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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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Map References: Top, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series: L7014, Sheets: 6432 II, 6131 I, II; 6232 II - IV, 6231 I - IV; 6230 I - IV; 6231 I, II, III, IV.

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. General. The "Tropic Lightning" Division continued its participation in Operation TAJU THAT throughout the reporting period. (See TAB B for the Division Operations Plan 1-68.) All divisional resources and assets were committed to this operation which had commenced on 8 April 1968.

To date, Operation TAJU THAT has been divided into two phases: Phase I terminating on 31 May and Phase II continuing through the end of the reporting period.

Most significant in the activities of the division between 1 May and 31 July were its countering of operations to defeat the "2nd Phase Offensive" of the enemy against SAIGON-COLON and its search and destroy maneuverings to thwart and upset the enemy preparations for the "3rd Phase Offensive" of late July or early August.

The "2nd Phase Offensive" (the "1st Phase Offensive" being the TAJU Offensive of 8 January-12 February) commenced 2 May and continued until 15 May. Alerted by intelligence sources in late April of the impending enemy attacks into the capital region, the 25th Infantry Division maneuvered the bulk of its combat forces into the southeastern quadrant of its tactical area of operational interest to establish a screen beyond the western environs of SAIGON-COLON.

Deploying itself in depth in western GIAM Province, eastern HAU TANG Province and northern IO?D AH Province during the first few days of May, the Division effectively executed a mobile defense to block the enemy's main avenues of approach from the northwest, west and southwest. Before the enemy main force units of the 5th and 9th VC/HVN and the 7th NVA divisions committed themselves to their approach marches beginning on 2 May, the 25th Infantry Division moved in force as required to successfully intercept and destroy the advancing enemy before he could reach his assault positions into SAIGON-DOLON.

With his main ground thrust broken and turned back, the enemy then mounted his heaviest "100 rockets a day" 105mm rocket-mohtar assaults against the capital region. Mounting extensive day and night, ground/aerial patrois throughout a "rocket belt" 10-15 kilometers west of SAIGON, the "Tropic Lightning" Division systematically crushed this threat within a few days of its initiation.

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A general statistical analysis of the Division’s operations between 1 May and 31 May 1968 reveals the following results:

U.S. killed in action - 218
U.S. wounded in action - 1,156 (393 evacuated)
U.S. equipment destroyed
- 22 armored personnel carriers
- five tanks
- one helicopter
- one 8" howitzer
- two 155mm howitzers
- one trailer
- seven trucks

U.S. equipment damaged
(dead killed 24 hours or longer)
- one 175mm howitzer
- one tank retriever
- ten trucks
- 31 helicopters
- two 155mm howitzers
- two 105mm howitzers
- ten tanks
- 21 armored personnel carriers
- five individual weapons
- two crew served weapons

U.S. equipment captured

Enemy killed in action
(confirmed by body count) - 2,275
Enemy prisoners-of-war - 77
Detained Enemy equipment and supplies captured
- 478 individual weapons
- 213 crew served weapons
- 33.6 tons of rice
- one star light scope
- 471 hand grenades
- 31,026 small arms rounds
- 511 rocket, artillery or mortar rounds
- 100 mortar fuses
- 105 pounds

Enemy documents captured
- 1,014 rocket, artillery or mortar rounds
- 166 mines
- 534,185 small arms rounds
- 1,775 hand grenades
- 151 weapons
- 12.8 tons of rice
- 18 crew served weapons
- 26 individual weapons
- 32 cluster bomb units
- 1,600 pounds of salt
- 12 bombs
- 283 mortar fuses

In general, contact with main force enemy units throughout the 25th Infantry Division's tactical area of operational interest (TAOI) diminished considerably in June and July. With his 2nd Phase Offensive on SAIGON and subsequently threatened artillery assaults on the capital city totally defeated, the enemy demonstrated little willingness to fight. Rather, in June his main force units that remained outside SAIGON broke contact, dispersed and exfiltrated west into northwest into WAR ZONE C. In executing this pullback the enemy avoided contact and when engaged was quick to disperse into smaller groups and disengage as quickly as possible. Intelligence sources clearly indicated the enemy's intent of withdrawing his depleted main force units to these traditional sanctuaries for replacements, resupply and retraining for future operations.

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With the departure of the enemy main force units from the SAIGON area, the 25th Infantry Division in June committed approximately a third of its combat forces to the continued defensive posture around SAIGON and deployed the remainder of the division to the west and northwest of the city into the western and central portions of the division TAOI.

The divisional units that remained in the immediate SAIGON area did so as a part of the Capital Military District, (later redesignated the Capital Military Assistance Command as a provisional U.S. Command under the control of II Field Forces to assist in the defense of SAIGON) or as elements under division control maneuvering in western GIA DINH Province outskirts of the city.

While these elements provided a defensive shield in and around SAIGON, the other Tropic Lightning combat forces moved from the immediate capital area to the west and northeast to pursue the dispersed enemy and to seek out and destroy his concealed weapons, ammunition and supply caches.

Extensive and wide ranging battalion size search and destroy and reconnaissance-in-force operations were conducted throughout the southern TAOI from the OCHI-LUANG on the south, the Cambodian border on the west, the TAY NINH-BAU CHONG TZO on the north, and the MAU KANG-NAY-TAM TAOI axis on the east. These operations were characterized by coordinated daylight cross country search and destroy sweeps seeking enemy base camps and supply caches, village searches in coordination with Vietnamese officials, airmobile assaults against targets of opportunity. At night the division employed extensive platoon size ambushes along canals, rivers, roads, trails and other likely routes of enemy movement. In addition, extensive night time moving platoon size patrols were employed in suspected areas of night time enemy activity. On an average day in June and July, 50% of the combat forces were employed during the day and 50% at night.

In addition to the search and destroy type activities described above, the division was active in securing the principle means of rear communications throughout the southern portion of the TAOI. In addition to screening secondary roads, the division maintained a round the clock security operation on the extensive main routes of supply in the TAOI. These KSVs are route 1 from SAIGON to CU CHI to NGU DAU, route 22 from NGU DAU to TAY NINH CITY, route 4 from TAY NINH City to RANG CO, routes 19-20-219 from TAY NINH CITY to DONG and route 61 from CU CHI to PHU CONG (CU CHI-LONG THIEN MSR).

The only portion of the TAOI that the division did not enter in force during June and July was the jungled and sparsely populated WAI Z0ON C north of the TAY NINH-BAU CHONG TZO axis. This area was subject, however, to extensive surveillance activity both aerial and long range ground reconnaissance by squad and platoon size units. Extensive Air Force B-52 and tactical fighter strikes were placed throughout WAI Z0ON C upon enemy base camps, supply concentrations and other targets of opportunity.

Despite the division's all out efforts to seek out the enemy in June and July, the level of contact dropped to the point in which engagement with local force platoon size units in scattered and infrequent skirmishes became the norm. Considerable success was realized, however, in discovering weapons, ammunition and supply caches throughout the area searched. The only consistent contact established by divisional units occurred in the final two weeks of July, when the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division (OPDN to the 25th Infantry Division) engaged what was established as the 2nd Battalion, 27th VC Regiment along an axis from TINCH NGU (AT 105912L) to TRUNG LU (AT 959999).

3
Statistically, "Tropic Lightning" Division operations against the enemy between 1 June and 31 July provided the following results:

**U.S. killed in action**
- 145

**U.S. wounded in action**
- 379 (499 evacuated)

**U.S. missing in action**
- 1

**U.S. equipment destroyed**
- three helicopters
- six trucks
- one tank
- 11 armored personnel carriers
- one M-42
- one 155mm howitzer

**U.S. equipment damaged**
(destroyed 24 hours or longer)
- 35 helicopters
- 36 trucks
- 12 tanks
- one K-578
- one M-42
- one F-134 radar
- 22 armored personnel carriers

**Enemy killed in action**
(verified by body count)
- 1,273

**Enemy prisoners-of-war**
- 37

**Enemy equipment and supplies captured**
- 425

**Enemy equipment and supplies destroyed**
- 298 individual weapons
- 43 crew served weapons
- 78.35 tons of rice
- 54,117 small arms rounds
- 426 pounds of medical supplies
- 11 radios
- 212 hand grenades
- 171 pounds of sugar
- four motorcycles
- 912 rocket, artillery or mortar rounds
- 22 protective masks
- 2,000 flashlights
- eight outboard motors
- 117 pounds

**Enemy documents captured**
- 763 rocket, artillery or mortar rounds
- 83 mines
- 18,881 small arms rounds
- 1,623 hand grenades
- 260 ammunitions
- 26.59 tons of rice
- 19 crew served weapons
- 25 individual weapons
- five bombs
- 12 cluster bombs
- 702 80mm rounds
- six outboard motors
- 1,270 gallons of gasoline
- one protective mask
- 837.5 pounds of explosive
- 1,780 blisters
- one radio
- three rocket launchers
4th Battalion, 9th Infantry. This combined force was redesignated TASK FORCE DUNCAN. The tank battalion took up blocking positions along an axis in the vicinity XT 5807, and the infantrymen occupied blocking positions from XT 6905 to XT 5824. The enemy force was thus surrounded on three sides with a vast swamp area to its rear. The fires of four artillery batteries and direct air strikes were placed on the enemy throughout the day. A total of 35 enemy dead and one FRO were confirmed by nightfall.

Elsewhere in the TACI, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry joined an estimated enemy platoon in bunker positions at XT 5807. By 1400 the target was struck by helicopter gunships. A subsequent assault on the bunkers revealed six VC KIA were discovered in the vicinity of the ambush.

4 May

TASK FORCE DUNCAN continued with its mission of reducing the enemy force which it had backed up to a swamp. The enemy unit was under heavy fire with supporting artillery, helicopter gunships and air strikes. Enemy units slowly tightened the vice on the besieged VC. By the end of daylight activities the task force had recovered an additional 25 enemy dead and three prisoners of war. Elements of the task force remained in their blocking positions during the night as supporting fires continued to pound at the enemy positions.

As TASK FORCE DUNCAN continued its operations, other divisions units engaged in light and widely scattered contacts with the enemy. Helicopters from B Company, 25th Aviation Battalion flying armed aerial reconnaissance along the CIVITIC FLYER between GO DUN and TAJ HIJIN observed and engaged an unknown enemy force at XT 4907. The action resulted in 23 enemy killed and two FROs. The enemy force was later identified as a local VC force which had been compounds.

4 May, C Company, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) advancing approximately four kilometers northeast of DUC HOI received fire from an unknown number of enemy at XT 629984. The company attacked into the enemy position and accounted for 23 enemy dead and one FRO. This enemy force was determined to be an element of the 27th VC Regiment.

5 May

TASK FORCE DUNCAN was redesignated TASK FORCE BONN at 1357 and continued its operations in the vicinity of XT 5907 - XT 6015. Ground forces swept into the enemy positions they discovered additional forty enemy dead, most of whom had been killed by artillery and air strikes. Additionally large numbers of abandoned infantry and crew served weapons along with ammunition, supplies and for were discovered. Contact was maintained with the enemy and supporting fires from helicopters, artillery and tactical air continued to be used in heavy volume.

At 1235, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) advancing along route I at a location approximately three kilometers northwest of the US GR Base Camp (XT 639120) engaged an estimated VC platoon. In a contact that continued until 1500 hours, the company was supported by helicopter gunships accounted for 23 VC KIA. The enemy force was identified as a unit of the 7th VC local force battalion.

Also on the afternoon of 5 May, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry searching approximately three kilometers southwest of the SHQDN TRAP town of TAJ HIJIN discovered a large enemy ammunition cache at XT 7829117. In addition to large numbers of 122mm and hand grenades, the company captured 72 complete 122mm rockets and 21,970 rounds of small arms ammunition.
B. Chronology of Significant Combat Actions.

1 May

Contact with enemy forces throughout the divisional tactical area of operational interest (TAOI) on 1 May was relatively light and scattered. Almost all divisional maneuver elements had completed their redeployment into the southeastern quadrant of the TAOI by this date. Mounting intensive daytime battalion and company size reconnaissance-in-force and air mobile combat assault operations combined with platoon and squad size night stationary and mobile ambushes, the division established a virtual 24 hour-a-day screen to the north, west, and southwest of SAIGON-CHOION. Despite these blanket maneuvers, only the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry experienced significant encounters with the enemy. The squadron’s 3 Troop flying armed aerial reconnaissance along and east of the CUBITIL UVIN between the 00 east-west grid line and DUC NOA and C Troop flying similar missions in the southern DOI LOI WOODS (center of mass 2T7417); and northeast of TANAI DAKO along route 237 detected and engaged small groups of enemy on five separate occasions during the day. The armed helicopters accounted for 15 VC KIA by body count and destroyed one XP-47 and one sampan.

2 May

Divisional maneuver battalions and supporting organic and attached aviation units continued their search for the enemy along suspected avenues of approach in the SAIGON-CHOION area from the northwest, west and southwest. Again, only the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry enjoyed any success in locating the enemy. 3 Troop continuing its armed aerial reconnaissance of the area it had overflown the previous day observed movement north of DUC NOA in the vicinity of XT 5510. Bounding the area with automatic weapons and rockets, the gunships drew in one round fire. Supporting artillery and Air Force tactical fighter air strikes were placed into the area. Following the lifting of these fires, the air cavalrymen went back into the area on low level reconnaissance and counted 25 enemy dead and four destroyed 50 caliber machine guns. Intelligence sources later identified the enemy as elements of the 27th VC Regiment.

Meanwhile, C Troop had turned its attention to reconnaissance of the IDN TRIANGLE (center of mass 7T228) and the HO X WOODS (center of mass 7T6027). At 1700 hours the troop detected approximately 60 VC positioned in a tree line along a canal from XT 70178 to XT 737173. The armed helicopters engaged the enemy force with their automatic weapons and rockets and then called in artillery and air strikes. A search of the target area subsequent to these attacks revealed 23 VC dead and numerous blood tracks leading out of the area to the north. These dead were identified as elements of the 101st NVA Regiment.

3 May

On 3 May enemy movement within the division TAOI and assault positions for their planned attacks became more apparent, and the division reacted accordingly. At 0000 hours 3 Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry continuing its armed aerial reconnaissance east of the ORIENTAL RIVER sighted an estimated 200 VC at XT 994064. This enemy force was immediately engaged by the gunships and artillery and tactical fighter air strikes were directed into the area. The 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) which was maneuvering in a search operation a short distance to the south of the enemy position was directed to engage. By 0400 hours the battalion had moved into blocking positions along an axis from XT 9904 to XT 9994. This maneuver fixed the enemy position and by 1500 hours the fourth of the twenty third was reinforced by the 2nd Battalion, 34th Infantry and the
6 May

TASK FORCE DASKS completed its operations against the enemy force in the general vicinity of XT 6005, XT 6006, XT 6105 and XT 9007. The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (Mech) swept through the area during the day and discovered 113 additional enemy dead and substantial numbers of enemy weapons, ammunition and supplies. The total enemy casualties by body count in the four day engagement was 213 dead. From five prisoners taken in the battle, it was learned that the enemy force intercepted and blocked by TASK FORCE DANKS consisted of a battalion of the 271st VC Regiment and that the survivors of the engagement, many of them wounded, had fled north through the swamp.

