rigging Equipment.

Observation: An insufficient quantity of rigging equipment as required to support units near combat resulted in delays to prepare the Detachment for the road convoy. The lack of additional equipment prevents the supported unit from pre-rigging their loads. Delays are frequently encountered in receipt of the additional equipment for the supported unit.

Lesson Learned: Command Observation, Evaluation and Recommendations.

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AVBN-G 12 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 13th Combat Aviation (Guardian) Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65(R1) (U)

have sufficient work parties and transportation in the PZ to maintain a constant supply of rigged loads. When the PZ and LZ are only a short distance apart, the problem is magnified due to the short turn-around flight time for each aircraft. The lack of rigging equipment causes the CH-47 to land and remain in the LZ for extended periods of time while the load is de-rigged and the rigging equipment is loaded on the aircraft for backhauls to the PZ. Thus, the LZ size requirement is necessarily larger to accommodate the CH-47 on the ground as well as the other landing aircraft. When utilizing armed escort, the problems of the escort commander are compounded due to the excessive time. The CH-47’s are in the LZ.

(c) Recommendations: Recommend the supported artillery unit be required to obtain and maintain sufficient and proper slings and straps for each Artillery piece and nets for their basic ammo load. Recommend this rigging equipment become a part of their section equipment and that sufficient extra rigging equipment be maintained at the unit headquarters level to support any normal requirement for additional ammo resupply. Recommend also that command emphasis at Corps level be placed on the requisitioning and maintenance of the necessary rigging equipment.

(2) "Piggy-Back" Loads.

(a) Observations: Seldom do ARVN Artillery units utilize the "piggy-back" load, instead artillery pieces are inserted with crews and then supplied with ammo.

(b) Evaluation: The full capabilities of the CH-47 are not realized until the "piggy-back" load is utilized. The most important advantage of this type load is the capability of putting an artillery piece, crew, and ammo into a firing position at the same time. Again, the proper rigging equipment must be on hand in order to prepare this type load for transport by CH-47. Fewer sorties will be required to move an artillery battery by utilizing the "piggy-back" method, and at the same time, better utilization of the CH-47 will be realized.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend the U.S. artillery advisors emphasize to their counterparts, the need for and resultant increase in the efficiency of an artillery move when utilizing the "piggy-back" method.

(d) Common frequency for maneuver elements in operational area.

(a) Observation: Ground units maneuvering in the same operational area do not always operate on or monitor a common FM frequency.

(b) Evaluation: When maneuver elements are operating on more than one frequency, gunships are not able to continuously monitor all the units in the operational area. Most often this occurs when there are maneuver elements present on the operation who have not been airlifted, but have entered the
operational area by some other mode of transportation. Also the Airplane Task Force Commander is not able to continuously monitor the progress of the maneuver elements. From the standpoint of placing accurate supporting fires on known or suspected enemy positions, the exact location of all friendly forces must be known at all times. The use of more than one frequency by the maneuver elements creates a condition that reduces the responsiveness of supporting support.

(c) Recommendation: The Airplane Task Force Commander should make every effort to have only one frequency for the maneuver elements in a given operational area.

(d) Air traffic congestion at stagefields/airfields.

(2) Observation: The occurrence of significant increase in air traffic density has created hazardous operating conditions on and around stagefields/airfields.

(e) Evaluation: To reduce the hazard caused by the increasingly congested conditions at stagefields, a Stagefield Operations (SOC) is appointed by the unit which furnishes the Air Mission Commander for the tactical operation. The SOC is a unit with extensive background in airplane operations. Its function is to positively control all aircraft traffic on and around the stagefield. To accomplish this mission, the SOC has control of a 1/4-inch telegraph (minus) which is equipped with two (2) 1/4-inch vehicles which have VHF and HF radio capability. All headquarter controlling aviation assets in the "Delta" are notified daily of the stagefields which will be used as staging areas for tactical operations. Precautions which are needed to control air traffic at stagefields which do not have control ofers have been prescribed to all aviation units. Occasionally, a field being utilized as a staging area for tactical operations is closed to fixed-wing traffic. The control measures listed above have partially reduced the hazard of hazardous conditions on and around our stagefields/airfields.

(f) Observation: Additional action taken or this is needed to increase the efficiency and speed of the traffic at stagefield operations is presented to other aviation units for their consideration.

5. Aircraft Commander Selection Criteria Observation:

(a) There has been a definite need to standardize the criteria utilized to select aircraft commanders at the unit level.

(b) Evaluation: The following guidance was published in the Tactical SOP to standardize the criteria utilized by the units in selecting their aircraft commanders.
AVBN-G
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 13th Combat Aviation (Guardian) Battalion for Period of Ending 31 October 1968, HCS COPH 65(R1) (U)

(1) Admininum of 350 hours flying time in RVN. (Second tour personnel must have logged 100 hours during the 2nd tour.)