As the 4th of the 9th and 1st of the 5th prepared for their mopping up activities for the day, TASK FORCE DANKS sent the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Armor south into the vicinity of BOA TRAI to reinforce the ARVN - RF-PF garrison of that town which was attacked by a three battalion enemy force (the 247th, 247th and D-14 VC battalions) in the early morning hours. At XT 4805 the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) clashed with an enemy unit at 0700. Supported by helicopters and artillery, the battalion accounted for 18 enemy dead and captured one prisoner in an all day running battle to the west of BOA TRAI.

B Company, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, in a sweep one kilometer north of Route 1 midway between CU CHI and PHU VINH (XT 58175) engaged an estimated VC platoon at 0600 and inflected 18 enemy and one POW on the enemy before he broke contact and retreated to the west. The 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) maneuvering near CU CHI in the vicinity of its C Company's contact of the previous day established contact with an enemy force of unknown size and claimed 12 VC KIA in the ensuing fire fight. At 1135, B Company, 3rd Battalion, 17th Cavalry following up on the 4th of the 23rd's contact earlier in the day near BOA TRAI, spotted 50 VC moving west away from the area of contact. The helicopters engaged the fleeing enemy and killed an additional 15 VC.

7 May

In the pre-dawn hours of 7 May, A and B Companies of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry commenced a reconnaissance-in-force operation in the vicinity of XT 7303 approximately ten kilometers northwest of SAIGON-DUONG. At 1115 hours this force ran into a large number of enemy; a force that was later identified as the 3rd Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment. After a heat attrition battle that lasted through the day and into the following day, the US force supported by helicopter gunships, artillery and tactical air inflected 199 dead on this enemy battalion. The survivors of the NVA battalion fled to the west.

Contact throughout the division TAQI became increasingly more frequent throughout the day, but most actions were with small infiltrating units.

8 May

At 0934 Company G, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry was sweeping at XT 73925 when it ran into an unknown size enemy force. Engaging the enemy with organic weapons the company accounted for 32 VC KIA and two prisoners before contact was lost. Later in the day at 1115 five kilometers to the northwest (XT 703942), the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry night defensive location engaged an unknown size VC force that moved into its position. In the fire fight that took place, 32 VC KIA were recorded and two POWs were taken. The two actions are believed to have involved the same enemy battalion of the 271st VC Regiment; the latter fight taking place as the VC sought to evade the first US unit which took it under fire.

7

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Meanwhile, a short distance to the northeast of where the VC battalion was fighting its second battle of the day, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry was engaging a VC company. With the support of armed helicopters, the US troops drove off the advancing enemy who left 24 dead and two prisoners behind.

Further to the north, the 2nd Battalion, 34th Infantry swept Route 1 south of DUC HOA (XJ 75120) in an area where it had a light contact the previous day. At 1245 the tanks came under fire. Returning fire with organic weapons and supported by armed helicopters, artillery and air strikes, the 2nd of the 34th Infantry pursued the enemy all day and into the night. Contact was lost at 0200 on the 9th. Forty-four enemy dead were recovered and one prisoner was taken.

9 May

Throughout the first week of May, many division base camps, artillery fire support bases and battalion night defensive positions had come under light but harassing enemy stand off rocket and mortar attacks. In the darkness of the early morning hours of 9 May, this enemy tactic was intensified with two heavy assaults.

At 0100 the division headquarters at CU CHI Base Camp was struck by thirty rounds of mixed 122mm and 107mm rockets. The rockets all falling within a span of two minutes resulted in seven killed and 48 wounded. Damage to the base camp installations was slight.

An hour later, Fire Support Base MAURY at XT 610022 came under a heavy mortar and rocket attack followed by a battalion size ground assault. A Company and the Scout Platoon of the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry which were securing the artillery positions were reinforced by the battalion's B Company and I Troop, 3rd Squadron, 11th Cavalry. In a fight that lasted until 0600, US casualties were nine KIA and 64 wounded. Additionally two 105mm and two 155mm howitzers were destroyed by enemy sappers who had breached the perimeter defense. Fourteen enemy dead were counted the following morning and one PWN was taken.

On the same day at 1450, A and B Companies and the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry made an air mobile combat assault into a swamp five kilometers east of DUC HOA (XS 65954) to check out a large enemy force reported to be in the area. Making contact immediately upon the landing, the infantry swept through the area with the support of helicopter gunships. In the contact that lasted until 2100, the infantryman recovered 66 enemy dead, took three prisoners and captured three 122mm rocket launchers and numerous other items of enemy weapons, ammunition and equipment. The prisoners later identified their unit as the 208th NVA Rocket Regiment.

10 May

Continuing their wide spread search for enemy units west of SAIGON, the maneuver battalions of the 29th Infantry Division established numerous small contacts on 10 May. The most significant of these involved C Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry which located an enemy force approximately nine kilometers west of SAIGON at XS 700914 at 1035. Pursuing the enemy which was later learned to be elements of the 21st VC Regiment to the north, C Company claimed 24 enemy dead and one prisoner in an all day fight which broke at 2145 hours.

11 May

Significant contact with the enemy west of SAIGON continued light and scattered throughout 11 May. At 1445 C Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry fixed an estimated VC platoon in a hedgerow at XT 819050 approximately three kilometers west of the SAIGON RIV. After calling in helicopter gunships and artillery to engage the entrenched VC, they
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Company assaulted the hedgerow at 2000 hours and discovered 15 enemy dead and numerous weapons, equipment and supplies.

12 May

The enemy stepped up the tempo of his activities west of Sугон in the early morning hours of 12 May, he staged a battalion size attack on artillery Fire Support Base FIKS VI at XS 799784. Beginning at 0138 with a mass mortar barrage, the enemy staged several wave assaults on the fire support base perimeter. Defended by personnel of the 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery, 6th Battalion, 7th Artillery and 2nd Battalion, 8th Artillery, the fire support base perimeter turned back all assaults. By 0407, the enemy attack was broken. At daylight, 98 enemy bodies were counted outside the perimeter wire and numerous weapons, ammunition and supplies were found abandoned.

The attacking force later was determined to be a battalion of the 272nd VC Piment.

Later in the day, C Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry (Mech) searching for the enemy in the vicinity of XS 7997 discovered an estimated platoon hiding in bunkers. Supported by artillery and air strikes, the company moved into the enemy positions and claimed 17 VC KIA and one POW in the action.

13 May

The 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) which had for several days had the mission of clearing the I-3S (route 1) from 00 DAU "A to the ROICN Bridge (XS 712072) was again performing this operation when at 0830 it came into contact with an unknown size enemy force in the village of 1F BUK BUCI (CT 553179) midway between TRUNG RANG and CU GHI. In a running house to house battle that lasted throughout the day, the battalion accounted for 19 enemy dead and one prisoner. The prisoner identified his unit as a TRUNG BUC local force company.

At about the same time that the "Triple Deuces" were initiating their contact, Company D of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Infantry was conducting a sweep through an area approximately five kilometers south of IU KPO (XS 79979). During the previous night, artillery had engaged a target in this area detected by radar. The infantrymen in their search discovered 15 VC KIA killed by artillery.

Again about the same time, elements of the 109th Light Infantry Brigade which had become CO DIV (operational control) on 12 May to the Tropic Lightning Division located the enemy in the vicinity of XS 7283. With initial contact made at 0820 by the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry, Companies A and B of the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry quickly moved to reinforce. Supported by armed helicopters, artillery and air strikes, these units pursued the estimated VC battalion until 2200 when contact was lost. Enemy losses for the encounter were established at 65 KIA by body count.

Far to the north in TAY NHIE Province, the communications relay complex operated at the summit of XU XI DU (CT 213982) was attacked by enemy sapper forces at 2145 hours. Successful in their effort to breach the perimeter of the mountain top compound, the enemy destroyed the communications relay facilities with mortars and satchel charges. Although the enemy lost 25 KIA in the fight which transpired, 19 US troops died in the fight.

14 May

The 199th contact with the enemy in the vicinity of the previous day's encounter continued intense. Establishing a night defensive position at XS 720843, Company I, 5th of the 12th and Company N 3rd D
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of the 2nd of the 3rd, came under attack at 0200 hours. In a battle that ran to until 0400, three infantry units supported by armed helicopters and artillery accounted for another 40 enemy dead. At about the same time (0300), C Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry was attacked in its night defensive position at XT 90308. In an all-day battle, the company, aided by helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes killed 31 of the attacking enemy. Intelligence gained from documents captured by the 101st in these three engagements revealed that the enemy force in each case was an element of the 273rd VC Regiment.

15 May

On the 13th and 14th of May intelligence sources indicated that enemy units which had moved towards SAIGON beginning on the 3rd of May were now exfiltrating the area on movements back to their sanctuary areas. Divisional units were now evolved to pursue the fleeing enemy. The A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry searching for the enemy in the northern TD '000S intercepted a large enemy unit moving north at XT 90308. In an all-day battle, the Troop reinforced by the Squadron's C Troop and supported by armoured, artillery and air strikes accounted for 82 VC KIA and captured three prisoners. The PS's identified their unit as the 7th Battalion, 5th-1, local force and reported that the battalion had been in constant contact for ten days with US and ARVN forces and had lost 140 of its 500 personnel either killed, wounded or missing. The survivors were pulling back into '00 ZONE C in northern TAY NINH Province.

16 May

On 16 May the pattern of contact with enemy forces throughout the division TAC continued to move away from 5700 KM further indicating the exfiltration of enemy units which had attempted to close on the city early in the month. At 1725 hours G Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Infantry (199th Light Infantry Brigade) searching for enemy forces approximately one kilometer north of the KI111 Silo Con. (18 149878) engaged an unknown enemy force. Attacking the enemy force as it moved west, the company killed 20 VC before the enemy unit was able to break contact. Flying late afternoon armed aerial reconnaissance mission over the NO TO 000S and FROM TRIANGLE, C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry detected 150 to 200 VC at XT 732193. The enemy were engaged by the armed helicopters in addition to artillery and air strikes that were called in. A check of the area following the engagement revealed the bodies of 21 VC.

17 May

Searching for suspected enemy rearmament caches along the banks of the RACH TRA Canal north of SAIGON and west of the "FACE" AVN, C Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry at XT 890193 located and evacuated 90 rounds of 75mm ammo, 40 anti-tank mines, 190 rounds of 82mm 20 rounds of 60mm ammo, 26 rounds of 82mm mortar, 1256 rounds of 12.7mm ammo, 120 rounds of 57mm 20 rounds of 40mm aro, 5 complete 122mm rockets, the 122mm aro, 20 rounds of 105mm aro, 5 complete 122mm rockets, the addition of its automatic weapons and calling in artillery, ten 122mm rockets were destroyed and ten VC KIA were accounted for. The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force operations eight kilometers north of D'C' Loc. Located 22 VC killed by artillery and air strikes and located and destroyed in place 43 122mm mortar rounds.
18 May
Pressing the search for enemy forces and equipment, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry located and evacuated the following from XT 754167: six light machine guns, 20 AK-47 rifles, two 75mm recoiless rifles, five 82mm mortar, one 60mm mortar, one .51 cal machine gun, one 22.7mm anti-aircraft machine gun, five PRC-10 radios, two anti-tank mines and 600 rounds of small arms ammo.

19 May
Continuing to search for enemy forces north of D'Ng Hoa, the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry engaged an unknown size force at XT 631042 at 0845. The contact was initiated when D Company made an air mobile combat assault into a "hot" landing zone. D Company was reinforced during the day by A and C Companies as well as supported by artillery, armed helicopters and air strikes. A total of 18 VC KIA were located after contact was broken late in the day. Documents found on the enemy dead identified the enemy unit in contact as the 3rd Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment.

20 May
The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry following up on its contact of the previous day searched the area surrounding the battle area. At 0955 at XT 634993 Company B took a small VC force under fire and accounted for nine VC KIA as well as capture numerous individual weapons and ammunition. Meanwhile, at a location seven kilometers north of Tan Son Nhut Air Base, C Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, a search and destroy operation ran into a concealed VC platoon hiding in bunkers along a canal bank. Regaining the enemy with organic weapons, artillery and armed helicopters, C Company destroyed the enemy platoon in place accounting for 25 VC KIA.

21 May
The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry which had been stalking the 3rd Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment for several days north of D'Ng Hoa found their prey at 0318 when the enemy battalion attacked the 4th at the night location at XT 634993. Turning back the enemy assault with the aid of supporting artillery and air strikes, the infantry pursued the enemy as they pulled back. In heavy fighting which ended late in the afternoon of the 21st several kilometers to the north of the night defensive position, the 4th of the 9th accounted for 25 VC bodies and two P07's. Air Force tactical air strikes flown in support of the battalion were credited with an additional 25 VC bodies that were located.

22 May
The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mech) searching for enemy forces had moved in the Southern Bdi Loi north of Thaton, 4th Cavalry searching in an area a short distance to the northeast of the last of the 5th's contact (XT 57475) came into contact with an unknown size enemy force. In a running battle which lasted all day, the cavalrymen supported by helicopter resupplys, artillery and air strikes accounted for another 20 VC KIA. To the north of these actions, at the Tan Son Nhut Air Base, an enemy seamer unit at 0750 attacked and overrun four gun positions of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Artillery on the base camp perimeter. Seven VC KIA were accounted for by the defending artillerymen, but the enemy succeeded in destroying one 175mm gun and one 8th Howitzer.

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The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, continuing their pursuit of the 3rd Battalion, 27th VC Regiment in the DUC HOA area, located an estimated enemy company three kilometers south of the town at XS 625965. The battalion's Company engaged the VC force with organic weapons, artillery, armed helicopters and air strikes between 0830 and 1915 hours. After contact with the enemy was broken, Company discovered 19 VC KIA. To the north, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, continued its search for enemy forces and weapons and ammunition caches immediately north of TAN SON NHUT Air Base. At 1045 hours B Company came across an estimated VC platoon at XS 624046. After a fire fight which included support from armed helicopters and artillery, 12 VC KIA were accounted for and two POWs were taken.

On 25 May, the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, was relocated from the DUC HOA area to a new battalion area of operations northeast of HOC MON where it established a new base camp at XT 778035. Conducting a company size combat assault and sweep to the northeast of the battalion base camp, A Company engaged an unknown number of VC between 1005 and 1430 hours at XT 784034. Supported by artillery, armed helicopters and air strikes, the infantry accounted for 23 VC KIA in the engagement.

Combat action in the division TAOI on 27 May was focused on the area 14 kilometers west of SAIGON at XS 671925 where the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry, was located in a night defensive position. At 2200 on the 26th, the battalion's night position came under mortar fire which was intermittent until 0330 hours when the position came under a massive ground attack. The 4th of the 23rd held off the human wave assaults with the aid of armed helicopters, artillery and air strikes. At dawn, the 4th of the 23rd was reinforced by A and C Troops of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry. The combined US force moved out of the NDP at first light and pursued the enemy which was attempting to break contact. The firefight in the general vicinity continued until 1600 hours. The enemy body count within the NDP and the surrounding area was 243 VC KIA as compared to six US fatalities. In addition, three personnel were taken who identified their unit as the 2nd Battalion, 273rd VC Regiment. Also captured were 28 AK-47 rifles, 11 RPG-2 rocket launchers, six 60mm mortars, 49 60mm mortar rounds, 58 hand grenades, 142 RPG-2 rounds and 22,500 rounds of small arms ammunition.

Meanwhile to the north, B Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, and B Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, joined forces to engage an unknown size VC force northeast of HOC MON (XT 600043 to XT 612043) in a running battle that lasted from 0850 until 1700 hours. By the end of the day the two companies had accounted for 15 VC KIA and large amounts of captured enemy ammunition and supplies.

The 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, searching for enemy weapons and ammunition caches in the western MHEL PLANTATION (XT 498322) discovered and evacuated a supply of weapons which included 87 individual weapons and three crew served weapons.

The ground troop (D) of the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, which had been conducting road clearing and security operations on the HSA from TAY NIN to GO DAO MAI, for over two weeks without incident, suddenly found the enemy at 0935 on 30 May. Having driven astride
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small arms fire along the road at XT 335345, elements of the Air Cavalry troop probed the area from which the fire had come and encountered an estimated VC company. The cavalrymen called in supporting artillery, helicopter gunships and air strikes on the enemy position. Sweeping through the area following the lifting of supporting fires, D Troop discovered 14 enemy bodies.

In the meantime, B Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry sweeping northeast of HOC MOM along the SAIGON RIVER (XT 792056) encountered a small enemy force heavily dug into a bunker complex. Supported by artillery, armed helicopter gunships and air strikes, the infantrymen overrun the enemy positions. They accounted for 11 VC KIA and captured five AK-47 rifles, two RPN-2 launchers and one pistol.

31 May

B Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry conducting a reconnaissance-in-force operation along the SAIGON RIVER approximately six kilometers northeast of HOC MOM (XT 792056) encountered an unknown size enemy force at 0825 hours. Armed helicopters, artillery and air strikes were called in to attack the enemy positions. Sweeping into the location occupied by the enemy, the infantrymen located 14 VC bodies and captured two AK-47 rifles, one RPG-2 rocket launcher, one 9mm pistol and two pounds of documents. At the same time, a short distance to the southwest of the B Company contact (XT 823047), C Company detected an estimated two VC squads hiding in bunkers. Supporting fires were placed on the enemy positions, and C Company discovered six VC KIA when it assaulted the enemy bunkers.

2 June

Conducting a search and destroy mission seven kilometers west of SAIGON, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry received fire from an estimated 40 VC at XT 708566. Returning fire with organic weapons and calling in supporting artillery and air, the company maintained contact with the enemy from 1335 to 1431. VC losses in the firefight were 21 KIA.

In the meantime, B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry which had been flying armed aerial reconnaissance over the BOI LOI WOODS, HO BO WOODS and IRON TRIANGLE detected an unknown number of VC in bunkers at XT 725066. In a battle which commenced at 1115 hours the enemy were hit by armed helicopter, artillery and air strikes. Checking the area following the engagement, the cavalrymen discovered 38 VC KIA.

3 June

D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry continued its armed aerial reconnaissance throughout the BOI LOI, HO BO WOODS and IRON TRIANGLE on 3 June and detected a rocket firing site at XT 625066. Attacking the position at 1130 and calling in airstrikes, the helicopters succeeded in destroying 27 122mm rockets and 2 rocket launchers as well as accounting for two VC KIA.

4 June

B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry flying armed recon. A reconnaissance along the ORIENTAL RIVER south of BAO THAI had five separate engagements with small groups of VC moving in the vicinity of the river. The engagements resulted in 17 VC KIA and six enemy sampans destroyed. Helicopters of D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry flying similar missions along the SAIGON RIVER in the vicinity of PHU KQA destroyed 13 enemy sampans throughout the day.

5 June

The night defensive position of the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry at XT 483066 came under a heavy mortar attack and company sized ground attack at 0113 hours. Receiving a total of 60 mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar
rounds, the cavalrymen reacted swiftly to the ground attack before it could get seriously underway. Fire was placed on the enemy by organic weapons, armed helicopters and artillery. A search of the perimeter area following the abortive assault located seven VC KIA, one POW, two AK-47 rifles, two RPG rocket launchers, nine RPG rounds, eight hand grenades and six mines.

Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry conducting an air mobile combat assault at 07h55 hours near the SAIGON River town of PHU L/HOC, located in a 'Hoik' at XT 09106A. At the company limit it drew heavy small arms fire, automatic weapons and rocket fire from an unknown size enemy force in the area. The infantrymen returned fire and called in supporting artillery, armed helicopters and air strikes. At 08h00 hours Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry moved in to reinforce the two companies of the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry. All three units remained in contact with the enemy throughout the day and into the night. When the infantry swept through the area of contact the following day, they discovered six VC KIA and one POW. Documents taken from the dead enemy and the POW identified the enemy unit in contact as the 1st Battalion, 103rd NVA Regiment.

B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry flying armed aerial reconnaissance along the OCTOPUS route from PHU L/HOC to DAO TRA: then east of BAO THAI engaged small groups of enemy on three occasions during the day accounted for 10 VC KIA.

An ambush patrol from Company C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry engaged approximately 20 VC at 03h00 hours at XT 815055. The ambush resulted in 15 VC KIA and the capture of 12 AK-47 rifles and 1000 rounds of small arms ammunition.

C Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry ('Tech') sweeping through a swamp midway between SAIGON and DAO TRA: (XT 695950) at 0915 hours discovered and confiscated a large enemy ammunition cache. Located in four sunken sampans, the cache included 10 complete 122mm rockets, 82 82mm mortar rounds, 12 cans of 82mm fuses, 26 cans of 60mm primer and 5,350 AK-47 rifle rounds. At 1000 hours B Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry sweeping through the SAIGON rocket belt received fire from an unknown size enemy force at XT 786072. The company returned the fire and called in armed helicopters, artillery and air strikes on the enemy positions. Sweeping through the area later in the day, the infantrymen counted 13 NVA KIA and captured two AK-47 rifles, one .50 caliber machine gun and two RPG-2 rocket launchers.

The 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division with two battalions (3rd Battalion, 107th Airborne Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 506th Airborne) became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division. The brigade arrived at the CH CIH Base Camp on 15 June and began preparations for operations within the Division T/OI.

An ambush patrol from C Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry engaged 25-30 enemy at 23h55 hours. The enemy force walked into the ambush set by the C Company element at XT 724999. In the fire fight that ensued 15 NVA were KIA from the claymores, hand grenades, small arms and automatic weapons fire of the ambush.

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A short time later at 0230 hours, the night defensive position of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry at KB 740998 came under a heavy mortar attack followed by a human wave ground assault by an estimated battalion sized enemy force. The bunkered perimeter of the night location met the enemy assaults with a heavy volume of fire. The enemy outside the perimeter were also taken under fire by supporting helicopters, artillery and air strikes. The following morning a search of the area beyond the perimeter revealed 72 enemy KIA and resulted in the capture of 29 AK-47 rifles, 13 RLG rocket launchers, three machine guns, 20 RLG rounds and 400 small arms rounds. One prisoner was also taken. The attacking enemy unit was identified as the 1st Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment.

On 18 June, D Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry searching for enemy arms and ammunition caches northeast of HOC MON discovered a large supply hidden in a tunnel at XT 795970. The company confiscated 35 - 122mm rocket war heads, six carbines, seven RLG rocket launchers, 13,689 small arms rounds, 88 RLG rounds and 88 82mm mortar rounds. The 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne which had moved from CU ONI Base Camp to an area of operations in the TRAPDOI south of the MICHELIN PLANTATION had been searching in vain for enemy forces in this area. It's first significant contact occurred at 0420 hours on the 18th when a D Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Airborne on a night patrol engaged an unknown size enemy force. Searching through the area of contact at first light, the company located seven VC KIA.

Company C, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry conducted a helicopter born assault at 1054 hours into a landing zone five kilometers northeast of TAL and the company landed, it came under fire from an unknown enemy size force occupying the terrain adjacent to the landing zone. Four helicopters were damaged by the fire, but were able to exit the landing zone. The infantry returned the enemy fire and called in armed helicopters and artillery for supporting fire. At 1430 hours, elements of Companies B and D linked up with C and the combined units remained in contact throughout the day. A sweep of the contact area the following morning revealed 14 VC KIA, seven AK-47 rifles, eight RPO-2 rounds, 25 hand grenades and miscellaneous medical supplies. The enemy unit in contact was identified as elements of a battalion of the 101st NVA Regiment.

Shifting its area of operations from the TRAPDOI south of the MICHELIN PLANTATION to western HU NH DIS Province southwest of TRUONG BANG, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division engaged in a significant combat action on 21 June. At 1142 hours Company A, 1st Battalion, 504th Airborne was searching east of the ONE NITTE RIVER at XT 430113 when it ran into the base camp of an estimated VC company. In the heavy fire fight that followed, A Company was reinforced by C Company and 1 Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Airborne. Helicopter gunships, artillery and airstrikes were also brought to bear on the enemy positions. After the contact which lasted through the day and night of 21 June, the area was searched and disclosed 64 VC KIA and the capture of 13 AK-47 rifles, two RPO-2 rocket launchers, two machine guns, 29 hand grenades, 19 RLG-2 rounds and 5,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. The enemy unit in contact was later identified as the 267th VC Battalion.

In the early morning hours, the DYNAMITE radar at PHU HAO DONG detected unidentified movement between its location and HOC MON.
The target was engaged with artillery. The following day helicopters flew over the area, engaged and located 15 VC KIA resulting from artillery.

23 June

The reconnaissance platoon of the 1st Battalion, 504th Airborne conducting a night search and destroy operation along the west bank of the ORIENTAL RIVIER discovered a large enemy ammunition cache. At 0230 hours the platoon uncovered 106 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 50 81mm mortar rounds, and 1,000 rounds of small arms ammunition at XT 410205.

20 June

B Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) conducted a combined search and destroy operation south of TRANG BANG with the 34th ARVN Ranger Battalion. The force came under fire from an unknown size enemy force at XT 500233. Supported by artillery, armed helicopters and air strikes, the joint force swept into the enemy positions and accounted for 20 VC KIA and four F07's.

30 June

Company A, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) conducting a road clearing and security mission on the MSR between TAY NINH and TRANG BANG received fire from an estimated enemy company at 0900 hours in the vicinity of XT 358332. At 0930, Company A reinforced by the battalion heavy mortar platoon moved north from TRANG BANG to reinforce the company. At 1005 a platoon of C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry also moved north from TRANG BANG to reinforce, and at 1105 hours two mechanized ARVN companies from TAY NINH moved into the area of contact. After a preparation by armed helicopters and mortars and a CS drop, A Company and the platoon of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry assaulted into the rubber plantation to the east of the road from which the enemy fire had originated. In the contact which continued until 1905 hours, 21 VC KIA were discovered, two F07's were taken and two AK-47's and one machine gun were captured.

Earlier in the day, the night defensive position of the 1st Battalion, 504th Airborne at XT 492235 came under attack from an estimated two companies at 0005 hours. In the contact which lasted until 0230, the paratroopers supported by armed helicopters and artillery turned back the enemy assault and accounted for 38 VC KIA and the capture of 12 AK-47 rifles, nine RPO rocket launchers, two machine guns, 2,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and 60 hand grenades. The attacking companies were later identified as elements of the 2nd Battalion, 275th VC Regiment.

3 July

Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, participating in the squadron's road clearing and security mission of the MSR between TAY NINH City and SAIGON, drew fire from an estimated enemy platoon at 0130 at a point on the MSR four kilometers southeast of GO DA HAU (XT 413231). The cavalry troop returned the enemy's fire with organic weapons and called in artillery, helicopter gunships and air strikes to hit the enemy positions. Contact with the enemy lasted until 0245 hours. Sweeping through the area at first light, the troop discovered four VC bodies and one AK-47 rifle. At about the same time that this contact was taking place, ten kilometers to the northeast (XT 536264) the night defensive position of D Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Airborne Infantry came under attack by an unknown size enemy force. Meeting the attack with organic weapons and supporting artillery, the company fought off the enemy charge. Sweeping into the area from which the enemy came, the company located 13 VC KIA and captured two machine guns, two rocket launchers, four AK-47 rifles and one field radio.

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4 July

The 25th Infantry Division’s major administrative and logistical base camps located at CD CHI, TAY NINH and DAU TIEG had come under frequent stand off mortar and rocket attacks during the reporting period. However, all of these attacks were minor in nature involving small amounts of ordnance and were conducted more for harassment than any other purpose. The one exception to this norm was the attack which took place on the DAU TIEG Base Camp beginning at 0220 hours and lasting until 0530. During that period of time, the base camp received 42 107mm rocket rounds and 515 rounds of mixed 82mm and 60mm mortar rounds. This massive artillery assault was combined with two separate ground probes on two sectors against the base camp perimeter. These probes were met by bunker line personnel and reaction forces from the Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry and the Headquarters Battery, 2nd Battalion, 7th Artillery. In both cases, the ground probes were repulsed with the enemy breaching the perimeter in only one location. Results of the attack in the way of U.S. losses were five KIA, 55 MIA, 12 quarter ton trucks, five 3/4 ton trucks, three 1 ton trucks, three 5 ton trucks, one APC, and six buildings damaged. Enemy losses were recorded at six KIA, six AK-47 rifles and one rocket launcher captured, and 434 satchel charges, 61 RG0 rounds, 45 60mm mortar rounds, 16 grenades and four mines destroyed.

8 July

Tropic Lightning maneuver elements continued to push their search for enemy supply caches. Searching along a canal bank one mile southwest of the SAIGON RIVER town of PHU CONG (XT 799124), C Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry uncovered and captured a large supply cache containing 530 rounds of small arms ammunition, 2208 rounds of 82mm, 18 82mm rounds, 70 rifle grenades, 40 pounds of medical supplies and one AK-47 rifle. Later in the day at 1832 companies B and C, 1st Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry, sweeping an area approximately three kilometers northeast of TRANS BAN (XT 520227) engaged an unknown size enemy force. The fire fight that followed was supported by armed helicopters, artillery and an Air Force “Spooky”, a gatling gun armed C-47 cargo aircraft. Pushing in and overrunning the enemy positions, the paratroopers recovered 21 VC KIA. Four troopers died in the contact and 13 were wounded.

9 July

At 0920 hours, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry sweeping west of the SAIGON RIVER one kilometer southwest of PHU LONG (XT 758124) discovered 12 VC KIA by artillery. Movement had been detected in the area the previous night by radar and the movement was engaged by artillery. Three destroyed AK-47 rifles and two unserviceable RPG rocket launchers were captured along with three RG0 rounds and 16 hand grenades. Searching several kilometers to the northeast of the 2nd of the 14th discovery (XT 758124) at 1150 hours, 3 Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry discovered a cache consisting of one AK-47 rifle, 3,300 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 170 pounds of explosives and 35 blasting caps.