(2) A minimum of four (4) months in RVN.

(3) Must be familiar with geographical area.

(4) Must have received a border orientation.

(5) Will be knowledgeable in all flight following procedures and techniques.

(6) Must be capable of performing the duties of trail or lead aircraft of a formation conducting a combat assault. (Not applicable to Assault Support Helicopter Command).

(7) Must have demonstrated the ability to remain calm under the stress of combat conditions.

(8) Must be thoroughly familiar with aircraft capabilities and limitations.

(9) Must be capable of presenting a comprehensive operational briefing to his crew, passengers and/or aviators.

(c) Recommendation: That other aviation headquarters evaluate the criteria as set forth in paragraphs (5), (6).

d. Intelligence: None

c. Logistics: None

f. Organization: None

g. Other: (Maintenance)

(1) Leaking master brake cylinders after CH-47 aircraft are deployed by aircraft carrier to RVN

(a) Observation: Many CH-47 units have had problems with leaking master brake cylinders after their aircraft were deployed to RVN by aircraft carriers.

(b) Evaluation: Normally, when the CH-47 is lifted onto the aircraft, a specific check for leaking master brakes is not required during the movement by ship to RVN.
During this move constant pressure on the master brake cylinder causes it to begin leaking. During deployment of the 271st ASHC by ship to RVN, the aircraft cocoons were taken off the rear of the aircraft, the APU started, parking brakes were then reset and the cocoons replaced after the APU cooled down. This procedure was followed once each week during deployment and to date no problems have developed with leaking master brake cylinders.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend that CH-47 helicopters being deployed to RVN or other areas by aircraft carrier be required to reset the parking brakes at least once each seven days to preclude future problems with the master brake cylinders.

(2) High Rate of In-flight Engine Failure and Precautionary Landings in UH-1 Aircraft.

(a) Observation: There has been a high rate of in-flight engine failures and precautionary landings among UH-1B, UH-1C and UH-1D helicopters assigned to this battalion. Engine failures have been particularly high among UH-1B and UH-1C aircraft using rebuilt T53-L11 and T53-L11B engines.

(b) Evaluation: The UH-1B and UH-1C helicopters assigned to this battalion are all utilized as gunships flying in support of assault helicopter operations. The nature of their mission requires that they fly at high gross weights, high air speed and continually execute maneuvers which place high stress on both the aircraft and the engine. UH-1D helicopters assigned to the battalion have a primary mission as assault helicopters. Their mission requires that they make formation landings into landing zones, often located in rough and difficult terrain. Their departure normally employs a maximum power climb to altitude. Engines and airframes of all aircraft are continually subjected to stress approaching design limitations. In an attempt to locate malfunctioning engines prior to in-flight failure, this battalion has initiated a program wherein pilots, prior to each flight, with the aircraft at a two foot hover, record engine torque, percent N-1, exhaust gas temperature, outside air temperature and gross weights of the aircraft. At the end of each flight the crew chief checks engine coast down time and monitors the engine for unusual noise or excessive smoking. In this manner, several malfunctioning engines have been located and either repaired or removed from service prior to in-flight failure. As an additional precaution against engine and airframe failures, this Battalion has initiated a program wherein the companies are required to perform a 100% technical inspection of each aircraft at each second intermediate inspection. This is in addition to the normal requirements in the PMI. During these inspections numerous minor discrepancies have been found and corrected which might otherwise have resulted in a precautionary landing, failures or major accidents with resultant loss of life or vital combat aircraft.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend that all helicopter companies experiencing a high rate of in-flight engine failures require pilots to monitor and record vital engine instrument readings and that these recordings be analyzed on a daily basis. In addition, recommend that all helicopter units whose aircraft are subjected to continued stress in the accomplishment of their daily mission, initiate a program of 100% technical inspection of all aircraft at the second intermediate.

All inclosures
3 Inc1- w/d, Hq, DA
1. Organization and Stationing
2. 13th CAB Aircraft Status
3. 13th CAB Operational Statistics

DISTRIBUTION
2 - CINCUSARPAC
3 - CG, USARV
2 - CG, 1st Aviation Brigade
4 - CG, 164th Aviation Group
8 - S-3 Operational File

CONFIDENTIAL
DA, HQ, 164th AVIATION GROUP, APO 96215 30 November 1968

SER DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) The attached 13th CAE ORL for the period ending 31 October 1968 has been evaluated by this headquarters as required by USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (U) The authorized unit strength for HHD, 13th CAE and authorized civilian strength for 13th CAE are listed below:

   a. MILITARY HHD, 13th CAE

      OFF WC E TOTAL
      22 2 85 109

   b. CIVILIAN 13th CAE

      HHD 111th ARHC 121st ARHC 175th ARHC 376th ARHC 271st ARHC TOTAL
      2 5 18 5 15 2 17

3. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   a. Insufficient Rigging Equipment: Concur with the recommendation. IV Corps advisors are attempting to procure the required rigging equipment for the ARVII units.

   b. "Piggy - Back" Loads: U.S. Advisors and their counterparts are aware of "Piggy - Back" load advantages and disadvantages. This method of transport is not being employed due to the shortage of rigging equipment. The required equipment is expected to be available soon and this method of rigging will be frequently employed.

   c. Common frequency for maneuver elements: Non - Concur with the recommendation. One FH frequency for all ground maneuver units would seriously restrict ground commanders in the control of their units. All ground elements on a common frequency with the gunships is not desirable. The present method of air - to - ground coordination for close fire support is desirable and adequate.
CONFIDENTIAL
AVGN (12 Nov 68) 1st Ind 30 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period ending 30 November 1968, ROG


d. Air traffic congestion at stagefields/airfields: Methods of controlling aircraft at tactical stagefields as contained in the evaluation are submitted for consideration only. Specific measures for stagefield air traffic control must be based on the tactical situation, availability of equipment and the availability of personnel. Control frequencies for uncontrolled airfields are listed in the Tactical Aerodrome Directory for Vietnam.

e. Aircraft Commander Selection Criteria Observation: The minimum criteria for selection and designation of aircraft commanders as stated in 1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 5-6, dated 1 November 1968, is considered adequate by this headquarters.

f. Leaking master brake cylinders on CH-47 aircraft:

(1) The first sentence in the evaluation should read "The parking brakes are set when CH-47 aircraft are positioned on the carrier flight deck, with no requirement to reset the brakes during surface movement."

(2) The recommendation to reset the helicopter parking brakes weekly should be evaluated to determine its merit.

g. High rate of inflight engine failure and precautionary landings in UH-1 aircraft: The action stated in the evaluation and recommendation has been successful for the 13th CAB. To allow ample time for the performance of scheduled maintenance, each aircraft is allocated a 24 hour stand down maintenance period for the intermediate inspection. This stand down period provides ample time for a thorough technical inspection and correction of deficiencies.

h.(U) The 13th Combat Aviation Battalion has accomplished all assigned missions during this reporting period.

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1 CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBA-C
5 CO, 13th CAB
2 33, 164th CAG

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AVBE-C (12 Nov 68) 2d Ind.
SUBJECT: Operational report of 13th Combat Aviation (Guardian) Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1968, nGS CSPOR-65 (K3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPM-O, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. (G) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 2b(1), page 6. In accordance with paragraph 1-3, a, TM 55-450-11, the transported unit is responsible to furnish slings, straps, cord, clevises, padding, tape, etc., used in rigging the equipment to be transported. USAV G-4 has established a liberal CBI for sling equipment authorized to be on hand at the supported unit level. This CBI will be published as a 725 series USARV Regulation in the near future.

   b. Paragraph 2g(2), page 9. This headquarters submitted a letter to USAV on 16 Nov 68 expressing concern in this area. Correct statistics show that fifty seven rebuilt engines were lost during the four month period, July - October. The average time per engine was 374.02 hours. It was recommended that this matter be pursued to determine the overall impact of AMCOM rebuilt engines within USARV. It is not considered essential to perform a 100% technical inspection during the second intermediate. Normal inspections, conducted as required, are considered adequate to detect minor discrepancies.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

J. D. Peterson
LT, AGC
ASST ADJ GEN

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AVHGC-DST (12 Nov 68) 3d Ind


HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CHOF-LT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 13th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning air traffic congestion at staging airfields, page 8, paragraph 2b(4). Concur. This headquarters has recently required subordinate commands to take a specific officer responsible for each airfield used by US Army Forces. MAC Directive 95-7 requires that an airfield commander/coordinate be appointed for forward airstrips.

   b. Reference item concerning leaking master brake cylinders after CH-47 aircraft are deployed by carrier to RVN, page 9, paragraph 2g(1). Concur. In view of the success of procedures used by the 271st ASHC, concur with the recommendation, however, shipboard safety must be considered.

   c. Reference item concerning high rate of inflight engine failure and precautionary landings in UH-1 aircraft, page 10, paragraph 2g(2) and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2b. Concur. It is the unit maintenance officer’s prerogative to increase the frequency of inspections to fit hazardous operating conditions. AVSCOM has been made aware of this problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

W. C. ARNITZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furln:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 13th CAB
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 13th Cbt Avn (Guardian) Bn for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (K1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C.P. SMYTHE
CPT, ADC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 13th Combat Aviation (Guardian) Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1968

CO, 13th Combat Aviation (Guardian) Battalion

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
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