10 July

Flying armed aerial reconnaissance at 1140 hours approximately seven kilometers northwest of TRANS BAN, D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 1st Cavalry detected approximately 50 VC in bunkers and spider holes at XT 743227. Assaulting the enemy with their rockets and automatic weapons and calling in artillery and air strikes, the air cavalrymen alerted the nearby 3rd Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry to the presence of the enemy unit. At 1347, Companies

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C and D of the battalion made a helicopter borne assault on the enemy positions. Overrunning the bunkers, the cavalrymen recovered 27 enemy bodies, and captured 15 AK-47 rifles, six RPG rocket launchers, 1,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 15 RPG rounds and 25 hand grenades.

11 July

Pursuing the remnants of the enemy force they attacked to the northeast by following blood trails, C and D Companies, 1st Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry discovered another six enemy bodies, four AK-47 rifles, 17 RPG rounds, 25 pounds of medical supplies, 350 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 2,100 pounds of rice, 35 pounds of sugar, one RPG rocket launcher, one pound of documents, and a dozen plates and seven hand grenades.

12 July

Flying armed aerial reconnaissance eight kilometers east of the CU CHI Base Camp (XII 714707) at 1145, Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry detected a sampan on a canal. Checking out the contents of the boat, the air cavalrymen captured nine complete 82mm rockets.

15 July

At 0945 hours a forward air controller for the 25th Infantry Division detected 10-20 enemy troops unloading two sampans on a canal one kilometer east of the Cambodian border. Air strikes were called in on the site and helicopters of C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry flew into the area to follow up the air strikes. The helicopters engaged several VC in bunkers near the spot where the two sampans lay destroyed. Checking out the results of the attack in the position, the air cavalrymen discovered six VC bodies and determined that the cargo in the sampans had exploded.

16 July

Companies D and C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry searching for enemy arms and weapons caches along the west bank of the SAIGON RIVER one kilometer south of PHU LONG (XII 801121) captured 1,345 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 22 hand grenades, three 82mm mortar rounds, nine 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, and 2 AK-47 rifles.

19 July

The 2nd Brigade Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP), a joint US-Vietnamese unit, acting on intelligence, assaulted a house four kilometers north of DUC HA (XII 690083) where a VC meeting was supposedly taking place. Breaking up on the house at 2320 hours, the CRIP succeeded in surprising the meeting and in the firefight that took place killed 9 VC and took one EW. Three pistols, one AK-47 rifle and one carbine were captured. The dead VC were later identified as high ranking VC cadre. At 1635, an ambush patrol from D Company, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, set up along a trail at XT 749167 ambushed a VC party. The results of the ambush were 7 VC KIA of the seven man party and the capture of five AK-47 rifles, one 82mm rocket launcher, one pistol, 5,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 80 RPG rocket rounds and 50 rounds of 9mm pistol ammunition.

22 July

At 0956 B Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Airborne Infantry was sweeping three kilometers northeast of TR꾸 PE (XII 532204) when it encountered an unknown size VC force. Supported by
helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes and reinforced by the battalion's C and D companies, the contact with the enemy force continued throughout the day and into the night. A sweep of the area the following day resulted in the discovery of six VC bodies. At the same time to the west of the paratroopers contact, 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry sweeping four kilometers north of G0 2h HAU (X 392301) engaged an unknown size enemy force. Armed helicopters, artillery and air strikes were called in on the enemy positions, and 3 Company was reinforced by companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (Mech). The contact lasted through the day and into the night. At first light, a sweep of the area revealed 13 VC KIA.

24 July

C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry flown armed aerial reconnaissance along the Cambodian border at 1830 hours detected a platoon size enemy force at X 342000 eight kilometers southwest of G0 5A HAU. Attacking with automatic weapons and rockets and calling in artillery and air strikes, the air cavalrTnen observed the enemy withdrawing to the west in the direction of CONIVIA. A low level reconnaissance of the area after the contact revealed 15 VC KIA.

25 July

Company C, 2nd Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry sweeping three kilometers northeast of TRAC TANG (X 5H219) at 0815 came into contact with an unknown size enemy force. C Company was reinforced by A and B Companies of the battalion and the contact was supported by helicopter gunships, artillery and air force fighter-bombers. Contact was maintained until 1900 hours. Sweep ing into the enemy positions, the paratroopers recovered 35 VC KIA and captured two X-17 rifles, one machine gun, one 50mm mortar and 155 rounds of 105mm ammunition.

C. Combat Aviation Support Operations. During the period of this report, 3,027 Air Force fighter-bomber sorties were flown in support of 25th Infantry Division operations. These sorties, which included an estimated 4,574 tons of ordnance consisted of daily predicted air attacks on known or suspected enemy targets and localized close air strikes in support of troops in contact. In addition, 100 J-42 missions (sorties not known) were flown against targets located in the division TFs. These targets were known or suspected enemy base camps and supply areas and were flown on planned or mission divert bases. Combined results of these air operations (figures not included in those cited in paragraph B) are as follows:

- Enemy KIA: 874
-建筑物破坏: 4,355
-结构破坏: 619
-次级爆炸: 139
-次级火灾: 125
- sampas破坏: 73
-桥梁破坏: 21
-战线破坏: 4,790 meters

Air Force units which provided support to the division during the period of this report were C Flight of the 4th Air Commando Squadron flying out of CHI IL HU Air Base; the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing consisting of the 39th, 55th, 59th and 49th Tactical Fighter Squadrons flying out of CHI IL NIN IX; the 31st Tactical Fighter Wing consisting of the 109th, 124th, 317th, 304th and 39th Tactical Fighter Squadrons flying out of TUY HO Air Base; the 39th Tactical Fighter Wing consisting of the 102nd, 395th, 415th and 419th Tactical Fighter Squadrons flying out of PHU TANG.
Air Base; the 174th, 355th, 414th, and 612th Tactical Fighter
Squadrons flying out of PHU CAT Air Base; the 3rd Tactical Fight-
er Wing consisting of the 90th, 50th and the 331st Tactical
Fighter Squadrons flying out of Johnston Island Air Base; and the 8th
and 13th Tactical Fighter Squadrons of the Australian Air Force
flying out of PHU BANG Air Base.

Army combat aviation support for the combat operations of the
25th Infantry Division was provided by the organic 25th Aviation
Battalion and 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, the 12th Aviation Group,
three separate aviation companies, two Air Ambulance Detachments
and the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.

Tactical troop lift and aerial resupply throughout the division
TACI was readily available on a daily basis by the 108th and 133rd
Assault Helicopter Companies of the 14th Combat Aviation Battal-
ion; the 616th, 118th and 160th Assault Helicopter Companies of the 146th
Combat Aviation Battalion; the 147th and 198th Assault Helicopter
Companies of the 222nd Combat Aviation Battalion; the 149th and
157th Assault Helicopter Companies of the 252nd Combat Support
Helicopter Company of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion. All
these units are organic to the 12th Aviation Group.

Air reconnaissance support to the division was made available
by the 75th Support Aircraft Company (Mohawks), the 145th Recon-
cessaca Aircraft Company (Third Bay) and the 146th Reconnaissance
Aircraft Company.

Armed aerial reconnaissance and helicopter gunships were pro-
vided to the division daily by the organic 245th Aviation Battalion
and 2 Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry; 3 and 6 Troops of the 3rd
Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry; and the 334th Armed Helicopter Com-
anie (Gunship) of the 144th Combat Aviation Battalion.

Armour service to the division was provided by the
158th Air Ambulance Detachment and the 57th Air Ambulance
Detachment out of the 4th Aviation Group (Air Ambulance). The 158th
provided air medical service to service working out of the 25 IAM
and the NHIA Base Camp and the 57th provided similar service
working out of the NHIA Base Camp.

2. Principle Command and Staff. The identification of the
principle command and staff personnel within the 25th Infantry
Division for the reporting period is as follows:

Commanding General - Major General F. E. Jones

Assistant Division Commander

Assistant Division Commander

Chief of Staff

Ground Officer, 1st Brigade

Ground Officer, 2nd Brigade

Ground Officer, 3rd Brigade

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Commanding Officer, DIVA2TY
Commanding Officer, DISCDK
Commanding Officer, 725 Maint Bn
Commanding Officer, 25th MED Bn
Commanding Officer, 12th Sig Bn
Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mechanized)
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mechanized)
Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 7th Artillery
Commanding Officer, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery
Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery
Commanding Officer, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry

Adjutant General

Chaplain

Finance Officer
Information Officer
Inspector General
Judge Advocate
Provost Marshal

Surgeon

- COL Gordon Turner Jr.
- COL Jacob J. Traut
- LTC Kenneth D. Owen
- LTC John K. Hardison
- LTC Elliott Schofield (Mar-21Jan)
- LTC Randler J. Takusch (1Apr-13Jul)
- LTC George O. Nafeel (1Jun-3Jul)
- LTC John W. Sorens
- LTC Peter V. Kohler
- LTC Henry H. Fritzshen (May-1Jul)
- LTC James V. Anderson (1Jun-3Jul)
- LTC Richard T. Simpson
- LTC Alfred M. Bercy (May)
- LTC Thomas C. Ryan (2May-31Jul)
- LTC Thomas C. Lodge (May-25Jun)
- LTC Clifford C. Neilson (2Jun-31Jul)
- LTC Ernest Conine (May-25Jun)
- LTC Stanford Touchstone (6Jun-31Jul)
- LTC Anfred C. Kelton Jr. (May-25Jun)
- LTC John F. Kenny Jr. (25Jun-13Jul)
- LTC Donald J. Green
- LTC King J. Coffman
- LTC Roy K. Flint
- LTC John H. Tinton Jr. (2May-20Jun)
- LTC Theodore E. Comer (2Jul-31Jul)
- LTC Allen K. R. Beam (May-21Jun)
- LTC Leslie R. Romney (2May-23Jun)
- LTC John F. Cooper (2Jul-31Jul)
- LTC P. Lineham Heard Jr.
- LTC Billy J. Leethers (May-20Jun)
- LTC Forrest R. Pierce (9May-31Jul)
- LTC Homer W. Kiser Jr.
- LTC Glenn K. Otis (May-23Jun)
- LTC Clarence A. Riley (2May-30Jun)
- LTC Clarence L. Mix (May-31Jun)
- Major Donald M. Williams (1Jul-21Aug)
- LTC William F. Rutt (23Jul-1Jul)
- LTC Parker C. Thompson (23May-2Jul)
- LTC Duncan C. Stewart (2Jul-1Jul)
- LTC George H. Barrett
- Major Andrew J. Sullivan (5Aug-21Aug)
- Major Otis U. Wilson (23Jun-31Jul)
- LTC Jack Norton
- LTC William McClain (May-31Jul)
- Major Ronald S. Darlow (7Jun-17Jul)
- LTC Malcolm L. Smith (1Jul-13Jul)
- LTC Rainer S. Tausch

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Personnel. During the months of May, June and July, the division personnel strength averaged 103.1% of the authorized strength.

Unlisted personnel strength during the period included a fairly constant level of 13.1%. As of 31 July, the personnel units of the division were authorized 15,870 enlisted personnel, with 16,297 assigned and 15,771 present for duty. An attached to the division had 64 enlisted personnel authorized, 65 enlisted and 66 present for duty as of the last day of the reporting period.

Officer personnel strength for the period averaged 97.2% of authorized strength. This represented the personnel in strength from the average of the preceding quarters.

Officer and warrant officer personnel strength within assigned divisional units as of 31 July stood at 1,161 authorized and 1,193 present. On the same day, 1,025 officers and warrant officers were present for duty. Attached units were authorized four officers and warrant officers. On 31 July, there were additional 44 officers being present for duty.

From 1 May to 31 July, the personnel input to the division was 292 officers, 38 warrant officers and 4,350 enlisted personnel for an aggregate input of 4,690 personnel. Personnel losses both programmed and unprogrammed approximated this total.

Personnel casualties for the period numbered 22 officers, 37 enlisted personnel killed in action, 87 officers, 131 non-commissioned officers and 153 enlisted personnel wounded in action, and casual; one officer and 23 enlisted personnel non-battle deaths; one officer and 27 enlisted non-battle injuries remaining unchanged.

Personnel shortages continued to exist in infantry Captains, non-commissioned officers in the grade of S-7 with 118 required in the grade of 5-8 in the 11G. An increase in programmed personnel involving artillery, armor and cavalry units was designated to various strengths.

Organization. The organization list of the 25th Division for the period 1 May to 31 July is as follows:

ASSIGNED

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 25th Infantry
25th Administration Company
25th Military Police Company
25th Aviation Battalion
65th Engineer Battalion
125th Maintenance Battalion
25th Supply and Transportation Battalion
25th Signal Battalion
3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry
Company F, 50th Infantry (LRRP)
390th Quartermaster Detachment
25th Military Intelligence Detachment
Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Tank, Division.
1st Battalion, 77th Artillery
5th Battalion, 77th Artillery
6th Battalion, 77th Artillery
7th Battalion, 11th Artillery
1st Battalion, 13th Artillery
2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery
3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Brigade
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Brigade

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1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mechanized)
2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry
6th Battalion, 9th Infantry
2nd Battalion, 34th Infantry
1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (Mechanized)
1st Battalion, 27th Infantry
2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry
2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mechanized)
3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry
2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry
13th Military History Detachment
9th Chemical Detachment
14th Tracker Dog Platoon
19th Public Information Detachment
20th Public Information Detachment
30th Scout Dog Platoon
40th Scout Dog Platoon
60th Scout Dog Platoon
ATTACHED

29th Field Artillery Detachment
29th Field Artillery Detachment
Battery B, 5th Battalion, 2nd Artillery
2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery (until 3 June)
1st Aviation Detachment
372nd Radio Research Company

In addition to the above assigned and attached units, the 109th Light Infantry Brigade and the 3rd Brigade, 109th Air Cavalry Division were placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the 25th Infantry Division.

The 399th Brigade was OPCON to the division from 12-23 May with its organic battalions being the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry.

The 3rd Brigade, 109th Air Cavalry Division became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division 14 June and remained in that status through the end of the reporting period. Organic units of this brigade were: the 1st Battalion, 399th Airborne Infantry, 3rd Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry; the 3rd Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry and A and C Batteries, 2nd Battalion, 399th Airborne Artillery.

Throughout the reporting period, battalions of the 25th Infantry Division were in turn placed under the operational control of the Capital Military District (CMD) which was later redesignated Capital Military Assistance Command, a provisional command created to assist in the defense of SAIGON.

Tab A provides a daily record of the 25th Infantry Division’s organization for combat from 1 May to 31 July.

Throughout the reporting period several divisional units were reorganized under new TOEs. These are as follows:

1. 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (Mech), 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry (Mech) and the 4th Battalion, 2nd Infantry (Mech) to TOE 7-52 per USARAF CG 225 dated 7 May 1946.

2. 2nd Battalion, 34th Infantry to TOE 17-355 per USARAF CG 225 dated 22 April 1946.

3. 15th and 20th Public Information Detachments to TOE 45-500 PAC 7/68 per USARAF CG 225 dated 28 May 1946.

23
4. 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery to TOE 3-3955 per USARV GO 272 dated 29 May 1968.

5. 18th Military History Detachment to TOE 3-375 POC 1/68 per USARV GO 278 dated 29 May 1968.

6. 9th Chemical Detachment to TOE 3-500E TNC 1/68 per USARV GO 297 dated 17 June 1968.

G. Training. The 25th Infantry Division continued to pursue an active internal training program during the reporting period. The heart of this training program was the Division Replacement Training Course, the Division Demolitions and Explosives Course, and the Lightning Combat Leaders Course all provided by the 25th Administration Company.

The Division Replacement training course, an intensive five day and five night Vietnam oriented field training block of instruction required to be taken by all divisional replacements was completed by 4,145 personnel between 1 May and 31 July. The Mines and Booby Trap Course, a four hour course of instruction in enemy and booby trap tactics required to be taken by all newly arrived divisional personnel, was completed by 4,284 personnel.

The Lightning Combat Leaders Course (LCLC), an eight day field leadership course for fire team and squad leaders, was completed by 552 junior leaders. Five hundred and sixty nine personnel received the four hour block of instruction in tunnel destruction received in the Division Demolitions and Explosives Course. In addition, a four hour course of instruction in tunnel destruction was attended by 2,414 students.

Other divisional courses of instruction, the instructing unit and the number of trainees for the period of the report are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>INSTRUCTING UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jungle Environmental</td>
<td>Fleet Airborne</td>
<td>Clark AFB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival</td>
<td>Electronic Training Unit, Pacific</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jungle Survival School</td>
<td>Fleet Airborne</td>
<td>Clark AFB</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electronic Training Unit, Pacific</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSPAO ORIENTATION</td>
<td>125th Sig Bn</td>
<td>Hawaii NA</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition/Downing</td>
<td>125th Sig Bn</td>
<td>Hawaii NA</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable Splicers Course</td>
<td>SE Asia Signal School</td>
<td>Long Tn</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Facilities</td>
<td>SE Asia Signal School</td>
<td>Long Tn</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagery Interpretation</td>
<td>1st I/W/35</td>
<td>Tohn MCT</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo Interpretation</td>
<td>1st I/W/35</td>
<td>Tohn MCT</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selected division personnel also attended specialized courses of instruction offered by non-divisional organizations between 1 May and 31 July. These courses by title, the instructing unit, location and number of trainees are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jungle Environmental</td>
<td>Fleet Airborne</td>
<td>Clark AFB</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival</td>
<td>Electronic Training Unit, Pacific</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jungle Survival School</td>
<td>Fleet Airborne</td>
<td>Clark AFB</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electronic Training Unit, Pacific</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSPAO ORIENTATION</td>
<td>334th Signal</td>
<td>Naha NA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition/Downing</td>
<td>Helicopter Company</td>
<td>Naha NA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable Splicers Course</td>
<td>SE Asia Signal School</td>
<td>Long Tn</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Facilities</td>
<td>SE Asia Signal School</td>
<td>Long Tn</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagery Interpretation</td>
<td>1st I/W/35</td>
<td>Tohn MCT</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo Interpretation</td>
<td>1st I/W/35</td>
<td>Tohn MCT</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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H. Intelligence and Security. Intelligence operations and activities within the 25th Infantry Division during the reporting period continued under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, LTC Albert N. Stubblebine. LTC Stubblebine was assisted in his responsibilities and duties by his deputy who until 9 July was Major T. L. Jamison. On 10 July, Lt. Col. George Richardson moved from his duties as G-2 Operations Officer to the position of Deputy G-2. Other key members of the G-2 section between 1 May and 31 July were Major P. G. Quinn who served as G-2 Plans Officer and Major L. G. Quinn who replaced Richardson as G-2 Operations Officer on 10 July.

Intelligence planning and operations for the reporting period were developed around the resources of the 25th Military Intelligence Detachment commanded by Major Gale Goodloe until 21 July and thereafter by Major Anthony Carragan, the 372nd Radio Research Company commanded by Capt. J. S. Carter, and F Company, 50th Infantry (LRF) commanded by Capt. William Shanahan until 30 June and thereafter by Captain Raymond C. Dawson.

The 25th Military Intelligence Detachment provided the G-2 with Order of Battle (OB) facilities, photo and imagery interpretation capabilities, interrogation of prisoner of war teams (IPW) and counter intelligence teams. The 372nd Radio Research Company provided specialized communications security and intelligence facilities and operations to the division throughout the TOA1. F Company, 50th Infantry (LRF) was the long range reconnaissance patrol arm of the division and reacted to requirements by the G-2 to execute patrols to locate enemy forces, base camps and supply activities and to monitor enemy troop movement.

In addition to these assets, the division exploited the aerial reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of organic aviation units and facilities as well as those of supporting organizations. Extensive use was made of the "People Sniffer" capability of the 25th Aviation Battalion and 9th Chemical Detachment. Other specialized aerial reconnaissance and surveillance was made available on a daily basis by the 73rd Support Aircraft Company (Skysaw) of the 1st Aviation Brigade which flew daily SLAR missions (side looking aerial radar) and infrared detection, "Red Haze" missions in response to division requirements.

Intelligence assets of the division and one that was extensively employed was the CUF (combined reconnaissance and intelligence platoon). One of these joint U.S.-Vietnamese units was assigned to each Brigade Headquarters and operated directly in support of their parent brigades.
Employing all of these assets to maximum advantage and coordinating closely with intelligence agencies at adjacent and higher headquarters as well as Vietnamese government intelligence agencies, the Tropic Lightning Division G-2 establishment was successful in producing information which forecasted the "2nd Phase" Offensive on SINDON in early May. This information accurately identified the major enemy units that would participate in the operation, each unit's strength, composition and capabilities, and the probable routes of approach each unit would take to move against SINDON.

Based on this information, the 25th Infantry Division was redeployed in early May to establish a screen to the west of SINDON and to be in position to intercept the enemy in his approach march. This strategy was admirably successful and resulted in the destruction of the enemy forces and the dissipation of their combat effectiveness before they could reach their assault positions.

As the enemy attack on SINDON was destroyed and as the enemy broke contact and withdrew, the intelligence apparatus continued to produce data and information which was invaluable in pursuing the enemy forces, capturing his weapons, ammunition and supplies and in taking appropriate action to counter his offense and defensive tactics.

Logistics. Logistical management and staff supervision for division operations continued to be provided by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-4. Logistical operations were accomplished by the Division Support Command and its organic units: the 25th Medical Battalion, the 725th Maintenance Battalion and the 25th Supply and Transportation Battalion.

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, performed at three different levels of organization: as the Division G-4 office, it guided and supervised supply and property accountability, maintenance and materiel readiness and current logistical operations; as the Installation G-4, it reviewed all reports of surveys required in the division and attached units. As the subZONE G-4, it provided guidance and supervision concerning the logistical functions of four base coordinators: namely the base camp coordinators for CUA, TAY BINH and DUNG TAN base areas and the senior advisor to the 25th Army Division.

During the entire reporting period, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, was LTC Walter I. Brent. His deputy from 1 May to 24 July was Major Gary E. Layton. On 25 July Major John F. Buck assumed the duties of deputy G-4. The Maintenance Officer with the G-4 section was Major Thomas K. Rodin. Supply activities were the responsibility of Captain James A. Tow. The G-4 office itself is currently organized under paragraph 0'03 7-4. It's organized into administrative, supply, and maintenance sections, manned by the four officers referenced above assisted by six enlisted personnel.

With the lessening of hostile actions as the reporting quarter progressed, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, was able to give increased attention to areas other than purely logistical support of maneuver elements engaged in combat operations. These focused primarily on the managerial aspects of logistics and encompassed all fields of supply and maintenance, working closely with Division Support Command elements, new and revised division regulations were developed, updated or reviewed; all to conform with the new or revised division policies or those of higher headquarters.
Of significance were the efforts to update and streamline the procedures necessary to assure the timely submission of data by subordinate units to the division headquarters, and subsequent compilation and submission of this to higher headquarters. Considerable time was also devoted to the expediting and procurement of major items to replace equipment lost through combat operations of normal wear.

The conservation of ammunition has been stressed in recent months. General Abrams recently directed that US Army units attempt to achieve a 10% savings in ammunition expenditures, and stated that the savings are able to be attained without a reduction in combat power. 25th Infantry Division experience during the period of this report indicates that such a savings can be easily attained.

With the conversion of many units within the division from TOE to MTOE, considerable attention has been given in May, June and July to the realignment of assets and the turn in of excess. Although the reorganization of many type units began prior to this reporting period, there were numerous target dates established for conversion completion that came about in May, June or July.

The US Army Readiness Assistance Team visited organic units of the 25th Infantry Division during the period of June to July. The purpose of these visits was to provide assistance and guidance for the improvement of the overall readiness posture of the division. Areas of interest to the team included FID, TA, ASL, Maintenance Management, property books and maintenance documents and maintenance of equipment.

Supply support operations continued to be the function of the 25th Supply and Transportation Battalion at DAU base camps on an area basis (i.e. organic and lodger units) for Class II, Class III, and Class IV items; and less than Class IV items which are supplied to organic elements only and less medical, cryptographic and EAM). The same type support is provided to divisional and lodger units at DAU TISH by a provisional company of the 87th Support Battalion. 6th the TA NHN base camp, similar support is provided by the 56th Supply and Services Battalion, 25th General Support Group, SAI GON Support Command. In support of divisional units operating in the immediate area of SAIGON, a Supply and Transportation Battalion forward support element participates in a Division Support Command forward support facility at TAY NIN NUT Air Base. This comprehensive entity is referred to as QNHC CITY.

Maintenance support for the division is provided by the 725th Maintenance Battalion with direct support companies at CU CHI, DAU TISH and TA NHN base camps and a maintenance team at QNHC CITY. The companies at the base camps provide support for only organic divisional units. At QNHC CITY, the maintenance team provides support on an area basis for organic and GRU units. Back up direct support maintenance is provided to non-divisional elements at CU CHI, DAU TISH and TA NHN by non-divisional maintenance companies which include aviation maintenance capabilities.

Medical support is provided by the 25th Medical Battalion whose companies provide an area service and operate the equivalent of post dispensaries or station hospitals at the base camps at CU CHI, TA NHN and DAU TISH. Additional medical support is provided by the division by the 12th Evacuation Hospital at CU CHI and the 4th Surgical Hospital (MUST) at TA NHN.
In the services area, the division provides graves registration service at CU CHI and DAU TIENG on an area basis. The 25TH Support Command provides quartermaster field laundries at each of the base camps. Water distribution is accomplished by the 25TH S&T Battalion at CU CHI. The battalion also operates the Post Exchanges at CU CHI, TAY NINH and DAU TIENG under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

For a detailed and statistical review of the logistical operations of the Division Support Command and its subordinate elements, see Tab C.

J. G-5 Activities. No significant changes occurred during the reporting period concerning the placement or consolidation of the Revolutionary Development cadre throughout the T-511. Although the majority of teams were withdrawn from assigned hamlets into District headquarters during the TET Offensive, with the increase in security, they again have been deployed into assigned hamlets. There are presently 30 RD teams deployed throughout the division, seventeen in TAY NINH Province, three in BIM DUONG Province (Division portion thereof) and ten in HIJ HIEN Province.

As the teams develop an area they are leaving a skeleton, four to five man rear detachment in each village/hamlet to insure that the area does not deteriorate after the teams depart.

The MACV Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) continues to be a valuable tool for this headquarters. The HES is received, at the earliest one month after rating has been completed. The HES can assist the tactical commander by providing relatively accurate information concerning population location and density. It also provides information as to the status of security and development in specific areas. Below is the hamlet status as of 30 June 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HAMLET CATEGORY</th>
<th>NUMBR</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>PER CNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9,140</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1,776,734</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>377,442</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>265,487</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20,711</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>73,948</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABANDONED</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>12,133</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>866,964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the enemy May offensive, additional destruction to civilian homes was incurred as a result of combat operations against the Viet Cong. The largest damage occurred in CU CHI District, HAU HIEN Province, where over 400 homes were reported destroyed. Damage was primarily centered in PHUOC HIEP (71531) and TAY AN KOI village (71531). There were 65 homes destroyed in PHUOC HIEP District, BIM DUONG Province. The division is currently reporting the rebuilding of these homes in cooperation with the District/Province officials.

In TAY TAI District, HAI DUONG Province, the division’s support of the GVN Civil Recovery Program has been particularly effective. There were 82 homes constructed or repaired in this program. Additionally, a VIS showroom was completed in June. The rebuild program has been entirely a Vietnamese effort, with technical assistance and the majority of the materials being provided by the division.

In PHU QU District, HAI DUONG Province, the most significant project was the continuation of rebuilding of homes damaged during the TET Offensive. 455 packets of lumber, each containing 140-200 boardfeet of lumber suitable to construct a home, were sent.
6' house, have been delivered to three main areas in PHU HOI District. In THANG AU (XT7741) all of the 2' homes reported as destroyed have been reconstructed. Work proceeded into the PARIS TAN HOA (XT7741) and TAN THAN DONG (XT7751) areas as planned. At the end of July, there were 76 homes completed in PARIS TAN HOA and 358 completed in TAN THAN DONG. Excellent cooperation has been evident between GVN officials, RD cadre and division civic action personnel.

A very successful village festival was conducted at TAN THAN DONG (XT7511) involving over 400 families (about 2300 people). Medical care, food, clothing, health items and toys, as well as entertainment, were provided to the people in conjunction with the conduct of an ARVN military operation in the area. The response of the people was favorable and the festival was successful primarily as a result of the cooperation between the 7th ARVN Regiment, GVN officials, KIICQXDS advisory personnel and division civic action personnel.

Progress was made in the rebuilding program in CU CHI District, HU NHIA Province. The division supplies transportation, supplemental lumber packets and considerable amounts of salvage lumber to support the rebuild program. The actual construction of the homes was entirely on a self-help basis. Over 1000 packets of lumber were pre-positioned to construct homes. Over 978 frames and roofs have been completed, 618 homes have been completely rebuilt and an estimated 1,400 homes which were destroyed have been repaired.

Route 81, from CU CHI to PHU CUOIK, (XT8111) has been virtually rebuilt. Improvements include widening the entire length of 81, construction of 2 bridges, numerous culverts and paving the road surface. The completion of this project has enabled the population of PHU HOI District to transport their produce to the PHU HOI market with greater ease. The highlight of this project was the opening of the PHU CUOIK bridge (XT 5013). This provided a much needed line of communication between the Province capital of PHU CUOIK and the District headquarters at PARIS TAN HOA.

Improving the existing road net between PHU TIEN (XT 8402) and HOC TAM (XT7638) was undertaken by the 2nd Brigade. During the past few months the road was not passable to wheeled vehicles due to bomb craters, erosion and a general lack of maintenance on other portions of the road. The project necessitated filling bomb craters, widening and resurfacing the road, and constructing a bridge at XT81059. The completion of this project not only establishes an improved line of communication in the area, but also enables the local citizens to transport their produce to market in much greater quantities by oxcart and other vehicles, thus improving the economic standing of the people of PHU TIEN.

Regional Forces/Popular Forces assistance has continued throughout the TAC. More emphasis has been placed on self-help projects by the Regional Forces/Popular Forces and this has met with excellent results. Thousands of board feet of lumber from Helping Hand, salvage FSF and powder cannisters have been provided for the Regional Forces/Popular Forces in the TAC. This has assisted them in building homes and furnishings for their homes.

Community Relations Commissions and Friendship Councils should be an effective medium to resolve problems that arise between Vietnamese people and US forces. In CU CHI, DAO TIENG and YEN NHAN Base Camps, meetings have enhanced a harmonious relationship between the Vietnamese people and US troops.
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A numerical summary for civic action construction/rebuild projects is listed below:

1. Dwellings
   - 3277
2. Roads (km)
   - 631
3. Dispensaries
   - 10
4. Schools
   - 11
5. Bridges
   - 7
6. Other
   - 36

A numerical summary for civic action distribution projects is listed below:

1. Coaent (lbs)
   - 2,900
2. Tin (sheets)
   - 6,168
3. Lumber (bd ft)
   - 629,289
4. Paint (gal)
   - 156
5. Food (lbs)
   - 22,602
6. Other (lbs)
   - 76,931

The division Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) continued to provide medical attention to a large number of civilians within the NDAI. During the past three months a total of 777 MEDCAPs were conducted treating 90,093 people.

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) activities throughout the months of May, June and July were primarily in support of combat operations in NHA XU, THANH XU, THINH DUONG and GIA GI TRIN Provinces.

A total of 42,523,200 leaflets were airdropped and hand disseminated throughout the Division TDQI. Twenty one leaflets were originated by G-5 and Brigade 8-5's. The leaflets were produced by G-5 and the 6th PSYOP Battalion.

Aerial loudspeaker broadcasts conducted during the quarter totaled 213 hours of broadcast time. Ground loudspeaker time totaled 144 hours of broadcast time. Two additional 1000 watt loudspeaker sets and two tape recorders were received by the Division in May. Each 1000 watt set consists of:

1. 4 loudspeakers
2. 4 amplifiers (250 watts ea)
3. 4 control boxes
4. 4 microphones
5. power cables
6. 1 tape recorder

Recently each Brigade is equipped with a 1000 watt loudspeaker set.

During the month of June 1968, two additional PSYOP teams were activated bringing the total to 3 PSYOP teams in the Division. Each team consists of one officer and one NCO. These teams consist of PSYOP by aerial and hand dissemination of leaflets in support of ground loudspeaker broadcasts.

Additionally two mobile audio-visual vans were provided to 1000 teams by the 4th PSYOP Battalion. Each van contains a movie projector, 200 watt speaker system, slide projector and other PSYOP equipment. The audio-visual vans are employed in a crucial role to greatly enhance the PSYOP team capability to communicate with the population.

During the quarter, the PSYOP effort was directed against 7/72HVN units in the division TDQI. A total of 128 NDAI OODs rallied during the months of May, June and July. This is an increase of 79 over the last reporting period.

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Two ARVN Political Warfare (POLWAR) teams from the 5th ARVN Division were attached to the 3rd Brigade during May. A third POLWAR team from the 30th ARVN Division was assigned to DISCOM in June. These teams have been valuable in the conduct of face to face PSYOP appeals in conjunction with the Medical Civic Action Program. The two POLWAR teams with the 3rd Brigade returned to their parent unit in June.

K. Signal Activities. See Tab D

L. Engineer Activities. During the month of May 1968, "A" Company of the 45th Engineer Battalion provided general support to the 29th Infantry Division while 3rd, 6th, and 9th companies provided direct support to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades respectively. "A" Company was continuing construction of highway 81 from XT061110 to XT 5030021. A total of 14,000 cubic yards of laterite was hauled to provide a two foot lift to the existing roadway. Two platoons of "A" Company were deployed to HUE in PHU Mountain during the month, after the Viet Cong had overrun the American positions. The engineers were responsible for rebuilding the defense and communication center facilities at that location.

The general support mission continued for "A" Company during June. The second platoon received the main responsibility of building new bunkers and secondary fighting positions on the bunker line at CU CHI base camp. First platoon worked on changing the contour of the bunker line and emplacing the new bunkers. Third platoon continued construction of water towers for water detection radar. The 5th company constructed a 255 foot M1A1 float bridge at XT 451101 near TRANG BONG and removed it after tactical units had passed.

"A" Company moved from CU CHI to TAY NINH on 10 July 1968, changing its mission from division general support to direct support of 1st Brigade. The initial assignment changes were to provide demolition teams and minesweep teams. The company assumed responsibility for mine sweeping from French Fort (XT236046) to XT 295981, and from XT 235981 to TAY NINH daily.

"B" Company had its tactical CTC move from TAY NINH to CU CHI early in May to continue its direct support of 1st Brigade. The first platoon provided personnel to handle aerial resupply of engineer materials from XT FINN to NUI BA DWI Mountain. This was in support of the rebuilding project of "A" Company. The major effort of the company was providing daily mine sweeps from TAY NINH to HUE 2501 Bridge and from CU CHI to TAY NINH daily. The daily mine sweep of the Main Supply Route was the primary task of "B" Company until 10 July. The area of responsibility expanded in June to include sweeping from PHU CHIN to CU CHI and from the French Fort (XT196591) to TAY NINH in addition to the normally assigned sweeps. Personnel from the sweep teams plus demolition men continued providing demolition teams to infantry battalions under 1st Brigade control. On 10 July, "B" Company moved to CU CHI and assumed the division general support mission. It worked on completing the construction of a 25 foot protective fence around the CU CHI base camp 294447 by the 294447 construction of the 45th Engineer battalion sector.

Second Brigade received engineer support from "C" Company of the 45th Engineers throughout the period. The "C" Company moved its headquarters to NUI BA DWI in early May and "C" Company was responsible for construction of the brigade forward TDC at that location. Also during May the company spent extensive time on construction of bunkers and fortifications at the NUI BA DWI Bridge (XT717012) for defense against enemy attacks. The company also provided demolition teams to the infantry battalions under second brigade control during this time.

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The HOC MOU fridge was finished in June and the company shifted its resources to minesweep teams and demolition teams in support of brigade operations.

Company "D" supported 3rd Brigade operations in May, June and July mainly by furnishing demolition teams to the maneuver battalions under brigade control. The beginning of July found the company "C" at D SIZE move to CO CHI to support 25th Division DSIZE. On 12 July, the company "C" moved to HOC MOU to begin construction of the brigade's HOC at that location. The company "C" later returned to D SIZE in June and then to D SIZE in early July for the remainder of the period and provided demolition teams and mine sweeps to infantry units. The company demolition men were responsible for destruction of numerous tunnels and bunkers around the HOC area.

The bridge company, "E" Company, continued its mission of providing tactical bridging support to the 25th Division. A continuing task is to reposition AVLs at strategic positions on the KSR to provide a quick method of crossing obstacles. The company provided bridge personnel to build and remove the 25th DIV Bridge (KSR 4191) in June. Bridge erection kits were provided to security patrol of the 25th DIV Bridge in July. The men were operated by engineers and infantry personnel provided the firepower for those waterway patrols. During July also, the company was tasked with six different dry span configurations to determine their applicability to airborne operations in Vietnam.

At the end of July the companies of the 4th Parachute Battalion were located at TAY NH, CI CHI and TAY NH. "G" Company is located at TAY NH in support of first brigade, "E" Company at CI CHI in general support of the 25th Infantry Division, "H" Company at CI CHI in support of second brigade and "J" Company at TAY NH in support of third brigade. The bridge company "C" continued bridge support for the Division.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

A. Personnel.

1. Deployment of Bandsmen to RNK.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many first-time enlisted bandsmen have been assigned to a COMUS Army band for from six months to two years prior to being levied for duty with the 25th Infantry Division RNK.

(b) EVALUATION: Bandsmen arriving for duty with the 25th Infantry Division who fit the above description are not promoted to accomplish the mission of a bandsman in a combat environment. During their service in a COMUS band, weapons training and qualification and other tactical training necessary for the bandsman in combat is apparently receiving little attention. The bandsmen arrive "rusty" and require the expenditure of valuable time for training purposes to restore an acceptable status of training in essential combat skills. This situation has not been the case with bandsmen who arrive in the division directly from Band RNK. The combat skills and principles they learned in basic combat training are still fresh in their minds, and these individual experience little difficulty in adjusting to the combat role of the bandsmen.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Bandsmen deployed to "D" should come directly from Band RNK; or, if they are re-deployed from a COMUS band, the COMUS band commanders should ensure the individuals have been provided adequate combat infantry refresher training before their departure.

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(2) Field Hygiene.

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel who are required to spend extended periods of time in the field in an environment where they are constantly exposed to the effects of water and moisture frequently develop skin infections and other skin disorders.

(b) EVALUATION: Commanders are constantly advised to take all preventative measures at their disposal to preclude the incidence of skin disorders caused by exposure to water and moisture. Among other things, this involves having their men remove their damp clothing at every possible opportunity.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To aid the commander in his efforts to combat this hygiene problem, it is recommended that all personnel be issued athletic short and shower shoes (thongs) that can be worn whenever possible to permit the drying of the skin by sun and air exposure.

(3) An informal record of disposition of possessions of evacuated personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Form FL 60, Disposition of Evacuated Personnel Possessions, is used as a record to maintain official information relative to the shipment and disposition of personal property belonging to personnel who have been evacuated from this area. On several occasions in the past completed FL 60's have been lost or otherwise misplaced and tracer actions to determine the whereabouts of personal belongings or actions taken to properly dispose of belongings here had to go unresolved. To preclude the possibilities of such situations recurring, a unit within the division has instituted a procedure whereby supply officers are required to maintain a back up system to informally account for the disposition of such personal property.

(b) EVALUATION: Such an informal record is required to be maintained for a minimum of 100 days and must include as a minimum the shipping date, shipping number, and the destination of the shipment. This procedure has become invaluable in circumstances where there is a heavy and continuous turnover in personnel and irregularities in shipment are not uncommon.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that in such a critical and sensitive area as the shipment of the possessions of evacuated personnel, an informal back up accounting system be employed at the company level.

L. Operations.

(1) Convoy Trail Party Medics.

(a) OBSERVATION: Trail party Medics must be experienced and capable of supervising under extremely adverse conditions including hostile fire.
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(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that utilization of a qualified NCO, in grade E-6 or above, reduces the time needed for vehicle recovery operations and the trail party continually moves at the prescribed rate. This can be attributed to experience and supervisory ability.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That trail parties, in convoys consisting of 50 or more vehicles, have an E-6 or above as NCOIC.

(2) Air Observer for Logistical Convoys.

(a) OBSERVATION: Logistical convoys need an air observer due to their size and composition.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that using an air observer for logistical convoys can be very beneficial. Experience has shown that the air observer can prevent the convoy from becoming involved in congested areas by halting it or directing MP escort personnel forward to alleviate the source of congestion. An observer also keeps the convoy vehicles moving at a proper interval and can immediately note any breaks in the convoy which would hinder the security of the elements. Vehicles that become inoperable due to mechanical failure or other reasons such as traffic accidents, can be recovered quicker if the recovery elements know what to expect and prepare for prior to arriving at the scene. An example of this was a 5-ton tractor and trailer loaded with artillery ammunition that experienced three flat tires causing it to become separated from other elements. The flat tires caused other mechanical components of the rear wheels section to become overheated and a fire resulted. The air observer found this vehicle separated from other elements and took immediate action to get assistance from the trail party in the form of additional personnel and fire extinguishers. The air observer is also able to provide continuous communications between the convoy and its base of operation in case tactical support is required.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an air observer continue to be provided for logistical convoys.

(3) Search Techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: Past records indicate that most ammunition caches discovered in the SAIGON area have been located either in streams or canals or in heavily vegetated areas immediately adjacent to waterways where access by water transportation is possible.

(b) EVALUATION: Recently, numerous caches have been located in open fields and along dikes indicating a possible change in enemy technique. The caches were normally buried in metal containers and were camouflaged to appear as an integral part of the dike and in most instances, would not have been discovered without the employment of mine sweepers or bamboo or metal probes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders at all echelons insure an increased emphasis on the employment of mine sweepers and the utilization of probes. Further, that search efforts are extended to all possible cache sites and are not concentrated along waterways and areas of heavy vegetation.

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(4) Night operations.  

(a) OBSERVATION: Command emphasis continues on night activities in an attempt to interdict VC lines of infiltration and communications and to locate, engage and destroy the enemy.

(b) EVALUATION: The results of increased employment of small units for night operations have been extremely favorable. The following data for the period 2 March - 27 July 1968 is submitted for reference: VC Statistics: number of contacts - 213; FOSS - 13; KIA (FOSS) - 131; KIA (POSS) - 5; captured weapons - 67. US statistics: US KIA - 7; US WIA - 31.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That command emphasis on night operations continue with the employment of platoon and squad size saturation ambushes and the commitment of roving patrols when the terrain, visibility and enemy situation permits.

(5) Aerial reconnaissance techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: Small unit leaders with limited military experience have a tendency to traverse planned patrol routes and to circle expected ambush sites numerous times when conducting aerial reconnaissance.

(b) EVALUATION: Aerial reconnaissance of patrol routes, ambush sites, and probable areas of operations is a definite asset to commanders at all echelons. However, "over aerial reconnaissance" frequently "telegraphs" to the enemy a unit's intention. It is a minimum, it allows the enemy to vacate an area that receives excessive attention. At worst, it allows the enemy to ambush our own operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That senior commanders encourage maximum aerial recon training prior to tactical operations and insure that improper surveillance techniques are avoided.

(6) Unit Identification at night.

(a) OBSERVATION: With command emphasis on night activities the necessity of air support during periods of limited visibility has increased considerably. Air support elements, however, experience difficulty in orientation at night regarding the exact ground location of friendly ground troops.

(b) EVALUATION: Night air support is enhanced and the possibility of costly accidents is eliminated when a prearranged system is established for marking the exact position of ground forces. The Strobelight has been found to be a most effective device to accommodate such a system of ground to air visual night communications.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units participating in night operations be equipped with strobelights as an identification media. Additional visual methods of identification should be readily available when conducting night tactical operations.

(7) Night ambush preparations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Squad or platoon size night ambush patrols can be more effectively executed if a thorough daylight ground reconnaissance of the ambush site is accomplished and if the ambush site is maintained under continuous observation prior to its occupation.
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(b) EVALUATION: Squad or platoon size ambush patrols have been permitted to sweep through a proposed ambush site during daylight hours as an element of a larger reconnaissance in force element. A small element will remain in a stay behind position in a location that affords good observation as the sweep element with the remainder of the ambush team move on to exit the area. At dark, the ambush team will rejoin the observation element and establish its ambush position in a known surrounding. This tactic has been found to be highly effective and can be effected without compromising the ambush site.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the small unit tactic described above be considered for wider application within Vietnam.

Use of artillery against bunkers.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of artillery against bunkers built into the side of dikes in rice paddy terrain was found to be generally ineffective. Well dug in bunker positions are relatively immune to mass artillery with the exception of direct hits.

(b) EVALUATION: For bunker busting purposes, it has been found that the air strike with 500 or 750 pound bombs or the direct fire of 8" mortars provided the best means of stand off attack. Mass artillery attack against well bunkered positions is wasteful.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That when confronted by well bunkered positions, that air delivered 500 and 750 pound bombs and/or direct fire 8" mortars be used as the primary means of stand off attack. If mass artillery is to be used, the air burst fuse (time, 60) would be the most desirable type of artillery attack.

Use of 60mm mortar.

(a) OBSERVATION: The effectiveness of 60mm mortars on offensive operations in jungled or rice paddy Vietnam terrain is greater than the 81mm mortar.

(b) EVALUATION: The weight of weapons and ammunition is the key consideration when comparing the 60mm mortar to the 81mm mortar as the direct support weapon in infantry offensive operations in jungle or rice paddy environment. The weight of the 81mm mortar and ammunition precludes its being carried by advancing troops moving through jungle or rice paddy. The 60mm mortar has more utility in the close range combat which characterize most combat situations. It can readily be fired at close range targets without the use of the base plate and bipod.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the 60mm mortar be made available for use in lieu of the 81mm mortar by infantry units operating in jungle or rice paddy terrain.

Enemy employment of booby traps.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy, now aware of our reluctance to use roads or trails when moving across country on foot, has adopted the tactic of emplacing booby traps 25-30 meters to the flanks of such lines of communications.

(b) EVALUATION: US troops cautioned against moving across country on roads or trails, nevertheless, attempt to evade their movement on these landmarks. The enemy, noting this, has more frequently been placing booby traps and mines at a distance from these routes.
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(c) OBSERVATION: That increased emphasis be placed in training and supervision in the techniques of cross-country navigation that will preclude the necessity to even use trails and roads as guiding devices.

(11) Use of white phosphorous grenades.

(a) OBSERVATION: At numerous times smoke aircraft or artillery smoke are not immediately available to provide a screen to conceal troop movements across open areas.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that this contingency can be provided for with little trouble by having troops carry white phosphorous grenades equipped with a delay fuse. This device emits sufficient smoke when used in the proper numbers to provide smoke screens for the movement of small units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That troops on an operation which will require movement through open areas carry white phosphorous grenades equipped with delay fuses for use if smoke ships or smoke artillery in not immediately available in an emergency.

(12) Road clearing and security missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: There are a great number of techniques and varied approaches which must be employed in the opening and maintaining of security along any main road.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy, after a period of time, able to anticipate the actions of US troops in nearly all operations if a pattern develops in those operations. By varying methods and employing new equipment and techniques the enemy is continually kept off balance. His use of resupply routes across these main roads as well as his interdiction efforts along the roads are disrupted to such a point that the enemy is no longer able to effectively operate in the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That those units involved in road clearing and security missions apply the following recommended techniques when engaging in the operations:

1. Employ scout dogs with the infantry security element which is utilized to secure the mine sweep teams as the sweep of the road is conducted at night.

2. Employ sniper teams, both at night and during daylight hours, at those critical locations were mining and road block incidents normally occur.

3. Provide an award/incentive program for those who find mines along the road.

4. Utilize drop off ambush patrols at critical areas while moving along road in night sweep.

5. Pay particular attention to organization, rest and motivation of mine sweep teams accompanying the tactical unit. Utilize unit personnel in OJT with the engineers sweep personnel. This allows engineer personnel to obtain relief during long tenuous sweep operations and unit personnel to become proficient in utilizing organic mine detectors.

(13) Night convoy escort/security missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: The success of night convoy's is determined to a great extent by (1) the secrecy of the date and route of the convoy (2) the route security provided by combat forces.
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(b) EVALUATION: Through experience it has been shown that night convoys can enjoy a great degree of success in reaching assigned destinations if there is sufficient route security present.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That forces available include US tactical units, a convoy security unit and local HPAF forces. Close coordination with NVA personnel is suggested. However it is necessary to restrict dissemination of convoy information so as to insure secrecy. The convoy security element should be organized with an advance unit that is able to leap frog in front of the moving convoy into prearranged critical areas or possible ambush sites to preclude the convoy being ambushed. If forces available allow, all critical areas along convoy routes should be outposted.

(14) Use of helicopters in RVN:

(a) OBSERVATION: A study of assault helicopter utilization reveals flying time is consumed in the performance of non-combat missions which could be accomplished by other available means of transportation.

(b) EVALUATION: The ready availability of assault helicopters in RVN has led to the malpractice of using these combat vehicles for administrative type missions that can be accomplished more economically by other means of transportation (i.e., Air Force in country airlift, scheduled road convoy, etc.). Poor planning and dissemination of the transport services information contributes to the demand for and improper use of combat helicopters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all echelons of command review procedures and policies concerning utilization of combat assault helicopters and that transportation facilities for administrative traffic be developed to preclude the demand for assault helicopters for this purpose.

(15) Repositioning of equipment:

(a) OBSERVATION: Repositioning of communications assets are vital to expeditious communications support.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that the practice of retaining uncommitted communications equipment in a platoon or company motor park is detrimental to rapid response to a communications requirement. By repositioning equipment according to anticipated needs, dictated by current intelligence, reaction time to provide communications support is greatly reduced. Counter guerrilla warfare is highly susceptible to urgent communications requirements in diverse locations and repositioned equipment is the only acceptable solution for minimum reaction time. As an example, analysis of current intelligence indicated increased activity in the SAIGON area. By moving an uncommitted AN/MRO-49 from DAU TIEN to CU CHI, a delay of several days to provide communications support was avoided when the requirement for another system in the SAIGON area was levied upon this battalion.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That maximum effort be made to reposition communications assets in such a manner as to reduce reaction time for providing communications support. Use should be made of all intelligence available to the command.

(16) Power Hum on telephone circuits:

(a) OBSERVATION: Power Hum is created when an AN/ATC-1 is used to terminate telephone circuits routed over pulse code modulation multiplex equipment using the CV-1584 ring frequency converter.

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(b) EVA. TION: The CV-158A, used as a FCT frequency converter with 116 multiplex equipment, has no provisions for termination on the loop side of the hybrid coil. This creates an "open circuit" which is highly susceptible to the induction of hum. This situation does not occur in the frequency multiplex systems using the T.V-139 ring frequency converter, as termination is applied internally to the loop side of the hybrid coil. External loop termination can be applied to the CV-158A/MTC-1 circuits by applying an "idle line termination kit" to the MTC-1.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All MTC-1 switchboards terminating circuits from CV-158A ring frequency converters should be modified with idle trunk terminating network, FSN 5805-029-038 (MTC 1-5805-031-30/41, 69 May 67). This kit applies a resistor in parallel with each line to prevent open circuit hum induction.

(17) Minesweep operations – Concealment in water.

(a) OBSERVATION: The wet season has created additional problems for minesweep operations in that potholes fill with water and offer excellent concealment for mines.

(b) EVALUATION: Evidence of road surface disturbance is often eliminated by rainfall making surface detection impossible. Additionally, the sensitivity of mines employed with anti-lift and anti-disturbance devices is greatly increased as the earth becomes wet. This allows the mine to settle which increases the sensitivity of the anti-lift/anti disturbance device.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Potholes that are filled with water should be investigated by: (1) hard exploration of the pothole for the presence of anti-lift and pressure type firing devices that have settled above the bottom of the pothole but concealed by water; and (2) then using the mine detector as in normal sweep operations. However, great care should be taken not to disturb a mine found in wet earth. If removal is desired, it is imperative to use a rope and grappling hook.

(18) Minesweep operations – Command detonated mines.

(a) OBSERVATION: Command detonated mines present a hazard to minesweep teams and their security. These mines could be detonated before detection with a mine detector.

(b) EVALUATION: Point and flank security must be especially alert for the presence of wires leading from detonated mines. Cut the wires when found but be careful to cut them separately; otherwise, the circuit would be completed thus detonating the mine.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Security elements for mine sweep teams, should be briefed on the procedures for disarming command detonated mines prior to a mission.

(19) Use of M476 Bridge balk as floating mine boom.

(a) OBSERVATION: The M476 Bridge Balk has been effectively used as a floating mine boom.

(b) EVALUATION: M476 balk can be used effectively as a floating mine boom on minor bodies of water with current less than 5 feet per second. In current greater than 5 feet per second, M476 balk booms over 200 feet cannot be closed with 27 ft bridge erection boats.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This device should be constructed either on shore or near shore and then pulled into place utilizing boats. If there is river traffic, an opening sufficient to accommodate this traffic should be provided. Tactical elements covering the boom with fire must be cautioned not to shoot directly at the boom. Some boom sections have been sunk due to friendly fire.

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Airlifting MA6 Dry Span.

(a) OBSERVATION: Careful planning is required for missions in which MA6 dry span will be airlifted.

(b) EVALUATION: Airlifting of fully assembled MA6 dry spans with CH-47’s and/or CH-54’s can provide instant bridges in inaccessible areas. In tests of specially configured spans approaching medium aircraft load, it was found that the effective weight on the aircraft was 25 - 30% more than the actual weight of the bridge. This increase in effective weight is apparently due to the drag of the large flat bridge area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Allowances must be made in mission planning for this increase in weight.

C. Training.

(d) Rigging for helicopter sling loads.

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel whose duties include preparing supplies and material for airlift by helicopter should be trained in the proper methods of creating aerodynamically stable loads.

(b) EVALUATION: With the increasing use of logistical helicopter airlift, a definite need for qualified rigging personnel has been indicated. An average of 7 Chinook loads each day are prepared for airlift by members of this battalion. Improper rigging seriously increases the required flight time per sortie due to excessive load "swaying." Proper rigging creates an aerodynamically stable load with less "swaying." This allows higher aircraft speed and reduced re-supply time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units utilizing helicopter airlift of supplies arrange with the supporting helicopter unit for training of personnel rigging loads for airlift.

D. Intelligence.

(i) Order of battle files.

(a) OBSERVATION: An efficient system for recording information on enemy units operating in the TAO area was needed.

(b) EVALUATION: The 03 section found the use of 5"x3" card system extremely valuable in recording information on enemy units. Although the 03 workbook provides an adequate means for the collection of data on enemy units, it becomes cumbersome if an attempt is made to start files on every unit which is reported as being present in or near the TAO. Furthermore, there are many unidentified units which are reported by agents or identified in documents. The card file system provides an effective means to maintain records on these units. When a new unit is discovered, the information is transcribed on a 5"x3" card which is filed in numerical order. When enough information is collected, the unit is entered in the 03 workbook. The advantages of this system are as follows:

(1) Units reported by agents can be readily traced.

(2) New units can be filed pending further information.

(3) Infiltration groups can be recorded when they first appear and prior to knowledge of the enemy unit to which they are attached.

(4) Enemy units in adjacent TAO’s can be recorded without the need for a workbook.

(5) The file is more durable and more flexible than a workbook.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the file be considered by other 03 sections operating in an unconventional environment.
Aerial Photography.

Observation: A more efficient system was needed to assist the Forward Air Controllers (FACs) in locating enemy targets.

Evaluation: The II Section, 25th MID initiated a program in which targets are located through photo interpretation means and then submitted to the Forward Air Controllers to be verified. If targets are good they are destroyed. Prior to submission to the FACs, the targets are annotated on photography, describing the target and giving the coordinate of the general area. This method is very helpful to the FACs in precisely locating targets and affirms that there is a higher percentage of targets destroyed and a more efficient use of ordnance.

Recommendation: This system should be adopted throughout South Vietnam by US and Allied Forces.

Visual reconnaissance techniques.

Observation: Aerial observation in the past has been done in general patterns over the whole tactical area of interest. This gave an overall picture of large enemy movements that might have been occurring.

Evaluation: Reconnaissance of smaller sections of the terrain lead to increased sightings of enemy activity. Incorporated into this system at the present time is the reconnaissance of specific targets received from other intelligence sources for verification. This enables the aircraft to fly directly to a sector of our area of interest and search out enemy activity.

Recommendation: A greater percentage of the allotted flight time should be used in verifying and searching out specific targets.

Counterintelligence support of tactical operations.

Observation: There is a need for increased participation of CI agent personnel in tactical operations mounted against counterintelligence targets.

Evaluation: (i) Tactical operations conducted by the 25th Infantry Division in response to information developed on specific counterintelligence targets have sharply increased between 1 May and 31 July 1968. While generally quite successful, there have been instances where these operations failed to fully exploit the full intelligence potential of these targets. Such less-than-total successes have usually been the result of (1) the tactical element's preoccupation with the military tasks at hand, and/or (2) a failure to fully understand the intelligence objective of the mission.

(ii) It is obvious that the tactical commander given the mission of neutralizing a counterintelligence target must retain his preoccupation of determining how best to perform his mission, and that the tactical situation may require him to sacrifice long-range potential for immediate tactical gain. It is most important, therefore, that military intelligence be allowed every opportunity to make fully understood the specific intelligence goals of the mission.

Recommendations: It is recommended that CI agent personnel assigned to USARV tactical elements be allowed to play a larger role in the actual conduct of tactical operations mounted against counterintelligence targets. Such participation can range from a pre-departure intelligence briefing and subsequent debriefing of the tactical element, to the agent's actual on-the-ground overview of the target with the unit. This sort of aggressive participation by CI agents is absolutely necessary to maximize the exploitation of counterintelligence targets.
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(5) Screening of captured enemy documents.

(a) OBSERVATION: Rapid screening of captured enemy documents by
capturing unit can reveal information of immediate intelligence value.

(b) EVALUATION: The overall value and intelligence value of
a batch of captured enemy documents may be quickly determined in
many cases by immediate rapid screening for and recording of unit,
codes; letter box numbers and dates. Of particular importance is
the currency of the documents (i.e. recent dates) and especially the
frequency with which unit designations and codes appear. Normally,
also, documents containing any papers relating to signal, radio, SOI,
or general communications topics as well as sketch maps or overlays
merit special attention and immediate exploitation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that field screening
personnel concentrate their initial efforts on items of the
categories mentioned. Expeditious evaluation at place of capture
can often result in unit identifications being made and/or more
rapid dissemination of intelligence information gathered.

(6) Screening of groups of detainees.

(a) OBSERVATION: When large groups of detainees are apprehended
during cordon and search or similar operations, they generally
produce overall unproductive interrogation results usually because of
lack of proper discretion in initially selecting those to be
detained and evacuated.

(b) EVALUATION: Normally, the best method of singling out potential
good sources or suspects is to bring in only those who have some-
thing definitely incriminating about their activity at time of capture;
for example, those who were running away, hiding, lacked ID cards,
or were of draft age yet not in the military service. Anyone else,
even if they do, in fact possess knowledge of enemy activities, can
not usually be inclined to reveal what information they have.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Unless a specific suspicion or fact can be
assessed against a certain individual during an operation did not bring
him in for intelligence exploitation purposes for the interrogator has
no information or starting point from which to question the detention.
A large number of suspects in itself does not by any means imply
that useful results will be produced. On the contrary, it
presents just that much more of a burden and handicap to the screening
agent who is faced with the problem of evaluating detainees with
no first-hand knowledge of their circumstances of capture.

(7) Airborne personnel detector.

(a) OBSERVATION: In the past personnel detector missions have been
conducted without a sound method of determining the validity of
enemy locations.

(b) EVALUATION: Using the old system of target location complete
dependence was placed on the experience level of the operator. The
operator observed the deflection variation of the two gauges on the
instrument. The operator would then decide as to the possibility of
a maximum or minimum classification of the target reading. This
variation of operator experience produced inconsistent classifications.

The airborne detector is designed to provide proportioned
readings in the amount of ammonia and condensation nuclei in
the atmosphere. Ammonia readings indicate emissions of ammonia, one of the
materials found useful for the detection of humans, as it is a by
product of human metabolism. Condensation nuclei (CN) readings are
selectively measured, and are the product of any combustion such as
fuel, tobacco and explosives. Many CN are produced by human activity
and therefore can be used to detect his presence.

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To take maximum advantage of the instrument capability, a representative value for readings taken from the gauges was established. The value of 15 milli amperes was assigned to account for background that the instrument will pick up from the crew and atmosphere. All readings between 40 and 70 milli amperes were considered minimum readings. Further all readings between 30 and 100 milli amperes were recorded as maximum. Considering the possible combinations, the following classifications and priorities were assigned:

A - readings represent a reading between 90 and 100 on both the ammonia mode and the condensation nuclei mode.
B - readings represent readings on both modes between 80 and 79 milli amperes.
C - readings represent only the ammonia mode between 80 and 99.
D - readings represent only the ammonia mode between 0 and 79 milli amperes.
E - readings represent the condensation nuclei mode between 0 and 100 milli amperes.
F - readings represent the condensation nuclei mode between 0 and 79 milli amperes.

The priority of attack was based on the strength of the readings. Therefore priority would be A, C, B, D, E, and F. This method provides the tactical commander with varying degrees of validity of the readings as well as a more exact determination of target priority.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this procedure be disseminated to other divisions for their consideration.

(8) Intelligence through civic action.

(a) OBSERVATION: In the course of medical, civic action programs (MEDCAPS) and other civic action projects, Vietnamese often provide information relative to enemy presence, booby traps, weapons and supply caches.

(b) EVALUATION: Information received from Vietnamese civilians during and subsequent to civic action programs has been checked out and found to be highly creditable and reliable in a high percentage of the instances.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Every effort be made to exploit the intelligence value of civic action programs by assigning trained intelligence personnel to civic action teams formed to execute a civic action program.

E. Logistics.

(i) TCE and HTOE changes.

(a) OBSERVATION: Consolidation of TCE and HTOE changes into one document is necessary for ease of use and accuracy. It is especially necessary to provide unit commanders with only one set of documents because this affects unit organization and employment as well as property accountability.

(b) EVALUATION: The numerous and lengthy changes to TCE's and HTOE's coupled with the constant turnover of property book officers has made it difficult to reconcile property books, determine excess, and recognize shortages. The cross checking involved at unit level upon receipt of each new document easily leads to errors.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That TCE's and HTOE's which effect numerous major changes be published at all inclusive documents.
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(2) Operation of Division ASF.

(a) ORIENTATION: Division run base - com ASF's cannot be managed properly without an augmentation of KOS qualified personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: While division base camp ASF's are an operational necessity and have to date adequately fulfilled tactical unit requirements, the proper management of the ASF's cannot be accomplished under the existing division TOE. The lack of qualified related personnel makes it difficult to accomplish the accurate accounting procedures required. The lack of KHE hindered proper stock and stock rotation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The operation of the division ASF be a function of 1st Log Cmd or that personnel with the requisite skills be provided the division as an augmentation.

(3) Preparation of the Army Equipment Status Report (TR 711-5).

(a) ORIENTATION: Through experience it was learned that the accurate completion of the Army Equipment Status Report can be accomplished only at a centralized location and under competent direction.

(b) EVALUATION: The preparation of this report at the level at which it was done lead to inaccurate interpretation of the reporting. Those in a lack of quality control and standards. Prior to June, the report was prepared under the guidance of direction and for the first time accurate results were obtained. The incidental benefit was gained through the correction of numerous books to correspond with the Army Equipment Status Report as completed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Army Equipment Status Report be prepared at a central location under the guidance of a division element.

(4) Supply actions at company and battalion level.

(a) ORIENTATION: Initial supply action and accounting is at the company and battalion level by the shortages of KOS qualified personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: During the past quarter, there has been a decrease in the effectiveness of company and battalion supply operations as a result of a shortage of qualified KOS personnel. Unit supply, FA, and property accountability have been affected because the few qualified personnel available have found it necessary to perform a multitude of duties in order to meet minor operational requirements. This problem became obvious through the discovery of a notable increase of administrative errors within 2nd BN and 4th BN.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That increased emphasis be given to providing KOS qualified personnel. The Unit Commander should consider establishing a formal training course for unit supply officers and others who have a need for supply OS training.

(5) The 10,000 gallon bladder.

(a) ORIENTATION: The 10,000 gallon bladder has been a constant problem. After eight to ten months use in this environment, the bladder begins to split at the seams.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been determined that by filling the 10,000 gallon bladder with a maximum of 8,000 gallons the problem of seams splitting is greatly reduced and the life of the bladder is prolonged.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a maximum of 8,000 gallons be established for the 10,000 gallon bladder.

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(a) OBSERVATION: Maintenance problems have been experienced during the period of this report with hall, cab race ring roller bearings and helical compression springs wearing out excessively on the M109 howitzer SP due to a lack of lubrication.

(b) EVALUATION: A check of the lubrication order showed that there were no instructions to lubricate the cab race ring and no grease fittings through which lubrication could be accomplished. By removing three pipe plugs and replacing same with grease fittings, it was found that the bearings could be lubricated. A message was sent to the Automotive Tank Command (ATAC), Army Material Command explaining the problem and the determined solution thereof. This headquarters was subsequently advised to take the suggested corrective action. Accordingly, instructions were given to all subordinate units to replace the three pipe plugs with appropriate grease fittings and lubricate with GAA at least once a week when traversing the turret. The problem of early bearing failure has been noticeably reduced.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the corrective action referenced above be published as a MND to the M109 howitzer SP.

(7) Bomb rack, FSN 1095-141-9328, for UH-1C helicopter.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been found that after approximately 25 hours of flying time the bomb rack for the UH-1C will start to malfunction because of dust build-up in the connection wells where the roller pod connects to the bomb rack.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been the experience within this unit that the situation outlined above can best be rectified by changing the bomb racks during intermediate inspection.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the situation as outlined above be studied at higher level to determine the best and most economical solution to the problem.

(8) Crossover drive for the XM-28 Armament sub-system, FSN 1090-077-2087, on the AH-1G helicopter.

(a) OBSERVATION: The crossover drive for the XM-28 does not function more than 15-20 hours without shearing the pin on the roller of the assembly, FSN 1090-077-2087.

(b) EVALUATION: There have been repeated failures of the armament sub-system, XM-28 on the AH-1G helicopter due to the shearing of the pin on the roller of the assembly, FSN 1090-077-2087. Most failures have occurred between 15-20 hours of use. The only solution to the problem appears to be the fabrication of a pin from stronger material.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That higher level agencies investigate the problem as cited and determine if a pin of stronger material can be provided.

(9) Premature failure of hydraulic servos, FSN 1080-072-1141, on UH-1 and AH-1G helicopters.

(a) OBSERVATION: There have been numerous instances of premature failure of hydraulic servos, FSN 1080-072-1141, on UH-1 and AH-1G helicopters in recent months.

(b) EVALUATION: Investigation of these failures has revealed that numerous servos have improper torque place on the servo by the re-building or the manufacturing organization.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units installing the hydraulic control servo take special care to check the torque of the "-g" nut during the installation phase and that corrective adjustments be made as necessary.

(10) Pylon transducers, FSN 625-929-0396, for AH-1G helicopters.

(a) OBSERVATION: The pylon transducers, FSN 625-929-0396 for the AH-1G became dirty after 50-100 hours of operation and caused erratic operation in the roll channel of the S.A.S.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been learned that when the transducer is replaced that it can be covered entirely with plastic or any other suitable shielding material to provide protection from dirt, dust, etc. entering the inside of the transducer. This field expedient has proven highly effective.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above field expedient be considered by other units experiencing similar problems with malfunctioning transducers.

(11) Rigging the tail rotor of the UH-1D/H.

(a) OBSERVATION: Time required to rig the tail rotor of the UH-1D/H can be reduced from three hours to one hour by rigging the left pedal first.

(b) EVALUATION: MIL-190-260-20 prescribes that in rigging the tail rotor of the UH-1D/H the right pedal be rigged first. To verify this it was determined that the control quill inside the gearbox became disengaged from the splines and that three hours were required to restore the equipment to its proper condition. It was learned that this situation did not occur when the left pedal was rigged first and that the entire operation could be executed in a maximum of one hour. This information has been submitted to the Army of the U.S. on DA Form 2023 and the improved procedure has been subsequently approved.

(12) Failure of "O" ring, hydraulic valve, FSN 625-011-0012, H. 6255-0-2, on UH-1 helicopter.

(a) OBSERVATION: The failure of the "O" ring, FSN 625-011-0012, H. 6255-0-2 of the hydraulic valve has been a problem for the unit.

(b) EVALUATION: It was learned that the "O" ring was being damaged resulting in the loss of hydraulic fluid and in occasions complete loss of aircraft hydraulics. It was discovered that the damage to the "O" ring occurred as the "O" ring was being installed on the bolt. This unit covers the threads of the bolt with plastic tape and dips the "O" ring in clean hydraulic fluid. This prevents the "O" ring from being nicked by the threads when being installed on the bolt. This procedure has been successful on one type of "O" ring, that must be installed over sharp surfaces. A letter on this procedure has been submitted.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above procedure be disseminated for the consideration of other units responsible for aircraft maintenance that may have encountered similar problems with "O" ring failure.

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(13) Filled fuel cells.

(a) OBSERVATION: M113's develop an excessive number of cracked fuel cells while participating in road clearing operations as a direct result of the high speed of movement.

(b) EVALUATION: A noted difference exists in the number of cracked fuel cells occurring to M113's participating in road clearing operations over those conducting normal tactical operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The M113 should be driven 12-15 miles per hour. Troop vehicle fuel cells should not be "filled to capacity to facilitate expansion.

F. Organization. None

G. Other.

(1) Use of PSYOP/MCAG Projects in conjunction with cordon and search operations.

(2) OBSERVATION: The use of PSYOP/MCAG projects in conjunction with cordon and search operations within Vietnamee villages does a good deal to explain to the villagers the reason for the action and to smooth over ruffled feelings the people may have as a result of the operation.

(b) EVALUATION: The utilisation of psychological operations teams and medical civic action teams in a village that has just been cordoned and searched has been very effective. The PSYOP team explain to the villagers the reason for the sortie and search and the resultant presence within their village of soldiers. The MCAG team provides the villagers medical care in such a way to pacify their feelings directly with the action of the soldiers involving through their village. This concerted effort has done much to allay some of the local villagers to the military operations in their villages.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That every effort be made to conduct psychological operations, civic action and other beneficial activities in direct coordination with combat operations so that innocent civilians can make a distinct association between them.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

7 Inclosures - all inclosures w/d, J. H. TRENTWELL JR., Hq, DA, Colonel CT, Acting Chief of Staff

3. TAB - 1st - Command
   Nov. 1968

3. TAB - 2nd - Infantry
   Division in LAM 1-48

3. TAB C - Division Support Command (DIV), 125th Signal Regiment (DIV), 23rd Field Artillery Command

5. TAB - 2nd Brigade Combat After Action Report
   TAB - 3rd Brigade Combat After Action Report
   TAB - 4th Brigade Combat After Action Report

7. TAB - 3rd Brigade Combat After Action Report

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TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATM: USFPA

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lesson Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning deployment of bandmen to LNV, page 32, paragraph 2, A(1): Concur. This is a matter of concern for higher headquarters.

b. Reference item concerning field hygiene, page 33, paragraph 2, A(2): Concur. The unit will be advised to request a change to SSA 50-902.

c. Reference item concerning power hum on telephone circuits, page 35, paragraph 2b(16). The open circuit hum and the use of idle line resistors is being investigated by an electronic equipment representative from the JDC-7 Area Office. Findings will be published in the December issue of the USAV Command Communications Pamphlet.

d. Reference item concerning operation of division ASP, page 44, paragraph 2, B(2): Concur. Under the provisions of USAV Regulation 735-28, the 1st Logistical Command is responsible for providing adequate ammunition support to include establishing and operating permanent and temporary ASPs as required.

e. Reference item concerning 10,000 gallon bladder, page 44, paragraph 2, A(5): Concur. This headquarters has advised units that the 10,000 gallon collapsible tank should not be filled to the maximum height of 43 inches, but rather that it be filled to a height of only 42 inches (1,569 gallons) in order to allow for expansion.

f. Reference item concerning 1109 howitzer, page 45, paragraph 2, A(4): Concur. This is a matter of concern for higher headquarters.

- g. Reference item concerning bomb rack for the UH-1C helicopter, page 45, paragraph 2, (7): Concur. This is a valid recommendation and will be included for the information of all units, in the next issue of the 34th General Support Group Newsletter.

- h. Reference item concerning crossover drive for the MD-28 armament subsystem on the AH-1G helicopter, page 45, paragraph 2, (8): Concur. The pin referred to has been replaced by shear pin, aluminum, part number 717158-5. This information is forthcoming in a change to T.O. 0-100-0-307-75. The information and requisitioning instructions appeared in the 34th General Support Group Newsletter for September 1968.

- i. Reference item concerning premature failures of hydraulic servos on UH-1 and AH-1G helicopters, page 45, paragraph 2, (9): Concur. The manufacturer is investigating the cause of these premature failures.

- j. Reference item concerning failure of "O" ring of the hydraulic valve on the UH-1 helicopter, page 46, paragraph 2, (12): Nonconcur. This procedure is outlined in TM 55-409, dated August 1965, page 24, paragraph 22.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W.C. ARMZ
CPT AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ II FFV
HQ 25th Inf Div
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 25th Inf Div for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558     15 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2e: This headquarters is querying ATAC by separate action to determine status of MNO action.

3. The 1st Indorsement to this correspondence has been inadvertently detached and will be forwarded when possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Ass't AG

7 Incl
nc
Cy furn: CG USARV
**Report Title**
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 25th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 1968**

**CG, 25th Infantry Division**

**Report Date**
1 Aug 1968

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**Sponsoring Military Activity**
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract**

51
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

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ITEM 5

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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

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